P=BPP unless E has sub-exponential circuits: Derandomizing the XOR Lemma

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Abstract

Yao showed that the XOR of independent random instances of a somewhat hard Boolean problem becomes almost completely unpredictable. In this paper we show that, in non-uniform settings, total independence is not necessary for this result to hold. We give a pseudo-random generator which produces n instances of a problem for which the analog of the XOR lemma holds. Combining this generator with the results of [25, 6] gives substantially improved results for hardness vs randomness trade-offs. In particular, we show that if any problem in $E = DTIME(2^{O(n)})$ has circuit complexity $2^{\Omega(n)}$, then $P = BPP$. Our generator is a combination of two known ones - the random walks on expander graphs of [1, 10, 19] and the nearly disjoint subsets generator of [23, 25]. The quality of the generator is proved via a new proof of the XOR lemma which may be useful for other direct product results.

1 Introduction

This paper addresses the relationship between three central questions in complexity theory. First, to what extent can a problem be easier to solve for probabilistic algorithms than for deterministic ones? Secondly, what properties should a pseudo-random generator have so that its outputs are "random enough" for the purpose of simulating a randomized algorithm? Thirdly, if solving one instance of a problem is computationally difficult, is solving several instances of the problem proportionately harder?

Yao's seminal paper ([30]) was the first to show that these questions are related. Building on work by Blum and Micali ([8]) he showed how to construct, from any cryptographically secure one-way permutation, a pseudo-random generator whose outputs are indistinguishable from truly random strings to any reasonably fast computational method. He then showed that such a psuedo-random generator could be used to deterministically simulate any probabilistic algorithm with sub-exponential overhead.

Blum, Micali, and Yao thus showed the central connection between "hardness" (the computational difficulty of a problem) and "randomness" (the utility of the problem as the basis for a pseudo-random generator to de-randomize probabilistic computation).

A different approach for using hardness as randomness was introduced by Nisan and Wigderson [25]. They achieve deterministic simulation of randomness making a weaker complexity assumption: instead of being the inverse of a function in P, the "hard" function could be any in EXP, deterministic exponential time. Their

result was used in [6] to show that if any function in EXP requires circuit size $2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$, then $BPP \subseteq DTIME(2^{(\log n)^{O(1)}})$. In words, under the natural hardness assumption above, randomness is not exponentially useful in speeding computation, in that it can always be simulated deterministically with quasi-polynomial slow-down.

The main consequence of our work is a significantly improved trade-off: if some function in $E = DTIME(2^{O(n)})$ has worst-case circuit complexity $2^{\Omega(n)}$, then $BPP = P$. In other words, randomness *never* speeds computation by more than a polynomial amount unless non-uniformity *always* helps computation more than polynomially (for infinitely many input sizes) for problems with exponential time complexity. This adds to a number of results which show that $P = BPP$ follows either from a "hardness" result or an "easiness" result. On the one hand, there is a sequence of "hardness" assumptions implying $P = BPP$ ([25], [4],[5]; this last, in work done independently from this paper, draws the somewhat weaker conclusion that $P = BPP$ follows from the existence of a function in E with circuit complexity $\Omega(2^n/n)$.) On the other hand, $P = BPP$ follows from the "easiness" premise $P = NP$[29], or even the weaker statement $E = EH$ [6] (where EH is the alternating hierarchy above E).

We feel that from these results, the evidence favors using as a working hypothesis that $P = BPP$. However, it has not even been proved unconditionally that $BPP \neq NE$! This is a sad state of affairs, and one we hope will be rectified soon. One way our result could help do so is if there were some way of "certifying" random Boolean functions as having circuit complexity $2^{\Omega(n)}$. (See [28] for some discussion of this possibility.)

The source of our improvement is in the amplification of the hardness of a function. The idea of such an amplification was introduced in [30], and was used in [25]. One needs to convert a mildly hard function into one that is nearly unpredictable to circuits of a given size. The tool for such amplification was provided in Yao's paper, and became known as Yao's XOR-Lemma. The XOR Lemma can be paraphrased as follows: Fix a non-uniform model of computation (with certain closure properties)

and a boolean function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$. Assume that any algorithm in the model of a certain complexity has a significant probability of failure when predicting f on a randomly chosen instance x. Then any algorithm (of a slightly smaller complexity) that tries to guess the XOR $f(x_1) \oplus f(x_2) \oplus \cdots \oplus f(x_k)$ of k random instances $x_1, \cdots, x_k$ won't do significantly better than a random coin toss.

The main hurdle to improving the previous trade-offs is the k-fold increase of input size from the mildly hard function to the unpredictable one, resulting from the independence of the k instances. In this paper, we show that true independence of the instances is not necessary for a version of the XOR Lemma to hold. Our main technical contribution is a way to pick k (pseudo-random) instances $x_1, \cdots, x_k$ of a somewhat hard problem, using many fewer than kn random bits, but for which the XOR of the bits $f(x_i)$ is still almost as hard to predict as if the instances were independent. Indeed, for the parameters required by the aforementioned application, we use only $O(n)$ random bits to decrease the prediction to exponentially small amount. Combining this with previous techniques yileds the trade-off above.

This task falls under the category of "derandomizations", and thus we were able to draw on the large body of techniques that have been developed for this purpose. Derandomization results eliminate or reduce reliance on randomness in an algorithm or construction. The general recipie requires a careful study of the use of independence in the probabilistic solution, isolating the properties of random steps that are acutally used in the analysis. This often allows substitution of the randomness by a pseudorandom distribution with the same properties.

Often, derandomization requires a new analysis of the probabilistic argument that can be interesting in its own right. The problem of derandomizing the XOR lemma has led to two new proofs of this lemma, which are interesting in their own right. In [16], a proof of the XOR lemma via hard-core input distributions was used to show that pairwise independent samples achieve some nontrivial amplification (a result we use here). We give yet another proof of the XOR lemma, based on an analysis of a simple "card guessing" game. A careful

dissection of this proof reveals two requirements of the "random inputs". Both requirements are standard in the derandomization literature, for which optimal solutions are known. One solution is the expander-walk generator of [1, 10, 19] (used for deterministic amplification) and the other is the nearly disjoint subset generator of [23] (used for fooling constant depth circuits, as well as in [25]). Our generator is simply the XOR of these two generators. Our new proof of the XOR lemma has already found another application: showing a parallel repetition theorem for three move identification protocols [7].

We conclude this section by putting our construction in a different context. Yao's XOR-Lemma is a prototypical example of a "direct product" theorem, a concrete sense in which several independent instances of a problem are harder than one. Direct product results exist (and are useful) for a variety of models besides circuits; Boolean decision trees [24], one-way communication complexity [17], 2-prover games [27] and recently also communication complexity [26]. Our result is the first derandomization of a direct product theorem. Such derandomization for other models is of interest whenever the input size blow-up has negative consequences. Indeed, a derandomization of the direct product theorem for 2-prover games (the Parallel Repetition Theorem of [27]) would have yielded better results concerning the impossibility of approximation, but Feige and Kilian [?] proved that such derandomization is impossible. For which other models can direct product results be derandomized, and for which can they not?

2   Definitions and History

In this section, we give the background needed for the paper. For simplicity, we present the results for the non-uniform Boolean circuit model of computation. Some analogs of both the historical results quoted and the new results in this paper hold for other models as well.

2.1   Distibutional hardness of functions

In this sub-section, we give the standard definitions of quantitative difficulty of a function for a certain distribution of inputs. The notion

of hardness for a function with a small range, with the extreme case being a Boolean function, is slightly more complicated than that for general functions, since one can guess the correct value with a reasonable probability. However, the Goldreich-Levin Theorem ([11]) gives a way to convert hardness for general functions to hardness for Boolean functions.

Definition 1 *Let m and ℓ be positive integers. Let $f : \{0, 1\}^m \to \{0, 1\}^\ell$. $S(f)$, the worst-case circuit complexity of f, is the minimum number of gates for a circuit C with $C(x) = f(x)$ for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$.*

Let π an arbitrary distribution on $\{0, 1\}^m$, and s be an integer. Define the success *$SUC_s^\pi(f)$ to be the maximum, over all Boolean circuits C of size at most s of $Pr_\pi[C(x) = f(x)]$. Note that if f can be exactly computed in size s (i.e., $S(f) \le s$), then $SUC_s^\pi(f) = 1$ for any distribution.*

For the (important) case $\ell = 1$ we define the advantage *$ADV_s^\pi(f) = 2SUC_s^\pi(f) - 1$. In both notations we replace the superscript π by A if π is the uniform distribution on a subset $A \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$. When π is uniform on $\{0, 1\}^m$ we eliminate the superscript altogether.*

The *hard-core predicate* result of Goldreich and Levin [11] allows a hardness result for a function with a linear-size output to be converted to a hardness result for a Boolean function.

Definition 2 *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^m \to \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Define $f^{GL} : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \to \{0, 1\}$ by $f^{GL}(x, y) = < f(x), y >$, where $< \cdot, \cdot >$ denotes the inner product in $GF(2)$. For a distribution π on $\{0, 1\}^m$ define π^{GL} on $\{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be π on the first coordinate and uniform on the second, independently. The function f^{GL} is called the* Goldreich-Levin predicate *for f.*

It is easy to see that $ADV_{s+O(m)}^{\pi^{GL}}(f^{GL}) \ge SUC_s^\pi(f)$. (Use the inner product of your guess for f and y as the guess for the inner product bit. If your guess for f is correct, so is this guess. If not, the guessed bit is correct with probability $1/2$.) The Goldreich-Levin hard core predicate theorem is a strong converse of this inequality. The following paraphrases the main result of [11] in our notation:

Theorem 1 *[11] There are functions $s' = \epsilon^{O(1)}s$, $\delta = \epsilon^{O(1)}$ so that: for every function f and distribution π, if $SUC_s^\pi(f) \le \delta$, then $ADV_{s'}^{\pi^{GL}}(f^{GL}) \le \epsilon$.*

Note that if $\epsilon = 1 - \gamma$, where $\gamma = o(1)$, then $\delta = (1 - \gamma)^{O(1)} = 1 - O(\gamma)$. So between functions and predicates that are only weakly unpredictable the above relationship gives quite tight bounds.

2.2 Hardness versus Randomness

For this section only, we use f, g, h to denote a Boolean function on strings of all lengths, and by f_n, g_n, h_n their segments on n-bit strings. Also, let $E = DTIME(2^{O(n)})$.

The hardness versus randomness trade-off we prove is stated formally below.

Theorem 2 *If there is a Boolean function $f \in E$ with $S(f_n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, then $BPP = P$.*

Fortunately, much of the way towards this theorem was made already, and this subsection details this progress, focusing on what remains to be done.

Nisan and Wigderson [25] showed how to simulate randomized algorithms efficiently using any problem in exponential-time that is sufficiently difficult for non-uniform circuits. Their result provides a wide trade-off, but we will need only the following version.

Theorem 3 *[25] If there is a Boolean function $f \in E$ with $ADV_{s(n)}(f_n) = 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ for some $s(n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, then $P = BPP$.*

So we need a function with expoenential unpredictability. In [6], random self-reducibility of EXP-complete functions was used, to "get started", namely generate a function with very mild unpredictability, from a function hard in the worst case. The premise in Theorem 2 regards E, so we what state below is a (somewhat tighter) variant of their results for this class. It can be proved with the same (by now standard) techniques, which we defer to the final paper. (The improvement is that our trasformation increases the input size by only a constant factor.)

Theorem 4 *If there is a Boolean function $f \in E$ with $S(f) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, then there is a function*

$h \in E$ with $SUC_{s(n)}(h_{cn}) \le 1 - n^{-2}$ for some constant c and some $s(n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$.

Yao's XOR lemma could then be used to amplify this mild hardness to the unpredictability level required in Theorem 2, by taking $k = O(n^3)$ independent inputs to h. However, this increases input size by a polynomial amount, which means that the simulation will still only be quasi-polynomial. Our main contribution will be achieving the same amplification with only a linear increase in size. Our starting point is made a bit better by the following partial amplification of [16] (proved via Theorem 8).

Theorem 5 *[16] If $h \in E$ has $SUC_{2^{\Omega(n)}}(h_n) \le 1 - n^{-2}$, then there is a $g \in E$ with $SUC_{2^{\Omega(n)}}(g_{2n}) \le 2/3$.*

To summarize, what remains is to, given a function with constant hardness against exponentially large circuits, "amplify" this hardness to constant another function with an exponentially small advantage against exponentially large circuits. This must be done without blowing up the input size by more than a constant factor. This is our main technical contribution, stated formally in Theorem 9.

2.3 Direct Product Lemmas

In order to achieve the task stated at the end of the previous section we first state the classical Yao's XOR Lemma, which accomplishes the amplification of hardness, but at the expense of increasing input size. We show its relation to other direct product lemmas, and give a definition of "de-randomized" direct product lemma. We discuss known pseudo-random direct product lemmas, and state our amplification result, which is proved in the remaining sections.

Let $g : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ and assume that $SUC_s(g) \le 1 - \delta$. In an information theoretic analog, we could think of the value of g on a random input as being completely predictable with probability $1 - 2\delta$ and as being a random coin flip othehwise. Then the advantage of guessing the exclusive or of k independent copies of g would be $(1 - 2\delta)^k$, since if it were ever a random coin flip, we would be unable to get any advantage in predicting the XOR.

The XOR lemma is a computational manifestation of this intuition. Define

$g^{\oplus(k)} : (\{0,1\}^n)^k \to \{0,1\}$ by
$g(x_1, \cdots, x_k) = g(x_1) \oplus \cdots \oplus g(x_k)$.

Theorem 6 *[30],[20]. There are functions k, s' of n, s, ϵ, δ with $k = O(-\log \epsilon/\delta)$, $s' = s(\epsilon\delta)^{O(1)}$ and so that, for any $g : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ with $SUC_s(g) \le 1 - \delta$, we have: $ADV_{s'}(g^{\oplus(k)}) \le \epsilon$.*

Theorem 1 reduces the XOR lemma to the following "direct product" theorem, which requires the circuit to output *all* values of $g(x_i)$, rather than their exclusive-or.

Define $g^{(k)} : (\{0,1\}^n)^k \to \{0,1\}^k$ by
$g^{(k)}(x_1, \cdots, x_k) = (g(x_1), \cdots, g(x_k))$. Then

Theorem 7 *There are (functions of ϵ, δ, s) $k = O(-\log \epsilon/\delta)$, $s' = (\epsilon\delta)^{O(1)} s$ so that for any $g : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ with $SUC_s(g) \le 1 - \delta$, we have: $SUC_{s'}(g^{(k)}) \le \epsilon$,*

Note that the Goldreich-Levin predicate for $g^{(k)}$ is basically $g^{\oplus k/2}$, (The number of inputs is not fixed at $k/2$ but a binomial distribution with expectation $k/2$; however, if we restrict r in the Goldreich-Levin predicate to have exactly $k/2$ 1's, the bound on the advantage is almost the same.) Thus, combining Theorem 7 with Theorem 1 yields Theorem 6. We'll use this approach in the rest of the paper: first show that computing f on many inputs is hard and then invoke Theorem 1 to make the hard function Boolean.

In the next section, we give a new proof of Theorem 7, which generalizes to distributions on $\vec{x}$ which are not uniform and hence can be sampled from using fewer than nk random bits. This allows us to give some conditions which suffice for such a pseudo-random distribution to have direct product properties similar to the uniform distribution. We give a construction of such a pseudo-random generator which uses only a linear number of bits to sample n n-bit inputs. We formalize the notion of a direct product result holding with respect to a pseudo-random generator as follows:

Definition 3 *Let G be a function from $\{0,1\}^m$ to $(\{0,1\}^n)^k$. G is an $(s, s', \epsilon, \delta)$ direct product generator, if for every boolean function g with $SUC_s(g) \le 1 - \delta$, we have:*

$$SUC_{s'}(g^k \circ G) \le \epsilon$$

(Here, the distribution is over uniformly chosen inputs to G.)

Let $s, s', \epsilon, m, \delta$ and k be fixed functions of n, and let G_n be a polynomial-time computable function from $\{0,1\}^m$ to $(\{0,1\}^n)^k$. The family of functions G is called a $(s, s', \epsilon, \delta)$ direct product generator if each G_n is a $(s(n), s'(n), \epsilon(n), \delta(n))$ direct product generator.

In this notation, [16] proved the following, which implies Theorem 5.

Theorem 8 *[16] There is a function G from $\{0,1\}^{2n}$ to $(\{0,1\}^n)^n$ which, for any $s = s(n)$, $c \ge 1$, is a $(s, sn^{-O(1)}, O(n^{-(c-1)}), n^{-c})$ direct product generator.*

The main technical contribution of this paper is the following:

Theorem 9 *For any $0 < \gamma < 1$, there is a $0 < \gamma' < 1$ and a $c > 0$ so that there is a polynomial time $G : \{0,1\}^{cn} \to (\{0,1\}^n)^n$ which is a $(2^{\gamma n}, 2^{\gamma' n}, 2^{-\gamma' n}, 1/3)$ direct product generator.*

The proof of this theorem is in Sections 3 and 4. As explained above, it establishes our hardness versus randomness trade-off Theorem 2. The proof will actually give the more general construction, with the above being a special case.

Theorem 10 *For any s, ϵ, δ there is a polynomial time $G : \{0,1\}^m \to (\{0,1\}^n)^k$, which is an $(s, s', \epsilon, \delta)$-generator with $k = O(-(\log \epsilon)/\delta)$, $s' = \sqrt{s}(\epsilon\delta/n)^{O(1)}$ and $m = O(Min\{n \log \epsilon^{-1}, n^2/\log s\})$.*

Despite the tightness of our generator for the parameters of interest, the above leaves a gap to close. We conjecture that the bounds above can be achieved for all s, ϵ, δ with $m = O(n)$.

3 The Card Guessing Game: A new proof of the direct product lemma

3.1 The Card Game

The Casino XOR offers the following game. After the player antes, the dealer places a sequence of k cards, each labelled either 0 or 1, on the table facing down. The cards are chosen by the casino, with the only restriction being

that (by law) they must all be 1 with probability p. One card is chosen at random, and the dealer turns over all cards except that one. The player then chooses whether or not to wager that the remaining card is a 1. If the player wagers, and the card is a 1, the player recieves $1, if the player wagers and the card is a 0, then the player loses $1. What is the value of this game?

The correspondence with the direct product lemma is, intuitively, as follows. Let g be a boolean function. We want to use an algorithm A advertised as having a probability p of computing $g^k(x_1, ..x_k)$ to get an algorithm A' that predicts g on a single x. We know that A gets all k answers correct with probability p. But when A does not get the answers all correct, then the answers it gives might be anything, so we assume they are picked adversarily (by the "casino"). Define the value of the i'th "card" to be 1 when A computes $g(x_i)$ correctly and 0 otherwise. Thus, we know all are 1 with probability p. The player "picks" a card i by setting $x_i = x$, and "turns over" the other cards by having the values $g(x_j)$ as "advice". [1] A' will then incorporate our strategy for the card game to get a strategy for either believing or disbelieving the prediction of $g(x) = g(x_i)$ given by A, i.e., wagering or holding.

We will give an almost optimal strategy for the card guessing game, and then formalize the above intuitive correspondence. Observe that if the dealer, when not making all cards 1's, fixes the values as independent coin tosses, the player can expect to win at most p. (Actually, since the above distribution also accidentally sets all cards to 1 with probability 2^k, this is really roughly $p - 2^{-k}$.) We will show a player strategy that almost achieves this, getting an expected pay-off of $p - 2^{-k/3}$.

Let $\bar{a} = (a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_k) \in \{0,1\}^k$ denote the random sequence chosen by the casino, and let $I \in_R [k]$ be the picked card. Consider the following strategy S: Let t be the number of cards you see marked 0, i.e., the number of $j \neq I$ with $a_j = 0$. Then S accepts the wager with probability 2^{-t}.

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[1] This assumes we are in a non-uniform model of computation. The direct product lemma also holds in uniform cryptographic settings. Here, "turns over" would mean choosing x_j in a way so that $g(x_j)$ can be computed simultaneously.

Theorem 11 *For any distribution on $\bar{a}$ which is equal to 1^k with probability at least p, S has an accepted pay-off of at least $p - 2^{-k/3}$.*

Proof.
Let $\bar{a}$ be a fixed sequence of cards. Clearly, if $\bar{a} = 1^k$, then S always accepts and always wins. We'll show that, for any other sequence $\bar{a}$, the conditional expected payoff for S is at least $-2^{k/3}$.

Let T denote the number of coordinates i in which $a_i = 0$. Then with probability T/k, $a_I = 0$, and the obseved number of 0's is $t = T - 1$. In this case, S accepts and loses with probability $2^{-t} = 22^{-T}$. On the other hand, with probability $1 - T/k$, $a_I = 1$ and the observed number of 0's is $t = T$. Thus, the overall expectation is $2^{-T}((1 - T/k) - 2T/k) = 2^{-T}(1 - 3T/k)$. If $T \leq k/3$, this is non-negative. If $T > k/3$, it is at least $-2^{-k/3}$.

Thus, S overall has an expectation 1 with at least probability p and at least $-2^{k/3}$ the rest of the time, for an overall advantage of at least $p - 2^{-k/3}$.

∎ [2]

We shall actually need a small variant of the above game. We showed that, if A has a certain probability p of guessing all k values of g, then A' gets almost the same advantage on a random input. However, this is not enough to contradict our assumption that (intuitively) g has a constant-size "hard" fraction of inputs. What we need to show is that A' gets the *same small advantage* on inputs from the supposed "hard" set. To do this, we'll just use the fact that many instances must come from this hard set.

This motivates the variant card guessing game. In the variant game, the casino picks, in addition to $\bar{a}$, a subset K cards (which can depend on $\bar{a}$). (Intuitively, K represents the "hard" instances of the problem.)

The casino does not reveal K to the player, but the card selected is a uniformly chosen element $I \in K$. The player still gets to see the

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[2] The optimal strategy seems to be the one that accepts with probablity $1/\binom{k-1}{t}$ if $t \leq (k-1)/2$ and reject otherwise. By a similar argument, this strategy obtains an expectation $p - 1/\binom{k-1}{(k-1)/2} = p - O(k^{1/2}/2^k)$. However, the calculation does not easily generalize to the situation in Theorem 12.

values of all cards (including those not in K) except a_I before deciding whether to wager on a_I.

The player can still use the strategy S described above, and a similar calculation shows:

Theorem 12 *For any distribution on $\bar{a}$ and K so that $\bar{a} = 1^k$ with probability at least p , and $|K| < k'$ with probability at most q, S has expected payoff at least $p - q - 2^{-k'/3}$. when I is a uniform element from K.*

3.2 (Yet Another) Proof of the XOR Lemma

Three completely different proofs of the XOR lemma are known [20, 16, 12], with the last reference containing a survey of all three. We are now ready for our new proof, after which we discuss its benefits for the purpose of derandomization.

Proof. (of Theorem 7) Let $q(k, \delta)$ be the probability that if k independent coins are tossed each with probability δ of heads, fewer than $\delta k/2$ heads are tossed. Then there is a constant $0 < c < 1/6$ so that $q(k, \delta) \leq 2^{-c\delta k}$. Pick $k = \frac{(-\log \epsilon + 3)}{c\delta} = O(-\frac{\log \epsilon}{\delta})$. Then $q(k, \delta) \leq \epsilon/8$, and, since $c < 1/6$, $2^{-k\delta/6} \leq \epsilon/8$. We'll show the contrapositive of the statement in Theorem 7: If $SUC_{s'}(g^{(k)}) \geq \epsilon$, then $SUC_s(g) \geq 1 - \delta$ for some $s = s' n^{O(1)} (\epsilon^{-O(1)})$

The plan of proving this staement is as follows. Assume $SUC_{s'}(g^{(k)}) \geq \epsilon$, and let C be a circuit achieving this success probability. We shall use it to construct a distribution on circuits F of approximately the same size, for which $Exp_F[ADV_F^H(g)] > \epsilon/2 - 2^{-\Omega(\delta k)}$ for *any* subset H of inputs with $|H| \geq \delta 2^n$.

The above will imply that taking $t = O(n/\epsilon^2)$ samples $F_1, ...F_t$ from this distribution, $Maj(F_1, ..F_t)$ (the Boolean majority function of the samples) is likely to predict f correctly on all but an at most δ fraction of inputs. Thus for some fixed choice of the samples we get a circuit which violates the hardness assumption.

The distribution on F will merely implement the strategy S of the previous section against the casino playing $\bar{a} = 1^k \oplus C(\bar{x}) \oplus g^{(k)}(\bar{x})$. We are now ready to formally present construction.

Consider the following distribution on probabilistic circuits with one n-bit input x. $I \in [k]$ is chosen uniformly at random, and for each

$J \neq I$, x_J is chosen uniformly. F sets $x_I = x$ and simulates $C(\bar{x})$. F then computes t, the number of $J \neq I$ where the J'th output of $C(\bar{x})$ differs from $g(x_J)$. [3] F outputs the I'th output of $C(\bar{x})$ with probability 2^{-t} and otherwise outputs 0 or 1 with equal probability.

Lemma 13 *Let $H \subseteq \{0,1\}^n, |H| \geq \delta 2^n$. Let $q = q(\delta, k)$. Then $Exp_F[ADV_F^H(g)] > \epsilon/2 - q - 2^{-\delta k/6} \geq \epsilon/16$.*

Proof. Without loss of generality, assume $|H| = \delta 2^n$. (If not, apply the result to a random $H' \subseteq H$ of the above size.) Consider the distribution D' on $x_1, ...x_k$ chosen by F given that $x \in H$. Any sequence $x_1, ..x_k$ with s elements from H has s values of I for which it can be chosen by F. Thus, the probabilities of such vectors are proportional to s, and since the average value of s is δk, the exact probability of the sequence in D' is $s/(\delta k)$ times the probability in the uniform distribution.

Now, there are at least a $\epsilon - q$ fraction of such tuples so that both $s \geq \delta k/2$ and $C(\bar{x}) = g^k(\bar{x})$. For each such sequence, the probability that it is chosen by F given $x \in H$ is at least $1/2$ the probability that it is chosen under the uniform distribution. Therefore, the probability that F simulates C on such a tuple is at least $(\epsilon - q)/2$. Note that given that F simulates C on $\bar{x}$, I is uniformly distributed among the indices i with $x_i \in H$.

Consider the following casino strategy for the variant card-guessing game. Let $k' = \delta k/2$. $I, x_1, ..x_k$ are chosen as F does. The casino sets $a_i = 1$ if and only if the i'th bit of $C(\bar{x})$ is $g(x_i)$. The casino defines K to be the set of indices i with $x_i \in H$. From the above discussion, the casino sets all $a_i = 1$ with probability at least $(\epsilon - q)/2$, and I is uniformly distributed in K. Furthermore, the probability that $|K| < k'$ is at most $q/2$, since at most a fraction q of sequences have fewer than k' elements in H, and each such has at most $1/2$ the probability in D' that it would have in the uniform distribution.

Thus, the expected payoff if the player uses the strategy S, from Theorem 12, is at least $(\epsilon -$

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[3]Here, we are interested in non-uniform complexity so $g(x_J)$ is given as advice; we could also modify the argument for the uniform cryptographic setting since there $x_J = f(y_J)$ and $g(x_J) = b(y_J)$ can be generated together from a common random input y_J.

$q)/2 - q/2 - 2^{k'/3} = \epsilon/2 - q - 2^{k'/3}$. This payoff is equal to the expected advantage for $F(x) = Prob[F(x) = g(x)] - Prob[F(x) \neq g(x)]$, since F outputs the correct value when S accepts the wager and wins, the wrong value when S accepts and loses, and a random value when S refuses the wager. ∎

Let $H = \{x | Prob_F(F(x) = g(x)) < 1/2 + \epsilon/32\}$. Since the expected success probability of F on H is the average of the probabilities used to define H, $Exp(Adv_F^H(g)) < \epsilon/16$. Thus, from Lemma 13, $|H| \leq \delta 2^n$. By Chenoff's bound, for t as mentioned earlier, if $F_1, ..F_t$ are chosen independently, $Maj(F_1, ...F_t)(x) = g(x)$ for all $x \notin H$ with probability $> 1 - 2^{-n}$. Thus, there are $F_1, ..F_t$ so that $Maj(F_1, ..F_t)$ achieves success probability $1 - \delta$. This function will have circuit size $O(ts') = s'n^{O(1)}\epsilon^{-O(1)}$ as claimed. ∎

4 Direct product lemmas for pseudo-random distributions

In this section, we present some general conditions on a pseudo-random distribution on $x_1, ..x_k$ so that the proof of the direct product theorem from the last section goes through basically unchanged.

Note that the argument from the last section basically used the independence of the x_i in two ways;

- For any $H \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$, $|H| \geq \delta 2^n$, with high probability, the number of $x_i \in H$ is at least some $k' = \Omega(k)$.

- It is possible (and computationally feasible) to fix the values of all the $x_J, J \neq I$ while leaving x_I free to be any value.

Of course the last condition really does force true independence. However, if instead of x_J being *completely fixed*, x_J could be restricted to a *relatively small set of possibilities*, we could still store $g(x_J)$ for each possible x_J. This motivates the following definition:

Definition 4 *Let $G_n : \{0, 1\}^m \to (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ be a polynomial time computable pseudo-random generator. We say G is M-restrictable if there is a polynomial-time computable function $h(i, x, \alpha)$, $h :$*

$[n] \times \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \to \{0, 1\}^m$, *with the following properties. For any inputs i, x, α, let $G(h(i, x, \alpha)) = x_1, ..x_k$.*

- *For any fixed i and uniformly chosen x, α, the random variable $h(i, x, \alpha)$ is uniformly distributed in $\{0, 1\}^m$.*

- *For any fixed i, x, α, we have $x_i = x$.*

- *For any fixed $i, j \neq i$, and α, there is a set $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$, $|S| \leq M$, so that for any value of x, $x_j \in S$.*

We also need to quantify the first, statistical use of independence:

Definition 5 *We say that a pseudo-random generator G producing a distribution $x_1, ..x_k$ on $(\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is (k', q, δ)-hitting if for any sets*

$$H_1, ..H_k \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n, |H_i| \geq \delta 2^n$$

we have $Prob[|\{i \, | \, x_i \in H_i\}| < k'] \leq q$.

One nice feature of the above definitions is that, if we can find two pseudo-random generators that satisfy them separately, we can merely take the bitwise XOR of the two to get a single restrictable, hitting distribution. This is formalized as follows:

Definition 6 *Let $x \oplus y$ denote the bit-wise xor of the two strings. Let $G(r), G'(s)$ be pseudo-random generators with outputs in $(\{0, 1\}^n)^k$, $G(r) = x_1, ..x_k$ and $G'(s) = y_1, ..y_k$. Then define the pseudo-random generator $G \oplus G'$ by $(G \oplus G')(r, s) = x_1 \oplus y_1, ..., x_k \oplus y_k$.*

Lemma 14 *Let $G(r), G'(s)$ be polynomial-time pseudo-random generators with outputs in $(\{0, 1\}^n)^k$.*

- *If G is (k', q, δ)-hitting then $G \oplus G'$ is (k', q, δ)-hitting.*

- *If G' is M-restrictable then $G \oplus G'$ is M-restrictable.*

Proof.

- Let $H_1, ..H_k \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n, |H_i| \geq \delta 2^n$ be given, and fix $y_1, ..y_k$. Let $H'_i = H_i \oplus y_i$; clearly, $|H'_i| = |H_i|$. Then $x_i \oplus y_i \in H_i \Longleftrightarrow x_i \in H'_i$, so applying the hitting condition for G to $H'_1, , ..H'_k$ gives us a bound on the hitting probability of $G \oplus G'$.

- Let h be the restricting function for G. Let $G(s) = y_1, ..y_k$. Then let $h'(i, x, \alpha \circ s) = (h(i, x \oplus y_i, \alpha), s)$. It is easy to check that h' is a restricting function for $G \oplus G'$.

■

We now show that these conditions are sufficient for a direct product theorem to hold for a generator:

Theorem 15 *Let s be a positive integer and let $G(r) : \{0, 1\}^m \to (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ be a $(\rho k, q, \delta)$-hitting, M-restrictable pseudo-random generator, where $q > 2^{-\rho k/3}$ and $s > 2Mnk$. Then G is a*
$$(s, \Omega(sq^2(n^{-O(1)})), O(q), \delta)$$
-direct product generator.

Proof.

Let $\epsilon = (4(\delta/\rho)+1)q$, We give a probabilistic construction which takes a circuit C that has success probability ϵ for $g^{(k)} \circ G$ and outputs a circuit F of size $O(|C| + kMn)$ whose expected advantage on any $H, |H| \geq \delta 2^n$ is at least q. We then take the majority of $O(n/q^2)$ such circuits.

The construction is based on the strategy for the variant card guessing game, and is similar to the previous section. We pick I from $1, ..k$ uniformly at random, and select α_0 at random. Let $x_1, ..x_k = G(h(I, x, \alpha_0))$, For each $j \neq I$, we construct (non-uniformly) a table of $g(x_j)$ for any x_j that is a possible output of $h(I, x, \alpha_0)$ (as we vary over x). There are at most M such values. Our circuit F, on input x simulates C on $G(h(I, x, \alpha_0))$. It then (via the tables) computes t, the number of indices $j \neq I$ where the j'th output of C differs from $g(x_j)$. F outputs the i'th output of C with probability 2^{-t}, and otherwise outputs a randomly chosen bit.

Lemma 16 *Let*
$$H \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n, |H| \geq \delta 2^n.$$
Then $Exp(Adv_F^H(g)) \geq q$

Proof. Let D be the distribution on $G(r)$ for a random r, and let D' be the conditional distribution given that $x_I \in H$ for a random I. For a fixed such sequence, let u be the number of $x_i \in H$. As before, the probability of the sequence in D' is $u/(\delta k)$ times its probability in

D. The probability in D that $u \geq \rho k$ and that $C(r) = g^k(G(r))$ is at least $\epsilon - q = 4\delta/\rho q$ from the hitting property of G and the success probability of C . Thus, the corresponding probability in D' that $u \geq \rho k$ and C succeeds , is at least $(\epsilon - q)\rho/\delta = 4q$, since for each such sequence, its probability in D' is at least ρ/δ of its probability in D. Also, $r = h(I, x, \alpha_0)$ is independent of I so given r (and hence $x_1, ..x_k$), I is a uniformly distributed index so that $x_I \in H$.

As before, the expected advantage of F on $x \in H$ is the same as the expected payoff of S on the variant game when the casino sets $a_j = 1$ iff the j'th output of C is $g(x_i)$, and picks K to be the set of positions i with $x_i \in H$. From the above, the probability p that all the a_i are 1 is at least $4q$. The probability that $|K| \leq k' = \rho k$ is at most q. So by Theorem 12, the expected advantage of F is at least $4q - q - 2^{-\rho k/3} \geq 3q - 2^{\rho k/3} \geq q$. ■

Thus, there is at most a δ fraction of x where F has expected probability $< 1/2 + q/2$, and taking the majority of $O(n/q^2)$ circuits F gives a circuit that predicts $g(x)$ on all x not in this fraction. Each F has size approximately $O(|C| + kM)$, so the combined circuit has size $O((|C| + kMn)n/q^2)$. Thus, if $|C| \leq s'$, there is a circuit of size $\leq s$ that has success probability at least $1 - \delta$, a contradiction. ■

5 Examples of hitting and restrictable generators

In this last section, we reduced the question of constructing a direct product generator to that of (separately) constructing hitting and restrictable generators. Here, we present a well-known example of each type, and combine them. This completes the proofs of Theorem 9 and Theorem 10.

5.1 Expander Walks: a hitting generator

The generator in this section originates from [1], who used it to derandomize probabilistic space-bounded machines. Its use in deterministic amplification was established in [10, 19].

Definition 7 *Fix an explicit expander graph G on vertex set $\{0, 1\}^n$, of constant degree (say 16) and small second eigenvalue (say < 8) [22]. Let the generator $EW : \{0, 1\}^n \times [16]^{k-1} \to$*

$(\{0,1\}^n)^k$ be defined by $EW(v; \bar{d}) = (v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_k)$ where $v_1 = v$ and v_{i+1} is the d_ith neighbour of v_i in G.

Note that this generator uses a seed of length $m = n + O(k)$. The amplification property of this generator, formalized below, asserts that with exponentially high probability, many of these k pseudo random points will satisfy arbitrary large events.

Theorem 17 [10, 19] For every $k \leq n$, the above generator is $(k/10, 2^{-k/10}, 1/3)$ hitting.

5.2 Nearly Disjoint Subsets: a restrictable generator

The generator of this section was invented in [23] (for derandomizing probabilistic constant-depth circuits), and was used to produce general hardness-randomness trade-offs in [25]. This generator will in general use more than $O(n)$ bits, but for the parameters of interest in Theorem 9 uses only $O(n)$ bits. The number of bits given in Theorem 10 for general circuit size will follow from the seed length here, and any improvement should circumvent this construction. We mention that this is impossible to do by simply building more efficient restrictable generators! [18] use entropy arguments to prove that the bounds below are tight for any construction.

Let M be given, let $\gamma = (\log M)/n$, i.e., $M = 2^{\gamma n}$, and set $m = 2n/\gamma$. In this section, we construct an M-restrictable generator using $O(m)$ bits. Unfortunately, $\Omega(m)$ bits is necessary for such any such generator. Thus, the direct product generator we construct is only interesting when $s > M > 2^{O(\sqrt{(n)})}$; otherwise m is larger than the number of bits in $O(\log s)$ independent instances. However, if we are dealing with exponentially hard functions, $M = 2^{\Omega(n)}$ and so $m = O(n)$.

Definition 8 Let $\Sigma = \{S_1, ...S_k\}$ be a family of subsets of $[m]$ of size n. We say Σ is γ-disjoint if $|S_i \cap S_j| \leq \gamma n$ for each $i \neq j$. Let $r \in \{0, 1\}^m$ and $S = \{s_1 < s_2 < ...s_n\} \subseteq [m]$. Then let the restriction of r to S, $r|_S$, be the n-bit string $r|_S = r_{s_1} r_{s_2} .. r_{s_n}$. Then, for a γ-disjoint Σ, $ND^\Sigma : \{0,1\}^m \times \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^n)^k$ is defined by: $ND^\Sigma(r) = r|_{S_1}, r|_{S_2}, \cdots, r|_{S_k}$.

Lemma 18 There is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that for any $\gamma > 0, n, k = O(n)$ and $m = 2n/\gamma$, produces, with probability $1 - 2^{-\Omega(n)}$, a γ-disjoint family of k subsets of $[m]$ each of size n, and uses $O(m)$ bits.

Proof. Let $p = \binom{m}{n} \leq 2^m$ and encode (efficiently and 1-1) the n-subsets of m by the integers modulo p. Pick n numbers in Z_p so that they are individually uniform and pairwise independent [10],[9] and let the S_i's be the sets encoded by these numbers. The probability that, for two independent sets S and S' of size n, their intersection is more than twice the expected size $m(n/m)^2 = n^2/m = \gamma n/2$ is exponentially small in n. Thus, since the S_i's are pairwise independent, this exponentially small amount times nk bounds the probability that any $|S_i \cap S_j| > \gamma n$ for $i \neq j$.) □ ∎

Lemma 19 If Σ is γ-disjoint, then ND^Σ is $M = 2^{\gamma n}$-restrictable.

Proof. For $i \in [n], x \in \{0,1\}^n, \alpha \in \{0,1\}^{m-n}$, let $h(i, x, \alpha)$ be the string $r \in \{0,1\}^m$ with $r_{S_i} = x$ and $r_{\overline{S_i}} = \alpha$. Fix i, $j \neq i$, and α. Since $|S_j \cap S_i| \leq \gamma n$, and since the output of $ND(h(i, x, \alpha))$ is determined in all bits not in S_i, there are only $2^{\gamma n}$ possible values for x_j, found by varying all bits in $S_j \cap S_i$. ∎

5.3 The Direct Product (and XOR) Generator XG

The generator we use to "fool" the XOR lemma is the simplest combination of the two generators above - we take the componentwise exclusive-or of their outputs. We describe here only the choice of parameters required by Theorem 9.

Definition 9 Let n be a positive integer, and let $1/30 > \gamma > 0$. Let $k = n$ in EW, and let $\gamma' = \gamma/4$, and let $m = 2n/\gamma'$. With the parameters above, we define the XOR generator $XG(r; r'; v; \bar{d})$ as follows: Use r to select Σ, a γ'-disjoint family of subsets of $[m]$. Then $XG[r; r'; v; \bar{d}] = ND^\Sigma(r') \oplus EW(v, \bar{d})$.

We ignore the possibility that Σ is not γ'-disjoint, since this happens only with exponentially small probability.

We can now prove Theorem 9:

Proof. We need to construct a
$(2^{\gamma n}, 2^{\gamma' n}, 2^{-\gamma' n}, 1/3)$-direct product generator
whose input length is $O(n)$. We claim that XG
is the desired generator. First note that $|r| = O(n)$, $|r'| = m = O(n)$, $|v| = n$, and $|\bar{d}| = O(k) = O(n)$. So the input to G is $O(n)$ bits.

By lemma 19 , Theorem 17, and Lemma
14, XG is $M = 2^{\gamma' n}$-restrictible, and is
$(n/10, 2^{-n/10}, 1/3)$-hitting. Then by Theorem
15, XG is a $(s, O((s - Mnk)q^2/n), O(q), 1/3)$-
direct product generator for any $q > 2^{-k/30}$.
In particular, for $s = 2^{\gamma n}$, $q = 2^{-\gamma' n}$, XG is a
$(2^{\gamma n}, 2^{(\gamma/2)n}/n^{O(1)}, O(2^{-\gamma' n}), 1/3)$- direct prod-
uct generator. ■

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