**NEW TITLE**

**Abstract:** How does occupational identity shape emotional experience? Prior work has largely framed occupation and emotion either in terms of how differences in occupational status structure the experience of powerful, negative emotions or explicating how cultural norms enforce types of acceptable emotional expression in workplaces. Complementing and building on this work by using an identity-centered approach informed by Affect Control Theory, this paper asks how being in one occupational identity versus another influences the emotions one is likely to experience in everyday life. I argue that one’s occupational identity generates daily interaction sets with typical others, which create opportunities for identity maintenance and confirmation. Affect Control Theory predicts that when individuals confirm identities within an interaction, they will experience the characteristic emotion of the identity. Using the emotions module from Affect Control Theory, I test and find support for the hypothesis that individuals will report experiencing emotions that are closer in cultural meaning to the characteristic emotion of their occupational identity more often than emotions that are more different in cultural meaning. I additionally explore how this relationship depends on the social location of the individual. Because higher status individuals may be more likely to make an occupational identity salient to their sense of self, have more interactional resources to be effective in maintaining their identity, and have more autonomous control over their work environments, I argue that this relationship is stronger for men, those with higher income, more educational credentials, and older individuals.

**Introduction**

How does one’s occupational identity determine which sorts of emotions an individual experiences in everyday life? Prior work has framed this question largely in terms of the relationships between the status structure and enforcement of emotion norms (Collett and Lizardo 2010; Hochschild 2012; Kemper 1978; Lively and Powell 2006). In general, this work has focused on explaining who is more likely to experience and suppress expression of negative emotions as a consequence of the lower status of an occupation and who has to produce and manage others’ emotions as part of their work (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993; Hochschild 2012; Lively 2002). This study, however, takes a more explicitly identity-centered approach to argue that one’s occupational identity shapes emotional experience by influencing the social interactions within the work environment and the emotional consequences that result from them. I hypothesize that individuals report experiencing emotions that are closer in meaning to their occupational identity’s characteristic emotion more frequently than emotions that are less similar in cultural meaning.

Working adults spend much of their daily lives inside the work environment, embodying their occupational identity to different degrees throughout the interactions that unfold while carrying out tasks (Fine 1996; Phelan and Kinsella 2009). Occupational identities can be clearly stratified based on their material rewards – the income earned, the hours worked, and the education and network ties required to attain them. In addition to these tangible characteristics, occupational identities also differ in cultural meaning: namely, how good the occupation is, how powerful it is, and how active it is (Freeland and Hoey 2018; Heise 2007). These meanings shape the types of interactions one has with other individuals in daily life and structure typical others with whom one is likely to interact. For example, a lawyer’s day is more likely to involve interactions with clients, other lawyers, or judges, which narrows down the possible types of interactions to those that are expected to occur within such an institutional domain. These interactions, when they go well, may engender feelings of contentment or self-respect; if they go poorly, they may evoke frustration or resentment. Identity theorists have long suggested that individuals largely strive to maintain their identities through interactions (Burke and Stets 2009; Heise 2007). Doing so with regard to occupational identity means meeting the societal expectations associated with your job’s meaning.

Notably, the extent to which an occupational identity is maintained throughout daily interactions may not be constant across individuals. First, an occupational identity may not be as salient to one’s sense of self and thus less important to maintain in every interaction. Second, an individual may have less ability to maintain and control the definition of a situation when faced with an inconsistency from an interaction partner, leading to the disconfirmation of their identity. Third, and an extension of the second, occupational identities may have broader sets of possible interaction partners and interactions, which lead to more opportunities for failed interactions. I argue that each of these mechanisms is influenced by the status of an individual, making the relationship between occupational identity and emotional experience stronger for those in higher status social positions.

Using this logic and taking a specifically Affect Control Theory approach, this paper tests the hypothesis that working adults are more likely to report feeling emotions that are close in meaning to the sentiment of their occupational identity’s characteristic emotion. Further, this relationship will be stronger for individuals with higher income, more educational attainment, men, and middle-aged individuals.

### **Background**

### **Affect Control Theory**

Affect Control Theory is a formal theory of social behavior that rests upon the fundamental principle that individuals act in ways to maintain cultural meaning. Drawing from research on how cultural meaning inheres in language and deriving from the symbolic interactionist tradition, Affect Control Theory advances that words not only have cognitive or denotive meaning, but also affective meaning. For instance, while “Mother” specifically means a woman who is the parent of a child, it also has the affective meanings associated with how good we think Mothers[[1]](#footnote-1) are, how powerful Mothers are, and how active Mothers are. These three dimensions of meaning: Evaluation, corresponding to good/bad, Potency to powerful/weak, and Activity to active/inactive, cover much of the variation in affective sentiment. Affect Control Theory researchers have conducted studies in various cultures in which they have individuals rate concepts along those three dimensions, resulting in estimates of the mean Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (EPA, hereafter) of many social identities and behaviors from a scale of -4.3 to 4.3. For instance, the EPA value of Mother in the most recent ACT dictionary is (3.05, 2.66, 0.76), meaning that in the U.S., Mothers are seen as very good, very powerful, and moderately active (Smith-Lovin et al. 2016)[[2]](#footnote-2). These culturally agreed-upon locations within affective space for identities and behaviors are termed fundamental sentiments; they represent the baseline cultural meaning of social terms.

In turn, Affect Control Theory argues that individuals cognitively define situations, in the form of an Actor doing a Behavior to an Object identity, and affectively react to that definition. As a result of situations, the impressions of these elements of the situation shift, due to how well the other aspects of the situation cohere with the cultural sentiment of each other (Heise and Smith-Lovin 1981). The sentiments of elements of a situation after an event have occurred are called the transient impressions of the Actor, Behavior, and Object. The affective control principle of the theory hinges on the difference between transient impressions and the fundamental sentiments for the elements of the situation. The deflection, or the sum of squared differences between the transient and fundamental E, P, and A values of the actor, behavior, and object, is the indicator of cultural (dis)confirmation. Higher deflection scores indicate more movement within the three-dimensional affective space, and as a result, are more culturally unlikely and unexpected (Heise and Mackinnon 1987). As an indication of affective movement, deflection is considered an emotional sense of unsettlement or anxiety about the situation and prompts individuals in a situation to act in such a way as to decrease deflection as much as possible.

### *Emotions in ACT*

Affect Control Theory involves affect both broadly as cultural sentiments, situational impressions of identities and actions, and as specifications of feelings that result as a consequence of events. The latter feelings are considered to be “situationally episodic and ephemeral affective experiences we call emotions” (MacKinnon 1994:123). Just as identities and behaviors exist in EPA space, so do words that indicate emotions such as Annoyed, which is bad, slightly weak, and slightly active (-2.08, -0.57, 0.53) or Proud, which is good, powerful, and moderately active (2.17, 2.28, 1.15).

In a similar way to the estimation of the impression formation equations that suggest what affects post-event impressions, Averett and Heise (1987) estimated attribution equations that predicted emotional attributions for the Actor or Object that “would combine with a known identity to make sense of an observed social event” (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1999:78). Flipping the understanding of these attribution equations from how observers would expect an actor or object to feel after an event to predicting emotional expression following an interaction, these attribution equations came to be the emotion equations (Averett and Heise 1987; Heise and Thomas 1989; MacKinnon 1994).

These equations suggest that emotions are the product of two elements: the deflection, or how different the transient impressions are from the fundamental sentiments, and the transient impression of the actor or object in question (MacKinnon 1994; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). This exemplifies that the fundamental sentiment itself matters in predicting the likelihood of certain emotions. If there is very little or no deflection, the transient impression will be equal to the fundamental sentiment and the Actor or Object will be predicted to feel an emotion that is similar in EPA to its identity’s fundamental sentiment (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). This type of emotion is called a *characteristic emotion*, and it occurs in situations in which identities are perfectly confirmed.

Characteristic emotions for identities are found by solving for the emotion profile that results in the transient impression in a social situation being equal to the fundamental sentiment cultural sentiment for the identity. This means that sometimes, but not always, the characteristic emotion will be close in EPA space to the fundamental sentiment of the identity.[[3]](#footnote-3) For example, some characteristic emotions of a Child are Elated and Amused, matching the high evaluation of the fundamental sentiment of Child (MacKinnon 1994). Conversely, identities that are not socially valued or powerless will feel corresponding emotions when their identities are confirmed – e.g. an Alcoholic (-2.03, -1.99, -0.09) will feel Humiliated or Hurt when his stigmatized identity is perfectly confirmed. Table 1 in the supplemental appendix provides the EPA values of the characteristic emotions for the occupational identities included in the paper, and figure 1 below shows the distribution of differences between the characteristic emotion and fundamental sentiment of these identities.

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### **Occupational Identity and Emotion**

Most adults who work full-time spend a considerable amount of their day-time hours within their occupational identity. Through embodying this identity, individuals will strive to enact behaviors within interactions that will maintain the fundamental sentiment of their occupational identity. Further, because Affect Control Theory computationally predicts the precise profile of the characteristic emotion that someone would feel after perfectly confirming their occupational identity, we should expect that individuals in occupational identities report feeling emotions that are similar in cultural meaning to the characteristic emotion of their identity more often than those that are discrepant.

Moreover, the institutional frameworks that structure the types of interactions an individual will have while occupying their occupational identity provide them with interaction sets that, in general, should work to maintain that identity (Ridgeway 2000). For example, pediatricians spend the majority of their occupational hours interacting with children and their parents in a doctor-patient relationship. Most of the interactions will fundamentally be of the type Doctor Helps Patient which maintains the identity of the Doctor in that situation. If institutional frameworks did not sustain identity maintaining interactions in this way, we would expect more volatility in the EPA ratings of identities and behaviors. Alternatively, we would expect evidence of cultural change in the fundamental EPA of those identities and behaviors. Given this, the first hypothesis argues that individuals should be likely to report experiencing emotions that are close in meaning to their occupational identity’s characteristic emotion.

**H1**: The greater the distance between an individual’s occupational identity’s characteristic emotion and an emotion word in EPA space, the less likely that individual is to report frequently feeling that emotion.

Because occupational identities on average tend to be fairly good, powerful and somewhat active, there are baseline expectations as to how likely certain emotions are to be experienced by employed individuals in general, regardless of occupational identity. For instance, Ashamed (-2.36, -0.4, -1.73) is bad, not powerful or weak, and inactive. The average distance between Ashamed and characteristic emotions across all occupational identities used in this study is 32, which is quite large. On the other hand, the average distance between a good, powerful, and active emotion such as Excited (2.69, 2.18, 2.24) and occupational identity characteristic emotions is slightly above 4. This means, regardless of individual differences in distance, we expect that on average, individuals should report feeling excited more often than they do ashamed.

**H2**: The larger the average distance between an emotion and occupational identity characteristic emotions, the less often employed individuals will report feeling that emotion on average.

**Status**

The relationship between occ-char-emotion-distance and propensity to frequently experience an emotion is dependent on how often the occupational identity is enacted and confirmed, both on a base rate and in relation to other identities that one carries around throughout social interactions. A classic postulate of structural and control theories of identity is that individuals want to confirm their identities and structure their interactions and accordingly structure and play out their interactions in order to do so (Burke and Stets 2009; Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006). However, there are three main pieces that affect the rate of confirmation of occupational identity: a) the opportunity to perform it in social interactions; b) the desire to perform it to uphold a self-concept; and c) the interactional resources to maintain the occupational identity in uncertain or combative situations. I argue that each of these is affected by one’s social status, specifically, their master statuses: class, gender, race, and age, such that it is both easier and more desirable for someone of higher status to confirm their occupational identity in everyday life.

First, in order to confirm an identity, you first need the opportunity to perform it through interactions with others. The more opportunities to enact the identity, the more chances an individual has to confirm it. Theoretically in an interaction any single (or multiple) identities can be evoked, and the probability of any one identity out of all possible identities being embodied is a consequence of the situational demands, the identity’s importance to self, and the role relationships with others involved in that interaction (Smith-Lovin 2007; Walker and Lynn 2013). Within identity research paradigms, scholars use the term salience to refer to that likelihood of an identity being enacted in a given situation, or “a substantial propensity to define a situation in a way that provides an opportunity to perform that identity” (Brenner, Serpe, and Stryker 2014:232). Research describing the influence of network ties to identity performance indicates that the degree to which role-based others are embedded within a personal network is highly related to that role identity’s salience. In other words, likelihood of identity enactment is related to the opportunity structure of enactment given by role based others and their connections to other alters in our networks (Walker and Lynn 2013).

While it is not a perfect measure of embeddedness, ego-network density can provide insight into the likelihood of individuals of different statuses having more role-based others that are highly embedded in their personal network. Recent work on status and ego network density, which indicates how many of ties are interconnected, suggest that there is a relationship between master statuses and higher within-ego network density. Specifically, recent research on sociodemographic, personality, and cognitive individual attributes that affect ego-networks “generally indicat[ed] that higher status subjects have, or perceive themselves to have, larger, denser, more diverse networks, and therefore likely enjoy significant benefits in terms of social capital and sense of social integration” (Brashears, Aufderheide Brashears, and Harder 2020:372). Women having less dense network cite?

A second and similar component to identity salience is identity prominence; the extent to which an identity is important to oneself (Brenner et al. 2014). It is not true of everyone that who they are is what they do and the extent to which an occupational identity is key to self-concept can affect the rate at which it is enacted and the desire that individuals have to confirm it effectively. A new development in Affect Control Theory, the Affect Control Theory of Self, predicts that people choose to enact certain identities in order to maintain their self-sentiments (Heise and MacKinnon 2010). <ANOTHER SENTENCE HERE ABOUT SELF SENTIMENTS AND OTHER THINGS>

In addition to occupational identity salience and prominence, a third factor which may affect rates of confirmation is the amount of interactional resources an individual has in order to enforce their definition of a situation against another’s. Following from this, we would expect that the ability to define situations and have interaction partners who work to maintain one’s definition of the situation is not equal across people, but rather a consequence of the status one holds in daily life that is wielded both unconsciously and consciously through interactions (Heise 2020). This power can be garnered through access to material, cultural and interpersonal resources, such as status, dress, manner, scripts, level of education, and self-esteem (Miles 2014; Stets and Cast 2016).

A fourth and final factor that may affect the confirmation of identities through interaction is the environmental resources that shape one’s interactions: access to a front/back stage where identity changes are common. Have interactions with the same people frequently? Are interaction partners reliable (e.g kindergarten students vs. university students in relation to kindergarten teacher & professor).

Each of these is patterned by status. I propose five hypotheses (H3-H8) corresponding to how the relationship between occ-char-emo-distance and likelihood of emotional experience is dependent on social factors related to status: income, education, gender, age, and occupational prestige. Ideally race would also be tested, but unfortunately due to the very low numbers of non-white individuals in the sample, there was not enough power to test that hypothesis.

**H3**: The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be stronger for those with higher income.

**H4:** The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be weaker for those who have a high school degree or less.

**H5:** The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be weaker for those who have a high school degree or less.

**H6:** The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be stronger for men than for women.

**H7:** The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be stronger the older the respondent.

**H8:** The negative relationship between distance from emotion and frequency of experiencing the emotion will be stronger the higher the prestige of an individual’s occupation.

### **Data**

The data used in this analysis come from the 1996 wave of the General Social Survey (GSS), accessed via the gssr package in R (Healy 2019). The GSS is a nationally representative survey that includes a core set of survey items collecting demographic and socioeconomic information, and additional modules on specific topics. In 1996, the GSS fielded a module focusing on emotional experience. This analysis is limited to only individuals who reported working full-time in the prior year to ensure that only respondents for whom a large portion of daily interactions occurred in the occupational identity were included. Additionally, those with missing values on the dependent and control variables were removed from the sample. This resulted in a total of 720 respondents for the primary analyses.


The Affect Control Dictionary used for measurements of the cultural meaning of the occupational identities and emotion words in this analysis was the most recent U.S. dictionary, measured in 2015 with a sample of respondents from the University of Georgia, Duke University, and the Durham, North Carolina community (Smith-Lovin et al. 2016). These identities and modifiers were measured by asking respondents to rate a single identity or emotion word at a time on how good/bad, powerful/weak, and active/inactive they were, on a scale from -4.3 (extremely bad, weak, inactive) to +4.3 (extremely good, powerful, active). The mean rating across respondents on each axis is used as the point estimate for the identity or behavior.

#### **Variables**

##### *Dependent Variables*

The 1996 emotions module asked questions about how many days of the past seven days the respondent experienced certain emotions. Of the emotion questions available, 16 are used in this analysis (because EPA ratings were available for them in the ACT sentiment dictionary): Angry, Anxious, Ashamed, Calm, Contented, Excited, Fearful, Happy, Lonely, Mad (at), Outraged, Overjoyed, Proud, Restless, Sad, and Worried. The dependent variable is operationalized as a binary variable, with 1 indicating the respondent reporting experiencing the emotion 4 or more days in the past week, and 0 indicating 3 or fewer days. Two questions were double barreled, one asking both about being excited or interested and another feeling anxious and tense. Only the first emotion word in each case (excited, anxious) was used for generating distances in this analysis. Figure one displays the distribution of the emotion variables collected together, in the original count format, aggregated across emotion, and then collapsed on the right into the binary specification.

Clearly, some emotions are less likely to be experienced than others. For example, the highly negative emotions such as ashamed, fearful, and lonely are left skewed, with high numbers of respondents who reported feeling them on zero of the last seven days. On the other hand, some of the more positive but less active emotions, such as calm, happy, and contented, are right skewed, with more individuals reporting feeling these emotions daily in comparison to other emotions included in this survey. The center image illustrates the uniqueness of this dependent variable distribution – for one, the count data is right censored, as no response could exceed the 7 days of the week. This led to a bimodal distribution with both zero-inflation as well as seven-inflation, for emotions which many people either reported feeling never or always. This is why the data was re-categorized as binary, as Poisson and Negative Binomial models predicted responses well outside of 7 and often under-predicted responses in the middle category.[[4]](#footnote-4)



*Independent Variables*

The primary independent variable tested in this analysis is the distance between the EPA meaning of the characteristic emotion of each respondent’s occupational identity and the meaning of each of the GSS emotions. To calculate this distance, every occupation in the International Standard Classification of Occupations from 1988 (ISCO-88) was assigned a matching occupational identity using a crosswalk, which pairs each occupational code originally in the GSS with an identity from the ACT dictionary used in this analysis (Freeland and Hoey 2018). The crosswalk used in this analysis is based on the same crosswalk used by Freeland and Hoey (2018), with some expansion. The rules used to match occupation codes to occupational identities that were not in Freeland and Hoey (2018) are included in supplemental appendix A to this paper. The crosswalk resulted in a total of 102 unique occupational identities occupied by the 720 respondents. The characteristic emotion for each occupational identity was calculated using Interact, an ACT simulation program written by Heise (2007). The version of Interact used was downloaded on February 20, 2020 and a copy of the program is saved for reproducibility.

The squared Euclidean distance between the EPA of each occupational identity’s characteristic emotion and the EPA of each GSS emotion was calculated. Because the Affect Control Theory equations that were used in this analysis were gendered, there is a slight difference between the calculation of a characteristic emotion for a woman versus a man embodying the same occupational identity. For all occupational identities in this sample, the female and male characteristic emotion were calculated, and the matching characteristic emotion to the gender of the respondent was used in for calculating the distance measure for each respondent. This distance was then standardized for the analysis, such that the mean is zero and standard deviation one, to help with model convergence and model interpretability.

In Table 1 and the corresponding histogram in Figure 2, contains the mean and standard deviation of the (unstandardized) distances for each emotion. These show that the average distance between occupational characteristic emotion and the emotion words in the GSS vary considerably, from a minimum of 4.63 for excited and a maximum of 43.87 for lonely. Similarly, some emotions show more variability in distance across the occupational identities, with lonely and sad having the most variation in distance amongst occupations (10.24 and 10.132, respectively) and contented and excited having the least variation amongst occupational identities (2.328 and 2.790, respectively).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Emotion | Mean | Standard Deviation |
| angry | 17.597 | 3.869 |
| anxious | 22.481 | 7.873 |
| ashamed | 31.304 | 7.780 |
| calm | 13.190 | 3.851 |
| contented | 4.753 | 2.331 |
| excited | 4.679 | 2.940 |
| fearful | 30.097 | 8.571 |
| happy | 5.933 | 4.136 |
| lonely | 43.653 | 10.311 |
| mad | 18.938 | 5.612 |
| outraged | 18.563 | 4.128 |
| overjoyed | 6.895 | 4.206 |
| proud | 2.500 | 2.385 |
| restless | 17.254 | 6.588 |
| sad | 37.703 | 10.184 |
| worried | 27.785 | 7.986 |

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Description automatically generated with medium confidence

The next variables of interest are those used to test the resource and status hypotheses: income, gender, education, and age. Income corresponds to a respondent’s family income, scaled to be consistent across waves and logged in the following analysis (for how realinc was computed: Ligon 1989). Education level is a factor variable with five levels: less than high school, high school, junior college, bachelor’s degree, and graduate school. The reference category is bachelor’s degree. Male is a binary variable with a level of one indicating the respondent identified themselves as male and 0 as female, and age is a factor variable with 3 levels: 18-29, 30-44, and 45-64. Race, measured as Black, White, or Other, was additionally included as a control variable.

Descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are shown in Table 2. The sample is slightly more male than female, and overwhelmingly white.

| **Characteristic** | **N = 720***1* |
| --- | --- |
| Age |  |
| 18-29 | 156 (22%) |
| 30-44 | 320 (44%) |
| 45-64 | 244 (34%) |
| Income | 27,188 (17,038, 48,938) |
| Sex |  |
| Female | 338 (47%) |
| Male | 382 (53%) |
| Race |  |
| White | 580 (81%) |
| Black | 103 (14%) |
| Other | 37 (5.1%) |
| Highest Degree |  |
| Bachelor | 150 (21%) |
| Graduate | 78 (11%) |
| HS | 380 (53%) |
| Junior College | 60 (8.3%) |
| Less than HS | 52 (7.2%) |
| Number of Children |  |
| none | 228 (32%) |
| 1-2 | 338 (47%) |
| 3+ | 154 (21%) |
| *1*n (%); Median (IQR) | |

**Analysis**

For analysis, the data was re-structured into long format such that there were 16 observations per individual, one for each emotion count included in the GSS. This resulted in a total of 11,521 observations per model[[5]](#footnote-5). The models were estimated by a multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts for each individual and fixed effects for each emotion. Structuring the data in this way creates dependencies between observations but allows for the pooling across all of the emotional response variables into a single analysis, to test the main hypotheses regardless of the specific emotion in question. Including the random intercepts for the individual and fixed effects for emotion then accounts for the grouped nature of the data and interdependent observations.

First, the binary indicator of frequent emotional experience was regressed on the standardized measure of distance in EPA space from the characteristic emotion, to test H1 without controls. Next, model two includes income, degree, and occupational prestige as an additional explanatory variables. Model three includes sex, race, and age as additional covariates, to test whether H1 holds when controlling for these possible confounders. To test H2, the correlation between the fixed effects for the 16 emotions of model 1 and the average distance between occupational identity’s characteristic emotion and the emotion is computed.

The second set of models tests the hypotheses about possible interaction effects: specifically, whether the relationship between distance and frequent emotional experience is stronger for those whom the occupational identity may be more salient, easier to maintain due to interactional resources, and upheld through more consistent interactions with similar others. For these, distance from emotion was interacted with income, highest educational degree, sex, and age, in separate models. In each of these, the distance from emotion was also specified as a random slope, in accordance with recent research specifying that cross-level interactions should always include a random slope for the level 1 variable (Heisig and Schaeffer 2019).

Lastly, the interaction models were run again with subsets of the data corresponding to the three main emotion profiles: good, powerful, and somewhat active emotions (); bad, weak, inactive emotions (ashamed, ), and bad, powerful, somewhat active emotions (angry, outraged) to determine whether the relationship holds for all types of emotions or only a subset.

**Results**

Table one shows the results from the models not including interaction terms. Because the dependent variable is across all emotions, the interpretation for the main effects that don’t vary by observation (all individual characteristics, level 2 variables in this analysis) is the probability of a respondent saying they feel an emotion on 4 or more days of the week, a baseline measure of emotionality. Across all four models, the effect of the distance between an individual’s occupation’s characteristic emotion and the emotion they are responding to is negative and significant. Even after adding control variables, the magnitude only decreases by 0.01. The fixed effects of emotion are not included in the tables in order to preserve space and readability of the results. They are illustrated and discussed later in the results section.

For models 2-4, the probability that a respondent will say they experienced an emotion 4 or more days in the prior week has 0.82 the odds of someone whose occupational identity’s characteristic emotion is one standard deviation closer in EPA space to the emotion. An example: holding everything else constant, an individual whose occupational identity’s characteristic emotion is the average distance away from an emotion has a probability of X of saying they experienced that emotion 4 or more days in the prior week. An individual whose occupational identity’s characteristic emotion is one standard deviation away in EPA space from the average has a probability of X. This relationship is visualized in figure 3. The x-axis is the standardized distance from emotion variable, so 0 indicates being the average distance away, -1 is one standard deviation below the mean, and 1 is one standard deviation above the mean.

Table X: Main Effect Results

|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Distance from Emotion | -0.20\*\* | -0.19\*\* | -0.19\*\* | -0.19\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Income (std) |  | -0.08\* | -0.07 | -0.07 |
|  |  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Less than HS |  | 0.39\* | 0.42\* | 0.41\* |
|  |  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| High School |  | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
|  |  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Junior College |  | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
|  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Graduate Degree |  | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
|  |  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Male |  |  | -0.03 | -0.03 |
|  |  |  | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Black |  |  | -0.07 | -0.07 |
|  |  |  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Other Race |  |  | -0.16 | -0.16 |
|  |  |  | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| 30-44 |  |  | -0.08 | -0.08 |
|  |  |  | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| 45-64 |  |  | -0.14 | -0.14 |
|  |  |  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Occupational Prestige (std) |  | 0.01 | 0.01 |  |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.05) |  |
| AIC | 10945.62 | 10945.44 | 10952.81 | 10950.88 |
| Log Likelihood | -5454.81 | -5448.72 | -5447.40 | -5447.44 |
| Num. obs. | 11491 | 11491 | 11491 | 11491 |
| Num. groups: id | 720 | 720 | 720 | 720 |
| Var: id (Intercept) | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.64 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05 | | | | |

Chart, line chart

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Figure 3

Model 2 shows some interesting results of the base level of emotionality across income and education groups. The main effect of income is negative and significant, although small, suggesting that a one standard deviation in income results in a -0.08 change in the log-odds of reporting experiencing an emotion more than half the days of the week. However, this effect does not remain after including demographic variables sex, race, and age in the following two models. For education, having less than a high school degree is associated with a higher probability of reporting experiencing an emotion more than half the days of the week in comparison to those with a bachelor’s degree (the reference group). This effect does remain following the inclusion of other demographic variables. This follows prior research on class differences in emotionality (Streib 2015). There is no significant main effect of occupational prestige, sex, race, or age. Although at first impression this may be surprising given perceptions of emotionality that are gendered, raced, and classed, this may point to other research showing how perceptions do not always match actual rates (e.g. paper on number of words said, etc.) .

Figure 4 displays the main effect of different emotions on the probability of individuals reporting experiencing them on 4 or more days in the week. The correlation between the average difference between characteristic-emotion-distance and the main effect of each emotion is () for characteristic emotion differences for men and () for women. This provides support for hypothesis 2, that across all emotions and all occupations, there is a relationship between likelihood of reporting feeling them very often and how culturally unexpected they are for the entire set of occupations.


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Figure 4

Table X+1 and figures 5-7 depict the results from models testing hypotheses regarding interaction effects between the main independent variable and various demographic characteristics that are related to status influence over interactions: income, education, sex, and age. In Model 5, the main effect of both income and distance from emotion are negative and significant, as is the interaction effect between the two. The interaction effect thus suggests that the greater the income level, the stronger the relationship is between cultural difference in emotion from one’s occupational identity’s characteristic emotion and the likelihood of experiencing it. Figure 5 displays this effect by plotting the predicted probability of reporting experiencing an emotion more than half the days in the prior week against the distance from emotion measure for incomes that fall one standard deviation below the mean (-1), average income level (0), and income one standard deviation above the mean (1), holding everything else constant. As an emotion gets further away in EPA space from an individual’s occupational’s characteristic emotion, the change in the predicted probability of reporting experiencing an emotion more than half the days in the prior week is sharper for those with higher income (and vice versa).

Table X+1 Models with Interaction Effects

|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Distance from Emotion | -0.49\*\*\* | -0.80\*\*\* | -0.30\* | -0.30\* | -0.46\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.16) |
| Income (std) | -0.16\*\* | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.09 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Dist Emotion\*Income | -0.17\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.06) |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 0.44\* | 0.64\*\* | 0.44\* | 0.39\* | 0.44\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.19) |
| High School | -0.01 | 0.18 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Junior College | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| Graduate Degree | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| Dist\*Less than HS |  | 0.54\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.26) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*HS |  | 0.50\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.16) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Junior College |  | 0.12 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.24) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Graduate Degree |  | 0.15 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.21) |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.18 | -0.18 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Dist\*Male |  |  | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.12) | (0.12) |  |
| 1-2 Children |  |  |  | 0.11 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.11) |  |
| 3+ Children |  |  |  | 0.18 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) |  |
| Black | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.06 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| Other Race | -0.16 | -0.16 | -0.16 | -0.16 | -0.16 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) |
| 30-44 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.12 | -0.17 | -0.12 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| 45-64 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.22 | -0.22 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Dist\*30-44 |  |  |  |  | 0.02 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.16) |
| Dist\*45-64 |  |  |  |  | -0.21 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.17) |
| AIC | 10462.36 | 10463.24 | 10456.24 | 10458.56 | 10469.41 |
| Log Likelihood | -5200.18 | -5197.62 | -5197.12 | -5196.28 | -5202.71 |
| Num. obs. | 11491 | 11491 | 11491 | 11491 | 11491 |
| Num. groups: id | 720 | 720 | 720 | 720 | 720 |
| Var: id (Intercept) | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.01 |
| Var: id dist\_emotion | 1.49 | 1.46 | 1.46 | 1.46 | 1.49 |
| \*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05 | | | | | |

Chart

Description automatically generated

**Figure 5**

Model 6 includes an interaction between highest degree earned and distance from emotion. Here, there is a positive and significant main effect of having less than a high school degree, in comparison to a bachelors’ degree, as in the previous models with no interaction effects. Interestingly, there is an interaction both between having less than a high school degree and distance from emotion and having a high school degree and the distance from emotion variable, suggesting that compared to individuals with bachelor’s degrees, those with a high school degree or less have a weaker relationship between distance from emotion and likelihood of reporting frequent experience of that emotion in the prior week. Figure 6 depicts this finding, with the slopes for the lines of predicted probabilities for individuals with high school degree and less than high school degree flatter than those with more than a high school degree (junior college, bachelors, and graduate degree).

Chart

Description automatically generated

**Figure 6**

Models 7 and 8 include an interaction between distance from emotion and sex. For both of these models this interaction is negative and significant, indicating that for men, the relationship between the distance from their occupational identity’s characteristic emotion and an emotion is stronger than it is for women. Even after controlling for the number of children in model 8, this relationship remains negative and significant. This interaction is depicted in figure 7, with the sharper slope of predicted probabilities across distances for men as compared to women.

Lastly, model 9 includes an interaction between age and distance from emotion. This interaction is not significant, suggesting that there is no difference in the relationship between an individual’s occ-identity-char-emotion-distance across different age groups.

Chart

Description automatically generated

**Figure 7**

One possibility

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Table X+2: Good, Powerful Emotions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** |
| Distance from Emotion | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| Income (std) | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Dist Emotion\*Income |  | 0.05 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.05) |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | -0.06 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.31) |
| High School | -0.41\* | -0.42\* | -0.42\* | -0.42\* | -0.43\* | -0.41\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
| Junior College | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.28) | (0.28) | (0.29) | (0.28) | (0.29) | (0.29) |
| Graduate Degree | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| Dist\*Less than HS |  |  | -0.12 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.20) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*HS |  |  | 0.02 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.12) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Junior College |  |  | 0.02 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.19) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Graduate Degree |  |  | -0.23 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.18) |  |  |  |
| Male | 0.41\*\* | 0.40\*\* | 0.40\*\* | 0.41\*\* | 0.38\*\* | 0.40\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Dist\*Male |  |  |  | 0.09 | 0.08 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) | (0.10) |  |
| Black | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| Other Race | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.31 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) |
| 30-44 | -0.12 | -0.13 | -0.12 | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.12 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| 45-64 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | -0.02 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.20) |
| 1-2 Children |  |  |  |  | -0.09 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.17) |  |
| 3+ Children |  |  |  |  | 0.35 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.22) |  |
| AIC | 4754.67 | 4757.77 | 4762.12 | 4758.11 | 4742.28 | 4760.10 |
| Log Likelihood | -2359.33 | -2357.89 | -2357.06 | -2358.05 | -2348.14 | -2358.05 |
| Num. obs. | 4318 | 4318 | 4318 | 4318 | 4308 | 4318 |
| Num. groups: id | 722 | 722 | 722 | 722 | 720 | 722 |
| Var: id (Intercept) | 2.20 | 2.24 | 2.24 | 2.24 | 2.23 | 2.25 |
| Var: id dist\_emotion |  | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 |

Table X+3: Bad, Weak Emotions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** |
| Distance from Emotion | -0.06 | -0.28\* | -0.56\*\* | -0.21 | -0.19 | -0.44\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.21) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.19) |
| Income (std) | -0.25\*\* | -0.25\* | -0.24\* | -0.24\* | -0.27\*\* | -0.25\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Dist Emotion\*Income |  | -0.02 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.07) |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 1.10\*\* | 1.14\*\* | 1.16\*\* | 1.13\*\* | 1.06\*\* | 1.13\*\* |
|  | (0.35) | (0.36) | (0.38) | (0.36) | (0.37) | (0.36) |
| High School | 0.49\* | 0.48\* | 0.53\* | 0.48\* | 0.37 | 0.47\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.23) |
| Junior College | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.18 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.35) | (0.36) | (0.35) | (0.35) | (0.35) |
| Graduate Degree | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.33) | (0.34) | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.33) |
| Dist\*Less than HS |  |  | 0.23 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.30) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*HS |  |  | 0.31 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.19) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Junior College |  |  | 0.36 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.29) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Graduate Degree |  |  | 0.61\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.27) |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.49\*\* | -0.52\*\* | -0.52\*\* | -0.57\*\* | -0.50\*\* | -0.52\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| Dist\*Male |  |  |  | -0.16 | -0.18 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.14) | (0.14) |  |
| Black | -0.42 | -0.48 | -0.48 | -0.48\* | -0.50\* | -0.47 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.25) |
| Other Race | -0.82\* | -0.93\* | -0.93\* | -0.93\* | -0.92\* | -0.94\* |
|  | (0.38) | (0.40) | (0.40) | (0.40) | (0.40) | (0.40) |
| 30-44 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.14 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.23) |
| 45-64 | -0.37 | -0.42 | -0.42 | -0.42 | -0.56\* | -0.34 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) |
| 1-2 Children |  |  |  |  | 0.57\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.21) |  |
| 3+ Children |  |  |  |  | 0.14 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.27) |  |
| AIC | 4386.27 | 4361.44 | 4361.92 | 4360.19 | 4345.34 | 4361.88 |
| Log Likelihood | -2173.14 | -2157.72 | -2154.96 | -2157.09 | -2147.67 | -2156.94 |
| Num. obs. | 5760 | 5760 | 5760 | 5760 | 5744 | 5760 |
| Num. groups: id | 722 | 722 | 722 | 722 | 720 | 722 |
| Var: id (Intercept) | 2.73 | 2.88 | 2.88 | 2.90 | 2.87 | 2.88 |
| Var: id dist\_emotion |  | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.70 | 0.69 |

Table X+4: Bad, Powerful Emotions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** | **Model 4** | **Model 5** | **Model 6** |
| Distance from Emotion | 0.01 | -1.10 | 0.15 | -0.98 | 0.19 | -0.89 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.56) | (0.61) | (0.63) | (0.41) | (0.80) |
| Income (std) | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.38) | (0.32) | (0.37) | (0.32) | (0.37) |
| Dist Emotion\*Income |  | -0.18 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.41) |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 0.78 | 0.73 | 1.28 | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.74 |
|  | (1.21) | (1.34) | (1.32) | (1.34) | (1.25) | (1.34) |
| High School | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.18 |
|  | (0.78) | (0.91) | (0.81) | (0.91) | (0.81) | (0.91) |
| Junior College | -0.17 | 0.10 | -0.19 | 0.19 | -0.13 | 0.12 |
|  | (1.25) | (1.36) | (1.36) | (1.36) | (1.26) | (1.36) |
| Graduate Degree | 0.05 | -0.16 | -0.04 | -0.20 | 0.08 | -0.20 |
|  | (1.12) | (1.53) | (1.41) | (1.52) | (1.13) | (1.54) |
| Dist\*Less than HS |  |  | 0.96 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.50) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*HS |  |  | -0.25 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.75) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Junior College |  |  | -0.89 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.41) |  |  |  |
| Dist\*Graduate Degree |  |  | 0.04 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.08) |  |  |  |
| Male | -0.04 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.59) | (0.67) | (0.60) | (0.72) | (0.62) | (0.67) |
| Dist\*Male |  |  |  | -0.29 | -0.40 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.74) | (0.59) |  |
| Black | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.04 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.13 |
|  | (0.82) | (0.88) | (0.82) | (0.88) | (0.83) | (0.88) |
| Other Race | -0.53 | -0.46 | -0.56 | -0.44 | -0.66 | -0.38 |
|  | (1.45) | (1.51) | (1.45) | (1.50) | (1.54) | (1.51) |
| 30-44 | -0.30 | -0.24 | -0.37 | -0.21 | -0.31 | -0.37 |
|  | (0.73) | (0.80) | (0.73) | (0.80) | (0.77) | (0.86) |
| 45-64 | -0.65 | -0.64 | -0.66 | -0.62 | -0.64 | -0.69 |
|  | (0.83) | (0.93) | (0.83) | (0.93) | (0.93) | (0.96) |
| 1-2 Children |  |  |  |  | 0.10 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.72) |  |
| 3+ Children |  |  |  |  | -0.11 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.95) |  |
| AIC | 866.48 | 865.71 |  | 865.78 |  | 867.69 |
| Log Likelihood | -419.24 | -415.86 |  | -415.89 |  | -415.84 |
| Num. obs. | 1443 | 1443 | 1443 | 1443 | 1439 | 1443 |
| Num. groups: id | 722 | 722 | 722 | 722 | 720 | 722 |
| Var: id (Intercept) | 119.41 | 202.72 | 117.07 | 204.02 | 120.46 | 205.04 |
| Var: id dist\_emotion |  | 86.19 | 0.00 | 85.28 | 0.00 | 87.02 |

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1. Mother is capitalized to follow the Affect Control Theory tradition when indicating a measured identity. All references to measured identities, behaviors, and emotions will be capitalized. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. All EPA measurements referenced in this paper come from this dictionary. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Add note about the reviewer’s point here [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. A fuller discussion of modeling strategies may be found in the supplemental appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Not exactly 16\*720 because there are some individuals who did not respond to every emotion question. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)