Expressive Order

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Dedication

To my dear wife, Elsa Lewis.

Contents

Preface

My first goal for this book is to provide a lasting sourcebook for researchers and scholars working with affect control theory. My second goal is to provide an accessible introduction to affect control theory for advanced undergraduates and graduate students. The book addresses these two very different goals with an unusual structure.

Part 1 communicates affect control theory conversationally, in words enriched with some figures and tables. The informal presentation foregoes scholarly exegeses and empirical data analyses, in favor of declarative statements of the theory's arguments, with everyday examples. A wide range of readers—including undergraduates in and out of the social sciences—should find the verbal presentation intelligible.

Part 2 presents the theory again, this time as a formal model. The mathematical formulation progresses step by step, from assumptions to derived propositions. Comprehension of the model is enhanced by a chapter that presents numerical examples and a chapter that discusses programming of the computer simulation program that implements the model. This formalization of the theory provides a level of definiteness and precision exceptional in sociology, allowing scholars and researchers in the social sciences to gain understanding of the theory's assumptions and propositions.

Part 3 of the book provides some resources for those interested in working with the theory—an overview of the theory's development and specialties, a description of the computer simulation program that can be used to design studies, and a glossary of terms.

Herman Smith read a draft of Part 1 and offered many useful suggestions, for which I am grateful. I also thank Lynn Smith-Lovin, Dawn Robinson, Neil MacKinnon, and Linda Francis for providing information used in Part 3.

David R. Heise

Part 1

Affect Control Theory, Plainly Told

1

Introduction

> By entering a situation in which he is given a face to maintain, a person takes on the responsibility of standing guard over the flow of events as they pass before him. He must ensure that a particular expressive order is sustained—an order that regulates the flow of events, large or small, so that anything that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with his face. (Goffman 1967, p. 9)

The title of this book derives from the above statement by sociologist Erving Goffman. The theory presented in this book—affect control theory—incorporates Goffman's insight that expressive order infuses social interactions as individuals maintain their identities, or faces.

1.1 Affect Control Theory

Here's the essence of affect control theory.

- You (and every individual) create events to confirm the sentiments that you have about the identities of yourself and others in the current situation.
- Your emotions reflect your sentiment about yourself and the kinds of validations or invalidations that you are experiencing at the moment.
- If your actions don't work to maintain your sentiments, then you re-conceptualize the identities of others or yourself.
- Confirming sentiments about your current identity actualizes your sense of self, or else produces inauthenticity that you resolve by enacting compensating identities.

- In the process of building events to confirm your sentiments, you perform social roles that operate the basic institutions of society.

This overview is too brief to cover all important matters. However, chapters in this book expand the key ideas.

1.2 Utility of the Theory

Affect control theory addresses questions like these:

- What are the expected behaviors of American middle-class mothers, fathers, daughters, and sons? How do expectations vary as a result of unusual events?
- What behavior is expected of employers and employees by females and by males? Of health-care practitioners and patients? Of teachers and students? Of citizens and legal officials?
- What are typical emotional reactions to victimization—to being cheated, robbed, assaulted, molested? Do emotions differ by settings, by the identity of the victimizer, by events that occurred previously? How are others likely to view a victim when they find out about the incident?
- In a particular social situation, what does one have to do in order to feel joy or pride or calmness? What kinds of events in the situation make one feel nervous or angry or depressed?
- How might employer-employee social interaction differ in Japan and America? What would be different in the behavior and emotions of a Canadian wife interacting with a Canadian husband, as opposed to husbands and wives in the U.S.A., or in Germany?

Affect control theory provides specific answers to such questions. Many of the theory's predictions have been validated in empirical studies.

Some published statements by sociologists have recognized affect control theory's usefulness.

> Undoubtedly this is the best developed empirically applicable cybernetic model in the history of theoretical sociology. (Thomas Fararo 1989, pp. 167)

> [ACT is] the most methodologically rigorous program [in the sociology of emotions]. ... It can formulate both emotional outcomes of situations and situational outcomes of emotions in a manner that is more efficient than any other presently available in either sociology or psychology. (T. David Kemper 1991, pp. 342-3)

> [Affect control theory] offers a rigorous methodology for modeling emotion in interaction …. The models and predictions can be applied to human-computer interaction leading to the design of "socially intelligent" systems that optimize user experience and outcomes. (Lisa Troyer 2004, p. 30)

1.3 Overview of the Book

Chapters in Part I are written in a conversational style unburdened with technical details and without embedded citations to published research. These chapters present the theory in its entirety.

Chapters 2 through 4 introduce the notion of culturally-grounded sentiments varying along three dimensions of affective meaning. Such sentiments are building blocks of social experience, according to affect control theory.

Chapters 5 through 7 consider how participants define social situations and create actions to fit the situation they have defined. The focus is on affective processes of impression formation and confirmation of sentiments. However, the chapters also describe how social institutions constrain the construction of situations and actions, and how social institutions are embodied and operated by individuals as they work to maintain meanings.

Chapter 8 introduces affect control theory's approach to emotions. Attention is given to how emotions relate to motives, and to how emotions relate to stress.

Chapter 9 focuses on individuals' accommodation to realities that violate their expectations. Three general processes are considered: labeling people with new identities, making attributions about an individual's character or mood, and changing one's own sentiments.

Chapter 10 considers individuals' personal identities—their selves—and how sentiments attached to selves generate preferences for enacting some identities rather than others.

Chapters in Part II of this book present affect control theory's mathematical model. These chapters clarify what's assumed, what's empirically measured, and what's derived in the theory.

Chapter 11 propounds that the likelihood of an event can be specified in terms of pre-event sentiments and feelings about event elements. Chapters 12 and 13 use this understanding to derive solutions for optimal behaviors and for optimal identities.

Chapter 14 describes how modifiers amalgamate with identities. The amalgamation equations are solved to specify which emotions and attributions are appropriate in given circumstances.

Chapter 15 links moods with optimal identities, specifying how a person's observed emotionality may influence labeling of that individual.

Chapter 16 formalizes notions of how an individual's self-sentiment is linked to the individual's identity preferences.

Chapter 17 simplifies the mathematics presented in prior chapters in order to illustrate the kinds of calculations that are involved in the formal model, and in order to show some properties of the solutions. Chapter 18 explicates the mathematical model in a different way, by sketching how it is implemented in a computer program for simulating social interaction.

Chapters in Part III of this book review research related to affect control theory and introduce the computer simulation program that is used in research.

Chapter 19 outlines the history of the research program, and shows how the scores of publications related to affect control theory partition into a number of different areas.

Chapter 20 outlines the use of affect control theory's computer program, *Interact*. The program is important for exploring new topics and for designing empirical studies.

Appendix A provides a glossary of basic concepts in affect control theory.

1.4 Further Readings

Erving Goffman provided readable discussions of several topics of concern in affect control theory in the following books: *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959); *Asylums* (1961); *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963); *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (1967).

Three previous books on affect control theory—by myself (Heise 1979); by Lynn Smith-Lovin and myself (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988); and by Neil MacKinnon (1994)—provide details regarding empirical research on affect control theory, and regarding the relation of affect control theory to other theories.

2

Sentiments

If you are like many Americans, you feel that doctors are helpful, powerful, and reserved. That's your sentiment about doctors, the way you feel in general about them even though you might have different feelings in particular circumstances.

For many Americans, the general sentiment about children is quite different: children are good, weak, and noisy. Gangsters provoke still another sentiment: bad, powerful, and active.

2.1 Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (EPA)

Sentiments have three aspects. Evaluation concerns goodness versus badness, Potency concerns powerfulness versus powerlessness, and Activity concerns liveliness versus quietness. The three aspects are abbreviated EPA.

Each aspect, or dimension, of sentiments can be characterized by a variety of contrasts.

> Some words characterizing the positive side of the Evaluation dimension are: nice, sweet, heavenly, good, mild, happy, fine, clean. Corresponding words for the negative side are: awful, sour, hellish, bad, harsh, sad, course, dirty.
>
> Characterizations of the positive side of the Potency dimension include: big, powerful, deep, strong, high, long, full, many. The corresponding words for the negative side are: little, powerless, shallow, weak, low, short, empty, few.
>
> Words characterizing the positive side of the Activity dimension include: fast, noisy, young, alive, known, burning, active, light. Corresponding negative words are: slow, quiet, old, dead, unknown, freezing, inactive, dark.

Characterizations within each dimension are correlated. For example, something judged sweet is likely to be judged clean also.

Characterizations across dimensions are uncorrelated. For example, sensing that something is powerful provides no clue as to whether it is good or bad.

Table 2-1. Example identities and behaviors having various configurations of evaluation, potency and activity (EPA)

EPA Configuration	Identities	Behaviors
Good, Potent, Active	champion, friend, lover	entertain, surprise, make love to
Good, Potent, Inactive	grandparent, priest, scientist	pray for, massage, console
Good, Impotent, Active	baby, child, youngster	ask about something, beckon to
Good, Impotent, Inactive	old-timer, patient, librarian	obey, observe, follow
Bad, Potent, Active	devil, bully, gangster	slay, rape, beat up
Bad, Potent, Inactive	executioner, scrooge, disciplinarian	execute, imprison, flunk
Bad, Impotent, Active	delinquent, junkie, quack	laugh at, ridicule, pester
Bad, Impotent, Inactive	loafer, has-been, bore	submit to, beg, ignore

Various kinds of people have different positions on the EPA dimensions. Table 2-1 shows some examples of kinds of people representing each configuration of EPA. Individuals' social behaviors also vary on the EPA dimensions, and Table 2-1 also shows some examples of social behaviors representing each EPA configuration.

The three aspects of sentiments—Evaluation, Potency, and Activity—are matters of degree. Each aspect can be greater or less, in either a positive or negative direction. For example, some things are slightly good, others are quite good, still others are extremely good.

You can picture the three dimensions by imagining that sentiments are floating around the room you're in.

- Things that are very good are up near the ceiling, things that are very bad are near the floor.
- Things that are powerful are near the wall in front of you, weak things are near the wall behind you.
- Lively things are on your right, and quiet things are on your left.
- Things that are neither good nor bad, powerful nor powerless, lively nor quiet hang around the center of the room.

So to see a grandparent you glance upward to your left at the good, powerful, quiet corner. To see a child you turn your head and look up over your right shoulder at the good, powerless, lively corner. To see a gangster you look down to your right at the bad, powerful, lively corner.

Ways of acting are in the room, too. Look up in front of you to your right, and there's making love to someone. Now drop your eyes to the floor along that same corner of the room, and you see raping someone. Look down behind you on the left; there's ignoring someone. Look up, forward to your left to see consoling someone.

The room represents EPA space, where sentiments about all kinds of things float inside like stars in the cosmos. EPA space also is affective space, since it is where your feelings about things are positioned.

Fig. 2-1. Rating scales for measuring EPA—a "semantic differential."

2.2 Measuring EPA

You can measure your own sentiments with the three rating scales shown in Figure 2-1. Each rating scale presents adjectives at its end points in order to describe the negative and positive poles of the dimension. Nine marking positions are between the end points, and adverbs at the bottom characterize the meaning of each marking position. You indicate your feelings about something by selecting one position on each scale.

The custom is to use plus units to measure goodness, powerfulness, and liveliness; minus units for bad, powerless, or quiet. Ratings are converted into numbers depending on which position is marked.

infinitely on the left side	=	-4.3
extremely on the left side	=	-3
quite on the left side	=	-2
slightly on the left side	=	-1
neutral	=	0
slightly on the right side	=	+1
quite on the right side	=	+2
extremely on the right side	=	+3
infinitely on the right side	=	+4.3

For example, something that you rate as "quite good, nice" gets coded +2 on Evaluation.

An EPA profile is a list of three such measures: the first number represents Evaluation, the second is Potency, and the third is Activity.

Try using these scales to measure some of your own feelings about things. Write down your ratings in the form of EPA profiles.

These days, sentiments usually are measured on computer-implemented scales that let you move a pointer anywhere on the scale to reflect your feelings. Ratings in-between the choice points shown in Fig. 2-1 get coded as fractions. For example, a rating halfway between “quite” and “extremely” on the good side of the Evaluation scale would be coded +2.5.

Distances between sentiments can be computed from the EPA profiles of the sentiments, using a standard formula. For example, among some American college students:

- The average EPA profile of "enemy" is -2.1, 0.8, 0.2 among males, and -2.5, 0.6, 0.9 among females.
- The average EPA profile of "friend" is 2.8, 1.9, 1.4 among males, and 3.5, 2.5, 2.0 among females.
- The distance between enemy and friend is 5.2 for males, and 6.4 for females.
- Thus sentiments about enemy and friend are further apart for the females than for the males.

This illustrates that numerically-measured sentiments can be analyzed mathematically.

2.3 Universality of EPA

Sentiments of people everywhere vary along the three dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. That's not just an assumption. It's an empirical finding from cross-cultural research in dozens of societies, conducted in the following steps.

1. Concepts that exist in every culture—like father, mother, child, water, moon—were assembled into a list.
2. Natives in each culture were asked to respond to each concept on the list with a modifier, and to name the opposite of that modifier. For example, some individuals in the U.S.A. might respond to mother with the word sweet, and give the word sour as the opposite.
3. The modifier opposites were formed into scales, and natives used the scales to rate each concept on the list. Ratings of a concept on a scale were averaged to get a number indicating how raters from that culture typically positioned the concept on the scale.
4. For each culture, a table was created, with a column for each scale, a row for each concept, and average ratings of concepts on scales in the cells. This allowed correlation coefficients to be computed between scales. For example, in the American table, average ratings of concepts on the sweet-sour scale and on the good-bad scale were used to compute a numerical correlation between the two scales. (Correlations near 1.0 indicate similarity; correlations near zero indicate absence of a relation; correlations near -1.0 indicate a reverse relation.)
5. A pan-cultural table also was created, allowing scales in different cultures to be correlated. For example, American average ratings of concepts on the sweet-sour scale and Mexican average ratings on a bueno-malo scale were compared across all concepts in order to define the correlation between those two scales.
6. Statistical analysis of correlations between scales showed that the scales clustered into three major groups—Evaluation, Potency, Activity—and every culture contributed scales to each group. For example, all three scales mentioned above ended up in the Evaluation cluster, indicating that con-

cepts rated as sweet by Americans tended to be rated good by Americans, and bueno by Mexicans.

In this study, the only thing translated from one language to another was the list of universal concepts. The only assumption in the analysis was that people in different cultures have roughly parallel feelings about the universal concepts, even though specific details might differ from one culture to another. (Fig. 3-1 in the next section shows that this assumption does hold cross-culturally for father, mother, and child.) Thus the cross-cultural study provides compelling evidence that sentiments around the world involve the three EPA dimensions, and the EPA dimensions are comparable in every culture.

2.4 Further Readings

Psychologist Charles Osgood with co-authors George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum (1957) instituted semantic differential rating scales in their book, *The Measurement of Meaning*. Osgood (1962) interpreted semantic differential measurements as a way of assessing affective meaning rather than meaning in general in his article, "Studies of the generality of affective meaning systems."

Osgood's book with W. May and M. Miron (1975), *Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning*, documented the massive cross-cultural project that verified the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity as cross-cultural universals.

I reviewed early methodological work on the semantic differential (Heise 1969b). I also described techniques for obtaining EPA data over the Internet (Heise 2001).

3

Culture

While you have your own personal feelings about things, you also share sentiments with people around you. That's the notion of culture—shared meanings and feelings.

3.1 Consensus

Your sentiment about an object results in part from your private encounters with the object. Additionally your sentiment is shaped by interactions with others—individuals in your social groups, and strangers in public places or the mass media. Your encounters with others pull your sentiment toward a cultural standard.

Consider child as an example.

Your own private experiences with children are one source of your sentiment about any child. You express your sentiment in public actions toward children and in talking about children with your associates. Your public acts and comments influence others and shape their social acts. However, your associates also have private experiences with children, which they express in their public behavior and talk, thereby influencing their associates, including you. Interacting and talking together changes your sentiment toward child to be like the sentiments of your associates, and their sentiments become more like yours. A shared sentiment toward children emerges. That shared sentiment eventually affects even your private experiences with children as you try to experience children in a way that affirms the shared sentiment about them.

Observing each other's actions toward an object and talking about the object produces a norm. The existence of a sentiment norm means that individual sentiments are more similar than they would be without social process.

Norms in one group influence norms in another group when the groups are bridged by individuals who are in both groups. Virtually all groups in a society are networked together by such bridges, and thus society-wide, cultural norms form over time as normative sentiments pass back and forth between groups.

Affective intersubjectivity—a crucial aspect of social life—emerges when you are with others from the same culture as you are from. You evoke shared sentiments as you talk about your experiences, and consequently your audience feels much the same as you do about experiences that you describe to them.

3.1.1 Individuality Versus Norms

Your sentiment about an object reflects your unique experiences with the object and also reflects cultural norms. Which has the bigger impact on your sentiments—unique experiences, or cultural norms? Among individuals who are well integrated into their culture, the relative impacts are as follows.

Cultural norms dominate evaluations. Eighty percent of the variation in an individual's evaluations of things relates to norms, and just 20 percent of the variation corresponds to the individual's unique experiences.

Cultural norms influence the Potency and Activity aspects of sentiments less, but still are more important than unique experiences. On both of these dimensions, approximately 60 percent of an individual's variation in feelings relates to norms, and about 40 percent of the variation relates to unique experiences.

Thus your sentiments are predominately cultural. Your feelings about most things are very similar to the feelings of other individuals in your society.

3.1.2 Measurement Implications

An important consequence of cultural consensus is that we can measure sentiments efficiently.

Here's an example illustrating the logic.

> Suppose that we take a random sample of four to find out the average height to the nearest inch of 100 humans—including three infants and 43 children—where the population mean is 4 feet. A first random sample estimates the average height as 4 feet 6 inches. However, another random sample estimates the average height as 3 feet 3 inches. Obviously, estimating the average height of the population from a sample of four can be quite misleading about the true average. To estimate the average height confidently, we need to use a much larger sample, or take a census of the whole population.
>
> Now consider a different population of adults in which every individual is 5 feet 9 inches in height, with the population mean being 5 feet 9 inches.. (You might imagine this population consists of 100 biological clones.) A first random sample of four yields a mean of 5 feet 9 inches. A second random sample of four also has a mean of 5 feet 9 inches. Every sample of four will have a mean of 5 feet 9 inches. In fact, a sample of four is extravagant in this case. We confidently can estimate the average height of the homogeneous population from a single individual.

Socially sharing a sentiment makes individuals homogeneous with regard to the sentiment. If a group were perfectly homogeneous, then any individual would repre-

sent the group with regard to the sentiment. In partially homogeneous groups we need to average the sentiments of a few individuals to get rid of effects of unique private experiences. Yet, because of the homogeneity, all of the individual sentiments are close to the average value, and a small sample provides a good basis for assessing the cultural sentiment. Costly large-sample surveys or censuses are not required.

3.2 Cultural Stability

Cultural sentiments can change, but changes evolve gradually, even in modern societies that are pervaded with social movements, fashions, and mass media.

One way of assessing the amount of stability in cultural sentiments is to determine how well earlier sentiments predict later sentiments. Correlations near 1.0 indicate stability in sentiments. Correlations near zero indicate that sentiments change randomly from year to year.

Evaluations are very stable, with correlations of 0.90 or more, even when 25 years separate earlier and later measures. Changes in evaluation usually involve increasing or decreasing levels of goodness or of badness; switches between approval and condemnation of a concept occur infrequently. When switches in evaluation do occur, they often relate to an issue that has been the focus of recognized social change in the society. For example, identities relating to homosexuality went from condemnation to approval at the end of the 20th Century, in both Canada and the U.S.A., possibly as a consequence of the gay rights movement.

Potency assessments also are stable, though not as stable as evaluations. Correlations between potency measurements 15 to 25 years apart range between 0.80 and 0.90 in different studies. Correlations are lower for behavior potencies because behavior potencies vary only from powerful to neither powerful nor powerless, whereas other kinds of concepts have both powerful and powerless instances. Concepts rarely switch between powerfulness and powerlessness. However, an example of such switching was provided by identities of young females in the U.S.A. going from powerless to somewhat powerful at the end of the 20th Century.

Activity connotations can change more rapidly than other aspects of sentiments, with correlations ranging from 0.60 to 0.90 in different studies. For example, in the U.S.A. in the last quarter of the 20th Century activities changed substantially, with concepts relating to authority and leadership gaining in activity, and concepts concerned with deviance and withdrawal losing activity.

Most cultural sentiments remain nearly the same for decades. Moreover, some changes that do occur are temporary, lasting only a few years before the old sentiments prevail again.

You may find this hard to believe with mass media always reporting how times are changing, and when you yourself have to strive to keep your attitudes up-to-date. However, here's a whimsical allegory to illustrate how very little change can seem massive. A carousel with its bright colors, flashing lights, loud music, bobbing ponies, and circular motion is fascinating and challenging to a four-year-old. Yet basi-



Fig. 3-1. Female sentiments about father, mother, and child in five cultures. Child is the lowest point on each line, mother is the middle point.

cally nothing is happening, so the same carousel is boring and insultingly simplistic to an eight-year-old.

We are like a four-year-old in confronting our contemporary culture. With hundreds of thousands of concepts and sentiments in the culture, a change of just one-tenth of a percent per year confronts us with hundreds of points of flux—a fascinating and challenging torrent of change. Yet the overall culture is nearly static!

3.2.1 Instability or Unreliability?

Imperfect correlations between measures of sentiments at two different times can arise from instabilities, but also from measurement errors—correlations are pulled toward zero if measurements are imprecise. Errors do occur in measuring sentiments, because of raters' fallibilities, like clumsiness in marking the rating scales, confusion

in translating subjective feelings to scale positions, or temporary states of mind in which raters misconceive their own sentiments.

In fact, about a third of the variation in an individual's evaluation ratings is error, and approximately half of the variation in potency and activity ratings is error. Because of this inaccuracy, ratings of sentiments by one individual on one occasion rarely are used for anything. Instead, multiple ratings are obtained and averaged in order to offset errors in one measurement with errors from another measurement, thereby revealing the regularities that underlie the set of measurements.

Sentiment norms typically are estimated from samples of 30 or more raters. With this many raters, only about three percent of the variation in mean ratings is error in the case of evaluation, eight percent in the case of potency, and nine percent in the case of activity. Put differently, with ratings averaged over 30 raters, the maximum over-time correlation of evaluation means is about 0.97, the maximum over-time correlation of mean potency ratings is 0.92, and the maximum over-time correlation of mean activity ratings is 0.91.

Thus, some of the decrements from 1.0 in over-time sentiment correlations are due to measurement errors rather than cultural instability, and the stability correlations would be higher if corrected for the effects of measurement errors. That fact, however, only reinforces the main conclusion, that cultural sentiments are very stable.

3.3 Variations Across Cultures

Sharing sentiments with others in your society is one aspect of culture. Another aspect is having different sentiments than people in other societies.

Fig. 3-1 shows cultural sentiments for father, mother, and child as measured among people in the U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Germany, and Northern Ireland. This chart is based on female sentiments, but it would look about the same were male measurements used instead.

You can see that people in all five cultures agree that fathers, mothers, and children are not bad, and they agree that parents are powerful and children are powerless. Thus, the general structure of sentiments about nuclear family identities is parallel across societies. However, aside from this shared general structure, major differences arise among raters from different countries.

- The Japanese raters evaluate family members less positively than individuals in the other cultures; among the Japanese the average rating of child is neither good nor bad.
- Generally, parents are evaluated more positively than children, but not among the German raters who feel that fathers are less good than either children or mothers.
- Mothers generally are felt to be nicer than fathers, but this difference is negligible for the American raters. The power difference between fathers and mothers also is negligible for the Americans.

These results typify cross-cultural variations in sentiments. People in different cultures share some general perspectives, yet specific sentiments vary from one culture to another.



Fig. 3-2. Correlations of American identity sentiments with identity sentiments in four other nations.

Correlation analysis provides a way to assess the degree of cross-cultural sharing. You compute a correlation coefficient to see how well you can predict sentiments in one culture from sentiments in another culture. The graph in Fig. 3-2 shows how accurately other cultures' EPA sentiments about identities can be predicted from U.S.A. values.

To illustrate, the front-most bar shows that Japanese females' evaluation ratings of identities can be predicted well from evaluation ratings of identities by females in the U.S.A., the correlation coefficient being almost 0.8. Evaluation ratings of identities also are quite parallel among Japanese males and American males. Potency ratings of identities by Japanese and Americans correlate somewhat higher than evaluation ratings, for both females and males. However, Japanese activity ratings of identities and U.S.A. activity ratings correlate less, around 0.65 for females, and 0.70 for males.

Overall, Fig. 3-2 shows that all of the cultures share general perspectives with the U.S.A., in that all of the correlations are substantially positive. Yet patterns in other cultures vary at least a little from U.S.A. patterns, in that none of the correlations reaches 1.0. The U.S.A. and Canada are most similar. Identity sentiments in other cultures diverge further from U.S.A. sentiments.

In the case of behaviors, U.S.A. evaluation ratings predict evaluation ratings in other cultures well (with all correlations above 0.86, for both females and males). U.S.A. potency ratings of behaviors have a relatively low correspondence with potency ratings in other cultures (with correlations ranging from 0.38 to 0.60). U.S.A. activity ratings of behaviors correlate with corresponding ratings in Canada, Germany, and Japan (with correlations between 0.67 and 0.81), but less so with ratings in Ireland (0.43 for females, 0.50 for males).

Studying numerous graphs like these reveals that evaluations are remarkably similar in these five societies, with a mean cross-culture correlation coefficient of 0.81 for social identities and 0.88 for behaviors. So people brought up in these Asian, European, and North American cultures largely agree about who is good and who is bad, and about which actions are moral and which are immoral.

Notions of who is relatively powerful and who is relatively powerless also are similar across societies. Cross-cultural consensus drops dramatically in judgments regarding the potencies of behaviors. However, almost all behavior potencies are positive rather than both positive and negative, and correlations generally decline with a reduced range of variation.

Feelings about the relative activity or passivity of identities and of behaviors are substantially shared across the cultures.

In conclusion, the results reveal a substantial international correspondence in the allocation of honor and stigma, and of power and dependency, to different kinds of people. A substantial international concordance also prevails regarding the morality of behaviors. Feelings about the relative power of different kinds of behaviors are somewhat shared cross-culturally, but correlations are lower in this case than in other comparisons. Substantial cross-cultural similitude characterizes feelings about the relative activation of kinds of people and of kinds of behaviors.

3.4 Further Readings

The notion of culture as consensus has been developed rigorously by A. Kimball Romney, S. C. Weller, and William H. Batchelder in "Culture as consensus: A theory of culture and informant accuracy" (1986); and "Recent applications of cultural consensus theory" (1987).

The flow of influence within a population was analyzed by Noah Friedkin in his 1998 book, *A Structural Theory of Social Influence*, and in an article with Eugene C. Johnsen (2003).

My 2001 article, "Project Magellan: Collecting Cross-Cultural Affective Meanings Via the Internet," presents cross-cultural comparisons of sentiments about identities and behaviors in more detail.

Neil MacKinnon and Alison Luke (2002) studied over-time changes in Canadian sentiments. My estimates of sentiment stability are derived in a methodological study of semantic differentials, *Measuring Sentiments*, which will be published as a book.

4

Sub-Cultures

Are you in a clique or community that is separate from the mainstream—a group that is involved in an unorthodox religion, an offbeat sexual preference, an oddball entertainment? If so, then ...

- You share most of your sentiments with other people in your society. Being in a special group doesn't give you a different culture.
- You do differ in sentiments for concepts that are most relevant to your unique membership.

Individuals who disagree too much to adopt a society's normative sentiment about something may gravitate to a special group that provides them with better affective resonance. As individuals segregate themselves in this way, diverging pockets of consensus—or subcultures—emerge. Societal diversity in sentiments about an issue often corresponds not to anarchic individuality but to the existence of sub-cultures.

A sub-culture consists of special meanings maintained within a sub-population of a society. Any aggregate of people who segregate some of their interactions may develop a sub-culture.

Sub-cultures orbit around types of people, actions, and material objects that are of special significance within the sub-population. Individuals in the sub-population typically have more positive sentiments about the focal matters than do individuals in the culture at large. For example, drug users maintain a sub-culture in which drug users, drug experiences, and drug paraphernalia are more positively evaluated than in the general culture.

Here are illustrations.

4.1 Gender

Do the feelings you have in social interaction differ from feelings experienced by the opposite sex? In the U.S.A. the answer is yes. Females and males have different sentiments about certain things, though not about a lot of things.

One U.S.A. study statistically tested male EPA ratings against females' ratings to see if they were different. The study found differences, but only barely beyond what would be expected by chance. Twelve percent of the male and female sentiments differed on Evaluation, Potency, or Activity to some degree, whereas ten percent would be expected by chance.

The key difference between female and male sentiments is that males are less condemning than females of sexuality identities, behaviors, and settings. For example, males give less negative ratings than females to the identities of bisexual, heterosexual, hooker, peeping tom, call girl, mistress, or porno star; to the behaviors of seduce, deflower, disrobe, undress, ravish, or rape; and to the settings of bedroom, burlesque show, topless bar, or orgy. Such male-female differences in evaluations of sexuality also appear in Canada, Germany, Japan, and China, so a gender difference in evaluating sexuality is a safe generalization.

4.1.1 A Pseudo-Sub-Culture

Aside from the difference in sentiments about sexuality, gender provides a case of a pseudo-sub-culture. That is, females and males sometimes differ in feelings and actions, not because they have different sentiments, but because they occupy discrete identities associated with different sentiments. More potency may be attributed to male identities than to the female counterparts.

In the following list, the first-named identity in each gendered pair was the identity with more potency according to a study in the U.S.A. during the 1970s.

> son-daughter, brother-sister, *nephew-niece*, *grandson-granddaughter*, boy-girl, man-woman, *husband-wife*, grandfather-grandmother, hero-heroine, *landlord-landlady,* adulterer-adulteress, *mother-father*

Male identities were more potent in all pairs except mother-father. Even the mother-father pair was not much of an exception since mother and father were nearly the same in powerfulness.

The relative powerlessness of female identities did not come from male chauvinism of the raters, since the ratings of potency in this analysis came solely from females!

The potency advantage for male identities in 20th Century America is no quirk of American culture. The same pattern in sentiments occurred for German females, too. Even for females in the People's Republic of China, male identities were more potent than female identities, despite a half century of radical communist leadership committed to raising the status of women in China!

On the other hand, the pattern appears to be dissipating in America. A 1990s study in the U.S.A. shows some deviations from this pattern with woman and wife

being at least as powerful as the male counterparts. In data collected early in the 21st Century, U.S.A. females were rating a number of female identities higher in potency than the corresponding male identities—all of the instances italicized in the list above. This suggests that the potency of female identities is increasing in the U.S.A., perhaps as a result of the feminist social movement.

4.1.2 Gendered Traits

According to a study done with Canadian and U.S.A. data, personality traits that imply a person is "productive, accomplished, and up for any type of challenge" typically are viewed as male, whereas the opposite kinds of traits are female. Thus stereotypical male traits include active, confident, energetic, adventurous, stable, strong, industrious, wise, an independent. Stereotypical female traits include foolish, inhibited, snobbish, unstable, unambitious, and weak.

However, among traits with moderate potency another gender distinction arises: the positively evaluated traits seem characteristic of women, and the negatively evaluated traits seem characteristic of men. So stereotypical male traits also include cruel, hostile, tough, and self-centered; whereas stereotypical female traits include sentimental, gentle, emotional, kind, sincere, and helpful. In this case, females seem nice in that they care about others, whereas men seem nasty in that they just look out for themselves.

One way of summarizing the results is that stereotypical traits give men a power advantage, and give women a status advantage. Men can get others to please them by setting up punishment-reward contingencies. Women, on the other hand, having the kind of status that derives from others' esteem, may have others pleasing them without instigation.

4.2 Gay Christians

Members of a gay fundamentalist church congregation in 1970s South Carolina saw the identities of Christian and homosexual more positively than did most Americans at the time. In particular, the goodness and powerfulness that the gay Christians associated with the identity of homosexual was opposite from others' feelings.

A method of analysis described in Part 3 of this book—the *Interact* simulation program—allows us to conjecture that the gay homosexuals' sentiments would have generated friendly, supportive interactions between gays and Christians. Such interactions theoretically included behaviors like greet, welcome, entertain, amuse, encourage, or compliment; and emotional states like compassionate, pleased, generous, touched, moved, contented, or charmed. Thus sentiments within the gay sub-culture theoretically permitted gays to behave normally and view themselves as positive interaction partners.

On the other hand, members of a southern Unitarian church in the 1970s rated Christian positively (though not as positively as the fundamentalist church members) and homosexual negatively. The negative evaluation of homosexual typified the general culture at that time. Theoretically, those sentiments would have produced

interactions between gays and Christians that were not very satisfying for either party. The homosexual's behaviors might have included tease, deride, annoy, needle, heckle, or blame; while the Christian's behaviors might have included examine, query, discipline, or analyze. The homosexual's emotions during the interaction could have included both anxiety and lightheartedness; the Christian's emotions would have included self-consciousness, apprehension, shock, or nervousness. Thus, homosexuals would have had to behave deviantly and produce few pleasant emotions for others if they accepted the sentiment about gays prevailing in the general culture.

A later survey of the two church congregations revealed that the Unitarians actually did have the expectations theoretically deduced from their sentiments, and the gay Christians saw their interactions in the positive manner generated from their positive sentiments.

4.3 Deviance Sub-Cultures

The negative sentiments we have about deviants allow us to predict deviants' behavior—on the whole, we expect bad people to behave badly, which they often do. Moreover, imagining that deviants share our negative sentiments about them allows us to understand their motives as well—bad people are driven to exercise their villainy, which makes them engage in malicious acts.

By stigmatizing deviants we make their conduct comprehensible, and that is so useful that we rarely question whether deviants have the same interpretations as we do. We imagine that they must because they engage in the very actions that confirm their stigma!

Yet lay intuitions about deviant psychology sometimes are wrong. Deviants in sub-cultures acquire positive sentiments about the sub-culture's special identities and actions. Then those identities elicit the characteristic behaviors of the deviants, not because the identities and behaviors are bad, but because they are good! That is, subcultural deviants do not feel they are engaging in despicable actions. They define themselves and their actions as positive.

Fig. 4-1 makes the point vividly. The chart is based on self-reports given anonymously in 1980s deviance classes at a large American university, and it shows how 94 females and 62 males evaluated "smoking marijuana, hash" and "sniffing cocaine," depending on their total experience with recreational drugs. The center of a circle shows the average ratings of the two drugs within the group represented by the circle. The diameters of the circles show the percentages of respondents in the different groups, by sex.

You can see that people who had no experience with recreational drugs viewed both kinds of drug use as wicked. Those who tried marijuana but nothing else viewed sniffing cocaine less negatively than non-users, and they felt that smoking marijuana is neither bad nor good. Those who tried both marijuana and cocaine felt that using these drugs is a positive act. And those far enough into the drug sub-culture to have tried LSD as well as the other two drugs not only felt positive about drug usage, they felt that using marijuana is quite good!



Fig. 4-1. Average evaluations of marijuana and cocaine among females and males who have used or not used marijuana, cocaine, and LSD. Circle size shows percentage of respondents at each level of drug experience.

The same finding replicates again and again in self-report studies. For example, those with experience in occult sub-cultures view invoking spirits positively, in contrast to others' views that this is devilish or farcical. Students who have threatened someone with a weapon see this as positive, self-reassuring behavior in contrast to the abhorrence expressed by others. Students with sado-masochistic sexual experience see such acts positively in contrast to the general condemnatory view.

4.3.1 Non-Normalized Deviants

Not all deviants normalize their identities or behaviors. Some really act out the plots we provide for them as deviants. They are the ones we might identify as psychiatrically disturbed in the sense that they maintain negative self-sentiments, confirm their negative self-concepts through behaviors that they believe are bad, and endure the capricious and frequently negative emotions that such behavior induces.

More on that later!

4.4 Occupations

Occupations have different levels of social standing, with professionals like doctors and judges at the top, and workers who do simple and subservient work—like boot-blacks—at the bottom. Position in the occupational hierarchy relates to average education and average income. Occupations with high social standing are those in which most of the people pursuing that occupation are well educated and well paid.

Sentiments associated with occupations reflect social standing somewhat. The education component of social standing corresponds roughly to evaluation of the occupation, at least for occupations where not everyone has a college degree. Income corresponds roughly to the occupation's potency.

Nearly every occupation has a sub-culture, at least to the extent of workers within the occupation evaluating their job more positively than do outsiders. Members of the occupation also may develop special sentiments regarding particular kinds of people and objects that they encounter frequently.

For example, a study of state police officers found that the troopers attributed more goodness, potency, and activity to themselves than college students attributed to them. Additionally, the troopers felt criminals are substantially less bad and less weak than suggested by student sentiments about criminals. Their special sentiments relate to the fact that troopers interact in a competitive, non-aggressive way with criminals, as required in their role, rather than in a conflictual, melodramatic way that would correspond with public sentiments about troopers and criminals.

4.5 Further Readings

I reported differences between male and female sentiments in the appendix of my book, *Understanding Events* (Heise 1979). Tom Langford and Neil MacKinnon (2000) reported their research on gendered traits in their article "The affective basis for the gendering of traits: Comparing the United States and Canada."

Lynn Smith-Lovin and William Douglass described their studies of gay and non-gay Christians in their 1992 article "An affect-control analysis of two religious groups."

MacKinnon and Langford assessed the relation between EPA and the average income and education of occupations in their 1994 article, "The meaning of occupational prestige scores: A social psychological analysis and interpretation." I reported the study of state troopers in Chapter 4 of *Understanding Events* (Heise 1979).

5

Defining Situations

When you enter a place, you figure out who you and others are so that you know how to act. Usually you define the situation fast and unconsciously because others' identities are evident from their uniforms (like a bus-driver) or you're encountering someone who always has the same role with you (like your mother). But the complexities of defining a situation become evident when an expected situation vanishes.

You probably have walked into a room expecting one group of people—like co-workers—and found someone else instead—like your sweetheart. When such a thing happens you are forced to re-define the situation. You can feel yourself dropping the readiness for some actions and preparing yourself to act in other ways.

Who you are depends on who others are, and what roles others take depend on the role you have. Thus you have to figure out these problems simultaneously. The solution to the puzzle of defining everyone may require more information, like knowing where you are. You and a co-worker aren't supposed to act like sweethearts at the place you work; and it's strange to act like co-workers when you and your sweetheart are alone in a cozy romantic restaurant.

5.1 Identities

Colloquial English has about 10,000 identities that can be assigned to people in everyday situations. About two-fifths of these relate to occupations and socioeconomic status, suggesting that work and wealth are preeminent factors in defining many social situations. Another ten percent of the identities manifest aspects of kinship, politics, or religion. Thus about half of the available identities available for defining social situations relate to basic social institutions of society.

About one eighth of the identities are linked to an individual's body in one way or another. This includes identities tied to an individual's sex or age—e.g., schoolgirl, altar-boy, heroine, womanizer, gent, lady, crone, or geezer—as well as some of the kinship identities, like sister and nephew. Also in this category are specific racial

labels, like white-trash, half-breed, or black. Some identities in this category link to specific body features, like runt, brunette, and mute.

Ethnic labels identifying an individual's ancestral heritage (excluding race) or geographic station constitute another five percent of identities. Examples include Italian, Hopi, Cockney, and Hoosier.

About ten percent of common identities lay an evaluative judgment on the individual who has the identity. Most of these stigmatize—e.g., bore, grouch, snob, scum-bag, bully, dimwit, patsy, oaf, sissy, or jerk. A few of the evaluative identities enfold a person with esteem, such as boyfriend, buddy, humanitarian, square-shooter, or self-starter.

About five percent of identities relate to avocations and leisure pursuits. Some examples are baseball-player, goalie, mountaineer, scuba-diver, tourist, hiker, moviegoer, coin-collector, or smoker. Another one percent relates to sexual activities—e.g., straight, bisexual, lesbian, libertine, or pervert.

No individual qualifies for all 10,000 identities. For example, just among occupations an individual would rarely be able to claim more than one of the following: coal-miner, lumberjack, dental hygienist, bailiff, assessor, senator, landscape-architect, banker, and private-detective. However, most adults in contemporary society have hundreds of identities that they may adopt —between 500 and 1,000.

You yourself probably have seven or eight hundred identities to choose from in a new social situation. So do most others who are in the situation with you. Thus, defining a situation can be an intellectual challenge.

5.2 Institutions

Social institutions are constellations of identities, settings, and actions relating to some elementary concern. They organize the huge number of identities that you can encounter, greatly simplifying the definition of situations. Figure out which institution's cues predominate at a given time and place, and you can infer that everyone at the scene probably has identities associated with that institution.

For example, if you're in a hospital, in a room where some people are dressed in white, and some individuals are supervising others, then, chances are, you are in a medical situation, and the individuals who are present have identities like doctor, nurse, technician, patient. Or if you're in a church, and an individual dressed in black is sermonizing others who are seated, then you likely are in a religious situation, with individuals who can be assigned identities like pastor, choir member, deacon, parishioner.

Among the institutions that you are likely to encounter in everyday life are the following.

The **Family** institution contains three clusters. *Marriage* related actions include marrying, committing adultery, and divorcing. Identities in this cluster include bachelor, spinster, fiancée, fiancé, bride, bridegroom, honeymooner, newlywed, husband, wife, widow, widower, adulteress, adulterer, mistress, divorce lawyer, divorcée, divorcé, ex-wife, and ex-husband.

Begetting, nurturing, and raising children relate to a *care-giving* cluster of identities in the family that includes parents, grandparents, siblings, and collateral relatives, as well as in-laws, step-relations, foster-relations, and babysitter. Some stigmatized identities in this group include illegitimate child, orphan, and deadbeat dad.

Apart from care-giving, another cluster of family identities relates to the world of *children*: infant, child, daughter, son, girl, boy, schoolgirl, or schoolboy; and also adults who orient toward pre-puberty children—schoolteacher, pediatrician, homemaker, and family man. Stigmatized identities in this group include truant, child molester, and abortionist.

Matters of sexual attraction, sexual activities, and sexual pleasuring traditionally were part of the family, but legitimation of homosexuality and other sexual preferences have cleaved **Sexuality** away from the family into a separate institution. Its identities include heterosexual, intimate, flirt, pickup, lady-killer, stud, lecher, adulterer, nymphomaniac, slut, adulteress, homosexual, gay, bisexual, lesbian, dyke, swinger, voyeur, sadist, masochist, prostitute, gigolo, pimp, rapist, and gynecologist.

At least two clusters of identities populate the **Business** institution. One cluster deals with people who are *working* at a job in a business, office, organization, company, etc., and may be engaged in hiring, employing, controlling, and paying. Among the relevant identities are employer, boss, foreman, worker, employee, work mate, co-worker, skilled worker, temporary worker, apprentice, intern, instructor, and trainee. The cluster also has disvalued identities for those whose work performance is deficient—clock watcher and do-nothing—plus identities for those who are separated from the work world like retiree and unemployed person.

Another *commercial* cluster involves selling, buying, and paying for goods and services in shops, stores, restaurants, etc. The cluster includes identities for those buying—customer, shopper and purchaser—and also includes identities for those selling: saleslady, salesman, salesclerk, and merchant. Additionally there are identities for individuals who deliver purchases such as server, waitress and waiter. Shoppers who forego paying are in this cluster—shoplifter—and also sellers of sexual services—e.g., hooker, call girl, pimp, and gigolo.

Identities related to **Religion** partition into two groups. *Ecclesiastic* identities are for those who interpret religious doctrine—preacher, evangelist, and saint—or conduct religious rites: clergyman, priest, priestess, minister, pastor, or rabbi. Types of individuals in a congregation—like protestant, catholic, or born-again Christian—also are in this cluster. A *divinity* cluster includes identities of supernatural beings, such as God and devil, and identities defined by a relation to the supernatural, such as pagan, devil worshiper, atheist, or agnostic.

The **Education** institution embraces those who enroll in universities, colleges, and other schools in order to study and learn, as well as those who do the teaching and training. Among the identities of this institution are student, undergraduate, coed, grind, scholar, graduate student, teacher, professor, lecturer, alumnus, and dropout.

The **Medical** institution embraces specialists licensed to treat or to perform operations on people who are ill, injured, or hurt. Patient and invalid are identities for those receiving care. Doctor identities include physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, doctor, gynecologist, and pediatrician, as well as the negatively evaluated identities of

abortionist, sawbones, shrink, and quack. The institutional identities also name kinds of nurses: e.g., registered nurse, head nurse, practical nurse.

The **Legal** institution has two clusters. A *law* component focuses on professionals who practice law—advising people on legal matters, conducting lawsuits, and speaking for clients in courts—or who represent the state and accuse people of crimes. The institutional identities include lawyer, attorney, defense attorney, divorce lawyer, and mouth-piece; plus the state officials of prosecuting attorney, district attorney, public defender, and judge. Labels for courtroom participants who are not legal professionals also are relevant identities: e.g., jury foreman and sheriff on the one hand, and felon, criminal, or crook on the other hand. A *police* component of law embraces members of police forces—such as police officer, cop, detective, state trooper, patrolman, plainclothesman, or nark. Some types of individuals who link with police in one way or another also are in the component: e.g., vigilante, stool-pigeon, or informer.

The **Political** institution has two branches. The *executive* component includes the identities of head, leader, governor, mayor, president, plus lower level office holders like assessor, auditor, recorder, treasurer, etc. The *electoral* component collects the identities of senator, politician, representative, candidate, lobbyist, legislator, conservative, alderman, and voter and citizen.

Other everyday institutions that haven't been delineated empirically yet include **Traveling** and **Entertainment**. The traveling institution presumably contains identities like driver, passenger, commuter, conductor, flight attendant, traveler. The entertainment institution encompasses identities like fan, athlete, movie-goer, movie star, host and hostess, guest.

The above institutions impinge on the lives of most individuals. Still more institutions exist in contemporary society—e.g., the **Military** and **Science**—but these organize daily experiences for comparatively few people.

Institutional identities are associated with general social roles that set expectations about what you and the other person should do in a scene. Even an intimate identity like sweetheart involves a general role defining proper behavior.

5.2.1 Cues to Institutions

You participate in various social institutions on a regularly scheduled basis during much of your life. Fig. 5-1 illustrates the idea for a hypothetical adult living in a suburb of a city. Every weekday the individual gets up early and shares some time with family members, then commutes to work in the city, stays a full work day, and commutes home for a few more hours with family. Saturday morning is spent with family, and the afternoon and evening are devoted to entertainments like socializing with friends, sports, and TV. Sunday is similar to Saturday, except some of the morning hours are devoted to religion. This weekly pattern repeats for most of the year, but for a few weeks during the individual's vacation, weekday time is committed to family, travel, and entertainment instead of to work. Time committed to specific institutions also varies at different stages in the individual's lifetime. For example, a youth is engaged with education instead of work, an elder frequently is engaged with the institution of medicine.



Fig. 5-1. Time committed to various institutions for a hypothetical individual. Mornings are at the center of the diagram, evenings are at the outer ends of the bars.

Such scheduled allocation of time to institutions is the norm for nearly everyone, even though time committed to specific institutions varies from one individual to another.

Thus, at any time you probably should be participating in some institution, and your first cue about your immediate situation is provided by your timepiece. Knowing the day and time, you know what institution you are supposed to be in—like the frazzled tourist who says, Today is Tuesday so I must be in Rome. Point of time greatly limits the likely situations you have to consider.

Your physical setting provides a second cue regarding the situation you are in. Most institutions have designated places where the institution's activities properly occur. For example, the medical institution is centered largely in ambulances, operating rooms, examination rooms, patient rooms, asylums, sanatoriums. Being in one of these places means that you probably should define the situation in terms of medical identities. Moreover, the likely identities are different in each of these places—e.g.,

in an ambulance, versus an operating room, versus a patient's room in a hospital—so recognizing your specific location narrows the situational possibilities down to a subset of an institution's identities.

5.3 Selves

Your self-sentiment also enters into the process of defining situations. You choose identities as a way of expressing yourself, of affirming the kind of person you are, even while fitting in with requirements of social institutions. Given a choice, you prefer social institutions that allot you identities with sentiments matching your self-sentiment. Within a given social institution, you prefer to take identities with sentiments closest to your self-sentiment. Encountering another individual, you prefer an identity that expresses your self-sentiment, and you try to cast the other into a complementary identity.

For example, suppose that you are a person with good self-esteem, thinking of yourself as capable, and also as somewhat introverted. Education, medicine, and religion are institutions providing a wealth of identities for expressing yourself. Within, say, academia, you incline toward identities like scholar, graduate student, or professor, while avoiding high-spirited academic identities like undergraduate or jock. As a student, you sometimes may cast other students into the identity of dullard, allowing you to take your preferred roles of tutor or helper with them.

Continuing the example, suppose you are the same kind of person, but extraverted instead of introverted. Now business, politics, and sexuality are institutions where you have many opportunities for self-expression. In the business world, you prefer identities like partner, negotiator, or organizer, and avoid identities like clerk or secretary. As a worker, you see co-workers as members of a team, allowing you to take your preferred role of teammate with them.

Of course, you do not always have a choice of identity. An extraverted individual with bills to pay may work as an aide, because that is the only job available, even though the aide identity does not express the individual's self well. Being somewhat inauthentic for that person, the aide identity creates a need for a compensatory identity, as discussed in Chapter 10.

5.4 Multiple Identities

You can maintain several different identities in a situation—for example, when you throw a party you may act as friend, host, and housekeeper, alternating among these identities for the performance of different kinds of behavior and to comprehend others' actions. Switching among identities as you interpret a particular event can change the self-significance of the event and compound your consequent emotions. For example, a guest who spills a glass of red wine on your carpet may have you aghast as a housekeeper, even while you display nonchalance as a host, and commiseration as a friend.

Some identities operate outside of regular institutions—for example, friendship identities, ethnic and racial identities, biological identities, mental-endeavor identities, and some stigmatizing identities. Such identities often co-occur with formal institutional identifications. For example, a man holding nearly any institutional identity simultaneously might be considered a friend, an Arab, a brunette, an expert, or a cad.

These tangential identities—sometimes called social identities as opposed to role identities—so often co-occur with other identities that they typically have a modifier form allowing them to be combined easily with identity nouns—e.g., an Arab intellectual, an intellectual Arab, a female golfer, an alcoholic judge. The modifier version promotes defining situations in terms of a participant's multiple identities.

5.4.1 Identity Modifiers

Sometimes you have personal information about an individual, and you qualify your definition of a situation involving the person to reflect your knowledge. You particularize the person's basic identity with specifications of traits, moods, biological characteristics, statuses, or moral dispositions. You thereby adjust general role expectations so as to better fit that particular individual..

Table 5-1. Example personality traits having various configurations of evaluation, potency and activity (EPA)

EPA Configuration	Trait
Good, Potent, Active	industrious, brave
Good, Potent, Inactive	wise, sincere
Good, Impotent, Active	carefree, impressionable
Good, Impotent, Inactive	humble, soft-spoken
Bad, Potent, Active	ruthless, belligerent
Bad, Potent, Inactive	strict, smug
Bad, Impotent, Active	rude, childish
Bad, Impotent, Inactive	lazy, withdrawn

Traits provide the most flexible means of characterizing an individual's uniqueness in a situation. Trait attribution is a way of understanding a person as more pleasant or more unpleasant than most people who perform a given role, as livelier or quieter, as more commanding or less so. Table 5-1 shows a few of the hundreds of trait names available in English.

Attributing a trait to a person amounts to assuming that the individual participates in every social situation in a special way, with role performances always skewed idiosyncratically. You are likely to attribute a trait after you note that an individual engaged in some abnormal action with regard to her or his situational identity, without repairing the impressions created by the peculiar action. Attributing a trait allows you to understand the peculiarity as being due to the individual's character or personality.

Sometimes you account for an individual's peculiar social participation by stressing a biological characteristic of the person—like sex, age, body type, disability—or

a status that the person has—like wealth, education, class. Like personality traits, these adjust the expected pleasantness, liveliness, and dominance of the person's performances in a situation. Imagine a friend telling you that he left your car with an aged, fat, half-blind, illiterate, and impoverished car mechanic! You might guess that your car will end up in worse shape than it started, unless that mechanic has special genius in her fingers!

Still another way that you adjust your expectations for people is by noting the kind of characters that they have: moral, noble, helpful, kind, fair, sensible—or immoral, petty, selfish, mean, unfair, foolish. This kind of qualification is especially useful when you want to put a rhetorical handle on the person, in order to negotiate with her ("you're a fair person, right?") or with others ("she's too selfish to depend on").

Moods are still another way of characterizing an individual's uniqueness in a situation. A mood interprets a person's peculiar social participation as due to a temporary affective state, applying just in the current situation and at the present time—not in all situations, and not even in the same situation on other days. Some moods that can be attributed to someone are: calm, relaxed; happy, ecstatic; scornful, contemptuous; lonely, depressed; panicked, tormented. As you can see, moods are named with same words as emotions. However, moods are temporary aspects of an individual's identity, whereas emotions are not.

5.5 Further Readings

This chapter draws heavily on a book being written by Neil MacKinnon and myself, *Identities, Selves, and Social Institutions*, for information about kinds of identities, the institutional partitioning of identities, social identities as modifiers, and the importance of institutions and self-sentiments in defining situations. A classic work addressing some of these issues is George McCall and Jerry Simmons' 1978 book, *Identities and Interactions*. A contemporary view is provided by James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium (2000) in *The Self We Live By: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World*.

Lynn Smith-Lovin has been exploring the topic of multiple identities and complex emotions (Smith-Lovin 2002; 2003). Modifier-identity combinations were analyzed in an article by Christine Averett and myself, "Modified social identities: Amalgamations, attributions, and emotions" (Averett and Heise, 1987), available in the book, *Analyzing Social Interaction* (Smith-Lovin and Heise, 1988).