#### Lecture 9

Hedonics: Property value models

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### Roadmap

- What can we use to infer the demand for environmental goods?
- What do housing prices tell us?
- When do changes in house prices give us welfare measures

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We can't compute CS, EV, CV, etc!

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This change in price can tell us something about how people value the change in the environmental good

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What does this price change mean?

Common market goods to use for revealed preference valuation are **properties** 

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- Rooms
- Bathrooms
- School quality
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Homes located in pristine areas are likely to be more valuable than identical homes located near toxic facilities

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It is uncontroversial that property values should reflect local attributes

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Suppose that we have some quality-differentiated good (i.e. a home)

This good is characterized by a set of J property characteristics x

parcel size, school quality, bedrooms, etc

It is also characterized by an environmental good q

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Here we will assume the supply of houses is fixed in the short run so the price function arises from buyer behavior

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$$\max_{x,q,z} U(x,q,z;s) \quad s.\,t. \quad y=z+P(x,q)$$

- z is the numeraire good (spending on other private goods)
- *y* is income
- s is the set of the household's characteristics like family size

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We won't touch on this in class but there is a **discrete choice** literature that works to alleviate these issues

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We are thus also implicitly assuming q varies across space so that households can sort into areas they prefer

• q is really picking up local environmental goods

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For homeowners we are basically assuming they rent from themselves every year

$$\max_{x,q,z} U(x,q,z;s) \quad s.\,t. \quad y=z+P(x,q)$$

The FOCs for this problem are:

$$egin{align} rac{\partial U}{\partial x_j} = & \lambda rac{\partial P}{\partial x_j} & j = 1, \dots, J \ rac{\partial U}{\partial q} = & \lambda rac{\partial P}{\partial q} \ rac{\partial U}{\partial z} = & \lambda \end{matrix}$$

Next, combine the last two FOCs

$$egin{aligned} rac{\partial U}{\partial q} = & \lambda rac{\partial P}{\partial q} \ rac{\partial U}{\partial z} = & \lambda \end{aligned}$$

gives us that

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial q} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial q} \bigg/ \frac{\partial U}{\partial z}$$

At a utility-maximizing choice, a household equates their MRS between q and z and the marginal implicit cost of q

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Knowledge of the hedonic price function P is enough to tell us about household WTP for q!

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Next we will define something called a bid function  $b(x, q, y, s, \bar{u})$  where:

$$U(x,q,y-b(x,q,y,s,ar{u});s)=ar{u}$$

The bid function b is the maximum amount the household is willing to pay for:

- A house with characteristics x, q
- ullet Given income y and household characteristics s
- Holding utility fixed

$$U(x,q,z;s)=ar{u}$$

We can also invert this to solve for z:<sup>1</sup>

$$z=U^{-1}(x,q,ar{u},s)$$

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Income, the bid function and z are related by:

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Now we have everything we need to derive a marginal WTP function for q

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$$U(x,q,y-b(x,q,y,s,ar{u});s)=ar{u}$$

Differentiate with respect to q to get:

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial z} \frac{\partial b}{\partial q} = 0$$

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We can then rearrange to get:

$$rac{\partial b}{\partial q} = rac{\partial U}{\partial q} igg/rac{\partial U}{\partial z}$$

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Conditional on x, this defines our compensated inverse demand function for q!

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
Our ultimate empirical goal is to estimate  $\pi^q(x,q,s,\bar{u})$ 

## Bid functions and housing prices

The red line is the hedonic price function

The blue lines are a single household's bid functions at different reference utility levels where  $u_1>u_0>u_2$ 


Higher utility  $\rightarrow$  lower bids because same level of q can be achieved with higher z



## Bid functions and housing prices

Optimal choice is where the household's bid function is tangent to the hedonic price schedule: a

This gives us an observed consumption level  $q_0$ , observed price  $P(x,q_0)$ , and realized utility  $u^0$ 




### Compensated MWTP

This plot shows the corresponding compensated MWTP curve associated with  $b(x, q, y, s, u^0)$ 

It is the slope of the bid function as q changes

We observe b if we can estimate P(x,q) and its derivative



## **Compensated MWTP**

We can estimate P(x,q) using home sales prices and home attributes data

The slope of P(x,q) is then equal to the MWTP for q

This gives us the consumers inverse demand for q

$$rac{\partial P(x,q_0)}{\partial q}=\pi^q(x,q_0,s,u^0)$$

