

Brest. Reassuming control of the 13th Infantry, General Stroh took responsibility for providing security for Rennes. Deployed to block all entrances into the city, the 8th Division became the VIII Corps reserve.¹⁶

Meanwhile, General Middleton had been pondering the proper mission of the 4th Armored Division. Though tempted to send it eastward toward Châteaubriant, he could not ignore Quiberon Bay. Yet the entire situation—not only in Brittany but all along the Allied front—was in a state of flux. All sorts of changes in the Allied plan were being rumored, and it seemed possible that the campaign might sweep so irresistibly eastward as to drag with it the entire VIII Corps. With this in mind, Middleton made a compromise decision on the evening of 3 August. He ordered Wood to block the bridges on the Vilaine River from Rennes to the coast.¹⁷ The Vilaine flows generally southwestward from Rennes and empties into the ocean about half way between St. Nazaire and Vannes. Two main highways cross the river—one at Redon, the other at la Roche-Bernard. By blocking the bridges at these towns and elsewhere, the 4th Armored Division would seal off the Rennes-Quiberon area. At the same time the division would also be ready to continue toward the east should that course of action become desirable and possible.

General Wood failed to get Middleton's message. "Have received no mission repeat have received no mission,"

he radioed the corps commander during the night of 3 August. "Reply urgent repeat reply urgent."

Deciding that it was time to see the division commander and make sure he understood the situation, Middleton drove to Wood's headquarters on 4 August.¹⁸

Wood threw his arms around the corps commander in welcome.

"What's the matter?" Middleton asked with dry humor. "Have you lost your division?"

"No!" Wood replied. It was worse than that. "They"—meaning the Allied command—"they are winning the war the wrong way."

Though Wood almost persuaded the corps commander that he ought to be allowed to go to the east without restriction, the result of the personal conference was a compromise. Without disarranging his dispositions oriented eastward, Wood agreed to block all the roads south of Rennes, to dispatch part of one combat command westward to secure the Vilaine River bridges near Redon, and to make maximum use of reconnaissance units to secure the Vilaine River line.¹⁹

The same day VIII Corps issued a list of the missions assigned to its combat components. The list confirmed the arrangements decided upon by Middleton and Wood. Sent to the Third Army headquarters as a routine matter, the information did not escape the sharp glance of Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, the army chief of staff. He immediately

¹⁶ 8th Div AAR, 8 Jul-4 Aug; VIII Corps G-3 Jnl, 2-4 Aug; Msg, Evans to Wood, 2040, 3 Aug; VIII Corps FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug; VIII Corps Msgs to 4th and 6th Armd Divs, 1645, 2 Aug.

¹⁷ Msg, Evans to Wood, 2040, 3 Aug.

¹⁸ Msg, Wood to Middleton, 0310, 4 Aug, and penned notation by member of the VIII Corps G-3 Sec on the msg.

¹⁹ Review Panel Min, OCMH, 9 May 56; Msg, Wood to Middleton, 1610, 4 Aug.

sent Middleton a memorandum to point out that General Patton "assumes that in addition to blocking the roads . . . , you are pushing the bulk of the [4th Armored] division to the west and southwest to the Quiberon area, including the towns of Vannes and Lorient, in accordance with the Army plan." The assumption notwithstanding, Gaffey at once ordered Patton's Household Cavalry to relay a message directly to Wood (and to Middleton for information) to the effect that the 4th Armored Division was expected to move to Vannes and Lorient, unequivocally to the west. Without comment, the corps headquarters noted the action and recorded the mission.²⁰

By this time the question on the proper mission of the armored division was not the only factor affecting its movements. The division was virtually out of gas. Had the combat commands south of Rennes been obliged to move suddenly, half their vehicles would have had to remain in place.

When the combat commands had begun their wide sweep around Rennes, the division trains had been left north of that city. Supply trucks that could have carried gasoline had been sent back to Avranches to bring the 13th Infantry forward. Not until the afternoon of 4 August, after the infantry occupied Rennes, was a direct supply route opened for the armored division; gasoline then became available.²¹

The uncertainty over the mission resolved and gasoline once more plentiful,

Wood on the morning of 5 August ordered CCA to drive the seventy miles westward to Vannes. The leading units of CCA departed at 1400 and swept into Vannes seven hours later. A battalion of the FFI that had already captured the Vannes airfield guided the column to the best approaches. So swift and surprising was the advance that the Germans in the town were unable to prepare demolitions. The combat command seized the bridges and other important installations intact.²²

Though the capture of Vannes cut the Brittany peninsula at its base, some fighting remained. On the following day, 6 August, the enemy launched a surprise counterattack from Auray and drove back CCA's outposts. A task force had to attack to re-establish the positions. To remove the root of the trouble, the task force continued to Auray, clearing the town the next morning. Thereupon the CCA commander, Colonel Clarke, sent a strong task force westward fifteen miles beyond Auray to seize a bridge at Hennebont, near Lorient. Led by light tanks, the column raced through artillery fire and found that the Germans had just destroyed the Hennebont bridge. Making a detour two miles to the north and crossing the Blavet River at Lochrist, CCA made contact with CCB near Lorient.

While CCA had taken Vannes and Auray, General Dager's CCB had driven directly toward Lorient. Reaching the outskirts of the city on the morning of 7 August and finding strong defenses, CCB detoured to the north to attack

²⁰ VIII Corps Msgs, 4 and 5 Aug; Memo, Gaffey to Middleton, 5 Aug; Msg, Army Info Patrol with the 4th Armd Div to VIII Corps, 5 Aug.

²¹ The Armored School, *Armor in the Exploitation*, p. 27; Ltr, Wood to OCMH, 24 Mar 54.

²² 4th Armd Div AAR, Aug; TUSA Info Serv Msg, 2330, 5 Aug; Koyen, *Fourth Armored Division*, pp. 22-26.

through a seemingly undefended approach from the northwest, through the village of Pont-Scorff. The move turned out to be a mistake. As the advance guard entered the village, German artillery fire fell in alarming proportions. The artillery fire killed 20 men, wounded 85, destroyed 5 half-tracks, 6 jeeps, 2 trucks, and 2 armored cars, and damaged a score of other vehicles.

The arrival of CCA in the Lorient region enabled the combat commands to establish a thin line around Lorient from Hennebont to Pont-Scorff. From positions for the most part out of range of German artillery, the division probed the Lorient defenses, trying to develop a feasible avenue of approach, but by 9 August it seemed clear that the Germans in Lorient were too strong for an armored division alone to reduce. Antitank ditches and mine fields were covered by interlocking bands of fire from what the division estimated to be 500 field pieces including antitank, anti-aircraft, coastal defense, and naval guns supplied with large stores of ammunition. Flak was so heavy that artillery planes could not get off the ground for observation. The FFI reported that the Germans had a great supply of provisions in the fortress city, including herds of cattle, and could therefore hold out for a long time. To be assured of success, an attack against Lorient would need support from the sea so that the Quiberon peninsula and Belle-Isle might first be neutralized.²³

Concerned lest the 4th Armored Division become embroiled in static warfare at Lorient, General Wood was gratified

to receive word from Middleton to hold the armor at arm's length from the fortress. "Do not become involved in a fight for Lorient unless enemy attacks," Middleton instructed. "Take a secure position and merely watch developments."²⁴

Actually, the fortress of Lorient was not as impregnable as it appeared to the Americans. The senior German commander in Lorient, Fahrmbacher, was seriously concerned lest a strong attack by the U.S. armor carry his position. Had Wood attacked between 6 and 9 August, Fahrmbacher later stated, the fortress would probably have fallen. The defenses of Lorient had not yet been organized; entire sectors were still unoccupied; many of the troops were untrained. Even the chain of command had not yet been firmly established. Preparations had been made for a garrison of 12,000 men in Lorient, but instead, there were about 25,000 Germans, plus 10,000 French civilians who constituted a potential Trojan horse and a certain drain on supplies. Rather than the 500 guns estimated by the Americans, Fahrmbacher had 197 guns in the fortress and 80 antitank pieces. By 10 August, when Fahrmbacher felt that he had erected an adequate, if provisional, defense, the American pressure decreased to the point that he no longer expected an attack.²⁵

²⁴ Penned Msg, probably in Middleton's hand, on Msg, Wood to Middleton, received at the VIII Corps CP, 1145, 8 Aug.

²⁵ For the rest of the war, Lorient was contained, in turn by the 4th Armored Division until 15 August, by the 6th Armored Division until it was relieved in mid-September by the 94th Division, and finally by the 66th, to whom Fahrmbacher surrendered his troops and the fortress on 10 May 1945. MS # B-731 (Fahrmbacher).

²³ 4th Armd Div G-3 Per Rpt 24, 9 Aug; Msg, Wood to Middleton, 2116, 8 Aug.

The resistance marked by the intense artillery fire on 7 August at Pont-Scorff was the first that could not be bypassed since the 4th Armored Division's commitment in Brittany. At Lorient, the division was at the end of a blind alley. Having no place to go was a cruel blow to General Wood, who had not abandoned the idea of driving eastward. On the evening of 6 August General Wood had radioed a message direct to General Patton: "Dear George: Have Vannes, will have Lorient this evening. Vannes intact, hope Lorient the same. Trust we can turn around and get headed in right direction soon."²⁶

Still optimistic, though somewhat subdued after CCB was halted near Lorient the following morning, Wood reported his situation to Middleton with candor:

Hoped to argue Boche into surrender of Lorient. However he still resists. Am attacking him from two sides. He may fold up. He has considerable fixed fortifications and can resist strongly if he wishes. If so, this is a job for infantry and guns. We should be allowed to reassemble and get ready to hit again in a more profitable direction, namely to Paris. Believe infantry division should be sent here at once for this job.²⁷

Patton had already made the decision. "Dear John," Middleton informed Wood in a letter he signed "Troy," "George was here this P.M. and made the following decision: When you take your objective, remain in that vicinity and await orders." If Wood could not take Lorient without help, Middleton continued, he was to hold in place until a decision could be made on the amount

of assistance he was to get. The reason, Middleton explained, was the obscurity that surrounded the developments not only in Brittany but on the larger front. It was possible that the American force driving toward Brest might also need help, and Patton did not want troops moved both east and west at the same time until the situation became clearer.²⁸

Terribly disappointed, Wood replied, "Am being left pretty far out on this limb." Still later he grumbled, "Can achieve impossible but not yet up to miracles. Boche does not intend to fold up." He radioed his belief that at least one infantry division supported by corps artillery, additional air power, and naval forces would be required to reduce Lorient. Finally, "My division requires overhaul for further operations at similar speeds," he radioed. "Request decision. Repeat request decision."²⁹

The decision that General Wood wanted was an admission by corps or army that another unit would relieve the 4th Armored Division at Lorient and an indication as to when the relief might take place. The 8th Division was supposed to have followed the 4th Armored Division into Brittany. When would it arrive at Lorient and allow Wood to get under way to the east? Why didn't the 8th come forward immediately from Rennes? Believing that the decision to move his armored division "away from the pursuit of a disorganized enemy" and toward Lorient "was one of the great mistakes of the war," and feeling certain that "a rapid

²⁶ Ltr, Middleton to Wood, 6 Aug.

²⁸ Msgs, Wood to Middleton, 1300, 7 Aug, 0233 and 2116, 8 Aug, and Msg received at VIII Corps CP, 1100, 8 Aug.

²⁶ Msg, Wood to Patton, 6 Aug.

²⁷ Msg, Wood to Middleton, 1000, 7 Aug.

move toward Chartres . . . would have been of immense value," he could not understand why the powerful mobile forces under his command were allowed to stand before a fortress city.³⁰

What Wood did not know was that the forces in Brittany had become step-children. As he had expected, the main action of the European campaign was developing east of Brittany, and Patton and Middleton lacked sufficient resources to develop the Brittany operation as they wished. Yet as soon as Middleton received Wood's request for a decision on the 4th Armored Division's future course of action, he replied, both by radio and by liaison plane, instructing Wood not to get involved in a battle at Lorient.³¹ At the same time he forwarded Wood's request to Patton, hoping thereby to get clarification of the entire Brittany situation and the future role of the VIII Corps.³²

At a conference late on 8 August, Patton informed Middleton that the VIII Corps still had the job of clearing the Brittany peninsula. Securing the ports of St. Malo and Brest had priority over the capture of Lorient. Thus, Wood would have to contain Lorient until St. Malo and Brest were taken. Only then could the far-flung forces of the VIII Corps in Brittany be assembled to help Wood "take Lorient out of the picture." The difficulty was that Middleton could not do everything at the same time. Given the forces at his disposal and his widely separated objectives, he could do no more than proceed from one task to another. Wood would have

to wait until the corps got around to his particular problem.³³

Despite this gloomy outlook, a spark of hope remained for the 4th Armored Division. Patton had told Middleton to send some troops to Nantes to relieve an American task force containing the Germans in that port city. Though Patton expected Middleton to dispatch troops from the 8th Division at Rennes, Middleton preferred to keep the 8th where it was so he could use it to reinforce the attack against St. Malo if necessary. Middleton therefore called upon the 4th Armored Division. He instructed Wood to contain Lorient and remain immobile, but he also told him to send a combat command eastward from Lorient to Nantes. An American unit was guarding Nantes, but Middleton did not know which one it was or exactly where it was. Wood was to locate and relieve the unit at Nantes. Middleton suggested that Wood send some cavalry along to enable the combat command to scout the Loire River east of St. Nazaire and Nantes and make contact with U.S. troops at Angers. The general situation, he added, looked good.³⁴

Good was hardly the word for it. Wood had wanted to go to Angers five days earlier. He sent Colonel Clarke's CCA on the eighty-mile move to Nantes on the morning of 10 August. On the following day CCA relieved a battalion of the 5th Division on the outskirts of the city. That night, heavy explosions in Nantes indicated that the Germans were destroying dumps and installations.

³⁰ Ltr, Wood to OCMH, 24 Mar 54.

³¹ Penned Msg, cited n. 24, above.

³² Notation on Msg, Wood to Middleton, received at VIII Corps CP, 1100, 8 Aug.

³³ Memo, Middleton for Wood, 8 Aug.

³⁴ Memos, Patton for Gaffey, and Middleton for Wood, 8 Aug.

French civilians reported the enemy withdrawing. Clarke therefore asked Wood's permission to enter Nantes with light forces.

Earlier, when Middleton had alerted Wood for the mission of driving to Nantes, he had ordered him categorically: "Do not become involved in fight in city. Merely prevent any enemy movement to north." Four days later, with a combat command at the gates of the city, the opportunity to take Nantes easily was too tempting to resist. Wood gave Clarke permission to attack. During the afternoon of 12 August, helped by men of the FFI, who led the troops safely through mine fields, CCA stormed the city and captured it.³⁵

Securing Nantes was like getting one's foot in the door. Wood's persistent efforts to drive to the east were about to succeed. A day later, on 13 August, the 4th Armored Division passed from the control of the VIII Corps, and on 15 August Wood handed over the responsibility of containing Lorient to the 6th Armored Division. By that time only a handful of 4th Armored Division troops remained at Lorient, impatient for the relief that would permit them to join the bulk of the division Wood had already sent out of Brittany. General Wood had finally gotten a mission he wanted. The 4th Armored Division was driving eastward.

During the first two weeks of August, the 4th Armored Division had displayed a constant and consistent aggressiveness. It had performed like cavalry—slashing, side-slipping, and pushing forward. It

had effectively exploited a fluid situation by using speed and surprise. Having made a reputation in the Cotentin, the division expanded it in Brittany. During the first twelve days of August, the 4th Armored Division took almost 5,000 prisoners and destroyed or captured almost 250 German vehicles. Against these figures, the division lost 98 killed, 362 wounded, 11 missing; 15 tanks and 20 vehicles.³⁶

Despite the impressive achievement represented by the number of the enemy destroyed and the amount of the territory liberated, the 4th Armored Division had not taken the port city assigned. Had Middleton and Wood been intent on securing Quiberon, the division might have arrived at Lorient a day or two earlier and perhaps have been in time to capture the fortress simply by smashing a way into the streets of the city; indeed, a serious effort launched immediately after the arrival of the division might still have taken the fortress.

In mid-August, as the Germans in western Europe seemed to be in the process of complete disintegration, the failure to take Lorient and Quiberon seemed less important than it would have seemed in July. By late September, Lorient and Quiberon were quite forgotten. "Looking at it with hindsight," General Middleton said many years afterward, "Wood was right, of course. But the high command at the time was absolutely right in . . . [wanting] the ports."³⁷ Wood's trouble was wanting to do the right thing at the wrong time.

³⁵ Evans to Wood, 8 Aug; Memo, Evans for BCT, 5th Div, 8 Aug; The Armored School, *Armor in the Exploitation*, p. 30; 4th Armd Div AAR, Aug.

³⁶ 4th Armd Div AAR, Aug; Koyen, *Fourth Armored Division*, p. 26.

³⁷ Min of Review Panel, OCMH, 9 May 56.

The 4th Armored Division had developed to a high degree of proficiency a reckless ardor for pursuit of a defeated enemy. The *esprit de corps* of the troops matched the supreme confidence of the division commander. It was stimulating to operate deep in enemy territory and report that over a thousand enemy soldiers were ready to surrender but that the division lacked "the time or the means to collect them."³⁸ It was heady to have such assurance that men

of the division could say with profound feeling of the Germans, "They've got us surrounded again, the poor bastards."³⁹

On the crest of a mounting wave of optimism the 4th Armored Division turned eastward and drove out of Brittany in search of further opportunities, its commander sure at last that he was heading in the right direction.

³⁸ TUSA Memo, Situation as of 0600, 6 Aug.

³⁹ Koyen, *Fourth Armored Division*, p. 13.

CHAPTER XX

“Take Brest”

While the 4th Armored Division was performing its feats in Brittany, the 6th Armored Division also was executing a spectacular movement. On the afternoon of 31 July the VIII Corps commander, General Middleton, ordered General Grow's division to relieve the 4th Armored Division's CCA in the Sélune River bridgehead at Pontaubault. (See Map VIII.)

Convinced that exploitation beyond Pontaubault was in order, but not knowing whether Middleton intended to move at once into Brittany or to consolidate his forces first at the base of the Cotentin, Grow asked Middleton whether the 6th Armored Division was to go beyond Pontaubault immediately. The answer was no. Satisfied that a day or two would pass (while other units of the corps arrived at Avranches) before the exploitation commenced, Grow dispatched Combat Command R (CCR), commanded by Col. Harry F. Hanson, to outpost the Pontaubault bridgehead.¹

In armored division practice, CCR was often considered more suitable for defensive than for offensive missions, primarily because it had less command tanks, radio equipment, and personnel than the other combat commands. By sending CCR ahead, General Grow indicated his intention to pass Combat Commands A and B through CCR at Pontaubault whenever he renewed the offensive. However, CCR was just moving forward when Grow received word—shortly before dawn, 1 August—to proceed at once through Pontaubault and move westward into Brittany through

¹ The sources for this chapter are: The invaluable msgs in the VIII Corps G-3 Jnl and File (all msgs cited are from this source unless otherwise noted). [Burk], *Combat Record of the Sixth Armored Division*, pp. 6ff. Robert W. Grow, “An Epic of Brittany,” *Military Review*, XXVI, No. 11 (February, 1947), pp. 3-9. Author's Intervs with former 6th Armd Div personnel: Gen Grow 18, 19, 31 Dec 52, 3 Jan 53; Mr. Michael J. Galvin (G-3), 6 Jan 53; Col Glen C. McBride (CofS), 19 Feb 53; Col Donald G. Williams (Engr), 16 Jan 53; Lt Col

Thomas A. Bruce (comdr of 128th FA Bn), 7 Jan 53. Ltrs, Gen Grow to Author, 26 and 27 Apr 54; Lt Col William J. Given (Sig Officer) to Gen Grow, 12 Jan 53; Mr. Ernest W. Mitchell (G-2) to Gen Grow, 5 Mar 53. Memo, Gen Grow to Author, n.d. Comments by Lt Col Eugene J. White, n.d. All in OCMH Files. See also, [Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow], *Brest to Bastogne, the Story of the 6th Armored Division* (pamphlet, Stars and Stripes, Information and Education Division, Special and Information Services, ETOUSA, Paris, c. 1945); [Lt. Robert J. Burns, Jr., and Lt. John S. Dahl], *The 68th Tank Battalion in Combat* (Minden, Nebraska: Warp Publishing Co., 1945); [Lt. Elmer J. Gruber], *A History of the 212th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in the E.T.O.* (n.p., n.d.); [Maj. Samuel R. Ross, Editor-in-Chief], *Battle Book: a Combat History of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, 6th Armored Division* (Apolda, Germany: Rob. Birkner, 1945); *Overseas Pictorial History of Headquarters Battery, 231st Armored Field Artillery Battalion* (Germany, 1945).

Pontorson and Dol-de-Bretagne to Dinan.²

Though General Grow's first impulse was to commit either CCA or CCB through CCR at once, the wreckage and rubble in Avranches and the existence of only one road to Pontaubault discouraged such action. As division military police took control of the routes through Avranches, as bulldozers worked to clear lanes for traffic, and as CCR moved to Pontaubault, Grow ordered Colonel Hanson to continue ten miles beyond Pontaubault to Pontorson. There, with the entire division through the Avranches bottleneck, Grow would pass the other combat commands through CCR for the westward advance into Brittany. Middleton visited Grow early on 1 August and approved the plans.

Several hours after Middleton's visit, as Grow was supervising the flow of traffic at a critical crossroads, General Patton arrived. Patton told Grow that he had wagered General Montgomery five pounds that U.S. troops would be in Brest "by Saturday night." Putting his hand on Grow's shoulder, Patton said, "Take Brest." To Grow's question on intermediate objectives, Patton indicated his interest in the Brest-Rennes railroad and instructed him to bypass resistance. The latter point was particularly satisfying. "That's all I want to know," Grow said. The corps objective, Dinan, was no longer valid.

To some, it might have seemed like madness to think of reaching Brest—more than two hundred miles west of

Avranches—in five days; but General Grow was delighted. He had "received a cavalry mission from a cavalryman." While serving years before as Patton's G-3, Grow had planned comparable operations for peacetime maneuvers. "It was what we had spent years studying and training for," he later recalled.

Giving armored forces seemingly impossible goals to keep commanders looking beyond the ends of their noses was not unusual for Patton. His dramatic words "Take Brest," and his ignoring of intermediate geographical objectives, clearly defined his intent to exploit through the entire length of the Brittany peninsula. The faster the exploiting force went, the greater would be its effect. If the exploitation culminated in capture of Brest, the operation would be perfect. The ultimate objective became the immediate goal. Even though it was perhaps hardly feasible to expect a solitary division to drive two hundred miles into enemy territory and single-handedly capture a fortress of unknown strength, it was exactly what General Grow set out to do.

The fragmentary corps order that Grow had received before dawn of 1 August contained a hastily sketched overlay showing a temporary boundary line between the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and a short arrow on each side pointing hazily into the Brittany peninsula. Later that day, as Middleton changed the 6th Armored Division objective from Dinan to Brest, he indicated two general routes as a guide for the division's movement. He also gave the division the 174th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. self-propelled guns), which complemented the normal attach-

² VIII Corps Opns Instrs (confirming fragmentary verbal orders), 31 Jul; 6th Armd Div G-3 Jnl, entry 0330, 1 Aug.



PONTAUBAULT BRIDGE over the Selune River, one of the few bridges left intact by retreating Germans.

ments, the 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 777th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion.³

Before General Grow could concentrate on his final objective, he had to move his division through Avranches and into Brittany and get his troops organized into two parallel columns poised for offensive action.⁴

Getting through the Avranches bottleneck was no mean achievement. On both 1 and 2 August German planes strafed the columns and tried to knock

out critical bridges, while all the combat commands and the division trains had to use the lone available highway toward Brittany. During one forty-hour period, the 777th Antiaircraft Battalion knocked out eighteen of forty enemy planes that appeared over Avranches and Pontaubault.

Beyond the bottleneck, the first terrain obstacle where the enemy might logically be expected to defend was the Couesnon River, the border of Brittany. Suspecting that the enemy would attempt to deny the crossing at Pontorson, General Grow split his division into two columns immediately south of Pontaubault, sending Hanson's CCR to Pontorson and Taylor's CCA southwestward to the Couesnon crossing at Antrain, seven miles south of Pontorson. Read's CCB followed CCR. Once across the Couesnon at Pontorson and Antrain, CCB might pass through CCR on the morning of 2 August, whereupon the 6th Armored Division would have

³ VIII Corps Opns Instrs (fragmentary verbal orders), 31 Jul, Msg, 1 Aug, and FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug.

⁴ Maj. Homer H. Hammond, *The Operations of the 6th Armored Division in the Brittany Peninsula*, Thesis, Officers' Advanced Course (The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga., 1946-47) (hereafter cited as Hammond, 6th Armored Division); see also [Committee 9], *Super Sixth in Exploitation* (6th Armored Division, Normandy to Brest), Operation COBRA, Research Report, Officers' Advanced Course (The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky., May 1949) (hereafter cited as [Committee 9], *Super Sixth*), an excellent source that includes good material on logistics, intelligence, and administration.