

Infantry to relieve CCB at Cambernon. After relief, CCB would be free to drive to the high ground north of Coutances if the VIII Corps was nowhere in evidence.⁵¹

Developments on 28 July illustrated the discrepancy between the results of COBRA as planned and as executed. North of the St. Lô–Coutances highway, CCB met little opposition on the move toward Cambernon. After knocking out two Mark V Panther tanks with bazookas, reconnaissance troops took the objective, securing it by noon. When Colonel Boudinot asked permission to continue westward to Monthuchon, General Huebner approved after a check with General Collins. (*Map VI*)

Almost immediately word came that VIII Corps had already captured Monthuchon. Still anxious to take a part of his original objective, Boudinot ordered his troops to bypass Monthuchon and take the high ground north of Coutances. Huebner could not sanction a crossing of the north–south Périers–Monthuchon–Coutances highway because it had been reserved for the VIII Corps, and he countermanded Boudinot's order. Although reconnaissance elements were already infiltrating across the road and outposting the high ground north of Coutances, the main body of CCB stopped in time to prevent serious intermingling with the VIII Corps.⁵² Forced to halt, the tankers could see the city of Coutances less than two miles away.

Although Combat Command B had found little to obstruct its advance, the

16th Infantry, attacking westward toward Monthuchon in a zone south of the St. Lô–Coutances highway, advanced only slightly before reaching a well-organized defensive line. “Any contact with the enemy?” a division staff officer asked on the telephone. “Three hundred and sixty degree contact,” came the somewhat exaggerated reply.⁵³ The regiment made no further progress during the afternoon, even though regimental attacks brought severe casualties and the loss of fifteen tanks, seven of them mediums. Tactical aircraft, which might have helped, were grounded because of cloudy weather.

Shortly before nightfall General Huebner told CCB to go to the aid of the 16th Infantry. Turning to the southeast and attacking, the combat command pinched the rear of the enemy position. Caught in a trap, the German defense disintegrated. Before midnight CCB and the 16th Infantry made contact.

Committed last, the 26th Infantry executed the 1st Division's final COBRA action. Having passed through Marigny during the morning of 28 July, it moved westward to take Cambernon. CCB's quick seizure of Cambernon and the cancellation of Monthuchon and Coutances as objectives for the VII Corps prompted General Huebner to change the regimental mission to that of sweeping the left flank of the division. Advancing through terrain infested by stragglers and remnants of German units, the 26th Infantry executed what was essentially a mop-up operation. In the early evening the leading battalion turned and faced south to exert pressure

⁵¹ 1st Div AAR, Jul, and G-3 Jnl, 28 Jul.

⁵² 1st Div G-3 Jnl, entries 1450 and 1537, 28 Jul; 3d Armd Div CCB AAR, Jul.

⁵³ 16th Inf S-3 Jnl, 28 Jul.

on the rear of German troops trapped near the village of Savigny.⁵⁴

Like CCB's shift to the south, the 26th Infantry's turn to the south was a consequence of the changing situation developing out of COBRA. According to the plan, the main battle was to have occurred in the triangular region formed on the Cotentin west coast between Lessay and Coutances by the highways from Lessay and Coutances to St. Lô. As the VIII Corps exerted pressure south from the Lessay-Périers road, the main exploiting force of the VII Corps was to have raced to Coutances to cut off German escape. "Did we lose the big fish

in the trap?" a 1st Division officer asked. "Yes, probably," came the reply.⁵⁵ The division had lost two big fish: the prestige of capturing Coutances and the opportunity of trapping large numbers of Germans north of the St. Lô-Coutances highway. In three days, the division had taken only 565 prisoners.⁵⁶ The bulk of the Germans, by escaping the VII Corps main effort, had slipped through the COBRA noose. As a result, the fighting shifted to the region south of the Coutances-St. Lô highway. The 1st Division had little alternative but to face south and assume the role that the VIII Corps had earlier played, the role of a pressure force.

⁵⁴ 1st Div AAR, Jul, and Situation Overlay, 2400, 28 Jul. S. Sgt. George E. Jackson received the DSC for heroic action that day.

⁵⁵ 16th Inf Jnl, 28 Jul.

⁵⁶ 1st Div G-2 Per Rpt 39, 28 Jul.

CHAPTER XIV

The Breakthrough Developed

The Second Thrust Toward Coutances

When night came on 26 July, the second day of Operation COBRA, General Collins still had one uncommitted unit, the 3d Armored Division (less CCB). Although scheduled to enter the fight on 26 July along with the other two armored columns, the 3d Armored had been withheld because of the uncertainty about the extent of the COBRA penetration. It was located in the VII Corps center where it might be used either to defend against counterattack or to reinforce success at any point within the corps.¹

When operations on 26 July left no doubt that a clear penetration had been made, General Collins told the commander, General Watson, to begin executing his original mission the next morning, 27 July. (*See Map V.*) Employing General Hickey's Combat Command A (with a battalion of the 1st Division's 26th Infantry attached), the 3d Armored Division was to attack through the middle of the Marigny-St. Gilles gap to the vicinity of Carantilly and Canisy. At Cerisy-la-Salle the division was to turn to the west, secure

Montpinchon, cut the north-south highway about half way between Coutances and Gavray, and set up blocking positions south of Coutances on high ground overlooking the roads leading south to Gavray and Bréhal.

This was basically a defensive mission. In making a wide envelopment en route to Coutances, the 3d Armored Division was to thwart the northward movement of German reinforcements against the 1st Division and its attached CCB. On the other hand, should COBRA thoroughly disorganize the Germans and force their withdrawal, the 3d Armored Division would be in position to block the southern exits from Coutances. If the VIII Corps reached Coutances ahead of the 3d Armored Division, General Watson was to halt at the Coutances-Gavray road in order to circumvent traffic congestion between VII and VIII Corps forces in a subsequent exploitation of COBRA. Because on 26 July a deep exploitation hardly seemed likely, General Collins told General Watson to destroy all bridges over the Sienne River not previously knocked out by air bombardment.²

¹ 3d Armd Div Ltr of Instrs, 26 Jul (confirming oral orders issued by the corps commander on the evening of 25 July).

² FUSA Outline Plan COBRA, 13 Jul; VII Corps FO 6 (rev), 20 Jul; 3d Armd Div Amendment to FO 4, 20 Jul; Ltr, Destruction of Bridges, 22 Jul; Memo, 23 Jul (an extract of VII Corps Msg, 23 Jul); Ltr of Instrs, 24 Jul.

Dividing CCA into three task forces—each basically a battalion of tanks and one of armored infantry—General Hickey sent the command across the Périers–St. Lô highway in column early on 27 July. The troops were to drive forward aggressively, outflanking or bypassing resistance and avoiding hedgerow fighting. Though the road net was not the best for rapid armored advance, little opposition was expected because the 4th Division already had passed through the area. With Operation COBRA well on the way to success, there seemed no reason why the armored column should not move quickly to the village of Cerisy-la-Salle, then swing to the west.³

This line of thought did not take into account certain obstacles—bomb craters, wrecked vehicles, and traffic congestion. The leading task force met a well-organized strongpoint southeast of Marigny around noon of 27 July and lost four of its medium tanks. While the head of the column sought to disengage, the rest of the armor jammed up along the roads to the rear for a distance of almost ten miles. Though the point finally broke contact and bypassed the resistance (which the 12th Infantry of the 4th Division cleared later in the day), another obstacle developed in the Carantilly–Canisy region. Here CCA's advance units encountered several German tanks and antitank guns deployed along a railroad embankment. Prevented from bypassing this resistance because of inadequate roads, the leading task force had no choice but to fight.

Heavy fire from CCA's tanks eventually subdued the defenses, but again the bulk of the column had to wait impotently for several hours along the roads to the rear. Traffic congestion and more enemy pockets prompted a halt shortly after dark.

The advance had been disappointing. The third task force in the column was still far back in the vicinity of Marigny and St. Gilles, the second was in the Carantilly–Canisy area, and the head of the combat command was more than three miles short of Cerisy-la-Salle, the pivot point for the westward thrust toward Coutances.⁴

The villages of Cerisy-la-Salle, on a hill almost 400 feet high, and Montpinchon, on a mound about 425 feet high two miles to the west and on the other side of a steep-walled valley, dominated the surrounding terrain in general and in particular the road net westward to Coutances. The 3d Armored Division commander, General Watson, had assumed that COBRA would develop so rapidly that CCA would occupy Cerisy-la-Salle without difficulty. Plans had thus been prepared for operations only in the area west of that village—along the Montpinchon–Coutances axis.

On the evening of 27 July, the situation demanded a change. CCA had started a day late, and its approach march had been disappointingly slow. In addition, there were indications that the Germans were in the process of establishing a front line facing eastward to cover a withdrawal through Coutances. Should they institute a full-scale withdrawal, they would inevitably try to pass through the Montpinchon–

³ 3d Arm'd Div CCA AAR, Jul, and Warning Order, 19 Jul; 3d Arm'd Div FO 4, 19 Jul, FO 5, 20 Jul, and G-3 Per Rpt 34, 28 Jul.

⁴ 3d Arm'd Div G-3 Per Rpt 33, 27 Jul.

Cerisy-la-Salle region and hold the commanding terrain. If CCA followed the original plan and passed through Cerisy-la-Salle in column, it would continue to move across the German front and be exposed to flanking fire. It might even get involved in an engagement at Cerisy-la-Salle or Montpinchon that might prevent the armor from reaching Coutances in time to block German withdrawal through that important road center. Thus, a quicker way to Coutances had to be found, but at the same time Cerisy-la-Salle and Montpinchon had to be seized and secured to deny the Germans dominating terrain, which in their hands would facilitate their escape from the Coutances area.

General Hickey's solution, which General Watson approved, was to start his turn westward toward Coutances at once and to move on a broad front. The leading task force was to turn west from Canisy, bypass Cerisy-la-Salle on the north, and drive to Montpinchon. The second task force in the CCA column was to continue to Cerisy-la-Salle and capture the high ground there. The last task force in the column was to assume the CCA main effort, swing westward from Carantilly, and head straight for Coutances. (*See Map VI.*)

Despite hopes for success, CCA was due for another day of disappointment on 28 July. Because of traffic congestion, the main effort from Carantilly did not get started until midafternoon. Even then terrain broken by hedgerows and small hills as well as a dearth of good roads slowed the advance markedly. Clearing isolated resistance, the task force in late afternoon reached a point about five miles west of Carantilly only

to run into a German pocket near Savigny, part of the same one that the 1st Division's 26th Infantry had encountered a few hundred yards to the north. Together, the 26th Infantry and CCA eliminated the pocket, but not until the following day.

In the meantime, the task forces moving on Cerisy-la-Salle and Montpinchon had made few gains. Troops of the *17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division* held the commanding terrain tenaciously and, from good positions on the hedgerowed slopes of both hills, refused to give way, even in the face of bombing and strafing by sixteen planes. The resistance at Cerisy-la-Salle and Montpinchon weakened only when night afforded the Germans concealment for withdrawal. The next day, 29 July, when the two task forces of CCA renewed their attacks, the opposition had virtually vanished. Moving together, the task forces continued with little difficulty to the north-south Coutances-Gavray highway.

Like the 1st Division, CCA had not crossed the Cotentin in time to ensnare the German forces. The Germans had escaped and thus had thwarted the original COBRA intent. The Americans were not sure whether their threat of encirclement had made the Germans pull out or whether the pressure of the VIII Corps had driven them out before the trap could be sprung.

The Pressure Force

As "the direct pressure force," VIII Corps was to tie down the Germans to prevent their disengagement and withdrawal before the completion of the VII Corps envelopment. While the VII

Corps was supposed to block the escape routes of the Germans opposing VIII Corps, VIII Corps was to cross the Lessay-Périers highway on a broad front, advance half way to Coutances (to the lateral highway from Geffosses through St. Sauveur-Lendelin to Marigny), and apply pressure to crush the trapped German forces.⁵

With four experienced infantry divisions, a recently arrived armored division, and a two-squadron cavalry group, and with nine battalions of corps artillery (five heavy and four medium) and a sufficient quantity of ammunition and supplies for a major operation, General Middleton planned to attack with his four infantry divisions abreast.⁶ His difficulty was the terrain on the VIII Corps front.

Theoretically, the VIII Corps zone was a fifteen-mile portion of the Cotentin between the west coast and the Lozon River, but since the 330th Infantry of the 83d Division was attacking in conjunction with VII Corps, General Middleton's sector actually stopped at the Taute River. The troops of the VIII Corps facing south toward the Lessay-Périers-St. Lô highway held an irregularly shaped front of from one to five miles north of the highway. The line followed the north banks of the Ay estuary and the Ay and Sèves Rivers and cut across the Carentan-Périers isthmus. (See Map V.)

On the coast, the 106th Cavalry Group looked toward the Ay estuary. The

79th Division was opposite the town of Lessay and faced the Ay River, which meanders across an open, swampy flood plain that offered the Germans superb fields of fire. The Germans had destroyed the only bridge across the Ay, the one to Lessay, and had mined the only good ford. Between the Ay and the Sèves, the 8th Division held a narrow front where hedgerows constituted natural defensive obstacles in depth. Along the Sèves, the 90th Division looked across a flood plain to the island of St. Germain, still held by the German forces that had turned back the division a week earlier. The 4th Armored Division occupied the western portion of the Carentan-Périers isthmus, and the 83d Division held the eastern part.

Two good highways lead south—one from Lessay, the other from Périers—and converge at Coutances. The terrain between these roads was in the 8th Division zone. Between the Ay and Sèves Rivers it was thick with hedgerows, though the least unfavorable on the corps front for offensive action. General Middleton chose to make his main effort there with the 8th Division, which was to attack frontally to the south and effect a penetration. The 79th Division was to follow through the gap, turn west to outflank the enemy positions south of the Ay, and seize Lessay. The 90th Division was to bypass the St. Germain area on both sides and advance on Périers, while the 83d Division was to attack southwest along the west bank of the Taute and eventually cross the river. When all four divisions were south of the Lessay-St. Lô highway, they were to move to the objective line, the Geffosses-St. Sauver-Lendelin—

⁵ FUSA Outline Plan COBRA, 13 Jul; VIII Corps FO 8, 15 Jul, and G-3 Sec Msg, 20 Jul, 8th Div G-3 Jnl File.

⁶ VIII Corps G-3 Per Rpt, 25 Jul, and Amendment 1 to FO 8, 15 Jul; Gen Bd Arty Rpt, App. C, Arty Support in Opn COBRA.



ENGINEERS CLEARING MINES IN LESSAY

Marigny road. The 4th Armored Division, pinched out by the advance, was to revert to First Army control.⁷

Early on the morning of 26 July the VIII Corps Artillery delivered twenty-five prearranged missions during a one-hour period, laid down counterbattery fires, and then prepared to fire on call. Though ground observation was limited, the small artillery planes assured effective support. Except in the 83d Division sector, where enemy shelling began immediately, German artillery remained silent for about two hours. As the 4th Armored Division helped by delivering supporting fires, the other divisions of the VIII Corps moved out.⁸

⁷ VIII Corps FO 8, 15 Jul, and Annex 2 (Overlay), and G-3 Sec Memo, 18 Jul.

⁸ Gen Bd Arty Rpt, App. C; VIII Corps AAR, Jul, and Amendment 1 to FO 8, 17 Jul; Arty Rpt, 26 Jul; 4th Armd Div G-3 Per Rpt 7, 24 Jul; Annex 4 (Arty) to 8th Div FO 4, 16 Jul.

Attacking with two regiments abreast, General Stroh's 8th Division met strong small arms and mortar fire at once. The zone of advance was thick with anti-tank and antipersonnel mine fields, and German tanks contested the attack. By sideslipping and outflanking, by employing tanks and tank destroyers to enfilade hedgerow defenses, and by engaging enemy armor with bazookas and antitank grenades, the 28th Infantry, on the right (west), advanced more than a mile and by evening secured the high, wooded ground just north of the Lessay-Périers highway.⁹

The other assault regiment, the 121st Infantry, on the left (east), attacked along the axis of the main road to Périers. If the troops cleared the road for one mile, tanks could use a small bridge over the Sèves River. The stream was only a dozen feet wide and easily fordable, but it ran through such flat, marshy ground that a tank-crossing seemed a dubious proposition except at the bridge. During the regimental attack, two infantry battalion command posts received direct enemy artillery hits. At the height of the crisis German tanks appeared. A tank platoon, called forward to challenge the German tanks, lost one Sherman to a mine and two others to the mud of a marshy bog. Blocked in their advance, unable to cross the river, and without observation of the battlefield, the remaining tanks were unable to help. Taking heavy casualties from small arms and mortar fire, the infantry fell back.

The 90th Division meanwhile mounted a two-pronged attack designed

⁹ 709th Tk Bn and 28th Inf AAR's, Jul; 8th Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Jul.

to bypass and isolate the St. Germain area. On the right, a battalion of the 359th Infantry crossed the Sèves River in a rapid assault, traversed open, marshy ground, and overran a German trench dug along a fringe of woods. The momentum of the assault carried the battalion a hundred yards beyond the trench to a sunken road. As the soldiers climbed the road embankment to continue south, they met a burst of small arms and mortar fire. A German counterattack supported by tanks and artillery soon followed, driving the infantry out of the sunken road and back to the trench. There the battalion held. Bazooka fire, destroying one German tank, discouraged others from closing in. In the rear, part of the 358th Infantry began a demonstration by fire to distract enemy attention, and the division artillery placed smoke shells ahead of the assault battalion of the 359th. Engineers attempted to construct a ford across the stream for supporting tanks, but German artillery and tank fire barred the only approach route to the stream and prevented not only tanks but also infantry reinforcements from coming forward.

Four and a half miles to the east, the 357th Infantry, comprising the left prong of the 90th Division attack, entered the Carentan-Périers isthmus and tried to advance toward the southwest to make eventual contact above Périers with the main body of the division on the right. At the same time, the 329th and 331st Regiments of the 83d Division attacked along the west bank of the Taute River toward the southwest. Although the three committed regiments had at least twice the strength of the enemy forces that opposed them—in troops, tanks,

mortars, and artillery—and although the 83d Division alone fired more than 300 individual missions before noon, the committed regiments “didn’t do a thing.” They advanced no more than 200 yards. The Germans fought resourcefully from entrenched positions along hedgerows and sunken roads, using their mortars and few available tanks effectively and keeping their limited artillery active all day.¹⁰

American intelligence officers had earlier considered that the Germans facing the VIII Corps had two alternatives of equal plausibility. The Germans could, they judged, defend in place or make a strong pretense of defending while withdrawing to the high ground north of Coutances.¹¹ There seemed no question by the end of 26 July but that the Germans had chosen to take the former course of action. The VIII Corps had succeeded in making a small penetration to the Lessay-Périers highway, but in so doing its divisions had incurred more than 1,150 casualties while capturing less than 100 prisoners. Yet General Middleton was satisfied. His troops appeared to be tying down the enemy and holding him in place for the VII Corps encirclement.¹²

During the early evening of 26 July, General Middleton instructed his subordinate commanders to resume the attack the following morning. Several hours later, after receiving reports that the German opposition on other fronts seemed to be disintegrating and after

¹⁰ Telecon, Middleton and Macon, 2100, 26 Jul, 83d Div G-2, G-3 Jnl and File; VIII Corps Arty Per Rpt, 26 Jul.

¹¹ VIII Corps G-2 Est 4, 15 Jul.

¹² Telecon, Middleton and Macon, 2100, 26 Jul, 83d Div G-2, G-3 Jnl and File.

learning that General Collins had ordered the VII Corps to continue the attack during the night, Middleton alerted his commanders to possible German withdrawal. He told all units to patrol vigorously. If a withdrawal were discovered in any sector, the unit in that sector was to attack at daylight, 27 July, in close pursuit.¹³

Patrols all along the front found not only extensive mine fields but also evidence that appeared to indicate that the enemy lines were being maintained in place. Rain and haze during the early morning hours of 27 July obscured visibility and made further investigation fruitless. On the premise that the Germans were still going to defend in strength, the units made careful, comprehensive attack plans.

Soon after the attack commenced, it became apparent that little more than a profusion of mine fields opposed the assault troops all across the corps front. Artillery preparations proved to have been a waste of ammunition. The 8th Division eliminated insignificant resistance and advanced more than a mile beyond the Lessay-Périers road. Two battalions of the 79th Division crossed the Ay River in single file, each man stepping carefully into the footsteps of the soldier ahead to avoid mines, and against slight harassing small arms fire took Lessay. Division engineers bridged the stream at the ford, and by the end of the day all three regiments were south of the river and abreast of the 8th Division. The 106th Cavalry Group crossed the Ay estuary that evening at low tide

and moved south to protect the coastal flank. The enemy had disengaged.¹⁴

In the 90th Division zone, after the enemy withdrawal was discovered, the division reconnaissance troop moved out ahead of the 359th Infantry in search of Germans. A destroyed Sèves River bridge on the main road to Périers delayed the advance until early afternoon and extensive mine fields on the roads slowed the leading troops by forcing them to proceed dismounted. By the middle of the afternoon, however, the reconnaissance unit was in the badly battered and deserted town of Périers.¹⁵

A mile south of Périers, on the highway to St. Sauveur-Lendelin, when troopers encountered a roadblock defended by infantry and tanks, members of the 359th Infantry, following the reconnaissance troop, moved against the opposition. Unable to bring antitank weapons and tank destroyers into range until evening because of mines, the regiment attacked shortly after nightfall, knocked out four German tanks, and then dug in for the night.

On the Carentan-Périers isthmus, the 357th Infantry had suspected an enemy withdrawal because German artillery had ceased early that morning, 27 July.¹⁶ When the troops attacked, they found only mines hampering their advance. Late that evening the regiment crossed the Taute River, overwhelmed German delaying positions just north of the Périers-St. Lô highway, and dug in along the highway for the night. The 358th

¹³ VIII Corps Fragmentary Orders, 1815 and 2050, 26 Jul, VIII Corps G-3 Jnl; Msg, 2130, 26 Jul, 8th Div G-3 Jnl.

¹⁴ 79th Div AAR, Jul, FO 7, 19 Jul, and G-3 Jnl, 26 Jul; Wyche Diary; VIII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 43, 27 Jul.

¹⁵ 8th Div G-3 Jnl, entry 1542, 27 Jul; VIII Corps Msg, 1415, 27 Jul, FUSA G-3 Jnl.

¹⁶ 375th Inf Jnl, 27 Jul.

Infantry, after sending patrols into the St. Germain area and finding that the Germans had withdrawn, moved south to the vicinity of the Périers-St. Lô highway.

The 83d Division also advanced against light resistance and encountered many mines. Early in the afternoon of 27 July resistance vanished, and the division extended its control over the entire west bank of the Taute River in zone. Just before dark troops crossed the Taute and advanced almost a thousand yards into the Marchésieux and la Varde area.¹⁷

In possession of the Lessay-Périers highway by the end of 27 July, the VIII Corps had made a significant gain, but had captured hardly more than 100 prisoners. The enemy had disengaged and moved behind a strong protective shell. Though small delaying forces and isolated pockets of resistance had hampered American pursuit, the biggest problem to the Americans had been mines—antitank and antipersonnel mines, Teller mines, Schu mines, mustard pot mines, box mines, and all types of booby traps rigged in buildings, hedgerows, ditches, fields, along the roads, and at road junctions and intersections. Behind this screen, the Germans had escaped the COBRA pressure force.¹⁸

After engineers laid a treadway bridge across the Ay at Lessay, the VIII Corps continued to advance on 28 July. The absence of opposition prompted General Bradley to revoke the original objective line—the Geffosses-St. Sauveur-Lende-

lin-Marigny highway—and to permit the troops to proceed beyond it.¹⁹ The 79th and 8th Divisions met no resistance as they moved about ten and seven miles, respectively, to the vicinity of Coutances. The 90th and 83d Divisions proceeded to the proximity of the Coutances-St. Lô highway, where the 1st Division of the VII Corps lay athwart their zones of advance. The unopposed advance of the VIII Corps and the sense of victory that it engendered were somewhat empty achievements. The number of prisoners taken by all the divisions on 28 July, for example, was little more than 200.

Aided by the terrain, the weather, the darkness, the absence of Allied night fighter planes, and the extreme caution of American troops, who had come to respect the ability of the Germans to fight in the hedgerows, the German troops facing the VIII Corps had neatly slipped out of the trap set by COBRA. American commanders had begun to suspect an impending withdrawal and had noted evidence of it. Operations in the adjacent VII Corps sector had confirmed it. Plans had been changed to anticipate it.²⁰ Yet despite precaution, warning, and suspicion on the part of the Americans, the Germans gave them the slip.

The Germans, on the other hand, though they had escaped the VIII Corps pressure force and had avoided entrapment by the first and second thrusts of

¹⁷ 83d Div G-3 Per Rpt 31, 27 Jul, and G-2, G-3 Jnl, 27 Jul.

¹⁸ VIII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 43, 27 Jul, and G-3 Per Rpt 43, 28 Jul.

¹⁹ VIII Corps Msg, 1515, 28 Jul; 83d Div G-2, G-3 Jnl, entry 1620, 28 Jul; ETOUSA Engr Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering, Aug 45, pp. 35, 36; Hosp Intervs, IV, GL-93 (317); XV Corps G-3 Memo, Conf at G-3 Office, Hq Third U.S. Army, 281600 Jul, 29 Jul, XV Corps G-3 Jnl and File.

²⁰ 79th Div and VIII Corps AAR's Jul; Wyche Diary.