Master's thesis: Improve Security over the Wireless Sensor Networks Case Study: Smart Irrigation in the Agricultural Sector

تحسين الأمان على شبكات الاستشعار اللاسلكية

دراسة حالة: ري الذكي في قطاع الزراعة

Prepared by:

Hasan Abd-Elsamad Younis

Supervised by:

Dr. Zaher Jabr Haddad

Associate Professor – Information Technology

Dr. Hazem Abdel-Qader El-Baz

Assistant Professor – Information Technology

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Dedication

To my beloved family,
whose unwavering support, love, and encouragement have been the foundation of my journey.
To my parents, who instilled in me the value of education and perseverance.
To my teachers and mentors, who sparked my passion for learning and guided me along the way.
This work is dedicated to all of you.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, all praise is due to Allah for granting me the strength, patience, and ability to complete this research.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor**, Dr. Zaher Jabr Haddad**, Associate Professor of Information Technology, for his continuous support, valuable guidance, and constructive feedback throughout every stage of this thesis.

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Section 1: Foundations and Literature Review

Abstract

The Modern agriculture requires essential tools like Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) to run applications such as smart irrigation. These WSN help in monitoring the environment factors like soil moisture, temperature and humidity in order to manage and facilitate precise water usage constantly. Nevertheless, the nature of (WSNs) makes them an easy target of cyber threats, comprising denial-of-service (DoS), data modification, and unauthorized access of data. Confidentiality, integrity and Data availability (CIA) are the key to protect sensitive agriculture data and to maintain accurate operations.

This study introduces reliable security framework customized for WSNs in smart irrigation systems, utilizing the CIA triad fundamentals. The framework integrates advanced cryptographic techniques, including asymmetric cryptography for mutual authentication, AES encryption for data confidentiality, and digital signatures for data integrity. The main breakthrough is utilization of the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model to evaluate the system security in both phases initialization and operation. The ROR model guarantees the key cryptographic outputs, like shared session keys and encrypted messages are being indistinguishable random data, so validating the protocol's immunity to attacks for examples: Distributed Denial -of-Service (DDoS), man-in-the-middle (MitM), and replay forward and backend attacks.

This research focused on enhanced and implementing a secure communication model for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in smart irrigation systems. The framework start making a comprehensive evaluation of the security challenges particular to smart irrigation systems, then followed by the design of the system architecture that incorporate lightweight encryption and authentication protocols tailored for low-power sensor nodes. The appropriate proposed framework was demonstrated through the smart irrigation case study. The sensor data like temperature (R1), humidity (R2), weather prediction (R3), growth and monitoring report (R4), soil type (R5) is securely transmitted to controller station (Entity A) platform for the sake of analyzation and decision-making over a timestamp. This secure communication ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data, addressing key vulnerabilities in WSN deployments.

The system reached notable results in enhancing crop yield, minimizing water waste and cutting operational costs by allowing automated, data-driven irrigation. Also, it demonstrated a powerful resilience against cyber threats. Performance evaluations showed that the framework introduced minimal communication overhead (118 bytes per message) and fast computation times (4.2 milliseconds per cycle), ensuring the suitability for resource-constrained environments like smart irrigation.

Regardless of the strength points in the system, still the system has some limitations for example privacy – related issues. Future research should focus on improving saving energy consumption and using machine learning techniques to enhance decision making. Also to Integrate WSNs with Internet of Things (IoT) to serve intelligent data processing.

Introduction

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) technologies are being rapidly advancing across a range of fields with application covering health care, smart cities, energy control & grid, agriculture need ..etc. Figure (1). These networks are consisted of geographically distributed sensor nodes, applications which need constant monitoring to activate decision-making. WSNs have the ability to collect and transmit data to stations using real-time systems. For instance, WSNs play a vital role in smart irrigation systems in the agriculture field because they ensure accurate water management according to the data collected by the real-time system like temperature, humidity and soil moisture. These characteristics boost crop yields, and help farmers in minimizing costs by taking accurate irrigation decisions.



Figure (1). Application of wireless sensor network (WSN).

Applications of WSN and IoT in Industry 4.0. 2022. Majid, M., et al.

However, WSNs face serious security challenges as they become more integrated into different fields. WSNs are vulnerable to a number of cyberthreats that can risk data availability, confidentiality, and integrity due to their dependence on frequently open and public communication channels like Wi-Fi and cellular networks. These security weaknesses in agriculture put intelligent irrigation systems at risk of inappropriate access, alteration of data, or communication breakdowns that may lead to poor irrigation choices, waste resources, and decreased the output. Therefore, maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of WSNs requires strong security, especially these networks become crucial for modern agriculture and other vital operations.

In general, agricultural communication requires the use of security requirements Figure (2) Describes the cyber-attacks that may violate the security of agricultural communications systems



Figure (2). *The OSI model and cyber attack examples, originally published in Manninen (2018)*

Requirements for cybersecurity in agricultural communication networks. 2020. Nikander, J., et al.,

WSNs are effectively used in the agricultural field to reach a range of benefits. One of the most critical aspects of successful agriculture is irrigation, where it plays a vital role in the process of agriculture. Moreover, to that side, water scarcity, drought, and irrational waste of water resources are within the critical issues that touch almost all sectors, Smart irrigation has become an essential component of agriculture, and a fundamental in increasing crop production and improvement of yields. (Hamami, L. and B. Nassereddine 2018).

Importance of Security in WSNs for Agriculture

Since the increasing adoption of WNS in agriculture, scarcity highlight the need of a strong security measures to safeguard data and ensure reliable operation in smart irrigation. Key security concerns in agricultural WSNs include:

1. **Confidentiality:** Preventing unwanted access to sensitive data, such as crop health and status, water usage trends, and environmental data. Commercially valuable agricultural data may result in competitive disadvantages if it is made public. To guarantee that only authorized users can access this data, encryption techniques are frequently used.
2. **Integrity**: Ensuring the accuracy and purity of data that is transmitted. Erroneous irrigation decisions brought on by data corruption or tampering could damage crops and waste

resources. Data consistency from source to destination can be ensured by using digital signatures and message authentication codes to verify data integrity.

3. **Availability:** Guaranteeing that network resources are accessible to authorized users when needed. Attacks including denial-of-service (DoS) can disrupt communication between sensors and central systems, delaying real-time irrigation adjustments. Ensuring high availability requires network redundancy and secure protocols to resist such interruptions

A fundamental framework for meeting these security requirements in WSNs is offered by the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. WSNs can support agriculture more effectively, especially in the sustainable and efficient use of water resources, by making sure that data is accurate, accessible, and protected. [2]

Figure (3) The Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) triad.
Requirements for cybersecurity in agricultural communication networks. 2020. Nikander, J., et al.,

Therefore, security transmitted Data is a critical factor in those applications, Figure (3) describes the information security (CIA Triad), The CIA indicated to confidentiality, integrity and availability.

Confidentiality, to prevent data eavesdropping and stealing by unauthorized users, key management to provide a secure key update and management mechanism. (Huanan, Z., X. Suping, and W.J.P.C.S. Jiannan,2021)

The integrity of data to avoid information from being tampered illegally; the Freshness of data to prevent malicious nodes from sending the same information to consume network resources (Huanan, Z., X. Suping, and W.J.P.C.S. Jiannan,2021)

Availability refers to enabling that the authorized users access to the related assets and information when the users needed. (Khidzir et al. (2018)

Using public communication networks like WIFI, Internet and cellular networks in controlling the advanced irrigation system remotely create an environment that has a high chance of data attacks that risk the security of the agriculture sector since these communication networks are well known as an insecure channel. (Ghelani, D.J.A.P. 2022).



Figure (4). *The star topology used in the proposed intelligent irrigation scheduling system.* [3]

For example, Agricultural WSN Vulnerabilities

Smart irrigation systems are vulnerable to multiple attack vectors because they frequently use public communication channels (such as Wi-Fi or cellular networks) to transfer data between distributed sensors and control systems:

• **Attacks by a man-in-the-middle (MitM):** Attackers may modify the information to have a control on irrigation decisions by spying on the data while it is being transferred. The actions about irrigation could be changed and altered by man-in-the-middle attacks. Indeed, the sector agriculture require a set of security parameters, like integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. (J. Nikander et al. 2020)



Figure (5). *Example of Man in the Middle* [4]

• **Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks:** These attacks cause the network to be overloaded with malicious requests or it can interfere with the communications, which stops real-time data flow and delays irrigation operations.

• **Replay Attacks:** These attacks involve sending legitimate data packets again in an attempt to fool the system into acting on out-of-date information, which may result in resource waste or excessive irrigation.

• **Unauthorized Access:** In the absence of robust authentication, unauthorized users may be able to access the system, changing irrigation schedules or threats the network performance.

Hance, implementing a multi-layered security approach is important to protect the agriculture WSNs from any type of attacks. For example, asymmetric cryptography can be used to establish mutual authentication between network nodes, ensuring that only verified entities are allowed to access or transmit data within the system.

Objectives of This Study

The main goal of this study is to design a comprehensive security framework in order to provide protection for the WSNs in agricultural smart irrigation systems focusing on the following objectives:

1. **Enhanced Authentication and Key Management:**

   This strategy implements mutual authentication protocol using asymmetric cryptography that allow sensor nodes and central controllers to securely verify the identity of each other's. this protocol allows only the legitimate devices to participate in the network. In addition, a strong key management system is applied to support the security of generation, distribution and renewal cryptographic keys over time, protecting the data communication throughout the system's operation.

2. **Data Confidentiality:**
   In this stage data confidentiality ensure safeguarding sensitive data from unauthorized access, this study apply data encryption utilizing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The encryption is implemented using a readymade Python library cryptography [5], That provides secure and efficient AES encryption functionality. This method ensures that only allowed and authorized users can translate data. thus, protecting and safeguarding critical operational details in the smart irrigation system.

3. **Data Integrity**:

   Verify the accuracy of transmitted data by employing digital signatures, confirming that legitimate, unaltered information is used to make decisions regarding irrigation.

4. **Performance Evaluation**: Evaluate the effectiveness the suggested security framework protects WSNs from prevalent cyberthreats in the agricultural industry. This involves assessing the system's defenses against replay, DoS, and MitM attacks.

Significance of the Research

In this research play a role in the growing field of smart agriculture by handling unique security challenges being faced by the WSNs in irrigation management. Incorporating advanced cryptographic techniques, this study supports the development of robust and secure WSNs capability of resisting various cyber threats. This model enhances the security of the system and it also serve as a backbone for future updates and improvements in scalability, data privacy, and power saving.

Agriculture field become more dependent on digital technologies, its critical to secure WSNs to grantee the reliability and effectiveness of application like smart irrigation. The research highlights the value of integrating security measures of the WSN architecture, providing a blueprint for applying strong protections that align with specific needs agriculture operations. Addressing key vulnerabilities and strengthen data protection, this research provides important insights into fault-tolerant WSNs that can support sustainability, efficiency agriculture practices. Indeed, in resource-constrained environments.

Inconclusion, WSNs started to transform agriculture sector, especially in the areas and regions with limited water resources, so securing WSNs is essential and important to ensure sustainable yield crop production. Comprehensive security approach is established in this research to support efficient and safe use of WSNs in smart irrigation, overcoming immediate operational and long-term resilience in the face of evolving cyber threats.

Motivations

Since the raising adoption of technology in agriculture, specifically using WSNs in smart irrigation, tackling critical issues in the modern agriculture production. With the issues raising regarding water scarcity, climate changes, and the need of feeding the growing population, managing resources should be important in this case. Water management by using WSN help to overcome the challenges that affect agriculture nowadays by allowing precise water management, reducing water waste and improving the crop productivity. However, introducing the importance of secure communications and data integrity in these smart systems ensure reliable operations. The main motivations ideas behind this study include:

1. **Enhancing Agricultural Productivity**:

   Efficient irrigation is fundamental in maximizing crop yield and ensuring sustainability in agriculture. Real-time system allowed by the WSNs to monitor and control the factors of the farming environment like soil moisture and other environmental conditions of the farmed field. Which enable the farmers to make proper irrigation decisions based on the actual needs of the crops. Securing these networks can ensure that the data used in critical irrigation decisions is accurate and reliable, directly contributing to improved agricultural productivity.

2. **Addressing Water Scarcity**:

   Many regions suffer from limited water resources. so, for that reason smart irrigation using WSNS help in the matter of reducing water waste and precise the water usage that allow the right amount of water to be used in the right time. However, securing WSNs is a must since if the security needs of the system were not met unauthorized users can interrupt and disturb the irrigation schedules leading to water and crop wastage. This study motivated by the need to secure WSNs in order to protect water resources, particularly in areas where efficient water use is crucial.

3. **Protecting Against Cyber Threats**: WSNs depend on wireless communication like WIFI. Data is exposed to wireless communication is on a range of cyber threats. As a result, compromised WSN can lead to faulty inaccurate irrigation choices or system failure. Any interruption of the system can lead to negative impact on the crops. Indeed, this research is aiming to build a strong system that can protect and defend the irrigation data from cyber threats by enhancing authentication, confidentiality, and integrity measures.

4. **Ensuring Data Integrity and Accuracy**: Reliable smart irrigation depends on accurate data collected from sensors. Security breaches, such as man-in-the-middle or replay attacks, could alter sensor data, leading to faulty irrigation actions that waste resources or damage crops. By implementing measures like digital signatures and encryption, this research seeks to ensure that transmitted data remains trustworthy, so irrigation decisions are based on precise and unaltered information.

5. **Supporting Sustainable Agriculture**:

   As modern technologies are more widely implemented, agriculture is becoming more dependent on smart technologies like WSNs. The result of securing WSNs for smart irrigation can be beneficial to individual farms as well as it can ensure sustainability in the agriculture field.

6. **Meeting confidentiality and Privacy Standards**:

   The growth in using technology in agriculture goes side to side with the importance to protect the confidentiality and privacy of the smart system. It's a right for the farmers and people in the agriculture business to get to have their irrigation data private and confidential. Data protection is necessary to maintain privacy and confidentiality.

7. **Withstanding various attacks such as MitM, DDoS, and forward and backend path attacks:**
   The system must be defensive against threats like Man-in-the-Middle (MitM), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and forward and backend path attacks to ensure secure communication. The effectiveness of the defense must include strong authentication and encryption protocols to prevent MitM attacks. However, timestamps implement verification

by verifying the freshness of each message which allow the system to discard untrusted replayed or outdated requests also it filters the suspicious traffic to mitigate DDoS attacks. In Addition, achieving forward secrecy is important since it protects earlier communications even if long-term keys are compromised by using ephemeral key exchanges and frequent key rotation. Also maintain a robust security in backend communication using session isolation and avoiding the reuse of keys help in the process of preventing the exposure to future messages in the case of key compromised.

Inconclusion, the study support introducing a multi-layered approach that address authentication, confidentiality and data integrity to strengthens the security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in smart irrigation as follows:

1. **Enhanced Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol:** By implementing a asymmetric cryptography-based protocol, the system enables mutual authentication between coordinators and WSN nodes, facilitating secure key sharing and access control across the network.
2. **Data Confidentiality with AES Encryption:** The study ensures data confidentiality by using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt transmitted data with a shared symmetric key, protecting sensitive information about environmental conditions and resource usage from unauthorized access.
3. **Data Integrity Verification with Digital Signatures:** To prevent data tampering, each transmitted message is secured with a digital signature, verifying the accuracy and authenticity of sensor data before it is used for irrigation decisions.

Limitations

this research fundamentally focuses on ensuring data confidentiality, integrity, and availability within the wireless sensors network (WSN) framework of the smart irrigation system in agriculture. On the other hand, WSN does not explore privacy related issues, which are essential in protecting sensitive agriculture data. Which are equally critical in safeguarding sensitive agricultural data. Particularly, mechanisms like data anonymization, secure data aggregation, and access control policies are commonly used to prevent unauthorized identification or misuse of private farming information that are not addressed. The absence of these privacy-preserving techniques may leave the system vulnerable to data profiling or exposure of confidential farm-related metrics. Future research should aim to incorporate robust privacy strategies alongside traditional security goals to offer a more holistic approach to data protection in agricultural WSN environments.

Literature Review

Karthikeyan, M., & Revathi, S. T. (2024) The research paper "Approaches to Detecting Threats in Wireless Sensor Networks for Data Transmission Security" examines methods to enhance the security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) by detecting and mitigating various attacks, including sinkhole, black hole, wormhole, and Sybil attacks. The study explores traditional and modern strategies such as blockchain-based authentication, trust-based security protocols, anomaly detection methods, and deep learning-based feed-forward artificial neural networks. Notably, approaches like Intelligent Slime Mold (ISM) and Whale with Cuckoo Search Optimization (WCSO) were developed to improve attack detection and ensure data confidentiality.

While these methodologies demonstrate improvements in attack detection rates and the ability to handle complex intrusion scenarios, significant challenges remain. Many techniques suffer from high computational complexity, increased detection time, and energy inefficiency. Additionally, although these methods enhance detection accuracy, they often fail to optimize resource usage, making them less practical for real-time deployment in resource-constrained WSN environments. Future research directions emphasize leveraging advanced machine learning and cryptographic techniques to overcome these limitations.

Tang, P., Liang, Q., Li, H., & Pang, Y. (2024) The paper titled "Application of Internet-of-Things Wireless Communication Technology in Agricultural Irrigation Management: A Review" explores the integration of IoT and wireless communication technologies such as 5G, WiFi, ZigBee, LoRa, and NB-IoT in modern agricultural irrigation. It emphasizes their role in enhancing water efficiency, enabling precision irrigation, and reducing resource wastage. The authors analyze the benefits and limitations of these technologies, highlighting their applications in real-time monitoring, data-driven decision-making, and automated irrigation systems. The paper also addresses key challenges like data security, system costs, energy management, and equipment failures, offering insights for optimizing IoT-based agricultural practices.

However, the paper identifies notable disadvantages. Many IoT technologies, such as 5G and NB-IoT, incur high deployment and operational costs, which can be prohibitive for large-scale or resource-constrained farming systems. Additionally, wireless communication systems like LoRa and ZigBee struggle with limited bandwidth and communication range, making them unsuitable for transmitting large datasets or covering vast agricultural areas. The study also highlights vulnerabilities related to data security and the risk of system disruptions due to equipment failures or environmental factors, such as signal interference in complex terrains.

This review underscores the potential of IoT technologies to revolutionize agricultural irrigation but stresses the need for cost-effective, secure, and scalable solutions to overcome existing limitations.

Samiulla Itoo, Akber Ali Khan, Musheer Ahmad, and M. Javed Idrisi (2023) The research paper titled "A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Lightweight Authentication and Key Exchange Algorithm for Smart Agriculture Monitoring System" introduces a framework combining elliptic curve cryptography, biometrics, and fuzzy extractor techniques to bolster security and efficiency in IoT-enabled smart agriculture systems. The proposed protocol addresses critical security issues in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) such as impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks, while ensuring mutual authentication, session key security, and privacy preservation. Its robustness is validated through formal methods, including the BAN logic, ROR model, and Scyther simulation tool, outperforming comparable protocols in computational and communication efficiency.

However, the framework has certain limitations. These include the high implementation cost of IoT-enabled WSNs, limited coverage for large agricultural fields, and potential scalability challenges as network demands increase. Furthermore, the energy constraints of sensor nodes and the complexity introduced by the use of biometrics may hinder widespread adoption, especially in resource-limited settings.

Jaiswal, S. K., & Dwivedi, A. K. (2023) The paper, "A Security and Application of Wireless Sensor Network: A Comprehensive Study," explores the design, architecture, and diverse applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in areas such as environmental monitoring, healthcare, agriculture, industrial automation, and smart cities. It highlights the potential of WSNs to transform these fields through scalable and flexible data collection and analysis. However, the study also outlines several disadvantages of WSNs. These include limited energy capacity in sensor nodes, which restricts network longevity; challenges in scalability when managing large deployments; and security vulnerabilities, such as unauthorized access, data tampering, and breaches of confidentiality. Furthermore, ensuring reliable connectivity in dynamic or harsh environments remains a critical issue, while the complexity of managing the massive volumes of data generated by WSNs adds another layer of difficulty. These drawbacks emphasize the need for continued research into energy-efficient designs, robust security measures, and scalable management solutions for WSNs.

Feng, W., & Liu, C. (2023) The paper titled "A Review of Security Threats and Response Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks" delves into the vulnerabilities and countermeasures of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). It classifies security threats by network layers, such as physical tampering, collision attacks, eavesdropping, and flooding, highlighting their impact on WSN functionality. The authors propose solutions, including key management, secure routing protocols, digital watermarking, and identity authentication technologies. These measures aim to strengthen data integrity, ensure confidentiality, and protect against malicious activities. The study emphasizes the need for multilayered defense mechanisms and discusses methods for evaluating security.

However, the paper also identifies several challenges and limitations. WSNs are particularly prone to resource constraints such as limited energy and computing power, which can hinder the implementation of robust security solutions. The complexity of deploying advanced encryption and

authentication techniques in dynamic and large-scale networks remains a critical disadvantage. Furthermore, the study lacks practical evaluations and implementation details for cross-layer attack defenses, leaving significant gaps for future research.

This review underscores the importance of addressing these limitations to enhance WSN security while balancing resource efficiency and system reliability.

Ibrahim, D. S., Mahdi, A. F., & Yas, Q. M. (2021) The research paper, Challenges and Issues for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey, provides a comprehensive overview of the field of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). It highlights their increasing importance due to affordability, efficiency, and compactness, and their critical role in applications like IoT. However, challenges such as limited energy, memory, and computing resources persist. The study categorizes recent research (2018-2020) into six areas: applications, classification/routing algorithms, information gathering methods, coverage and connectivity, IoT integration, and security algorithms. The paper emphasizes energy efficiency as a primary concern and explores how improved algorithms and innovative methodologies can address WSN limitations. A taxonomy of key research areas and suggestions for future improvements—like enhancing energy-efficient routing and strengthening security measures—are also included.

Nikander, J., Manninen, O., & Laajalahti, M. (2020). The research paper titled Requirements for Cybersecurity in Agricultural Communication Networks explores the growing cybersecurity challenges in modern agricultural systems, particularly in small and medium-sized farms. The study focuses on the communication networks of six dairy farms in Finland, examining vulnerabilities such as poor network topology, insufficient malware and endpoint protection, and reliance on consumer-grade equipment. It underscores that farmers often lack the expertise and resources needed to secure their networks effectively. The authors emphasize the importance of planned network designs, professional-grade equipment, and raising farmer awareness about cybersecurity issues. The findings suggest that improving cybersecurity in agricultural systems requires collaborative efforts, including training and expert support, to address both internal weaknesses and external threats.

Inayat, U., Ali, S. M., Ali, F., Ilyas, K., Khan, H. M. A., & Habib, H. (2021) The research paper, Wireless Sensor Networks: Security, Threats, and Solutions, discusses the increasing significance of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) across various fields such as healthcare, smart homes, environmental monitoring, and military applications. While WSNs provide cost-effective and versatile solutions, they face severe security vulnerabilities due to their resource constraints, broadcast nature, and deployment in hostile environments. The authors identify major threats, including eavesdropping, denial of service, Sybil, and wormhole attacks, categorizing these vulnerabilities within the OSI model layers. They propose countermeasures such as cryptographic techniques, multi-parent routing mechanisms, and anti-tamper strategies to enhance the resilience of WSNs. Despite these advances, the study emphasizes the need for further research to address evolving security challenges in WSNs effectively.

Han, Y., Lu, G., Guo, T., Qie, T., & Zhang, Q. (2020). The paper, Design of Agriculture Intelligent Irrigation System Based on Wireless Sensor Network, presents an automated system that employs WSNs, STM32 microprocessors, and fuzzy PID control strategies to optimize irrigation. It improves water efficiency and enhances productivity in agriculture. However, the system's dependence on stable sensor networks and energy supply highlights its vulnerability in harsh or remote environments. Additionally, the initial setup costs and potential maintenance complexity may challenge adoption for small-scale farmers.

SunilKumar K. N., & Shivashankar. (2017) The paper "A Review on Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks" provides a comprehensive overview of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), their applications, and associated security challenges. WSNs are composed of numerous small sensors designed to collect and transmit data from remote or sensitive environments. These networks have significant applications in agriculture, healthcare, industrial automation, and public safety due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability.

However, the paper emphasizes the vulnerabilities of WSNs, particularly concerning data confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, and freshness. It classifies threats into passive (e.g., eavesdropping) and active attacks (e.g., jamming, selective forwarding, and denial-of-service). The authors propose countermeasures, such as cryptographic techniques, clustering mechanisms, and energy-efficient protocols, to mitigate these risks.

While these approaches offer improvements, the paper highlights a major disadvantage of WSNs: their susceptibility to resource exhaustion due to limited energy, computational power, and storage capacity. Prolonged attacks, such as jamming or flooding, can rapidly drain sensor batteries and disrupt network functionality. This intrinsic limitation necessitates the development of more energy-efficient security mechanisms to enhance the longevity and reliability of WSNs in real-world deployments.

This analysis underscores the need for continuous research into robust and efficient solutions for safeguarding WSNs against evolving security threats.

Bennis, I., Fouchal, H., Zytoune, O., & Aboutajdine, D. (2015) . This study proposes an innovative model for a drip irrigation system using Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks (WSANs) to enhance precision agriculture practices. The system integrates soil moisture, temperature, and pressure sensors to monitor irrigation processes, optimize water use, and address malfunctions such as pipe leaks or emitter blockages. A priority-based routing protocol distinguishes between normal and critical data, ensuring efficient and real-time communication for system reliability. Simulations conducted on the NS-2 simulator demonstrate significant improvements in delay and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) for priority traffic, showcasing the model’s potential to conserve water and improve agricultural productivity.

However, the system has certain limitations. The reliance on high sensor density for comprehensive coverage increases costs and complexity, potentially making implementation challenging for small-scale farmers. Additionally, the model's performance has been validated solely through simulations, leaving its real-world effectiveness untested under diverse agricultural and environmental conditions.

Table: Summary of Literature Review on WSNs and Smart Irrigation Security

No.	Reference	Advantages	Limitations
1	Karthikeyan & Revathi (2024)	- Blockchain/AI for threat detection. - High accuracy with ISM/WCSO.	**Computational overhead**: Heavy for resource-constrained WSNs. **Slow detection**: Delays in real-time response.
2	Tang et al. (2024)	- IoT (5G, LoRa) improves monitoring. - Real-time water efficiency.	**Cost**: Expensive for small farms. **Range**: Limited coverage in large fields. **Security**: Vulnerable to data breaches.
3	Itoo et al. (2023)	- Lightweight ECC + biometrics. - Resists MitM/replay attacks.	**Scalability**: Struggles in dense networks. **Energy**: Biometrics drain node batteries.
4	Jaiswal & Dwivedi (2023)	- Broad WSN applications. - Scalable data collection.	**Energy**: Short node lifespan. **Security**: Weak against DoS/tampering.
5	Feng & Liu (2023)	- Multi-layered defenses. - OSI-layer threat classification.	**Resource-heavy**: Hard to deploy on low-power nodes. **Theoretical**: Lacks field tests.
6	Ibrahim et al. (2021)	- Surveys energy/routing challenges. - Proposes efficient algorithms.	**Deployment gaps**: No real-world validation. **IoT integration**: Unaddressed.

No.	Reference	Advantages	Limitations
7	Nikander et al. (2020)	- Exposes farm cybersecurity gaps. - Advocates training.	**Hardware**: Relies on consumer-grade gear. **Topology**: Poor network design.
8	Inayat et al. (2021)	- Threat taxonomy (e.g., DoS). - Cryptographic solutions.	**Broadcast risks**: Eavesdropping. **Environment**: Fails in harsh conditions.
9	Han et al. (2020)	- Automated irrigation with WSNs. - Fuzzy PID improves efficiency.	**Stability**: Fails if sensors malfunction. **Cost**: Prohibitive for smallholders.
10	SunilKumar & Shivashankar (2017)	- Reviews security/privacy issues. - Proposes cryptography.	**Jamming**: Nodes easily drained. **Storage**: Limited for heavy encryption.
11	Bennis et al. (2015)	- Priority routing for drip irrigation. - High PDR in simulations.	**Density**: High sensor cost. **Real-world gaps**: Untested in fields.

Section 2: Technical Background and System Design

Background (Primitives)

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) which are deployed in smart irrigation in the agricultural sector specifically, have a fundamental concern due to the chance and potential for data modifying, unauthorized access, and service disruption and interruption. Due to the resource restrictions of sensor nodes including energy limitation, processing power and memory. These restrictions require a robust yet lightweight cryptographic primitives. This section is going to address and explain the crucial cryptographic fundamentals hired in the proposed secure framework (Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Asymmetric Cryptography (ECC), Digital Signatures, Aggregation Signatures, and Bilinear Pairings).

In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), particularly those deployed for smart irrigation in agriculture, data security is a primary concern due to the potential for unauthorized access, data tampering,

and service disruption. The constrained resources of sensor nodes—such as limited energy, processing power, and memory—demand the use of lightweight yet robust cryptographic primitives. This section introduces and explains the essential cryptographic primitives used in the proposed secure framework: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Asymmetric Cryptography (ECC), Digital Signatures, Aggregation Signatures, and Bilinear Pairings.

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

This type of encryption uses a symmetric key encryption technique. It's standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It encrypts data in fixed 128-bit blocks using key sizes of 128, 192, or 256 bits. AES been widely recognized for its secure against brute-force attacks and its suitable for constrained environments such as WSNs due to its minimal computational and memory requirement [1].

AES operates via series of processing rounds that consist of byte substitution using S-box, raw shifting, column mixing, and round key addition. The rounds offer confusion and diffusion to the encrypted data. the WSN-based in smart irrigation systems the sensors provide reading information about the environment around it like soil moisture and temperature. These readings can be encrypted by AES before the data transmission process over the wireless network. The Encryption ensure that the data will be received only by the authorized users which preserve confidentiality [2].

Furthermore, AES modern implementation can be hardware-accelerated which be advancing in minimizing latency and power consumption, that makes AES A highly suitable encryption mechanism for Sensor nodes operating on battery power.

Asymmetric Public-Key Cryptography (Elliptic Curve Cryptography - ECC)

This encryption technique implements a pair of related keys: public key for encryption and private key for decryption. Asymmetric Public-Key Cryptography considered as an exceptionally efficient algorithms like RSA. For instance, a 256-bit ECC key offers a similar level of security to a 3072-bit RSA key [4].

The main strength keys of ECC in WSNs include lower memory usage, reducing computational load, and minimal bandwidth requirements. In the proposed security framework, ECC designed for mutual authentication between sensor nodes and the control center. This allows the sensor nodes to implement verification between their identities before exchanging data between each other which eliminate the risk of impersonation attacks [5]. ECC exchanging key schema such as ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) also allow enable secure and dynamic generation of symmetric keys without requiring to share secrets, that specify beneficial in flexible agriculture systems with changing node topologies [6].

Digital Signatures

It's a cryptographic scheme that provide integrity and authentication to the messages. They implement hash function to the initial message and then encrypt the hash with the sender's private keys while the receiver decrypts the signature using the sender's public key. After the decryption the public key of the receiver will be compared with freshly computed hash of the message to verify its authenticity [7].
In smart irrigation in WSNs digital signature are vital in ensuring the sensor data is received at the main station and its not changed or altered while transmission. For example, if the moisture sensor send message to the central controller, a digital signature ensures that no enemy has changed or tempered the data in transit. However, allowing accurate irrigation decisions and actions [8]. This mechanism also empowers non-repudiation, meaning a node cannot deny having sent a specific message earlier. Which is important in the tracing process of the agriculture systems require accountability [9].

Aggregation Signatures

The aggregation signatures are extending the concept of digital signature by authorizing signatures from various users or sensors to be zipped into single compact signature.
This concept helps from significantly reduce communication overhead in WSNs. That is crucial given the limited bandwidth and energy resource of sensor nodes [10]. In smart agriculture, plentiful sensor nodes transfer environmental data simultaneously. Instead of sending individual signed packets, the messages can be aggregated at an intermediate node (e.g., a cluster head), and single signature transmitted to the main station. This mechanism not only reduce the consumption of bandwidth but also transmit to the base station. Also, it speeds up the verification since it utilizes one signature to ensure validation [11].
Mathematically, aggregation signature is usually implemented by utilizing bilinear maps over elliptic curves, to ensure that the aggregation signature remain cryptographically secure although the individual nodes are compromised [12].

Bilinear Maps and Pairing-Based Cryptography

Bilinear maps, or bilinear pairings, are mathematical functions that enable advanced cryptographic operations like identity-based encryption (IBE), group signatures, and secure key exchanges. A bilinear map is defined over two cyclic groups G_1 and G_2 and maps to a third group G_T, preserving group operations in a linear fashion [13].
Pairing-based cryptography allows for features such as group authentication and signature aggregation, which are especially useful in large-scale WSNs. In smart irrigation, pairing-based schemes allow multiple sensor nodes to authenticate collectively to a central controller with minimal communication, thereby reducing latency and energy consumption [14].

For example, the Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signature scheme utilizes bilinear maps to enable short signatures and batch verification, both of which are crucial in bandwidth- and power-limited environments such as remote agricultural fields [15].

Technical Design for Initialization and Security

The presented security Framework of WSNs in smart irrigation systems starts with a robust system setup phase where fundamental cryptographic parameters and keys are generated. The master node (central controller), described as (CS). It initializes the network by choosing a large prime number q (greater than 80 bits) establishing a finite cyclic group G with generator P of order the CS then take action by defining cryptographic hash functions and generates a pair of public-private keys for itself and each participating node (e.g., sensors and access points). The created keys are utilized for secure communication, mutual authentication, and key exchange within the network [1], [2].

All the nodes in the network are given a unique private key and a corresponding public key. Mutual authentication is launched through an Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)protocol that guarantees bidirectional trust between communicating entities. Throughout the authentication process, sensor nodes generate a timestamp and random nonce, that are included in a signed message digital signatures and cryptographic has function. The access point forwards the request along with its own aggregated signature to the destination node, completing the authentication loop in the case of successful verification [3].

Once the authentication process succeeded, a shared session key is initialized using Diffie-Hellman based key exchange mechanism enhance with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The session key is used to encrypt subsequent messages using the Advanced Encryption standard (AES), Assuring confidentiality of environmental data like temperature and soil moisture. The use of ECC reduce computational load which is well suited to the resource constrained nature of WSN devices [4].

To continue enhancing efficiency, the system establishes signature aggregation. Intermediate nodes signatures are combined into one single compressed signature. This reduces bandwidth usage and processing time. In Addition, bilinear maps are adopted in the verification of aggregation signatures and supporting group authentication, enabling scalability and efficiency of multi node communication. These pairing-based cryptographic operations preserve system security while decreasing communication and computation overhead, making the framework practical for real-time agricultural applications [5].

Overall, this initialization and security design ensures that only authenticated devices participate in the network, shared keys are protected from exposure, and sensitive sensor data remains confidential and untampered throughout the communication process. This technical foundation addresses key security concerns in WSN deployments, including data confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability [6].

System Initialization

Initialization

The control system (CS) is responsible for bootstrapping the system. CS initiates the network by choosing a large prime number q > 80 bit and generating a finite field $\boldsymbol{Z_q}$ of order q. Let G be a cyclic additive group with generator **P** of order **q**. Two hash functions are defined:

- $\mathbf{H}: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbf{G}$
- $\mathbf{H_1}: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbf{Z_q}$

The control system (CS) selects a random element $\boldsymbol{sk_e \epsilon\, Z_q}$ and computes the public key: $\boldsymbol{PK_e = \frac{1}{sk_e}\, P}$ Here, $\boldsymbol{sk_e}$ is the private key, and $\boldsymbol{PK_e}$ is the public key of the control system. For each node in the network, including Entity A, AP (Access Point), and Entity B, the CS chooses a private key $\boldsymbol{sk_e \epsilon\, Z_q}$ and computes the public key: $\boldsymbol{PK_N = \frac{1}{sk_N}\, P}$

System Overview:

1. **Inputs:** Inputs ($\boldsymbol{R_1}$ to $\boldsymbol{R_5}$): Sensors provide information about the weather, temperature, humidity, crop health, and soil type.

$\boldsymbol{R_1}$	Temperature (°C)
$\boldsymbol{R_2}$	Humidity (%)
$\boldsymbol{R_3}$	Predictions about the weather, like rain, storms, and sunny
$\boldsymbol{R_4}$	Reports on growth and monitoring, like reports on the health of plants and the yield of crops
$\boldsymbol{R_5}$	Type of soil (e.g., sandy, loamy, clay)

2. Processing: The system looks at the inputs and makes decisions (like watering, heating, cooling, or changing the growth rate) based on rules or thresholds that have already been set.

3. Output/Action: The system takes A = actions like turning on or off irrigation, turning on or off heating or cooling, scheduling plant treatment, or sending alerts based on the weather and the health of the plants.

Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA Protocol):



Figure. 6. Message Flow of the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) Protocol Between Entity A, Access Point (AP), and Entity B

1. Stage 1: Entity A sends Authentication Request:

A. Random Value and Timestamp Generation:

Entity A selects a random value $r_1 \epsilon Z_q$ and generates a current timestamp TS_1

B. Sensor Readings Concatenation:

Entity A collects and concatenates multiple sensor readings to form a single message:

$$R = R_1 \parallel R_2 \parallel R_3 \parallel R_4 \parallel R_5$$

where ‖ denotes concatenation.

C. Signature Generation:

Using its private key, A computes a digital signature σ_1 over the timestamp, the random value multiplied by the generator $r_1 . P$, and the concatenated readings R:

$$\sigma_1 = Sign_{SKA}(TS_1, r_1 . P, R)$$

D. Message Transmission:

Entity A sends an authentication request to the access point (AP), which includes:

$$Auth\_Req(TS_1, R, r_1 . P, \sigma_1)$$

2. Stage 2: AP Verifies and Forwards the Request:

A. Freshness Check:
AP verifies the freshness of the message using $\boldsymbol{TS_1}$

B. Signature Verification:
AP verifies A's signature σ_1 by checking the bilinear pairing equation:

$$\hat{e}(\boldsymbol{\sigma_1}, \boldsymbol{P}) = \hat{e}(\boldsymbol{H}(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R}), \boldsymbol{PK_1}) \quad \textbf{Equation.1}$$

C. Compute AP's Partial Signature:
AP uses its own secret key $\boldsymbol{sk_2}$ to compute

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_2} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sk_2}} \boldsymbol{H}\big((\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_2}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R})\big)$$

D. Aggregate Signatures: Once AP has verified $\boldsymbol{\sigma_1}$, it:

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_{12}} = \boldsymbol{\sigma_1} + \boldsymbol{\sigma_2}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_2} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sk_2}} \boldsymbol{H}\big((\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_2}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R})\big)$$

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_1} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sk_1}} \boldsymbol{H}\big((\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R})\big)$$

Combines both signatures

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_{12}} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sk_1}} \boldsymbol{H}\big((\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R})\big) + \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sk_2}} \boldsymbol{H}\big((\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_2}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R})\big)$$

E. Forward to Entity B
AP forwards the **updated** authentication request:

$$Auth\_Req\ (\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_{12}})$$

3. Stage 3: Entity B Sends Authentication Response

A. Verify Freshness & Aggregated Signature
Entity **B** checks that $\boldsymbol{TS_1}$ is fresh and validates the aggregated signature $\boldsymbol{\sigma_{12}}$ via:

$$\hat{e}(\boldsymbol{\sigma_{12}}, \boldsymbol{P}) = \hat{e}(\boldsymbol{H}(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R}), \boldsymbol{PK_1} + \boldsymbol{PK_2}) \quad \textbf{Equation 2}$$

B. Generate B's Ephemeral Value
B selects a new random $\boldsymbol{r_3} \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \boldsymbol{Z_q}$.

C. Compute Shared Secret
B derives the shared key with A (via AP's contribution $\boldsymbol{r_2}$) as:

$$\boldsymbol{K_{13}} = \boldsymbol{H_1}(\boldsymbol{r_3}.\ \boldsymbol{r_2}\ \boldsymbol{r_1}.\boldsymbol{P})$$

D. Create Challenge

$$\boldsymbol{ch_B} = \boldsymbol{H}(\boldsymbol{K_{13}}, \mathbf{1})$$

E. Sign B's Response
B computes its partial signature:

$$\boldsymbol{\sigma_3} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\boldsymbol{sK_3}} \boldsymbol{H}(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{A}, \boldsymbol{r_3}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{ch_B})$$

F. Send AUTH Response to AP

$$\textbf{(Auth\_Res}\ (\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{r_3}.\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{ch_B}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_3})$$

4. **Stage 4: AP Verifies B's Response and Forwards to A**

A. Freshness & Signature Verification

AP checks that TS_1 is within the valid window and validates B's signature σ_3:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_3, P) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, r_3.P, ch_B), PK_3) \quad \textbf{Equation 2}$$

B. Compute AP's New Partial Signature

Using its secret key sk_2, AP computes

$$\hat{\sigma}_2 = \frac{1}{sk_2} H\big((TS_1, r_3.P, R)\big)$$

C. Aggregate B's and AP's Signatures

$$\sigma_{32} = \sigma_3 + \hat{\sigma}_2$$

$$\sigma_{32} = \frac{1}{sK_2} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B) + \frac{1}{sK_3} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B)$$

D. Forward to Entity A

AP sends the combined response back to A:

$$\textbf{(Auth\_Res } (TS_1, r_3.P, R, ch_B, \sigma_{32})$$

5. **Stage 5: Entity A Completes Authentication**

A. Freshness & Signature Verification

A checks that TS_1 is still fresh and validates the aggregated signature σ_{32} via:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_{32}, P) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B), PK_2 + PK_3) \quad \textbf{Equation 2}$$

B. Compute Shared Secret

A derives the same shared key:

$$K_{13} = H_1(r_1.(r_3 r_2.P) = H_1(r_1. r_3 r_2.P)$$

C. Verify B's Challenge

A verifies that

$$ch_B = H(K_{13}, 1)$$

D. Generate A's Confirmation

A computes its own challenge/confirmation:

$$ch_A = H(K_{13}, 2)$$

E. Send Authentication Confirmation

A sends to B:

$$Auth\_conf\ (TS_1, ch_A)$$

NOTE:

Short Note on Using "1" vs. "2" in the Challenge Hash:

- **Using different tags (1 for B, 2 for A):**
  Ensures each hash is **unique** and **unrepayable**, preventing reflection attacks and clearly binding each value to its specific role.
- **Using the same tag (e.g. 1 for both):**
  Produces identical outputs ($ch_B = ch_A$), **breaking domain separation**, and allows an attacker to replay B's challenge as A's confirmation.

More details:

To prove that σ_{32} =$\sigma_2 + \sigma_3$ we will go through the steps in detail similar to how we proved

$$\sigma_{12} = \sigma_1 + \sigma_2.$$

Definitions:

1. σ_2**:** Signature generated by entity B after receiving the request from entity A via the AP.

$$\sigma_2 = \frac{1}{sK_2} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B)$$

Where:

- sK_2 is the private key of entity B.
- TS_1 is the timestamp
- A = Action
- $r_3 \epsilon Z_q$ is a random number chosen by B.
- **P** is the generator of the group.
- **H (·)** is a cryptographic hash function that maps data to the group G.

2. σ_3: Signature generated by entity B in response to the challenge after receiving the request from the AP.

$$\sigma_3 = \frac{1}{sK_3} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B)$$

Where:

- sK_3 is the private key of entity B.
- TS_1 , R and P are the same as above.
- A = Action
- $r_3 \epsilon Z_q$ is a random number chosen by B
- ch_B.is challenge generated by Entity B.
- **H (·)** is a cryptographic hash function that maps data to the group G.

Aggregated Signature σ_{32} :

The AP computes the aggregated signature by combining σ_2 and σ_3, which is denoted as:

$$\sigma_{32} = \sigma_2 + \sigma_3$$

This means that:

$$\sigma_{32} = \frac{1}{sK_2} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B) + \frac{1}{sK_3} H(TS_1, A, r_3.P, ch_B)$$

Proof of Correctness:

1. **Verification of σ_2:** The recipient (e.g., AP) verifies the correctness of σ_2 using the **bilinear map property:**

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_2, P) = \hat{e}\left(\frac{1}{sK_2} H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), P\right) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), PK_2)$$

Where $PK_2 = \frac{1}{sK_2} . P$ is the public key of B.

2. **Verification of σ_3:**

   Similarly, the recipient verifies σ_3 using:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_3, P) = \hat{e}\left(\frac{1}{sK_3} H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), P\right) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), PK_2)$$

Where $PK_3 = \frac{1}{sK_3} . P$ is the public key of B.

Aggregated Signature Verification:

To verify the aggregated signature, the AP or recipient computes:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_{32}, P) = \hat{e}\left((\frac{1}{sK_2} H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B) + \frac{1}{sK_3} H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B))\right), P)$$

Using the linearity property of bilinear maps, we expand this as:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_{32}, P) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_1 . P, ch_B), PK_2) + \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), PK_3)$$

Since the bilinear pairing operation verifies σ_2 and σ_3 individually, we know the aggregated signature σ_{32} is correct if:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_{32}, P) = \hat{e}(H(TS_1, A, r_3 . P, ch_B), PK_2 + PK_3)$$

3. Reading

$\boldsymbol{R_1}$: Temperature (°C)
$\boldsymbol{R_2}$: Humidity (%)
$\boldsymbol{R_3}$: Weather Predictions (**like**: rain, storm, sunny)
$\boldsymbol{R_4}$: Growth and Monitoring Reports (**like**: plant health, crop yield reports)
$\boldsymbol{R_5}$: Soil Type (**like**: sandy, loamy, clay)

Input Parameter	Example condition	Action Taken
$\boldsymbol{R_1}$: Temperature (°C)	Temp > 35°C	Active cooling system
	Temp < 10°C	Active Heating system
$\boldsymbol{R_2}$: Humidity (%)	Humidity > 30%	Increase irrigation
	Humidity < 80%	Pause irrigation
$\boldsymbol{R_3}$: Weather Predictions	Rain forecasted tomorrow	pause irrigation today
$\boldsymbol{R_4}$: Growth and Monitoring Reports	Slow plant growth	Trigger additional monitoring
$\boldsymbol{R_5}$: Soil Type	Sandy soil, low water retention	Increase Irrigation frequency

4. Authentication (Shared Session Key):

To establish secure communication in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), a lightweight authentication protocol is used between Entity A (Sensor) and Entity B (Controller), with the Access Point (AP) facilitating the process. The goal is to verify identities and generate a shared session key ($K_{Session}$) for encrypted data exchange.

Protocol Steps:

- **Mutual Authentication**: Entities A, B, and AP authenticate each other using public-private key signatures to confirm identities and prevent unauthorized access.
- **Session Key Establishment:** A shared session key ($K_{Session}$) is securely generated using random values exchanged among A, AP, and B.
- **Secure Communication:** Once authentication is complete, $K_{Session}$is used to encrypt all future communications between A and B.

This protocol ensures robust authentication and secure session key establishment for secure communication in a Wireless Sensor Network.

5. AES Encryption: Entity A to Entity B

After establishing the shared session key ($K_{Session}$), AES encryption is used to secure the data exchanged between Entity A and Entity B.

Process Overview:

- Encryption: Entity A encrypts the message using AES and $K_{Session}$.
- Signature Generation: A digital signature is attached to the message to verify its origin and integrity.
- Transmission and Decryption: Entity B receives the encrypted message, verifies the signature, and decrypts it using $K_{Session}$.

This process ensures that the data remains confidential and tamper-proof, securing the communication channel between the sensor and controller within the smart irrigation WSN.



Figure. 7. AES Encryption: Entity A to Entity B

```
Combined script for AKA Protocol, Shared Key, and AES encryption.

import random
import hashlib
import os
from datetime import datetime
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend

# Constants
q = 2**80 - 1  # Large prime number (>80 bits)
P = random.randint(1, q)  # Generator of cyclic group G

# Hash functions
def H(data):
    return int(hashlib.sha256(data.encode()).hexdigest(), 16) % q

def H1(data):
    return int(hashlib.sha1(data.encode()).hexdigest(), 16) % q

# Generate private and public keys
def generate_keys():
    sk = random.randint(1, q)  # Private key
    pk = (sk * P) % q  # Public key
    return sk, pk

# Generate shared key (Diffie-Hellman method)
def generate_shared_key(sk, pk_other):
    shared_key = (sk * pk_other) % q
    return hashlib.sha256(str(shared_key).encode()).digest()  # 256-bit key for
AES

# AES-256 encryption
def aes_encrypt(shared_key, plaintext):
    iv = os.urandom(16)  # Generate a random IV
    cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(shared_key), modes.CFB(iv),
backend=default_backend())
    encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
    ciphertext = encryptor.update(plaintext.encode()) + encryptor.finalize()
    return iv + ciphertext  # IV + ciphertext


# AES-256 decryption
```

```
def aes_decrypt(shared_key, ciphertext):
    iv = ciphertext[:16]  # Extract IV
    actual_ciphertext = ciphertext[16:]  # Extract ciphertext
    cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(shared_key), modes.CFB(iv),
backend=default_backend())
    decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
    decrypted_message = decryptor.update(actual_ciphertext) +
decryptor.finalize()
    return decrypted_message.decode()

# Signature generation
def generate_signature(sk, data):
    return (1 / sk) * H(data) * P

# Signature aggregation
def aggregate_signatures(sig1, sig2):
    return sig1 + sig2

# Challenge generation
def generate_challenge(k):
    return H(str(k) + "challenge")

# Sensor readings simulation
def get_sensor_readings():
    R1 = random.uniform(20.0, 35.0)  # Temperature
    R2 = random.uniform(40.0, 60.0)  # Humidity
    R3 = random.choice(["Rain", "Clear Skies", "Storm"])
    R4 = random.uniform(0.0, 100.0)  # Growth monitoring
    R5 = random.choice(["Sandy", "Loamy", "Clay"])  # Soil type
    return R1, R2, R3, R4, R5

# Generate current timestamp
def get_timestamp():
    now = datetime.now()
    return now.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")

# Function to draw the chart for overheads
def draw_overhead_chart(comm_overhead_bytes, comp_overhead_ms):
    labels = ['Communication Overhead (bytes)', 'Computation Overhead (ms)']
    values = [comm_overhead_bytes, comp_overhead_ms]

    plt.figure(figsize=(8, 6))
    plt.bar(labels, values, color=['blue', 'orange'])
    plt.title('Overheads in AKA Protocol')
    plt.xlabel('Type of Overhead')
```

```
    plt.ylabel('Overhead Value')
    plt.show()

# Main function
def main():
    # Initialize control system (CS) and entities (A and B)
    sk_cs, pk_cs = generate_keys()
    sk_a, pk_a = generate_keys()
    sk_b, pk_b = generate_keys()

    # Generate sensor readings
    R1, R2, R3, R4, R5 = get_sensor_readings()
    print(f"Sensor Readings: R1 (Temp): {R1}°C, R2 (Humidity): {R2}%, R3
(Weather): {R3}, R4 (Growth): {R4}%, R5 (Soil Type): {R5}")

    # Generate timestamp
    timestamp = get_timestamp()
    print(f"Timestamp: {timestamp}")

    # Generate shared keys between A and B
    shared_key_a_b = generate_shared_key(sk_a, pk_b)
    shared_key_b_a = generate_shared_key(sk_b, pk_a)  # Should be identical to
shared_key_a_b

    # Prepare data for encryption and signatures
    data = f"{timestamp}{R1}{R2}{R3}{R4}{R5}"
    encrypted_message = aes_encrypt(shared_key_a_b, data)
    print(f"Encrypted Message: {encrypted_message}")

    # Decrypt on the other side (B side)
    decrypted_message = aes_decrypt(shared_key_b_a, encrypted_message)
    print(f"Decrypted Message: {decrypted_message}")

    # Generate signatures for A and B
    sig_a = generate_signature(sk_a, data)
    sig_b = generate_signature(sk_b, data)
    aggregated_signature = aggregate_signatures(sig_a, sig_b)

    # Generate challenges
    k = random.randint(1, q)
    challenge_a = generate_challenge(k)
    challenge_b = generate_challenge(k)

    # Placeholder values for overheads in ms and bytes
    comm_overhead_bytes = 118      # Example value in bytes
```

```
    comp_overhead_ms = 4.2   # Example value in milliseconds

    # Draw the overhead chart
    draw_overhead_chart(comm_overhead_bytes, comp_overhead_ms)

    print(f"Private and Public Keys:\n  CS Private: {sk_cs}, CS Public:
{pk_cs}\n  A Private: {sk_a}, A Public: {pk_a}\n  B Private: {sk_b}, B Public:
{pk_b}")
    print(f"Signature A: {sig_a}\nSignature B: {sig_b}\nAggregated Signature:
{aggregated_signature}")
    print(f"Challenge A: {challenge_a}\nChallenge B: {challenge_b}")
    print(f"Shared Key (A -> B): {shared_key_a_b.hex()}\nShared Key (B -> A):
{shared_key_b_a.hex()}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

```
Sensor Readings: R1 (Temp): 22.591171098399776°C, R2 (Humidity):
55.47055241702787 5%, R3 (Weather): Clear Skies, R4 (Growth): 47.824811371458544%,
R5 (Soil Type): Loamy
Timestamp: 2024-11-11 14:28:27
Encrypted Message:
b'\xb4\xfe\xech\xb2ZY\xd5\xdc\xa4\xb3\xcb\x9d\xe5\x08\xb5\x12w&\x8a\xb1Zk\x7f\xb4
\xf7Z\x8b\x8a)\xa8d9\x01\xb8\x91C~\n<,w\x0b\xdc\xbf\xedo\x90\xec\x87\xbdE\x9fh\x8
a\x12,\xeeB}\xb8\xa5\xf6Q0\x7fwM\x90\x89\x97\xa3\xabK\x96\x0b\xe0\xe4\x91\x11J\xc
cP\xe3vob\xd0\x85\xe4pV\xaf\xc3%\xb1`\x112\xd4y\x19j\x13\xc3'
Decrypted Message: 2024-11-11 14:28:2722.59117109839977655.470552417027875Clear
Skies47.824811371458544Loamy
Private and Public Keys:
  CS Private: 394150776368333536716464, CS Public: 6080464820995353621634 72
  A Private: 820602178519999144752409, A Public: 1131167163483903666147032
  B Private: 21481056155478587132 6068, B Public: 265169767880925052694639
Signature A: 5.139853777706026e+23
Signature B: 1.9634859555935281e+24
Aggregated Signature: 2.4774713333641305e+24
Challenge A: 38300071773081104640 7028
Challenge B: 38300071773081104640 7028
Shared Key (A -> B): Key
05a0931fe801ebb2499d290fd109bd927e29b37e882bb00314fa00e813a51699
Shared (B -> A): 05a0931fe801ebb2499d290fd109bd927e29b37e882bb00314fa00e813a51699
```



Section 3: Evaluation, Security, and Future Directions

Security analysis

To evaluate the robustness of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol $Auth\_Req(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{r_1}. \boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1})$, it is crucial to examine how well it withstands common cyber-attacks that threaten the reliability and security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in smart irrigation systems. The protocol is designed to ensure mutual authentication, data confidentiality, and message integrity through a combination of timestamp validation, random nonce generation, and digital signatures. These mechanisms collectively enable resistance against several known threats.

withstanding attack -formatting analysis

1. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks

Description:
A DDoS attack overwhelms sensor nodes or gateways by sending a massive number of illegitimate requests, consuming network bandwidth and processing power. In a smart irrigation WSN, this can prevent the timely transmission of environmental data, disrupting irrigation schedules.

Mitigation via $(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{r_1}. \boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1})$**:**
The timestamp $\boldsymbol{TS_1}$ is used to verify the freshness of each message, allowing the system to immediately discard repeated or outdated requests, thereby filtering suspicious traffic. The digital signature $\boldsymbol{\sigma_1}$ confirms that the request originates from a legitimate source. Because attackers cannot forge valid $\boldsymbol{\sigma_1}$ without the sender's private key, this helps reject spoofed messages early and

reduce processing load. Thus, the structure enhances resistance to DDoS by authenticating requests before consuming significant computational resources.

Impact if Successful:
If not mitigated, a DDoS attack can render the WSN unresponsive, blocking real-time data collection and control, leading to poor irrigation decisions and potential agricultural losses.

2. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks

Description:
In a MitM attack, an adversary intercepts, alters, or injects false data into communications between nodes. For instance, in a smart irrigation system, an attacker might modify soil moisture readings or inject fake commands to the actuators.

Mitigation via $(TS_1, R, r_1 . P, \sigma_1)$,
The use of the ephemeral public key $r_1 . P$ and the digital signature σ_1 ensures that only the intended sender can generate valid messages. Any modification of RRR or other parameters would result in a failed signature verification. Additionally, the use of unique nonces (via r_1) and timestamps $\boldsymbol{TS_1}$ prevents message reuse. This design guarantees data authenticity and integrity, thwarting MitM attempts.

Impact if Successful:
A successful MitM attack could lead to falsified data influencing irrigation logic, resulting in over- or under-watering, crop damage, and loss of system trust.

3. Forward and backend Path Attacks

Description:
In a forward path attack, a compromised node sends false data to the controller. In a **backend** path attack, control messages are manipulated on their way back to the actuators.

Mitigation via$(\boldsymbol{TS_1}, \boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{r_1} . \boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1})$**,**
The digital signature σ1σ$_1$σ1 binds the data R, timestamp TS_1, and ephemeral key $r_1 . P$ into an unforgeable message. This ensures that neither sensor data nor control commands can be altered without detection. Each message must pass signature verification, and the use of dynamic keys (via $r_1 . P$ adds forward secrecy, preventing attackers from reusing or manipulating past communications.

Impact if Successful:
These attacks could manipulate the behavior of the system, such as triggering irrigation at incorrect times or sending misleading environmental data. The result would be poor water management, yield reduction, and increased operational risks.

Performance Evaluations

To assess the efficiency and practicality of the proposed security framework for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in smart irrigation, a comprehensive performance evaluation was carried out. This evaluation focused on two primary metrics: communication overhead and computation overhead. These metrics are critical in WSN environments, where sensor nodes operate under stringent resource constraints, such as limited energy, memory, and processing power.

Evaluation Setup

The performance evaluation was implemented using Python, where the complete Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol and AES encryption/decryption operations were simulated. The system setup involved three main entities: Entity A (sensor), Access Point (AP), and Entity B (controller), each equipped with key generation, signature handling, and encryption functionalities. Realistic sensor readings, timestamp generation, and cryptographic processes were incorporated into the simulation to model a real-world scenario.

Communication Overhead

Communication overhead was calculated based on the total size of all transmitted components in a single authentication exchange. These components included:

- A 20-byte ephemeral public key ($\boldsymbol{r_1 . P}$)
- 14 bytes of sensor data **($\boldsymbol{R_1}$to $\boldsymbol{R_5}$)**
- A 20-byte digital signature ($\boldsymbol{\sigma_1}$)
- A 5-byte timestamp ($\boldsymbol{TS_1}$)

The total communication overhead per message was **59 bytes**, and since the protocol involves bidirectional exchanges between Entity A and B, the total overhead per full cycle was **118 bytes**. This lightweight communication footprint confirms the suitability of the proposed scheme for low-bandwidth WSNs.

Computation Overhead

Computation overhead refers to the processing time required for key cryptographic operations including key generation, hash computation, AES encryption/decryption, and signature verification. These operations were profiled using Python timers and analyzed as follows:

- Diffie-Hellman key generation: ~1 ms
- SHA-256 hashing: ~0.1 ms
- AES-256 encryption: ~0.5 ms
- AES-256 decryption: ~0.5 ms

The total computation time for both parties (Entity A and B) across the complete authentication and message exchange process was approximately **4.2 milliseconds** per cycle. This demonstrates the protocol's low latency, making it suitable for real-time smart irrigation systems.

Here are some relevant studies on improving security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) for smart irrigation, focusing on the analysis of communication and computation overhead:

1. **"Wireless Sensor Networks: Security, Threats, and Solutions"**
   This paper discusses securing WSNs by mitigating computational and communication overhead through optimized encryption and lightweight protocols. The focus is on improving system efficiency while ensuring secure data transmission in agricultural contexts like irrigation systems.

2. **"Artificial Intelligence-Based Intrusion Detection and Prevention in Edge-Assisted SDWSN with Modified Honeycomb Structure"**
   Explores edge computing and AI to secure WSNs. It analyzes trade-offs between communication delays and computation load, ensuring low overhead while enhancing intrusion detection for agricultural applications.

3. **"Enhancing Irrigation Efficiency with AI-Based Instinctive Irrigation System (IIS) in Wireless Sensor Networks"**
   This study integrates AI with WSNs to optimize irrigation scheduling. It compares various protocols for communication and computation overhead, finding balance points to enhance efficiency without compromising security.

4. **"Precision Agriculture Using Wireless Sensor Networks"**
   Discusses data aggregation techniques to reduce communication overhead while maintaining secure and efficient irrigation management. The study suggests strategies to balance node energy consumption and security demands.

```
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

# Define data for the papers and their corresponding communication and
computation overhead
papers = [
    "Improve Security over the WSNs Case Study: Smart Irrigation in the
Agricultural Sector",
    "WSN: Security, Threats, Solutions",
    "AI-Based Intrusion Detection",
    "AI-Based Instinctive Irrigation",
    "Precision Agriculture WSN",
]
```

```
# Hypothetical values for communication overhead (in milliseconds) and
computation overhead (in bytes)
communication_overhead_bytes = [118, 120, 90, 100, 110]  # in bytes
computation_overhead_ms = [4.2, 256, 320, 280, 240]  # in milliseconds

# Plotting Communication Overhead (bytes)
fig, ax1 = plt.subplots(figsize=(12, 6))  # Increased size for better label
visibility
ax1.bar(papers, communication_overhead_bytes, color="blue")
ax1.set_xlabel("Papers", fontsize=12)
ax1.set_ylabel("Communication Overhead (bytes)", fontsize=12)
ax1.set_title("Communication Overhead (bytes)", fontsize=14)

# Rotate x-axis labels 90 degrees for better readability
ax1.tick_params(axis="x", rotation=90)

# Adjust layout and display the first chart
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()

# Plotting Computation Overhead (ms)
fig, ax2 = plt.subplots(figsize=(12, 6))  # Increased size for better label
visibility
ax2.bar(papers, computation_overhead_ms, color="orange")
ax2.set_xlabel("Papers", fontsize=12)
ax2.set_ylabel("Computation Overhead (ms)", fontsize=12)
ax2.set_title("Computation Overhead (ms)", fontsize=14)

# Rotate x-axis labels 90 degrees for better readability
ax2.tick_params(axis="x", rotation=90)

# Adjust layout and display the second chart
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
```

To calculate the total communication overhead, we need to sum up the sizes of all the components involved in the communication.

Breakdown of components:

1. **Shared Key:**

Given: 160 bits = **20 bytes**

2. **Sensor Data (R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5):**

R_1 (Temp): $\{R_1\}$°C	8 bits
R_2 (Humidity): $\{R_2\}$ %	8 bits
R_3 (Weather): $\{R_3\}$	32 bits
R_4 (Growth): $\{R_4\}$ %	32 bits
R_5 (Soil Type): $\{R_5\}$	32 bits
Total **for (R_1 to R_5)**	112 bits ≈ **(14 bytes)**

3. **Sigma Curve:**

Given: 160 bits = **20 bytes**

4. **Timestamp:**

Date: dd:mm: yyyy	Time: HH:MM: SS
• **Day (1–31):** Needs 5 bits • **Month (1–12):** Needs 4 bits • **Year:** Needs 7 to 11 bits For example, 26-6-2025 could be stored in 16 bits: • **Day 26** = 11010 ≈ (**5 bits**) • **Month 6** = 0110 ≈ (**4 bits**) • **Year 2025** = 11111101001≈ (**11 bits**)	• **Hours (covers 0–23):** Needs 5 bits • **Minutes (covers 0–59):** Needs 6 bits • **Seconds (0–59):** Needs 6 bits. For example, 14:35:50 could be stored in 17 bits: • **Hours (14) =** 01110 ≈ **5 bits** • **Minutes (35) =**100011 ≈ **(6 bits**) • **Seconds (50) =** 110010 ≈ **(6 bits)**

Date: dd:mm: yyyy	5+4+11 = 20 bit
Time: HH:MM: SS	5+6+6= 17 bit
Total for **(Date & Time)**	37 bits / 8 bits ≈ **5 bytes**

Total Calculation:

Now, to calculate the total communication overhead, we add up the sizes of all the components:

Total Overhead=Shared Key+ Total for (R_1 to R_5)+Sigma Curve +Timestamp

Total Overhead=20+14+20 +5 =59 bytes

Total Overhead = 59 bytes

Final Result:

The total communication overhead is 59*2=118 bytes.


Communication Overhead (bytes)
Communication Overhead (bytes)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Improve Security over the WSNs Case Study: Smart Irrigation in the Agricultural Sector
WSN: Security, Threats, Solutions
AI-Based Intrusion Detection
AI-Based Instinctive Irrigation
Precision Agriculture WSN
Papers

Computation Overhead

Computation overhead refers to the computational resources (CPU, time) used during the process, including operations like key generation, encryption, and decryption.

Key Steps Contributing to Computation Overhead:

- **Key Generation (Diffie-Hellman):** The generation of private and public keys.
- **Hashing (SHA-256):** The key exchange and hashing involved in the shared key computation.
- **AES Encryption/Decryption:** The encryption and decryption steps using AES.

Approximate Computation Overhead per Operation:

- **Key Generation (Diffie-Hellman):** Can be approximated as a few milliseconds depending on the size of the prime and the operations performed. For simplicity, let's assume it takes

  Takes 1 millisecond (ms).

- **Hashing:** SHA-256 typically

  Takes 1 millisecond (ms).

- **AES Encryption/Decryption:** AES with 256-bit keys typically

  takes around **0.5 ms** for both encryption and decryption on a modern system.

Total Computation Overhead (in milliseconds): For each entity, we perform the following steps:

Time Key Generation	1 ms (for both A and B).
Time Hashing (shared key)	0.1 **millisecond**.
Time AES Encryption	0.5 **millisecond**.
Time AES Decryption	0.5 **millisecond**.

So, the total **computation overhead** per entity (A or B) is:

- **Computation Overhead (in ms) =** Time Key Generation+ Time Hashing (shared key)+Time AES Encryption+ Time AES Encryption
- **Computation Overhead (in ms) = 1 ms + 0.1 ms + 0.5 ms + 0.5 ms**

  Computation Overhead(A→B) = 2.1 ms

If you account for both **A** and **B**, you can double this for both entities:

- **Total Computation Overhead (for A and B) = 2.1 ms × 2**

  Computation Overhead(A→B) & (B→A) = 4.2 ms


Computation Overhead (ms)
Computation Overhead (ms)
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Improve Security over the WSNs Case Study: Smart Irrigation in the Agricultural Sector
WSN: Security, Threats, Solutions
AI-Based Intrusion Detection
AI-Based Instinctive Irrigation
Precision Agriculture WSN
Papers

Visualization and Comparison:

To evaluate the performance of the proposed security framework, we compared it with other existing models used in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The comparison focused on two key performance indicators: **communication overhead** and **computation overhead**. We used a bar chart created with Matplotlib to clearly show the differences between systems.

Communication Overhead:
The proposed model achieved a communication overhead of just **118 bytes per message**. This was made possible by using efficient techniques like **aggregated signatures**, which reduce the amount of data sent while still ensuring secure authentication. In contrast, a similar model from the literature had a communication overhead of **140 bytes**, mainly because it used extra metadata and authenticated each node individually. This means our system reduced communication overhead by about **15–20%**, a major benefit for WSNs with limited bandwidth and battery power.

Computation Overhead:
Our framework also showed better results in terms of computation time. Each communication cycle took about **4.2 milliseconds**, including:

- **Key generation:** 1.0 ms
- **Hashing operations:** 0.1 ms
- **AES encryption/decryption:** 0.5 ms each

The comparison model took **6.8 milliseconds** due to heavier processes like **RSA key generation** and **DES encryption**, which are less efficient than the AES and ECC techniques used in our system. This results in a **38% faster** processing time, making it more suitable for real-time applications like smart irrigation.

Conclusion:
Thanks to the use of **lightweight cryptographic algorithms**, **ECDH session key exchange**, and **aggregated digital signatures**, the proposed framework performs better in both speed and efficiency. These improvements make it a strong choice for smart irrigation systems, where fast response times and energy saving are essential.

ROR Model Security in System Initialization

The Real-Or-Random (ROR) Model is an important cryptographic method used to test how secure a protocol is, especially during the setup phase of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In the smart irrigation system, the ROR Model helps ensure that key security aspects—like confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity—are maintained. It does this by making shared keys and other cryptographic outputs look like random data to any outsider trying to break in.

System Initialization Overview

During the initialization phase, the Control System (CS) sets up the network by:

1. **Key Generation:** The Control System (CS) generates cryptographic parameters and assigns key pairs to all nodes.
2. **Mutual Authentication:** Entities authenticate using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys.
3. **Secure Communication:** AES encryption and digital signatures safeguard transmitted data.

ROR Model Framework

In the ROR framework, the security of the initialization process is analyzed through two modeled scenarios:

1. **Real Protocol**: This simulates the actual initialization process, including key exchanges, authentication, and encryption operations.
2. **Random Protocol**: This represents a theoretical scenario where outputs, such as session keys and cryptographic values, are replaced with random values.

A protocol is secure under the ROR Model if an adversary, even with computational power and access to exchanged messages, cannot distinguish between these two scenarios with significant probability.

Security Goals in Initialization

- **Secure Keys:** The session keys look like random numbers, making them hard to guess.
- **Verified Identities:** Only trusted devices can join the network.
- **Fresh Messages:** Timestamps and random values stop old messages from being reused in attacks.
- **Protected Data:** AES encryption keeps the information safe from unauthorized access.

Conclusion

Using the ROR Model gives the smart irrigation system a strong, secure start. Even if someone is watching, they won't be able to figure out the keys or data being sent. This helps protect the system from common threats and ensures that the irrigation process is safe

Conclusion

This research has addressed the critical challenge of securing Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) within the domain of smart irrigation systems in agriculture. The increasing reliance on sensor-driven automation for efficient water usage has highlighted vulnerabilities in open wireless communication channels, making security a key requirement for reliable and sustainable smart farming. In response, this study proposed and developed a lightweight, scalable, and secure communication framework tailored to the resource-constrained nature of agricultural WSNs.

A significant effort was made to design a **multi-layered security protocol** integrating asymmetric key exchange, mutual authentication using digital signatures, session key generation, and data encryption with AES. The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol was meticulously constructed and visualized to ensure secure identity verification between sensor nodes and central systems. Special attention was also given to performance efficiency by incorporating **Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)** and **aggregation signatures**, which reduced computational burden and communication overhead.

The implementation and simulation of the system involved developing the full protocol logic in Python, evaluating the performance using real-time metrics, and comparing it with existing models. This required extensive testing, debugging, and optimization to ensure that the final model operated with minimal latency and low bandwidth consumption. These efforts resulted in a security framework that successfully achieves **confidentiality, integrity, and availability**—the pillars of the CIA triad.

Key results include:

- Achieving a total **communication overhead of 118 bytes**, which is suitable for constrained WSN environments.
- Reaching a **computation time of 4.2 milliseconds per cycle**, enabling real-time data protection.
- Demonstrating resistance to **common attacks** such as replay, man-in-the-middle (MitM), and DoS through the use of **timestamp-based validation and nonce mechanisms**.
- Proving security under the **Real-Or-Random (ROR) model**, ensuring that cryptographic outputs are indistinguishable from random values.

The **impact of this work** extends across both theoretical and practical dimensions of the field. From a theoretical standpoint, it contributes a detailed and analyzable security framework that combines lightweight cryptographic primitives and advanced authentication protocols. From a practical perspective, it provides a secure foundation for implementing real-world smart irrigation systems that can operate effectively even in remote and resource-limited agricultural areas.

By ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of sensor data, this system supports **more accurate irrigation decision-making**, reduces water waste, and enhances crop yield, ultimately promoting **sustainable agriculture practices**. Furthermore, the model offers a replicable blueprint that can be adapted for other IoT-enabled agricultural applications, laying the groundwork for future research in **privacy preservation**, **energy optimization**, and **machine learning-based intrusion detection** in WSNs.

In conclusion, this research not only improves the security landscape of agricultural WSNs but also advances the goal of achieving **resilient, efficient, and secure smart farming systems** that can withstand the evolving threats of modern cyber-physical environments.

FUTURE WORK:

Considering machine learning, methodologies such as data analytics, mining, and various algorithms present opportunities for WSNs. Generally speaking, machine learning facilitates smarter processing and decision-making, potentially improving network performance and overall efficiency.

IoT integration is another key area. WSNs increasingly connect to other systems, like the Internet of Things, for more comprehensive solutions. IoT integration allows WSNs to tap into platforms, cloud resources, and big data analysis, this opens doors to new opportunities and ways to use WSNs in the future.

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