
## SWITCH SPOOFING ATTACKS

## **Switch Spoofing Attacks:**

Hopping	<ul><li>Enables traffic from 1 VLAN to be seen by another VLAN</li><li>Trunk ports have access/pass all VLANs by default</li></ul>
Spoofing	<ul> <li>Attacker takes advantage of default config on switch port (dynamic auto)</li> <li>Takes advantage of misconfigured ports: Configures sys to spoof itself as switch</li> <li>Emulation of 802.1Q/DTP messages</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Tricks switch into thinking another switch is attempting to form trunk</li> <li>Allows attacker to gain access to all VLANs allowed on trunk port</li> <li>Mitigation: Turn off trunking all ports: Except needed: Disable DTP: Manually enable trunking</li> </ul>

## **Double-Tagging (double-encapsulated) Attack**





Double-	■ Takes advantage of way HW operates on switches
tagging	■ Most only perform 1 lvl of 802.1Q de-encapsulation
	■ Embeds hidden 802.1Q tag inside frame
	■ Tag allows frame to be fwded to VLAN 802.1Q didn't specify
	<ul><li>Works EVEN if trunk ports disabled (host sends frame on segment not trunk)</li></ul>
	1. Attacker sends double-tagged 802.1Q frame to switch
	<ul> <li>Outer header has VLAN tag of attacker: Same as native VLAN port</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Switch processes frame received as if it were on trunk port/port w/voice VLAN</li> </ul>
	- It shouldn't receive tagged eth0 frame on access port <b>Assume native = VLAN 10:</b>
	Inner tag VLAN 20
	2. Frame arrives on switch: Looks at first 4-bytes of 802.1Q tag
	<ul> <li>Switch sees frame is destined for VLAN 10 (native)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Fwds packet out all VLAN 10 ports after stripping VLAN 10 tag</li> </ul>
	<ul><li>VLAN 20 tag is still intact/uninspected by 1st switch</li></ul>
	3. Second switch only looks at inner 802.1Q tag attacker sent:

- Sees the frame is destined for VLAN 20: TargetSecond switch sends frame to victim port/floods
- Depends if there is an existing MAC table entry for victim host
- Unidirectional: Only works when attacker is connected to port in same VLAN as native on trunk port

Mitigation: Ensure native VLAN of the trunk ports is different from VLAN of user ports.

**PVLAN Edge:** Some apps require no traffic fwded at L2 between ports on same switch: 1 neighbor doesn't see traffic by another

**PVLAN: AKA protected ports:** No exchange of uni/multi/broadcast traffic between these ports on switch happens

## PVLAN Protected port doesn't fwd traffic (uni/multi/broadcast) to any other port also protected: Except control traffic Data traffic can't be forwarded between protected ports at L2 Fwding behavior between protected/nonprotected port proceeds as usual Protected ports must be manually config To configure PVLAN Edge: switchport protected cmd in int config no switchport protected cmd int config cmd: disable port show interfaces [int id] switchport (priv exec) cmd verify config of PVLAN Edge