

# Java Secure Coding

Denial of Service (DoS)  
Input Validation  
Mutability  
Variable Scope  
Thread Safety  
Exception Handling  
Role-Based Authentication

# What We Will Cover

- ◆ Denial of Service (DoS)
- ◆ Input Validation
- ◆ Mutability
- ◆ Variable Scopes
- ◆ Thread Safety
- ◆ Exception Handling
- ◆ Role-Based Authentication

# Denial of Service (DoS)

## **Denial of Service (DoS)**

Input Validation

Mutability

Variable Scope

Thread Safety

Exception Handling

Role-Based Authentication

# DoS Resources Attacked

- ◆ Affects Resources
  - CPU
  - Memory
  - Disk Space
  - etc.

# DoS Examples

- ◆ Requesting images with large size
- ◆ Failure of Sanity checking of sizes by integer overflow errors
- ◆ Memory allocation to an object graph much more than usual
- ◆ Zip bombs: Huge decompressed file from a tiny zip file
- ◆ Billion laughs attack: Growing XML documents dramatically during parsing

## DoS Examples, cont'd

- ◆ Increasing executing cost for example from  $O(n)$  to  $O(n^2)$
- ◆ Exhibiting catastrophic backtracking by regular expression
- ◆ Processor time may be consumed by XPath expressions
- ◆ Infinite loops
- ◆ and many more ...

# (DoS): Release Resources

- ◆ A good sample pattern to extracting the paired acquire and release operations in Java SE 8:

```
1 long sum = readFileBuffered(InputStream in -> {  
2     long current = 0;  
3     for (;;) {  
4         int b = in.read();  
5         if (b == -1) {  
6             return current;  
7         }  
8         current += b;  
9     }  
10 });
```

# DoS: Integer Overflow

- ◆ The following piece of code avoids overflow:

```
1 private void checkGrowBy(long extra) {  
2     if (extra < 0 || current > max - extra) {  
3         throw new IllegalArgumentException();  
4     }  
5 }
```



# Input Validation

Denial of Service (DoS)

**Input Validation**

Mutability

Variable Scope

Thread Safety

Exception Handling

Role-Based Authentication

# Validate All Inputs

- ◆ Input Sources:
  - Method Arguments
  - External Streams
- ◆ If from untrusted sources, validate it

# Validate Output From Objects As Input

- ◆ Example: `Class` object returned by `ClassLoaders`
- ◆ `ClassLoader` instances which
  - get passed as arguments
  - or are set in `Thread` context can be controled by attacker
- ◆ So, don't make many assumptions when calling this method

# Define Wrappers Around Native Methods

- ◆ Java code unlike native methods is secure, so :
  - Do not make a native method public
  - Instead expose the functionality through a public java-based wrapper method
  - Example: Next slide

# Example of Wrapper

```
1 public final class NativeMethWrap {
2
3     // private native method
4     private native void nativeOperation(byte[] data, int offset,
5                                         int len);
6
7     // wrapper method performs checks
8     public void doOperation(byte[] data, int offset, int len) {
9         // copy mutable input
10        data = data.clone();
11
12        // validate input
13        // Note offset+len would be subject to integer overflow.
14        // For instance if offset = 1 and len = Integer.MAX_VALUE,
15        // then offset+len == Integer.MIN_VALUE which is lower
16        // than data.length.
17        // Further,
18        // loops of the form
19        //     for (int i=offset; i<offset+len; ++i) { ... }
20        // would not throw an exception or cause native code to
21        // crash.
22
23        if (offset < 0 || len < 0 || offset > data.length - len) {
24            throw new IllegalArgumentException();
25        }
26
27        nativeOperation(data, offset, len);
28    }
29 }
```

# Quiz

- ◆ What is DoS?
  - (in the context of security)
- ◆ What areas of Java SE can be attacked?
- ◆ What are the defences against DoS?

- ◆ Input validation:
  - Overview: A Java code to set Boiler temperature using JNI implementation
  - Requirements: Linux, JDK 64bit, gcc compiler 64-bit
  - Approximate time: 60 minutes
  - Instructions: labs/java-security-validation/labs/input\_validation.md
  - [https://github.com/elephantscale/secure-coding-labs/blob/main/java\\_security\\_validation/labs/input\\_validation.md](https://github.com/elephantscale/secure-coding-labs/blob/main/java_security_validation/labs/input_validation.md)

# Mutability

Denial of Service (DoS)

Input Validation

**Mutability**

Variable Scope

Thread Safety

Exception Handling

Role-Based Authentication



# Introduction

- ◆ Mutable object: it is possible to change the state and fields after creation
- ◆ Immutable object: you cannot change anything after creation
- ◆ Most classes are created as mutable
- ◆ Mutable classes may result in a variety of security issues

# How to Create Mutable and Immutable

```
1 class MutableClass{
2     private string value;
3
4     public MutableClass(string value) {
5         this.value = "SomeString";
6     }
7
8     //getter and setter for value
9 }
10
11 class ImmutableClass {
12     private final string value;
13
14     public ImmutableClass(string value) {
15         this.value = "SomeString";
16     }
17
18     //only getter
19 }
```

# Immutability In Value Types

- ◆ Should not be subclassable
- ◆ Hiding constructors helps more flexibility in creation of instances
- ◆ Is a protection against mutable inputs and outputs

# Copy Mutable Output Values

- ◆ Example of copying a trusted mutable object:

```
1 public class OutputCopy {  
2     private final java.util.Date date;  
3     ...  
4     public java.util.Date getDate() {  
5         return (java.util.Date)date.clone();  
6     }  
7 }
```

# Copies of Mutable Classes

- ◆ Mutable objects can be changed during and after execution of the method or constructor call
- ◆ Types which are subclassed can behave incorrectly
- ◆ Following example creates a copy of mutable object, calls a copy constructor

# Copy of Mutable as Subclass

```
1 public final class CopyMutableInput {  
2     private final Date date;  
3  
4     // java.util.Date is mutable  
5     public CopyMutableInput(Date date) {  
6         // create copy  
7         this.date = new Date(date.getTime());  
8     }  
9 }
```

# Support Copy Functionality

- ◆ Let it be possible creating safe copy
- ◆ Static creation method, a copy constructor and public copy method for final classes may help in this regard
- ◆ Do not use `java.lang.Cloneable` mechanism

# Overridable Identity Equality

- ◆ Overridable methods sometimes behave strange
- ◆ You may get `True` value from two different objects by `Object.equal`
- ◆ Example: When using key in a `Map`, an object may be able to pass itself off as a different object that it should not have access to
- ◆ Solution: If possible collection implementation that enforces identity equality like `IdentityHashMap`



# Collection Implementation Example

```
1 private final Map<Window,Extra> extras = new IdentityHashMap<>();
2
3     public void op(Window window) {
4         // Window.equals may be overridden,
5         // but safe as we are using IdentityHashMap
6         Extra extra = extras.get(window);
7     }
```

# Package Private Key

- ◆ If such a collection is not available: Package private key helps

```
1 public class Window {
2     /* pp */ class PrivateKey {
3         // Optionally, refer to real object.
4         /* pp */ Window getWindow() {
5             return Window.this;
6         }
7     }
8     /* pp */ final PrivateKey privateKey = new PrivateKey();
9
10    private final Map<Window.PrivateKey, Extra> extras =
11        new WeakHashMap<>();
12    ...
13 }
14
15 public class WindowOps {
16     public void op(Window window) {
17         // Window.equals may be overridden,
18         // but safe as we don't use it.
19         Extra extra = extras.get(window.privateKey);
20         ...
21     }
22 }
```

# Input to Untrusted Object As Output

- ◆ Previous instructions on output objects are applicable when passed to untrusted objects
- ◆ Apply proper copying

```
1 private final byte[] data;  
2  
3     public void writeTo(OutputStream out) throws IOException {  
4         // Copy (clone) private mutable data before sending.  
5         out.write(data.clone());  
6     }
```

# Output From Untrusted Objects As Input

- ◆ Previous instructions on input objects are applicable when returned from untrusted objects
- ◆ Apply proper copying and validation

```
1 private final Date start;  
2     private Date end;  
3  
4     public void endWith(Event event) throws IOException {  
5         Date end = new Date(event.getDate().getTime());  
6         if (end.before(start)) {  
7             throw new IllegalArgumentException("...");  
8         }  
9         this.end = end;  
10    }
```

# Wrapper Methods

- ◆ If you need public access to a internal state of calss declaring a private field and enabling access via public wrapper method would help
- ◆ If you need access from subclasses declaring a private field and enabling access via protected wrapper method is a good idea
- ◆ Wrapper methods enable us validate input before setting a new value

# Example of Wrapped State

```
1 public final class WrappedState {
2     // private immutable object
3     private String state;
4
5     // wrapper method
6     public String getState() {
7         return state;
8     }
9
10    // wrapper method
11    public void setState(final String newState) {
12        this.state = requireValidation(newState);
13    }
14
15    private static String requireValidation(final String state) {
16        if (...) {
17            throw new IllegalArgumentException("...");
18        }
19        return state;
20    }
21 }
```

# Making Public Static Fields Final

```
1 public class Files {  
2     public static final String separator = "/";  
3     public static final String pathSeparator = ":";  
4 }
```



# Public Static Final Field Values

- ◆ Only immutable and unmodifiable values should be stored in public static fields
- ◆ Following example shows prevention the list from being modified

```
1 import static java.util.Arrays.asList;
2     import static java.util.Collections.unmodifiableList;
3     ...
4     public static final List<String> names = unmodifiableList(asList(
5         "Fred", "Jim", "Sheila"
6     ));
```



# Variable Scope

Denial of Service (DoS)

Input Validation

Mutability

**Variable Scope**

Thread Safety

Exception Handling

Role-Based Authentication

# Class Level Scope

- ◆ Also called member variables
- ◆ Are declared inside the class but outside any function
- ◆ Can be access outside the class with these rules:

Modifier	Package	Subclass	World
public	Yes	Yes	Yes
protected	Yes	Yes	No
Default (no modifier)	Yes	No	No
private	No	No	No

# Class Level Declaration

```
1 public class ClassLevelVar
2 {
3     int num;
4     private String address
5     void method1() {
6     }
7     int method2() {
8     }
9     char a;
10 }
```

# Method Level Scope

- ◆ Also called local variables
- ◆ Declared inside the method
- ◆ Only accessible inside the method
- ◆ When execution of the method finishes, they disappear

# Method Level Declaration

```
1 public class MethodLevelVar
2 {
3     void method()
4     {
5         // Local variable
6         int x;
7     }
8 }
```

# Block Scope

- ◆ Also called Loop variables
- ◆ Are declared inside brackets { }
- ◆ Are valid only inside the bracket
- ◆ Example:

```
1 public class BlockScope
2 {
3     public static void main(String args[])
4     {
5         {
6             int temp = 10;
7             System.out.println(temp);
8         }
9
10        System.out.println(temp); // you will get an error
11    }
12 }
13 }
```

# Method Scopes

- ◆ The discussion of scopes for methods follows the same guidelines as for variables

# Class Scopes

- ◆ Public and package access
- ◆ Private class doesn't make sense
- ◆ Default modifier is package access



# Thread Safety

Denial of Service (DoS)  
Input Validation  
Mutability  
Variable Scope  
**Thread Safety**  
Exception Handling  
Role-Based Authentication

# Introduction

- ◆ Many techniques provide secure threading some of them are:
  - No state
  - No shared state (one of the best ways)
  - Message passing
  - Immutable state
  - Synchronized blocks
  - Volatile fields

# No State

- ◆ an instance or static variable may be used by multiple threads
- ◆ Avoid instance or static variables
- ◆ Example: (part of `class.lang.Math` )

```
1 public static int subtractExact(int x, int y) {  
2  
3     int a = b - c;  
4  
5     if (((b ^ c) & (b ^ a)) < 0) {  
6  
7         throw new ArithmeticException("integer overflow");  
8  
9     }  
10  
11     return a;  
12  
13 }
```

# No Shared State

- ◆ You cannot avoid state? At least don't share it
- ◆ One way is extending the thread class and adding an instance variable
- ◆ Pool and workQueue are local to a single worker thread in the example
- ◆ Example:

```
1 package java.util.concurrent;
2
3 public class ForkJoinWorkerThread extends Thread {
4     final ForkJoinPool pool;
5     final ForkJoinPool.WorkQueue workQueue;
6
7 }
8
9 }
```

# Message Passing

- ◆ You don't want to share the state? Let the threads communicate
- ◆ How? pass messages between them
- ◆ An example of sending a message with Akka framework:

```
1 target.tell(message, getSelf());
```

- ◆ And receive a message:

```
1 @Override
2
3 public Receive createRcv() {
4
5     return rcvBuilder()
6
7         .match(String.class, s -> System.out.println(s.toLowerCase()))
8
9         .build();
10
11 }
```

# Immutable State

- ◆ If you don't want the message to be changed by another thread make it immutable
- ◆ When implementing an immutable class, declare its fields as final
- ◆ Example:

```
1 public class aFinalField
2 {
3     private final int finalField;
4     public aFinalField(int value)
5     {
6         this.finalField = value;
7     }
8 }
```

# Synchronized Blocks

- ◆ Put a lock inside a sync block
- ◆ To be sure two threads won't execute this section simultaneously

```
1 synchronized(lock)
2 {
3
4     counter++;
5
6 }
```

# Volatile Fields

- ◆ By declaration of a variable you tell the JVM and the compiler to return the latest written value

```
1 public class aVolatileField
2
3 {
4
5     private volatile int    volatileField;
6
7 }
```



- ◆ Thread safety:
  - Overview: A Railway Ticket Booking System for explaining the Thread-safe and Exception Handling.
  - Requirements: Linux, JDK 1.8 and Apache Maven 3.5.4
  - Approximate time: 60 minutes
  - Instructions: labs/thread-safety-labs/labinfo/thread\_safe.md & thread\_unsafe.md
  - <https://github.com/elephantscale/secure-coding-labs/tree/main/thread-safety-labs/labinfo>

# Exception Handling

Denial of Service (DoS)

Input Validation

Mutability

Variable Scope


Thread Safety

**Exception Handling**

Role-Based Authentication

# What Is An Exception?

- ◆ Exception = exceptional event
- ◆ A disruption during normal flow of program's instruction
- ◆ An object is created containing information about the error



# Kinds of Exception?

- ◆ Checked exception; subject to exception handling
- ◆ Error
- ◆ Runtime exception
- ◆ An exception must be enclosed by one of these:
  - ◆ `try` statement
  - ◆ `throws` clause

# How to Throw an Exception?

- ◆ It's done by `throw` statement:

```
1 public Object pop() {  
2     Object obj;  
3  
4     if (num == 0) {  
5         throw new EmptyStackException();  
6     }  
7  
8     obj = objectAt(num - 1);  
9     setObjectAt(num - 1, null);  
10    num--;  
11    return obj;  
12 }
```

# The try-with-resources Statement

- ◆ Ensures that the resource will be closed at the end
- ◆ Example:

```
1 public static void viewTable(Connection conn) throws SQLException {
2
3     String query = "select COFFEE_NAME, SUPPLIER_ID, PRICE, SALES, TOTAL from COFFEES";
4
5     try (Statement stmt = conn.createStatement()) {
6         ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
7
8         while (rs.next()) {
9             String coffeeName = rs.getString("COFFEE_NAME");
10            int supplierID = rs.getInt("SUPPLIER_ID");
11            float price = rs.getFloat("PRICE");
12            int sales = rs.getInt("SALES");
13            int total = rs.getInt("TOTAL");
14
15            System.out.println(coffeeName + ", " + supplierID + ", " +
16                               price + ", " + sales + ", " + total);
17        }
18    } catch (SQLException e) {
19        JDBCUtilities.printSQLException(e);
20    }
21 }
```

# Advantages of Exceptions

- ◆ Separating error-handling code from regular code
- ◆ Propagating errors up the call stack
- ◆ Grouping and differentiating error types

# Role-Based Authentication

Denial of Service (DoS)

Input Validation

Mutability

Variable Scope

Thread Safety

Exception Handling

**Role-Based Authentication**



# Introduction

- ◆ Allows user to authenticate to a role
- ◆ For every instance of authentication specify the following attributes:
  - ◆ Conflict resolution level
  - ◆ Authentication configuration
  - ◆ Login success URL
  - ◆ Authentication post processing classes

# Login URLs

- ◆ Can be specified in The User Interface Login URL.
- ◆ Calls the role authentication module
- ◆ Redirection :
- ◆ Upon successful or failed login, `Access Manager` redirects the user to the right page