

Exchange Rates

The following table sets forth, for the periods and dates indicated, certain information concerning the Noon Buying Rate in Won per US\$1.00.

Year Ended December 31,	At End of Period	Average ⁽¹⁾	High	Low
		(Won per US\$1.00)		
2014	1,090.9	1,054.0	1,117.7	1,008.9
2015	1,169.3	1,133.7	1,196.4	1,063.0
2016	1,203.7	1,160.5	1,242.6	1,090.3
2017	1,067.4	1,141.6	1,207.2	1,067.4
2018	1,112.9	1,099.3	1,141.7	1,054.6
October	1,140.8	1,131.6	1,141.7	1,112.4
November	1,118.6	1,125.3	1,132.3	1,117.5
December	1,112.9	1,122.5	1,133.2	1,108.8
2019 (through April 19)	1,135.4	1,127.1	1,143.3	1,111.8
January	1,111.8	1,120.3	1,129.5	1,111.8
February	1,124.7	1,121.8	1,128.0	1,116.1
March	1,136.3	1,131.6	1,138.1	1,126.5
April (through April 19)	1,135.4	1,136.3	1,143.3	1,131.7

Source: Federal Reserve Board

Note:

(1) The average rate for annual and interim periods were calculated by taking the simple average of the Noon Buying Rates on the last day of each month during the relevant period. The average rates for the monthly periods (or portion thereof) were calculated by taking the simple average of the daily Noon Buying Rates during the relevant month (or portion thereof).

We have translated certain amounts in Korean Won, which appear in this annual report, into U.S. Dollars for convenience. This does not mean that the Won amounts referred to could have been, or could be, converted into U.S. Dollars at any particular rate, the rates stated above, or at all. Unless otherwise stated, translations of Won amounts to U.S. Dollars are based on the Noon Buying Rate in effect on December 31, 2018, which was ₩1,112.9 to US\$1.00. On April 19, 2019, the Noon Buying Rate in effect was ₩1,135.4 to US\$1.00.

ITEM 3.B. Capitalization and Indebtedness

Not applicable.

ITEM 3.C. Reasons for the Offer and Use of Proceeds

Not applicable.

ITEM 3.D. Risk Factors

An investment in the American depositary shares representing our common shares involves a number of risks. You should carefully consider the following information about the risks we face, together with the other information contained in this annual report, in evaluating us and our business.

Risks Relating to Our Overall Business

Difficult conditions and turbulence in the Korean and global economy and financial markets may adversely affect our business, asset quality, capital adequacy and earnings.

Most of our assets are located in, and we generate most of our income from, Korea. Accordingly, our business and profitability are largely dependent on the general economic and social conditions in Korea,

including interest rates, inflation, exports, personal expenditures and consumption, unemployment, demand for business products and services, debt service burden of households and businesses, the general availability of credit, the asset value of real estate and securities and other factors affecting the financial well-being of our corporate and retail customers.

The Korean economy is closely integrated with, and is significantly affected by, developments in the global economy. In light of the ongoing general uncertainty about economic and political conditions in Europe (particularly amid Brexit), signs of cooling economy for China, the continuing geopolitical and social instability in various parts of the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as well as in the former republics of the Soviet Union, including Russia and Ukraine, and potential escalation of the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China as each country introduces tariffs on goods traded with the other, among others, significant uncertainty remains as to the global economic prospects in general and has adversely affected, and may continue to adversely affect, the Korean economy. In addition, as the Korean economy matures, it is increasingly exposed to the risk of a “scissor effect,” namely being pursued by competitors in less advanced economies while not having fully caught up with competitors in advanced economies, which risk is amplified by the fact that Korean economy is heavily dependent on exports. The Korean economy also continues to face other difficulties, including sluggishness in domestic consumption and investment, volatility in the real estate market, rising household debt, potential declines in productivity due to aging demographics and low birth rates, and a rise in youth unemployment. Any future deterioration of the global and Korean economies could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

In particular, difficulties in financial and economic conditions could result in significant deterioration in the quality of our assets and accumulation of higher provisioning, allowances for loan losses and charge-offs as an increasing number of our corporate and retail customers declare bankruptcy or insolvency or otherwise face increasing difficulties in meeting their debt obligations. For example, in 2011 and 2012, the continuing slump in the real estate market and the shipbuilding industry led to increased delinquency among our corporate borrowers in the construction, real estate leasing, shipbuilding and shipping industries, and in certain cases, even insolvency, workouts, recovery proceedings and/or voluntary arrangements with creditors, as was the case for the current and former member companies of the STX Group, Keangnam Enterprises Co., Ltd., Dongbu Steel Co., Ltd., Sambu Construction Co., Ltd. and Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction Co., Ltd. During the same period, the sustained slump in the real estate market also led to increased delinquency among our retail borrowers, and in particular, borrowers with collective loans for pre-sale of newly constructed apartment units.

Accordingly, Shinhan Bank’s delinquency ratio (based on delinquency of one or more month and net of charge-offs and loan sales) increased from 0.48% as of December 31, 2010 to 0.60% as of December 31, 2011 and 0.61% as of December 31, 2012. However, primarily due to a modest rebound in the housing market and Shinhan Bank’s active efforts to reduce its exposure to such troubled industries and other at-risk borrowers through preemptive risk management policies and increased lending to borrowers with high-quality credit profiles as part of Shinhan Bank’s strategic initiative to improve its asset quality, Shinhan Bank’s delinquency ratio has steadily decreased or remained stable since then, to 0.39% as of December 31, 2013, 0.31% as of December 31, 2014, 0.33% as of December 31, 2015, 0.28% as of December 31, 2016, 0.23% as of December 31, 2017 and 0.25% as of December 31, 2018. There is no assurance, however, that Shinhan Bank will not experience further loan losses from borrowers, particularly those in troubled industries, since the quality of loans to such borrowers may further deteriorate due to increases in base interest rate by the Bank of Korea, a continued slump in these industries or for other reasons. As for Shinhan Card, its delinquency ratio under the Financial Services Commission guidelines increased slightly from 2.15% as of December 31, 2013 to 2.18% as of December 31, 2014, before stabilizing and decreasing to 1.69%, 1.68%, 1.49% and 1.53% as of December 31, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively, largely as a result of its enhanced preemptive risk management and controlled asset growth as well as the sale of large non-performing loans to improve its asset quality.

Moreover, as was the case during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, depending on the nature of the difficulties in the financial markets and general economy, we may be forced to scale back certain of our core

lending activities and other operations and/or borrow money at a higher funding cost or face a tightening in the net interest spread, any of which may have a negative impact on our earnings and profitability. Furthermore, while we and our principal subsidiaries currently maintain a capital adequacy ratio at a level higher than the required regulatory minimum, there is no guarantee that an even higher capital requirement will not be imposed by the Government in case of a renewed economic crisis.

In addition, given the highly integrated nature of financial systems and economic relationships worldwide, there may be other unanticipated systemic or other risks that may not be presently predictable. Any of these risks, if materialized, may have a material adverse effect on our business, liquidity, financial condition and results of operations.

Competition in the Korean financial services industry is intense, and may further intensify.

Competition in the Korean financial services industry is, and is likely to remain, intense, including as a result of the sustained low interest rate environment (which narrows opportunities to make profit based on the spread between lending rates and funding rates), the continuing sluggishness in the general economy, the growing maturation and saturation of the industry as a whole, the entry of new market participants and deregulation, among others.

In the banking sector, Shinhan Bank competes principally with other national commercial banks in Korea, but also faces competition from a number of additional banking institutions, including branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Korea, regional banks, Internet-only banks, government-owned development banks and Korea's specialized banks, such as Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea and the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, as well as various other types of financial service providers, including savings institutions (such as mutual savings and finance companies, credit unions and credit cooperatives), investment companies (such as securities brokerage firms, merchant banking corporations and asset management companies) and life insurance companies. As of December 31, 2018, Korea had six major nationwide domestic commercial banks (including Citibank Korea Inc. and Standard Chartered Bank Korea Limited, both of which are domestic commercial banks acquired by global financial institutions), six regional commercial banks, two Internet-only banks and branches and subsidiaries of 38 foreign banks. Foreign financial institutions, many of which have greater experiences and resources than we do, may continue to enter the Korean market and compete with us in providing financial products and services either by themselves or in partnership with existing Korean financial institutions.

In the small- and medium-sized enterprise and retail banking segments, which have been Shinhan Bank's traditional core businesses, competition is expected to increase further. In recent years, Korean banks, including Shinhan Bank, have increasingly focused on stable asset growth based on quality credit, such as corporate borrowers with high credit ratings, loans to "small office, home office" ("SOHO") with high levels of collateralization, and mortgage and home equity loans within the limits of the prescribed loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratios. This common shift in focus toward stable growth based on less risky assets has intensified competition as banks compete for the same limited pool of quality credit by engaging in price competition or by other means although Shinhan Bank has traditionally focused, and will continue to focus, on enhancing profitability rather than increasing asset size or market share, and has avoided, to the extent practicable, engaging in price competition by way of lowering lending rates. In addition, such competition may result in lower net interest margin and reduced overall profitability, especially if the low interest rate environment were to continue for a significant period of time. Although Shinhan Bank's net interest margin has improved slightly in 2018 compared to 2017 due to, at least partly, increases in base interest rate by the Bank of Korea from 1.25% to 1.50% in November 2017 and from 1.50% to 1.75% in November 2018 and may improve further if the base interest rate is increased again during 2019, the effect on its results of operations may be less beneficial due to increased volatility of market interest rates and tighter regulations regarding SOHO loans, including the implementation of additional credit review guidelines for individual businesses. Therefore, if competing financial institutions seek to expand market share by lowering their lending rates, Shinhan Bank may suffer customer loss,

especially among customers who select their lenders principally on the basis of lending rates. In response thereto or for other strategic reasons, Shinhan Bank may subsequently lower its lending rates to stay competitive, which could lead to a decrease in its net interest margins and outweigh any potential positive impact on the net interest margin from a general rise in market interest rates. Any future decline in Shinhan Bank's customer base or its net interest margins could have an adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

In the credit card sector, Shinhan Card competes principally with existing "monoline" credit card companies, credit card divisions of commercial banks, consumer finance companies, other financial institutions and, recently, credit card service providers allied with mobile telecommunications service providers in Korea. Competition has been historically intense in this sector and the market has shown signs of saturation as existing and new credit card service providers make significant investments and engage in aggressive marketing campaigns and promotions to acquire new customers and target customers with high credit quality. While competition has subsided somewhat recently due to stricter government regulations, such as curbs on excessive marketing expenses, competition remains intense and credit card issuers may continue to compete with Shinhan Card for customers by offering lower interest rates and fees, higher credit limits, more attractive promotions and incentives and alternative products such as credit card reward points, gift cards and low-interest consumer loan products. As a result, Shinhan Card may lose customers or service opportunities to competing credit card issuers and/or incur higher marketing expenses. Also, over the years, the Government has implemented regulations lowering certain merchant fees chargeable by credit card companies. In 2012, the Government adopted regulations mandating lower merchant fees chargeable to small- and medium-sized enterprises, and beginning January 31, 2016, a further reduction in the merchant fees chargeable to small- and medium-sized enterprises went into effect. The Enforcement Decree of the Specialized Credit Finance Business Act was amended in July 2017 and January 2019 to further expand the range of small- and medium-sized enterprises subject to lower merchant fees, and additional amendments to regulations requiring further downward adjustments to merchant fees may come into force in the future. For further details on the Government's regulations on merchant fees chargeable by credit card companies, See "– Risks Relating to Our Credit Card Business – Future changes in market conditions as well as other factors, such as stricter regulation, may lead to reduced revenues and deterioration in the asset quality of credit card receivables." In addition, since the implementation of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in September 2016, revenue growth for corporate cards and service related industries such as dining, floral and entertainment have shown signs of decline, and additional regulations on loans reducing maximum interest rates chargeable from 27.9% to 24% came into effect in February 2018. These developments have put further downward pressure on the results of operations for credit card companies, including Shinhan Card. Furthermore, the Government's recent guidelines to bolster consumer protection and protect customers' personal data in the aftermath of data leaks at certain credit companies (not including Shinhan Card) may result in additional compliance costs for Shinhan Card. Customer attrition, together with any further lowering of fees or reduction in base and market interest rates and/or additional expenses from more extensive marketing and promotional campaigns that Shinhan Card might implement to acquire and retain customers, could reduce its revenues and earnings. Furthermore, the average credit quality of Shinhan Card's customers may deteriorate if customers with higher credit quality borrow from our competitors rather than Shinhan Card and it may become more difficult for Shinhan Card to attract and maintain quality customers. In general, the growth, market share and profitability of Shinhan Card's operations may decline or become negative as a result of market saturation in this sector, interest rate competition, pressure to lower fee rates and incur higher marketing expenses, as well as Government regulation and social and economic developments in Korea that are beyond our control, such as changes in consumer confidence levels, spending patterns or public perception of credit card usage and consumer debt. If Shinhan Card fails to maintain or attract new cardholders or increase the card usage by existing customers or experiences deterioration in its asset quality and a rise in delinquency, our business, financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected.

In other financial services sectors, our other subsidiaries also compete in a highly fragmented market. Some of our competitors, particularly major global financial institutions, have greater experience and resources than we do.

Consolidation among our rival institutions and the Government's privatization efforts may also add competition in the markets in which we and our subsidiaries conduct business. A number of significant mergers and acquisitions in the industry have taken place in Korea recently, including Hana Financial Group's acquisition of Korea Exchange Bank in 2012 and the resulting merger of Hana Bank and Korea Exchange Bank in September 2015. Moreover, in 2014, pursuant to the implementation of the Government's privatization plan with respect to Woori Finance Holdings (now merged into Woori Bank) and its former subsidiaries, Woori Financial, Woori Asset Management and Woori F&I were acquired by KB Financial Group, Kiwoom Securities and Daishin Securities, respectively, and Woori Investment & Securities, Woori Aviva Life Insurance and Woori FG Savings Bank were acquired by NongHyup Financial Group. In addition, in October 2014, the Government's ownership interest in the holding companies of Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank were acquired by JB Financial Group and BS Financial Group (now BNK Financial Group), respectively. In 2015, the Government decided to sell a 30% to 40% interest in Woori Bank to multiple investors in separate blocks ranging from 4% to 10% each. Since December 2016, Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation has consummated sales transactions with seven institutional investors including Kiwoom Securities, Korea Investment and Securities, Hanwha Life Insurance, Tongyang Life Insurance, Eugene Asset Management, Mirae Asset Global Investments and IMM Private Equity for the sale of an aggregate 29.7% interest in Woori Bank in separate blocks. In the securities brokerage sector, Mirae Asset acquired KDB Daewoo Securities in 2016, creating the largest brokerage company in Korea by assets, and on June 1, 2016, KB Financial Group completed its acquisition of Hyundai Securities and merged it with its existing brokerage unit, KB Investment & Securities Co., creating the fifth largest brokerage company in Korea by assets. Any of these developments may place us at a competitive disadvantage and outweigh any potential benefit to us in the form of opportunities to acquire new customers who are displeased with the level of services at the newly reorganized entities or to provide credit facilities to corporate customers who wish to maintain relationships with a wide range of banks in order to diversify their sources of funding. In September 2018, we announced the acquisition of a 59.15% interest in Orange Life Insurance, Ltd., the former Korean unit of ING Life Insurance, as part of our efforts to diversify and enhance our non-banking businesses. The acquisition was approved by the Financial Services Commission on January 16, 2019 and closed on February 1, 2019. We expect that such consolidation and other structural changes in the financial industry will continue. Other financial institutions may seek to acquire or merge with other entities, and the financial institutions resulting from such consolidation may, by virtue of their increased size and business scope, provide greater competition for us. Increased competition and continuing consolidation may lead to decreased margins, resulting in a material adverse impact on our future profitability.

Regulatory reforms and the general modernization of business practices in Korea have also led to increased competition among financial institutions in Korea. Since July 2015, the Financial Services Commission has provided, through the Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute, the integrated automatic payment transfer management service, which allows account holders to search for, terminate or modify automatic payments they have set up with financial institutions participating in such service (currently including banks, securities companies and other financial institutions such as The Post Office, Korean Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives, National Credit Union Federation of Korea, Mutual Savings Bank and National Forestry Cooperative Federation). In addition, the Financial Services Commission began providing the integrated account management service from December 2016, which allows account holders to search for detailed information of their bank accounts opened in banks participating in such service, close small-sum inactive accounts (i.e., accounts with no transaction activity during the previous one year period and with a balance of less than ₩500,000) and transfer the balance in such accounts to other accounts. Moreover, in December 2017, the Financial Services Commission introduced the "my account at a glance" system, which enables consumers to view their key financial account information online, including information on banks, insurances, mutual finance, loan and card issuances on one page. The "my account at a glance" system became available on mobile channels in February 2016 and expanded its scope of services to include savings banks and securities companies. Since their introduction, the integrated automatic payment transfer management service, integrated account management service and "my account at a glance" system have gained widespread acceptance. As the reform of the financial sector continues, competition may become more intense among existing banks, insurance companies, securities companies and other financial organizations, and may lead to significant changes in the

current Korean financial market. Moreover, the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was amended on July 12, 2018 to provide that, beginning on January 1, 2020, in calculating loan to deposit ratio, retail loans and corporate loans will be weighed differently, with retail loans subject to a multiple of 115% and corporate loans (excluding loans to SOHOs) subject to a multiple of 85%, thereby increasing the impact of retail loans and reducing the impact of corporate loans in calculating such ratio. This may further intensify competition for corporate loans and deposits among commercial banks and, as a result, Shinhan Bank may face difficulties in increasing or retaining its corporate loans and deposits, which in turn may result in an increase in its cost of funding.

Furthermore, as the Korean economy further develops and new business opportunities arise, more competitors may enter the financial services industry. For example, as online service providers and technology companies with large-scale user networks, such as Kakao Corp., NAVER and Samsung Electronics, recently make significant inroads in providing virtual payment services through a system based on a growing convergence of financial services and technology commonly referred to as “fintech,” competition for online customers is growing not just among commercial banks, but also from online and mobile payment service providers. Also, widespread consumer acceptance of mobile phone payment services in lieu of credit card services could add to the competitive threat faced by existing credit card service providers, including our credit card subsidiary. In 2015, the Government announced its plans to allow Internet-only banks to operate in Korea. KT consortium’s K-Bank and Kakao consortium’s Kakao Bank commenced operations in April 2017 and July 2017, respectively. Internet-only banks may have advantages over traditional banks as the former can pass savings in labor and overhead costs to their customers by offering higher interest rates on deposit accounts, lower loan costs and reduced service fees. Accordingly, commercial banks will likely face increasing pressure to upgrade their service platforms to attract and maintain online users, which represents a growing customer base compared to traditional customers who have primarily conducted banking in-person at physical banking branches.

Recently, following the global financial crisis, the Government has subjected Korean financial institutions to stricter regulatory requirements and guidelines in areas of asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity and residential and other lending practices (including a requirement to maintain a certain ratio of core capital to total risk exposure, which was introduced in January 2018 in order to control excessive leverage), which has had a dampening effect on competition. The Financial Services Commission implemented the capital requirements of Basel III, whose minimum requirements were phased in sequentially from December 1, 2013 through full implementation by January 1, 2015, based on the guidelines set forth in the amended Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business and the Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business. In addition, the Financial Services Commission has implemented the Basel III requirements relating to liquidity coverage ratio and capital conservation buffer, each of which have been fully phased in as of January 1, 2019. As of January 1, 2016, the Financial Services Commission implemented Basel III requirements relating to accumulation of additional capital for systemically important banks and bank holding companies and countercyclical capital buffer requirements. Each year, the Financial Services Commission may designate banks with significant influence (based on size and connectivity with other financial institutions) on the domestic financial system as a domestic systemically important bank and require the accumulation of additional capital in accordance with the highest of: (i) ratio of common equity capital to risk-weighted assets, ranging from 0.0% to 2.0%, depending on the systematic importance evaluation score, (ii) if the bank’s holding company is a domestic systemically important bank holding company, the capital ratio corresponding to the additional capital required for the bank holding company under the Financial Holding Company Supervision Regulations, or (iii) if the bank is also a global systemically important bank, as defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the “Basel Committee”), the capital ratio as required by the Basel Committee. According to the instructions of the Financial Services Commission, domestic systemically important banks including Shinhan Bank have been required to maintain an additional capital buffer of 0.25% since January 1, 2016, with such buffer increased by 0.25% annually to reach 1.00% as of January 1, 2019. The Financial Services Commission may also, upon quarterly review, determine and require banks to accumulate a required level of countercyclical capital buffer within the range of 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, taking into account factors such as the degree of increase in credit relative to the gross domestic product. However, there is no assurance that these measures will have the

effect of curbing competition or that the Government will not reverse or reduce such measures or introduce other deregulatory measures, which may further intensify competition in the Korean financial services industry. For further details on the capital requirements applicable to us, see “Item 4.B. Business Overview – Supervision and Regulation – Principal Regulations Applicable to Financial Holding Companies – Capital Adequacy.”

If, despite our efforts to adapt to the changing macroeconomic environment and comply with new regulations, we are unable to compete effectively in the changing business and regulatory environment, our profit margin and market share may erode and our future growth opportunities may become limited, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

We and our subsidiaries need to maintain our capital ratios above minimum required levels, and the failure to so maintain could result in the suspension of some or all of our operations.

We and our subsidiaries in Korea are required to maintain specified capital adequacy ratios. For example, since January 1, 2015, we and our banking subsidiaries in Korea are required to maintain a minimum common equity Tier I capital adequacy ratio of 4.5%, a Tier I capital adequacy ratio of 6.0% and a total capital (BIS) ratio of 8.0%. These ratios measure the respective regulatory capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets on a consolidated basis and are determined based on guidelines of the Financial Services Commission. In addition, as further described below, Shinhan Bank is also required to maintain a capital conservation buffer and additional capital as a domestic systemically important bank and may be required to maintain a countercyclical capital buffer. Also, our subsidiaries Shinhan Card, Shinhan Life Insurance and Shinhan Investment are each required to maintain a consolidated adjusted equity capital ratio of 8.0%, a solvency ratio of 100% and a net capital ratio of 100%, respectively.

While we and our subsidiaries currently maintain capital adequacy ratios in excess of the respective required regulatory minimum levels, we or our subsidiaries may not be able to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy requirements for a number of reasons, including an increase in risky assets and provisioning expenses, substitution costs related to the disposal of problem loans, declines in the value of securities portfolios, adverse changes in foreign currency exchange rates, changes in the capital ratio requirements, the guidelines regarding the computation of capital ratios, or the framework set by the Basel Committee upon which the guidelines of the Financial Services Commission are based, or other adverse developments affecting our asset quality or equity capital.

In December 2010, the Basel Committee issued final rules in respect of (i) a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems and (ii) an international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, which together are commonly referred to as “Basel III.” Under Basel III, Tier I capital is defined to include common equity Tier I and additional Tier I capital. Common equity Tier I capital is a new category of capital primarily consisting of common stock, capital surplus, retained earnings and other comprehensive income (progressively phased into the capital ratio calculation over several years). The new minimum capital requirements, including the minimum common equity Tier I requirement of 4.5% and additional mandatory capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5%, have been fully implemented as of January 1, 2019. Additional discretionary countercyclical capital buffer requirements are also expected to be phased in, which will range at the discretion of national regulators between 0% and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Basel III also introduces a minimum leverage ratio requirement. On December 7, 2017, the Basel Committee finalized several key methodologies for measuring risk-weighted assets. The revisions include a standardized approach for credit risk, standardized approach for operational risk, revisions to the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk framework and constraints on the use of internal models. The Basel Committee had also previously finalized a revised standardized model for counterparty credit risk, revisions to the securitization framework and its fundamental review of the trading book, which updates both modeled and standardized approaches for market risk measurement. The revisions also include a capital floor set at 72.5% of total risk-weighted assets based on the revised standardized approaches to limit the extent to which banks can reduce risk-weighted asset levels through the use of internal models.

In order to implement the capital requirements under Basel III in Korea, the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was amended, effective December 1, 2013. Under the amended Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business, effective from January 1, 2015, commercial banks in Korea are required to maintain a minimum common equity Tier I ratio of 4.5%, a minimum Tier I capital ratio of 6.0% and a minimum total capital (BIS) ratio of 8.0%. The Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was further amended on December 26, 2014, to implement the liquidity coverage ratio requirements under Basel III in increments of 5% annually, from 80% as of January 1, 2015 to 100% as of January 1, 2019. Capital conservation buffer requirements have also been phased in from January 1, 2016 in increments of 0.625% annually, to the effect that commercial banks in Korea are required to maintain a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% as of January 1, 2019. If a commercial bank fails to maintain such capital conservation buffer requirements, such bank will be subject to certain restrictions relating to its use of income, such as distributing dividends and purchasing treasury stock. As of January 1, 2016, the Financial Services Commission implemented Basel III requirements relating to accumulation of additional capital for systemically important banks and bank holding companies and countercyclical capital buffer requirements. Each year, the Financial Services Commission may designate banks with significant influence (based on size and connectivity with other financial institutions) on the domestic financial system as a domestic systemically important bank and require the accumulation of additional capital in accordance with the highest of: (i) ratio of common equity capital to risk-weighted assets, ranging from 0.0% to 2.0%, depending on the systematic importance evaluation score, (ii) if the bank's holding company is a domestic systemically important bank holding company, the capital ratio corresponding to the additional capital required for the bank holding company under the Financial Holding Company Supervision Regulations, or (iii) if the bank is also a global systemically important bank, as defined by the Basel Committee, the capital ratio as required by the Basel Committee. Shinhan Financial Group, Shinhan Bank and Jeju Bank were selected as a domestic systemically important bank holding company and domestic systemically important bank, respectively, from 2016 through 2019. According to the instructions of the Financial Services Commission, domestic systemically important banks including Shinhan Bank have been required to maintain an additional capital buffer of 0.25% since January 1, 2016, with such buffer increased by 0.25% annually to reach 1.00% as of January 1, 2019. The Financial Services Commission may also, upon quarterly review, determine and require banks to accumulate a required level of countercyclical capital buffer within the range of 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, taking into account factors such as the degree of increase in credit relative to the gross domestic product. Since March 2016, the Financial Services Commission has maintained countercyclical capital buffer requirements at 0%, and the Financial Supervisory Service has maintained the countercyclical capital buffer requirement at 0% for the first quarter of 2019. In addition, the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business is expected to be amended during 2019 such that the countercyclical capital buffer requirement also takes into account the increase of credit in the retail sector. The Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was also amended on June 30, 2018 to add "concentration of risk in the retail sector" as an additional criteria when the Financial Supervisory Service evaluates the risk management systems of Korean banks.

We and our banking subsidiaries are currently, and have been, in full compliance with Basel III requirements as implemented in Korea since its introduction in December 2013. However, there is no assurance that we will continue to be able to be in compliance with Basel III requirements. New requirements under Basel III may require an increase in the credit risk capital requirements in the future, which may require us or our subsidiaries to either improve asset quality or raise additional capital. In addition, if the capital adequacy ratios of us or our subsidiaries were to fall below the required levels, the Financial Services Commission might impose penalties ranging from a warning to suspension or revocation of our or our subsidiaries' business licenses. In order to maintain the capital adequacy ratios above the required levels, we or our subsidiaries may be required to raise additional capital through equity financing, but there is no assurance that we or our subsidiaries will be able to do so on commercially favorable terms or at all and, even if successful, any such capital raising may have a dilutive effect on our shareholders with respect to their interest in us or on us with respect to our interest in our subsidiaries.

Liquidity, funding management and credit ratings are critical to our ongoing performance.

Liquidity is essential to our business as a financial intermediary, and we may seek additional funding in the near future to satisfy liquidity needs, meet regulatory requirements, enhance our capital levels or fund the growth of our operations as opportunities arise.

For example, Basel III includes an international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, as noted above, including a new minimum liquidity standard, known as the liquidity coverage ratio, which is designed to ensure that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high quality liquid assets ("HQLA") that can be easily and speedily converted into cash in the private marketplace to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days. The liquidity coverage ratio is computed as (a) the value of a banking organization's HQLA, divided by (b) its total expected net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days under stress scenarios. The minimum liquidity coverage ratio is 100%. In January 2013, the Basel Committee released a revised formulation of the liquidity coverage ratio, one of two quantitative liquidity measures approved in December 2010 as part of Basel III. The Basel Committee extended the timetable for full phase-in of the liquidity coverage ratio to the effect that the minimum liquidity coverage ratio was set at 60% as of January 1, 2015 and thereafter was increased in annual increments of 10% so that the minimum liquidity coverage ratio is 100% as of January 1, 2019. In December 2014, the Financial Services Commission promulgated regulations to implement the liquidity requirements of Basel III, including raising the minimum liquidity coverage ratio to 80% as of January 1, 2015 and thereafter by annual increments of 5% so that the minimum liquidity coverage ratio for commercial banks in Korea is 100% as of January 1, 2019.

A substantial part of the liquidity and funding requirements for our banking subsidiaries is met through short-term customer deposits, which typically roll over upon maturity. While the volume of our customer deposits has generally been stable over time, customer deposits have from time to time declined substantially due to the popularity of other, higher-yielding investment opportunities, namely stocks and mutual funds, for example, during times of bullish stock markets. During such times, our banking subsidiaries were required to obtain alternative funding at higher costs. There is no assurance that a similar development will not occur in the future. In addition, in recent years, we have faced increasing pricing competition from our competitors with respect to our deposit products. If we do not continue to offer competitive interest rates to our deposit customers, we may lose their business, which has traditionally provided a stable and low-cost source of funding. In addition, even if we are able to match our competitors' pricing, doing so may result in an increase in our funding costs, which may have an adverse impact on our results of operations.

We and our subsidiaries also raise funds in capital markets and borrow from other financial institutions, the cost of which depends on market rates and the general availability of credit and the terms of which may limit our ability to pay dividends, make acquisitions or subject us to other restrictive covenants. While we and our subsidiaries are not currently facing liquidity difficulties in any material respect, if we or our subsidiaries are unable to obtain the funding we need on terms commercially acceptable to us for an extended period of time for whatever reason, we may not be able to ensure our financial viability, meet regulatory requirements, implement our strategies or compete effectively.

Credit ratings affect the cost and other terms upon which we and our subsidiaries are able to obtain funding. Domestic and international rating agencies regularly evaluate us and our subsidiaries, and their ratings of our and our subsidiaries' long-term debt are based on a number of factors, including our financial strength as well as conditions affecting the financial services industry and the Korean economy in general. There can be no assurance that the rating agencies will maintain our current ratings or outlooks. There is no assurance that Shinhan Bank, Shinhan Card, any of our other major subsidiaries or our holding company will not experience a downgrade in their respective credit ratings and outlooks for reasons related to the general Korean economy or reasons specific to such entity. Any downgrades in the credit ratings and outlooks of us and our subsidiaries will likely increase our cost of funding, limit our access to capital markets and other borrowings, or require us to provide additional credit enhancement in financial transactions, any of which could adversely affect our liquidity, net interest margins and profitability, and in turn, our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, bond and equity prices, and other market factors have affected and will continue to affect our business, results of operations and financial condition.

The most significant market risks we face are interest rate, foreign exchange and bond and equity price risks. Changes in interest rate levels, yield curves and spreads may affect the interest rate margin realized between lending and borrowing costs. Changes in foreign currency exchange rates, particularly in the Korean Won to U.S. Dollar exchange rates, affect the value of our assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, the reported earnings of our non-Korean subsidiaries and income from foreign exchange dealings, and substantial and rapid fluctuations in exchange rates may cause difficulty in obtaining foreign currency-denominated financing in the international financial markets on commercial terms acceptable to us or at all. The performance of financial markets may affect bond and equity prices and, therefore, cause changes in the value of our investment and trading portfolios. While we have implemented risk management systems and risk thresholds to mitigate and control these and other market risks to which we are exposed, it is difficult to predict with accuracy changes in economic or market conditions and to anticipate the effects that such changes could have on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Of particular importance is the change in the base and market interest rates. Since 2009, Korea, like many other countries, has experienced a low interest rate environment despite some marginal fluctuations, in part due to the Government's policy to stimulate the economy through active rate-lowering measures. Between 2009 and 2014, the base interest rate set by the Bank of Korea remained within the band between 2.00% and 3.25%. In an effort to support Korea's economy in light of the recent slowdown in Korea's growth and uncertain global economic prospects, the Bank of Korea reduced the base interest rate to 1.75% in March 2015, 1.50% in June 2015, and further reduced such rate to the historic low of 1.25% in June 2016. In November 2017, the Bank of Korea raised the base interest rate to 1.50%, marking the first time it increased the base interest rate since 2011, and further raised such rate to 1.75% in November 2018. Interest rate movements, in terms of magnitude and timing as well as their relative impact on our assets and liabilities, have a significant impact on our net interest margin and profitability, particularly with respect to our financial products that are sensitive to such movements. For example, if the interest rates applicable to our loans (which are recorded as assets) increase at a slower pace or by a thinner margin than the interest rates applicable to our deposits (which are recorded as liabilities), our net interest margin will shrink and our profitability will be negatively affected. In addition, the relative size and composition of our variable rate loans and deposits (as compared to our fixed rate loans and deposits) may also impact our net interest margin. Furthermore, the difference in the average repricing frequency of our interest-earning assets (primarily loans) compared to our interest-bearing liabilities (primarily deposits) may also impact our net interest margin. For example, since our deposits tend to have longer terms, on average, than those of our loans, our deposits are on average less sensitive to movements in the base interest rates on which our deposits and loans tend to be pegged, and therefore, a decrease in the base interest rates tends to decrease our net interest margin while an increase in the base interest rates tends to have the opposite effect. While we continually manage our assets and liabilities to minimize our exposure to interest rate volatility, such efforts by us may not mitigate the impact of interest rate volatility in a timely or effective manner, and our net interest margin, and in turn our financial condition and results of operations, could suffer significantly.

We cannot assure you when and to what extent the Government will in the future adjust the base interest rate, to which the market interest rate correlates. A decision to adjust the base interest rate is subject to many policy considerations as well as market factors, including the general economic cycle, inflationary levels, interest rates in other economies and foreign currency exchange rates, among others. In general, a decrease in interest rates adversely affects our interest income due to the different maturity structure for our assets and liabilities as discussed above. In contrast, if there were to be a significant or sustained increase in interest rates, all else being equal, such movement would lead to a decline in the value of traded debt securities and could also raise our funding costs, while reducing loan demand, especially among retail customers. Rising interest rates may therefore require us to re-balance our assets and liabilities in order to minimize the risk of potential mismatches in our asset liability management and to maintain our profitability. In addition, rising interest rates may adversely affect the Korean economy and the financial condition of our corporate and retail borrowers, including holders of

our credit cards, which in turn may lead to deterioration of asset quality for our credit portfolio. Since most of our retail and corporate loans bear interest at rates that adjust periodically based on prevailing market rates, a sustained increase in interest rates will increase the funding costs of our borrowers and may adversely affect their ability to make payments on their outstanding loans. See “Item 5.A. Operating Results – Interest Rates.”

We may incur losses associated with our counterparty exposures.

We face the risk that counterparties will be unable to honor contractual obligations to us or our subsidiaries. These parties may default on their obligations to us or our subsidiaries due to bankruptcy, lack of liquidity, operational failure or other reasons. This risk may arise, for example, from entering into swaps or other derivative contracts under which counterparties have obligations to make payments to us or our subsidiaries or in executing currency or other trades that fail to settle at the required time due to non-delivery by the counterparty or systems failure by clearing agents, exchanges, clearing houses or other financial intermediaries. Any realization of counterparty risk may adversely affect our business, operations and financial condition.

Risks Relating to Our Banking Business

We have significant exposure to small- and medium-sized enterprises, and financial difficulties experienced by such enterprises may result in a deterioration of our asset quality.

Our banking activities are conducted primarily through our wholly-owned subsidiary, Shinhan Bank. One of our core banking businesses has historically been and continues to be lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (as defined in “Item 4.B. Business Overview – Our Principal Activities – Corporate Banking Services – Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises Banking”). Shinhan Bank’s loans (before allowance for loan losses and deferred loan origination costs and fees) to such enterprises amounted to ₩71,757 billion as of December 31, 2016, ₩78,556 billion as of December 31, 2017 and ₩84,972 billion as of December 31, 2018, representing 27.5%, 28.3% and 28.0%, respectively, of our total loan portfolio as of such dates.

Compared to loans to large corporations, which tend to be better capitalized and better able to weather business downturns, or loans to individuals and households, which tend to be secured with homes and with respect to which the borrowers are therefore less willing to default, loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises have historically had a relatively higher delinquency ratio. Many small- and medium-sized enterprises represent sole proprietorships or small businesses dependent on a relatively limited number of suppliers or customers and tend to be affected to a greater extent than large corporate borrowers by fluctuations in the Korean and global economy. In addition, small- and medium-sized enterprises often maintain less sophisticated financial records than large corporate borrowers. Therefore, it is generally more difficult for banks to judge the level of risk inherent in lending to such enterprises, as compared to large corporations. In addition, many small- and medium-sized enterprises are dependent on business relationships with large corporations in Korea, primarily as suppliers. Any difficulties encountered by those large corporations would likely hurt the liquidity and financial condition of related small- and medium-sized enterprises, including those to which we have exposure, also resulting in an impairment of their ability to repay loans. As large Korean corporations continue to expand into China, Southeast Asia and other countries with lower labor costs and other expenses by relocating their production plants and facilities to such countries, such development may have a material adverse impact on such small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Financial difficulties experienced by small- and medium-sized enterprises as a result of, among other things, recent economic difficulties in Korea and globally and aggressive marketing and intense competition among banks to lend to this segment in recent years, coupled with our efforts to counter asset quality deterioration through conservative lending policy, have led to a fluctuation in the asset quality of our loans to this segment. As of December 31, 2016, 2017 and 2018, Shinhan Bank’s delinquent loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises were ₩362 billion, ₩303 billion and ₩299 billion, respectively, representing delinquency ratios (net of charge-offs and loan sales) of 0.51%, 0.39% and 0.35% respectively. If the ongoing difficulties in the Korean or global economy were to continue or aggravate, the delinquency ratio for our loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises may rise.

Of particular concern is our significant exposure to enterprises in the real estate and leasing and construction industries. As of December 31, 2018, Shinhan Bank had outstanding loans (before allowance for loan losses and deferred loan origination costs and fees) to enterprises in the real estate and leasing and construction industries (many of which are small- and medium-sized enterprises) of ₩25,454 billion and ₩3,009 billion, respectively, representing 10.1% and 1.2%, respectively, of its total loan portfolio as of such date. We also have other exposure to borrowers in these sectors of the Korean economy, including extending guarantees for the benefit of such companies and holding debt and equity securities issued by such companies. In addition, Shinhan Bank has exposure to borrowers in the shipbuilding and shipping industries, which have yet to stage a meaningful turnaround.

The enterprises in the real estate development and construction industries in Korea, which are heavily concentrated in the housing market, continue to experience difficulties amid slowing real estate demand despite a moderate recovery in recent years, largely due to a combination of factors including the Government's policy measures to stabilize the real estate market, oversupply of residential property, ongoing economic sluggishness in Korea and globally and the demographic changes in the Korean population. We also have limited exposure to real estate project financing, particularly by construction companies that have built residential units in provinces outside the metropolitan Seoul area, which have experienced a relatively low rate of pre-sales, the proceeds from which the construction companies primarily rely on as a key source for liquidity and cash flow.

Any of the foregoing developments may result in deterioration in the asset quality of our banking subsidiaries. See "Item 4.B. Business Overview – Description of Assets and Liabilities – Credit Exposures to Companies in Workout and Recovery Proceedings." We have been taking active steps to curtail delinquency among our small- and medium-sized enterprise customers, including by way of strengthening loan application review processes and closely monitoring borrowers in troubled sectors. Despite such efforts, there is no assurance that the delinquency ratio for our loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises will not rise in the future, especially if the Korean economy were to face renewed difficulties and, as a result, the liquidity and cash flow of these borrowers deteriorate. A significant rise in the delinquency ratios among these borrowers would lead to increased charge-offs and higher provisioning and reduced interest and fee income, which would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

A decline in the value of the collateral securing our loans or our inability to fully realize the collateral value may adversely affect our credit portfolio.

Most of our mortgage and home equity loans are secured by borrowers' homes, other real estate, other securities and guarantees (which are principally provided by the Government and other financial institutions), and a substantial portion of our corporate loans are also secured, including by real estate. As of December 31, 2018, the secured portion of Shinhan Bank's loans (before allowance for loan losses and deferred loan origination costs and fees) amounted to ₩112,236 billion, representing 48.7% of its total loans. No assurance can be given that the collateral value will not materially decline in the future. Shinhan Bank's general policy for mortgage and home equity loans is to lend up to 45% to 82% of the appraised value of the collateral, but subject to the maximum loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio and debt service ratio requirements for mortgage loans implemented by the Government, and to periodically re-appraise such collateral. In order to mitigate our loss in the event of a decrease in the value of collateral, we have made effort to increase the proportion of installment principal repayment-based loans and manage the loan-to-value ratio of loans. As of December 31, 2018, installment principal repayment-based housing loans accounted for 49.1% of the housing loans extended by Shinhan Bank, and the loan-to-value ratio of mortgage and home equity loans of Shinhan Bank was 49.9%. Despite these efforts however, if the real estate market in Korea experiences a downturn, the value of the collateral may fall below the outstanding principal balance of the underlying mortgage loans. Borrowers of such under-collateralized mortgages or loans may be forced to pay back all or a portion of such mortgage loans or, if unable to meet the collateral requirement through such repayment, sell the underlying collateral, which sales may lead to a further decline in the price of real estate in general and set off a chain reaction for other borrowers due to the further decline in the value of collateral. Declines in real estate prices reduce the value of the collateral

securing our mortgage and home equity loans, and such reduction in the value of collateral may result in our inability to cover the uncollectible portion of our secured loans. A decline in the value of the real estate or other collateral securing our loans, or our inability to obtain additional collateral in the event of such decline, may result in the deterioration of our asset quality and require us to make additional loan loss provisions. In Korea, foreclosure on collateral generally requires a written petition to a Korean court. Foreclosure procedures in Korea generally take 10 to 14 months from initiation to collection depending on the nature of the collateral, and foreclosure applications may be subject to delays and administrative requirements, which may result in a decrease in the recovery value of such collateral. No assurance can be given that we will be able to realize the full value of collateral as a result of, among others, delays in foreclosure proceedings, defects in the perfection of collateral and general declines in collateral value. Our failure to recover the expected value of collateral could expose us to significant losses.

Guarantees received in connection with our real estate financing may not provide sufficient coverage.

Primarily through Shinhan Bank, we, alone or together with other financial institutions, provide financing to real estate development projects, which are concentrated largely in the construction of residential complexes. Developers in Korea commonly use project financing to acquire land and pay for related project development costs. As a market practice, lenders in project financing, including Shinhan Bank, generally receive from general contractors a performance guarantee for the completion of projects by the developers as well as a payment guarantee for the loans raised by a special purpose financing vehicle established by the developers in order to procure the construction orders, as the developers tend to be small and highly leveraged. Shinhan Bank has actively managed and reduced its real estate project financing-related exposure, particularly during sustained downturns in the Korean real estate market. As of December 31, 2018, the total outstanding amount of Shinhan Bank's real estate project financing-related exposure was ₩2.2 trillion. However, if defaults were to significantly increase under our existing loans to real estate development projects and the general contractors fail to pay the guaranteed amount necessary to cover the amount of our financings, this may have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

A limited portion of our credit exposure is concentrated in a relatively small number of large corporate borrowers, and future financial difficulties experienced by them may have an adverse impact on us.

Of Shinhan Bank's 10 largest corporate exposures as of December 31, 2018, two were companies for which Shinhan Bank was a main creditor bank. All of the 10 companies are or were members of the main debtor groups as identified by the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service, which are mostly comprised of the largest Korean commercial conglomerates known as "*chaebols*." As of such date, the total amount of Shinhan Bank's exposures to the 10 companies was ₩18,905 billion, or 11.1%, of its total exposures. As of that date, Shinhan Bank's single largest outstanding exposure to a main debtor group amounted to ₩4,239 billion, or 2.5%, of its total exposures. Largely due to the continued stagnation in the shipbuilding industry, current and former member companies of the STX Group, one of the leading conglomerates in Korea, entered into voluntary arrangements in 2013 with their creditors (including Shinhan Bank) to improve their credit situation, and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding and STX Heavy Industries, two of the STX Group's member companies, recently filed for court receivership in May 2016 and July 2016, respectively. Due to stagnation in the construction industry, Keangnam Enterprises Co., Ltd., a large construction company in Korea, also entered into workout proceedings in 2013 and subsequently filed for recovery proceedings in March 2015. Dongbu Steel Co., Ltd. and Sambu Construction Co., Ltd. also experienced significant hardship and entered into workout or recovery proceedings in 2015. Additionally, in October 2015, creditors of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd., led by Korea Development Bank, announced a restructuring plan that included cash injection and additional loans totaling ₩4.2 trillion and extensive streamlining measures, and in November 2016, Korea Development Bank agreed to swap ₩1.8 trillion of debt to equity and the Export-Import Bank of Korea agreed to issue ₩1 trillion of perpetual bonds. Amid continued deterioration of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.'s financial conditions, in March 2017, Korea Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Korea further agreed to provide an additional ₩2.9 trillion in loans and swap ₩1.6 trillion of debt to equity, provided that

other creditors and bondholders agree to certain debt-to-equity swaps and extension of maturities. In January 2016, Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction Co., Ltd. entered into voluntary restructuring agreements with its creditors due to liquidity shortage in the wake of prolonged industry slowdown. Partly as a result of its active past efforts to reduce exposure to the shipbuilding and construction sectors, Shinhan Bank currently has limited exposure to the aforementioned troubled companies. However, if the credit quality of Shinhan Bank's exposure to large corporations, including those in the main debtor groups, declines, Shinhan Bank may be required to record additional loan loss provisions in respect of loans and impairment losses in respect of securities, which would adversely affect its financial condition, results of operations and capital adequacy. No assurance can be given that the allowances it has established against these exposures will be sufficient to cover all future losses arising from such exposures, especially in the case of a prolonged or renewed economic downturn.

A limited number of the main debtor groups to which Shinhan Bank has credit exposure are subject to restructuring programs or are otherwise making significant efforts to improve their financial conditions, such as by obtaining intragroup loans and entering into agreements to further improve their capital structures. No assurance can be given that there will not be future restructuring with Shinhan Bank's major corporate customers or that such restructuring will not result in significant losses to Shinhan Bank with less than full recovery. In addition, if the Government decides to pursue an aggressive restructuring policy with respect to distressed companies, Korean commercial banks, including Shinhan Bank, may face a temporary rise in delinquencies and intensified pressure for additional provisioning. Furthermore, bankruptcies or financial difficulties of large corporations, including *chaebol* groups, may have an adverse ripple effect of triggering delinquencies and impairment of Shinhan Bank's loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises that supply parts or labor to such corporations. If Shinhan Bank experiences future losses from its exposure to large corporations, including *chaebol* groups, it may have a material adverse effect on Shinhan Bank's business, financial condition and results of operations. See "Item 4.B. Business Overview – Description of Assets and Liabilities – Loans – Loan Portfolio – Exposure to Main Debtor Groups."

The asset quality of our retail loan portfolio may deteriorate.

In recent years, consumer debt, including lending to households and small unincorporated businesses, has continued to increase in Korea. Shinhan Bank's portfolio of retail loans is comprised of two principal product types, namely secured retail loans (which are primarily comprised of mortgage and home equity loans secured by real estate) and general purpose loans (which are unsecured loans and tend to carry a higher credit risk). As of December 31, 2018, Shinhan Bank's retail loan portfolio (before allowance for loan losses and deferred loan origination costs and fees) was ₩112,594 billion, representing 44.5% of its total loans outstanding. As of December 31, 2016, 2017 and 2018, Shinhan Bank's non-performing retail loans were ₩157 billion, ₩215 billion and ₩238 billion, respectively, representing non-performing loan ratios (net of charge-offs and loan sales) of 0.16%, 0.21% and 0.21%, respectively.

Our large exposure to consumer debt means that we are exposed to changes in economic conditions affecting Korean consumers. For example, a rise in unemployment, an increase in interest rates or a decline in housing prices in Korea could adversely affect the ability of consumers to make payments and increase the likelihood of potential defaults. Economic difficulties in Korea that hurt consumers could result in increasing delinquencies and a decline in the asset quality of the our household loan portfolio, which may in turn require us to record higher provisions for credit loss and charge-offs and may materially and adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

Any deterioration in the asset quality of our guarantees and acceptances will likely have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In the normal course of banking activities, we make various commitments and incur certain contingent liabilities in the form of guarantees and acceptances. Financial guarantees, which are contracts that require us to make specified payments to reimburse the beneficiary of the guarantee for a loss such beneficiary incurs because

the debtor in respect of which the guarantee is given fails to make payments when due in accordance with the terms of the relevant debt instrument, are recognized initially at fair value, and such initial fair value is amortized over the life of the financial guarantee. Other guarantees are recorded as off-balance sheet items in the notes to our financial statements and those guarantees that we have confirmed to make payments are recorded on the statements of financial position. As of December 31, 2018, we had aggregate guarantees and acceptances of ₩15,522 billion, for which we provided allowances for losses of ₩105.5 billion. If there is significant deterioration in the quality of assets underlying our guarantees and acceptances, our allowances may be insufficient to cover actual losses resulting in respect of these liabilities.

Risks Relating to Our Credit Card Business

Future changes in market conditions as well as other factors, such as stricter regulation, may lead to reduced revenues and deterioration in the asset quality of credit card receivables.

As of December 31, 2016, 2017 and 2018, Shinhan Card's interest-earning credit card assets amounted to ₩22,765 billion, ₩25,250 billion and ₩28,311 billion, respectively. Our large exposure to credit card and other consumer debt means that we are exposed to changes in economic conditions affecting Korean consumers in general. For example, a rise in unemployment, an increase in interest rates, a downturn in the real estate market, or a general contraction or other difficulties affecting the Korean economy may lead Korean consumers to reduce spending (a substantial portion of which is conducted through credit card transactions), which in turn leads to reduced earnings for our credit card business, as well as to higher default rates on credit card loans, deterioration in the quality of our credit card assets and increased difficulties in recovering written-off assets from which a significant portion of Shinhan Card's revenues is derived. Any of these developments could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Increasing consumer and corporate spending and borrowing on our card products and growth in card lending balances depend in part on Shinhan Card's ability to develop and issue new or enhanced card and prepaid products and increase revenue from such products and services, as well as the level of discretionary income among our cardholders, which is largely affected by macroeconomic factors beyond our control. In addition, credit card companies in Korea, including Shinhan Card, may not be able to enjoy any rapid growth in revenue over the long term due to the maturing nature of the credit card industry, in part due to oversaturation of credit card service providers. Shinhan Card's future earnings and profitability also depend on its ability to attract new cardholders, reduce cardholder attrition, increase merchant coverage and capture a greater share of customers' total credit card spending in Korea and overseas. Shinhan Card may not be able to manage and expand cardholder benefits in a cost-effective manner or contain the growth of marketing, promotion and reward expenses to a commercially reasonable level. If Shinhan Card is not successful in increasing customer spending, maintaining or expanding its market position and asset growth, or containing costs or cardholder benefits, its financial condition, results of operations and cash flow could be negatively affected.

KT consortium's K-Bank and Kakao consortium's Kakao Bank commenced operations in April 2017 and July 2017, respectively. Internet-only banks are expected to become major competitors to Shinhan Card in various business areas, particularly in the mid-term interest loan market. In addition, with the rapid growth of online service providers and technology companies providing virtual payment services, more competitors are entering the financial payments industry, creating a new paradigm in the payments market and changing the competitive landscape. New competitors, including Kakao Corp., NAVER and Samsung Electronics, have introduced new payment methods which are now competing with Shinhan Card's payment model AppCard. In 2018, Kakao Bank launched its own credit card business, expanding its mid-range interest rate loan offerings and competing with the existing credit card service providers. Shinhan Card is currently making efforts to enhance its AppCard payment model and cooperating with other credit card service providers to promote its joint NFC (near field communication) payment network.

In addition, Government policies and regulations aimed at protecting small- and medium-sized enterprises, such as the reduction of fees chargeable to small- and medium-sized merchants, may have a material adverse

effect on our revenues from Shinhan Card. In January 2012, the Government expanded the definition of a small- and medium-sized merchant to include those with annual sales of up to ₩200 million and, effective September 2012, lowered fees chargeable to such merchants from 1.8% to 1.5% with respect to credit cards. In January 2015, the Government further expanded the definition of a small- and medium-sized merchant to include those with annual sales of more than ₩200 million and up to ₩300 million, and imposed a cap on fees chargeable to such merchants at 2.0% with respect to credit cards. In November 2015, the Government announced a further reduction in the merchant fees chargeable to small- and medium-sized enterprises with respect to credit cards, effective January 31, 2016, from 2.0% to 1.3% for merchants with annual sales of more than ₩200 million and up to ₩300 million, and from 1.5% to 0.8% for merchants with annual sales of up to ₩200 million. In July 2017, the Enforcement Decree of the Specialized Credit Finance Business Act was amended to expand the range of small- and medium-sized enterprises subject to lower merchant fees. Upon the amendment, merchants with annual sales of more than ₩300 million and up to ₩500 million are subject to merchant fees chargeable with respect to credit cards of 1.3%, and merchants with annual sales of up to ₩300 million are subject to merchant fees chargeable with respect to credit cards of 0.8%. In January 2019, the government further expanded the definition of a small- and medium-sized merchant to include those with annual sales of more than ₩500 million and up to ₩3 billion. Upon the amendment, merchants with annual sales of more than ₩500 million and up to ₩1 billion are subject to merchant fees chargeable with respect to credit cards of 1.4%, and merchants with annual sales of more than ₩1 billion and up to ₩3 billion are subject to merchant fees chargeable with respect to credit cards of 1.6%. Pursuant to the Specialized Credit Financial Business Act, the rates of fees chargeable to merchants are subject to review and revision every three years, starting from 2012, and the rates of fees chargeable may be further adjusted due to changes in relevant regulations or Government policy. Additionally, during 2018, the Seoul metropolitan and other regional governments have launched "Zero Pay", a government sponsored QR code-based mobile payment platform charging little to no transaction fees (up to 0.5% depending on volume of sales) and aimed at reducing transaction fees small businesses pay to credit card companies. The Financial Services Commission also announced its plans to establish an open banking system that would provide fintech firms access to banks' payment systems at lower costs. Additional amendments to regulations requiring further downward adjustments to merchant fees or Government policies aimed at reducing transaction fees paid to credit card companies may be implemented in the future, placing further downward pressure on the results of operations for credit card companies, including Shinhan Card.

In 2013, the Government also implemented measures regulating marketing costs in order to control excessive marketing campaigns and curtail undue marketing expenses, which had the effect of impeding revenue growth for credit card companies but also reduced or slowed the growth in their marketing expenses. Effective December 2013, the Government also introduced guidelines to curb the interest rates that credit card companies, including Shinhan Card, may charge on card loans and cash advances. Furthermore, the Government also provides tax incentives, among others, for the use of check cards (where the amounts paid with check cards are instantly debited from the customer's bank accounts) to encourage the use of check cards in lieu of credit cards in an attempt to preempt a potential rise in delinquency among credit card users, and if check cards are widely used in lieu of credit cards, this would reduce interest income from credit cards, which generally have a longer repayment period than that of check cards, and may have an adverse impact on Shinhan Card's revenues and results of operations. On November 26, 2018, the Financial Services Commission introduced additional guidelines aimed at curtailing excessive marketing expenses for credit card companies, for example by limiting the benefits credit card companies may offer to large corporate credit card clients or merchants as well as requiring a reasonable level of annual service fees for credit card holders. Although these and similar Government initiatives and measures may result in a reduction in marketing expenses, which in turn may help reduce the overall expenses of our credit card business, there is no assurance that Government measures will achieve their intended results, and such measures may result in a decline in the volume of credit card transactions or otherwise adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Risks Relating to Our Other Businesses

We may experience significant losses from our investments and, to a lesser extent, trading activities due to market fluctuations.

We enter into and maintain large investment positions in fixed income products, primarily through our treasury and investment operations. These activities are described in “Item 4.B. Business Overview – Our Principal Activities – Other Banking Services.” We also maintain smaller trading positions, including equity and equity-linked securities and derivative financial instruments as part of our operations. Taking these positions entails making assessments about financial market conditions and trends. The revenues and profits we derive from many of these positions and related transactions are dependent on market prices, which are beyond our control. When we own assets such as debt or equity securities, a decline in market prices, for example, as a result of fluctuating market interest rates or stock market indices, can expose us to trading and valuation losses. If market prices move in a way that we have not anticipated, we may experience losses. In addition, when markets are volatile and subject to rapid changes in price directions, actual market prices may be contrary to our assessments and lead to lower than anticipated revenues or profits, or even result in losses, with respect to the related transactions and positions.

We may generate losses from our brokerage and other commission- and fee-based business.

We, through our investment and other subsidiaries, currently provide, and seek to expand the offerings of, brokerage and other commission- and fee-based services. Downturns in stock markets typically lead to a decline in the volume of transactions that we execute for our customers and, therefore, a decline in our non-interest revenues. In addition, because the fees that we charge for managing our clients’ portfolios are often based on the size of the assets under management, a downturn in the stock market, which has the effect of reducing the value of our clients’ portfolios or increasing the amount of withdrawals, also generally reduces the fees we receive from our securities brokerage, trust account management and other asset management services. Even in the absence of a market downturn, below-market performance by our securities, trust account or asset management subsidiaries may result in increased withdrawals and reduced cash inflows, which would reduce the revenue we receive from these businesses. In addition, protracted declines in asset prices can reduce liquidity for assets held by us and lead to material losses if we cannot close out or otherwise dispose of deteriorating positions in a timely way or at commercially reasonable prices.

Prolonged periods of declining or low interest rates may reduce or turn negative our investment margin on savings insurance products and result in an increase in the valuation of our liabilities associated with these products.

We, principally through Shinhan Life Insurance, offer fixed rate insurance policies such as savings insurance products that include guaranteed benefits. These products expose us to the risk that changes in interest rates will reduce our investment margin, which is the difference between the amounts that we are required to pay under the contracts and the rate of return we earn on investments intended to support obligations under such contracts. During periods of declining or low interest rates, we may have to invest insurance cash flows and reinvest the cash flows we received as interest or return of principal on our investments in lower yielding instruments. In addition, during periods of declining or low interest rates, fixed rate policies may become relatively more attractive investments to consumers. This could result in an increase in payments we are required to pay on such products and higher percentage of such products remaining in-force from year to year, during a period when our new investments carry lower returns. During periods of sustained lower interest rates, our reserves for policy liabilities may not be sufficient to meet future policy obligations and may need to be strengthened.

Significantly lower or negative investment margins may cause us to accelerate amortization, thereby reducing net income in the affected reporting period and potentially negatively affecting our credit instrument covenants or rating agency assessment of our financial condition. In addition, under IFRS 17, which is expected

to become effective beginning 2022, insurance contract liabilities will be calculated in terms of market value (as the present value of future insurance cash flows with a provision for risk) instead of book value. As the discount rate will reflect current interest rates rather than book yields, we may have a significantly higher debt balance under IFRS 17 due to higher insurance liabilities, thereby resulting in a decrease in our risk-based capital.

We may fail to realize the anticipated benefits of and encounter significant risks in connection with mergers and acquisitions.

We continue to seek and evaluate opportunities for diversification and growth of our business, including through strategic acquisitions, and have experienced substantial growth through several mergers and acquisitions. Most notably, our acquisition of Chohung Bank in 2003 has enabled us to have the second largest banking operations in Korea. In addition, our acquisition in March 2007 of LG Card, the then largest credit card company in Korea, has enabled us to have the largest credit card operations in Korea and significantly expand our non-banking business capacity so as to achieve a balanced business portfolio. In September 2018, we announced the acquisition of a 59.15% interest in Orange Life Insurance, Ltd., the former Korean unit of ING Life Insurance, as part of our efforts to diversify and enhance our non-banking businesses. The acquisition was approved by the Financial Services Commission on January 16, 2019 and closed on February 1, 2019. In addition to Orange Life Insurance, Ltd., on October 31, 2018, we agreed to acquire Asia Trust Co., Ltd. in order to expand our real estate business capacity and have also acquired certain small-sized overseas financial service companies and asset management companies. We expect to integrate these and any future acquisitions with our existing businesses and generate synergies and expand our business capabilities. However, we may encounter significant risks, including difficulty in successfully integrating acquired businesses, increased expenses such as working capital requirements or capital expenditures, regulatory risks and financial risks such as potential liabilities of the businesses we acquire. In addition, evaluating potential acquisitions may require us to incur significant expenses or divert management's attention away from other business issues. As such, no assurance can be given that any completed or contemplated acquisitions will not have a negative effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations that outweigh any potential benefits.

Other Risks Relating to Us as the Holding Company

Our ability to continue to pay dividends and service debt will depend on the level of profits and cash flows of our subsidiaries.

We are a financial holding company with minimal operating assets other than the shares of our subsidiaries. Our primary source of funding and cash flow is dividends from, or disposition of our interests in, our subsidiaries or our cash resources, most of which are currently the result of borrowings. Since our principal assets are the outstanding capital stock of our subsidiaries, our ability to pay dividends on our common and preferred shares and service debt will mainly depend on the dividend payments from our subsidiaries.

Companies in Korea are subject to certain legal and regulatory restrictions with respect to payment of dividends. For example, under the Korean Commercial Code, dividends may only be paid out of distributable income, which is calculated by subtracting the aggregate amount of a company's paid-in capital and certain mandatory legal reserves from its net assets, in each case as of the end of the prior fiscal year. In addition, financial companies in Korea, including banks, credit card companies, securities companies and life insurers, such as our subsidiaries, must meet minimum capital requirements and capital adequacy ratios applicable to their respective industries before dividends can be paid. For example, under the Banking Act of 1950, as amended (the "Banking Act"), a bank is required to credit at least 10% of its net profit to a legal reserve each time it pays dividends on distributable income until such time when this reserve equals the amount of its total paid-in capital, and under the Banking Act, the Specialized Credit Financial Business Act and the regulations promulgated by the Financial Services Commission, if a bank or a credit card company fails to meet its required capital adequacy ratio or is otherwise subject to the management improvement measures imposed by the Financial Services Commission, then the Financial Services Commission may restrict the declaration and payment of dividend by such a bank or credit card company. In addition, if our or our subsidiaries' capital adequacy ratios fall below the required levels, our ability to pay dividends may be restricted by the Financial Services Commission.

Damage to our reputation could harm our business.

We are one of the largest and most influential financial institutions in Korea by virtue of our financial track records, market share and the size of our operations and customer base. Our reputation is critical to maintaining our relationships with clients, investors, regulators and the general public. Our reputation can be damaged in numerous ways, including, among others, employee misconduct (including embezzlement), cyber or other security breaches, litigation, compliance failures, corporate governance issues, failure to properly address potential conflicts of interest, the activities of customers and counterparties over which we have limited or no control, prolonged or exacting scrutiny from regulatory authorities and customers regarding our trade practices, or uncertainty about our financial soundness and our reliability. If we are unable to prevent or properly address these concerns, we could lose our existing or prospective customers and investors, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Our risk management policies and procedures may not be fully effective at all times.

In the course of our operations, we must manage a number of risks, such as credit risks, market risks and operational risks. We seek to monitor and manage our risk exposures through a comprehensive risk management platform, encompassing centralized risk management organization and credit evaluation systems, reporting and monitoring systems, early warning systems and other risk management infrastructure, using a variety of risk management strategies and techniques. See “Item 4.B. Business Overview – Risk Management.” Although we devote significant resources to developing and improving our risk management policies and procedures and expect to continue to do so in the future, our risk management practices may not be fully effective at all times in eliminating or mitigating risk exposures in all market environments or against all types of risk, including risks that are unidentified or unanticipated. For example, in the past, a limited number of our and our subsidiaries’ personnel engaged in embezzlement of substantial amounts for an extended period of time before such activities were detected by our risk management systems. In response to these incidents, we have strengthened our internal control procedures by, among others, implementing a real-time monitoring system, but there is no assurance that such measures will be sufficient to prevent similar employee misconducts in the future. Management of credit, market and operational risk requires, among others, policies and procedures to record properly and verify a large number of transactions and events, and we cannot assure you that these policies and procedures will prove to be fully effective at all times against all the risks we face.

We may experience disruptions, delays and other difficulties relating to our information technology systems.

We rely on our information technology systems to seamlessly provide our wide-ranging financial services as well as for our daily operations, including billing, online and offline financial transactions settlement and record keeping. We continually upgrade, and make substantial expenditures to upgrade, our group-wide information technology system, including in relation to customer data-sharing and other customer relations management systems, particularly in light of the heightened cyber security risks from advances in technology. Despite our best efforts, however, we may experience disruptions, delays, cyber or other security breaches or other difficulties relating to our information technology systems, and may not timely upgrade our systems as currently planned. Any of these developments may have an adverse effect on our business, particularly if our customers perceive us to not be providing the best-in-class cyber security systems and failing to timely and fully rectify any glitches in our information technology systems.

Our activities are subject to cyber security risk.

Our activities have been, and will continue to be, subject to an increasing risk of cyber-attacks, the nature of which is continually evolving. Cyber security risks include unauthorized access, through system-wide “hacking” or other means, to privileged and sensitive customer information, including passwords and account information, and illegal use thereof. Cyber security risk is generally on the rise as a growing number of our customers increasingly rely on our Internet- and mobile phone-based banking services for various types of financial

transactions. While we vigilantly protect customer data through encryption and other security programs and have made substantial investments to build and upgrade our systems and defenses to address the growing threats from cyber-attacks, there is no assurance that such data will not be subject to future security breaches. In addition, there can be no assurance that we will not experience a leakage of customer information or other security breaches as a result of illegal activities by our employees, outside consultants or hackers, or otherwise.

For example, in March 2013, we experienced a temporary interruption in providing online financial services due to large-scale cyber-attacks by unidentified sources on the security systems of major broadcasting networks and financial institutions in Korea. The interruption of our online financial services lasted approximately 90 minutes, after which our online system resumed without further malfunction. The Financial Supervisory Service conducted an investigation into the incident and found that Shinhan Bank and Jeju Bank had not properly maintained their information technology administrator accounts and vaccine servers. As a result, in December 2013, the Financial Supervisory Service notified Shinhan Bank and Jeju Bank of an institutional caution (which does not give rise to significant sanctions unlike in the case of repeated institutional warnings) and imposed disciplinary actions against five of Shinhan Bank's employees and three of Jeju Bank's employees. We do not believe such incident resulted in any material loss or leakage of customer information or other sensitive data.

Major financial institutions in Korea and around the world have also fallen victim to large-scale data leakage in the past. In December 2013, it was reported that there was a leakage of personal information of approximately 130,000 customers of Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank in Korea, which leakage was attributed to a third party sub-contractor in the case of Standard Chartered Bank, and an employee in the case of Citibank. In addition, in January 2014, it was reported that there was a leakage of personal information of approximately 100 million customers of NH Card, Lotte Card and KB Card in Korea due to illegal access to such information by an employee of a third party credit information company in the course of developing information technology programs for these three credit card companies. In 2017, Equifax Inc., a U.S. credit reporting company, was reported to have suffered a breach of personal information of over 143 million people.

Other than the cyber security attack in March 2013 as discussed above, we have not experienced any material security breaches in the past, including any similar large scale leakage of customer information. In order to minimize the risk of security breaches related to customer and our other proprietary information, we have taken a series of group-wide preventive measures, such as the adoption and implementation of a best-in-class information security system and reinforcement of internal control measures. We are fully committed to maintaining the highest standards of cyber security and consumer protection measures and upgrading them continually. We have implemented the ISO 27001-certified security management system for us and all our subsidiaries, and we have obtained the Information Security Management System certification for most of our subsidiaries. Our Integrated Security Control Center's security management system enables us to continuously monitor for signs of potential cyber-attacks and provides us with advance warnings that will allow us to promptly respond to such attacks. We believe such certifications represent third-party validations that we are in compliance with best-in-class international standards on matters of information security. Our security management system continuously monitors for signs of potential cyber-attacks and is designed to provide early warning alerts to enable prompt action by us. In order to prevent intentional and accidental security issues by our employees, we have created a violation monitoring system, reinforcing our security measures by preemptively identifying various scenarios of threats and by collecting and analyzing different types of data that allows us to quickly identify any potential security violations. Moreover, we established a new information security lab to build a continuous security research and development system to respond to hacking and other cyber threats. Through these measures, we are developing technical capabilities necessary to respond to the latest security threats. We also provide intensive employee training to our information technology staff and other employees on cyber security and have adopted advanced security infrastructure (including through hiring a highly competent team of information security experts) for online financial services such as mandatory website certification and keyboard security functions. In addition, reviews of our system are conducted, across all of our subsidiaries, through periodic audits and simulation reviews by external experts. In addition, in compliance with applicable regulations we currently carry insurance to cover cyber security breaches up to ₩10 billion in relation to our banking

business and up to W3 billion in the aggregate and up to W1 billion per incident for our securities investment business and have set aside a reserve of W1 billion for our credit card business. In addition, in light of the growing use of mobile devices to access financial services, we have implemented security measures (including encryptions and service terminal monitoring) to provide a secure mobile banking service as well as to prevent illegal leakage or sharing of customer data and otherwise enhance customer privacy. We are also keenly aware of the litigation and regulatory sanctions risks that may arise from security breaches and are aggressively reinforcing a group-wide culture that stresses safety and good custodianship as among our highest priorities. Furthermore, we are actively taking steps to implement preventive and other steps recommended or required by the regulatory authorities in relation to actual and potential financial scams. However, given the unpredictable and continually evolving nature of cyber security threats due to advances in technology or other reasons, there is no assurance that, notwithstanding our best efforts at maintaining the best-in-class cyber security systems, we will not be vulnerable to major cyber security attacks in the future.

The public is developing heightened awareness about the importance of keeping their personal data private, and the financial regulators are placing greater emphasis on data protection by financial service providers. For example, under the Personal Information Protection Act, as last amended in October 2017, financial institutions, as personal information manager, may not collect, store, maintain, utilize or provide resident registration numbers of their customers, unless other laws or regulations specifically request or permit the management of resident registration numbers. Further, under the Use and Protection of Credit Information Act, as last amended in December 2018, a financial institution has a higher duty to protect credit information, meaning information necessary to assess the creditworthiness of the counterparty to financial transactions and other commercial transactions. Such regulations have considerably restricted a financial institution's ability to transfer or provide the information to its affiliate or holding company, and treble damages can be imposed on a financial institution for a leakage of such information. In addition, under the Electronic Financial Transaction Act, as last amended in April 2017 with effect from October 2017, a financial institution is primarily responsible for compensating its customers harmed by the financial institution's cyber security breach, even if the breach is not directly attributable to the financial institution. We maintain an integrated system that closely monitors customer information to ensure compliance with data protection laws and regulations.

If a cyber or other security breach were to happen with respect to us or any of our subsidiaries, it may result in litigation by affected customers or other third parties (including class actions), compensation for any losses suffered by victims of cyber security attacks, reputational damage, loss of customers, heightened regulatory scrutiny and related sanctions, more stringent compliance with the present and future regulatory restrictions, and other costs related to damage control, reparation and reinforcement of information security systems, any of which may have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Our customers may become victims to "voice phishing" or other financial scams, for which we may be required to make monetary compensation and suffer damage to our business and reputation.

In recent years, financial scams known as voice phishing have been on the rise in Korea. While voice phishing takes many forms and has evolved over time in terms of sophistication, it typically involves the scammer making a phone call to a victim under false pretenses (for example, the scammer pretending to be a member of law enforcement, an employee of a financial institution or even an abductor of the victim's child) and luring the victim to transfer money to an untraceable account controlled by the scammer. More recently, voice phishing has increasingly taken the form of the scammer "hacking" or otherwise wrongfully obtaining personal financial information of the victim (such as credit card numbers or Internet banking login information) over the telephone or other means and illegally using such information to obtain credit card loans or cash advances through automated telephone banking or Internet banking. Reportedly, a substantial number of such scammers belong to international criminal syndicates with bases overseas, such as China, with operatives in Korea.

In response to the growing incidents of voice phishing, regulatory authorities have undertaken a number of steps to protect consumers against voice phishing and other financial scams. There is no assurance, however, that

the regulatory activities will have the desired effect of substantially eradicating or even containing the incidents of voice phishing or other financial scams. For example, following an investigation in November and December 2011 of major credit card companies, including Shinhan Card, as to their compliance with regulations on card loan-related voice phishing and the scope of damage suffered by customers as a result of voice phishing, the Financial Supervisory Service issued a number of guidelines for credit companies to comply with in order to minimize damage from voice phishing, including, among others, (i) strengthening identity verification procedures for card loan applications that are made online or through the automated response system, (ii) delaying the timing of loan payout by a few hours following the approval of card loan application, and (iii) giving an option to customers to block card loan applications. In May 2012, Shinhan Card completed all necessary steps to fully comply with these additional guidelines and has been in full compliance since then.

Although the financial institutions are often not legally at fault for the damage suffered by victims of voice phishing, the compensation scheme was adopted largely in consideration of social responsibility among financial institutions and that the financial institutions were not required to, and therefore in many instances did not, confirm the personal identity of the card loan or cash advance applicants prior to the adoption of such scheme. On December 8, 2011, Shinhan Card began implementing a mandatory outcall procedure to verify the personal identity of applicants for card loans and cash advances if not requested in person. In January 2012, financial institutions, the Financial Supervisory Service, the police and other related institutions formed a joint committee to prevent voice phishing incidents and implemented preventive measures such as enforcing a 10 minute delay for withdrawal of credit card loans of ₩3 million or more from an automated teller machine. In addition, Shinhan Card and our other subsidiaries have established a fraud detection system that identifies any questionable transactions based on deviations from a customer's conventional transaction patterns.

Partly as a result of these efforts, Shinhan Card did not receive any claims in 2018 in relation to voice phishing. Accordingly, we do not believe that any currently outstanding claims in relation to voice phishing will have a material adverse impact on our business, financial condition or results of operations. Additionally, other than voice phishing incidents and the recent cyber security attacks as discussed above, we have not experienced any material security breaches in the past. However, given continual advances in technology and the increasing sophistication of the financial scammers, there is no assurance that we will be able to prevent future financial scams or that the frequency and scope of financial scams will not rise. If financial scams involving us and our subsidiaries were to continue or to become more prevalent, it may result in compensation for any losses suffered by victims thereof, reputational damage, loss of customers, heightened regulatory scrutiny and related sanctions, compliance with the present and future regulatory restrictions, and other costs related to damage control, reparation and reinforcement of our preventive measures, any of which may have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Legal claims and regulatory risks arise in the conduct of our business.

In the ordinary course of our business, we are subject to regulatory oversight and potential legal and administrative liability risk. We are also subject to a variety of other claims, disputes, legal proceedings and government investigations in Korea and other jurisdictions where we are active. See "Item 8.A. Consolidated Statements and Other Financial Information – Legal Proceedings." These types of proceedings may expose us to substantial monetary and/or reputational damages and legal defense costs, injunctive relief, criminal and civil penalties and the potential for regulatory restrictions on our businesses. The outcome of these matters cannot be predicted and they could adversely affect our future business.

While we plan to rigorously defend our positions in the lawsuits or other regulatory proceedings against us, it is difficult to predict the final outcome of such cases. The total amount in dispute may increase during the course of litigation and other lawsuits may be brought against us based on similar allegations. Accordingly, these lawsuits and other proceedings may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Risks Relating to Law, Regulation and Government Policy

We are a heavily regulated entity and operate in a legal and regulatory environment that is subject to change, and violations could result in penalties and other regulatory actions.

As a financial services provider, we are subject to a number of regulations that are designed to maintain the safety and soundness of Korea's financial system, to ensure our compliance with economic and other obligations and to limit our risk exposure. These regulations may limit our activities, and changes in these regulations may increase our costs of doing business. Regulatory agencies frequently review regulations relating to our business and implement new regulatory measures, including increasing the minimum required provisioning levels or capital adequacy ratios applicable to us and our subsidiaries from time to time. We expect the regulatory environment in which we operate to continue to change. Changes in regulations applicable to us, our subsidiaries and our or their business or changes in the implementation or interpretation of such regulations could affect us and our subsidiaries in unpredictable ways and could adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Upon implementation of the Government-proposed Financial Consumer Protection Act (currently pending at the National Assembly's subcommittee for review of the bill), banks as financial instrument distributors will be subject to heightened investor and consumer protection measures, including stricter distribution guidelines, improved financial dispute resolution system, increased liability for damages borne by direct financial instrument distributors and newly imposed penalty surcharges. We may also become subject to other restrictions on our operations as a result of future changes in laws and regulations, including more stringent liquidity and capital requirements under Basel III, which are being adopted in phases in Korea in consideration of, among others, the pace and scope of international adoption of such requirements. Any of these regulatory developments may have a material adverse effect on our ability to expand operations or adequately manage our risks and liabilities. For further details on the principal laws and regulations applicable to us as a holding company and our principal subsidiaries, see "Item 4.B. Business Overview – Supervision and Regulation."

In addition, violations of law and regulations could expose us to significant liabilities and sanctions. For example, the Financial Supervisory Service conducts periodic audits on us and, from time to time, we have received institutional warnings from the Financial Supervisory Service. If the Financial Supervisory Service determines as part of such audit or otherwise that our financial condition, including the financial conditions of our operating subsidiaries, is unsound or that we have violated applicable law or regulations, including Financial Services Commission orders, or if we or our operating subsidiaries fail to meet the applicable requisite capital ratio or the capital adequacy ratio, as the case may be, set forth under Korean law, the Financial Supervisory Service may ask the Financial Services Commission to order, among other things, cancellations of authorization, permission or registration of the business, suspensions of a part or all of the business, closures of branch offices, recommendations for dismissal of officers or suspensions of officers from performing their duties, or may order, among other things, institutional warnings, institutional cautions, reprimanding warnings on officers, cautionary warnings on officers or cautions on officers. From time to time, our subsidiaries, including Shinhan Bank and Shinhan Card, have been subject to investigations and/or sanctions from the Financial Supervisory Service. See "Item 8.A. Consolidated Statements and Other Financial Information – Legal Proceedings." If any such measures are imposed on us or our subsidiaries as a result of unsound financial condition or failure to comply with minimum capital adequacy requirements or for other reasons, it will have a material adverse effect on us and our subsidiaries' business, financial condition and results of operations.

The Government may encourage targeted lending to certain sectors in furtherance of policy objectives, and we may take this factor into account.

The Government has encouraged and may in the future encourage targeted lending to certain types of enterprises and individuals in furtherance of government initiatives. The Government, through its regulatory bodies such as the Financial Services Commission, from time to time announces lending policies to encourage Korean banks and financial institutions, including us and our subsidiaries, to lend to particular industries,

business groups or customer segments, and, in certain cases, has provided lower cost funding through loans made by the Bank of Korea for further lending to specific customer segments.

For example, the Government has taken and is taking various initiatives to support small- and medium-sized enterprises and low-income individuals, who were disproportionately affected by the downturn in the Korean and global economy in the late 2000s and have yet to fully recover. As part of these initiatives, the Financial Supervisory Service has recently encouraged banks in Korea to increase lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises in order to ease the financial burden on such enterprises amid sluggish economic recovery, and in February 2016, the Bank of Korea announced that it would increase support for loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises in anticipation of growing liquidity difficulties among such enterprises in light of the sustained sluggishness of the general economy and to stimulate trade exports, infrastructure investments and entrepreneurial efforts. The financial regulators have also adopted several measures designed to improve certain lending practices of the commercial banks which practices were perceived as having an unduly prohibitive effect on extending loans to small- to medium-sized enterprises.

In addition, as a way of supporting the Government's initiative to assist promising startups, in February 2015, the financial regulators announced that they would encourage the banks in Korea to increase lending to technology companies in the small- to medium-sized enterprise segment by an annual target of ₩20 trillion and to enhance technology-related credit review capabilities. Pursuant to these initiatives, the total lending to technology companies in the small- to medium-sized enterprise segment, on a cumulative basis, reached ₩58.4 trillion in 2016, ₩82.0 trillion in 2017 and ₩97.0 trillion in 2018. As of December 31, 2018, Shinhan Bank's total lending to technology companies reached, on a cumulative basis, ₩15.3 trillion.

Furthermore, in response to an increasing level of consumer debt and amid concerns over the debt-servicing capacity of retail borrowers if interest rates were to rise, the Financial Services Commission announced in February 2014 that it plans to increase the proportion of fixed interest rate loans and installment principal repayment-based loans within the total housing loans extended by commercial banks (which loans have historically been, for the most part, variable interest rate loans with the entire principal being repaid at maturity, which is usually rolled over on an annual basis). According to this plan, the target proportion for fixed interest rate loans was set at 35%, 37.5% and 40% and the target proportion for installment principal repayment-based housing loans was set at 35%, 40% and 45%, each by the end of 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. Amid concerns about increasing household debt, in May 2016 the target proportion for fixed interest rate loans and installment principal repayment-based housing loans for 2016 were increased to 40% and 45%, respectively, and in February 2017 the target proportion for fixed interest rate loans and installment principal repayment-based housing loans for 2017 were increased to 45% and 55%, respectively. In April 2018, the Financial Services Commission announced that the target proportion for fixed interest rate loans for 2018 would be set at 47.5%. In addition, an expanded tax deduction limit for interest repayment is granted for loans with maturity of 10 years or more (compared to 15 years or more prior to this plan). The Financial Services Commission announced that it would examine whether banks meet their targets on an annual basis.

In furtherance of the policy to expand the proportion of fixed rate housing loans, the Financial Services Commission implemented "Relief Debt Conversion" program from March 24 to March 27, 2015 and from March 30 to April 3, 2015, respectively, under which borrowers of eligible housing loans (namely, loans that have been in existence for one year or more since the original loan date, with no delinquency in the past six months, with principal amounts of ₩500 million or less and for houses valued at ₩900 million or less that are on a floating rate basis and/or an interest payment only basis) might convert such loans to new fixed rate loans in respect of which the borrowers would be required to repay the principal and interest in installment for a term of 10, 15, 20 or 30 years without a grace period, provided that the new loans pass the maximum loan-to-value ratio of 70% (irrespective of the location of the property) and the maximum debt-to-income ratio of 60% (only in respect of apartment units located in the greater Seoul metropolitan area, subject to certain exceptions). The borrowers were allowed to convert the original loans only at the banks that extended such loans. The banks holding the newly converted fixed rate loans are required to sell such loans to Korea Housing Finance

Corporation, a government-controlled entity, which will then securitize such loans and issue mortgage-backed securities (backed by such loans) to be purchased by the banks who sold the loans in proportion to the amounts of the loans sold, and the banks will be required to hold such securities for a period of one year, after which the bank can sell or dispose of such securities in the market or otherwise. According to the Financial Services Commission, under this program, approximately 327,000 borrowers converted loans in the aggregate amount of ₩31.7 trillion to fixed rate loans, of which Shinhan Bank accounted for approximately 13.5%. Due in large part to such initiatives, fixed interest rate loans and installment principal repayment-based loans accounted for 44.2% and 51.0%, respectively, of the total housing loans extended by commercial banks in Korea as of June 30, 2018, according to data published by the Government in December 2018. Fixed interest rate and installment principal repayment-based housing loans accounted for 43.8% and 49.1%, respectively, of the housing loans extended by Shinhan Bank as of December 31, 2018.

In the event that market interest rates increase from those applicable during this program's implementation in March and April 2015, we may experience valuation or realization losses on the mortgage-backed securities to be held by Shinhan Bank. Due to the prevailing interest rate environment and other market conditions, we also may not be able to sell or otherwise dispose of the mortgage backed securities in the market or otherwise in amounts or at prices commercially reasonable to us. In addition, as a result of this program we may incur additional costs from recalibrating our asset portfolio and asset-liability management policy. Any of these developments could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

We, on a voluntary basis, may factor the existence of the Government's policies and encouragements into consideration in making loans although the ultimate decision whether to make loans remains with us and is made based on our internal credit approval procedures and risk management systems independently of Government policies. In addition, in tandem with providing additional loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises and low-income individuals, Shinhan Bank takes active steps to mitigate the potential adverse impacts from making bad loans to enterprises or individuals with high risk profiles as a result of such arrangement, such as by strengthening its loan review and post-lending monitoring processes. However, we cannot assure you that such arrangement did not or will not, or similar or other government-led initiatives in the future will not, result in a suboptimal allocation of our loan portfolio from a risk-reward perspective compared to what we would have allocated based on purely commercial decisions in the absence of such initiatives. The Government may implement similar or other initiatives in the future to spur the overall economy or encourage the growth of targeted industries or relief to certain segments of the population. Specifically, the Government may introduce lending-related initiatives or enforce existing ones in a heightened fashion during times when small- and medium-sized enterprises or low-income households on average are facing an increased level of financial distress or vulnerability due to an economic downturn, which makes lending to them in the volume and the manner suggested by the Government even riskier and less commercially desirable. Accordingly, such policy-driven lending may create enhanced difficulties for us in terms of risk management, deterioration of our asset quality and reduced earnings, compared to what would have been in the absence of such initiatives, which may have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

The Government may also encourage investments in certain institutions in furtherance of policy objectives, and we may not recoup our investments therein in a timely or otherwise commercially reasonable manner.

In addition to targeted lending, the Government may from time to time encourage or request the financial institutions in Korea, including us and our subsidiaries, to make investments in, or provide other forms of financial support to, certain institutions in furtherance of the Government's policy objectives. In response thereto, we have made and will continue to make the ultimate decision on whether, how and to what extent we will comply with such encouragements or requests based on our internal risk assessment and in accordance with our risk management systems and policies. At the same time, as a leading member of the financial service industry in Korea and as a responsible corporate citizen we will also fully give due consideration to such encouragements or requests from the Government, especially in relation to the long-term benefit arising from furthering the policy objective of maintaining a sound financial system, even if complying with such requests may involve additional short-term costs and risks to a limited extent.

For example, to deal with a growing number of non-performing loans in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Government sponsored the establishment of United Asset Management Company Ltd. ("UAMCO") in October 2009 through capital contributions from six major policy and commercial banks, namely Shinhan Bank, Kookmin Bank, KEB Hana Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea, Woori Bank and Nonghyup Bank. The Government originally planned to dispose of UAMCO during 2015 and establish a new company that specializes in corporate restructuring, but the Government scrapped such plans and instead decided to reorganize UAMCO and expand its restructuring business. As part of an effort to strengthen its balance sheet, UAMCO received additional capital contributions in May 2016 from two new shareholders, Korea Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and two of its existing shareholders, Woori Bank and Nonghyup Bank. Shinhan Bank has committed to contribute ₩175 billion of capital to UAMCO, of which ₩85 billion has been contributed to date. As of the date hereof, Shinhan Bank holds a 14% equity interest in UAMCO, while seven other policy and commercial banks each hold interests ranging from 2% to 14%.

UAMCO seeks to achieve financial improvement of struggling companies through a wide range of restructuring programs, including debt restructuring, capital injection, asset sales, corporate reorganization, workouts and liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and is the largest purchaser in Korea of non-performing financial assets generally. Shinhan Bank sold non-performing assets to UAMCO in the amount of ₩103.5 billion, ₩118.2 billion and ₩131.7 billion in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively. With an enlarged capital base following the recent capital contributions mentioned above, it is expected that UAMCO will play a more active role in the restructuring of the Korean corporate sector. The Government is also considering an amendment of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act of Korea to facilitate the business activities of UAMCO.

If UAMCO is successful in its expanded restructuring activities, it is anticipated that financial institutions including us will be able to further enhance their financial soundness by transferring more non-performing loans to UAMCO rather than directly engaging in the restructuring activities of the troubled borrowers. However, Shinhan Bank or other banks may be requested by the Government to make additional capital contributions or loans to UAMCO, which may entail unanticipated costs. Additionally, given the generally poor quality of our non-performing assets, there is no assurance that we will be able to sell such assets held by us to UAMCO on commercially reasonable terms and on a timely basis. Furthermore, there is no assurance that in furtherance of similar or other policy objectives, the Government may not request or otherwise encourage us or our subsidiaries to provide similar or other investments or provide other financial support for which we are not duly compensated or otherwise take up additional risk that we would not normally have undertaken, which may have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

The level and scope of government oversight of our retail lending business, particularly regarding mortgage and home equity loans, may change depending on the economic or political climate.

Real estate comprises the most significant asset for a substantial number of households in Korea, and movements of housing prices have generally had a significant impact on the domestic economy. Accordingly, regulating housing prices, either in terms of attempting to stem actual or anticipated excessive speculation during times of a suspected housing price bubble and spur the pricing and/or volume of real estate transactions during times of a depressed real estate market by way of tax subsidy, guidelines to lending institutions or otherwise, has been a key policy initiative for the Government.

For example, during the early to mid-2000s, the Government adopted several regulatory measures, including in relation to retail banking, to stem a rise in speculation in real estate investments generally and in select areas. Some of the measures undertaken in the past include requiring financial institutions to impose stricter debt-to-income ratio and loan-to-value ratio requirements for mortgage loans for real property located in areas deemed to have engaged in a high level of speculation, raising property tax on real estate transactions for owners of multiple residential units, adopting a ceiling on the sale price of newly constructed housing units and recommending that commercial banks restrain from making further mortgage and home equity lending, among

others. In addition, amid a prolonged slump in the housing market in Korea, in April 2013, the Government announced a real estate comprehensive countermeasure, which provides, among other things, for (i) reduced capital gains tax and (ii) exemption of acquisition tax for first-time homebuyers. In addition, in November 2013, the Government announced a permanent reduction in acquisition tax, with retrospective application from August 2013. Prior to such reduction, acquisition tax was assessed on a differentiated scale based on whether the homebuyer was purchasing a primary home or a secondary home, with the former being assessed an acquisition tax of 2% for the purchase of homes under ₩900 million and 4% for homes exceeding ₩900 million, and the latter being assessed an acquisition tax of 4% regardless of the price of the home. Under the new regulatory structure, the differentiated tax scale for primary homes and secondary homes is eliminated, and all homebuyers are assessed an acquisition tax of 1% for the purchase of homes under ₩600 million, 2% for homes exceeding ₩600 million but less than ₩900 million and 3% for homes exceeding ₩900 million. Furthermore, in February 2014, the Financial Services Commission announced plans to increase the proportion of fixed interest rate loans and installment principal repayment-based loans within the total housing loans extended by commercial banks. See “– The Government may encourage targeted lending to certain sectors in furtherance of policy objectives, and we may take this factor into account.” In addition, in order to rationalize the regulations on the housing loans, the Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service provided administrative instructions in July 2014 with effect from August 1, 2014, which have been extended and amended several times, that all financial institutions including banks under the Banking Act are subject to the maximum loan-to-value ratio of 70% (irrespective of the location of the property, subject to certain exceptions) and the maximum debt-to-income ratio of 60% (only in respect of apartment units located in the greater Seoul metropolitan area, subject to certain exceptions). The above administrative instructions have been replaced by the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business and the Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business reflecting the tightened measures as discussed below. Furthermore, in December 2014, the National Assembly also passed several bills that were designed to stimulate the real estate market. In November 2016, amid concerns about increasing household debt, the Government announced another real estate comprehensive countermeasure requiring property buyers in Seoul to retain ownership for a longer period of time and increasing down payments to be made on the property. In January 2017, in order to modernize credit review methods and stabilize the management of household debt, the Financial Services Commission announced the planned introduction of a debt service ratio and a new debt-to-income ratio. The new debt-to-income ratio, which has been implemented beginning January 31, 2018 reflects (i) both principal and interest payments on the applicable mortgage and home equity loan and existing mortgage and home equity loans and (ii) interest payments on other loans. Previously, debt-to-income ratio had only reflected (i) both principal and interest payments on the applicable mortgage and home equity loan and (ii) interest payments on existing mortgage and home equity loans. Debt service ratios reflect principal and interest payments on both the applicable loan and other loans and were introduced on a trial basis as a self-regulatory reference index beginning on March 26, 2018 and were fully implemented in October 2018. The new debt-to-income ratios will be used as the primary reference index in the evaluation and approval process for mortgage and home equity loans, and debt service ratios will be used as a supplementary reference index providing additional limits on mortgage and home equity loans. Since October 2018, loans to rental businesses are subject to a rent-to-interest ratio (calculated as the borrower’s aggregate annual rental income from rental properties over its aggregate annual payment amount of interest on loans secured by such rental properties) of at least 1.25 for residential rental businesses and at least 1.50 for non-residential rental businesses.

On August 2, 2017, the Government unveiled a tighter set of real estate market measures aimed at taming speculation and deterring the rise of housing prices. Pursuant to the measures, beginning August 3, 2017, Seoul, Sejong Special Self-Governing City and Gwacheon were named “overheated speculative districts,” with the loan limits of those buying homes there to be tightened to 40% of their property value from 60%. The maximum debt-to-income ratio will be capped at 40% from 50%. Eleven districts in Seoul and Sejong Special Self-Governing City have also been designated “speculative districts” subject to higher taxes and tougher regulations. The August 2, 2017 measures come after President Moon Jae-in administration’s first countermeasures, unveiled on June 19, 2017, which were designed to prevent the resale of home purchasing rights of real estate assets in Seoul while tightening the bars for maximum loan-to-value ratio for home buyers to 60% from 70% and

maximum debt-to-income ratio to 50% from 60% in the regions designated as “adjustment targeted areas” (comprised of Seoul, Sejong Special Self-Governing City, seven cities in Gyeonggi Province and seven boroughs in Busan Metropolitan City). However, the new lending limits, which became effective on July 3, 2017, failed to halt the surge in housing prices, thus leading to the more stringent measures announced on August 2, 2017. Currently, loan-to-value ratios and new debt-to-income ratios in “overheated speculative districts,” “speculative districts,” “adjustment targeted areas” and other regions are regulated by the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business and the Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business. These renewed measures are expected to lead to a decline in the overall volume of home mortgage loans but may result in an increase in long-term deposits loans required for house rentals and lending to borrowers with high credit profiles.

As housing prices in the greater Seoul metropolitan area continued to rise despite the above measures, on September 13, 2018, the Government announced a more robust policy to curb housing prices. Effective from September 14, 2018, these measures include, among other things, tighter regulations on maximum loan-to-value ratios in “overheated speculative districts,” “speculative districts” and “adjustment targeted areas” (collectively, the “regulated areas”), under which the maximum loan-to-value ratio applicable to owners of single or multiple residential units attempting to purchase an additional residential unit located in any of the regulated areas using a mortgage loan will be nil with certain exceptions applicable only to owners of a single residential unit attempting to purchase an additional residential unit. The maximum loan-to-value ratio will be also nil, with certain exceptions, in the case of purchases of high value residential units (for which the declared value is more than ₩900 million) located in any of the regulated areas not being made for the purpose of actual residence. These renewed measures are expected to lead to a decline in the overall volume of home mortgage loans but may result in an increase in long-term deposit loans required for house rentals and lending to borrowers with high credit profiles.

Pursuant to the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business, Shinhan Bank must maintain a loan to deposit ratio of no more than 100%. Currently, in calculating the loan to deposit ratio, there is no differentiation between retail loans and corporate loans. However, the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was amended on July 12, 2018 to provide that, beginning from January 1, 2020, in calculating such loan to deposit ratio, retail loans and corporate loans will be weighed differently, with retail loans subject to a multiple of 115% and corporate loans (excluding loans to SOHOs) subject to a multiple of 85%, thereby increasing the impact of retail loans and reducing the impact of corporate loans in calculating such ratio. Additionally, the Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was amended on June 30, 2018 to provide for a weighted multiple to be applied to mortgage and home equity loans where the loan-to-value ratio exceeds 60% in determining required minimum total capital (BIS) ratio. Further, the Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business is expected to be amended during 2019 such that the countercyclical capital buffer requirement also takes into account the increase of credit in the retail sector. The Detailed Regulation on the Supervision of the Banking Business was also amended on June 30, 2018 to add “concentration of risk in the retail sector” as an additional criteria when the Financial Supervisory Service evaluates the risk management systems of Korean banks.

There is no assurance that Government measures will achieve their intended results. While any Government measure that is designed to stimulate growth in the real estate sector may result in growth of, and improved profitability for, our retail lending business (particularly with respect to mortgage and home equity loans) at least for the short term, such measure could also result in unintended consequences, including potentially excessive speculation resulting in a “bubble” for the Korean real estate market and a subsequent market crash. In contrast, any Government measure changing the direction of its stimulative measures (for example, in order to preemptively curtail an actual or anticipated bubble in the real estate market) may result in a contraction of the real estate market, a decline in real estate prices and consequently, a reduction in the growth of, and profitability for, our retail and/or other lending businesses, as well as otherwise have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations or profitability. See “— Risks Relating to Our Banking Business – A decline in the value of the collateral securing our loans or our inability to fully realize the collateral value may adversely affect our credit portfolio.”

We engage in limited settlement transactions involving Iran which may subject us to legal or reputational risks.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") administers and enforces certain laws and regulations ("OFAC Sanctions") that impose restrictions upon dealings with or related to certain countries, governments, entities and individuals that are the subject of OFAC Sanctions, including Iran, and maintains a list of specially designated nationals (the "SDN List"), whose assets are blocked and with whom U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing. Some OFAC Sanctions require a U.S. nexus in order to apply ("Primary Sanctions") while other OFAC Sanctions on certain dealings with or related to Iran, North Korea, and Russia apply even in the absence of a U.S. nexus ("Secondary Sanctions"). Non-U.S. persons are subject to Secondary Sanctions and can also be held liable for violations of Primary Sanctions on various legal grounds, such as causing violations by U.S. persons by engaging in transactions completed in part in the United States. The European Union also enforces certain laws and regulations that impose restrictions upon nationals and entities of, and business conducted in, member states with respect to activities or transactions with certain countries, governments, entities and individuals that are the subject of such laws and regulations. The United Nations Security Council and other governmental entities also impose similar sanctions.

In August 2016, the government of Korea authorized Shinhan Bank to act as a settlement bank for Euro-denominated transactions between Korean and Iranian businesses. Prior to the granting of this permission, payments for business activities were settled only in Korean Won and we did not participate in such settlements. From August 2016 through August 2017, Shinhan Bank processed ten such transactions that resulted in a minimal amount of revenue. Since August 2017, Shinhan Bank has ceased processing any such transactions and has no intention to process any such transactions in the future. We are committed to engaging only in lawful activities and in obeying all relevant OFAC Sanctions and European Union sanctions but cannot guarantee that actions taken by our employees will not violate such sanctions. On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to terminate the participation of the United States in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the "JCPOA"), pursuant to which certain relief of OFAC Sanctions relating to Iran had been provided. Following two wind down periods, one that ended on August 6, 2018 and that ended on November 4, 2018, all Iran-related Secondary Sanctions that had been waived pursuant to the JCPOA were re-imposed and non-U.S. persons now face risk of Secondary Sanctions for dealing with certain key sectors of the Iranian economy or for providing associated services related to the targeted activities. As such, any Iran-related activities may subject us to OFAC Sanctions and to potential legal or reputational risks.

The implementation of IFRS 9 with effect from January 1, 2018 renders certain of our historical financial information as of and for the years ended December 31, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 not directly comparable with that of our financial information after January 1, 2018.

With effect from January 1, 2018, IFRS 9 'Financial Instruments' has replaced in entirety previous guidance in IAS 39. Following the adoption of IFRS 9, we are required to re-classify and re-measure (including impairment measurement) certain of our financial instruments from January 1, 2018 without requiring any restatement of the corresponding figures of the prior period. Based on the method of adoption allowed under IFRS 9, we are permitted to adjust our shareholder equity from January 1, 2018 without requiring any restatement of the corresponding figures of the prior period where the difference between the new carrying amount and original carrying amount recognized in retained earnings. The difference between the new carrying amount and original carrying amount amounted to ₩344 billion as of January 1, 2018. As we are not required to restate affected financial figures with the implementation of IFRS 9, certain of our historical financial information as of and for the years ended December 31, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 is not directly comparable against that of our financial information after January 1, 2018. Investors must therefore exercise caution when making comparisons of any financial figures after January 1, 2018 against our historical financial figures prior to January 1, 2018 and when evaluating our financial condition, results of operations and results. For further information regarding the adoption of IFRS 9, see "Item 5.A. Operating Results – Critical Accounting Policies – Recently Adopted Standards and Interpretations – IFRS 9, 'Financial Instruments'" and Note 60 of the notes to our consolidated financial statements included in this annual report.

The implementation of IFRS 9 has caused us to increase our allowance for impairment losses to cover expected credit loss on our loan portfolio and other financial instruments and may increase volatility in our profit or loss.

Following the adoption of IFRS 9, the “incurred loss” model under the previous guidance for loans, debt instruments, lease receivables, contractual assets and financial guarantee contracts has been replaced with a forward-looking “expected credit loss” model, and therefore impairment losses are likely to be recognized earlier, on a more forward-looking basis and on a broader scope of financial instruments than using the incurred loss model under the previous guidance. Accordingly, as of January 1, 2018, we increased our credit loss allowance from ₩2,579 billion to ₩3,226 billion as a result of adopting IFRS 9. IFRS 9 also introduces additional requirements for a financial asset to be measured at amortized costs or fair value through other comprehensive income compared to the previous guidance and therefore would potentially increase the proportion of financial assets that are measured at fair value through profit or loss, thereby increasing volatility in our profit or loss. For further information regarding the adoption of IFRS 9, see “Item 5.A. Operating Results – Critical Accounting Policies – Recently Adopted Standards and Interpretations – IFRS 9, ‘Financial Instruments’” and Note 60 of the notes to our consolidated financial statements included in this annual report.

Risks Relating to Korea

Unfavorable financial and economic conditions in Korea and globally may have a material adverse impact on our asset quality, liquidity and financial performance.

We are incorporated in Korea, where most of our assets are located and most of our income is generated. As a result, we are subject to political, economic, legal and regulatory risks specific to Korea, and our business, results of operations and financial condition are substantially dependent on developments relating to the Korean economy. As Korea’s economy is highly dependent on the health and direction of the global economy, and investors’ reactions to developments in one country can have adverse effects on the securities price of companies in other countries, we are also subject to the fluctuations of the global economy and financial markets. Factors that determine economic and business cycles in the Korean or global economy are for the most part beyond our control and inherently uncertain. In addition to discussions of recent developments regarding the global economic and market uncertainties and the risks relating to us as provided elsewhere in this section, factors that could have an adverse impact on Korea’s economy in the future include, among others:

- continued volatility or deterioration in Korea’s credit and capital markets;
- difficulties in the financial sectors in Europe, China and elsewhere and increased sovereign default risks in select countries and the resulting adverse effects on the global financial markets;
- declines in consumer confidence and a slowdown in consumer spending and corporate investments;
- adverse changes or volatility in foreign currency reserve levels, commodity prices (including oil prices), exchange rates (including fluctuation of the U.S. Dollar, the Euro or the Japanese Yen exchange rates or revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi and the overall impact of the referendum in the United Kingdom in June 2016, in which the majority of voters voted in favor of an exit from the European Union (“Brexit”) on the value of the Korean Won), interest rates, inflation rates or stock markets;
- increasing levels of household debt;
- increasing delinquencies and credit defaults by retail and small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers;
- continuing adverse conditions in the economies of countries and regions that are important export markets for Korea, such as the United States, Europe, Japan and China, or in emerging market economies in Asia or elsewhere, as well as increased uncertainty in the wake of Brexit;
- the economic impact of any pending or future free trade agreements;

- potential escalation of the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China as each country introduces tariffs on goods traded with the other;
- social and labor unrest;
- decreases in the market prices of Korean real estate;
- a decrease in tax revenue and a substantial increase in the Government's expenditures for fiscal stimulus measures, unemployment compensation and other economic and social programs that, together, would lead to an increased government budget deficit;
- financial problems or lack of progress in the restructuring of Korean business groups, other large troubled companies, their suppliers or the financial sector;
- loss of investor confidence arising from corporate accounting irregularities and corporate governance issues concerning certain Korean business groups;
- increases in social expenditures to support an aging population in Korea or decreases in economic productivity due to the declining population size in Korea;
- geopolitical uncertainty and risk of further attacks by terrorist groups around the world, including the actions of the so-called "Islamic State";
- the occurrence of severe health epidemics in Korea and other parts of the world, including the recent Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Zika virus outbreaks;
- deterioration in economic or diplomatic relations between Korea and its trading partners or allies, including deterioration resulting from territorial or trade disputes or disagreements in foreign policy such as the recent diplomatic tension between Korea and China with respect to the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Korea and trade disputes between Korea and the United States with respect to the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Korean steel, washing machines, transformers and solar panels;
- political uncertainty, or increasing strife among or within political parties in Korea, and political gridlock within the government or in the legislature, which prevents or disrupts timely and effective policy making;
- hostilities or political or social tensions involving oil-producing countries in the Middle East and North Africa and any material disruption in the global supply of oil or sudden increase in the price of oil;
- political or social tensions involving Russia and any resulting adverse effects on the global supply of oil or the global financial markets;
- the occurrence of natural or man-made disasters in Korea (such as the sinking of the Sewol ferry in April 2014, which significantly dampened consumer sentiment in Korea for months) and other parts of the world, particularly in trading partners of Korea; and
- an increase in the level of tensions or an outbreak of hostilities between North Korea and Korea or the United States.

Any future deterioration of the Korean economy could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Tensions with North Korea could have an adverse effect on us, the price of our common shares and our American depositary shares.

Relations between Korea and North Korea have been tense throughout Korea's modern history. The level of tension between Korea and North Korea has fluctuated and may increase abruptly as a result of current and future events. In particular, since the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, there has been increased uncertainty with

respect to the future of North Korea's political leadership and concern regarding its implications for political and economic stability in the region. Although Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-un has assumed power as his father's designated successor, the long-term outcome of such leadership transition remains uncertain. In February 2017, Kim Jong-un's half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, was reported to have been assassinated in an international airport in Malaysia.

In addition, there continues to be heightened security tension in the region stemming from North Korea's hostile military and diplomatic actions, including in respect of its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. Some examples from recent years include the following:

- North Korea renounced its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003 and conducted three rounds of nuclear tests between October 2006 to February 2013, which increased tensions in the region and elicited strong objections worldwide. On January 6, 2016, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted its first hydrogen bomb test, hours after international monitors detected a 5.1 magnitude earthquake near a known nuclear testing site in the country. The alleged test followed a statement made in the previous month by Kim Jong-un, who claimed that North Korea had developed a hydrogen bomb. On February 7, 2016, North Korea launched a rocket, claimed by them to be carrying a satellite intended for scientific observation. The launch was widely suspected by the international community to be a cover for testing a long-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. On February 18, 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law mandatory sanctions on North Korea to punish it for its recent nuclear and missile tests, human rights violations and cybercrimes. The bill, which marks the first measure by the United States to exclusively target North Korea, is intended to seize the assets of anyone engaging in business related to North Korea's weapons program, and authorizes US\$50 million over five years to transmit radio broadcasts into the country and support humanitarian assistance projects. On March 2, 2016, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution to impose sanctions against North Korea, which include inspection of all cargo going to and from North Korea, a ban on all weapons trade and the expulsion of North Korean diplomats who engage in "illicit activities." Also, on March 4, 2016, the European Union announced that it would expand its sanctions on North Korea, adding additional companies and individuals to its list of sanction targets. In September 2016, North Korea announced that it had successfully tested a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on ballistic missiles. In response, the Government condemned the test, and on November 30 2016, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution imposing additional sanctions on North Korea including an annual cap on North Korea's exports of coal and a prohibition on exports of non-ferrous metals such as copper, nickel, silver and zinc. In March 2017, North Korea launched four midrange missiles aimed at the U.S. military bases in Japan, which landed off the east coast of the Korean peninsula. The United Nations Security Council condemned the launches and expressed its plan to adopt additional measures against the regime. On April 4, 2017, one day before the first meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korea launched a ballistic missile which landed off the east coast of the Korean peninsula. In addition to the United Nations Security Council's condemnation, representatives of the Government and China expressed their plan to impose stronger sanctions on North Korea. On April 15, 2017, North Korea launched another missile which failed when it exploded immediately after liftoff. In response, the Government condemned the launch as a violation of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and warned that North Korea would have to face punitive consequences if this leads to a future nuclear experiment or launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. In July 2017, North Korea conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile tests which displayed further development of its long-range ballistic missile capabilities that potentially enable it to target certain areas of the United States as well as other neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted stronger sanctions against North Korea. In August 2017, North Korea announced its plan to launch four ballistic missiles targeting Guam, resulting in heightened diplomatic tensions between North Korea and the United States. In September 2017, North Korea detonated a sixth nuclear bomb, the most powerful weapon

that North Korea has ever tested. Such detonation further heightened diplomatic tensions between North Korea and other nations. Each of the United Nations, the United States and the European Union adopted additional sanctions against North Korea. Spain, Mexico, Peru and Kuwait expelled from their respective territories the ambassadors of North Korea. In November 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of another intercontinental ballistic missile, which, due to its improved size, power and range of distance, may potentially enable North Korea to target the United States mainland.

- In August 2015, two Korean soldiers were injured in a landmine explosion while on routine patrol of the southern side of the demilitarized zone. Claiming the landmines were set by North Koreans, the Korean army re-initiated its propaganda program toward North Korea utilizing loudspeakers near the demilitarized zone. In retaliation, the North Korean army fired artillery rounds on the loudspeakers, resulting in the highest level of military readiness for both sides. High-ranking officials from North Korea and Korea subsequently met for discussions intending to diffuse military tensions and released a joint statement whereby, among other things, North Korea expressed regret over the landmine explosions that wounded the Korean soldiers.
- From time to time, North Korea has fired short- to medium-range missiles from the coast of the Korean peninsula into the sea. Recently in March 2015, North Korea fired seven surface-to-air missiles into waters off its east coast in apparent protest of annual joint military exercises being held by Korea and the United States.
- In December 2013, Jang Sung-taek, a relative of Kim Jong-un, who was widely speculated to be the second in command after Kim Jong-un, was executed on charges of sedition. There are reports that such development may cause further political and social instability in North Korea and/or adoption of more hostile policies that could engender further friction with North Korea and the rest of the world.
- In April 2013, North Korea blocked Koreans from entering the industrial complex in the border city of Kaesong. In the same month, the United States deployed nuclear-capable carriers in the Korean air and sea space. In September 2013, however, Korea and North Korea reached an agreement and resumed operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In February 2014, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that Korea's approach toward the expansion and internationalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex could conflict with U.S. legislative efforts to expand its sanctions on North Korea. On February 10, 2016, in retaliation of North Korea's recent launch of a long-range rocket, Korea announced that it would halt its operations of the Kaesong Industrial Complex to impede North Korea's utilization of funds from the industrial complex to finance its nuclear and missile programs. In response, North Korea announced on February 11, 2016 that it would expel all Korean employees from the industrial complex and freeze all Korean assets in the complex. All 280 Korean workers present at Kaesong left hours after the announcement by North Korea, and the complex remains closed as of the date hereof.
- In March 2013, North Korea stated that it had entered "a state of war" with Korea, declaring the 1953 armistice invalid, and put its artillery at the highest level of combat readiness to protest the Korea-United States allies' military drills and additional sanctions imposed on North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests.

North Korea's economy also faces severe challenges, including severe inflation and food shortages, which may further aggravate social and political tensions within North Korea. In addition, reunification of Korea and North Korea could occur in the future, which would entail significant economic commitment and expenditure by Korea that may outweigh any resulting economic benefits of reunification. On April 27, 2018, May 26, 2018 and September 18, 2018, President Moon Jae-in met Kim Jong-un in a summit to discuss, among other matters, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. On June 12, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in turn had an official summit in Singapore, the first ever meeting between leaders of the United States and North Korea. Subsequent to the Singapore summit, they signed a joint statement, which stated, among others, new peaceful relations and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The second official summit between U.S.

President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un was held in Vietnam on February 27, 2019 and February 28, 2019. On the night of February 27, 2019, the U.S. White House announced that U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un would sign a joint agreement the next afternoon. However, on February 28, 2019, the U.S. White House announced that the summit was cut short and that no agreement was reached. In the aftermath of the two summits, there remains significant uncertainty regarding peace talks and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. As such, there can be no assurance that the level of tension on the Korean peninsula will not escalate in the future or that the political regime in North Korea may not suddenly collapse. Any further increase in tension or uncertainty relating to the military, political or economic stability in the Korean peninsula, including a breakdown of diplomatic negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program, occurrence of military hostilities, heightened concerns about the stability of North Korea's political leadership or its actual collapse, a leadership crisis, a breakdown of high-level contacts or accelerated reunification could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations, as well as the price of our common shares and our American depositary shares.

Risks Relating to Our American Depositary Shares

There are restrictions on withdrawal and deposit of common shares under the depositary facility.

Under the deposit agreement, holders of shares of our common stock may deposit those shares with the depositary bank's custodian in Korea and obtain American depositary shares, and holders of American depositary shares may surrender American depositary shares to the depositary bank and receive shares of our common stock. However, under current Korean laws and regulations, the depositary bank is required to obtain our prior consent for the number of shares to be deposited in any given proposed deposit which exceeds the difference between (1) the aggregate number of shares deposited by us for the issuance of American depositary shares (including deposits in connection with the initial and all subsequent offerings of American depositary shares and stock dividends or other distributions related to these American depositary shares) and (2) the number of shares on deposit with the depositary bank at the time of such proposed deposit. We have consented to the deposit of outstanding shares of common stock as long as the number of American depositary shares outstanding at any time does not exceed 40,432,628. As a result, if you surrender American depositary shares and withdraw shares of common stock, you may not be able to deposit the shares again to obtain American depositary shares.

Ownership of our shares is restricted under Korean law.

Under the Financial Holding Companies Act, any single shareholder (together with certain persons in a special relationship with such shareholder) may acquire beneficial ownership of up to 10% of the total issued and outstanding shares with voting rights of a bank holding company controlling national banks such as us. In addition, any person, except for a "non-financial business group company" (as defined below), may acquire in excess of 10% of the total voting shares issued and outstanding of a financial holding company which controls a national bank, provided that a prior approval from the Financial Services Commission is obtained each time such person's aggregate holdings exceed 10% (or 15% in the case of a financial holding company controlling regional banks only), 25% or 33% of the total voting shares issued and outstanding of such financial holding company. The Government and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation are exempt from this limit. Furthermore, certain non-financial business group companies (i.e., (i) any same shareholder group with aggregate net assets of all non-financial business companies belonging to such group of not less than 25% of the aggregate net assets of all members of such group; (ii) any same shareholder group with aggregate assets of all non-financial business companies belonging to such group of not less than ₩2 trillion; or (iii) any mutual fund in which a same shareholder group identified in (i) or (ii) above owns more than 4% of the total shares issued and outstanding of such mutual fund) may not acquire beneficial ownership in us in excess of 4% of our outstanding voting shares, provided that such non-financial business group companies may acquire beneficial ownership of up to 10% of our outstanding voting shares with the approval of the Financial Services Commission under the condition that such non-financial business group companies will not exercise voting rights in respect of such shares in excess of the 4% limit. See "Item 4.B. Business Overview – Supervision and Regulation – Principal Regulations

Applicable to Financial Holding Companies – Restrictions on Financial Holding Company Ownership.” To the extent that the total number of shares of our common stock that you and your affiliates own together exceeds these limits, you will not be entitled to exercise the voting rights for the excess shares, and the Financial Services Commission may order you to dispose of the excess shares within a period of up to six months. Failure to comply with such an order would result in a fine of up to ₩50 million, plus an additional charge of up to 0.03% of the book value of such shares per day until the date of disposal.

Holders of our ADSs will not have preemptive rights in certain circumstances.

The Korean Commercial Code and our articles of incorporation require us, with some exceptions, to offer shareholders the right to subscribe for new shares in proportion to their existing ownership percentage whenever new shares are issued. If we offer any rights to subscribe for additional shares of our common stock or any rights of any other nature, the depositary bank, after consultation with us, may make the rights available to you or use reasonable efforts to dispose of the rights on your behalf and make the net proceeds available to you. The depositary bank, however, is not required to make available to you any rights to purchase any additional shares unless it deems that doing so is lawful and feasible and:

- a registration statement filed by us under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, is in effect with respect to those shares; or
- the offering and sale of those shares is exempt from or is not subject to the registration requirements of the U.S. Securities Act.

We are under no obligation to file any registration statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. If a registration statement is required for you to exercise preemptive rights but is not filed by us, you will not be able to exercise your preemptive rights for additional shares and you will suffer dilution of your equity interest in us.

Holders of our ADSs will not be able to exercise dissent and appraisal rights unless they have withdrawn the underlying shares of our common stock and become our direct stockholders.

Under Korean law, in some limited circumstances, including the transfer of the whole or any significant part of our business and the merger or consolidation of us with another company, dissenting stockholders have the right to require us to purchase their shares under Korean law. However, under our deposit agreement, holders of our American depositary shares do not have, and may not instruct the depositary as to the exercise of, any dissenter’s rights provided to the holders of our common shares under Korean law. Therefore, if holders of our American depositary shares wish to exercise dissenting rights, they must withdraw the underlying common stock from the American depositary shares facility (and incur charges relating to that withdrawal) and become our direct stockholders prior to the record date of the shareholders’ meeting at which the relevant transaction is to be approved, in order to exercise dissent and appraisal rights.

The market value of your investment in our ADSs may fluctuate due to the volatility of the Korean securities market.

Our common stock is listed on the KRX KOSPI Division of the Korea Exchange, which has a smaller market capitalization and is more volatile than the securities markets in the United States and many European countries. The market value of ADSs may fluctuate in response to the fluctuation of the trading price of shares of our common stock on the Stock Market Division of the Korea Exchange. The Stock Market Division of the Korea Exchange has experienced substantial fluctuations in the prices and volumes of sales of listed securities and the Stock Market Division of the Korea Exchange has prescribed a fixed range in which share prices are permitted to move on a daily basis. Like other securities markets, including those in developed markets, the Korean securities market has experienced problems including market manipulation, insider trading and settlement failures. The recurrence of these or similar problems could have a material adverse effect on the

market price and liquidity of the securities of Korean companies, including our common stock and ADSs, in both the domestic and the international markets.

The Government has the potential ability to exert substantial influence over many aspects of the private sector business community, and in the past has exerted that influence from time to time. For example, the Government has promoted mergers to reduce what it considers excess capacity in a particular industry and has also encouraged private companies to publicly offer their securities. Similar actions in the future could have the effect of depressing or boosting the Korean securities market, whether or not intended to do so. Accordingly, actions by the government, or the perception that such actions are taking place, may take place or has ceased, may cause sudden movements in the market prices of the securities of Korean companies in the future, which may affect the market price and liquidity of our common stock and ADSs.

Your dividend payments and the amount you may realize upon a sale of your ADSs will be affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the Won.

Investors who purchase the American depositary shares will be required to pay for them in U.S. Dollars. Our outstanding shares are listed on the Korea Exchange and are quoted and traded in Won. Cash dividends, if any, in respect of the shares represented by the American depositary shares will be paid to the depositary bank in Won and then converted by the depositary bank into U.S. Dollars, subject to certain conditions. Accordingly, fluctuations in the exchange rate between the Won and the U.S. Dollar will affect, among other things, the amounts a registered holder or beneficial owner of the American depositary shares will receive from the depositary bank in respect of dividends, the U.S. Dollar value of the proceeds which a holder or owner would receive upon sale in Korea of the shares obtained upon surrender of American depositary shares and the secondary market price of the American depositary shares.

If the Government deems that certain emergency circumstances are likely to occur, it may restrict the depositary bank from converting and remitting dividends in Dollars.

If the Government deems that certain emergency circumstances are likely to occur, it may impose restrictions such as requiring foreign investors to obtain prior Government approval for the acquisition of Korean securities or for the repatriation of interest or dividends arising from Korean securities or sales proceeds from disposition of such securities. These emergency circumstances include any or all of the following:

- sudden fluctuations in interest rates or exchange rates;
- extreme difficulty in stabilizing the balance of payments; and
- a substantial disturbance in the Korean financial and capital markets.

The depositary bank may not be able to secure such prior approval from the government for the payment of dividends to foreign investors when the Government deems that there are emergency circumstances in the Korean financial markets.

Other Risks

We are generally subject to Korean corporate governance and disclosure standards, which differ in significant respects from those in other countries.

Companies in Korea, including us, are subject to corporate governance standards applicable to Korean public companies which differ in many respects from standards applicable in other countries, including the United States. As a reporting company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we are, and in the future will be, subject to certain corporate governance standards as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, foreign private issuers, including us, are exempt from certain corporate governance requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or under the rules of the New York