

- EBITDA does not reflect the impact of income taxes on our operating performance.
- EBITDA does not reflect the impact of depreciation, depletion and amortization on our operating performance. The assets of our businesses which are being depreciated, depleted and/or amortized (including, for example, our mineral reserves) will have to be replaced in the future and such depreciation, depletion and amortization expense may approximate the cost to replace these assets in the future. By excluding such expense from EBITDA, EBITDA does not reflect our future cash requirements for such replacements.
- Other companies in our industry may calculate EBITDA differently or may use it for different purposes than we do, limiting its usefulness as a comparative measure.

We compensate for these limitations by relying primarily on our U.S. GAAP operating results and using EBITDA only supplementally. See our consolidated income statements and consolidated statements of cash flows included elsewhere in this document.

EBITDA is a measure of our operating performance that is not required by, or presented in accordance with, U.S. GAAP. EBITDA is not a measurement of our operating performance under U.S. GAAP and should not be considered as an alternative to net income, operating income or any other performance measures derived in accordance with U.S. GAAP or as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities or as a measure of our liquidity. In particular, EBITDA should not be considered as a measure of discretionary cash available to us to invest in the growth of our business.

Reconciliation of EBITDA to net income is as follows for the periods indicated:

	Year ended December 31,				
	2005	2004	2003	2002	2001
Consolidated EBITDA reconciliation:					
Net income	381,180	1,342,706	143,508	89,253	47,418
Add:					
Depreciation, depletion and amortization	167,600	137,820	101,689	78,773	13,378
Interest expense	40,829	51,409	48,516	36,773	14,526
Income taxes	136,643	175,776	47,759	2,653	30,184
Consolidated EBITDA	<u>726,252</u>	<u>1,707,711</u>	<u>341,472</u>	<u>207,452</u>	<u>105,506</u>
Steel segment EBITDA reconciliation:					
Net income	67,443	1,014,356	114,011	57,977	(16,924)
Add:					
Depreciation, depletion and amortization	95,789	81,052	67,272	49,728	154
Interest expense	35,890	36,058	38,351	30,416	11,708
Income taxes	61,420	118,177	26,186	(4,673)	8,038
Consolidated EBITDA	<u>260,542</u>	<u>1,249,643</u>	<u>245,820</u>	<u>133,448</u>	<u>2,976</u>
Mining segment EBITDA reconciliation:					
Net income	313,736	328,350	29,497	31,274	64,341
Add:					
Depreciation, depletion and amortization	71,811	56,768	34,417	29,045	13,224
Interest expense	4,940	15,351	10,165	6,357	2,818
Income taxes	75,223	57,599	21,573	7,328	22,146
Consolidated EBITDA	<u>465,710</u>	<u>458,068</u>	<u>95,652</u>	<u>74,004</u>	<u>102,529</u>

(4) The 2004 amount includes a gain of \$800.0 million from the sale of our stake in Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, or MMK.

Exchange Rates

The following tables show, for the periods indicated, certain information regarding the exchange rate between the ruble and the U.S. dollar, based on data published by the Central Bank of Russia.

These rates may differ from the actual rates used in preparation of our financial statements and other financial information provided herein.

Year ended December 31,	Rubles per U.S. dollar			
	High	Low	Average ⁽¹⁾	Period End
2005	29.00	27.46	28.31	28.78
2004	29.45	27.75	28.82	27.75
2003	31.88	29.25	30.61	29.45
2002	31.86	30.14	31.39	31.78
2001	30.30	28.16	29.22	30.14

(1) The average of the exchange rates on the last business day of each full month during the relevant period.

	Rubles per U.S. dollar	
	High	Low
April 2006	27.77	27.27
March 2006	28.12	27.66
February 2006	28.26	28.10
January 2006	28.48	28.02
December 2005	29.00	28.64
November 2005	28.88	28.50

The exchange rate between the ruble and the U.S. dollar on May 19, 2006 was 27.07 rubles per one U.S. dollar.

No representation is made that the ruble or U.S. dollar amounts in this document could have been or can be converted into U.S. dollars or rubles, as the case may be, at any particular rate or at all. The ruble is generally not convertible outside Russia. A market exists within Russia for the conversion of rubles into other currencies, but the limited availability of other currencies may inflate their values relative to the ruble.

Risk Factors

An investment in our shares and ADSs involves a high degree of risk. You should carefully consider the following information about these risks, together with the information contained in this document, before you decide to buy our shares and ADSs. If any of the following risks actually occurs, our business, financial condition, results of operations or prospects could be materially adversely affected. In that case, the value of our shares and ADSs could also decline and you could lose all or part of your investment.

We have described the risks and uncertainties that our management believes are material, but these risks and uncertainties may not be the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties, including those we currently are not aware of or deem immaterial, may also result in decreased operating revenues, increased operating expenses or other events that could result in a decline in the value of our shares and ADSs.

Risks Relating to Our Business and Industry

We operate in a cyclical industry, and any local or global downturn in the mining or steel industry may have an adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

Our mining business sells significant amounts of coal, iron ore and nickel to third parties. Cyclical and other uncontrollable changes in world market prices of these commodities could affect the results of our mining activities. The changes in these prices result from factors, such as demand and transportation costs, which are beyond our control. Prices of these commodities have varied significantly in the past and could vary significantly in the future. Prolonged declines in world market prices for the commodities we sell to third parties would have a material adverse effect on our revenues. A decline in steel prices could also negatively impact the prices for these commodities.

The steel industry also is cyclical in nature because the industries in which steel customers operate are cyclical and sensitive to changes in general economic conditions. The demand for steel products thus generally correlates to macroeconomic fluctuations in the economies in which steel producers sell products, as well as in the global economy. The prices of steel products are influenced by many factors, including demand, worldwide production capacity, capacity-utilization rates, raw-material costs, exchange rates, trade barriers and improvements in steel-making processes. Steel prices have experienced, and in the future may experience, significant fluctuations as a result of these and other factors, many of which are beyond our control.

We derived approximately 46% and 39% of our total revenues from sales to customers in Russia in 2005 and 2004, respectively. The Russian economy has experienced significantly fluctuating growth rates over the past 10 years. From 1994 to 1998, the Russian economy contracted in real terms at an average rate of 4.9% per year; after the Russian crisis in 1998, the economy recovered and grew in real terms at an average rate of 6.6% per year from 1999 to 2005. Russian production of steel also suffered a substantial decline from over 77 million tonnes in 1991 to 44 million tonnes in 1998, but then recovered to 66.2 million tonnes in 2005. Further, our products in Russia are mainly used in the construction, engineering and automotive industries, which are particularly vulnerable to general economic downturns. In addition to Russia, Asia and the Middle East are also large destinations for our products, and these areas, like Russia, face greater risks of volatility. Accordingly, any significant decrease in demand for steel products or decline in the price of these products in Russia or other emerging market economies could result in significantly reduced revenues, thereby materially adversely affecting our results of operations and financial condition.

The steel industry is highly competitive, and we may not be able to compete successfully.

We face competition from domestic and foreign steel manufacturers, many of which have greater resources. A number of our Russian competitors are undertaking modernization and expansion plans, which may make them more efficient or allow them to develop new products.

We also face price-based competition from steel producers in emerging market countries, including, in particular, Ukraine. Recent consolidation in the steel sector globally has also led to the creation of several very large steel producers, each with greater financial resources and more extensive global operations than Mechel. Moreover, the steel industry suffers from production overcapacity. Increased competition could result in more competitive pricing and reduced profitability.

Successful implementation of our strategy to expand our specialty long product sales depends on our ability to increase our export sales of these products.

While we expect continued growth of demand in the Russian market for specialty long products, our strategy to expand these sales substantially is dependent on our ability to increase our exports of these products to other countries, particularly the EU countries. We face a number of obstacles to this strategy, including trade barriers and sales and distribution challenges.

We will require a significant amount of cash to fund our capital improvements program. Our ability to generate cash or obtain financing depends on many factors beyond our control.

The total cost of our capital improvements over the next five years is expected to be approximately \$1.1 billion. Most of our current borrowing is from Russian banks and financial institutions and ruble-denominated bonds. In the future, we may rely to a greater extent than currently on foreign capital markets and other foreign financing sources for our capital needs. It is possible that these foreign sources of financing, as well as domestic sources, may not be available in the future in the amounts we require or at an acceptable cost. See “—Risks Relating to the Economic Environment in Russia—Emerging markets such as Russia are subject to greater risks than more developed markets, and financial turmoil in any emerging market could disrupt our business, as well as cause the price of our securities to suffer” and “—Risks Relating to the Economic Environment in Russia—The Russian banking system remains underdeveloped, and another banking crisis could place severe liquidity constraints on our business.”

Our business strategy foresees additional acquisitions and continued integration, and we may fail to identify suitable targets, acquire them on acceptable terms or successfully integrate them.

Our strategy relies on our status as an integrated mining and steel group, which allows us to benefit from economies of scale, realize synergies, better satisfy the needs of our domestic and international mining and steel customers and compete effectively against other mining and steel producers. We also intend to enhance the profitability of our business by applying our integration strategy to a larger asset base and, towards that end, we need to identify suitable targets that would fit into our operations, acquire them on acceptable terms and successfully integrate them.

The acquisition and integration of new companies pose significant risks to our existing operations, including:

- additional demands placed on our senior management, who are also responsible for managing our existing operations;
- increased overall operating complexity of our business, requiring greater personnel and other resources;
- significant, initial cash expenditures to integrate new acquisitions;
- incurrence of debt to finance acquisitions and higher debt service costs related thereto; and
- strains on our labor force as production may be shifted to new companies or locations to optimize our overall production.

Moreover, the integration of new businesses may be difficult for a variety of reasons, including differing culture, management styles and systems and infrastructure and poor records or internal controls. For example, regional governments have special perpetual rights, or a “golden share,” in our subsidiaries Beloretsk Metallurgical Plant and Izhtal, giving them the right to veto certain shareholder decisions and appoint a voting representative on the board of directors of these subsidiaries. The shareholder decisions regarding these subsidiaries that may be vetoed by the regional governments are as

follows:

- approval of amendments and supplements to the company's charter or approval of a new version of the charter;
- reorganization of the company;
- liquidation of the company;
- changes in the charter capital of the company; and
- approval of major and interested party transactions.

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In addition, integrating new acquisitions may require significant initial cash investments. Furthermore, even if we are successful in integrating our existing and new businesses, expected synergies and cost savings may not materialize, resulting in lower than expected profit margins. We cannot assure you that we will be successful in realizing any of the anticipated benefits of the companies that we are now in the process of integrating or that we may acquire in the future. If we do not realize these benefits, our financial condition, results of operations and prospects could be materially adversely affected.

Our independent registered public accounting firm reported material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting and we may not be able to remedy these material weaknesses or prevent future weaknesses. If we fail to do so, there is a more than remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim statements will not be prevented or detected.

In connection with the audit of our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2005, management and our independent registered public accounting firm identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting as defined in the standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's Auditing Standard No. 2 that affected our financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2005. The material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting are summarized below:

- we do not have an adequate system of internal control over the preparation of our U.S. GAAP consolidated financial statements to ensure that material errors do not occur in their preparation;
- we do not have an adequate system of internal controls at our Swiss subsidiaries, which conduct our export sales;
- we do not have a unified, comprehensive accounting and financial reporting system for U.S. GAAP reporting purposes; and
- we do not have adequate accounting resources and expertise in respect of the preparation of our U.S. GAAP consolidated financial statements.

Notwithstanding the steps we have taken and continue to take that are designed to remedy each material weakness identified above, we may not be successful in remediating these material weaknesses in the near or long term and we may not be able to prevent other material weaknesses in the future. Any failure to maintain or implement required new or improved internal control over financial reporting, or any difficulties we encounter in their implementation, could result in significant deficiencies or additional material weaknesses, cause us to fail to meet our periodic reporting obligations or result in material misstatements in our financial statements. Any such failure could also adversely affect the results of periodic management evaluations and annual auditor attestation reports regarding the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting that will be required when the SEC's rules under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 become applicable to us beginning with our annual report for the year ending December 31, 2006, to be filed in 2007. The existence of a material weakness could result in errors in our financial statements that could result in a restatement of financial statements, cause us to fail to meet our reporting obligations and cause investors to lose confidence in our reported financial information, leading to a decline in the price of our securities. See "Item 15. Controls and Procedures" for additional information.

We depend on key accounting staff for the preparation of U.S. GAAP financial information. Given the competition for such personnel and the remote locations of our subsidiaries, our key accounting staff may leave our company, which could disrupt our ability to timely and accurately report U.S. GAAP financial information.

Our subsidiaries maintain their books and records in local currencies and prepare accounting reports in accordance with local accounting principles and practices. In particular, each of our Russian subsidiaries

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maintains its books in rubles and prepares separate unconsolidated financial statements in accordance with Russian accounting standards. For every reporting period, we translate, adjust and combine these standalone Russian statutory financial statements to prepare consolidated U.S. GAAP financial statements. This is a difficult task requiring U.S. GAAP-experienced accounting personnel at each of our subsidiaries and at our Moscow corporate offices. Russia has available only a small number of accounting personnel with U.S. GAAP expertise. Moreover, there is an increasing demand for such personnel as more Russian companies are beginning to prepare financial statements on the basis of U.S. GAAP or other international standards. Such competition, combined with the remote locations of our subsidiaries which such personnel may not find suitable in comparison to other opportunities, makes it difficult for us to hire and retain such personnel, and our key accounting staff may leave our company. Under these circumstances, we may have difficulty in remedying the material weaknesses identified by our independent registered public accounting firm and in the timely and accurate reporting of our financial information in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

The potential implementation by the Russian government of a law requiring companies to purchase or lease the land on which they operate may have a material adverse effect on our financial condition.

Much of the land occupied by privatized Russian companies, including most of our subsidiaries, was not included in the privatizations of these companies and is still owned by federal, regional or municipal governments. The companies use the land pursuant to a special title of perpetual use whereby they have the right to use the land but do not have the right to alienate such land.

The Land Code of the Russian Federation, as amended, which was enacted October 25, 2001, requires privatized Russian companies to either purchase or lease the land on which they operate. This requirement was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2004, but implementation has been delayed by the Russian legislature until January 1, 2008. Currently, there is no unified way to determine the purchase price of land as different regulatory authorities have proposed different figures, but all approaches propose determining the purchase price by multiplying the resale price of the land quoted in the land registry by a specified ratio. Our estimates of the cost for us to purchase land where we have operations using the proposed valuations ranges from \$40.6 million to \$129.7 million. However, these estimates do not include the land on which the Beloretsk Metallurgical Plant, Vyartsilya Metal Products Plant and Southern Kuzbass Coal Company operate because the governmental authorities have not yet determined the resale price of the land to be quoted in the land registry for those

properties.

Increasing tariffs and restructuring in the energy sector could materially adversely affect our business.

In 2005, our Russian operations purchased approximately 3.9 billion kwh of electricity, representing 70% of their needs, from local subsidiaries of RAO UES, the government-controlled national holding company for the Russian power sector. Domestic electricity prices are regulated by the Russian government. The government is currently in the early stages of implementing a restructuring plan for the power sector aimed at introducing competition, liberalizing the wholesale electricity market and moving from regulated pricing to a market-based system by 2008. This reform process could also cause disruptions to the supply of electricity to us. In addition, while subject to doubt as to whether it will be implemented as currently written, according to the Russian Energy Strategy approved by the Russian government in 2003, electricity tariffs for industrial users are expected to reach 3.2-3.6 cents per kwh by 2006 and 4.0-4.5 cents per kwh by 2020. In 2005, our average cost of electricity was 3.1 cents per kwh. Assuming a price of 3.6 cents per kwh in 2005, our Russian operations would have incurred approximately \$37.6 million in additional costs. Further price increases for electricity may also occur in the future as the industry is restructured and controlled to a greater extent by the private sector. If we are required to pay higher prices for electricity in the future, our costs will rise and our business and prospects could be materially adversely affected.

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Our Russian operations also purchase significant amounts of natural gas, primarily for the production of electricity at our own co-generation facilities, from Gazprom. Gazprom is a government-controlled company and the dominant producer and monopoly transporter of natural gas within Russia. Domestic natural gas prices are regulated by the government. These prices have been rising over the last few years. The average price for industrial consumers was approximately \$39 per thousand cubic meters (\$1.11 per thousand cubic feet) in 2005, and increased by 39% in comparison with 2004. Further, domestic natural gas prices are significantly below Western European levels, which helps to provide us with a cost advantage over our competitors. According to the Russian Energy Strategy approved by the Russian government in 2003, natural gas prices are expected to reach \$40-42 per thousand cubic meters (\$1.13-1.19 per thousand cubic feet) by 2006 and to \$59-64 per thousand cubic meters (\$1.67-1.81 per thousand cubic feet) by 2010. Assuming a price of \$42 per thousand cubic meters in 2005, our Russian operations would have incurred approximately \$6 million in additional costs. If we are required to pay a higher price for natural gas, our costs will rise and our business and prospects could be materially adversely affected.

The reorganization of the Russian railways transportation sector exposes us to uncertainties regarding transportation costs of raw materials and steel products.

Railway transportation is our principal means of transporting raw materials and steel products to our facilities and to customers, as well as to ports for onward transportation overseas. In accordance with legislation enacted in 2003, the Russian Railways Ministry was privatized and its assets are now owned by OAO Russian Railroads, an open joint stock company wholly-owned by the Russian government. Russian Railroads is responsible for the management of all Russian railroads. The Russian government, through the Federal Tariff Service, continues to set rail tariffs and pursue its policy of maintaining international transportation tariffs and possibly increasing domestic tariffs. Factors which may lead to an increase in domestic tariffs include the insufficient financial transparency of Russian Railroads, the poor state of repair of Russia's rolling stock and the cross-subsidization of unprofitable passenger transportation sectors. Failure of Russian Railroads to upgrade its rolling stock within the next few years could also result in a shortage of available working rolling stock and a disruption in transportation of our materials and products. If these or other factors result in increased railway transport costs, our results of operations could be materially adversely affected.

We face numerous protective trade restrictions in the export of our steel products.

We face numerous protective tariffs, duties and quotas which reduce our competitiveness in, and limit our access to, particular markets. Several key steel importing countries currently have import restrictions in place on steel products or intend to introduce them in the future. The EU has a quota system in place with respect to Russian steel imports, which affected our exports to ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States that joined the EU on May 1, 2004. Our exports to Romania and Bulgaria will also fall under the quantitative limits after these countries join the EU in 2007. Our sales into the EU constituted approximately 13.0% of our steel segment revenues in 2005. The export of our steel into the EU is an important part of our growth strategy. If EU quotas are not increased in line with our sales growth objectives, our ability to expand our sales in the EU and pursue our growth strategy could be limited.

The United States has a quota system in place with respect to imports of hot-rolled coil and thick steel plate. In January 2004, China imposed new anti-dumping duties on cold-rolled steel imports from Russia that are retroactive to September 2003 and will last for five years. In 2005, approximately 81% of our steel segment revenues were derived from sales of steel products that were subject to import restrictions. See "Item 4. Information on the Company—Steel Business—Trade Restrictions."

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We benefit from Russia's tariffs and duties on imported steel, which may be eliminated in the future.

Russia has in place import tariffs with respect to certain imported steel products. These tariffs generally amount to 5% of value, but also step up to 20% of value for certain higher value-added steel products. Russia has in place a 21% countervailing duty on Ukrainian steel bars, which has been extended through August 2007. We believe we benefit from this duty because it prevents subsidized Ukrainian exports to Russia from reducing the prices we can obtain for these products in our domestic markets. Almost all of our sales of steel products in Russia were protected by these tariffs in 2005. These tariffs and duties may be reduced or eliminated in the future, which could materially adversely affect our revenues and results of operations.

According to press reports, Russia may complete its negotiations and join the WTO in 2006. Russia's future accession to the WTO could negatively affect our business and prospects. In particular, Russia's entry into the WTO may require lowering or removing of tariffs and duties on steel products, causing increased competition in the domestic steel market from foreign producers and exporters. See also "—Increasing tariffs and restructuring in the energy sector could materially adversely affect our business."

Further appreciation in real terms of the ruble against the U.S. dollar may materially adversely affect our results of operations.

Our reporting currency is the U.S. dollar. Our products are typically priced in rubles for domestic sales and in U.S. dollars (and, to a lesser extent, euros) for export sales, whereas the majority of our direct costs are incurred in rubles and, to a lesser extent, in other local currencies where our operations are based. Appreciation in real terms of the ruble against the U.S. dollar results in an increase in our costs relative to our revenues, adversely affecting our results of operations. In 2005, the ruble appreciated in real terms against the U.S. dollar by 10.8% according to the Central Bank of Russia, and further real appreciation of the ruble against the U.S. dollar may materially adversely affect our results of

operations.

Limitations on the conversion of rubles to foreign currencies in Russia could increase our costs when making payments in foreign currencies to suppliers and creditors and could cause us to default on our obligations to them.

Many of our major capital expenditures are denominated and payable in various foreign currencies, including the U.S. dollar and euro. Russian legislation currently permits the conversion of ruble revenues into foreign currency. However, the market in Russia for the conversion of rubles into foreign currencies is limited and may not continue to exist.

Additionally, any delay or other difficulty in converting rubles into a foreign currency to make a payment or delay in or restriction on the transfer of foreign currency could limit our ability to meet our payment and debt obligations, which could result in the loss of suppliers, acceleration of debt obligations and cross-defaults and, consequently, have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Estimates of our reserves are subject to uncertainties.

The estimates concerning our reserves contained in this document are subject to considerable uncertainties. These estimates are based on interpretations of geological data obtained from sampling techniques and projected rates of production in the future. Actual production results may differ significantly from reserve estimates. In addition, it may take many years from the initial phase of drilling before production is possible. During that time, the economic feasibility of exploiting a discovery may change as a result of changes in the market price of coal, iron ore or nickel.

We are subject to mining risks.

Our business operations, like those of other mining companies, are subject to all of the hazards and risks normally associated with the exploration, development and production of natural resources, any of which could result in production shortfalls or damage to persons or property. In particular, hazards associated with our open-pit mining operations include:

- flooding of the open pit;
- collapses of the open-pit wall;
- accidents associated with the operation of large open-pit mining and rock transportation equipment;
- accidents associated with the preparation and ignition of large-scale open-pit blasting operations;
- production disruptions due to weather; and
- hazards associated with the disposal of mineralized waste water, such as groundwater and waterway contamination.

Hazards associated with our underground mining operations include:

- underground fires and explosions, including those caused by flammable gas;
- cave-ins or ground falls;
- discharges of gases and toxic chemicals;
- flooding;
- sinkhole formation and ground subsidence; and
- other accidents and conditions resulting from drilling, blasting and removing and processing material from an underground mine.

We are at risk of experiencing any and all of these hazards. The occurrence of any of these hazards could delay production, increase production costs and result in injury to persons and damage to property, as well as liability for us. The liabilities resulting from any of these risks may not be adequately covered by insurance, and we may incur significant costs that could have a material adverse effect upon our business, results of operations and financial condition.

More stringent environmental laws and regulations or more stringent enforcement of existing environmental laws and regulations in the jurisdictions where we operate may have a significant negative effect on our operating results.

Our operations and properties are subject to environmental, health and safety and other laws and regulations in the jurisdictions in which we operate. For instance, our operations generate large amounts of pollutants and waste, some of which are hazardous, such as benzapiren, sulphur oxide, sulphuric acid, nitrogen ammonium, sulphates, nitrites, phenicols and sludges (including sludges containing chrome, copper, nickel, mercury and zinc). The discharge, storage and disposal of such hazardous waste is subject to environmental regulations, including some requiring the clean-up of contamination and reclamation, such as requirements for cleaning up highly hazardous waste oil and iron slag. In addition, pollution risks and related clean-up costs are often impossible to assess unless environmental audits have been performed and the extent of liability under environmental laws is clearly determinable.

Generally, there is a greater awareness in Russia of damage caused to the environment by industry than existed during the Soviet era. For example, a news article in 2005 cited us as one of Russia's ten worst polluters. Environmental legislation in the jurisdictions where we operate, however, is generally weaker,

and less stringently enforced, than in the EU or the United States. More stringent standards may be introduced or enforcement increased in Russia and elsewhere where we conduct our operations. Based on the current regulatory environment in these jurisdictions, as of December 31, 2005, we have not created any reserves for environmental liabilities and compliance costs, other than an accrual in the amount of \$59.1 million for asset retirement obligations (ARO), consistent with U.S. GAAP requirements. In addition, upon our acquisitions of Mechel Targoviste and Mechel Campia Turzii, as part of the purchase agreements, we committed to the Romanian government to invest \$7.3 million and \$4.6 million, respectively, into environmental protection and reclamation. Environmental obligations of these Romanian subsidiaries amounted to \$3.7 million as of December 31, 2005. Any change in this regulatory environment could result in actual costs and liabilities for which we have not provided.

Also, in the course, or as a result, of an environmental investigation, courts can issue orders and decisions administratively halting part or all of the production at a facility that has violated environmental standards. In the event that production at one of our facilities is partially or wholly prevented due to this type of sanction, our business could suffer and our operating results would be negatively affected.

In addition, we are generally not indemnified against environmental liabilities or any required land reclamation expenses of our acquired businesses that arise from activities that occurred prior to our acquisition.

The Kyoto Protocol may negatively affect us.

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was ratified by Russia on November 4, 2004, and took effect on February 16, 2005, requires the signatory countries to make substantial reductions in “greenhouse gas” emissions. Future Russian legislation enacted to implement the Kyoto Protocol may result in raised environmental standards for industries including the mining and steel industries, which may in turn result in increased environmental costs. Russian industrial technologies may not be able to comply with these raised environmental standards and such non-compliance may become an additional basis for restricting Russian steel exports to the European market. The amount of EU anti-dumping duty on Russian exports may be increased as a result of adjustments to the relatively low environmental component of production costs of Russian companies used in the calculation of the EU dumping margin. Additionally, Russian companies may not be able to participate in certain mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, including trading in carbon emissions, due to a lack of a relevant legislative and regulatory framework in Russia. This may benefit our competitors from countries that have timely implemented such a framework.

Our business could be adversely affected if we fail to obtain or renew necessary licenses and permits or fail to comply with the terms of our licenses and permits.

Our business depends on the continuing validity of certain licenses and the issuance of certain new licenses and our compliance with the terms thereof, including subsoil licenses for our mining operations. Regulatory authorities exercise considerable discretion in the timing of license issuance, renewal and monitoring licensees’ compliance with license terms. Requirements imposed by these authorities may be costly and time-consuming and may result in delays in the commencement or continuation of exploration or production operations. Further, private individuals and the public at large possess rights to comment on and otherwise engage in the licensing process, including through intervention in courts and political pressure. Accordingly, the licenses we need may not be issued or renewed, or if issued or renewed, may not be issued or renewed in a timely fashion, or may involve requirements which restrict our ability to conduct our operations or to do so profitably.

Our competitors may also seek to deny our rights to develop certain natural resource deposits by challenging our compliance with tender rules and procedures or compliance with license terms. Political factors can also affect whether non-compliance with licensing regulations and terms of our licenses could

lead to suspension or termination of our licenses and permits, and to administrative, civil and criminal liability.

We have a limited history of renewing our subsoil licenses. In 2003, we extended the subsoil license for the Tatianinsk deposit, which was set to expire in June 2002, for a 10-year period, which is the only subsoil license we have renewed. Of our fifteen coal subsoil licenses, seven expire on dates falling in 2012 through 2014 and eight expire on dates falling in 2024 and 2025; our four iron ore subsoil licenses expire on dates falling in 2009 through 2015; and our two nickel subsoil licenses expire on dates falling in 2012 and 2013. See “Item 4. Information on the Company—Mining Business—Mineral Reserves.”

Accordingly, these factors may seriously affect our ability to obtain or renew necessary licenses, and if we are unable to obtain or renew necessary licenses or we are only able to obtain them with newly-introduced material restrictions, we may be unable to realize our reserves and our business and results of operations could be materially adversely affected.

In addition, as part of their obligations under licensing regulations and the terms of our licenses and permits, our companies must comply with numerous industrial standards, recruit qualified personnel, maintain necessary equipment and a system of quality control, monitor our operations, maintain appropriate filings and, upon request, submit appropriate information to the licensing authorities, which are entitled to control and inspect their activities. In the event that the licensing authorities discover a material violation by our company, we may be required to suspend our operations or incur substantial costs in eliminating or remedying such violation, which could have a material adverse effect on our business or results of operations.

Deficiencies in the legal framework relating to subsoil licensing subject our licenses to the risk of governmental challenges and, if our licenses are suspended or terminated, we would be unable to realize our reserves, which could materially adversely affect our business and results of operations.

Most of the existing subsoil licenses in Russia date from the Soviet era. During the period between the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991 and the enactment of the first post-Soviet subsoil licensing law in the summer of 1992, the status of subsoil licenses and Soviet-era mining operations was unclear, as was the status of the regulatory authority governing such operations. The Russian government enacted the Procedure for Subsoil Use Licensing, or Licensing Regulation, on July 15, 1992, which came into effect on August 20, 1992. As was common with legislation of this time, the Licensing Regulation was passed hastily, without adequate consideration of transition provisions, and contained numerous gaps. In an effort to address the problems in the Licensing Regulation, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued ministerial acts and instructions that attempted to clarify and, in some cases, modify the Licensing Regulation. Many of these acts contradicted the law and were beyond the scope of the Ministry’s authority, but subsoil licensees had no option but to deal with the Ministry in relation to subsoil issues and comply with its ministerial acts and instructions. Thus, it is possible that licenses applied for and/or issued in reliance on the Ministry’s acts and instructions could be challenged by the prosecutor general’s office as being invalid. In particular, deficiencies of this nature subject subsoil licensees to selective and arbitrary governmental claims.

Legislation on subsoil rights still remains internally inconsistent and vague, and the regulator’s acts and instructions are often arguably inconsistent with legislation. Subsoil licensees thus continue to face the situation where both failing to comply with the regulator’s acts and instructions and choosing to comply with them places them at the risk of being subject to arbitrary governmental claims, whether by the regulator or the prosecutor general’s office.

A provision that a license may be suspended or terminated if the licensee does not comply with the “significant” or “material” terms of a license is an example of such a deficiency in the legislation. However, the Ministry of Natural Resources has not issued any interpretive guidance on the meaning of these terms.

Similarly, under Russia’s civil law system, court decisions on the meaning of these terms do not have any precedential value for future cases and, in any event, court decisions in this regard have been inconsistent. These deficiencies result in the regulatory authorities, prosecutors and courts having significant discretion over enforcement and interpretation of the law, which may be used to challenge our subsoil rights selectively and arbitrarily.

Moreover, during the tumultuous period of the transformation of the Russian planned economy into a free market economy in the 1990s, documentation relating to subsoil licenses was not properly maintained and, in many cases, was lost or destroyed. Initially, during the period between the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the privatizations of the mid-1990s, as state subsidies ceased, many mining operations were forced to shut down or scale back production. In addition, during this time, complete governmental planning and oversight ceased, leaving the local management ill-equipped to operate these businesses,

which faced severe liquidity problems. The employees, who were often unpaid for months, had little incentive to look after the businesses. In these circumstances, the maintenance of documentation relating to subsoil licenses, as well as compliance with the administrative requirements of the legislation of this period, was not a priority for management. The situation did not significantly improve as these mines were privatized in the mid-1990s, primarily since most Russian businesses during these times continued to face severe liquidity problems and the management focused on the operation of these mines. Thus, in many cases, although it may be clearly evident that a particular enterprise has mined a licensed subsoil area for decades, the historical documentation relating to their subsoil licenses may not be complete.

If, through governmental or other challenges, our licenses are suspended or terminated we would be unable to realize our reserves, which could materially adversely affect our business and results of operations.

Our Romanian operations face certain risks.

Romania is not self-sufficient in energy resources. Domestic energy prices, which are significantly higher than the prices we pay in Russia, have recently increased and may continue to increase in the future, which might hurt the profitability of our operations in Romania. For example, in 2005, the price of natural gas increased by approximately 45% in Romania and is expected to continue to increase through 2006. Shortages in energy supplies, including administrative limitations during peak usage, may limit our production capacity and efficiency and hinder our output. If we are unable to obtain these resources on economic terms, the operations of our Romanian subsidiaries could be materially adversely affected.

In addition, preparations for Romania's admission into the EU will result in increased environmental liabilities, labor costs and other expenditures for our Romanian operations. Entrance into the EU requires the restructuring of Romania's major metallurgical entities, including our Romanian subsidiaries Mechel Targoviste and Mechel Campia Turzii. As part of this process, individual viability plans must be agreed upon with EU consultants and incorporated into each company's business plans. Evidence of implementation of these plans and achievement of the targets stated therein must be provided to investors under their privatization contracts. The viability plans of Mechel Targoviste and Mechel Campia Turzii include additional investments into technology and increased environmental controls. After the restructuring is complete, key business performance indicators must be in line with EU requirements. In addition to the costs of complying with these requirements, Romania's admission to the EU may also result in trade duties and quotas on the export of steel finished and semi-finished products into Romania.

In connection with their acquisition, we also committed to make capital investments of approximately \$21.1 million at Mechel Targoviste and approximately \$22.7 million at Mechel Campia Turzii, as well as to maintain labor force levels for five years from the date of acquisition of these Romanian facilities. See "Item 5. Operating and Financial Review and Prospects—Contractual obligations and commercial commitments." Although we have complied with these undertakings to date, our failure to comply in the future could result in the forfeiture of part of our ownership stake in these companies.

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In addition, since their acquisition our Romanian enterprises suffer ongoing significant losses that are expected to continue minimum until the end of privatization agreements. This can significantly deteriorate our overall financial position and performance and materially adversely affect your investment.

We are controlled by two shareholders who run our business collectively and whose interests could conflict with those of the holders of our securities.

The Chairman of our Board of Directors, Mr. Igor Zyuzin, and our Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Vladimir Iorich, own approximately 73% of our common shares. These two shareholders have acted in concert since signing an Ownership, Control and Voting Agreement dated August 1, 1995, which requires them to vote the same way. See "Item 7. Major Shareholders and Related Party Transactions—Major Shareholders—Ownership, Control and Voting Agreement of August 1, 1995" for more information regarding this agreement. This agreement gives them control over us and the ability to elect a majority of the directors, appoint management, issue additional shares and approve certain actions requiring the approval of a majority of our shareholders. In February 2006, Messrs. Zyuzin and Iorich reached an agreement pursuant to which Mr. Zyuzin will purchase all of Mr. Iorich's stake in Mechel over the course of a year. In March-May 2006, Mr. Zyuzin purchased a portion of Mr. Iorich's stake, resulting in his stake in Mechel increasing to 52.2% and Mr. Iorich's stake decreasing to 20.8%. Prior to the transactions, Messrs. Zyuzin and Iorich had held equal stakes of 42.2%. The purchase was financed by the sale of shares and a mandatory exchangeable bond convertible into shares. Mr. Zyuzin may undertake similar and other financing options for future transactions in order to complete the purchase of Mr. Iorich's stake. Regardless of the financing selected, he intends to retain at least a 51% stake in Mechel. The interests of these controlling shareholders could conflict with those of holders of ADSs and materially adversely affect your investment.

Our competitive position and future prospects depend on our senior managers and other key personnel.

Our ability to maintain our competitive position and to implement our business strategy is dependent to a large degree on the services of our senior management team and other key personnel, particularly Mr. Zyuzin, our Chairman, and Mr. Iorich, our Chief Executive Officer, who are also our founding shareholders. Messrs. Zyuzin and Iorich consult extensively with each other before significant decisions are made and as a team have provided strategic direction and leadership to us. Over the course of this year, Mr. Iorich intends to dispose of his stake in Mechel and step down as our Chief Executive Officer.

Moreover, competition in Russia, and in the other countries where we operate, for personnel with relevant expertise is intense due to the small number of qualified individuals and, as a result, we attempt to structure our compensation packages in a manner consistent with the evolving standards of the Russian labor market. We are not insured against the detrimental effects to our business resulting from the loss or dismissal of our key personnel. The loss or decline in the services of members of our senior management team or an inability to attract, retain and motivate qualified key personnel could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

In the event the title to any privatized company we acquired is successfully challenged, we risk losing our ownership interest in that company or its assets.

Almost all of our business consists of privatized companies, and our business strategy will likely involve the acquisition of additional privatized companies. To the extent that privatization legislation is vague, inconsistent or in conflict with other legislation, including conflicts between federal and local privatization legislation, many privatizations are vulnerable to challenge, including selective challenges. For instance, a series of presidential decrees issued in 1991 and 1992 that granted to the Moscow City government the right to adopt its own privatization procedures were subsequently held to be invalid by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which ruled, in part, that the presidential decrees

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addressed issues that were the subject of federal law. While this court ruling, in theory, did not require any implementing actions, the presidential decrees were not officially annulled by another presidential decree until 2000. In the event that any title to, or our ownership stakes in, the privatized companies acquired by us, including Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant,

Southern Urals Nickel Plant, Southern Kuzbass Coal Company and its subsidiaries, Beloretsk Metallurgical Plant, Urals Stampings Plant, Korshunov Mining Plant, Port Posiet, Port Kambarka or Izhtal, are subject to challenge as having been improperly privatized and we are unable to defeat this claim, we risk losing our ownership interest in such company or its assets, which could materially affect our business and results of operations.

If the Federal Antimonopoly Service were to conclude that we acquired or created a new company in contravention of antimonopoly legislation, it could impose administrative sanctions and require the divestiture of this company or other assets.

Our business has grown substantially through the acquisition and founding of companies, many of which required the prior approval or subsequent notification of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service or its predecessor agencies. In part, relevant legislation restricts the acquisition or founding of companies by groups of companies or individuals acting in concert without this approval or notification. This legislation is vague in certain parts and subject to varying interpretations. If the Federal Antimonopoly Service were to conclude that an acquisition or the creation of a new company was done in contravention of applicable legislation and that competition has been reduced as a result, it could seek redress, including suing for the transactions that led to the violation of competition laws to be declared invalid, obliging the acquirer to perform activities to restore competition, and seeking the dissolution of the company operating in contravention of antimonopoly legislation. Any of these actions could adversely affect our business strategy and our results of operations.

In the event that the minority shareholders of our subsidiaries were to successfully challenge past interested party transactions or do not approve interested party transactions in the future, we could be limited in our operational flexibility.

We own less than 100% of the equity interests in some of our subsidiaries. In addition, certain of our wholly-owned subsidiaries have had other shareholders in the past. We and our subsidiaries in the past have carried out, and continue to carry out, transactions with us and others which may be considered to be "interested party transactions" under Russian law, requiring approval by disinterested directors, disinterested independent directors or disinterested shareholders depending on the nature of the transaction and parties involved. See "Item 10. Additional Information—Charter and Certain Requirements of Russian Legislation—Interested Party Transactions." The provisions of Russian law defining which transactions must be approved as "interested party transactions" are subject to different interpretations, and these transactions may not always have been properly approved. We cannot assure you that our and our subsidiaries' applications of these concepts will not be subject to challenge by former and current shareholders. Any such challenges, if successful, could result in the invalidation of transactions, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations or prospects.

In addition, Russian law requires a three-quarters majority vote of the holders of voting stock present at a shareholders' meeting to approve certain transactions and other matters, including, for example, charter amendments, major transactions involving assets in excess of 50% of the assets of the company, repurchase by the company of shares and certain share issuances. In some cases, minority shareholders may not approve interested party transactions requiring their approval or other matters requiring approval of minority shareholders or supermajority approval. In the event that these minority shareholders were to challenge successfully past interested party transactions, or do not approve interested party transactions or

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other matters in the future, we could be limited in our operational flexibility and our business, financial condition, results of operations or prospects could be materially adversely affected.

Our existing arrangements with trade unions may not be renewable on terms favorable to us, and our operations could be adversely affected by strikes and lockouts.

As of December 31, 2005, approximately 88% of our employees were represented by trade unions. Although we have not experienced any business interruption at any of our businesses as a result of labor disputes from the dates of their respective acquisition by us and we consider our employee relations to be good, large union representation subjects our businesses to interruptions through strikes, lockouts or delays in renegotiations of labor contracts. Our existing arrangements with trade unions also may not be renewed on terms favorable to us. In such events, our business and results of operations could be materially adversely affected.

We do not carry the types of insurance coverage customary in more economically developed countries for a business of our size and nature, and a significant event could result in substantial property loss and inability to rebuild in a timely manner or at all.

The insurance industry is not yet well developed in Russia, and many forms of insurance protection common in more economically developed countries are not yet available in Russia on comparable terms, including coverage for business interruption. At present, our facilities are not insured, and we have no coverage for business interruption or loss of key management personnel or for third-party liability, other than customary insurance coverage with respect to our international trading operations and sales. In the event that a significant event were to affect one of our facilities, we could experience substantial property loss and significant disruptions in our production capacity, for which we would not be compensated. For example, if substantial production capacity were lost at our Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant, which is our primary steel production facility, we would not be able to replace a substantial portion of this capacity with capacity from our other plants, potentially resulting in the interruption of the production of a number of our products. Additionally, depending on the severity of the property damage, we may not be able to rebuild damaged property in a timely manner or at all. We do not maintain separate funds or otherwise set aside reserves for these types of events. Any such loss or third-party claim for damages may have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

If transactions of members of the group and their predecessors-in-interest were to be challenged on the basis of non-compliance with applicable legal requirements, the remedies in the event of any successful challenge could include the invalidation of such transactions or the imposition of other liabilities on such group members.

Members of the group, or their predecessors-in-interest at different times, took a variety of actions relating to share issuances, share disposals and acquisitions, mandatory buy-out offers, valuation of property, interested party transactions, major transactions, meetings of the group members' governing bodies, other corporate matters and anti-monopoly issues that, if successfully challenged on the basis of non-compliance with applicable legal requirements by competent state authorities, counterparties in such transactions or shareholders of the relevant group members or their predecessors-in-interest, could result in the invalidation of such transactions and our corporate decisions, restrictions on voting control or the imposition of other liabilities. Because applicable provisions of Russian law are subject to many different interpretations, we may not be able to defend successfully any challenge brought against such transactions, and the invalidation of any such transactions or imposition of any such liability may, individually or in the aggregate, have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Vaguely drafted Russian transfer pricing rules and lack of reliable pricing information may potentially affect our results of operations.

Russian transfer pricing rules entered into force in 1999, giving Russian tax authorities the right to make transfer pricing adjustments and impose additional tax liabilities in respect of all controlled transactions, provided that the transaction price differs from the market price by more than 20%. Controlled transactions include transactions between related entities and certain other types of transactions between independent parties, such as foreign trade transactions or transactions with significant (by more than 20%) price fluctuations. The Russian transfer pricing rules are vaguely drafted, leaving wide scope for interpretation by Russian tax authorities and courts. Due to the uncertainties in interpretation of transfer pricing legislation, the tax authorities may challenge our prices and propose adjustments. If such price adjustments are upheld by the Russian courts and implemented, our future financial results could be adversely affected. In addition, we could face significant losses associated with the assessed amount of prior tax underpaid and related interest and penalties, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. See also “Risks Relating to Russian Legislation and the Russian Legal System—Weaknesses and changes in the Russian tax system could materially adversely affect our business and the value of our securities.”

Risks Relating to Our Shares and ADSs and the Trading Market

Because the depositary may be considered the beneficial holder of the shares underlying the ADSs, these shares may be arrested or seized in legal proceedings in Russia against the depositary.

Because Russian law may not recognize ADS holders as beneficial owners of the underlying shares, it is possible that holders of ADSs could lose all their rights to those shares if the depositary's assets in Russia are seized or arrested. In that case, holders of ADSs would lose all the money they invested.

Russian law may treat the depositary as the beneficial owner of the shares underlying the ADSs. This is different from the way other jurisdictions treat ADSs. In the United States, although shares may be held in the depositary's name or to its order, making it a “legal” owner of the shares, the ADS holders are the “beneficial,” or real owners. In U.S. courts, an action against the depositary, would not result in the beneficial owners losing their shares. Russian law may not make the same distinction between legal and beneficial ownership, and it may only recognize the rights of the depositary in whose name the shares are held, not the rights of ADS holders, to the underlying shares. Thus, in proceedings brought against a depositary, whether or not related to shares underlying ADSs, Russian courts may treat those underlying shares as the assets of the depositary, open to seizure or arrest. In the past, a lawsuit was filed against a depositary bank other than Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas seeking the seizure of various Russian companies' shares represented by ADSs issued by that depositary. In the event that this type of suit were to be successful in the future against the depositary, and the shares underlying our ADSs were to be seized or arrested, the ADS holders involved would lose their rights to such underlying shares.

Voting rights with respect to the shares represented by our ADSs are limited by the terms of the deposit agreement for the ADSs and relevant requirements of Russian law.

ADS holders will have no direct voting rights with respect to the shares represented by the ADSs. They will be able to exercise voting rights with respect to the shares represented by ADSs only in accordance with the provisions of the deposit agreement relating to the ADSs and relevant requirements of Russian law. Therefore, there are practical limitations upon the ability of ADS holders to exercise their voting rights due to the additional procedural steps involved in communicating with them. For example, the Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies and our charter require us to notify shareholders no less than 30 days prior to the date of any meeting and at least 50 days prior to the date of an extraordinary meeting

to elect our Board of Directors. Our ordinary shareholders will receive notice directly from us and will be able to exercise their voting rights by either attending the meeting in person or voting by power of attorney.

As an ADS holder, you, by comparison, will not receive notice directly from us. Rather, in accordance with the deposit agreement, we will provide the notice to the depositary. The depositary has undertaken in turn, as soon as practicable thereafter, to mail to you notice of such meeting, copies of voting materials (if and as received by the depositary from us) and a statement as to the manner in which instructions may be given by holders. To exercise your voting rights, you must then instruct the depositary how to vote its shares. Because of this extra procedural step involving the depositary, the process for exercising voting rights may take longer for you than for holders of shares. ADSs for which the depositary does not receive timely voting instructions will not be voted at any meeting.

In addition, although securities regulations expressly permit the depositary to split the votes with respect to the shares underlying the ADSs in accordance with instructions from ADS holders, there is little court or regulatory guidance on the application of such regulations, and the depositary may choose to refrain from voting at all unless it receives instructions from all ADS holders to vote the shares in the same manner. You may thus have significant difficulty in exercising voting rights with respect to the shares underlying the ADSs. There can be no assurance that holders and beneficial owners of ADSs will (1) receive notice of shareholder meetings to enable the timely return of voting instructions to the depositary, (2) receive notice to enable the timely cancellation of ADSs in respect of shareholder actions or (3) be given the benefit of dissenting or minority shareholders' rights in respect of an event or action in which the holder or beneficial owner has voted against, abstained from voting or not given voting instructions.

The price of our shares and ADSs may be highly volatile.

The trading prices of our shares and ADSs may be subject to wide fluctuations in response to many factors, including:

- variations in our operating results and those of other mining and steel companies;
- variations in national and industry growth rates;
- actual or anticipated announcements of technical innovations or new products or services by us or our competitors;
- changes in governmental legislation or regulation;
- general economic conditions within our business sector or in Russia; or
- extreme price and volume fluctuations on the Russian or other emerging market stock exchanges.

You may be unable to repatriate your earnings from our ADSs.

We anticipate that any dividends we may pay in the future on the shares represented by the ADSs will be declared and paid to the depositary in rubles and will be converted into U.S. dollars by the depositary and distributed to holders of ADSs, net of the depositary's fees and expenses. The ability to convert rubles into U.S. dollars is subject to the availability of U.S. dollars in Russia's currency markets. Although there is an existing, albeit limited, market within Russia for the conversion of rubles into U.S. dollars, including the interbank currency exchange and over-the-counter and currency futures markets, the further development of this market is uncertain. At present, there is no market for the conversion of rubles into foreign

ADS holders may not be able to benefit from the United States-Russia income tax treaty.

In accordance with Russian legislation, dividends paid to a non-resident holder generally will be subject to Russian withholding at a rate of 15% for legal entities and organizations and at a rate of 30% for individuals. This tax may be reduced to 5% or 10% for legal entities and organizations and to 10% for individuals under the Convention between the United States of America and the Russian Federation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (the "United States-Russia income tax treaty") for U.S. tax residents. However, the Russian tax rules applicable to ADS holders are characterized by significant uncertainties. In 2005, the Ministry of Finance expressed an opinion that ADS holders (rather than the depository) should be treated as the beneficial owners of the underlying shares for the purposes of the double tax treaty provisions applicable to taxation of dividend income from the underlying shares, provided that tax residencies of the ADS holders are duly confirmed. However, in the absence of any specific provisions in the Russian tax legislation with respect to the concept of beneficial ownership and taxation of income of beneficial owners, it is unclear how the Russian tax authorities and courts will ultimately treat the ADS holders in this regard. Thus, we may be obliged to withhold tax at standard rates when paying out dividends, and U.S. ADS holders may be unable to benefit from these treaties. See "Item 10. Additional Information—Taxation—Russian Income and Withholding Tax Considerations—United States-Russia Income Tax Treaty Procedures," "Item 10. Additional Information—Taxation—Russian Income and Withholding Tax Considerations—Taxation of Dividends" and "Item 10. Additional Information—Taxation—United States Federal Income Tax Considerations—Taxation of dividends on common shares or ADSs" for a more detailed discussion of this issue and administration procedures.

Capital gains from the sale of ADSs may be subject to Russian income tax.

Under Russian tax legislation, gains realized by non-resident legal entities or organizations from the disposition of Russian shares and securities, as well as financial instruments derived from such shares, such as the ADSs, may be subject to Russian profits tax or withholding income tax if immovable property located in Russia constitutes more than 50% of our assets. However, no procedural mechanism currently exists to withhold and remit this tax with respect to sales made to persons other than Russian companies and foreign companies with a registered permanent establishment in Russia. Gains arising from the disposition at foreign stock exchanges of the foregoing types of securities listed on these exchanges by foreign holders who are legal entities or organizations are not subject to taxation in Russia.

Gains arising from the disposition of the foregoing types of securities and derivatives outside of Russia by U.S. holders who are individuals not resident in Russia for tax purposes will not be considered Russian source income and will not be taxable in Russia. Gains arising from disposition of the foregoing types of securities and derivatives in Russia by U.S. holders who are individuals not resident in Russia for tax purposes may be subject to tax either at the source in Russia or based on an annual tax return, which they may be required to submit with the Russian tax authorities.

You may have limited recourse against us and our directors and executive officers because we generally conduct our operations outside the United States and all of our directors and executive officers reside outside the United States.

Our presence outside the United States may limit your legal recourse against us. Mechel is incorporated under the laws of the Russian Federation. All of our directors and executive officers reside outside the United States, principally in Russia. All or a substantial portion of our assets and the assets of our directors and executive officers are located outside the United States. As a result, you may not be able to affect service of process within the United States upon us or our directors and executive officers or to enforce in a U.S. court judgments obtained against us or our directors and executive officers in jurisdictions outside the United States, including actions under the civil liability provisions of

U.S. securities laws. In addition, it may be difficult for you to enforce, in original actions brought in courts in jurisdictions outside the United States, liabilities predicated upon U.S. securities laws.

There is no treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation providing for reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments in civil and commercial matters. These limitations may deprive you of effective legal recourse for claims related to your investment in the ADSs. The deposit agreement provides for actions brought by any party thereto against us to be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, provided that any action under the U.S. federal securities laws or the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder may, but need not, be submitted to arbitration. The Russian Federation is a party to the United Nations (New York) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but it may be difficult to enforce arbitral awards in the Russian Federation due to a number of factors, including the inexperience of Russian courts in international commercial transactions, official and unofficial political resistance to enforcement of awards against Russian companies in favor of foreign investors, Russian courts' inability to enforce such orders and corruption.

Risks Relating to the Russian Federation

Emerging markets such as Russia are subject to greater risks than more developed markets, and financial turmoil in any emerging market could disrupt our business, as well as cause the price of our securities to suffer.

Investors in emerging markets such as the Russian Federation should be aware that these markets are subject to greater risk than more developed markets, including in some cases significant legal, economic and political risks. Investors should also note that emerging economies such as the economy of the Russian Federation are subject to rapid change and that the information set out herein may become outdated relatively quickly. Accordingly, investors should exercise particular care in evaluating the risks involved and must decide for themselves whether, in light of those risks, their investment is appropriate. Generally, investment in emerging markets is only suitable for sophisticated investors who fully appreciate the significance of the risks involved and investors are urged to consult with their own legal and financial advisors before making an investment in the shares and ADSs.

Economic Risks

The Russian economy is less stable than those of most Western countries and could adversely affect our business and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Russian economy has experienced at various times:

- significant declines in gross domestic product;
- hyperinflation;
- an unstable currency;

- high government budget deficit and government debt relative to gross domestic product;
- a weak banking system providing limited liquidity to domestic enterprises;
- high levels of loss-making enterprises that continued to operate due to the lack of effective bankruptcy proceedings;
- significant use of barter transactions and illiquid promissory notes to settle commercial transactions;
- widespread tax evasion;

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- growth of a black and gray market economy;
 - pervasive capital flight;
 - high levels of corruption and the penetration of organized crime into the economy;
 - significant increases in unemployment and underemployment; and
 - the impoverishment of a large portion of the population.

Although Russia has benefited recently from the increase in global commodity prices, providing an increase in disposable income and an increase in consumer spending, the Russian economy has been subject to abrupt downturns in the past. In particular, on August 17, 1998, in the face of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, the Russian government defaulted on its ruble-denominated securities, the Central Bank of Russia stopped its support of the ruble and a temporary moratorium was imposed on certain foreign currency payments. These actions resulted in an immediate and severe devaluation of the ruble and a sharp increase in the rate of inflation; a substantial decline in the prices of Russian debt and equity securities; and an inability of Russian issuers to raise funds in the international capital markets. These problems were aggravated by a major banking crisis in the Russian banking sector after the events of August 17, 1998, as evidenced by the termination of the banking licenses of a number of major Russian banks. This further impaired the ability of the banking sector to act as a consistent source of liquidity to Russian companies and resulted in the losses of bank deposits in some cases.

Recently, the Russian economy has experienced positive trends, such as the increase in the gross domestic product, a relatively stable ruble, strong domestic demand, rising real wages and a reduced rate of inflation; however, these trends may not continue or may be abruptly reversed.

The Russian banking system remains underdeveloped, and another banking crisis could place severe liquidity constraints on our business.

Russia's banking and other financial systems are less developed or regulated in comparison with other countries, and Russian legislation relating to banks and bank accounts is subject to varying interpretations and inconsistent application. The August 1998 financial crisis resulted in the bankruptcy and liquidation of many Russian banks and almost entirely eliminated the developing market for commercial bank loans at that time. Many Russian banks currently do not meet international banking standards, and the transparency of the Russian banking sector in some respects still lags far behind internationally accepted norms. Aided by inadequate supervision by the regulators, certain banks do not follow existing Central Bank of Russia regulations with respect to lending criteria, credit quality, loan loss reserves or diversification of exposure. Furthermore, in Russia, bank deposits made by corporate entities generally are not insured.

Recently, there has been a rapid increase in lending by Russian banks, which many believe has been accompanied by a deterioration in the credit quality of the borrowers. In addition, a robust domestic corporate debt market is leading to Russian banks increasingly holding large amounts of Russian corporate ruble bonds in their portfolios, which is further deteriorating the risk profile of Russian bank assets. The serious deficiencies in the Russian banking sector, combined with the deterioration in the credit portfolios of Russian banks, may result in the banking sector being more susceptible to market downturns or economic slowdowns, including due to Russian corporate defaults that may occur during any such market downturn or economic slowdown. In addition, the Central Bank of Russia has from time to time revoked the licenses of certain Russian banks, which resulted in market rumors about additional bank closures and many depositors withdrawing their savings. If a banking crisis were to occur, Russian companies would be subject to severe liquidity constraints due to the limited supply of domestic savings and the withdrawal of foreign funding sources that would occur during such a crisis.

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There is currently a limited number of sufficiently creditworthy Russian banks. We hold the bulk of our excess ruble and foreign currency cash in Russian banks, including subsidiaries of foreign banks, in part, because we are required to do so by Central Bank of Russia regulations and because the ruble is not transferable or convertible outside of Russia. There are few, if any, safe ruble-denominated instruments in which we may invest our excess ruble cash. Another banking crisis or the bankruptcy or insolvency of the banks from which we receive or with which we hold our funds could result in the loss of our deposits or affect our ability to complete banking transactions in Russia, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

The infrastructure in Russia is inadequate, which could disrupt normal business activity.

The infrastructure in Russia largely dates back to Soviet times and has not been adequately funded and maintained over the past decade. Particularly affected are the rail and road networks, power generation and transmission systems, communication systems and building stock. In May 2005, a fire and explosion in one of the Moscow power substations built in 1963 caused a major power outage in a large section of Moscow and some surrounding regions. The blackout disrupted the ground electric transport, including the metro system, led to road traffic accidents and massive traffic congestion, disrupted electricity and water supply in office and residential buildings and affected mobile communications. The trading on exchanges and the operation of many banks, stores and markets were also halted.

The deterioration of the infrastructure in Russia harms the national economy, disrupts the transportation of goods and supplies, adds costs to doing business and can interrupt business operations. The Russian government is actively considering plans to reorganize the nation's rail, electricity and communications systems. Any such reorganization may result in increased charges and tariffs while failing to generate the anticipated capital investment needed to repair, maintain and improve these systems. These factors could have a material adverse effect on our business and results of operations.

Fluctuations in the global economy could materially adversely affect the Russian economy and the value of the shares and ADSs.

The Russian economy is vulnerable to market downturns and economic slowdowns elsewhere in the world. As has happened in the past, financial problems or an increase in the perceived risks associated with investing in emerging economies could dampen foreign investment in Russia and Russian businesses could face severe liquidity constraints, further materially adversely affecting the Russian economy. Additionally, because Russia produces and exports large amounts of oil, the Russian economy is especially vulnerable to the price of oil on the world market and a decline in the price of oil could slow or

disrupt the Russian economy or undermine the value of the ruble against foreign currencies. Recent military conflicts and international terrorist activity have also significantly impacted oil and gas prices, and pose additional risks to the Russian economy. Russia is also a major producer and exporter of metal products and its economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices and the imposition of tariffs and/or anti-dumping measures by the United States, the European Union or by other principal export markets.

Political and Social Risks

Political and governmental instability could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Since 1991, Russia has sought to transform itself from a one-party state with a centrally-planned economy to a democracy with a market economy. As a result of the sweeping nature of the reforms, and the failure of some of them, the Russian political system remains vulnerable to popular dissatisfaction, including dissatisfaction with the results of privatizations in the 1990s, as well as to demands for autonomy from particular regional and ethnic groups.

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Current and future changes in the government, major policy shifts or lack of consensus between various branches of the government and powerful economic groups could disrupt or reverse economic and regulatory reforms. In addition, the Russian presidential elections scheduled for 2008 could bring more volatility to the market. Any disruption or reversal of reform policies could lead to political or governmental instability or the occurrence of conflicts among powerful economic groups, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Conflict between central and regional authorities and other conflicts could create an uncertain operating environment, hindering our long-term planning ability.

The Russian Federation is a federation of 88 sub-federal political units, consisting of republics, territories, regions, cities of federal importance and autonomous regions and districts. The delineation of authority and jurisdiction among the members of the Russian Federation and the federal government is, in many instances, unclear and remains contested. Lack of consensus between the federal government and local or regional authorities often results in the enactment of conflicting legislation at various levels and may lead to further political instability. In particular, conflicting laws have been enacted in the areas of privatization, land legislation and licensing. Some of these laws and governmental and administrative decisions implementing them, as well as certain transactions consummated pursuant to them, have in the past been challenged in the courts, and such challenges may occur in the future. This lack of consensus hinders our long-term planning efforts and creates uncertainties in our operating environment, both of which may prevent us from effectively and efficiently implementing our business strategy.

Additionally, ethnic, religious, historical and other divisions have, on occasion, given rise to tensions and, in certain cases, military conflict, such as the continuing conflict in Chechnya, which has brought normal economic activity within Chechnya to a halt and disrupted the economies of neighboring regions. Various armed groups in Chechnya have regularly engaged in guerrilla attacks in that area. Violence and attacks relating to this conflict have spread to other parts of Russia, and several terrorist attacks have been carried out by Chechen terrorists in other parts of Russia, including in Moscow. The further intensification of violence, including terrorist attacks and suicide bombings, or its spread to other parts of Russia, could have significant political consequences, including the imposition of a state of emergency in some or all of Russia. Moreover, any terrorist attacks and the resulting heightened security measures are likely to cause disruptions to domestic commerce and exports from Russia. These factors could materially adversely affect our business and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Crime and corruption and negative publicity could disrupt our ability to conduct our business.

The political and economic changes in Russia in recent years have resulted in significant dislocations of authority. The local and international press have reported that significant organized criminal activity has arisen, particularly in large metropolitan centers. Property crime in large cities has increased substantially. In addition, the local press and international press have reported high levels of corruption, including the bribing of officials for the purpose of initiating investigations by government agencies. Press reports have also described instances in which government officials engaged in selective investigations and prosecutions to further the commercial interests of government officials or certain individuals. Additionally, some members of the Russian media regularly publish disparaging articles in return for payment. The depredations of organized or other crime, demands of corrupt officials or claims that we have been involved in official corruption could result in negative publicity, could disrupt our ability to conduct our business effectively and could thus materially adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations and the value of the shares and ADSs.

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Social instability could increase support for renewed centralized authority, nationalism or violence and thus materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

The failure of the government and many private enterprises to pay full salaries on a regular basis and the failure of salaries and benefits generally to keep pace with the rapidly increasing cost of living have led in the past, and could lead in the future, to labor and social unrest. Labor and social unrest may have political, social and economic consequences, such as increased support for a renewal of centralized authority, increased nationalism, including restrictions on foreign involvement in the economy of Russia, and increased violence. An occurrence of any of the foregoing events could restrict our operations and lead to the loss of operating revenues, materially adversely affecting our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Legal Risks and Uncertainties

Weaknesses relating to the legal system and legislation create an uncertain environment for investment and business activity.

Russia is still developing the legal framework required to support a market economy. The following risk factors relating to the Russian legal system create uncertainties with respect to the legal and business decisions that we make, many of which uncertainties do not exist in countries with more developed market economies:

- inconsistencies between and among the Constitution, federal law, presidential decrees and governmental, ministerial and local orders, decisions, resolutions and other acts;
- conflicting local, regional and federal rules and regulations;
- the lack of judicial and administrative guidance on interpreting legislation;

- the relative inexperience of judges and courts in interpreting legislation;
- the lack of an independent judiciary;
- a high degree of discretion on the part of governmental authorities, which could result in arbitrary actions such as suspension or termination of our licenses; and
- poorly developed bankruptcy procedures that are subject to abuse.

Furthermore, several fundamental laws have only recently become effective. The recent nature of much of Russian legislation, the lack of consensus about the scope, content and pace of economic and political reform and the rapid evolution of the Russian legal system in ways that may not always coincide with market developments place the enforceability and underlying constitutionality of laws in doubt and results in ambiguities, inconsistencies and anomalies. In addition, Russian legislation often contemplates implementing regulations which have not yet been promulgated, leaving substantial gaps in the regulatory infrastructure. All of these weaknesses could affect our ability to enforce our rights under our licenses and under our contracts, or to defend ourselves against claims by others. We cannot assure you that regulators, judicial authorities or third parties will not challenge our compliance with applicable laws, decrees and regulations.

Failure to comply with existing laws and regulations or the findings of government inspections, or increased governmental regulation of our operations, could result in substantial additional compliance costs or various sanctions or court judgments which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Our operations and properties are subject to regulation by various government entities and agencies in connection with obtaining and renewing various licenses, permits, approvals and authorizations, as well as with ongoing compliance with existing laws, regulations and standards. Regulatory authorities exercise considerable discretion in matters of enforcement and interpretation of applicable laws, regulations and standards, the issuance and renewal of licenses, permits, approvals and authorizations and in monitoring licensees' compliance with the terms thereof. Russian authorities have the right to, and frequently do, conduct periodic inspections of our operations and properties throughout the year. Any such future inspections may conclude that we or our subsidiaries have violated laws, decrees or regulations, and we may be unable to refute such conclusions or remedy the violations.

Our failure to comply with existing laws and regulations or the findings of government inspections may result in the imposition of fines or penalties or more severe sanctions including the suspension, amendment or termination of our licenses, permits, approvals and authorizations or in requirements that we cease certain of our business activities, or in criminal and administrative penalties applicable to our officers. Moreover, an agreement made or transaction executed in violation of a law may be invalidated and unwound by a court decision. Any such decisions, requirements or sanctions, or any increase in governmental regulation of our operations, could increase our costs and materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

One or more of our subsidiaries could be forced into liquidation on the basis of formal non-compliance with certain requirements of Russian law, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Certain provisions of Russian law may allow a court to order liquidation of a Russian legal entity on the basis of its formal non-compliance with certain requirements during formation, reorganization or during its operation. There have been cases in the past in which formal deficiencies in the establishment process of a Russian legal entity or non-compliance with provisions of Russian law have been used by Russian courts as a basis for liquidation of a legal entity. For example, in Russian corporate law, negative net assets calculated on the basis of Russian accounting standards as at the end of the second or any subsequent year of a company's operation, can serve as a basis for a court to order the liquidation of the company, upon a claim by governmental authorities. Many Russian companies have negative net assets due to very low historical asset values reflected on their Russian accounting standards balance sheets; however, their solvency, i.e., their ability to pay debts as they come due, is not otherwise adversely affected by such negative net assets. Currently, we have two subsidiaries with negative net assets, Port Kambarka and Kaslinsky Architectural Art Casting Plant.

Weaknesses in the Russian legal system create an uncertain legal environment, which makes the decisions of a Russian court or a governmental authority difficult, if not impossible, to predict. If involuntary liquidation were to occur, then we may be forced to reorganize the operations we currently conduct through the affected subsidiaries. Any such liquidation could lead to additional costs, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

The judiciary's lack of independence, overall inexperience, occasional abuse of discretion, the difficulty of enforcing court decisions and governmental discretion in enforcing claims could prevent us or you from obtaining effective redress in a court proceeding.

The independence of the judicial system and its immunity from economic, political and nationalistic influences in Russia remain largely untested. The court system in Russia is understaffed and underfunded.

Judges and courts are generally inexperienced in the area of business and corporate law. Judicial precedents generally have no binding effect on subsequent decisions. Not all Russian legislation and court decisions are readily available to the public or organized in a manner that facilitates understanding. The Russian judicial system can be slow or unjustifiably swift. Enforcement of court orders can, in practice, be very difficult in Russia. Additionally, court claims are often used in furtherance of political and commercial aims or infighting. We may be subject to such claims and may not be able to receive a fair hearing. Additionally, court orders are not always enforced or followed by law enforcement agencies, and the government may attempt to invalidate court decisions by backdating or retroactively applying relevant legislative changes. Judicial decisions in Russia can be unpredictable and may not provide effective redress.

These uncertainties also extend to property rights. During Russia's transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, legislation has been enacted to protect private property against expropriation and nationalization. However, it is possible that due to the lack of experience in enforcing these provisions and due to political factors, these protections would not be enforced in the event of an attempted expropriation or nationalization. Expropriation or nationalization of any of our entities, their assets or portions thereof, potentially without adequate compensation, would have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

Selective or arbitrary government action could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Governmental authorities in Russia have a high degree of discretion and, at times, act selectively or arbitrarily, without hearing or prior notice, and sometimes in a manner that is inconsistent with legislation or influenced by political or

commercial considerations. Selective or arbitrary governmental actions have reportedly included the denial or withdrawal of licenses, sudden and unexpected tax audits and claims, criminal prosecutions and civil actions. Federal and local government entities have also used ordinary defects in matters surrounding share issuances and registration as pretexts for court claims and other demands to invalidate such issuances and registrations or to void transactions. Moreover, the government also has the power in certain circumstances, by regulation or government act, to interfere with the performance of, nullify or terminate contracts. Standard & Poor's, a provider of independent credit ratings, has expressed concerns that "Russian companies and their investors can be subjected to government pressure through selective implementation of regulations and legislation that is either politically motivated or triggered by competing business groups." In this environment, our competitors may receive preferential treatment from the government, potentially giving them a competitive advantage over us.

In addition, recently, the Russian tax authorities aggressively have brought tax evasion claims on the basis of certain Russian companies' use of tax-optimization schemes, and press reports have speculated that these enforcement actions have been selective and politically motivated. Selective or arbitrary government action, if directed at us, could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects, and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Lack of developed corporate and securities laws and regulations in Russia could limit our ability to attract future investment.

The regulation and supervision of the securities market, financial intermediaries and issuers are considerably less developed in Russia than in the United States and Western Europe. Securities laws, including those relating to corporate governance, disclosure and reporting requirements, have only recently been adopted, whereas laws relating to anti-fraud safeguards, insider trading restrictions and fiduciary duties are rudimentary. In addition, the Russian securities market is regulated by several different authorities, which are often in competition with each other. These include:

- the Federal Service for the Financial Markets, or the FSFM;

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- the Ministry of Finance;
 - the Russian Federal Anti-Monopoly Service;
 - the Central Bank of Russia; and
 - various professional self-regulatory organizations.

The regulations of these various authorities are not always coordinated and may be contradictory. In addition, Russian corporate and securities rules and regulations can change rapidly, which may materially adversely affect our ability to conduct securities-related transactions. While some important areas are subject to virtually no oversight, the regulatory requirements imposed on Russian issuers in other areas result in delays in conducting securities offerings and in accessing the capital markets. It is often unclear whether or how regulations, decisions and letters issued by the various regulatory authorities apply to our group. As a result, we may be subject to fines and/or other enforcement measures despite our best efforts at compliance.

Because there is little minority shareholder protection in Russia, your ability to bring, or recover in, an action against us will be limited.

In general, minority shareholder protection under Russian law derives from supermajority shareholder approval requirements for certain corporate action, as well as from the ability of a shareholder to demand that the company purchase the shares held by that shareholder if that shareholder voted against or did not participate in voting on certain types of actions. Companies are also required by Russian law to obtain the approval of disinterested shareholders for certain transactions with interested parties. See "Item 10. Additional Information—Charter and Certain Requirements of Russian Legislation—Description of Capital Stock—Rights Attaching to Common Shares" for a more detailed description of some of these protections. While these protections are similar to the types of protections available to minority shareholders in U.S. corporations, in practice, corporate governance standards for many Russian companies have proven to be poor, and minority shareholders in Russian companies have suffered losses due to abusive share dilutions, asset transfers and transfer pricing practices. Shareholder meetings have been irregularly conducted, and shareholder resolutions have not always been respected by management. Shareholders of some companies also suffered as a result of fraudulent bankruptcies initiated by hostile creditors.

The supermajority shareholder approval requirement is met by a vote of 75% of all voting shares that are present at a shareholders' meeting. Thus, controlling shareholders owning slightly less than 75% of outstanding shares of a company may have a 75% or more voting power if certain minority shareholders are not present at the meeting. In situations where controlling shareholders effectively have 75% or more of voting power at a shareholders' meeting, they are in a position to approve amendments to the charter of the company or significant transactions including asset transfers, which could be prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders. It is possible that our controlling shareholders and our management in the future may not run us and our subsidiaries for the benefit of minority shareholders, and this could materially and adversely affect the value of the ADSs. See "—Risks Relating to Our Business and Industry—We are controlled by two shareholders who run our business collectively and whose interests could conflict with those of the holders of our securities" for more discussion of the control our current shareholders have over us.

Disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as anti-fraud legislation, have only recently been enacted in Russia. Most Russian companies and managers are not accustomed to restrictions on their activities arising from these requirements. The concept of fiduciary duties of management or directors to their companies and shareholders is also relatively new and is not well developed. Violations of disclosure

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and reporting requirements or breaches of fiduciary duties to us and our subsidiaries or to our shareholders could have a material adverse effect on the value of the ADSs.

While the Joint Stock Companies Law provides that shareholders owning not less than 1% of the company's stock may bring an action for damages on behalf of the company, Russian courts to date do not have much experience with respect to such lawsuits. Russian law does not contemplate class action litigation. Accordingly, your ability to pursue legal redress against us may be limited, reducing the protections available to you as a holder of ADSs.

Shareholder liability under Russian legislation could cause us to become liable for the obligations of our subsidiaries.

The Civil Code and the Joint Stock Companies Law generally provide that shareholders in a Russian joint stock company are not liable for the obligations of the joint stock company and bear only the risk of loss of their investment. This may not be the case, however, when one person is capable of determining decisions made by another person or entity. The person or entity capable of determining such decisions is deemed an "effective parent." The person whose decisions are capable of being so

determined is deemed an “effective subsidiary.” Under the Joint Stock Companies Law, an effective parent bears joint and several responsibility for transactions concluded by the effective subsidiary in carrying out these decisions if:

- this decision-making capability is provided for in the charter of the effective subsidiary or in a contract between the companies; and
- the effective parent gives obligatory directions to the effective subsidiary.

In addition, an effective parent is secondarily liable for an effective subsidiary’s debts if an effective subsidiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt resulting from the action or inaction of an effective parent. This is the case no matter how the effective parent’s ability to determine decisions of the effective subsidiary arises. For example, this liability could arise through ownership of voting securities or by contract. In these instances, other shareholders of the effective subsidiary may claim compensation for the effective subsidiary’s losses from the effective parent which caused the effective subsidiary to take action or fail to take action knowing that such action or failure to take action would result in losses. Accordingly, we could be liable in some cases for the debts of our subsidiaries. This liability could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

Shareholder rights provisions under Russian law could result in significant additional obligations on us.

Russian law provides that shareholders that vote against or abstain from voting on certain matters have the right to sell their shares to the company at market value in accordance with Russian law. The decisions that trigger this right to sell shares include:

- decisions with respect to a reorganization;
- the approval by shareholders of a “major transaction,” which, in general terms, is a transaction involving property worth more than 50% of the gross book value of our assets calculated according to Russian accounting standards, regardless of whether the transaction is actually consummated; and
- the amendment of our charter in a manner that limits shareholder rights.

Our (or, as the case may be, our subsidiaries’) obligation to purchase shares in these circumstances, which is limited to 10% of the company’s net assets calculated in accordance with Russian accounting standards at the time the matter at issue is voted upon, could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects.

The lack of a central and rigorously regulated share registration system in Russia may result in improper record ownership of our shares, including the shares underlying your ADSs.

Ownership of Russian joint stock company shares (or, if the shares are held through a nominee or custodian, then the holding of such nominee or custodian) is determined by entries in a share register and is evidenced by extracts from that register. Currently, there is no central registration system in Russia. Share registers are maintained by the companies themselves or, if a company has more than 50 shareholders or so elects, by licensed registrars located throughout Russia. Regulations have been issued regarding the licensing conditions for such registrars, as well as the procedures to be followed by both companies maintaining their own registers and licensed registrars when performing the functions of registrar. In practice, however, these regulations have not been strictly enforced, and registrars generally have relatively low levels of capitalization and inadequate insurance coverage. Moreover, registrars are not necessarily subject to effective governmental supervision. Due to the lack of a central and rigorously regulated share registration system in Russia, transactions in respect of a company’s shares could be improperly or inaccurately recorded, and share registration could be lost through fraud, negligence, official and unofficial governmental actions or oversight by registrars incapable of compensating shareholders for their misconduct. This creates risks of loss not normally associated with investments in other securities markets. Further, the depository, under the terms of the agreement governing the deposit of ADSs, will not be liable for the unavailability of shares or for the failure to make any distribution of cash or property with respect thereto due to the unavailability of the shares. See “Item 10. Additional Information—Charter and Certain Requirements of Russian Legislation—Description of Capital Stock—Registration and Transfer of Shares.”

Characteristics of and changes in the Russian tax system could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and prospects and the value of the shares and ADSs.

Generally, taxes payable by Russian companies are substantial and numerous. These taxes include, among others:

- income taxes;
- value-added tax, or VAT;
- unified social tax; and
- property tax.

The tax environment in Russia historically has been complicated by the fact that various authorities have often issued contradictory tax legislation. This uncertainty potentially exposes us to significant fines and penalties and enforcement measures despite our best efforts at compliance, and could result in a greater than expected tax burden and the suspension or termination of our licenses.

Recently, there have been significant changes to the Russian taxation system. Global tax reforms commenced in 1999 with the introduction of Part One of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, or the Tax Code, which sets general taxation guidelines. Since then, Russia has been in the process of replacing legislation regulating the application of major taxes such as corporate income tax, VAT and property tax with new chapters of the Tax Code.

In practice, the Russian tax authorities generally interpret the tax laws in ways that rarely favor taxpayers, who often have to resort to court proceedings to defend their position against the tax authorities. Recent events within the Russian Federation suggest that the tax authorities may be taking a more assertive position in their interpretations of the legislation and assessments. Differing interpretations of tax regulations exist both among and within government ministries and organizations at the federal, regional and local levels, creating uncertainties and inconsistent enforcement. Tax declarations, together

with related documentation such as customs declarations, are subject to review and investigation by a number of authorities, each of which may impose fines, penalties and interest charges. Generally, in an audit taxpayers are subject to inspection with respect to the three calendar years which immediately preceded the year in which the audit is carried out. Previous audits do not completely exclude subsequent claims relating to the audited period because Russian tax law authorizes upper-level tax inspectorates to review the results of tax audits conducted by subordinate tax inspectorates. In addition, on July 14, 2005, the Russian Constitutional Court issued a decision that allows the statute of limitations for tax liabilities