

Exchange Rates

The table below sets forth, for the periods and dates indicated, information concerning the noon buying rate for Won, expressed in Won per one U.S. dollar. The “noon buying rate” is the rate in New York City for cable transfers in foreign currencies as certified for customs purposes by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Unless otherwise stated, translations of Won amounts into U.S. dollars in this annual report were made at the noon buying rate in effect on December 31, 2015, which was 1,169.3 to US\$1.00. We do not intend to imply that the Won or U.S. dollar amounts referred to herein could have been or could be converted into U.S. dollars or Won, as the case may be, at any particular rate, or at all. On April 22, 2016, the noon buying rate was 1,147.9 = US\$1.00.

	Won per U.S. dollar (noon buying rate)			
	Low	High	Average ⁽¹⁾	Period-End
2011	1,049.2	1,197.5	1,106.9	1,158.5
2012	1,063.2	1,185.0	1,126.2	1,063.2
2013	1,050.1	1,161.3	1,094.7	1,055.3
2014	1,008.9	1,117.7	1,052.3	1,090.9
2015	1,063.0	1,196.4	1,131.0	1,169.3
October	1,120.9	1,180.0	1,143.2	1,140.5
November	1,136.5	1,172.7	1,153.5	1,149.4
December	1,140.7	1,188.0	1,169.9	1,169.3
2016 (through April 22)	1,126.0	1,242.6	1,188.4	1,147.9
January	1,190.4	1,217.0	1,203.3	1,210.0
February	1,186.1	1,242.6	1,216.2	1,238.1
March	1,138.9	1,229.6	1,181.6	1,138.9
April (through April 22)	1,126.0	1,158.4	1,145.7	1,147.9

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

⁽¹⁾ The average of the daily noon buying rates of the Federal Reserve Bank in effect during the relevant period (or portion thereof).

Item 3B. Capitalization and Indebtedness

Not Applicable

Item 3C. Reasons for the Offer and Use of Proceeds

Not Applicable

Item 3D. Risk Factors

Risks relating to our corporate credit portfolio

The largest portion of our exposure is to small- and medium-sized enterprises, and financial difficulties experienced by companies in this segment may result in a deterioration of our asset quality and have an adverse impact on us.

Our loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises amounted to 60,793 billion (excluding discontinued operations), or 31.4% of our total loans, as of December 31, 2013, 62,544 billion, or 30.2% of our total loans, as of December 31, 2014 and 67,115 billion, or 29.5% of our total loans, as of December 31, 2015. As of December 31, 2015, Won-denominated loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises that were classified as substandard or below were 1,162 billion, representing 1.7% of such loans to those enterprises. See “Item 4B. Business Overview—Corporate Banking—Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Banking.” We recorded charge-offs of 472 billion in respect of our Won-denominated loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises in 2015, compared to charge-offs of 319 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2014 and 517 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2013. According to data compiled by the Financial Supervisory Service, the industry-wide delinquency ratios for Won-denominated loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises

decreased in 2014 and 2015. The delinquency ratio for small- and medium-sized enterprises is calculated as the ratio of (1) the outstanding balance of such loans in respect of which either principal or interest payments are overdue by one month or more to (2) the aggregate outstanding balance of such loans. Our delinquency ratio for such loans denominated in Won was 1.5% (excluding discontinued operations) as of December 31, 2013, 1.5% as of December 31, 2014 and 1.4% as of December 31, 2015. Our delinquency ratio may increase in 2016 as a result of, among other things, adverse economic conditions in Korea and globally. See “Other risks relating to our business—Difficult conditions in the global financial markets could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.” Accordingly, we may be required to take measures to decrease our exposures to these customers.

In light of the deteriorating financial condition and liquidity position of small- and medium-sized enterprises in Korea as a result of the global financial crisis commencing in the second half of 2008, the Korean government introduced measures intended to encourage Korean banks to provide financial support to small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers. For example, the Korean government requested Korean banks, including us, to establish a “fast track” program to provide liquidity assistance to small- and medium-sized enterprises on an expedited basis. Under the “fast track” program we established, which is currently expected to be effective through December 31, 2016, liquidity assistance is provided to small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers applying for such assistance, in the form of new short term loans or maturity extensions or interest rate adjustments with respect to existing loans, after expedited credit review and approval. The overall prospects for the Korean economy in 2016 and beyond remain uncertain, and the Korean government may extend or renew existing or past policies and initiatives or introduce new policies or initiatives to encourage Korean banks to provide financial support to small- and medium-sized enterprises. We believe that, to date, our participation in such government-led initiatives (primarily through the “fast track” program) has not caused us to extend a material amount of credit that we would not have otherwise extended nor materially impacted our results of operations and financial condition in general. The aggregate amount of outstanding small- and medium-sized enterprise loans made by us under the “fast track” program was 29 billion as of December 31, 2015, which represented 0.04% of our total small- and medium-sized enterprise loan portfolio as of such date. Furthermore, loans made by us under the “fast track” program are partially guaranteed by the Korean government’s public financial institutions, including the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and the Korea Technology Finance Corporation. However, there can be no assurance that our future participation in such government-led initiatives would not lead us to extend credit to small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers that we would not otherwise extend, or offer terms for such credit that we would not otherwise offer, in the absence of such initiatives. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the financial condition and liquidity position of our small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers benefiting from such initiatives will improve sufficiently for them to service their debt on a timely basis, or at all. Accordingly, increases in our exposure to small- and medium-sized enterprises resulting from such government-led initiatives may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

Many small- and medium-sized enterprises represent sole proprietorships or very small businesses dependent on a relatively limited number of suppliers or customers and tend to be affected to a greater extent than large corporate borrowers by fluctuations in the Korean and global economy. In addition, small- and medium-sized enterprises often maintain less sophisticated financial records than large corporate borrowers. Therefore, it is generally more difficult for us to judge the level of risk inherent in lending to these enterprises, as compared to large corporations.

In addition, many small- and medium-sized enterprises have close business relationships with large corporations in Korea, primarily as suppliers. Any difficulties encountered by those large corporations would likely hurt the liquidity and financial condition of related small- and medium-sized enterprises, including those to which we have exposure, also resulting in an impairment of their ability to repay loans.

Financial difficulties experienced by small- and medium-sized enterprises as a result of, among other things, adverse economic conditions in Korea and globally, as well as aggressive marketing and intense competition among banks to lend to this segment in recent years, have led to a deterioration in the asset quality of our loans to this segment in the past and such factors may lead to a deterioration of asset quality in the future. Any such

deterioration would result in increased charge-offs and higher provisioning and reduced interest and fee income from this segment, which would have an adverse impact on our financial condition and results of operations.

We have exposure to Korean construction and shipbuilding companies, and financial difficulties of these companies may adversely impact us.

As of December 31, 2015, the total amount of loans provided by us to construction and shipbuilding companies in Korea amounted to 6,018 billion and 1,939 billion, or 2.6% and 0.9% of our total loans, respectively. We also have other exposures to Korean construction and shipbuilding companies, including in the form of guarantees extended for the benefit of such companies and debt and equity securities of such companies held by us. In the case of shipbuilding companies, such exposures include refund guarantees extended by us on behalf of shipbuilding companies to cover their obligation to return a portion of the ship order contract amount to customers in the event of performance delays or defaults under shipbuilding contracts. In the case of construction companies, we also have potential exposures in the form of guarantees provided to us by general contractors with respect to financing extended by us for residential and commercial real estate development projects, as well as commitments to purchase asset-backed securities secured by the assets of companies in the construction industry and other commitments we enter into relating to project financing for such real estate projects which may effectively function as guarantees.

The construction industry in Korea has experienced a downturn in recent years, due to excessive investment in residential property development projects, stagnation of real property prices and reduced demand for residential property, especially in areas outside of Seoul, including as a result of the deterioration of the Korean economy. The shipbuilding industry in Korea has also experienced a severe downturn in recent years due to a significant decrease in ship orders, primarily due to adverse conditions in the global economy and the resulting slowdown in global trade. In response to the deteriorating financial condition and liquidity position of borrowers in the construction and shipbuilding industries, which were disproportionately impacted by adverse economic developments in Korea and globally, the Korean government implemented a program in the first half of 2009 to promote expedited restructuring of such borrowers by their Korean creditor financial institutions, under the supervision of major commercial banks. In accordance with such program, 24 construction companies and five shipbuilding companies became subject to workout in 2009, following review by their creditor financial institutions (including us) and the Korean government. Each year since 2009, the Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service have announced the results of subsequent credit risk evaluations conducted by creditor financial institutions (including us) of companies in Korea with outstanding debt of 50 billion or more, pursuant to which a number of companies were selected by such financial institutions for restructuring in the form of workout, liquidation or court receivership. Most recently, in December 2015, 19 companies with outstanding debt of 50 billion or more (one of which was a construction company and two of which were shipbuilding and shipping companies) were selected by such financial institutions for restructuring. There is no assurance, however, that these measures will be successful in stabilizing the Korean construction and shipbuilding industries.

The allowance for credit losses that we have established against our credit exposures to Korean construction and shipbuilding companies may not be sufficient to cover all future losses arising from these and other exposures. If the credit quality of our exposures to Korean construction and shipbuilding companies declines, we may incur substantial additional provisions for credit loss, which could adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition. Furthermore, although a portion of our loans to construction and shipbuilding companies are secured by collateral, such collateral may not be sufficient to cover uncollectible amounts in respect of such loans.

We also have construction-related credit exposures under our project financing loans for real estate development projects in Korea. In light of the general deterioration in the asset quality of real estate project financing loans in Korea in recent years, Korean banks, including us, implemented a uniform set of guidelines to apply more stringent criteria in evaluating the asset quality of real estate project financing loans. As a result, we may be required to establish additional allowances with respect to our outstanding real estate project financing loans, which could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

We have exposure to the largest Korean commercial conglomerates, known as “chaebols,” and, as a result, financial difficulties of chaebols may have an adverse impact on us.

Of our 20 largest corporate exposures (including loans, debt and equity securities, credit-related commitments and other exposures) as of December 31, 2015, eight were to companies that were members of the 30 largest *chaebols* in Korea. As of that date, the total amount of our exposures to the 30 largest *chaebols* was 26,390 billion, or 7.2% of our total exposures. If the credit quality of our exposures to *chaebols* declines, we could incur additional provisions for credit loss, which would hurt our results of operations and financial condition. See “Item 4B. Business Overview—Assets and Liabilities—Loan Portfolio—Exposure to Chaebols.”

The allowances we have established against these exposures may not be sufficient to cover all future losses arising from these exposures. In addition, in the case of companies that are in or in the future enter into workout, restructuring, reorganization or liquidation proceedings, our recoveries from those companies may be limited. We may, therefore, experience future losses with respect to these exposures.

A large portion of our exposure is concentrated in a relatively small number of large corporate borrowers, which increases the risk of our corporate credit portfolio.

As of December 31, 2015, our 20 largest exposures to corporate borrowers totaled 40,182 billion, which represented 11.0% of our total exposures. As of that date, our single largest corporate exposure was to the Bank of Korea, to which we had outstanding credits in the form of debt securities of 6,060 billion and loans in Won of 2,270 billion, representing 2.3% of our total exposures in the aggregate. Aside from exposure to the Korean government and government-related agencies, our next largest exposure was to Hyundai Heavy Industries, to which we had outstanding exposure of 2,109 billion representing 0.6% of our total exposures. Any deterioration in the financial condition of our large corporate borrowers may require us to record substantial additional allowances and may have a material adverse impact on our results of operations and financial condition.

We have exposure to companies that are currently or may in the future be put in restructuring, and we may suffer losses as a result of additional provisions for credit loss required or the adoption of restructuring plans with which we do not agree.

As of December 31, 2015, our credit exposures to companies that were in workout or corporate restructuring amounted to 1,445 billion or 0.4% of our total credit exposures, of which 1,171 billion or 81.0% was classified as substandard or below and substantially all of which was classified as impaired. As of the same date, our allowance for credit losses on these credit exposures amounted to 481 billion, or 33.3% of these exposures. These allowances may not be sufficient to cover all future losses arising from our credit exposure to these companies. Furthermore, we have other exposure to such companies, in the form of debt and equity securities of such companies held by us (including equity securities we acquired as a result of debt-to-equity conversions). Including such securities, our exposures as of December 31, 2015 to companies in workout or restructuring amounted to 1,462 billion, or 0.4% of our total exposures. Our exposures to such companies may also increase in the future, including as a result of adverse conditions in the Korean economy. In addition, in the case of borrowers that are or become subject to workout, we may be forced to restructure our credits pursuant to restructuring plans approved by other creditor financial institutions of the borrower, or to dispose of our credits to other creditors on unfavorable terms, which may adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

Risks relating to our consumer credit portfolio

We may experience increases in delinquencies in our consumer loan and credit card portfolios.

In recent years, consumer debt has increased rapidly in Korea. Our portfolio of consumer loans amounted to 71,041 billion (excluding discontinued operations) as of December 31, 2013, 80,217 billion as of December 31, 2014 and 93,448 billion as of December 31, 2015. Our credit card portfolio amounted to 4,209 billion (excluding discontinued operations) as of December 31, 2013, 5,114 billion as of December 31, 2014 and

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6,099 billion as of December 31, 2015. As of December 31, 2015, our consumer loans and credit card receivables represented 41.1% and 2.7% of our total lending, respectively. See “Item 4B. Business Overview—Consumer Banking—Lending Activities” and “Item 4B. Business Overview—Credit Cards—Products and Services.”

The growth in our consumer loan portfolio in recent years, together with adverse economic conditions in Korea and globally, may lead to increasing delinquencies and a deterioration in asset quality. The amount of our consumer loans classified as substandard or below was 454 billion (excluding discontinued operations) (or 0.6% of our consumer loan portfolio) as of December 31, 2013, 488 billion (or 0.6% of our consumer loan portfolio) as of December 31, 2014 and 345 billion (or 0.4% of our consumer loan portfolio) as of December 31, 2015. We charged off consumer loans amounting to 240 billion in 2015, as compared to 115 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2014 and 180 billion (including discontinued operations) in 2013, and recorded provisions for credit loss in respect of consumer loans of 103 billion in 2015, as compared to 150 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2014 and 238 billion (including discontinued operations) in 2013. Within our consumer loan portfolio, the outstanding balance of general purpose household loans, which, unlike mortgage or home equity loans, are often unsecured and therefore tend to carry a higher credit risk, amounted to 20,673 billion (excluding discontinued operations), or 29.1% of our total outstanding consumer loans, as of December 31, 2013, 22,393 billion, or 27.9% of our total outstanding consumer loans, as of December 31, 2014 and 24,179 billion, or 25.9% of our total outstanding consumer loans, as of December 31, 2015.

In our credit card segment, outstanding balances overdue by more than one month amounted to 76 billion (excluding discontinued operations), or 1.8% of our credit card receivables, as of December 31, 2013, 85 billion, or 1.7% of our credit card receivables, as of December 31, 2014 and 97 billion, or 1.6% of our credit card receivables, as of December 31, 2015. In line with industry practice, we have restructured a portion of our delinquent credit card account balances as loans. As of December 31, 2015, these restructured loans amounted to 82 billion, or 1.3% of our credit card balances. Because these restructured loans are not initially recorded as being delinquent, our delinquency ratios do not fully reflect all delinquent amounts relating to our credit card balances. Including all restructured loans, outstanding balances overdue by more than one month accounted for 2.9% of our credit card balances as of December 31, 2015. We charged off credit card balances amounting to 198 billion in 2015, as compared to 163 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2014 and 172 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2013, and recorded provisions for credit loss in respect of credit card balances of 181 billion in 2015, as compared to 158 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2014 and 125 billion (excluding discontinued operations) in 2013. Delinquencies may increase in the future as a result of, among other things, adverse economic conditions in Korea, difficulties experienced by other credit card issuers that adversely affect our customers, additional government regulation or the inability of Korean consumers to manage increased household debt.

A deterioration of the asset quality of our consumer loan and credit card portfolios would require us to record increased provisions for credit loss and charge-offs and will adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. In addition, our large exposure to consumer debt means that we are exposed to changes in economic conditions affecting Korean consumers. Accordingly, economic difficulties in Korea that hurt those consumers could result in further deterioration in the credit quality of our consumer loan and credit card portfolios. For example, a rise in unemployment or an increase in interest rates in Korea could adversely affect the ability of consumers to make payments and increase the likelihood of potential defaults.

In light of adverse conditions in the Korean economy affecting consumers, in March 2009, the Financial Services Commission requested Korean banks, including us, to establish a “pre-workout program,” including a credit counseling and recovery service, for retail borrowers with outstanding short-term debt. The pre-workout program has been in operation since April 2009 and, following successive extensions by the Korean government, is expected to continue indefinitely. Under the pre-workout program, maturity extensions and/or interest reductions are provided for retail borrowers with total loans of less than 1.5 billion (consisting of no more than 500 million of unsecured loans and 1 billion of secured loans) who are in arrears on their payments for more than 30 days but less than 90 days. The aggregate amount of consumer credit (including credit card receivables)

we provided which became subject to the pre-workout program in 2015 was 26 billion. In addition, in March 2015, in response to increasing levels of consumer debt and amid concerns over the debt-servicing capacity of retail borrowers if interest rates were to rise, the Korean government launched, and requested Korean banks to participate in, a mortgage loan refinancing program aimed at reducing the payment burden on and improving the asset quality of outstanding mortgage loans. Under such refinancing program, qualified retail borrowers converted their outstanding non-amortizing floating-rate mortgage loans from Korean commercial banks (including us) into long-term amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with lower interest rates. The aggregate principal amount of mortgage loans that were refinanced under such program was 31.7 trillion for all commercial banks, of which our share was 3.9 trillion. Our participation in such refinancing program adversely affected our interest income on our outstanding mortgage loans, as well as our overall net interest margin. More generally, our participation in such government-led initiatives to provide financial support to retail borrowers may lead us to offer credit terms for such borrowers that we would not otherwise offer, in the absence of such initiatives, which may have an adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.

A decline in the value of the collateral securing our consumer loans and our inability to realize full collateral value may adversely affect our consumer credit portfolio.

A substantial portion of our consumer loans is secured by real estate, the values of which have fluctuated significantly in recent years. Although it is our general policy to lend up to 70% of the appraised value of collateral (except in areas of high speculation designated by the government where we generally limit our lending to 40% to 70% of the appraised value of collateral) and to periodically re-appraise our collateral, the downturn in the real estate markets in Korea in recent years has resulted in declines in the value of the collateral securing our mortgage and home equity loans. If collateral values decline further in the future, they may not be sufficient to cover uncollectible amounts in respect of our secured loans. Any future declines in the value of the real estate or other collateral securing our consumer loans, or our inability to obtain additional collateral in the event of such declines, could result in a deterioration in our asset quality and may require us to record additional allowances for credit losses.

In Korea, foreclosure on collateral generally requires a written petition to a court. An application, when made, may be subject to delays and administrative requirements that may decrease the value of such collateral. We cannot guarantee that we will be able to realize the full value on our collateral as a result of, among other factors, delays in foreclosure proceedings and defects in the perfection of our security interest in collateral. Our failure to recover the expected value of collateral could expose us to potential losses.

Risks relating to our structure and strategy

The implementation of the Korean government's privatization plan may have an adverse effect on us and your interests as a shareholder.

In June 2013, the Korean government, through the Public Funds Oversight Committee of the Financial Services Commission, announced an updated plan to privatize Woori Finance Holdings and its former subsidiaries, including us. The privatization plan provided for the segregation of such entities into three groups and the disposal of the Korean government's interest in these entities held through the KDIC in a series of transactions, many of which have been completed. Such transactions included the following:

- ***Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank.*** In May 2014, Woori Finance Holdings established KJB Financial Group and KNB Financial Group through a spin-off of its businesses related to the holding of the shares and thereby controlling the business operations of Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank, respectively. As a result of such spin-off, KJB Financial Group became the owner of the shares of Kwangju Bank previously held by Woori Finance Holdings, and KNB Financial Group became the owner of the shares of Kyongnam Bank previously held by Woori Finance Holdings. Woori Finance Holdings no longer owned any shares of Kwangju Bank or Kyongnam Bank, and neither they nor their new holding companies were its subsidiaries, after the spin-off. Following such spin-off, each of these banks was merged with its holding company, and in October 2014, the KDIC sold its 56.97% ownership interest in Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank to JB Financial Group and BS Financial Group, respectively.

- *Woori Investment & Securities and Other Subsidiaries.* In March 2014, Woori Finance Holdings sold its 52.0% ownership interest in Woori Financial to KB Financial Group. In May 2014, Woori Finance Holdings sold its 100.0% ownership interest in Woori Asset Management to Kiwoom Securities and sold its 100.0% ownership interest in Woori F&I to Daishin Securities. In June 2014, Woori Finance Holdings sold its 37.9% ownership interest in Woori Investment & Securities, its 51.6% ownership interest in Woori Aviva Life Insurance and its 100.0% ownership interest in Woori FG Savings Bank to NongHyup Financial Group in a collective sale. As a result of such sales, Woori Investment & Securities, Woori Asset Management, Woori Aviva Life Insurance, Woori FG Savings Bank, Woori F&I and Woori Financial were no longer subsidiaries of Woori Finance Holdings, and it no longer owned any shares in such former subsidiaries.
- *Woori Bank.* In November 2014, Woori Finance Holdings merged with and into us. As a result of the merger, the other former subsidiaries of Woori Finance Holdings, including Woori Card, Woori Private Equity, Woori FIS, Woori Investment Bank and Woori Finance Research Institute, became our subsidiaries. In December 2014, the KDIC sold 40,143,022 shares of our common stock in a private sale in Korea, as a result of which its ownership interest in us was reduced to 51.06%. We expect the KDIC to sell all or a portion of the remaining shares of our common stock it owns to one or more purchasers in the future.

See “Item 4A. History and Development of the Company–Privatization Plan.”

The implementation of the Korean government’s privatization plan, including the merger of Woori Finance Holdings with and into us and the expected sale of the KDIC’s remaining ownership interest in us to third parties, is likely to have a significant impact on us. For example, the loss of the Korean government as our indirect controlling shareholder, the spin-off of Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank and the loss of our former affiliates such as Woori Investment & Securities that had complementary businesses may have a material adverse effect on our credit profile and credit ratings, as well as our business, financial condition and results of operations. Furthermore, the sale of a controlling interest in us to one or more third parties may result in a change in our business, management, strategy, capital structure and assets and liabilities and lead to diversion of management attention, a loss of customers and labor unrest. In addition, such sale may require us to integrate our operations and systems with those of the purchasers or their affiliates and to reorganize or reduce overlapping personnel, branches, networks and administrative functions. There is also no guarantee that the various transactions completed under the privatization plan will not result in unintended adverse tax consequences for us and our subsidiaries, as well as our shareholders. Accordingly, the implementation of the privatization plan may have a material adverse effect on the trading price of our common stock and American depositary shares, or ADSs, and your interests as a shareholder.

We may not generate sufficient additional fees to achieve our revenue diversification strategy.

An important element of our overall strategy is increasing our fee income in order to diversify our revenue base, in anticipation of greater competition and declining lending margins. Historically, our primary source of revenues has been net interest income from our banking operations. To date, except for credit card, trust management, bancassurance and currency transfer fees (including foreign exchange-related commissions) and fees collected in connection with the operation of our investment funds, we have not generated substantial fee income. We intend to develop new sources of fee income as part of our business strategy, including through our investment banking and asset management businesses. Although we, like many other Korean financial institutions, have begun to charge fees to our customers more regularly, customers may prove unwilling to pay additional fees, even in exchange for more attractive value-added services, and their reluctance to do so would adversely affect the implementation of our strategy to increase our fee income. Furthermore, the fees that we charge to customers are subject to regulation by Korean financial regulatory authorities, which may seek to implement regulations or measures that may have an adverse impact on our ability to achieve this aspect of our strategy.

Risks relating to competition

Competition in the Korean financial industry is intense, and we may lose market share and experience declining margins as a result.

Competition in the Korean financial market has been and is likely to remain intense. Some of the financial institutions that we compete with are larger in terms of asset size and customer base and have greater financial resources or more specialized capabilities than us. In addition, in the area of our core banking operations, most Korean banks have been focusing on retail customers and small- and medium-sized enterprises in recent years, although they have begun to generally increase their exposure to large corporate borrowers, and have been focusing on developing fee income businesses, including bancassurance and investment products, as increasingly important sources of revenue. In the area of credit cards, Korean banks and credit card companies have in the past engaged in aggressive marketing activities and made significant investments, contributing to some extent to lower profitability and asset quality problems previously experienced with respect to credit card receivables. The competition and market saturation resulting from this common focus may make it more difficult for us to secure retail, small- and medium-sized enterprise and large corporate customers with the credit quality and on credit terms necessary to maintain or increase our income and profitability.

In addition, we believe that regulatory reforms and the general modernization of business practices in Korea will lead to increased competition among financial institutions in Korea. In the second half of 2015, the Korean government implemented measures to facilitate bank account portability of retail customers by requiring commercial banks to establish systems that allow retail customers to easily switch their bank accounts at one commercial bank to another and automatically transfer the automatic payment settings of their former accounts to the new ones. Such measures are expected to further intensify competition among financial institutions in Korea. We also believe that foreign financial institutions, many of which have greater experience and resources than we do, will seek to compete with us in providing financial products and services either by themselves or in partnership with existing Korean financial institutions. Furthermore, a number of significant mergers and acquisitions in the industry have taken place in Korea in recent years, including Hana Financial Group's acquisition of a controlling interest in Korea Exchange Bank in February 2012 and the subsequent merger of Hana Bank into Korea Exchange Bank in September 2015. Moreover, in 2014, pursuant to the implementation of the Korean government's privatization plan with respect to Woori Finance Holdings and its former subsidiaries, Woori Financial, Woori Asset Management and Woori F&I were acquired by KB Financial Group, Kiwoom Securities and Daishin Securities, respectively, and Woori Investment & Securities, Woori Aviva Life Insurance and Woori FG Savings Bank were acquired by NongHyup Financial Group. In addition, in October 2014, the KDIC's ownership interest in Kwangju Bank and Kyongnam Bank were acquired by JB Financial Group and BS Financial Group, respectively. See "Item 4A. History and Development of the Company—Privatization Plan." We expect that consolidation in the financial industry will continue. Other financial institutions may seek to acquire or merge with other entities, and the financial institutions resulting from such consolidation may, by virtue of their increased size and business scope, provide significantly greater competition for us. Increased competition and continuing consolidation may lead to decreased margins, resulting in a material adverse impact on our future profitability. Accordingly, our results of operations and financial condition may suffer as a result of increasing competition in the Korean financial industry.

Competition for customer deposits may increase, resulting in a loss of our deposit customers or an increase in our funding costs.

In recent years, we have faced increasing pricing pressure on deposit products from our competitors. If we do not continue to offer competitive interest rates to our deposit customers, we may lose their business. In addition, even if we are able to match our competitors' pricing, doing so may result in an increase in our funding costs, which may have an adverse impact on our results of operations.

Other risks relating to our business

Difficult conditions in the global financial markets could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

While the rate of deterioration of the global economy since the commencement of the global financial crisis in 2008 has slowed, with some signs of stabilization and improvement, the overall prospects for the Korean and global economy in 2016 and beyond remain uncertain. In recent years, the global financial markets have experienced significant volatility as a result of, among other things:

- the financial difficulties affecting many governments worldwide, in particular in southern Europe and Latin America;
- the slowdown of economic growth in China and other major emerging market economies;
- interest rate fluctuations as well as the possibility of increases in policy rates by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks; and
- political and social instability in various countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, including Iraq, Syria and Egypt, as well as in Ukraine and Russia.

In light of the high level of interdependence of the global economy, any of the foregoing developments could have a material adverse effect on the Korean economy and financial markets, and in turn on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

We are also exposed to adverse changes and volatility in global and Korean financial markets as a result of our liabilities and assets denominated in foreign currencies and our holdings of trading and investment securities, including structured products. The value of the Won relative to major foreign currencies in general and the U.S. dollar in particular has fluctuated widely in recent years. See "Item 3A. Selected Financial Data—Exchange Rates." A depreciation of the Won will increase our cost in Won of servicing our foreign currency-denominated debt, while continued exchange rate volatility may also result in foreign exchange losses for us. Furthermore, as a result of adverse global and Korean economic conditions, there has been significant volatility in securities prices, including the stock prices of Korean and foreign companies in which we hold an interest. Such volatility has resulted in and may lead to further trading and valuation losses on our trading and investment securities portfolio as well as impairment losses on our investments in joint ventures and associates.

Our risk management system may not be effective in mitigating risk and loss.

We seek to monitor and manage our risk exposure through a standardized risk management system, encompassing a multi-tiered risk management governance structure under our Board Risk Management Committee, our centralized credit risk management system called the CREPIA system, reporting and monitoring systems, early warning systems and other risk management infrastructure, using a variety of risk management strategies and techniques. See "Item 11. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk." However, such risk management strategies and techniques employed by us and the judgments that accompany their application cannot anticipate the economic and financial outcome in all market environments, and many of our risk management strategies and techniques have a basis in historic market behavior that may limit the effectiveness of such strategies and techniques in times of significant market stress or other unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, our risk management strategies may not be effective in a difficult or less liquid market environment, as other market participants may be attempting to use the same or similar strategies as us to deal with such market conditions. In such circumstances, it may be difficult for us to reduce our risk positions due to the activity of such other market participants.

Our failure to meet the financial and other business targets set forth in current terms of the memorandum of understanding between us and the KDIC may result in substantial harm to us.

Under the current terms of the memorandum of understanding entered into between us and the KDIC, we are required to meet certain financial and business targets on a quarterly basis until the end of 2016. See "Item 4A. History and Development of the Company—History—Memoranda of Understanding." As a result of

deteriorating economic and financial market conditions in Korea and globally, both we and Woori Finance Holdings have failed to meet certain of our respective targets in recent years. For example, in April 2014, the KDIC imposed an institutional warning on Woori Finance Holdings and us in connection with Woori Finance Holdings' failure to meet its financial targets for return on assets, expense-to-revenue ratio and non-performing loan ratio as of December 31, 2013 and our failure to meet our financial targets for return on assets and non-performing loan ratio as of December 31, 2013. In April 2015, the KDIC imposed an institutional warning on us in connection with our failure to meet our financial target for expense-to-revenue ratio as of December 31, 2014. In April 2016, while we failed to meet our financial target for expense-to-revenue ratio, the KDIC waived institutional measures due to our satisfaction of the other financial targets and the consideration of certain factors. We entered into a new business normalization plan with new restructuring measures and financial targets with the KDIC in March 2016.

If we fail to satisfy our obligations under the current or any new memorandum of understanding in the future, the Korean government, through the KDIC, may impose penalties on us. These penalties could include the replacement of our senior management, sale of our assets, restructuring of our organization, restrictions on our business, including a suspension or transfer of our business, and elimination or reduction of existing equity. Accordingly, our failure to meet the obligations in the memorandum of understanding may result in harm to our business, financial condition and results of operations.

We have provided certain assets as collateral in connection with our secured borrowings and could be required to make payments and realize losses in the future relating to those assets.

We have provided certain assets as collateral for our secured borrowings in recent years. As of December 31, 2015, the aggregate amount of assets we had provided as collateral for our secured borrowings was 9,217 billion. These secured borrowings may take the form of asset securitization transactions, where we nominally sell our assets to a securitization vehicle that issues securities backed by those assets, although the assets remain on our statements of financial position. These secured borrowings are intended to be fully repaid through recoveries on collateral. Some of these nominal asset sales were with recourse, which means that if delinquencies arise with respect to such assets, we will be required to either repay a proportionate amount of the related secured borrowing (by reversing the nominal sale and repurchasing such assets) or compensate the securitization vehicle for any net shortfalls in its recoveries on such assets. If we are required to make payments on such assets, or to repay our secured borrowings on those assets and are unable to make sufficient recoveries on them, we may realize further losses on these assets.

An increase in interest rates would decrease the value of our debt securities portfolio and raise our funding costs while reducing loan demand and the repayment ability of our borrowers, which could adversely affect us.

Interest rates in Korea have been subject to significant fluctuations in the past. In an effort to stem inflation amid improved growth prospects, the Bank of Korea gradually increased its policy rate in 2010 and 2011 by a total of 125 basis points to 3.25%. However, the Bank of Korea reduced its policy rate to 2.00% through a series of reductions from 2012 to 2014 to support Korea's economy in light of the slowdown in Korea's growth and uncertain global economic prospects. In 2015, the Bank of Korea further reduced its policy rate to an unprecedented 1.50% amid deflationary concerns and interest rate cuts by central banks around the world. All else being equal, an increase in interest rates in the future could lead to a decline in the value of our portfolio of debt securities, which generally pay interest based on a fixed rate. A sustained increase in interest rates will also raise our funding costs, while reducing loan demand, especially among consumers. Rising interest rates may therefore require us to re-balance our asset portfolio and our liabilities in order to minimize the risk of potential mismatches and maintain our profitability. See "Item 11. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk." In addition, rising interest rate levels may adversely affect the Korean economy and the financial condition of our corporate and consumer borrowers, including holders of our credit cards, which in turn may lead to a deterioration in our credit portfolio. In particular, since most of our consumer and corporate loans bear interest at rates that adjust periodically based on prevailing market rates, a sustained increase in interest rate levels will increase the interest costs of our consumer and corporate borrowers and will adversely affect their ability to make payments on their outstanding loans.

Our funding is highly dependent on short-term deposits, which dependence may adversely affect our operations.

We meet a significant amount of our funding requirements through short-term funding sources, which consist primarily of customer deposits. As of December 31, 2015, approximately 95.1% of these deposits had maturities of one year or less or were payable on demand. In the past, a substantial proportion of these customer deposits have been rolled over upon maturity. We cannot guarantee, however, that depositors will continue to roll over their deposits in the future. In the event that a substantial number of these short-term deposit customers withdraw their funds or fail to roll over their deposits as higher-yielding investment opportunities emerge, our liquidity position could be adversely affected. We may also be required to seek more expensive sources of short-term and long-term funding to finance our operations. See “Item 5B. Liquidity and Capital Resources—Financial Condition—Liquidity.”

Labor union unrest may disrupt our operations and hinder our ability to continue to reorganize our operations.

Most financial institutions in Korea have experienced periods of labor unrest. In recent years, we have transferred or merged some of the business operations of our subsidiaries and affiliates into one or more entities and implemented other forms of corporate and operational restructuring, including in connection with the Korean government’s privatization plan with respect to Woori Finance Holdings and its former subsidiaries. See “—Risks relating to our structure and strategy—The implementation of the Korean government’s privatization plan may have an adverse effect on us and your interests as a shareholder.” We may also decide to implement other organizational or operational changes, as well as acquisitions or dispositions, in the future. Such efforts have in the past been met with significant opposition from labor unions in Korea. Actual or threatened labor disputes may in the future disrupt the reorganization process and our business operations, which in turn may hurt our financial condition and results of operations.

The secondary market for corporate bonds in Korea is not fully developed, and, as a result, we may not be able to realize the full “marked-to-market” value of debt securities we hold when we sell any of those securities.

As of December 31, 2015, we held debt securities issued by Korean companies and financial institutions (other than those issued by government-owned or -controlled enterprises or financial institutions, which include the KDIC, the Korea Electric Power Corporation, the Bank of Korea, the Korea Development Bank and the Industrial Bank of Korea, among others) with a total book value of 2,960 billion in our trading and investment securities portfolio. The market value of these securities could decline significantly due to various factors, including future increases in interest rates or a deterioration in the financial and economic condition of any particular issuer or of Korea in general. Any of these factors individually or a combination of these factors would require us to write down the fair value of these debt securities, resulting in impairment losses. Because the secondary market for corporate bonds in Korea is not fully developed, the market value of many of these securities as reflected on our consolidated statements of financial position is determined by references to suggested prices posted by Korean rating agencies, which measure prices based on observable market data. These valuations, however, may differ significantly from the actual value that we could realize in the event we elect to sell these securities. As a result, we may not be able to realize the full “marked-to-market” value at the time of any such sale of these securities and thus may incur additional losses.

We may be required to raise additional capital if our capital adequacy ratio deteriorates or the applicable capital requirements change in the future, but we may not be able to do so on favorable terms or at all.

Under the capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Services Commission, we are currently required to maintain a minimum Tier I common equity capital adequacy ratio of 4.5%, Tier I capital adequacy ratio of 6.0% and combined Tier I and Tier II capital adequacy ratio of 8.0%, on a consolidated basis. In addition, the current terms of the memorandum of understanding between us and the KDIC requires us to meet specified capital adequacy ratio requirements. See “Item 4A. History and Development of the Company—History—Memoranda

of Understanding.” As of December 31, 2015, our Tier I common equity capital, Tier I capital and combined Tier I and Tier II capital ratios were 8.47%, 10.43% and 13.66%, respectively, which exceeded the minimum levels required by both the Financial Services Commission and such memorandum. However, our capital base and capital adequacy ratio may deteriorate in the future if our results of operations or financial condition deteriorates for any reason, or if we are not able to deploy our funding into suitably low-risk assets. To the extent that we fail to maintain our capital adequacy ratios in the future, Korean regulatory authorities may impose penalties on us ranging from a warning to suspension or revocation of our licenses.

The current capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Services Commission are derived from a new set of bank capital measures, referred to as Basel III, which the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initially introduced in 2009 and began phasing in starting from 2013. Commencing in July 2013, the Financial Services Commission promulgated a series of amended regulations implementing Basel III, pursuant to which Korean banks and bank holding companies were required to maintain a minimum ratio of Tier I common equity capital (which principally includes equity capital, capital surplus and retained earnings less reserve for credit losses) to risk-weighted assets of 3.5% and Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets of 4.5% from December 1, 2013, which minimum ratios were increased to 4.0% and 5.5%, respectively, from January 1, 2014 and increased further to 4.5% and 6.0%, respectively, from January 1, 2015. Such requirements are in addition to the pre-existing requirement for a minimum ratio of Tier I and Tier II capital (less any capital deductions) to risk-weighted assets of 8.0%, which remains unchanged. The amended regulations also require an additional capital conservation buffer of 0.625% on January 1, 2016, with such buffer to increase in stages each subsequent year to 2.5% by 2019, as well as a potential counter-cyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% starting in 2016, which will be determined on a quarterly basis by the Financial Services Commission. Furthermore, we were designated as one of five domestic systemically important banks for 2016 by the Financial Services Commission and may be subject to an additional capital requirement of 0.25% in 2016, if deemed necessary, with such potential requirement to increase in stages to 1.0% by 2019. The implementation of Basel III in Korea may have a significant effect on the capital requirements of Korean financial institutions, including us. See “Item 4B. Business Overview—Supervision and Regulation—Principal Regulations Applicable to Banks—Capital Adequacy.”

We may be required to obtain additional capital in the future in order to remain in compliance with more stringent capital adequacy and other regulatory requirements. However, we may not be able to obtain additional capital on favorable terms, or at all. Our ability to obtain additional capital at any time may be constrained to the extent that banks or other financial institutions in Korea or from other countries are seeking to raise capital at the same time. Depending on whether we are obtaining any necessary additional capital, and the terms and amount of any additional capital obtained, holders of our common stock or ADSs may experience a dilution of their interest.

We engage in limited activities relating to Iran and may become subject to sanctions under relevant laws and regulations of the United States and other jurisdictions as a result of such activities, which may adversely affect our business and reputation.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, administers and enforces certain laws and regulations (which we refer to as OFAC sanctions) that impose restrictions upon activities or transactions within U.S. jurisdiction with certain countries, governments, entities and individuals that are the subject of OFAC sanctions, including Iran. Even though non-U.S. persons generally are not directly bound by OFAC sanctions, in recent years OFAC has asserted that such non-U.S. persons can be held liable on various legal theories if they engage in transactions completed in part in the United States or by U.S. persons (such as, for example, wiring an international payment that clears through a bank branch in New York). The European Union also enforces certain laws and regulations that impose restrictions upon nationals and entities of, and business conducted in, member states with respect to activities or transactions with certain countries, governments, entities and individuals that are the subject of such laws and regulations, including Iran. The United Nations Security Council and other governmental entities also impose similar sanctions.

In 2015, in addition to the OFAC sanctions described above, the United States maintained indirect sanctions under authority of, among others, the Iran Sanctions Act, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, or CISADA, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2012, or the NDAA, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, or ITRA, various Executive Orders, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, or IFCA. These indirect sanctions, which we refer to collectively as U.S. secondary sanctions, provide authority for the imposition of U.S. sanctions on foreign parties that provide services (including banking services and financing) in support of certain Iranian activities in the energy, shipping and military sectors, among others. Iran has also been designated as a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, potentially subjecting banks dealing with Iranian financial institutions to increased regulatory scrutiny.

Also in 2015, Korea had a sanctions program targeting Iran in accordance with the series of relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. In particular, in September 2010, the Korean government announced broad sanctions implementation guidelines covering financial, trade, transportation and energy-related activities with Iran, which also included a proposal to facilitate legitimate trade between Korea and Iran through Won-denominated settlement accounts to be opened by the Central Bank of Iran, or CBI, at certain Korean banks for such purpose. In December 2011, the Korean government announced expanded sanctions against Iran, including the addition of 99 entities and six individuals that are related to Iran’s nuclear program to the Korean government’s sanctioned party list with respect to Iran.

On January 16, 2016, however, the so-called “P5+1” powers (the United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) and Iran declared that “Implementation Day” had occurred under a previously agreed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA, which provided Iran with significant (but not complete) sanctions relief. The relief lifted the majority of European Union, United Nations, Korean, and U.S. secondary sanctions, including those U.S. secondary sanctions targeting the following activities: (i) financial and banking transactions with some (but not all) Iranian banks and financial institutions, including CBI; (ii) purchases of Iranian crude oil; (iii) investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; (iv) purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran; and (v) transactions with Iran’s energy sector. As a result, dealings with most Iranian financial institutions and the Iranian energy sector are now unrestricted, so long as the dealings have no connection to the United States and do not involve remaining Iranian entities designated for U.S. terrorism, human rights, nonproliferation and other sanctions; do not conceal the identity of Iranian participants; and do not relate to military activities or human rights violations. OFAC sanctions remain in place, however, which means that all transactions involving Iran within U.S. jurisdiction are still prohibited, including U.S. dollar clearing transactions.

Violations of OFAC sanctions via transactions with a U.S. jurisdictional nexus can result in substantial civil or criminal penalties. A range of sanctions may be imposed on companies that engage in sanctionable activities within the scope of U.S. secondary sanctions, including, among other things, the blocking of any property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which the sanctioned company has an interest, which could include a prohibition on transactions or dealings involving securities of the sanctioned company pursuant to CISADA. Financial institutions engaging in targeted activity could be sanctioned by termination or restriction of their ability to maintain correspondent accounts in the United States. The imposition of sanctions against foreign financial institutions pursuant to the U.S. secondary sanctions is not automatic, requiring further action by the U.S. administration.

In 2015, we engaged in the following activities relating to Iran:

- We operate certain accounts for CBI, which were opened by CBI pursuant to a service agreement entered into by us and CBI in September 2010 to facilitate trade between Korea and Iran. The accounts opened by CBI consist of Won-denominated accounts that are used for the settlement of exports of goods produced or substantially transformed in Korea to Iran by Korean exporters and Won, U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese Yen-denominated accounts (of which only the Won accounts are currently in use) that are used for the settlement of imports of oil and natural gas from Iran by Korean importers. By the terms of the service agreement (as amended) between us and CBI, settlement of export and import transaction payments due from Iranian entities to Korean exporters or from Korean importers to Iranian entities through such accounts opened by CBI are effected by crediting or debiting the relevant amount to or

from the applicable accounts while a corresponding payment of funds is made to or from an Iranian bank by CBI. Any funds deposited for the account of Iranian entities as a result of Korean imports of oil and gas may only be used by transferring them to the Won-denominated account and then making payment to accounts of Korean persons and entities opened at financial institutions in Korea in respect of Korean exports to Iran. No transfers of funds may be made from these accounts to Iran, to Iranian accounts in any third country, or for any use other than those described above. Furthermore, the applicable laws and regulations and banking guidelines of Korea require that trade transactions between Korean and Iranian parties be subject to prior certification and clearance by relevant Korean governmental authorities (or organizations designated thereby) to ensure compliance with Korean economic sanctions and export controls against Iran, and the settlement of payments through the accounts opened by CBI with us are not permitted without such prior certification and clearance. In 2015, the total fee revenue from maintaining the CBI accounts amounted to approximately 151 million (which represented approximately 0.001% of our total revenue). As there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts, we estimate that our net income before tax from maintaining the CBI accounts also amounted to approximately 151 million (which represented approximately 0.01% of our total net income before tax). We intend to continue maintaining the accounts opened by CBI, and in light of the lifting of certain sanctions against Iran, including U.S. secondary sanctions, the scope of our services provided to CBI may be adjusted to reflect such change in circumstances.

- We also provide limited export-import financing services to Korean exporters and importers in connection with their trade transactions with Iran that were permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and were not subject to U.S. secondary sanctions, primarily by discounting, advising on or issuing letters of credit, and to a lesser extent, issuing performance bonds on behalf of Korean contractors with respect to Iranian construction projects permitted under the relevant Korean sanctions and not subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. All such transactions are settled through the accounts opened by CBI with us as described above. In 2015, our total fee revenue from such export-import financing services amounted to approximately 2.3 billion (which represented approximately 0.02% of our total revenue), while our net income before tax from such activities (net of expenses directly applicable to such activities based on our internal management accounts) amounted to approximately 1 billion (which represented approximately 0.07% of our total net income before tax). We intend to continue providing the export-import financing services with its current scope, to the extent U.S. secondary sanctions or other applicable sanctions remain lifted.
- We also maintain a limited number of deposit accounts in Korea for an Iranian financial institution that the U.S. government has historically viewed as controlled by the government of Iran. These accounts were opened with us before the institution was designated for U.S. sanctions. Under Korean customer protection requirements, we are unable to provide specific information identifying this Iranian financial institution or the volume of its deposits. As a Korean bank is generally prohibited under Korean law from unilaterally terminating a deposit account without the consent of the depositor, we do not currently have plans to terminate these deposit accounts. In 2015, there were minimal fee revenues from maintaining such deposit accounts, and there were no expenses directly applicable to such activities under our internal management accounts.

In addition, pursuant to requests from the U.S. government received in 2015, and authorization from the competent Korean authorities, we released US\$490 million each on four different occasions, or a total of US\$1,960 million, from the Won-denominated accounts of CBI maintained by us to the accounts of CBI located outside Korea. We understand that such requests were in furtherance of an interim Joint Plan of Action agreed between the P5+1 and Iran in November 2013.

We do not believe that our activities relating to Iran violate OFAC sanctions or are sanctionable under U.S. secondary sanctions. Moreover, to the extent our activities were sanctionable under those U.S. secondary sanctions programs that were lifted pursuant to the JCPOA, U.S. authorities have indicated that sanctions will not be imposed pursuant to the suspended U.S. secondary sanctions. Nevertheless, there can be no assurances that the

relevant relief will remain in place, and even if it does, there is no guarantee that our activities relating to Iran will not be found to violate OFAC sanctions or involve sanctionable activity under U.S. secondary sanctions, or that any other government will not determine that our activities violate applicable sanctions of other countries. The re-imposition or “snap-back” of U.S. sanctions pursuant to the JCPOA could also occur, and the scope of re-imposed sanctions would be determined at that time, although sanctions would not be retroactively applied to activities properly engaged in while sanctions relief was in effect. Sanctions against Iran are evolving rapidly, and future changes in law could also adversely affect us.

Our business and reputation could be adversely affected if the U.S. government were to determine that our activities relating to Iran violate OFAC sanctions or involve sanctionable activity under the U.S. secondary sanctions and we are unable to resolve the U.S. government’s concerns (for example, through closing the accounts opened by CBI with us), or if any other government were to determine that our activities relating to Iran violate applicable sanctions of other countries. Any prohibition or conditions placed on our use of U.S. correspondent accounts could effectively eliminate our access to the U.S. financial system, including U.S. dollar clearing transactions, which would adversely affect our business, and any other sanctions or civil or criminal penalties imposed could also adversely affect our business. If the U.S. government were to challenge the compatibility of our activities relating to Iran with the OFAC sanctions or the U.S. secondary sanctions, while no assurances can be given that any such measures would be successful, we intend to take all necessary measures to the extent possible to ensure that prohibitions or conditions are not placed on our use of U.S. correspondent accounts, including closing the accounts opened by CBI with us, if required.

We are cooperating with an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice and the New York State Office of the Attorney General into the use and operation of the CBI accounts. It is not possible to predict the outcome of such investigation at this time, and there can be no assurance that such investigation will not result in an unfavorable outcome or adversely affect our business or reputation. Furthermore, beginning in October 2014, the Prosecutors’ Office of Korea investigated a scheme by which the representative director of a Korean company and one of our employees engaged in fraudulent trade transactions involving our Won-denominated settlement activities through the CBI accounts. These individuals were arrested for, charged with and convicted of violations of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Law. The Prosecutors’ Office of Korea completed its investigation in connection with this incident and concluded that neither we nor our executive officers engaged in any wrongdoing. However, the fraudulent transactions in question did not meet the conditions attached to operation of the CBI accounts, and there can be no assurances that U.S. authorities would agree that we were not culpable or that the transactions would not be considered sanctionable.

Furthermore, some of our U.S. investors may be required to divest their investments in us under the laws of certain U.S. states or under internal investment policies relating to companies doing business with Iran or may decide for reputational reasons to divest such investments, and some U.S. institutional investors may forego the purchase of our securities. We are aware of initiatives by U.S. governmental entities and U.S. institutional investors, such as pension funds, to adopt or consider adopting laws, regulations or policies prohibiting transactions with or investment in, or requiring divestment from, entities doing business with countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism. There can be no assurance that the foregoing will not occur or that such occurrence will not have a material adverse effect on the value of our common stock and ADSs.

Our Internet banking services are subject to security concerns relating to the commercial use of the Internet.

We provide Internet banking services (including mobile and smartphone banking services) to our retail and corporate customers, which require sensitive customer information, including passwords and account information, to be transferred over a secure connection on the Internet. However, connections on the Internet, although secure, are not free from security breaches. We may experience security breaches in connection with our Internet banking services in the future, which may result in regulatory sanctions as well as liability to our customers and third parties and materially and adversely affect our business.

We may experience disruptions, delays and other difficulties from our information technology systems.

We rely on our information technology systems for our daily operations including billing, effecting online and offline banking transactions and record keeping. We may experience disruptions, delays or other difficulties from our information technology systems, which may have an adverse effect on our business and adversely impact our customers' confidence in us.

We are generally subject to Korean corporate governance and disclosure standards, which differ in significant respects from those in other countries.

Companies in Korea, including us, are subject to corporate governance standards applicable to Korean public companies which differ in many respects from standards applicable in other countries, including the United States. As a reporting company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we are subject to certain corporate governance standards as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, foreign private issuers, including us, are exempt from certain corporate governance requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. There may also be less publicly available information about Korean companies, such as us, than is regularly made available by public or non-public companies in other countries. Such differences in corporate governance standards and less public information could result in less than satisfactory corporate governance practices or disclosure to investors in certain countries.

Risks relating to government control

The KDIC, which is our controlling shareholder, is controlled by the Korean government and could cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that may be against your interests.

The Korean government, through the KDIC, currently owns 51.06% of our outstanding common stock, although it is in the process of implementing a privatization plan with respect to us pursuant to which it intends to dispose of such common stock. See "—Risks relating to our structure and strategy—The implementation of the Korean government's privatization plan may have an adverse effect on us and your interests as a shareholder." So long as the Korean government remains our controlling shareholder, it will have the ability to cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that may conflict with the interests of our other shareholders. For example, in order to further its public policy goals, the Korean government could request that we participate with respect to a takeover of a troubled financial institution or encourage us to provide financial support to particular entities or sectors. Such actions or others that are not consistent with maximizing our profits or the value of our common stock may have an adverse impact on our results of operations and financial condition and may cause the price of our common stock and ADSs to decline.

In addition, pursuant to the terms of our memorandum of understanding with the KDIC, we are required to take any necessary action (including share buybacks and payment of dividends) to return to the KDIC the funds it injected into us, so long as such action does not cause a material adverse effect on the normalization of our business operations as contemplated by the memorandum of understanding. Any action that we take as a result of this requirement may favor the KDIC over our other shareholders and may therefore be against your interests.

Risks relating to government regulation and policy

The Korean government may promote lending and financial support by the Korean financial industry to certain types of borrowers as a matter of policy, which financial institutions, including us, may decide to follow.

Through its policy guidelines and recommendations, the Korean government has promoted and, as a matter of policy, may continue to attempt to promote lending by the Korean financial industry to particular types of borrowers. For example, the Korean government has in the past announced policy guidelines requesting financial institutions to participate in remedial programs for troubled corporate borrowers, as well as policies aimed at promoting certain sectors of the economy, including measures such as making low interest funding available to financial institutions that lend to these sectors. The government has in this manner encouraged mortgage lending

to low-income individuals and lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises. We expect that all loans or credits made pursuant to these government policies will be reviewed in accordance with our credit approval procedures. However, these or any future government policies may influence us to lend to certain sectors or in a manner in which we otherwise would not in the absence of that policy.

In the past, the Korean government has also announced policies under which financial institutions in Korea are encouraged to provide financial support to particular sectors. For example, in light of the deteriorating financial condition and liquidity position of small- and medium-sized enterprises in Korea as a result of the global financial crisis commencing in the second half of 2008 and adverse conditions in the Korean economy affecting consumers, the Korean government introduced measures intended to encourage Korean banks to provide financial support to small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers. See “—Risks relating to our corporate credit portfolio—The largest portion of our exposure is to small- and medium-sized enterprises, and financial difficulties experienced by companies in this segment may result in a deterioration of our asset quality and have an adverse impact on us.” In addition, in March 2015, in response to increasing levels of consumer debt and amid concerns over the debt-servicing capacity of retail borrowers if interest rates were to rise, the Korean government requested Korean banks to participate in a mortgage loan refinancing program aimed at reducing the payment burden on and improving the asset quality of outstanding mortgage loans. See “—Risks relating to our consumer credit portfolio—We may experience increases in delinquencies in our consumer loan and credit card portfolios.”

The Korean government may in the future request financial institutions in Korea, including us, to make investments in or provide other forms of financial support to particular sectors of the Korean economy as a matter of policy, which financial institutions, including us, may decide to accept. We may incur costs or losses as a result of providing such financial support.

The Financial Services Commission may impose burdensome measures on us if it deems us to be financially unsound.

If the Financial Services Commission deems our financial condition to be unsound, or if we fail to meet applicable regulatory standards, such as minimum capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, the Financial Services Commission may order or recommend, among other things:

- admonitions or warnings with respect to our officers;
- capital increases or reductions;
- assignments of contractual rights and obligations relating to financial transactions;
- a suspension of performance by our officers of their duties and the appointment of receivers;
- disposals of property holdings or closures of subsidiaries or branch offices or downsizing;
- stock cancellations or consolidations;
- mergers with other financial institutions;
- acquisition of us by a third party; and
- suspensions of a part or all of our business operations.

If any of these measures are imposed on us by the Financial Services Commission, they could hurt our business, results of operations and financial condition. In addition, if the Financial Services Commission orders us to partially or completely reduce our capital, you may lose part or all of your investment.

Risks relating to Korea

Unfavorable financial and economic developments in Korea may have an adverse effect on us.

We are incorporated in Korea, and substantially all of our operations are located in Korea. As a result, we are subject to political, economic, legal and regulatory risks specific to Korea. The economic indicators in Korea in recent years have shown mixed signs of growth and uncertainty, and future growth of the Korean economy is subject to many factors beyond our control, including developments in the global economy.

In recent years, adverse conditions and volatility in the worldwide financial markets, fluctuations in oil and commodity prices and the general weakness of the global economy have contributed to the uncertainty of global economic prospects in general and have adversely affected, and may continue to adversely affect, the Korean economy. See “—Other risks relating to our business—Difficult conditions in the global financial markets could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.” The value of the Won relative to major foreign currencies has fluctuated significantly. See “Item 3A. Selected Financial Data—Exchange Rates.” Furthermore, as a result of adverse global and Korean economic conditions, there has been volatility in the stock prices of Korean companies in recent years. Future declines in the Korea Composite Stock Price Index, known as the KOSPI, and large amounts of sales of Korean securities by foreign investors and subsequent repatriation of the proceeds of such sales may adversely affect the value of the Won, the foreign currency reserves held by financial institutions in Korea, and the ability of Korean companies to raise capital. Any future deterioration of the Korean or global economy could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Developments that could have an adverse impact on Korea’s economy include:

- difficulties in the financial sector and increased sovereign default risks in select countries and the resulting adverse effects on the global financial markets;
- adverse changes or volatility in foreign currency reserve levels, commodity prices (including oil prices), exchange rates (including fluctuation of the U.S. dollar, the euro or the Japanese yen exchange rates or revaluation of the Chinese renminbi), interest rates, inflation rates or stock markets;
- continuing adverse conditions in the economies of countries and regions that are important export markets for Korea, such as China, the United States, Europe and Japan, or in emerging market economies in Asia or elsewhere;
- decreases in the market prices of Korean real estate;
- increasing delinquencies and credit defaults by consumer or small- and medium-sized enterprise borrowers;
- declines in consumer confidence and a slowdown in consumer spending;
- increasing levels of household debts;
- difficulties in the financial sector in Korea, including the savings bank sector;
- the continued growth of the Chinese economy, to the extent its benefits (such as increased exports to China) are outweighed by its costs (such as competition in export markets or for foreign investment and the relocation of the manufacturing base from Korea to China), as well as a slowdown in the growth of China’s economy, which is Korea’s most important export market;
- social and labor unrest;
- a decrease in tax revenue and a substantial increase in the Korean government’s expenditures for fiscal stimulus measures, unemployment compensation and other economic and social programs that, together, would lead to an increased government budget deficit;
- financial problems or lack of progress in the restructuring of *chaebols*, other large troubled companies, their suppliers or the financial sector;
- loss of investor confidence arising from corporate accounting irregularities and corporate governance issues concerning certain *chaebols*;
- increases in social expenditures to support an aging population in Korea or decreases in economic productivity due to the declining population size in Korea;
- the economic impact of any pending or future free trade agreements;
- geo-political uncertainty and risk of further attacks by terrorist groups around the world;

- natural or man-made disasters that have a significant adverse economic or other impact on Korea or its major trading partners;
- the occurrence of severe health epidemics in Korea or other parts of the world, such as the recent Middle East Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in Korea;
- deterioration in economic or diplomatic relations between Korea and its trading partners or allies, including deterioration resulting from territorial or trade disputes or disagreements in foreign policy;
- political uncertainty or increasing strife among or within political parties in Korea;
- hostilities or political or social tensions involving oil producing countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa and any material disruption in the global supply of oil or increase in the price of oil;
- an increase in the level of tensions or an outbreak of hostilities between North Korea and Korea or the United States; and
- changes in financial regulations in Korea.

Escalations in tensions with North Korea could have an adverse effect on us and the market price of our ADSs.

Relations between Korea and North Korea have been tense throughout Korea's modern history. The level of tension between the two Koreas has fluctuated and may increase abruptly as a result of current and future events. In particular, since the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, there has been increased uncertainty with respect to the future of North Korea's political leadership and concern regarding its implications for political and economic stability in the region. Although Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-un, has assumed power as his father's designated successor, the long-term outcome of such leadership transition remains uncertain.

In addition, there have been heightened security concerns in recent years stemming from North Korea's nuclear weapon and long-range missile programs as well as its hostile military actions against Korea. Some of the significant incidents in recent years include the following:

- From time to time, North Korea has conducted ballistic missile tests. Most recently in February 2016, North Korea launched a long-range rocket in violation of its agreement with the United States as well as United Nations sanctions barring it from conducting launches that use ballistic missile technology. Despite international condemnation, North Korea released a statement that it intends to continue its rocket launch program. Following the rocket launch, the Korean government announced that it would shut down the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, an industrial park jointly operated with North Korea, to prevent North Korea from using the funds earned through the industrial park in furtherance of its missile program. North Korea responded by declaring the industrial park a military control zone, expelling all Korean workers from, and freezing all Korean assets and equipment at, the industrial park.
- North Korea renounced its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003 and conducted three rounds of nuclear tests between October 2006 to February 2013, which increased tensions in the region and elicited strong objections worldwide. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed resolutions that condemned North Korea for the nuclear tests and imposed sanctions against North Korea. In January 2016, North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear test, claiming that the test involved its first hydrogen bomb, a claim which has not been independently verified. In response to such test (as well as North Korea's long-range rocket launch in February 2016), the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution in March 2016 condemning North Korea's actions and significantly expanding the scope of the sanctions applicable to North Korea.
- In August 2015, two Korean soldiers were injured in a landmine explosion near the Korean demilitarized zone. Claiming the landmines were set by North Koreans, the Korean army re-initiated its propaganda program toward North Korea utilizing loudspeakers near the demilitarized zone. In retaliation, the North Korean army fired artillery rounds on the loudspeakers, resulting in the highest level of military readiness for both Koreas.

- In March 2013, North Korea stated that it had entered “a state of war” with Korea, declaring the 1953 armistice invalid, and put its artillery at the highest level of combat readiness to protest the Korea-United States allies’ military drills and additional sanctions imposed on North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests.
- In March 2010, a Korean naval vessel was destroyed by an underwater explosion, killing many of the crewmen on board. The Korean government formally accused North Korea of causing the sinking, while North Korea denied responsibility. Moreover, in November 2010, North Korea fired more than one hundred artillery shells that hit Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island near the Northern Limit Line, which acts as the de facto maritime boundary between Korea and North Korea on the west coast of the Korean peninsula, causing casualties and significant property damage. The Korean government condemned North Korea for the attack and vowed stern retaliation should there be further provocation.

North Korea’s economy also faces severe challenges, which may further aggravate social and political pressures within North Korea. There can be no assurance that the level of tensions affecting the Korean peninsula will not escalate in the future. Any further increase in tensions, which may occur, for example, if North Korea experiences a leadership crisis, high-level contacts between Korea and North Korea break down or military hostilities occur, could have a material adverse effect on the Korean economy and on our business, financial condition and results of operations and the market value of our common stock and ADSs.

Labor unrest in Korea may adversely affect our operations.

Economic difficulties in Korea or increases in corporate reorganizations and bankruptcies could result in layoffs and higher unemployment. Such developments could lead to social unrest and substantially increase government expenditures for unemployment compensation and other costs for social programs. According to statistics from the Korea National Statistical Office, the unemployment rate was 3.1% in 2013, increased to 3.5% in 2014 and further increased to 3.6% in 2015. Further increases in unemployment and any resulting labor unrest in the future could adversely affect our operations, as well as the operations of many of our customers and their ability to repay their loans, and could adversely affect the financial condition of Korean companies in general, depressing the price of their securities. Furthermore, the government’s privatization plan with respect to us contemplates the sale of its ownership interest in us to a third party, which may lead to labor unrest among our employees. See “Item 4A. History and Development of the Company–Privatization Plan.” Any of these developments may have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Risks relating to our common stock and ADSs

The market price of our common stock and ADSs could be adversely affected by the ability of the KDIC to sell or otherwise dispose of large blocks of our common stock.

The KDIC currently owns 345,142,556 shares, or 51.06%, of our outstanding common stock. In the future, the KDIC may choose to sell large blocks of our common stock publicly or privately to a strategic or financial investor, including for the purpose of recovering the public funds it injected into us. For example, in September 2004, the KDIC sold approximately 45 million shares of our common stock, which constituted 5.7% of our outstanding common stock, and in June 2007, the KDIC disposed of approximately 40 million shares of our common stock, which constituted 5.0% of our outstanding common stock. In addition, in November 2009, the KDIC sold approximately 56 million shares of our common stock, which constituted 7.0% of our outstanding common stock, and in April 2010, the KDIC disposed of approximately 73 million shares of our common stock, which constituted 9.0% of our outstanding common stock. Most recently, in December 2014, the KDIC sold 40,143,022 shares of our common stock, which constituted 5.9% of our outstanding common stock.

In June 2013, the Korean government, through the Public Funds Oversight Committee of the Financial Services Commission, announced an updated plan to privatize Woori Finance Holdings and its former subsidiaries, including us. The privatization plan provided for the segregation of such entities into three groups and the disposal of the Korean government’s interest in these entities held through the KDIC in a series of transactions, many of which have been completed. See “—Risks relating to our structure and strategy—The

implementation of the Korean government's privatization plan may have an adverse effect on us and your interests as a shareholder." The privatization plan may be changed by the Korean government, or its further implementation may be delayed, depending on market conditions and other factors. We do not know precisely when, how or what percentage of our shares owned by the KDIC will ultimately be disposed of, or to whom such shares will be sold. As a result, we cannot predict the impact of any such transactions on us or our stock prices. The implementation of the Korean government's privatization plan with respect to us, including future sales of our common stock by the KDIC or the possibility that such transactions may occur, could adversely affect the prevailing market prices of our common stock and ADSs.

Ownership of our common stock is restricted under Korean law.

Under the Bank Act, a single shareholder, together with its affiliates, is generally prohibited from owning more than 10.0% of a nationwide bank's total issued and outstanding shares with voting rights or more than 15.0% of a regional bank's total issued and outstanding shares with voting rights, with the exception of certain shareholders that are non-financial business group companies, whose applicable limit was reduced from 9.0% to 4.0% pursuant to an amendment of the Bank Act which became effective on February 14, 2014. To the extent that the total number of shares of our common stock (including those represented by ADSs) that you and your affiliates own together exceeds the applicable limits, you will not be entitled to exercise the voting rights for the excess shares, and the Financial Services Commission may order you to dispose of the excess shares within a period of up to six months. Failure to comply with such an order would result in an administrative fine of up to 0.03% of the book value of such shares per day until the date of disposal. Non-financial business group companies may not acquire beneficial ownership of shares of a nationwide bank in excess of 4.0% of such bank's outstanding voting shares, unless they obtain the approval of the Financial Services Commission and agree not to exercise voting rights in respect of shares in excess of the 4.0% limit, in which case they may acquire beneficial ownership of up to 10.0% of such nationwide bank's outstanding voting shares. See "Item 4B. Business Overview—Supervision and Regulation—Principal Regulations Applicable to Banks—Restrictions on Bank Ownership." In addition, if the shareholding of any single shareholder, together with its affiliates, increases to a level exceeding the applicable limits as a result of a merger, such shareholder will be restricted from exercising its voting rights in respect of shares in excess of the applicable limit pursuant to the Bank Act from the effective date of the merger, and will be required to dispose of such excess shares within three years after such effective date.

You will not be able to exercise dissent and appraisal rights unless you have withdrawn the underlying shares of our common stock and become our direct shareholder.

In some limited circumstances, including the transfer of the whole or any significant part of our business and the merger or consolidation of us with another company, dissenting shareholders have the right to require us to purchase their shares under Korean law. However, if you hold our ADSs, you will not be able to exercise such dissent and appraisal rights if the depositary refuses to do so on your behalf. Our deposit agreement does not require the depositary to take any action in respect of exercising dissent and appraisal rights. In such a situation, holders of our ADSs must withdraw the underlying common stock from the ADS facility (and incur charges relating to that withdrawal) and become our direct shareholder prior to the record date of the shareholders' meeting at which the relevant transaction is to be approved, in order to exercise dissent and appraisal rights.

You may be limited in your ability to deposit or withdraw common stock.

Under the terms of our deposit agreement, holders of common stock may deposit such stock with the depositary's custodian in Korea and obtain ADSs, and holders of ADSs may surrender ADSs to the depositary and receive common stock. However, to the extent that a deposit of common stock exceeds any limit that we may specify from time to time, that common stock will not be accepted for deposit unless our consent with respect to such deposit has been obtained. We currently have not set any such limit; however, we have the right to do so at any time. Under the terms of the deposit agreement, no consent would be required if the shares of common stock were to be obtained through a dividend, free distribution, rights offering or reclassification of such stock. We have consented, under the terms of the deposit agreement, to any deposit unless the deposit would be prohibited

by applicable laws or violate our articles of incorporation. If we choose to impose a limit on deposits in the future, however, we might not consent to the deposit of any additional common stock. In that circumstance, if you surrender ADSs and withdraw common stock, you may not be able to deposit the stock again to obtain ADSs. See “Item 9C. Markets–Restrictions Applicable to Shares.”

You will not have preemptive rights in some circumstances.

The Korean Commercial Code of 1962, as amended, and our articles of incorporation require us, with some exceptions, to offer shareholders the right to subscribe for new shares of our common stock in proportion to their existing shareholding ratio whenever new shares are issued. If we offer any rights to subscribe for additional shares of our common stock or any rights of any other nature, the depositary, after consultation with us, may make the rights available to holders of our ADSs or use commercially feasible efforts to dispose of the rights on behalf of such holders, in a riskless principal capacity, and make the net proceeds available to such holders. The depositary will make rights available to holders of our ADSs only if:

- we have requested in a timely manner that those rights be made available to such holders;
- the depositary has received the documents that are required to be delivered under the terms of the deposit agreement, which may include confirmation that a registration statement filed by us under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), is in effect with respect to those shares or that the offering and sale of those shares is exempt from or is not subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act; and
- the depositary determines, after consulting with us, that the distribution of rights is lawful and commercially feasible.

Holders of our common stock located in the United States may not exercise any rights they receive absent registration or an exemption from the registration requirements under the Securities Act.

We are under no obligation to file any registration statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or to endeavor to cause such a registration statement to be declared effective. Moreover, we may not be able to establish an exemption from registration under the Securities Act. Accordingly, you may be unable to participate in our rights offerings and may experience dilution in your holdings. If a registration statement is required for you to exercise preemptive rights but is not filed by us or is not declared effective, you will not be able to exercise your preemptive rights for additional ADSs and you will suffer dilution of your equity interest in us. If the depositary is unable to sell rights that are not exercised or not distributed or if the sale is not lawful or feasible, it will allow the rights to lapse, in which case you will receive no value for these rights.

Your dividend payments and the amount you may realize upon a sale of your ADSs will be affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Won.

Our common stock is listed on the KRX KOSPI Market and quoted and traded in Won. Cash dividends, if any, in respect of the shares represented by the ADSs will be paid to the depositary in Won and then converted by the depositary into U.S. dollars, subject to certain conditions. Accordingly, fluctuations in the exchange rate between the Won and the U.S. dollar will affect, among other things, the amounts you will receive from the depositary in respect of dividends, the U.S. dollar value of the proceeds that you would receive upon sale in Korea of the shares of our common stock obtained upon surrender of ADSs and the secondary market price of ADSs. Such fluctuations will also affect the U.S. dollar value of dividends and sales proceeds received by holders of our common stock.

The market value of your investment may fluctuate due to the volatility of, and government intervention in, the Korean securities market.

Our common stock is listed on the KRX KOSPI Market, which has a smaller market capitalization and is more volatile than the securities markets in the United States and many European countries. The market value of ADSs may fluctuate in response to the fluctuation of the trading price of shares of our common stock on the