

RISK FACTORS

Our business and operations are subject to various risks, many of which are beyond our control. If any of the risks described below actually occurs, our business, financial condition or results of operations could be seriously harmed.

Risks Relating to KEPCO

The Government's plan related to the electricity industry in Korea and its restructuring may have a material adverse effect on us.

On January 21, 1999, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, or the MOCIE, announced a restructuring plan for the electricity industry in Korea, or a Restructuring Plan. For a detailed description of the Restructuring Plan, see Item 4 "Information on the Company—Business Overview—Restructuring of the Electricity Industry in Korea".

The Government promulgated the Law on Promotion of Restructuring of Electricity Industry and amended the Electricity Business Law on December 23, 2000, which allowed us to implement the Restructuring Plan. Pursuant to the Law on Promotion of Restructuring of Electricity Industry, in April 2001, the Government established the Korea Power Exchange to deal with the sale of electricity and to work out regulations governing the electricity industry to allow for electricity distribution through a competitive bidding process, a competitive bidding pool system for the sale and purchase of electricity and the Korean Electricity Commission to regulate the restructured Korean electricity industry and to ensure fair competition.

In February, 2001, our board of directors approved a plan to split our non-nuclear and non-hydroelectric generation unit into five wholly-owned generation subsidiaries and convert our nuclear and hydroelectric generation unit into a separate wholly-owned generation subsidiary. In March, 2001, our shareholders approved the plan to establish the generation subsidiaries and allocate our assets and liabilities to such generation subsidiaries, effective as of April 2, 2001. In September 2003, the Tripartite Commission, which included, among others, representatives from the Government, the leading businesses and labor unions in Korea, established the Joint Study Group on Reforming Electricity Distribution Network to propose a methodology of introducing competition within the industry for distribution of electricity. In June 2004, based on a report published by this Joint Study Group, the Tripartite Commission issued a resolution that recommended halting the plan to form and privatize the distribution subsidiaries, and in lieu thereof, creating independent business divisions within us, namely, the "strategy business units", as way of improving operational efficiency and internal competition among the business divisions. This resolution was adopted by the MOCIE in June 2004, and we subsequently commissioned a third party consultant to conduct a study on implementing plans related to the creation of the strategy business units and solicited comments on the study from various parties, including labor unions and the Government. Based on this study and the related comments, on September 25, 2006, we established nine strategy business units having a separate management structure with limited autonomy and separate financial accounting and performance evaluation criteria. The performance of these units is currently under evaluation for two years, and based on such evaluation, we may expand the use of strategic units or otherwise reformulate the structure of our business divisions. We cannot assure that the strategic business units will successfully achieve their intended goals of improving operational efficiency and internal competition among the business divisions.

In December 2006, the Government announced the third Basic Plan. The third Basic Plan focuses on, among other things, (1) establishing an optimal level and mix of generating capacity based on fuel types and the operational efficiency of each generation unit, (2) equilibrating the supply and demand of electricity at the regional-level through region-specific planning for capacity expansion, (3) giving greater weight to environmental issues by proactively addressing some of the concerns identified under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, (4) improving the accuracy of electricity supply forecast by adopting as its basis the effective supply reserve ratio, which takes into account only those generation units that are capable of generating electricity at times of peak demand, rather than the overall supply

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reserve ratio, which has been traditionally used and takes into account the supply capability of all generation units regardless of whether they are actually capable of generating electricity at times of peak demand, and (5) improving the transparency and the level of specializing in the decision-making process for formulating the basic plan by formalizing more compartmentalized processes and procedures, including seeking advice from outside experts. We cannot assure that the third Basic Plan, or the plans subsequently adopted, will successfully achieve their intended goals, the foremost of which is to formulate a capacity expansion plan that will result in balanced overall electricity supply and demand in Korea at an affordable cost to the end users.

Further changes in law and regulation relating to the electricity industry in Korea and the Government's plan, including any amendments thereto, for the electricity industry in Korea or its restructuring may have a material adverse effect on our business, growth prospects, financial condition and results of operation.

Failure to successfully implement the revised restructuring plan could have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.

The Restructuring Plan contemplates that we eventually dispose of our interests in our generation subsidiaries (excluding our nuclear and hydroelectric power generation subsidiary). In April 2002, the MOCIE released the basic privatization plan for five of our generation subsidiaries, other than our nuclear and hydroelectric power generation subsidiary. In 2002, we commenced the sale of Korea South-East Power Co., Ltd., or KOSEP, one of our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries. According to the original plan, the sale of KOSEP was, in principle, to take the form of a sale of management control, potentially supplemented by an initial public offering as a way of broadening the investor base.

KOSEP submitted its application for a preliminary screening review to the Korea Exchange in November 2003, which was approved in December 2003. However, in June 2004, KOSEP requested the Korea Exchange to delay the listing of its stock due to unfavorable stock market conditions at that time. We intend to resume KOSEP's stock-listing process in due course, after taking into consideration the overall stock market situation and other pertinent matters. The aggregate foreign ownership of our generation subsidiaries is currently limited to 30% of total power generation capacity in Korea. We cannot assure you as to the timing or the extent to which our divestiture will occur. In addition, it is possible that Korean law relating to anti-competitive practices as in effect at a given time may affect the manner in which we conduct our business through our generation subsidiaries.

The proliferation of a competing system which enables regional districts to independently source electricity would erode our market position and hurt our business, growth prospects, revenues and profitability.

In July 2004, the government adopted the Community Energy System to enable regional districts to source electricity from independent power producers to supply electricity without having to undergo the cost-based pool system used by our generation subsidiaries and most independent power producers to distribute electricity nationwide. A supplier of electricity under the Community Energy System must be authorized by the Korea Electricity Commission and be approved by the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy in accordance with the Electricity Business Act. The purpose of this system is to decentralize electricity supply and thereby reduce transmission costs and improve the efficiency of energy use. As of March 31, 2007, one district is using this system and 20 other districts are preparing to launch it. As the government is fostering further competition in the power market, we expect that this system will be widely adopted by 2008. Once widely adopted, this system will erode our market position in the generation and distribution of electricity in Korea, which has been virtually monopolistic to-date. Unless we become more operationally efficient so as to keep the loss of our market share to the minimum, this system may have a material adverse effect on our business, growth, revenues and profitability.

Increases in fuel prices will adversely affect our results of operations and profitability.

Fuel costs constituted 32.6% and 37.2% of our operating revenues and operating expenses, respectively, in 2006. Our generation subsidiaries purchase substantially all of the fuel that they use (except for anthracite coal) from a limited number of suppliers outside Korea at prices determined in part by prevailing market prices in currencies other than Won. In addition, our generation subsidiaries purchase a significant portion of their fuel requirements under contracts with limited quantity and duration. For instance, most of the bituminous coal requirements are imported from Australia, Indonesia and China, which accounted for approximately 35.4%, 37.6% and 18.5%, respectively, of the annual bituminous coal requirements of our generation subsidiaries in 2006. Approximately 81.5% of the bituminous coal requirements of our generation subsidiaries in 2006 were purchased under long-term contracts and the remaining 18.5% from the spot market. Pursuant to the terms of our long-term supply contracts, prices are adjusted annually in light of market conditions. See Item 4 “Information on the Company–Business Overview–Fuel”. In recent years, the prices of bituminous coal, oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG, have increased significantly, resulting in higher fuel cost. As a result of such price increases, our generation subsidiaries are unlikely to secure their respective fuel requirements at prices comparable to those of prior periods. In addition, any significant interruption or delay in the supply of fuel from any of the suppliers could cause our generation subsidiaries to purchase fuel on the spot market at prices higher than contracted, resulting in an increase in fuel cost. The prices of oil and LNG are substantially dependent on the price of crude oil. According to Bloomberg (Bloomberg Ticker: PGCARDUBA), the average daily spot price of Dubai crude oil was US\$61.525 per barrel in 2006 compared to US\$49.445 per barrel in 2005 and was US\$59.623 per barrel as of June 15, 2007. Because the Government regulates the rates we charge for electricity we sell (see Item 4 “Information on the Company–Business Overview–Rates”), our ability to pass on such cost increases to our customers is limited. We estimate that the recent increase in fuel prices has had a material adverse effect on our results of operations and profitability in 2007 to date. Fuel prices may remain high throughout 2007 and thereafter. Accordingly, we expect our operating income and net income may be adversely impacted.

The movement of Won against the U.S. dollar and other currencies may have a material adverse effect on us.

In recent years, the Won has considerably appreciated against the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies. At this time, it is difficult to predict whether and to what extent Won will continue to appreciate. The appreciation of Won against the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies may have an adverse impact on us by negatively impacting Korea’s ability to export its products to other countries, on which the overall production level of the Korean economy significantly depends.

We also cannot assure you that the Won will not significantly depreciate against the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies. The depreciation of Won against the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies in the past had resulted in a material increase in the cost of servicing our foreign currency debt and the cost of fuel materials and equipment purchased from overseas. In contrast, as of December 31, 2006, approximately 30.2% of our long-term debt (including the current portion thereof) was denominated in foreign currencies, principally in U.S. dollars and Yen. The prices for substantially all of the fuel materials and a significant portion of the equipment we purchase are stated in currencies other than Won, generally U.S. dollars. Since substantially all of our revenues are denominated in Won, we must generally obtain foreign currencies through foreign-currency denominated financings or from foreign currency exchange markets to make such purchases or service such debt. As a result, any significant depreciation of the Won against the U.S. dollar or other foreign currencies will have a material adverse effect on our profitability, our results of operations.

Labor unrest may adversely affect our operations.

As of December 31, 2006, approximately 62.7% of the employees of our generation subsidiaries were members of the Korean Power Plant Industry Union. The Restructuring Plan and the privatization plan for our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries generated labor unrest in 2002. Labor unions to which our employees belong have opposed the Restructuring Plan from its very inception. In particular, the prospect of privatizing some of

our core assets has raised concerns among some of our employees. On February 25, 2002, employees belonging to labor unions of our five non-nuclear generation subsidiaries began a six-week strike to protest the Government's plans to privatize our five non-nuclear generation subsidiaries. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the second largest confederation of labor unions in Korea with over 600,000 members as of December 31, 2006, negotiated with the Government on behalf of the labor unions. After prolonged negotiations with the Government, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions directed the labor unions of our five non-nuclear generation subsidiaries to end their strike on April 2, 2002. There was no material disruption in the operation of generation subsidiaries as a result of such labor strike.

On June 24, 2005, the Korean government announced its policy to relocate the headquarters of government-invested enterprises, including us and certain of our subsidiaries including six generation subsidiaries, out of the Seoul metropolitan area to other provinces in Korea by the end of 2012. Pursuant to this policy, our headquarters is scheduled to be relocated to Naju in Jolla Province, which is approximately 300 kilometers south of Seoul. In addition, the headquarters of certain of our subsidiaries are scheduled to be relocated to various other cities in Korea. While we intend to comply with this policy, there can be no assurance that our labor union and those of our subsidiaries will not oppose such relocation. We cannot assure you that a large-scale strike will not occur again in the future, including, among others, as a result of the Government's policy to move our headquarters out of the Seoul metropolitan areas, or that any such labor unrest will be satisfactorily resolved. A large-scale strike may adversely affect our results of operations, including by severely disrupting the power supply as well as substantially hindering the implementation of our strategies and management policies.

Operation of nuclear power generation facilities inherently involves numerous hazards and risks, any of which could result in a material loss of revenues or increased expenses.

Through Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd., or KHNP, our wholly-owned nuclear subsidiary, we currently operate 19 units out of 20 nuclear-fuel generation units due to the end of intended life of Kori 1 unit on June 18, 2007. The operation of nuclear power plants is subject to certain hazards, including environmental hazards such as leaks, ruptures and discharge of toxic and radioactive substances and materials. These hazards can cause personal injuries or loss of life, severe damage to or destruction of property and natural resources, pollution or other environmental damage, clean-up responsibilities, regulatory investigation and penalties and suspension of operations. Nuclear power has a stable and lowest cost structure among the fuel types that comprise the base load and is the largest source of Korea's electricity supply accounting for 39.3% of electricity generated in Korea in 2006. Due to significantly lower fuel costs as compared with conventional power plants, our nuclear power plants are generally operated at full capacity with only routine shutdowns for check-up and overhaul lasting 30 to 40 days. In December 2003, in response to concerns of potential exposure to radioactive materials arising from a release incident, we shut down Younggwang-5, one of our nuclear power plants for assessment, inspection and overhaul. This nuclear power plant resumed its operations in April 2004. In November 2003, we shut down Younggwang-6, another of our nuclear power plants for planned overhaul, during which a mechanical problem was discovered giving rise to concerns as to its safety. After the overhaul, this nuclear power plant resumed its operations in April 2004. The breakdown, failure or suspension of operation of a nuclear unit could result in a material loss of revenues, an increase in fuel costs related to the use of alternative power sources, additional repair and maintenance costs, greater risk of litigation and increased social and political hostility to the use of nuclear power, any of which could have a material adverse impact on our financial conditions and results of operation.

Opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear-fuel generation units may have an adverse effect on us.

In 2006, our nuclear generation units accounted for 39.0% of the electricity generated in Korea. In recent years, we have encountered increasing social and political opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear generation units. Although the Government and we have undertaken various community programs to address concerns of residents of areas near our nuclear units, community opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear units could result in delayed construction or relocation of planned nuclear units, which could have a

material adverse impact on our business and results of operation. See Item 4 “Information on the Company—Business Overview—Power Generation—Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.”, “—Business Overview—Community Programs” and “—Business Overview—Insurance”.

The amounts and scope of coverage of our insurance are limited.

Substantial liability may result from the operation of our nuclear generation units, the use and handling of nuclear fuel and possible radioactive emissions associated with such nuclear fuel. While KHNP carries insurance for its generation units and nuclear fuel transportation and is the beneficiary of a certain Government indemnity with respect to such risks, such insurance is limited in terms of amounts and scope of coverage and does not cover all types or amounts of loss which could arise in connection with the ownership and operation of nuclear plants. Accordingly, material adverse financial consequences could result from a significant accident.

In addition, our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries carry insurance covering against certain risks, including fire, in respect of their key assets, including buildings and equipment located at their respective power plants, construction-in-progress and imported fuel and procurement in transit, as well as directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. These insurance and indemnity, however, cover only a portion of the assets that our generation subsidiaries own and operate and do not cover all types or amounts of loss that could arise in connection with the ownership and operation of these power plants. Unlike us, our generation subsidiaries are not permitted to self-insure, and accordingly have not self-insured, against risks of their uninsured assets or business. Accordingly, material adverse financial consequences could result from a significant accident to the extent uninsured.

Because we and our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries do not carry insurance against terrorist attacks, an act of terrorism would result in significant financial losses. See Item 4 “Information on the Company—Business Overview—Insurance”.

We may require a substantial amount of additional indebtedness, to refinance existing debt and for future capital expenditures.

We anticipate that additional indebtedness will be required through the coming years in order to refinance existing debt and to make capital expenditures for construction of generation plants and other facilities. The amount of such additional indebtedness may be substantial. We expect that a portion of our long-term debt will need to be raised through foreign currency borrowings and issuance of securities in international capital markets. The cost of such financing may not be acceptable to us.

We may not be able to raise equity capital in the future without the participation of the Government.

Under applicable laws, the Government, is required to own directly, or through Korea Development Bank (a statutory banking institution wholly-owned by the Government), at least 51% of our issued capital stock. As of June 15, 2007, the Government, directly or through Korea Development Bank, owned 51.07% of our issued capital stock. Accordingly, without changes in the existing Korean law, it may be difficult or impossible for us to undertake, without the participation of the Government, any equity financing in the future (other than sales of treasury stock).

Risks Relating to Korea and the Global Economy

Adverse developments in Korea may adversely affect us.

Our financial condition and results of operations are subject to political, economic, legal and regulatory risks specific to Korea. From early 1997 until 1999, Korea experienced a significant financial and economic downturn, from which it is widely believed the country has now recovered to a large extent, despite mixed signs of recovery and uncertainty at times. However, future recovery or growth of the economy is subject to many factors beyond our control. Events related to terrorist attacks, developments in the Middle East, higher oil prices, the general weakness of the global economy and the outbreak of epidemics such as SARS or the H5N1 avian flu

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in Asia and other parts of the world have increased and continue to increase the uncertainty of global economic prospects in general and may continue to adversely affect the Korean economy. Any future deterioration of the Korean economy could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

Developments that could hurt Korea's economy in the future include:

- financial and other problems related to *chaebols* (Korean conglomerates) or their suppliers, and their potential adverse impact on the Korean economy;
- loss of investor confidence arising from corporate accounting irregularities and corporate governance issues at certain companies or introduction of new Government policies or regulations adverse to foreign investment;
- a slowdown in consumer spending, a rising level of household debt and the resulting slowdown in the overall economy;
- adverse changes or volatility in foreign currency reserve levels, commodity prices (including an increase in coal, oil and LNG prices), exchange rates (including depreciation of the U.S. dollar or the Yen or revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi), interest rates and stock markets;
- adverse developments in the economies in other markets, including countries that are important export markets for Korea, such as the United States, Japan and China, or in emerging economies in Asia or elsewhere that could result in a loss of confidence in the Korean economy;
- the continued emergence of China, to the extent benefits relating to it (such as increased exports to China) are outweighed costs relating to it (such as competition in export markets or for foreign investment and the relocation of the manufacturing base from Korea to China);
- social and labor unrest;
- a decrease in tax revenues and a substantial increase in the Government's expenditures for unemployment compensation and other social programs that, together, would lead to an increased government budget deficit;
- deterioration in economic or diplomatic relations between Korea and its trading partners or allies, including deterioration resulting from trade disputes or disagreements in foreign policy;
- political uncertainty or increasing strife among or within political parties in Korea and uncertainty related to the presidential election in the second half of 2007;
- hostilities involving oil producing countries in the Middle East and any material disruption in the supply of oil or increase in the price of oil resulting from those hostilities; and
- an increase in the level of tensions or an outbreak of hostilities between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea, and Korea and/or the United States.

Tensions with North Korea could have an adverse effect on us and the market value of the Notes.

Relations between Korea and North Korea have been tense over Korea's modern history. The level of tension between Korea and North Korea has fluctuated and may increase or change abruptly as a result of current and future events, including ongoing contacts at the highest levels of the governments of Korea and North Korea and the relationship between North Korea and the United States. In December 2002, North Korea removed the seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon nuclear power plant and evicted inspectors from the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, and has reportedly resumed activity at its Yongbyon power plant. In January 2003, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, demanding that the United States sign a non-aggression pact as a condition to North Korea dismantling its nuclear program. During July 2003 and February 2004, Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia held the first two rounds of multilateral talks in an effort to resolve issues relating to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In June 2004, a third round of talks was held, resulting in an agreement to hold further

talks in September 2004. In February 2005, North Korea announced that it possesses nuclear weapons and pulled out of the six-party disarmament talks. In July 2005, North Korea returned to the six-party talks and held bilateral talks with the United States to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons. In a joint statement in September 2005, North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and programs and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In return, the other five nations participating in the talks, Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, expressed a willingness to provide North Korea with energy assistance and other economic support. However, on September 20, 2005, one day after the joint statement was released, North Korea announced that it would not dismantle its nuclear weapons program unless the United States agreed to provide civilian nuclear reactors in return, a demand that the United States rejected. Representatives of the six nations reconvened in Beijing in November 2005 for the first phase of the fifth-round of six-party talks, which ended without further progress being made with respect to the implementation of the joint statement.

In July 2006, North Korea conducted several missile tests, which increased tensions in the region and raised strong objections from Japan and the United States. In response, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution condemning such missile tests and banning any United Nations member state from conducting transactions with North Korea in connection with material or technology related to missile development or weapons of mass destruction. On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test, which increased tensions in the region and raised strong objections from Korea, the United States, Japan, China and other nations worldwide. In response, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which prohibits any United Nations member state from conducting transactions with North Korea in connection with any large-scale arms and material or technology related to missile development or weapons of mass destruction, providing luxury goods to North Korea, and imposes freezing of assets and an international travel ban on persons associated with North Korea's weapons programs, and calls upon all United Nations member states to take cooperative action, including through inspection of cargo to or from North Korea. In February 2007, the six parties entered a new accord whereby North Korea would begin to disable its nuclear facilities in return for fuel oil and aid. We cannot assure you that these recent events constitute a final agreement on North Korea's nuclear program, including critical details such as implementation, timing and verification, or that North Korea will fulfill its obligations under such accord.

In October 2004, the United States proposed plans to withdraw approximately one-third of the 37,500 troops then stationed in Korea by the end of 2008 in three phases. Under these plans, the United States withdrew 5,000 troops from Korea by the end of 2004 and is expected to withdraw another 5,000 troops by the end of 2006 and another 2,500 troops by the end of 2008. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, there were 28,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Korea as of February 23, 2007, and the number is expected to decrease to 25,000 by the end of 2008. Any further increase in tensions, resulting for example from a break-down in contacts or an outbreak in military hostilities, could hurt our business, results of operations and financial condition and could lead to a decline in the price of our common stock and our American depositary shares.

Unemployment and labor unrest in Korea may adversely affect us.

The economic downturn in Korea in 1997 and 1998 and the increase in the number of corporate reorganizations and bankruptcies thereafter caused layoffs and increasing unemployment in Korea, and a similar economic downturn in the future could lead to further layoffs. These factors could lead to social unrest and substantially increase government expenditures for unemployment compensation and other costs for social programs. During 1998 and 1999, there were large-scale protests and labor strikes in Korea. According to statistics from Korea National Statistical Office, the unemployment rate generally increased from 3.3% as of December 31, 2002, to 3.6% as of December 31, 2003, to 3.7% as of December 31, 2004 and to 3.7% as of December 31, 2005 and 3.5% as of December 31, 2006. An increase in unemployment or labor unrest in Korea could adversely affect our operations and the financial conditions of Korean companies in general, depressing the price of securities on the Stock Market Division of the Korea Exchange, and the value of the Won relative to other currencies. These developments would likely have an adverse effect on the price of our common stock and our American depositary shares.

Financial instability in Korea and other countries, particularly emerging market countries, may adversely affect us.

The Korean market and the Korean economy are influenced by economic and market conditions in other countries, including emerging market countries. Financial turmoil in Asia and elsewhere in the world in the past has adversely affected the Korean economy. Although economic conditions are different in each country, investors' reactions to developments in one country, such as Argentina or Brazil, could have adverse effects on the price of securities of companies in other countries, including Korea. A loss of investor confidence in the financial systems of emerging and other markets may cause increased volatility in Korean financial markets. We cannot assure you that financial events of the type that occurred in emerging markets in Asia in 1997 and 1998 will not happen again or will not have a material adverse effect on our business.

Our consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with Korean GAAP, which differ materially from U.S. GAAP.

Our consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting regulations applicable to Government-invested companies and Korean GAAP, which differ in certain significant respects from U.S. GAAP.

Korean GAAP and U.S. GAAP differ, among other ways, in respect of the following issues:

- treatment of asset revaluation;
- treatment of foreign exchange translation gains and losses; and
- the establishment of regulatory asset and liability to offset the impact of foreign exchange translation losses and gains on our income statement, deferred income taxes and reserves for self-insurance.

See Item 5 "Operating and Financial Review and Prospects—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP" and Note 33 of the notes to our consolidated financial statements.

We are generally subject to Korean corporate governance and disclosure standards, which differ in significant respects from those in other countries.

Companies in Korea, including us, are subject to corporate governance standards applicable to Korean public companies which differ in many respects from standards applicable in other countries, including the United States. As a reporting company registered with the Securities Exchange Commission and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we are, and will continue to be, subject to certain corporate governance standards as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended. However, foreign private issuers, including us, are exempt from certain corporate governance standards required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. There may also be less publicly available information about Korean companies, such as us, than is regularly made available by public or non-public companies in other countries. Such differences in corporate governance standards and less public information could result in less than satisfactory corporate governance practices or disclosure to investors in certain countries.

ITEM 4. INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

General Information

We were established by the Government on December 31, 1981 as the successor to Korea Electric Company and, until 1989, were wholly owned by the Government. Our registered office is located at 167 Samseong-Dong, Gangnam-Gu, Seoul, Korea, and our telephone number is 82-2-3456-4264. Our website address is www.kepco.co.kr.

In 1989, the Government sold 21% of our common stock as part of a planned partial privatization. Such partial privatization was one of several sales undertaken by the Government with respect to shares of Government-owned companies. In 1994, the Government sold 1.2% of our outstanding shares in a global offering. In 1995, the Government sold 1.1% of our shares in another global offering. From November 1997 to February 1998, the Government contributed our shares as a capital injection into Korea Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank to support the financial condition of those financial institutions. In March 1999, the Government sold 5% of our shares in a global offering. As a result, as of December 31, 2000, the Government owned, directly or indirectly, 54% of our issued common stock (including treasury stock). On June 20, 2001, the Government transferred 127,086,334 shares of our common stock, which represented 19.85% of our outstanding capital held by it, to Korea Development Bank, and on April 30, 2004, the Government transferred 34,511,869 shares of our common stock, which represented 5.39% of our outstanding capital, to Korea Development Bank, in each case to strengthen the capital base of Korea Development Bank, which is wholly-owned by the Government. On December 30, 2004, the Government sold 19,592,000 shares (or 3.06% of total outstanding shares) of our common stock to Korea Development Bank through the over-the-counter market at (Won)27,100 per share. As a result, the Government's direct ownership in us decreased to 23.97% from 27.03% and Korea Development Bank's direct ownership in us increased to 29.99% from 26.93%. As a result of such transfer, the Government and Korea Development Bank owned 23.97% and 29.99%, respectively, of the outstanding shares of our common stock as of the end of April 2004. In December 2005, the Ministry of Defense of Korea made an in-kind contribution of certain electric distribution facilities, which had previously been managed by the Ministry of Defense, in return for 819,139 newly issued shares of our common stock, which were issued in December 2005. Following such issuance, the Government directly owned 24.07% and, through Korea Development Bank, an additional 29.95%, of the outstanding shares of our common stock. On November 21 2006, we purchased 18,900,000 of common shares, or 2.95% of our total outstanding common stock held by the Government and held in treasury. Currently, the Government and Korea Development Bank own 21.12% and 29.95% of our common shares, respectively. See the table setting forth certain information relating to certain owners of our capital stock as of December 31, 2006 in Item 7 "Major Shareholders and Related Party Transactions—Major Shareholders".

Under relevant laws, the Government is required to own, directly or through Korea Development Bank, at least 51% of our capital. Direct or indirect ownership of more than 50% of our outstanding common stock enables the Government to control the approval of certain corporate matters which require a stockholders' resolution, including approval of dividends. The rights of the Government and Korea Development Bank as holders of our common stock are exercised by the MOCIE based on the Government's ownership of our common stock and a proxy received from Korea Development Bank in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and Economy, or the MOFE.

We operate under the general supervision of the MOCIE. The MOCIE, in consultation with the MOFE, is responsible for approving the electric power rates we charge after review by the Korean Electricity Commission. See Item 4 "Information on the Company—Business Overview—Rates". We furnish reports to officials of the MOCIE, the MOFE and other Government agencies and regularly consult with such officials on matters relating to our business and affairs. See Item 4 "Information on the Company—Business Overview—Regulation".