

**Item 3C. Reasons for the Offer and Use of Proceeds**

Not Applicable

**Item 3D. Risk Factors**

*Our business and operations are subject to various risks, many of which are beyond our control. If any of the risks described below actually occurs, our business, financial condition or results of operations could be seriously harmed.*

**Risks Relating to KEPCO**

***Increases in fuel prices will adversely affect our results of operations and profitability as we may not be able to pass on the increased cost to consumers at a sufficient level or on a timely basis.***

Fuel costs constituted 47.2% and 49.1% of our operating revenues and operating expenses, respectively, in 2010. Our generation subsidiaries purchase substantially all of the fuel that they use (except for anthracite coal) from a limited number of suppliers outside Korea at prices determined in part by prevailing market prices in currencies other than Won. For example, most of the bituminous coal requirements (which accounted for approximately 43.6% of our entire fuel requirements in 2010 in terms of electricity output) are imported from a limited number of countries principally consisting of Indonesia and Australia and, to a lesser extent, Canada and China, which accounted for approximately 51%, 32%, 4% and 3%, respectively, of the annual bituminous coal requirements of our generation subsidiaries in 2010. Approximately 70.8% of the bituminous coal requirements of our generation subsidiaries in 2010 were purchased under long-term contracts and the remaining 29.2% from the spot market. Pursuant to the terms of our long-term supply contracts, prices are adjusted annually based on prevailing market conditions. In addition, our generation subsidiaries purchase a significant portion of their fuel requirements under contracts with limited duration. See Item 4B. "Business Overview—Fuel."

In recent years, the prices of bituminous coal, oil and liquefied natural gas, or LNG, have fluctuated significantly, resulting in a higher fuel cost to us. For example, the average "free on board" Newcastle coal price index ranged from US\$128.4 per ton in 2008 to US\$72.4 per ton in 2009 and to US\$98.8 per ton in 2010, and rose to US\$118.5 per ton as of June 3, 2011. The prices of oil and LNG are substantially dependent on the price of crude oil, and according to Bloomberg (Bloomberg Ticker: PGCARDUBA), the average daily spot price of Dubai crude oil fluctuated from US\$93.8 per barrel in 2008 to US\$61.7 per barrel in 2009 and US\$78.1 per barrel in 2010, and was US\$118.7 per barrel as of June 3, 2011. If fuel prices increase sharply within a short span of time, our generation subsidiaries may be unable to secure requisite fuel supplies at prices that they were able to obtain during prior periods. In addition, any significant interruption or delay in the supply of fuel, bituminous coal in particular, from any of their suppliers may cause our generation subsidiaries to purchase fuel on the spot market at prices higher than the prices available under existing supply contracts, resulting in an increase in the fuel cost. We cannot assure you that the fuel prices will not significantly increase in the remainder of 2011 or thereafter.

Because the Government regulates the rates we charge for the electricity we sell to our customers (see Item 4B. "Business Overview—Sales and Customers—Electricity Rates"), our ability to pass on such cost increases to our customers is limited. The increase in fuel prices led to our recording an operating loss in 2008 and a net loss from 2008 to 2010 under Korean GAAP and we expect that a high level of fuel prices will continue to have an adverse effect on our results of operation in 2011 and beyond. If fuel prices remain at the current level or continue to increase and the Government, out of concern for inflation or for other reasons, maintains the current level of electricity tariff or does not increase it to a level to sufficiently offset the impact of high fuel prices, the fuel price increases will significantly lower our profit margins or even cause us to suffer operating and/or net losses and our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows would seriously suffer. In addition, partly because the Government may have to undergo a lengthy deliberative process to approve an increase in electricity tariff, which represents a key component of the consumer price index, the electricity tariff may not be adjusted to a level sufficient to ensure a fair rate of return to us in a timely manner or at all. For

example, in July 2009 and August 2010, the Government increased the electricity tariff by an average of 3.9% and 3.5%, respectively. However, such increases were insufficient to fully offset the adverse impact from the rise in fuel costs. Similarly, we cannot assure that any future tariff increase by the Government will be sufficient to fully offset the adverse impact on our results of operations from the current or potential rises in fuel costs.

On February 10, 2010, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy announced that it plans to overhaul the current system for determining electricity tariff chargeable to customers by more closely aligning the tariff levels to the movements in fuel prices, with the aim of providing more timely pricing signals to the market regarding the expected changes in electricity tariff levels and encouraging more efficient use of electricity by customers. Currently scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2011, the new tariff system is also intended to provide greater financial stability and ensure a minimum return on investment to electricity suppliers, such as us. However, there is no assurance that the new tariff system will be adopted as presently anticipated or at all, or that the new tariff system in its final form will fully cover our expenses on a timely basis or at all, or will not have unintended consequences that we are not presently aware of. In addition, the Government may not maintain or raise the tariff level to ensure our profitability until the implementation of the new tariff system in July 2011. Any of such developments may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows. See Item 4B. "Business Overview—Recent Developments—Proposed Changes to the Electricity Tariff System."

***The Government may adopt policy measures to substantially restructure the Korean electric power industry or our operational structure, which may have a material adverse effect on our business, operations and profitability.***

From time to time, the Government considers various policy initiatives to foster efficiency in the Korean electric power industry, and at times have adopted policy measures that have substantially modified our business and operations. For example, in January 1999, with the aim of introducing greater competition in the Korean electric power industry and thereby improving its efficiency, the Government announced a restructuring plan for the Korean electric power industry, or the Restructuring Plan. For a detailed description of the Restructuring Plan, see Item 4B. "Business Overview—Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry in Korea." As part of this initiative, in April 2001 the Government established the Korea Power Exchange to enable the sale and purchase of electricity through a competitive bidding process, established the Korea Electricity Commission to ensure fair competition in the restructured the Korean electric power industry, and, in order to promote competition in electricity generation, split off our electricity generation business to form one nuclear generation company and five non-nuclear generation companies to be wholly owned by us. In 2002, the Government introduced a plan to privatize one of our five non-nuclear generation subsidiaries, but this plan was suspended indefinitely in 2003 due to prevailing market conditions and other policy considerations.

In 2003, the Government established a Tripartite Commission consisting of representatives of the Government, leading businesses and labor unions in Korea to deliberate on ways to introduce competition in electricity distribution, such as by forming and privatizing new distribution subsidiaries. In 2004, the Tripartite Commission recommended not pursuing such privatization initiatives but instead creating independent business divisions within us to improve operational efficiency through internal competition. Following the adoption of such recommendation by the government in 2004 and further studies by Korea Development Institute, in 2006 we created nine "strategic business units" (which, together with our other business units, were subsequently restructured into 13 such units in December 2008) that came to have separate management structures (although with limits on its autonomy), financial accounting systems and performance evaluation systems, but with a common focus on maximizing profitability.

In 2009, the Government commissioned Korea Development Institute to undertake a study addressing concerns regarding inefficiencies in the cost structure of electricity generation, including by potentially consolidating one or more of our generation subsidiaries or merging them with us. On August 25, 2010, based on this study and deliberations with various interested parties, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy announced the Proposal for Improvements in the Structure of the Electric Power Industry, whose key initiatives include maintaining the current structure of having six generation subsidiaries but adopting several measures to improve

## Table of Contents

operational efficiency, management autonomy and coordination among the generation subsidiaries. For further details of this Proposal, see Item 4B. "Business Overview—Recent Developments—Proposal for the Improvement in the Structure of the Electric Power Industry."

In addition, in order to deal with the shortage of fuel and other resources and also to comply with various environmental standards, the Government is currently considering a plan to adopt the Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS"), under which each generation subsidiary will be required to supply 2.0% and 10.0% of the total energy generated from such subsidiary in the form of renewable energy by 2012 and 2022, respectively, with fines being levied on any unit failing to do so in the prescribed timeline. We currently estimate that, if the RPS is implemented as currently planned, our generation subsidiaries will incur approximately Won 45 trillion in additional capital expenditure over the next 10 years. We expect that such additional capital expenditure will be covered by a corresponding increase in electricity tariff. However, there is no assurance that the Government will in fact raise the electricity tariff to a level sufficient to fully cover such additional capital expenditures or at all. For further details, see Item 4B. "Business Overview—Renewable Energy."

Other than as set forth above, we are not aware of any specific plan by the Government to resume the implementation of the Restructuring Plan or otherwise change the current structure of the electric power industry or the operations of us or our generation subsidiaries in the near future. However, for reasons relating to changes in policy considerations, economic and market conditions and/or other factors, the Government may resume the implementation of the Restructuring Plan or initiate other steps that may change the structure of the Korean electric power industry or the operations of us or our generation subsidiaries. Any such measures may have a negative effect on our business, results of operation and financial condition. In addition, the Government, which beneficially owns a majority of our shares and exercises significant control over our business and operations, may from time to time pursue policy initiatives with respect to our business and operations which may vary with the interest and objectives of our other shareholders.

***Our capacity expansion plans, which are based on projections on long-term supply and demand of electricity in Korea, may prove to be inadequate.***

We and our generation subsidiaries make plans for expanding or upgrading our generation capacity based on the Basic Plan Relating to the Long-Term Supply and Demand of Electricity, or the Basic Plan, which is generally announced and revised every two years by the Government. In December 2010, the Government announced the fifth Basic Plan relating to the future supply and demand of electricity. The fifth Basic Plan, which is effective for the period from 2010 to 2024, focuses on, among other things, (i) ensuring that electricity generation conforms to the National Energy Basic Plan relating to the overall energy management policy for Korea, (ii) expanding the base-load generation capacity to promote economical supply of electricity, (iii) preparing contingency planning to cover for, among others, delayed construction of generation facilities, and otherwise ensure stable long-term balance between electricity supply and demand, (iv) tightening supply management during 2011 to 2014 in response to the short-term decrease in facility reserve ratios, (v) fostering environmentally friendly electricity sources in line with the planned nationwide reduction in greenhouse gas emission, by giving priority in the construction of nuclear generation facilities and taking other green energy initiatives; (vi) appropriately adjusting the generation capacity expansion and (vii) improving transparency in planning and engaging a greater number of experts in the process of planning future basic plans. We cannot assure that the fifth Basic Plan, or the plans subsequently adopted, will successfully achieve their intended goals, the foremost of which is to formulate a capacity expansion plan that will result in balanced overall electricity supply and demand in Korea at an affordable cost to the end users. If there is a significant variance between the actual capacity expansions by us and our generation subsidiaries based on the projected electricity supply and demand and the actual supply and demand, this may result in inefficient use of our capital, mispricing of electricity and undue financing costs on the part of us and our generation subsidiaries, which may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition and cash flows.

From time to time, we may experience temporary power shortages or circumstances bordering on power shortages due to factors beyond our control, such as extreme weather conditions. For example, due to extremely

cold weather, during the winter of 2010-2011 our electricity reserve level fell to a lower than normal level of 5.5% despite emergency measures mandated by the Government, such as reduced daytime railway services and reduced daytime industrial use of electricity during peak hours. These circumstances may lead to increased end-user complaints and greater public scrutiny over our capacity levels, which may in turn result in our need to modify our capacity expansion plans, and if we were to substantially modify our capacity plans, this may result in additional capital expenditures, which may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition and cash flows.

***The movement of Won against the U.S. dollar and other currencies may have a material adverse effect on us.***

The Won has fluctuated significantly against major currencies in recent years, especially as a result of the recent global financial crisis and the relatively speedy recovery of Korean economy therefrom. See Item 3A. "Selected Financial Data –Currency Translations and Exchange Rates." The depreciation of Won against U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies typically results in a material increase in the cost of fuel and equipment purchased from overseas and the cost of servicing our foreign currency-denominated debt as the prices for substantially all of the fuel materials and a significant portion of the equipment we purchase are stated in currencies other than Won, generally in U.S. dollars. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 26.1% of our long-term debt (including the current portion and discounts on debentures but excluding premium on debentures) before accounting for swap transactions was denominated in foreign currencies, principally in U.S. dollars, Yen and Euro. Since substantially all of our revenues are denominated in Won, we must generally obtain foreign currencies through foreign-currency denominated financings or from foreign currency exchange markets to make such purchases or service such debt. As a result, any significant depreciation of Won against the U.S. dollar or other major foreign currencies will have a material adverse effect on our profitability and results of operations.

***We may not be successful in implementing new business strategies.***

As part of our overall business strategy, we plan to undertake new, or expand existing, projects such as strengthening of our renewable energy generation capabilities under the Renewable Portfolio Standards initiative, adoption of the "smart grid" projects to improve the operational efficiency of our electricity transmission and distribution network, and expansion in overseas markets, particularly in the construction and operation of nuclear generation units.

Due to their inherent uncertainties, such new and expanded strategic initiatives expose us to a number of risks and challenges, including the following:

- new and expanded business activities may require unanticipated capital expenditures and involve additional compliance requirements;
- new and expanded business activities may result in less growth or profit than we currently anticipate, and there can be no assurance that such business activities will become profitable at the level we desire or at all;
- certain of our new and expanded businesses, particularly in the areas of renewable energy, require substantial government subsidies to become profitable, and such subsidies may be substantially reduced or entirely discontinued;
- we may fail to identify and enter into alternative business areas in a timely fashion, putting us at a disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors, particularly in overseas markets; and
- we may need to hire or retrain personnel who are able to supervise and conduct the relevant business activities.

As part of our business strategy, we may also seek, evaluate or engage in potential acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures, strategic alliances, restructurings, combinations, rationalizations, divestments or other similar opportunities. The prospects of these initiatives are uncertain, and there can be no assurance that we will be able to successfully implement or grow new ventures, and these ventures may prove more difficult or costly than we

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## [Table of Contents](#)

presently expect. In addition, we regularly review the profitability and growth potential of our businesses. As a result of such review, we may decide to exit from or to reduce the resources that we allocate to new ventures in the future. There is a risk that these ventures may not achieve profitability or operational efficiencies to the extent we presently expect and we may fail to recover investments or expenditures that we have already made. Any of the foregoing may have a material adverse effect on our reputation, business, results of operation, financial condition and cash flows.

***We plan to pursue international expansion opportunities that may subject us to different or greater risk from those associated with our domestic operations.***

While our operations have, to date, been primarily based in Korea, we plan to expand, on a selective basis, our overseas operations in the future. In particular, we plan to further diversify the geographic focus of our operations from Asia to the rest of the world, including the resource-rich Middle East, Australia and Africa as well as expand our project portfolio, which has to-date involved primarily the construction and operation of conventional thermal generation units, to include the construction and operation of nuclear power plants as well as mining and development of fuel sources in order to increase the level of self-sufficiency in the procurement of fuels.

Overseas operations generally carry risks that are different from those we face in our domestic operations. These risks include:

- challenges of complying with multiple foreign laws and regulatory requirements, including tax laws and laws regulating our operations and investments;
- volatility of overseas economic conditions, including fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates;
- difficulties in enforcing creditors' rights in foreign jurisdictions;
- risk of expropriation and exercise of sovereign immunity where the counterparty is a foreign government;
- difficulties in establishing, staffing and managing foreign operations;
- differing labor regulations;
- political and economic instability, natural calamities, war and terrorism;
- lack of familiarity with local markets and competitive conditions;
- changes in applicable laws and regulations in Korea that affect foreign operations; and
- obstacles to the repatriation of earnings and cash.

Any failure by us to recognize or respond to these differences may adversely affect the success of our operations in those markets, which in turn could materially and adversely affect our business and results of operations.

Furthermore, while we seek to enter into business opportunities in a prudent and selective manner, some of our new international business ventures, such as mining and resource exploration, carry risks inherent to such businesses, which are different from our traditional business of electricity power generation, transmission and distribution. As we are relatively inexperienced in these types of businesses, the actual revenues and profitability from, and investments and expenditures into, these business ventures may be substantially different from what we planned or anticipated and have a material adverse impact on our overall business, results of operations, financial condition and cash flows.

***The proliferation of a competing system which enables regional districts to independently source electricity would erode our market position and hurt our business, growth prospects, revenues and profitability.***

In July 2004, the Government adopted the Community Energy System to enable regional districts to source electricity from independent power producers to supply electricity without having to undergo the cost-based pool system used by our generation subsidiaries and most independent power producers to distribute electricity nationwide. A supplier of electricity under the Community Energy System must be authorized by the Korea Electricity Commission and be approved by the Minister of Knowledge Economy in accordance with the Electricity Business Act. The purpose of this system is to decentralize electricity supply and thereby reduce transmission costs and improve the efficiency of energy use. These entities do not supply electricity on a national level but are licensed to supply electricity on a limited basis to their respective districts under the Community Energy System. As of December 31, 2010, 12 districts were using this system and four other districts were preparing to launch it. The generation capacity installed or under construction of the electricity suppliers in these 16 districts amounted to approximately 1% of the aggregate generation capacity of our generation subsidiaries as of December 31, 2010. Since the introduction of the Community Energy System in 2004, a total of 31 districts have obtained the license to supply electricity through the Community Energy System, but 15 of such districts have reportedly abandoned plans to adopt the Community Energy System, largely due to the relatively high level of capital expenditure required, the rise in fuel costs and the lower-than-expected electricity output per cost. However, if the Community Energy System is widely adopted, it will erode our market position in the generation and distribution of electricity in Korea, which has been virtually monopolized by us until recently, and may have a material adverse effect on our business, growth, revenues and profitability.

***Labor unrest may adversely affect our operations.***

As of December 31, 2010, approximately 75.6% of our employees, 62.8% of the employees of our nuclear generation subsidiary and 66.9% of the employees of our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries were members of labor unions. Since the six-week labor strike in 2002 by the union members of our generation subsidiaries in response to the proposed privatization of one of our generation subsidiaries, there has been no material subsequent labor dispute. However, we cannot assure you that there will not be a major labor strike or other disruptions by the labor unions of us and our generation subsidiaries if the Government resumes privatization or other restructuring initiatives or for other reasons, which may adversely affect our business and results of operations.

***Planned relocation of the headquarters of us and our generation subsidiaries may reduce our operational efficiency.***

In June 2005, as part of an initiative to foster balanced economic growth in the provinces, the Government announced a plan to relocate the headquarters of select government-invested enterprises, including us and our six generation and certain other subsidiaries, from the Seoul metropolitan area to other provinces in Korea by the end of 2012. Currently, our headquarters and those of our generation subsidiaries are within close vicinity of each other in the City of Seoul. Pursuant to the Government's relocation policy, our headquarters are scheduled to be relocated to Naju in Jeolla Province, which is approximately 300 kilometers south of Seoul, by the end of 2012. In addition, the headquarters of certain of our subsidiaries are scheduled to be relocated to various other cities in Korea. See Item 5B. "Liquidity and Capital Resources—Capital Requirements" for further details. While we intend to comply with the relocation plan, there can be no assurance that, following such relocation, we will be able to maintain the current level of operational efficiency due to geographic dispersion of our business units.

***Operation of nuclear power generation facilities inherently involves numerous hazards and risks, any of which could result in a material loss of revenues or increased expenses.***

Through KHNP, we currently operate 21 nuclear-fuel generation units. The operation of nuclear power plants is subject to certain hazards, including environmental hazards such as leaks, ruptures and discharge of toxic and radioactive substances and materials. These hazards can cause personal injuries or loss of life, severe

damage to or destruction of property and natural resources, pollution or other environmental damage, clean-up responsibilities, regulatory investigation and penalties and suspension of operations. Nuclear power has a stable cost structure (which is least costly among the fuel types used by our generation subsidiaries) and is the second largest source of Korea's electricity supply, accounting for 31.3% of electricity generated in Korea in 2010. Due to significantly lower unit fuel costs compared to those for conventional power plants, our nuclear power plants are generally operated at full capacity with only routine shutdowns for check-up and overhauls lasting 20 to 30 days, with limited exceptions. The breakdown, failure or suspension of operation of a nuclear unit could result in a material loss of revenues, an increase in fuel costs related to the use of alternative power sources, additional repair and maintenance costs, greater risk of litigation and increased social and political hostility to the use of nuclear power, any of which could have a material adverse impact on our financial conditions and results of operation.

Recently, in response to the damage to the nuclear facilities (including nuclear meltdowns) in Japan as a result of the tsunami and earthquake in March 2011, the Government announced plans to further enhance the safety and security of nuclear power facilities, including by establishing a nuclear safety commission in July 2011 for neutral and independent safety appraisals, subjecting nuclear power plants to additional safety inspections by governmental authorities and civic groups and requiring KHNP to prepare a comprehensive safety improvement plan. As a result of the foregoing, as well as a generally higher level of public and regulatory scrutiny of nuclear power facilities in general following the recent nuclear incident in Japan, KHNP is expected to incur additional compliance costs and capital expenditures, which could have a material adverse impact on our financial conditions and results of operation.

***Opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear-fuel generation units may have an adverse effect on us.***

In recent years, we have encountered increasing social and political opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear generation units. Although we and the Government have undertaken various community programs to address concerns of residents in areas near our nuclear units, civic and community opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear units could result in delayed construction or relocation of planned nuclear generation units, which could have a material adverse impact on our business and results of operation. See Item 4B. "Business Overview-Power Generation-Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.," "-Community Programs" and "-Insurance."

***The amount and scope of coverage of our insurance are limited.***

Substantial liability may result from the operations of our nuclear generation units, the use and handling of nuclear fuel and possible radioactive emissions associated with such nuclear fuel. KHNP carries insurance for its generation units and nuclear fuel transportation, and we believe that the level of insurance is generally adequate and is in compliance with relevant laws and regulations. In addition, KHNP is the beneficiary of Government indemnity which covers a portion of liability in excess of the insurance. However, such insurance is limited in terms of amount and scope of coverage and does not cover all types or amounts of losses which could arise in connection with the ownership and operation of nuclear plants. Accordingly, material adverse financial consequences could result from a serious accident or a natural disaster to the extent it is neither insured nor covered by the government indemnity.

In addition, our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries carry insurance covering certain risks, including fire, in respect of their key assets, including buildings and equipment located at their respective power plants, construction-in-progress and imported fuel and procurement in transit. Such insurance and indemnity, however, cover only a portion of the assets that the non-nuclear generation subsidiaries own and operate and do not cover all types or amounts of loss that could arise in connection with the ownership and operation of these power plants. In addition, unlike us, our generation subsidiaries are not permitted to self-insure, and accordingly have not self-insured, against risks of their uninsured assets or business. Accordingly, material adverse financial consequences could result from a serious accident to the extent it is uninsured.



## [Table of Contents](#)

In addition, because we and our non-nuclear generation subsidiaries do not carry insurance against terrorist attacks, an act of terrorism would result in significant financial losses. See Item 4B. "Business Overview—Insurance."

### ***We may require a substantial amount of additional indebtedness to refinance existing debt and for future capital expenditures.***

We anticipate that additional indebtedness will be required in the coming years in order to refinance existing debt, make capital expenditures for construction of generation plants and other facilities and make acquisitions and investments related to overseas natural resources. The amount of such additional indebtedness may be substantial. We expect that a portion of our long-term debt will need to be paid or refinanced through foreign currency-denominated borrowings and capital raising in international capital markets. Such financing may not be available on terms commercially acceptable to us or at all, especially if the global financial markets experience significant turbulence or a substantial reduction in liquidity.

### ***We may not be able to raise equity capital in the future without the participation of the Government.***

Under applicable laws, the Government is required to directly or indirectly own at least 51.0% of our issued capital stock. As of June 7, 2011, the Government, directly and through Korea Finance Corporation (a statutory banking institution wholly-owned by the Government), owned 51.1% of our issued capital stock. Accordingly, without changes in the existing Korean law, it may be difficult or impossible for us to undertake, without the participation of the Government, any equity financing in the future (other than sales of treasury stock).

## **Risks Relating to Korea and the Global Economy**

### ***Unfavorable financial and economic conditions in Korea and globally may have a material adverse impact on us.***

We are incorporated in Korea, where most of our assets are located and most of our income is generated. As a result, we are subject to political, economic, legal and regulatory risks specific to Korea, and our business, results of operation and financial condition are substantially dependent on the Korean consumers' demand for electricity, which are in turn largely dependent on developments relating to the Korean economy. In addition, the Korean economy is closely integrated with, and is significantly affected by, developments in the global economy and financial markets. Starting in late 2008, the global economy and financial markets experienced significant hardship as a result of a substantial reduction in credit and liquidity following a crisis in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, which then spread to markets involving highly leveraged structured financial products. While the Korean and global economy have shown growing signs of recovery since the second half of 2009, there can be no assurance that there will not be further difficulties resulting from the recent financial and economic crisis. In addition, many governments worldwide, in particular in southern Europe, are showing increasing signs of fiscal stress and difficulties meeting debt burdens and there are signs of uncertainty relating to the major economies in the world, including the United States and China. Any of these or other developments could potentially trigger another financial and economic crisis, and government programs designed to manage these developments, including macroeconomic easing, fiscal stimulus or otherwise, may not have the desired effect and in fact may, for reasons related to timing, magnitude or other factors, have the unintended consequences of triggering, prolonging or worsening economic and financial difficulties. As Korea's economy is highly dependent on the health and direction of the global economy, investors' reactions to developments in one country can have adverse effects on the securities price of companies in other countries. Factors that determine economic and business cycles of the Korean or global economy are for the most part beyond our control and inherently uncertain. In light of the high level of interdependence of the global economy, any of the foregoing developments could have a material adverse effect on the Korean economy and financial markets, and in turn on our business and profitability.



More specifically, factors that could hurt Korea's economy in the future include, among others:

- volatility in foreign currency reserve levels, commodity prices (including oil prices), exchange rates (particularly against the U.S. dollar), interest rates and stock markets and inflows and outflows of foreign capital, either directly, into the stock markets, through derivatives or otherwise;
- increased reliance on exports to service foreign currency debts, which could cause friction with Korea's trading partners;
- adverse developments in the economies of countries to which Korea exports goods and services (such as the United States, China and Japan), or in emerging market economies in Asia or elsewhere that could result in a loss of confidence in the Korean economy;
- the continued emergence of China, to the extent its benefits (such as increased exports to China) are outweighed by its costs (such as competition in export markets or for foreign investment and relocation of the manufacturing base from Korea to China);
- social and labor unrest or declining consumer confidence or spending resulting from lay-offs, increasing unemployment and lower levels of income;
- uncertainty and volatility in real estate prices arising, in part, from the Government's policy-driven tax and other regulatory measures;
- a decrease in tax revenues and a substantial increase in the Government's expenditures for unemployment compensation and other social programs that together could lead to an increased Government budget deficit;
- political uncertainty or increasing strife among or within political parties in Korea, including as a result of the increasing polarization of the positions of the ruling conservative party and the progressive opposition;
- a deterioration in economic or diplomatic relations between Korea and its trading partners or allies, including such deterioration resulting from trade disputes or disagreements in foreign policy;
- any other development that has a material adverse effect in the global economy, such as an act of war, a terrorist act or a breakout of an epidemic such as SARS, avian flu or swine flu;
- hostilities involving oil-producing countries in the Middle East and elsewhere and any material disruption in the supply of oil or a material increase in the price of oil resulting from such hostilities; and
- an increase in the level of tensions or an outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula.

Any future deterioration of the Korean economy could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operation.

***Tensions with North Korea could have an adverse effect on us and the market value of our shares.***

Relations between Korea and North Korea have been tense throughout Korea's modern history. The level of tension between the two Koreas has fluctuated and may increase abruptly as a result of current and future events. In recent years, there have been heightened security concerns stemming from North Korea's nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs and uncertainty regarding North Korea's actions and possible responses from the international community. In April 2009, after launching a long-range rocket over the Pacific Ocean which led to protests from the international community, North Korea announced that it would permanently withdraw from the six-party talks that began in 2003 to discuss Pyongyang's path to denuclearization. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear testing by launching several short-range missiles. In response to such actions, the Republic decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, an international campaign aimed at stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, over Pyongyang's harsh rebuke and threat of war. After the United

## [Table of Contents](#)

Nations Security Council passed a resolution on June 12, 2009, to condemn North Korea's second nuclear test and impose tougher sanctions such as a mandatory ban on arms exports, North Korea announced that it would produce nuclear weapons and take "resolute military actions" against the international community. In November 2010, North Korean forces fired artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island off the west coast of Korea killing four South Koreans. Efforts at multilateral negotiations with North Korea have been made in response to North Korean provocations, but the prospects of such negotiations remain unclear.

There recently has been increased uncertainty about the future of North Korea's political leadership and its implications for the economic and political stability of the region. In June 2009, American and South Korean officials announced that Kim Jong-il, the North Korean ruler who reportedly suffered a stroke in August 2008, designated his third son, who is reported to be in his twenties, to become his successor. The succession plan, however, remains uncertain. In September 2010, Kim Jong-eun was made a general in the North Korean army, named the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and appointed to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party in a series of measures widely believed to be part of the succession plan. In addition, North Korea's economy faces severe challenges. For example, on November 30, 2009, the North Korean government redenominated its currency at a ratio of 100 to 1 in an attempt to control inflation and reduce income gaps. In tandem with the currency redenomination, the North Korean government banned the use or possession of foreign currency by its residents and closed down privately run markets, which led to severe inflation and food shortages. Such developments may further aggravate social and political tensions within North Korea as well as the entire Korean peninsula.

There can be no assurance that the level of tension and instability in the Korean peninsula will not escalate in the future, or that the political regime in North Korea may not suddenly collapse. Any further increase in tension or uncertainty relating to the military or economic stability in the Korean peninsula, including a breakdown of diplomatic negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program, occurrence of military hostilities or heightened concerns about the stability of North Korea's political leadership, could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operation and could lead to a decline in the market value of our common shares and our American depositary shares.

***Our consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with Korean GAAP, which differ in significant respects from U.S. GAAP.***

Our consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with Accounting Regulations for Public Enterprise Associate Government Agency and Korean GAAP, which differ in certain significant respects from U.S. GAAP.

Korean GAAP and U.S. GAAP differ, among other ways, in respect of the following issues:

- treatment of asset revaluation;
- treatment of foreign exchange translation gains and losses;
- the establishment of regulatory assets and liabilities to offset the impact of foreign exchange translation losses and gains on our income statement, deferred income taxes and reserves for self-insurance; and
- treatment of liabilities for decommissioning costs.

See Item 5B. "Liquidity and Capital Resources—Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP" and Note 38 of the notes to our consolidated financial statements.

***Our reported financial results under the new IFRS accounting standards may differ significantly for those under the existing Korean GAAP accounting standards.***

In March 2007, the Government announced that all companies listed on the Korea Exchange, including us, will be required to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") adopted for use in

Korea beginning January 1, 2011. In addition, we are required to comply with IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standard Board ("IASB") for our SEC reporting obligations. IFRS is the financial reporting standard adopted in more than 110 countries and has requirements that are substantially different from those under Korean GAAP. Starting in the first quarter of 2011, we currently prepare and report our financial statements under IFRS as adopted for use in Korea and publish such financial statements on the website of the Financial Supervisory Service of Korea as required under the applicable regulations and listing rules of the Korea Exchange. Compared to our previous reporting standards under Korean GAAP, IFRS provides for differing reporting requirements with respect to, among others, revenue recognition and property, plant and equipment, which may make it difficult for our shareholders and other investors to compare our reported financial results under IFRS to our reported financial results under the previous Korean GAAP and thereby make their investment decisions on a sufficiently informed basis. Beginning January 1, 2011, we will prepare and report our financial statements under IFRS as issued by the IASB and as adopted for use in Korea for our SEC reporting obligations. See Item 4B. "Business Overview—Recent Developments—Adoption of IFRS."

***We are generally subject to Korean corporate governance and disclosure standards, which differ in significant respects from those in other countries.***

Companies in Korea, including us, are subject to corporate governance standards applicable to Korean public companies which differ in many respects from standards applicable in other countries, including the United States. As a reporting company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we are, and will continue to be, subject to certain corporate governance standards as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended. However, foreign private issuers, including us, are exempt from certain corporate governance standards required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. For a description of significant differences in corporate governance standards, see Item 16G. "Corporate Governance." There may also be less publicly available information about Korean companies, such as us, than is regularly made available by public or non-public companies in other countries. Such differences in corporate governance standards and less public information could result in less than satisfactory corporate governance practices or disclosure to investors in certain countries.