

The effect of spatial mobility on partnered individuals' subjective well-being Elias Hofmann, Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB)

Motivation, theory and research questions:

- Job-related household migration: Which partner benefits most?
- Contrasting theories:
 - "New home economics" (Mincer, 1978): Maximization of common utility function within the household, irrespective of individual costs → Increase in sum of subjective well-being (SWB) within household (not necessarily SWB increases for both partners)
 - Bargaining theories (Ott, 1992): Both need to benefit individually

 otherwise, the move is not undertaken → Increase in individual
 SWB for both partners (no difference)
- Empirical evidence:
 - Generally: Positive income effects only for men (Cooke et al., 2009)
 - In Germany: Income gains for male and female partners (except for female East-West migrants)_(Nisic & Melzer, 2016)
 - Inconsistent results regarding subjective well-being effects
- Advantage of SWB measurement (VS economic indicators):
 Captures both the monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits of migration
- Also: Importance of couple-level analyses to analyse couple-level phenomena

Results:

- Benefits of migration on household level: Sum of SWB increases with migration.
- At the same time: Increases in individual SWB for both partners
 - SWB difference between partners remains the same with migration - no partner benefits more than the other.

Conclusion:


Results in line with the expectation of the bargaining theory: Both partners strive for their own good and need to benefit individually from migration.

Next steps:

• Further explore the **conditions** under which this relationship holds (e.g., stratification by household/individual income, etc.)

Data and methods:

- Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), 1991-2021 (excl. 2014 and 2016)
- Work-related migration of couples sharing a household, within Germany (n = 504 moves)
- Panel fixed-effects regressions (step impact function)
 - Outcome variables (separate models): Sum of SWB within household; Difference in SWB between partners (SWB_{woman}-SWB_{man}); Individual SWB_{woman}; Individual SWB_{man}
 - Event variable: Job-related household move
 - Controls: Average age between partners (linear, squared),
 GDP change since last year (in %), dummy first observation within panel



Effect of internal migration on SWB, SOEP v38, n=504 migration events, own calculations, 95% Cl's.

Sources:

Cooke, T. J., Boyle, P., Couch, K., & Feijten, P. (2009). A longitudinal analysis of family migration and the gender gap in earnings in the United States and Great Britain. *Demography*, *46*(1), 147–167.

Mincer, J. (1978). Family migration decisions. *Journal of Political Economy,* 86, 749–773

Nisic, N. & Melzer, S.M. (2016). Explaining gender inequalities that follow couple migration. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 78*(4), 1063–1082.

Ott, N. (1992). *Intrafamily bargaining and household decisions*. Berlin, Germany.

Contact:

: elias.hofmann@bib.bund.de

: @_elias_hofmann

: @eliashofmann.bsky.social

www.bib.bund.de