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### DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

PRIMARY SECONDARY
Labor Economics Public Finance
Urban Economics Real Estate

**DISSERTATION TITLE:** "Essays in Applied Microeconomics"

Expected Date of Completion: May 2026

Principal Advisor: Professor Pat Kline

Other References: Professors David Card and Emmanuel Saez

## PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES DEGREE DATE FIELD

London School of Economics M.S. 2018 Environmental Economics

Stanford University B.S. 2012 Earth Systems

## **WORKING PAPERS**

<u>Parental Death, Inheritance, and Labor Supply in the United States</u> (Job Market Paper) with John Voorheis

Does parental death influence the next generation's labor supply? To what extent is this response mediated by inherited wealth? Answering these questions advances our understanding of household earnings dynamics and wealth accumulation as well as aggregate wealth inequality. We are the first to study how inheritances affect labor supply in the U.S. using large-scale administrative data. Leveraging federal tax and Social Security records, we estimate event studies around parental death to investigate impacts on adult children. We find that parental death causes sizable gains in investment income—our main proxy for inheritances—and proportionate reductions in labor supply, with annual per-adult investment income at the tax unit level increasing by about \$300 (45 percent) and annual per-adult wage earnings decreasing by \$600 (2 percent) on average. These earnings responses are large relative to the implied wealth transfer. Income effects are the dominant channel through which parental death reduces earnings, with children of wealthier parents exhibiting larger earnings reductions. Over six years, inheritances slightly equalize the distribution of investment income.

## Winners and Losers from Mileage-Based Reforms to the Gas Tax

An increasingly common policy proposal is to tax vehicle miles driven rather than consumption of motor fuels. This paper investigates the distributional consequences of an efficiency-enhancing policy reform in which a gasoline tax is replaced or supplemented by a mileage tax. Using National Household Travel Survey data, I show that household burdens from a gas-to-mileage tax swap are harder to predict than those from the initial gas tax. This result arises because demographic and geographic covariates poorly predict household fuel economy. Consequently, most losers from the swap cannot be compensated. While such reforms may thus be considered unfair from the perspective of compensation, a revenue-equivalent tax swap is not regressive.

#### **WORKS IN PROGRESS**

## Access to Opportunity with Overlapping Generations

There is ample evidence that certain neighborhoods offer greater upward mobility for children than others. Housing

tenure stickiness arising from both institutional frictions and preferences of older households, who moved to such neighborhoods when they were raising children, may crowd out opportunities for younger families with children to enter. I document that, in certain metropolitan areas in the U.S., multiple measures of neighborhood-level upward mobility correlate positively with the share of older households without children at home. I next explore the extent to which this correlation varies in areas with tax wedges frequently cited as barriers to moving for established homeowners. In California, I am able to rule out that a tenure-based housing subsidy known as Proposition 13, as currently structured, meaningfully deters older households from moving. In forthcoming work, I investigate whether older households themselves are responsible for a neighborhood's upward mobility and develop a spatial equilibrium model to estimate the congestion costs of housing tenure stickiness.

# <u>Does Private Local Governance Benefit Neighborhoods? Evidence from Homeowner Associations</u> with Manisha Padi

Homeowner Associations (HOAs) are powerful private governance structures that millions of U.S. homeowners belong to. These organizations levy fees to support common amenities and contractually obligate homeowners to adhere to specific building rules, with the power to foreclose if homeowners fail to meet payments or requirements. Do these contractual agreements yield returns for homeowners in the form of higher housing values and home equity, or do benefits primarily accrue to housing developers and financial institutions? To answer these questions, we first construct a database of state-level HOA laws and their amendments. Next, we use proprietary data to build a panel of property-level HOA membership and loan and property outcomes. Merging the two datasets, we use variation in legislation and matching methods to study the effect of HOAs on household finance. Early results point to limited HOA impacts on property values, home equity, or financial distress on average. In forthcoming work, we explore variation by HOA restrictiveness and alternative mechanisms explaining the prominence of HOAs.