

Production Expectations Modulate Contrastive Inference

Anonymous CogSci submission

Abstract

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Keywords: add your choice of indexing terms or keywords; kindly use a semicolon; between each term

Introduction

One of the most interesting features of language is its flexibility. To refer to one single object a speaker can choose an utterance out of an indefinite set of possible referring expressions. *The banana, the yellow banana, the yellow, curvy fruit-thingy* for example are all utterances that can refer to the same object. At the same time, the same utterance – e.g., *banana* – can be used to refer to different kinds of objects. But this flexibility poses a challenge for the listener, who needs to pragmatically infer the speaker’s intention. Consequently, trying to understand how a listener processes these utterances and what affects their interpretation has become a central question in psycholinguistic research.

One of the most fundamental findings is that listeners process utterances incrementally, i.e., new information is incorporated into the interpretation of the utterance as soon as it becomes available (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995). For instance, eye-tracking experiments have shown that if a listener hears the incomplete utterance *the yellow* in a display like Figure 1a, they fixate on the yellow objects in the display even before they hear the disambiguating noun *banana* and [ek: arrive at] the final referent [ek: cite].

But listeners go beyond the information contained in the signal itself; they also take into account contextual information and specifically the nature of other possible referents to draw rapid pragmatic inferences about the speaker’s intention [ek: cite]. One of those inferences is called the “contrastive inference” (Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999). Consider the context in Figure 1a that shows a yellow and orange banana, a yellow corncob and some other distractor item. When a listener is asked to *pick out the yellow...*, there

are two eligible objects to choose from: the yellow banana and the yellow corncob. Sedivy et al. (1999); Sedivy (2003) show that when there is a contrast to one of the objects (here, another banana), listeners fixate more on the yellow banana than when the contrast is absent. The increase in looks to the target as opposed to the competitor is interpreted as suggesting a preference for the banana interpretation (Eberhard et al., 1995).

Even though a contrastive inference can lead to a preference of the target over the competitor, this does not need to be the case. Instead we need to differentiate between two cases: a contrastive inference and a final target preference. A contrastive inference occurs when the presence of the contrast increases the target “considerations” over those in a context with no contrast. That means there can be a contrastive inference even if there is no overall target preference over the competitor.

Originally, the contrastive inference effect has been shown with size adjectives in eye-tracking experiments (Sedivy et al., 1999) and has since been replicated reliably, especially in the scalar adjective domain [ek: cite]. However the effect seems to be less stable with color adjectives (Sedivy, 2003). Sedivy (2003) reports that the contrastive inference arises in contexts where the target object has a “predictable” color (such as the yellow banana in Figure 1a) but not when it is replaced by an object with an “unpredictable” color like a cup. They suggest that those objects differ in how likely a speaker is to produce the color modifier for the object in isolation, i.e., in the absence of a contrast, a yellow banana is usually just called *a banana* while a yellow cup is still sometimes called *a yellow cup*.

Since then inferences have been shown to be modulated by multiple factors. First of all, its occurrence seems to be dependent on the expectations of informativity [ek: elaborate] (Aparicio, Xiang, & Kennedy, 2016; Aparicio, Kennedy, & Xiang, 2018; Sedivy, 2003). However informativity alone cannot account for [ek: ...]. Other studies indicate that also adjective semantics matter, such that the inference arises with color adjectives, relative adjectives and maximum standard absolute adjectives, but not with minimum standard absolute adjectives (Aparicio et al., 2018). Furthermore the effect only arises when the listener considers the speaker as a reliable speaker, who does not violate communicative norms (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011).




Figure 1: This is a figure. [ek: label with A and B]

All of these factors tend to modulate contrastive inference. In this paper, we provide a novel account of contrastive inferences that has the potential to unify all the above properties by reducing them to listeners’ expectations about the speaker’s contextual probability of producing the pre-nominal adjective. Following recent research highlighting the importance of the listener’s generative model of the speaker in generating pragmatic inferences (Degen, Hawkins, Graf, Kreiss, & Goodman, 2019)[ek: cite more], we propose the Rational-Speech Act (RSA) framework (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016) as a new way to think about contrastive inference incrementally. In this framework, the listener reasons about a speaker’s possible utterances, therefore giving the speaker model a central role in the predictions. It provides a way to quantitatively assess which predictions a listener with prior beliefs and expectations about the speaker *should* make. This shifts the focus away from specific cognitive and linguistic factors that influence contrastive inference onto listener’s production expectations (and their prior beliefs).

In this paper we will show on qualitative examples how the RSA account can make the same predictions about the basic contrast effect as for instance the default description (Sedivy, 2003). But the RSA account also makes new predictions about the context that *should* affect contrastive inference and final target preference. To test the model, we report a production study we conducted to elicit modifier probability estimates. The data to be explained by the model was collected in a comprehension experiment using an incremental decision task. We will then evaluate the model on the basis of the empirical data.

Accounts of contrastive inference [ek: Model section]

[ek: "Likelihood" and "probability" are all scrambled up here. Don't forget to fix that!]

In the literature, different factors have been considered to give rise to contrastive inference which indirectly put more or less relevance onto the speaker.

Sedivy et al. (1999) for instance only considers a very limited speaker model. In this account, a contrastive inference

arises when the modifier is not a component of the object’s *default description*. In other words, since *yellow* is added to the default description *the banana*, the adjective elicits a contrastive inference in the listener. It therefore only assumes speaker considerations as to the creation of the default descriptions for objects and is completely independent of the context the target is presented in.

[ek: cite rubio fernandez] gives the speaker a more central role. In this account, the production probabilities of this more involved speaker directly affect the size of the contrastive inference. It therefore predicts that contrastive inference is not binary, but can occur in different strengths. While this account considers listeners’ reasoning not only about the target but also about the competitor, the speaker model is still restricted to target considerations only. [ek: write this better]

A Rational-Speech Act account gives the speaker a central role in the predictions, since the listener directly reasons about the speaker’s possible utterances u for each object r in the display C .

$$P_{L_1}(r|u, C) = \frac{P_{S_0}(u|r, C) * P(r|C)}{\sum P_{S_0}(u|r_i, C) * P(r_i|C)} \quad (1)$$

For now we will make the simplifying assumption that listeners have a uniform prior over all objects in the display. Then the RSA model predicts a direct relationship between the production probabilities and the listener’s distribution over possible referents. So far in the literature, RSA has been mainly applied to the analysis of full utterances. To receive RSA predictions after an incomplete reference such as *the yellow...*, P_{S_0} is simply the underlying probability of color mention for each referent in the display.

To understand the qualitative predictions of the RSA account, we will first consider the context in Figure 1a. Upon hearing the modifier *yellow*, the pragmatic listener P_{L_1} will now consider how likely a speaker is to include this modifier in their referring expression **for each object in the display**. Since only the target (yellow banana) and the competitor (corn cob) are yellow, we will assume that the production probabilities of *yellow* for the other objects in the display are 0. The pragmatic listener therefore only needs to consider the target and the competitor. All of the following modifier production probabilities for the target and competitor are the ones obtained in the production study explained below.

If the contrasting banana is absent, speakers are unlikely to include the color modifier when referring to the target banana [ek: number] and they are equally unlikely to do so for its competitor, the corn cob [ek: number]. The pragmatic listener will therefore not be able to prefer one potential referent over the other.

The presence of the orange banana will not affect the listener’s expectations about modifier production for the competitor (corn cob). However, since the modifier is now necessary for a unique identification, the speaker is much more likely to use the modifier [ek: number]. Here, the pragmatic listener then predicts the yellow banana to be the more likely

target over the competitor [ek: number vs number] (target preference) and therefore predicting the generally reported case of contrastive inference.

In contrast to previous accounts of contrastive inference, the prediction on whether a “contrastive inference” arises is not only dependent on the choice of the target object but also the competitor. This raises the question what happens if we change the modifier production probabilities for the competitor. [ek: Westerbeek] showed that speakers are more likely to include the color modifier for objects in isolation when they appear in an atypical than in a typical color. For example the yellow strawberry in Figure 1b receives a higher modifier production probability [ek: number] than the corn cob competitor in Figure 1a. The difference between the modifier production probabilities between the target and the competitor is much smaller in this case, predicting that the contrastive inference is smaller.

[ek: rewrite on the basis of “given ttn context, whether it’s a ttp or tap context it is compared to matters for contrastive inference conclusions”]

To investigate when a listener with a generative speaker model should draw a contrastive inference, we need to elicit how likely a listener can expect a modified over an unmodified referring expression for each object in the display. To evaluate the performance of the model and to gain information about the prior of the objects, we need comprehension data that informs us which object is considered the most likely target referent.

Experiment 1: Modifier Production in an Interactive Reference Game

To investigate whether production probabilities affect listeners’ contrastive inferences, we need to manipulate how likely a listener is to observe a modified utterance for each object in the display.[jd: this first sentence should be in the previous paragraph. here just say “Exp. 1 was aimed at obtaining modifier production probabilities for all the displays ultimately used in the contrastive inference experiment (Exp. 2). We elicited these probabilities in a free production interactive reference game.”] Our main assumption is that the typicality of a color for an object will affect these modifier production probabilities. When the object is in isolation for instance, a listener should expect the speaker to call a yellow banana simply *the banana*, but a blue banana *the blue banana*. In this production experiment, we tested this hypothesis and empirically elicited the proportion of color modifier mention for the target and competitor. The results are taken as the basis of what production probabilities a listener can expect to observe.

Participants

[jd: just flagging this section as one that can be radically shortened if you run out of space] We recruited 282 participants over Amazon Mechanical Turk, who were randomly matched to form one listener-speaker chat pair (i.e., 141 pairs in total). The estimated time for completion was 10 to 12

minutes and each participant was paid \$2.30. We restricted participation to workers with IP addresses in the US and an approval rate of previous work above 97%.

Exclusions were performed on the 141 speakers, since they provided the utterances. Participants were excluded when they participated multiple times in the experiment (1 participant; 139 pairs remaining) and when they did not use a noun from the display in at least half of the cases (27 participants; 112 pairs remaining). These participants clearly misunderstood the task, using expressions such as *yellow monkey* instead of *yellow banana*, or *should be yellow*, *must have teeth to eat* for *corn*. All speakers indicated that their native language was English.

Material

Each context included four items, as displayed in [ek: Figure]. The pool of items consisted of 10 types (banana, broccoli, carrot, corn, egg, lettuce, pumpkin, strawberry, swan, tomato), each of which could occur in a typical or atypical color. For example, the broccoli could occur in its typical color green or in the atypical color red. The resulting pool contains 20 items, 10 of which are atypically colored. The number of colors is carefully counterbalanced such as each color occurs twice as a typical and twice as an atypical instance. All items were carefully normed for color-diagnosticsity [ek: Tanaka Presnell], typicality and nameability.

Design

The contexts varied in the typicality of the target, the typicality of the competitor and the presence of a contrast, resulting in eight conditions. For the critical trials, each participant saw four randomly created contexts from each of these eight conditions. In each condition we are interested in the modifier production probabilities for the target and the competitor, which is why in half of the trials when a contrast was present, the target was marked as the item to be communicated and in the other half, the competitor was marked. However when there is no contrast present, this distinction is irrelevant. For example, when target and competitor are both (a)typical, it is irrelevant, which is underlyingly coded as the target. Similarly when the modifier production probability for a typical target in context with an atypical competitor is the same as the probability for a typical competitor in a context with an atypical target. The fillers were eight randomly created contexts where the contrast was the item to be communicated and 20 randomly created contexts where the distractor was the item to be communicated. Overall, each participant saw 60 different contexts (32 critical trials) in a completely randomized order.

Procedure

Participants were randomly paired up and each was randomly assigned either to the role of a speaker or listener. They could communicate freely through a real-time multi-player interface similar to [ek: Hawkins (2015)]. The speaker was in-




Figure 2: This is a figure. [ek: make text bigger in figure]

structed to communicate a target object out of a four-object context to the listener. The target could be identified by a green border surrounding it. The speaker and the listener saw the same set of objects but in a randomized order to avoid trivial position-based references such as “the left one”. After the listener clicked on the presumed target, both the speaker and listener received feedback about whether the right object had been selected.

Results

[ek: only selected items with correct selection] Figure 4 shows the probability of color modifier mention for the target and competitor in each condition¹.

When a contrast to the target is present (e.g., another banana), a speaker needs to include the color modifier to fully disambiguate the two items (see the upper row in Figure 4). When the typicality of the target is atypical, this is completely borne out in the data. However if the target is typical, participants sometimes also used the unmodified utterance. [ek: refer to speculations about the reason for this in discussion]

When the contrast is absent (see the lower row in Figure 4), speakers were more likely to include a color modifier when referring to an atypical target than a typical one [ek: stats?].

Independent of contrast, speakers were more likely to include the color modifier for an atypical color competitor over a typical one [ek: stats?].

The results of this production experiment show that the probability of a speaker’s modifier use is modulated by the color typicality of the item and the presence of a contrast. Our experiment therefore manipulates the modifier production probabilities a listener can expect in different contexts.

¹Note that some data is duplicated in the conditions where the contrast is absent ([ek: see section...for explanation]). In the conditions where target and competitor are both (a)typical, the modifier probabilities are created by the same data. The underlying data is also identical in the two conditions where one of the items is (a)typical.




Figure 3: This is a figure. [ek: make text bigger in figure]

Comprehension Experiment: An Incremental Decision Task

To investigate which objects listeners consider to be the most likely target after observing the color adjective, we conducted an incremental decision task. [ek: ...]

Participants

We recruited 239 participants over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 121 of which saw atypical color competitors and 118 saw typical color competitors in the critical trials. The study took on average 7 minutes and each of them were paid \$1.80 for their participation. We restricted participation to workers with IP addresses in the US and an approval rate of previous work above 97%.

We excluded participants who did the Hit multiple times (1) who indicated that they did the Hit incorrectly or were confused (13), who indicated that they had a native language other than English (6), and who gave more than 20% erroneous responses (7). An erroneous response is defined as a click to a non-target object after observing the fully disambiguating noun, i.e., participants are excluded who selected the wrong final object more than 11 times. Overall, we excluded 27 people, which is 11% of the subjects. 211 participants remain, 108 of which were in the atypical competitor and 103 were in the typical competitor condition.

Material

The item pool is the same as described in the production study.

Design

[ek: clarify what is within and between-subject manipulation with rationale]




Figure 4: This is a figure.

Participants completed 55 trials in total, 20 of which were critical trials and 35 were fillers. The contexts varied for each participant with respect to the presence of a contrast and the target’s color typicality (within-subject manipulation). Participants were randomly assigned to see either typical or atypical competitors on critical trials (between-subject manipulation). All critical trials included color modified utterances. To avoid that participants learn that the color modifier is always part of the referring expression, we need filler trials with unmodified referring expression. Another confound could be that participants can derive the target already from the context without seeing a referring expression, since the target is the only object that shares its color and type features with other objects in the display. The filler trials therefore needed to introduce primarily unmodified referring expressions that target other objects in the display. The exact trial structure is summarized in table 1.

Procedure

This experiment is a one-player adaptation of the production study explained above and follows the design of an incremental decision task [ek: cite Qing].

All participant were assigned the role of the listener, which means that they needed to identify which object was the target given a referring expression placed above the context. Crucially, the referring expression was only gradually revealed and participants had to choose an object each time. The choices had to be made prior any information about the target (i.e., after observing “Click on the”), after observing an adjective (“Click on the yellow”) and after observing the full referring expression with the disambiguating noun (“Click on the yellow banana!”). The selections a listener makes before receiving any information about the target, inform us about potential priors they might have. The critical selections are the clicks after observing the adjective but before the disambiguating noun, since they will inform us about the inferences

Table 1: Overview of the trial structure for the comprehension study.

trial type	number	utterance	referent
critical	20	modified	target
filler	5	unmodified	competitor (typical)
filler	5	modified	competitor (atypical)
filler	5	modified	contrast
filler	20	unmodified	distractor (typical)

participants seem to draw from observing the adjective. We also collected the clicks after the fully disambiguating noun was presented, which functioned as attention checks in the analysis.

To center the position of the mouse after each selection, a button appeared in the center of the grid which had to be clicked to reveal the next word or to advance to the next trial.

Before participants proceeded to the main trials, they had to complete four practice trials constructed from the speaker perspective. In the speaker role, they saw contexts with four non-color diagnostic objects, one of which was marked as the target by a green border surrounding it. They were then asked to refer to the object such that a second player could identify it. The practice trials were introduced to familiarize the participants with the task.

The main trials were randomized with one restriction: Trials in which a speaker’s color modifier use to refer to the target is very unlikely only occurred after the 15th trial. These were contexts where there was no contrast and either both target and color competitor were typical objects, or the target was typical while the color competitor was atypical. We introduced this restriction to minimize the risk that participants perceive the “utterance generator” (speaker) as unnatural.

Results

Figure 5 shows the proportion of clicks on the objects in the display prior observing the adjective (lighter colors) and after the adjective (darker colors), grouped by context condition. Before an adjective is observed, all items should appear equally likely to be the target, which is supported by the generally uniform distribution in all conditions. After the adjective is observed (darker colors), only the target and competitor are legible options and we predict that the presence of the contrast and the typicality of the objects will affect the listeners’ object choices.

When the contrast is present (upper row in Figure 5), there is a general preference for target selection over competitor selection. This preference is biggest for the case when the target is atypical and the competitor is typical and disappears for when the target is typical and the competitor is atypical.

When the contrast is absent (lower row in Figure 5) and target and competitor differ in typicality, there is a preference for the item with the atypical color. When the two items share




Figure 5: This is a figure. [ek: make bars and text bigger]

their typicality, the selection are approximately at the same rate.

These results clearly show that the color typicality of the objects in the display affect the inference listeners draw about the target. We will turn to how these results correspond to the production data by considering the RSA model predictions.

Model evaluation

To assess the relationship between the modifier production probabilities and the comprehension data in the simplest way, we will assume a flat prior over all objects in the display. The probabilities to choose the target over the competitor are then simply the normalized modifier production probabilities as shown in Equation (2), where r is the possible referent, u the utterance and C the specific context.

$$P_{L_1}(r|u, C) = \frac{P_{S_0}(u|r, C)}{P_{S_0}(u|r_{\text{target}}, C) + P_{S_0}(u|r_{\text{comp}}, C)} \quad (2)$$

Figure 6 shows the model predictions (in blue) and the empirical results (in purple) for target and competitor selection after observing the adjective.

The model predicts...

The model qualitatively predicts the patterns for the different context conditions. However, it generally predicts a stronger inference than borne out in the empirical data. [ek: which is why the correlation is so low]

[ek: the rsa model is a significant predictor for the comprehension data; however there are also biases: position and non-switching (see figure); in fact if we add these predictors to the model, they also become significant. In the new




Figure 6: This is a figure.




Figure 7: This is a figure.[ek: fix condition naming][jd: don't say "clicks to the target" but instead "target selection" on the y-axis and throughout the paper. clicks sounds clumsy. maybe also highlight the ttp and tap conditions visually if you use them as the motivating example at the beginning of the paper]




Figure 8: This is a figure.[ek: fix a lot]




Figure 9: This is a figure.[ek: fix a lot]

plots, we can see that (when the position is equal), whatever was previously clicked highly affects the outcome. Now the model underpredicts the target clicks in most conditions. The reverse is true if the competitor was clicked previously. This is something where the eyetracking data will provide more information since we expect the switching cost to be lower.]

Discussion

[jd: somewhere make clear that it's not just color-diagnostics of the target (as sedivy suggests) that matters – instead, it's that, and the color-diagnostics of the other distractors, and their relative typicality, etc etc, which are all ultimately captured variable modifier production expectations, and *that's* the explanatory quantity]

[ek: random thought: if target is typical and contrast present – does the typicality of the contrast affect modifier production for the target? It should. So far we see that modifier mention for the typical target + contrast contexts is not at

ceiling, because (maybe) "banana" is still a better description of the target than the contrast. This would probably change if the contrast was brown.]

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