


Multi-Party Schnorr Signatures

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April 23, 2023


What is a Cryptographic Signature?

- used to verify that a message comes from a particular person
 - signer holds secret signing key
- main security property: unforgeability




Threshold Cryptography

- introduced by Desmedt & Frankel [D87, DF89]
- secret key enables signatures, decryption, etc.
 - single point of failure
- idea: distribute the secret key among several parties
 - some fraction may be corrupt





Threshold Cryptography

- distribute the secret key  via:
 - trusted key generation *algorithm* (Shamir secret sharing [Sha79])
 - distributed key generation *protocol* (DKG)



What are Threshold Signatures?



Public Key PK


- t -out-of- n
- trusted key generation or DKG to produce PK

(2,3) Example

What are Multi-Signatures?




(3,3) Example



Public Key PK

- n -out-of- n
- key aggregation to produce PK
- set of signers can be spontaneous

Why Multi-Party Schnorr Signatures? Why Now?




(Single-Party) Schnorr Signature Scheme [Sch91]



To generate a key pair:

$$sk \leftarrow \mathbb{F}; \quad PK \leftarrow g^{sk}$$



To sign a message m :

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}; \quad R \leftarrow g^r$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$z \leftarrow r + c \cdot sk$$



Verify:

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$R \cdot PK^c = g^z \quad \checkmark$$

Multi-Party Schnorr Signature Scheme

Key Generation: PK



$$sk_1$$

$$R_1 \leftarrow g^{r_1}$$

$$sk_2$$

$$R_2 \leftarrow g^{r_2}$$

$$R = R_1 R_2$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$



$$z_1 \leftarrow r_1 + c \cdot sk_1 \quad z_2 \leftarrow r_2 + c \cdot sk_2$$

Round 1:

$$R_1, R_2$$

Round 2:

$$z_1, z_2$$



Combine / Verify:

$$z \leftarrow z_1 + z_2$$

$$c \leftarrow H(PK, m, R)$$

$$R \cdot PK^c = g^z \quad \checkmark$$

NOT concurrently secure 

Multi-Signatures

Scheme	Secure Under	Signing Rounds
MuSig [MPSW18, BDN18] SimpleMuSig [BDN18, CKM21]	DL+ROM	3
MuSig2 [NRS21] DWMS [AB21] SpeedyMuSig [CKM21]	OMDL+ROM	2
Lindell22 Sparkle [CKM23] FROST [KG20, BCKMTZ22] FROST2 [CKM21]	Schnorr DL+ROM	3
	OMDL+ROM	2

All are concurrently secure ✓

One-More Discrete Logarithm (OMDL):

- stronger assumption
- + essentially non-interactive signing

MuSig2: Simple Two-Round Schnorr Multi-Signatures

Jonas Nick¹, Tim Ruffing¹, and Yannick Seurin²

How to Prove Schnorr Assuming Schnorr: Security of Multi- and Threshold Signatures

Elizabeth Crites¹, Chelsea Komlo², and Mary Maller³

Fully Adaptive Schnorr Threshold Signatures

Elizabeth Crites¹, Chelsea Komlo², and Mary Maller³

FROST: Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures

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Better than Advertised Security for Non-interactive Threshold Signatures

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Stefano Tessaro⁵, and Chenzhi Zhu⁵ 

Deployment and Standardization

Multi-Party Schnorr Signatures in Practice

FROST

The GitHub repository page for [jesseposner/FROST-BIP340](#) displays several logos of projects that have implemented or are using the FROST multi-party Schnorr signature scheme. These include:

- firo (red logo)
- toposware (green and blue abstract logo)
- PENUMBRA (black background with orange and blue geometric logo)
- CRYPTOSAT (black background with white and purple abstract logo)
- serai-dex/serai (orange circle with white Bitcoin symbol)
- Chainflip (black rectangle with white text and logo)
- AMIS (blue gradient square with white stylized 'M' shape)
- Zcash (yellow circle with black 'Z')
- Dlaus (bright yellow square with black 'Dlaus' text)
- CRYPTOSAT (black background with white and purple abstract logo)

Below the logos, the repository statistics are shown: 9 contributors, 2 used by, 94 stars, 18 forks.

MuSig2

The image shows two GitHub repository pages related to MuSig2 implementation:

- BlockstreamResearch/secp256k1-zkp**: This page includes the Blockstream logo and a link to a pull request (#1372) titled "Add BIP MuSig2". It also features logos for LLFourn and input-output-hk/musig2.
- input-output-hk/musig2**: This page includes the input-output-hk logo and a link to a pull request (#223) titled "musig: Update to BIP v1.0.0-rc.4 (Check pubnonce in NonceGen)". It also features logos for bitcoin/bips and BlockstreamResearch/secp256k1-zkp.

Both repositories show activity from March 3, 2023, including 0 comments, 3 reviews, 3 files, and 1 commit.

On the right side, there is a logo for muun (blue square with white text) with the subtitle "Self-custodial wallet for bitcoin and lightning."

Standardization



NISTIR 8214C (Draft)

NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Date Published: January 25, 2023

Comments Due: April 10, 2023

Email Comments to: nistir-8214C-comments@nist.gov

Author(s)

Luís T. A. N. Brandão (Strativia), Rene Peralta (NIST)

<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8214c/draft>

Thank you!

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