



Department of State

ROK 146
TELEGRAM

7

~~SECRET~~ 490

PAGE 01 SEOUL 00093 220604Z

12
ACTION EUR 20

INFO EA 10, CCO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, USIA 12, SA 01, SAL 01, ACDA 16, NIC 01,
RSR 01, IO 13, SAH 02, /110 W

P 220530Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2332

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 9342

REF: STATE 224690 AND 224692

1. I CONVEYED SENSE OF REFTELS TO BOTH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND PROVIDED FOREIGN MINISTER WITH COPY OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. I SUGGESTED ROKG STATEMENT CONCERNING SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND FONMIN SAID THEY FELT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND WOULD PROCEED TO PUT ONE OUT.
2. FONMIN SAID THAT ADVERSE CHICOM REACTION TO RUSSIAN MOVE HAD ALREADY BEEN NOTED. I SAID THIS HAD NOT COME TO MY ATTENTION AND INQUIRED AS TO NATURE. HE REPLIED THAT LOCAL PRESS THIS MORNING REPORTED CHICOMS AS SAYING IN EFFECT THAT REVISIONIST ACTION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS FOOLISH AND UNWISE. I HAVE NOT HEARD THIS FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE.
3. IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN REACTION, FONMIN EXPRESSED BELIEF NORTH KOREANS WOULD PROBABLY ANNOUNCE THEIR APPROVAL OF SOVIET MOVE IN VIEW OF RECENT IMPROVEMENT USSR-NK RELATIONS. I COMMENTED THAT NORTH KOREANS MIGHT THINK TWICE ABOUT DOING SO. THEY HAVE COMMON FRONTIER WITH SOVIET UNION, AND NK REGIME MIGHT BE UNEASY ABOUT APPROVING SUCH BLATANT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN NEIGHBORING COMMUNIST STATE. CHICOM DISAPPROVAL, IF A FACT, MIGHT ALSO IMPEL NORTH KOREANS TO ADOPT NONCOMMITTAL ATTITUDE, I SAID, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

GP-1 PORTER

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By g/jclm NARA, Date 4-26-06