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Reconsidering the Rubber Stamp Thesis: A Consolidation Theory of Expropriations and Legislatures in Party-based Autocracies

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Growing conventional wisdom suggests authoritarian legislatures prevent oil nationalizations. However, country scholars and media outlets remain skeptical. We develop a theory aligning with the skeptics. We argue that expropriations and legislative closures are jointly caused by authoritarian regime consolidation. Coalition-building autocrats cancel elections until they can guarantee a pliant legislature, a process abetted by expropriation. Testing this theory poses a challenge due to the equifinality of the consolidation and binding arguments. Both predict correlations between legislative closures and nationalization. To address this challenge, we test the argument using recently developed Bayesian qualitative techniques. Evidence shows little support for binding theories, but evidence for the consolidation theory. These findings suggest that authoritarian legislatures are less constraining than new conventional wisdom suggests.

Do authoritarian legislatures prevent autocrats from expropriating? Long dismissed as inconsequential rubber stamps, recent work argues that legislatures perform a range of functions. Many of the theorized functions simply assist autocrats in strengthening their rule such as information provision or bureaucratic oversight (Truex 2016; Schuler 2018; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 136-137). However, in a stronger challenge to the rubber stamp thesis, others suggest that legislatures "bind" autocrats by coopting opponents or facilitating collective action among regime insiders (Wright 2008; Wilson and Wright 2015; Gandhi 2008b; Svolik 2012; Bonvecchi and Simison 2017).

Two key pieces of evidence for the binding theory are that autocrats are more likely to expropriate private companies, particularly foreign oil firms, when legislatures are closed (Wilson and Wright 2015; Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin 2011; Warshaw 2012; Wright 2008) and that authoritarian legislatures occasionally reject government proposals (Saiegh 2011). Despite the evidence, not all are convinced that legislatures constrain. Media outlets such as *The Economist* continue to dismiss the role of authoritarian legislatures.[1] Furthermore, some argue that while legislatures may assist autocrats, they do not constrain (Pepinsky 2014; Slater 2003; Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014).[2]

Regarding expropriation, which view is correct? While the binding theories have marshaled substantial empirical evidence, the large-N findings remain puzzling. First, the findings suggest that legislatures only prevent expropriation in party-based regimes

[1] For example see: *The Economist.* "The National People's Congress: What Makes a Rubber Stamp?" May 5, 2012

[2] This view accords with the perspective that variation in economic growth in autocracies result from policy decisions rather than institutional constraints (Glaeser, et al. 2004).

(Wright 2008; Wilson and Wright 2015). However, most theories of party control of legislatures suggest that when parties are strong and cohesive, legislatures should be less constraining of executives from the same party (Brownlee 2007; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Second, it is not clear why a popularly elected legislature should prevent nationalization when many asset expropriations are immensely popular. Indeed, Mexico still celebrates the anniversary of its oil nationalization as a national holiday.

To reconcile these diverging views, this paper offers an alternative theory linking authoritarian legislatures and expropriation. We argue that expropriations and closures jointly result from the process of authoritarian regime consolidation, which we define as the process of the autocracy eliminating external and internal rivals and signaling dominance to the population. Autocrats close legislatures to eliminate supporters of the old regime and do not reopen them until they have eliminated challengers. Once rivals have been eliminated, partially through using expropriations to buy off rivals, the legislature is reopened as a public signal of dominance (Wedeen 2015). While legislatures may later serve some of the additional auxiliary functions theorized in other work, legislatures and expropriations are negatively correlated because expropriations and legislative closures are used to build a pliant assembly. This means that single-party legislatures should be *more pliant* to the whims of the autocracy than in other regimes.

However, distinguishing between our consolidation theory and the extant binding theory poses an empirical challenge. Legislative closures may be a better proxy for consolidation than other controls, such as regime age, used in standard statistical models. This raises the equifinality problem in which legislative closures simultaneously measure consolidation and constraint. To address this challenge, we apply recent advances in the

integration of qualitative case data into a fully Bayesian model in order to systematically examine these potential causal mechanisms (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Fairfield and Charman 2017). We apply this method to the universe of 31 party-based autocracies with oil resources since World War II because these are the regimes that should exhibit the mechanisms predicted by the competing theories.[3] Furthermore, we focus on oil nationalizations because they are unambiguously observable.[4]

Beyond demonstrating the utility of a relatively new methodological technique, the primary contribution of this paper is to resolve the disjuncture between the competing views on the role of authoritarian legislatures in preventing expropriation. The evidence we provide suggests that we should downplay the importance of legislatures in preventing expropriation in settings where the same party controls the executive and legislature. Additionally, in contrast to prevailing wisdom, we also show that legislatures in personalistic regimes and monarchies are more adversarial than in party-based regimes. Once regime dynamics are accounted for, the data and conclusions are clear. Single-party legislatures likely do not prevent expropriation. Rather, party-based regimes without legislatures feature autocrats hungry for resources to build a new coalition.

Authoritarian Legislatures, Expropriation, and Economic Outcomes

[3] While this may seem like a "small-N", our analysis uses the same number of cases as conventional large-N studies. Large-N time series analyses generate more observations by breaking regimes up into country-years, but not by including additional cases.

[4] Below, we provide evidence that oil nationalizations generalize to other nationalizations.

The theoretical link between authoritarian legislatures and property rights protection has a long lineage. North and Weingast suggest that parliamentary reforms under the Stuart monarchy in the United Kingdom protected elite property rights (1989). More recent work echoes this theme. Wright argues that "[b]y constraining his own power, the dictator is investing in property rights" (2008, 328). The role of legislatures in protecting property rights is used to explain greater investment (Wright 2008; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011) and growth (Wright 2008; Boix 2003; Gandhi 2008a) in autocracies with legislatures. The presumption is that legislators prefer the long term benefits of investment and thus seek to protect property rights against an autocrat who is motivated by short term personal gain. Despite skepticism about the link (Pepinsky 2014), important papers examining a wide range of theoretical questions still operationalize the presence of an authoritarian legislature as a constraint or a way to make concessions (for example: Woo and Conrad 2019; Rivera 2017; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012).

Existing research identifies two broad mechanisms linking legislatures to property rights protections (Schuler and Malesky 2015). The first argues that legislatures prevent autocrats from seizing assets through co-optation (Gandhi 2008b; Gandhi and Przeworksi 2007). Rather than fighting with opponents publicly, autocrats co-opt opponents in a legislature, who can defend their interests in a controlled manner. The second set argues that legislatures stabilize power sharing arrangements, thus preventing autocrats from seizing assets from those connected to the regime (Svolik 2012; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). Empirical work supporting these views shows that legislatures only protect property rights in non-personalistic regimes, which are defined as party-based and military regimes as opposed to personalistic regimes and monarchies (Wright 2008;

Wilson and Wright 2015). In explaining these findings, they argue that personalist leaders establish legislatures to facilitate their dominance while non-personalist leaders wish to establish constraints.

Despite the robust results, the heterogeneous effects are puzzling. First, they contradict North and Weingast's argument that parliament under the British monarchy (a distinctly non-party regime) had a *positive* effect on property rights. Furthermore, this is difficult to reconcile with research on democracies suggesting that when party institutions are stronger, legislatures provide a weaker check on government (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Legislatures usually have more influence when parties are weak or fragmented (Tsebelis 2002). Therefore, while recent work suggests that party-based regimes should have more constraining legislatures, classic work from democracies implies the opposite.

Case study evidence suggests that autocracies with weak parties do conform to patterns found in democracies. Indeed, research from the Middle East suggests that the frequent closure of legislatures in monarchies such as Kuwait and Morocco constitutes evidence that the legislatures were in fact engaging in adversarial behavior (Herb 2014). Furthermore, most of the case study evidence of strong legislatures comes from military regimes or monarchies and not party based regimes (Gandhi 2008b; North and Weingast 1989). This raises a final concern, which is that the null impact of legislatures on expropriation in non-party regimes may have nothing to do with the degree of constraint provided by the legislature. Rather, it may result from the fact that legislatures may be just as likely to support expropriation as the autocrats.

Authoritarian Consolidation in Party-Based Regimes

Our central argument is that existing theoretical and empirical research reaches counterintuitive conclusions because it does not account for how legislative closures and expropriations in party-based autocracies fit into the evolution of authoritarian rule. While recent research on authoritarianism increasingly emphasizes how authoritarian regimes evolve (Svolik 2012; Dimitrov 2013; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018), few assess how the process of legislative closures and expropriation fit into a "life cycle" theory of authoritarian development. We argue that regime consolidation systematically impacts expropriation and legislative closures. Additionally, this process better explains party-based regimes, which are distinguished from other forms of autocracy such as military, hereditary, or personalist regimes by their reliance on a civilian-based organization capable of mobilizing political support and managing the bureaucracy.

In defining consolidation, echoing the "prospective" view of democratic consolidation, which suggests that consolidation occurs when a regime is expected to persist (Huntington 1993; Svolik 2015), we contend that an autocratic consolidation occurs when there is a significant drop in the probability that an autocrat or autocratic group will either transition to democracy or to some other authoritarian regime. We contend that consolidation will generally follow a three-step process.

Consolidation Step 1: Eliminate Previous Regime:

New party-based authoritarian regimes are built on the ashes of a different pre-existing ruling coalition (Svolik 2012; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Unseating the previous regime means that the launching organization must dislodge the previous regime from power. Eliminating the previous regime, therefore, is the first step in consolidation.

Consolidation Step 2: Weaken Internal and External Rivals

The next phase of consolidation is defining the new ruling coalition. While the launching organization may agree on the need to eliminate the old regime, for several reasons, there may be uncertainty as to who should and will rule the new one. As Haber observes: "The early years of dictatorships… tend to be characterized by a power struggle – a game as it were, with the stakes being tenure in office – between the dictator and the leadership of the organized group that launched him." (2006, 696). A reason for post-transition instability is that the condition of secrecy required to unseat an incumbent necessitates a collegial, decentralized organizational structure within the launching organization. At the same time, the risks mean that those who participate feel entitled to a greater share of the rewards (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 36-37). This leads to conflicting expectations and heightened stakes in the competition for power in the new regime. The second step of consolidation, therefore, includes the elimination or co-optation of external and internal rivals for power.

Consolidation Step 3: Signal Strength to the Public

The final consolidation step is managing social threats. While autocrats retain the ability to repress, repression is costly (Haber 2006 Gandhi 2008b). Therefore, autocrats prefer citizens to support or act is if they support the regime. To engender support, once the identity the power structure within the new regime is settled, regimes may find it beneficial to project unity and strength to the public. The importance of communicating strength and unity is central to research on the importance of signaling strength (Wedeen

2015; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013; Schedler and Hoffman 2016) and disaggregating the opposition (Donno 2013; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Weingast 2003).

The Role of Legislatures and Expropriations in the Consolidation Process

With regards to the consolidation process, legislatures have two important features that impact when autocrats are likely to close and reopen them. First, legislative elections can signal strength by demonstrating the capacity to win an overwhelming majority of seats (Gehlbach and Simpser 2015; Simpser 2013). If citizens see that the regime can win overwhelming majorities in a legislature, they may calculate that resistance is futile and be less likely to rebel. Second, the act of electing members of the ruling party can also reduce the likelihood of protest by inducing citizens to act *as if* they support the regime even when they do not (Wedeen 2015). If enough citizens believe that others support the regime, this will decrease support for a rebellion. For these two reasons, setting up a legislature can be useful for cementing a party's rule.

If our logic applies, the legislature is likely to be reopened *after* the first two consolidation steps are complete. If the goal of the legislature is to signal strength to the public, rival contenders for power must first be eliminated. Otherwise, public contestation in the legislature will undermine the very signaling effect the party is trying to achieve. With regards to expropriation, we suggest that it will occur during the second stage, before the legislature is reopened. As Albertus and Menaldo show, expropriations can be used to buy support (2012). Autocrats expropriate to punish rivals, who may control the expropriated assets, and signal the identity of the new ruling coalition. For this reason, expropriations tend to take place early in a regime’s life cycle.

How Party-Based Consolidation Differs from Non-Party Regimes

The process described above should apply most explicitly to party-based regimes, which are defined as regimes that rule through an organized, civilian authority (Geddes 1999). Military regimes, monarchies, and personalist regimes differ from party-based regimes in important ways. Many purely military regimes promote their rule as a restoration of authority to a civilian regime or simply evolve into party regimes. For monarchies, essentially all were established in the pre-modern era. Therefore, monarchs after WWII have already established themselves and are attempting to retain power rather than establish their power.

With regards to personalist regimes, we follow recent work suggesting that personalization is not a regime type but rather a feature of regimes that can vary over time within party-based, military, or hereditary regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Svolik 2012). However, in some cases, regimes may exist where an incoming civilian ruler takes over with a weak supporting party. Fujimori in Peru and Yeltsin in Russia would be examples of these types of leaders. In these cases, we would consider such leaders personalistic by default. Therefore, such regimes are *unconsolidated*, and as such will either face a more restraining legislature or will simply fail to reopen the legislature until they have set up a ruling party. In line with our theory, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018, 111) suggest that civilian regimes coming into power without strong parties will typically wait until they have set up a party before holding initial elections.

Possible Objections

We anticipate several possible objections to our theory, several of which we will revisit in our empirical analysis below. First, some may object that our argument appears deterministic. However, we see our theory as probabilistic in the same way that one would in a large-N analysis. Therefore, as the data will show, it may not *always* be the case that consolidation, legislative closures, and expropriation coincide. Other factors, such as ideological heterogeneity between the incoming and outcome regime, the nature of the transition (backsliding versus a transition), the price of oil, or international factors may play a role and supersede our argument. As with any other analysis, we must ensure that these explanations are not endogenous to our own.

Second, we might also ask why an autocrat would need to close a legislature to seat a pliant legislature. Why not simply rig the elections to install a legislature that suits one's needs? Our argument suggests several possible reasons, including the need to consolidate power to gain control over the electoral manipulation machinery. However, as we will show, some regimes do rig elections and expropriate after the legislature is open. While these cases are not the norm, they are nonconforming. However, we argue these nonconforming cases are more consistent with our theory than the alternative binding theory. While our theory predicts that legislative closures and expropriations will overlap, we also predict no legislative resistance should the autocrat decide to expropriate once the legislature is reopened. Therefore, while binding theory suggests that legislatures should prevent expropriation, our argument makes no such claim.

Another objection is why an autocrat would choose to use expropriation to build a coalition if they are already strong enough to close a legislature. We introduce qualitative evidence that autocrats do have consolidation as an objective when expropriating. More

theoretically, expropriations may precede legislative elections because a fractious, unconsolidated launching organization may disagree on the need for expropriation but agree on the need to maintain a closed legislature. Indeed, as Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) note, individuals in a launching group are involved in two games, where they compete with each other within the group while cooperating to marginalize rivals outside the group. While individual leaders in the group may expropriate to seek personal advantage, they may nonetheless agree with other elites on the need to maintain a closed legislature to exclude those outside the launching organization.

Consolidation, Legislative Closures, and Expropriations

We now turn to our empirical analysis. Unfortunately, traditional statistical approaches generate predictions that cannot distinguish between the competing theoretical explanations. Controlling for a wide range of potential omitted variables and sources of endogeneity, our argument and the binding view predict that oil companies should be nationalized during legislative closures. Existing large-N analysis finds this to be the case (Wilson and Wright 2015).[5] Controlling for regime age, fixed effects for global oil prices, a country's oil reserves and other country-specific factors autocracies ruling through parties expropriate more when legislatures are not in session.

As ***Table 1*** shows, the observational equivalence poses an empirical challenge. Consider the case of a nationalization that occurs with a closed legislature. The logic of the binding theory is straightforward in this instance. The autocrat would be free to

[5] We replicate these findings using data available at:

http://sites.psu.edu/wright/research/41-2/

pursue this option precisely because there would be no legislative body that could oppose it. A counterfactual would suggest that had the legislature been open, nationalization would not have occurred. In this case, only the absence of legislative constraint will allow the autocrat to expropriate. Consolidation theory also predicts nationalizations when legislatures are closed. An autocrat using an expropriation to punish rivals or to build support during a closure will be observationally equivalent. Despite similar predictions, the causal mechanisms are distinct and carry important implications for how we view the importance of legislatures. Disentangling these explanations requires the incorporation of additional information that speaks directly to the different causal processes.

Table 1: Equifinality of Legislative Closures and Expropriations

	Nationalization	No Nationalization
Closed Legislature	**Consistent with both Binding and Consolidation Theories**	Indeterminant
Open Legislature	Strongly inconsistent with Binding, potentially weakly consistent with Consolidation	**Consistent with both Binding and Consolidation Theories**

One potential proxy that could measure consolidation specifically would be regime age. However, if the consolidation process takes varying lengths of time *and* the consolidation process predicts when a legislature reopens, regime age may be a less reliable proxy for consolidation than the presence of a legislature. Problematically, this means that the legislature variable acts both as a proxy for executive constraints and for regime consolidation. Therefore, a cross-national quantitative analysis will be unable to distinguish between the causal mechanisms, where the link between executive constraints and expropriation could either be through the binding nature of the legislature *or* because

the non-legislative periods occurred during a period of consolidation where expropriation was used to build a new coalition (Goertz 2017; Haggard and Kaufman 2012).

A Bayesian approach potentially mitigates this problem by incorporating additional information that is assigned a probability (priors) that a certain hypothesis is true if such information is observed. Bayesian analysis has been recognized for some time as a potential framework for mixed-methods research (Buckley 2004; Gill and Walker 2005), and more recently, Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) and Fairfield and Charman (2017) advocate for the incorporation of qualitative information in a Bayesian framework. In-depth process tracing generates pieces of evidence that might distinguish between competing hypotheses or causal types ("clues" for Humphreys and Jacobs). [6]

It is important to note before we explain the BIQQ method that the causal leverage of the BIQQ method for our application rests on the ability of the clues to distinguish one theory from another. Therefore, skeptics of our argument should focus on how informative our clues should be for consolidation and binding theories, as this is what drives the results we find below. If, upon observing the clues for a given case, it is no more likely that the consolidation or binding theories are true than not in those cases, then our analysis will provide no more leverage than simple correlations.

With this in mind, we search for a set of observable clues that should reveal if the consolidation and binding theories are more likely. Our consolidation theory suggests that authoritarian legislatures in single-party regimes are primarily *public signals that*

[6] For Humphreys and Jacobs (2015), clues distinguish causal types, not rival theories. Below, we suggest that different theories lead to different distributions of causal types, thus allowing the clues to distinguish between theories with the proper setup.

consolidation is complete. Furthermore, expropriations are used to siphon support from rivals. This leads to a set of observable clues for the consolidation argument that can be incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Starting with legislative closures, the consolidation theory predicts that legislatures in single-party regimes should be closed during the first two stages. If the goal of the legislature is to *signal dominance*, then opponents should be eliminated before holding the election and seating the legislature:

> *Consolidation Clue 1: Were rivals eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the autocrat was strong relative to the rivals?*

Turning to the timing of expropriation, under the consolidation theory expropriations should occur in the first two stages of the consolidation process, when the regime is eliminating the *ancien* regime and building a new coalition. As explained above, expropriations are theorized to weaken rivals and build support. One set of rivals are competing leftist groups calling for nationalization. If the new regime intends co-opt or convince supporters of rival groups to shift their support, nationalization would be a useful strategy to signal their commitment to redistribution.

> *Consolidation Clue 2: Were leftist groups within the coalition or competing with the coalition calling for nationalization?*

A final important distinction for the consolidation theory concerns the level of activity once the legislature is created. Under the consolidation theory, the purpose of closing the legislature and expropriating is to build a pliant legislature.

Consolidation Clue 3: Did the legislature fail to oppose the regime on major legislation?

These clues contrast with the expectations from the binding theories of authoritarian legislatures. The binding theory of legislatures holds that autocrats will open legislatures when they need greater cooperation from regime insiders or outsiders (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Svolik 2012; Gandhi 2008b).

Binding Clue 1: Did the legislature open when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation?

Following from this, if the goal is co-optation or power sharing to provide a constraint, the resulting legislature should also include these rivals.

Binding Clue 2: Did the newly opened legislature include elite or opposition rivals?

Finally, with regards to legislative activity, when legislatures are open, we should see the legislature at least occasionally challenge the autocrat on major policy initiatives.

Binding Clue 3: Did the legislature oppose the regime on major legislation?

Research Design

To integrate these qualitative clues, we apply a Bayesian integrated qualitative and quantitative approach. Because integrated quantitative and qualitative analysis is more tractable with a dependent variable that is discrete and easily observed, we will test the argument by examining specific type of nationalization – oil nationalizations. In our setup, the "treatment" is an open legislature and the outcome is no nationalization.[7] In terms of our unit of analysis, because it is impossible for a non-oil producing state to expropriate oil resources, we limit our analysis of regimes to those that have measurable oil assets. Using the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset of authoritarian regimes to identify party-based regimes, this leads to 31 party-based regimes with oil assets (see ***Appendix A***). Based on this subset of regimes, we constructed our own original dataset of when oil expropriations occurred based on the secondary literature (see ***Appendix B*** for the summary and ***Appendix C*** for description of cases). Before proceeding, it is worth noting that while this may seem like a "small-N" on which to test a theory, we actually include a similar number of cases as "large-N" analyses, which generate more observations by splitting regimes up into country-years. Importantly, these regimes often feature little change within regime over time.

[7] While it may be awkward for the dependent variable to be the absence of an event, making nationalization the dependent variable would have required "no legislature" to be the independent variable.

Because the BIQQ approach has yet to be widely adopted, we briefly explain its basic mechanics. BIQQ starts with Rubin's (1974) potential outcomes framework. With a binary treatment effect and outcome, a case has four potential causal types: adverse, beneficial, chronic, or destined. Beneficial cases are those in which the treatment causes the outcome. Because we cannot observe the counterfactual of no treatment, we do not know if that case would have experienced the same outcome regardless of treatment (destined). In our setup, this corresponds to the following categories:

- Type A (adverse): Nationalization occurs because of a legislature or nationalization does not occur because there was no legislature.
- Type B (beneficial): Nationalization occurs because of no legislature or nationalization does not occur because of a legislature.
- Type C (chronic): Nationalization occurs regardless of regardless of whether there is a legislature or not.
- Type D (destined): Nationalization does not occur regardless of whether there is a legislature or not.

Using the BIQQ approach, the estimated causal effect is the proportion of B types minus the proportion of A types (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). The fundamental problem of causal inference, however, is that we do not know which of our B types are genuinely B types instead of C types or D types (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). BIQQ addresses this by requiring the researcher to consider what other types of evidence might be observed for the different causal types and the probative value of that evidence. By employing qualitative process tracing techniques, we can incorporate additional qualitative data (see the clues above) in order to distinguish between causal types.

The value of the BIQQ is that qualitative information can be incorporated in a Bayesian model in order to update prior beliefs about the likelihood of causal types. This requires the researcher to systematically search for qualitative indicators of the causal mechanisms and to assign relative weights on the meaning of the observation of those same indicators. Both of these steps are required components of the approach. Questions about whether or not an indicator is present, whether or not the right indicators have been searched for, or whether or not the weight of the qualitative evidence is too strong or too weak all must be directly answered in any BIQQ analysis. These issues are not unique to the BIQQ model, but the approach does force an explicit reckoning with these problems.

The BIQQ approach is useful for us given the equifinality in quantitative analyses of this question.[8] In setting up our test, with the entire duration of the regime as our unit of analysis, there are three potential treatment conditions. There are regimes that never had legislatures, always had legislatures, or had legislatures only part of the time. Because all single-party regimes had a legislature for at least part of their existence, there are no regimes that never had a legislature. Of the 31 cases, 13 had legislatures for their entire existence, with the remainder closing legislatures at some point.

If we match our treatment with the dependent variable – nationalization – this leads to four quadrants of cases representing four theoretically possible relationships (see ***Table 2***). Quadrant I (QI) includes those countries where nationalization occurred during a closure. Quadrant II (QII) includes those cases where the legislature was always closed

[8] Humphreys and Jacobs allow for a single model to address equifinality. However, the proposed approach requires assigning probabilities to 16 types, which in our case would lead to a large number of empty cells, and thus prove unwieldy.

and no nationalization occurred. Quadrant III (QIII) includes cases where the nationalization occurred when the legislature was open. Quadrant IV (QIV) includes cases where no nationalization occurred when the legislature is open. Of our 31 observations, nine nationalized during closure, 12 nationalized with the legislature open, and ten never nationalized. QII is empty because all 31 cases have an open legislature at some point in time. QIII represents adverse cases for the binding and consolidation theories.

Of greatest concern for this paper are the cells QI and QIV, which are consistent with both consolidation and binding theories. As ***Table 3*** shows, observing treatment and outcome for the cases in QI or QIV is not sufficient to identify the causal type. Because QIII is not consistent with either theory, we look for clues in the remaining 19 cases (QI and QIV) that are potentially consistent with both theories.[9] To assess the consolidation theory, the presence of clues will increase the probability that the case is a B Type. In the cases where there was a nationalization and no legislature (QI), we code the clue as present (K=1) if we found evidence for clues 1 and 2. For the cases where there is no nationalization and a legislature exists (QIV), to code K = 1, we require the presence of clue 3. The presence of a clue increases our confidence that consolidation explains the link between the lack of nationalization and a legislature in a given case (see ***Appendices A*** and ***B*** for a table of each of the cases and how we coded the clues). Note that this is a

[9] One could argue against running two separate analyses for consolidation and binding theories because clues signal causal types and not theories. We are sympathetic, but we choose to split the analysis in order to not stack the deck in favor of either theory. Additionally, clues can still signal causal type conditional on the mechanism being tested.

conservative test of our argument, because in several of the QI cases we were able to find clue 1 or 2, but not both, and thus did not count this is a case where the clue was present.

Table 2: Observational Data and Potential Causal Types

	Y = 0 (Nationalization)	**Y = 1 (No Nationalization)**
X = 0 (Closed Legislature)	**Quadrant I (QI):** Nationalization occurs while legislature is closed. (legislature is closed at least part of the time) Causal Type C: Nationalize whether open or closed *or* Causal Type B: Nationalization because no legislature N = 9	**Quadrant II (QII):** No nationalization while legislature is closed (legislature always closed). Causal Type A: No nationalization because closed legislature *or* Causal Type D: No nationalization whether open or closed N = 0
X = 1 (Open Legislature)	**Quadrant I (QIII):** Nationalization occurs while legislature is open (legislature is always open or open at some point). Causal Type A: Nationalize because legislature *or* Causal Type C: Nationalize whether open or closed N = 12	**Quadrant I (QIV):** No nationalization (legislature is always open or open at some point) Causal Type D: No nationalization whether open or closed *or* Causal Type B: No nationalization because of legislature N = 10

In our second analysis, we follow the same process for the binding arguments as we did for the consolidation test, except we look instead for the binding clues. It is important to note that although the clues for the consolidation and binding theories may

appear to be mirror images, we may not see the BIQQ results of the consolidation and binding analyses mirror each other exactly. This is because we may fail to find clues for both the consolidation and binding theories simply due to lack of information. For example, with regards to Angola (See ***Appendices A*** and ***B***), we were unable to confirm the identity of the key rivals and whether they were included in the legislature when it opened. Additionally, the consolidation and binding theories are not necessary mutually exclusive. It may be the case that a leader, using expropriations and legislative closures to consolidate, could in theory open a legislature that includes some rivals. Although this is rare, the case of Syria, where Hafiz Asad held elections including important opposition parties, nonetheless held off on holding elections until he was in a position of power (Dawisha 1978). In this case, K could equal 0 or 1 in both analyses for the same case.

Consolidation Theory Results

Starting with our analysis of the consolidation theory, ***Table 3*** decomposes the cases given the presence or absence of a clue. Unfortunately, space does not permit an extended discussion of any particular case. However, the additional qualitative evidence detailed in the appendices is illustrative. In the cases in which nationalization occurred during a closed legislature (X=0, Y=0), clues 1 and 2 are present (therefore K=1) in five out of the nine cases. It should be noted that in the cases that we do not have clues, such as Cuba, Angola, Syria or Bangladesh, additional research could show that these cases are also consistent with the theory, thus strengthening the findings. However, the clues are coded as absent because we lacked information in the secondary, English language literature that rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure or that expropriation

was used to appeal to rivals. Turning to the ten cases that did not nationalize with an open legislature (X=1, Y=1), only Belarus has any evidence of legislative opposition. Therefore, we code K = 0 for that case and one for the remaining nine.

Table 3: Consolidation Clues and Causal Types

	Y = 0 (Nationalization)	Y = 1 (No Nationalization)
X = 0 (Closed Legislature)	**Quadrant I (QI):**	**Quadrant II (QII):**
K = 0	N = 4 [Evidence of Causal Type C]	N = 0 [No cases]
K= 1	N = 5 [Evidence of Causal Type B]	N = 0 [No cases]
X = 1 (Open Legislature)	**Quadrant III (QIII):**	**Quadrant IV (QIV):**
K= 0	N = 12, No Clue Sought	N = 1 [Evidence of Causal Type D]
K= 1		N = 9 [Evidence of Causal Type B]

Note: For QI, K=1 if consolidation clues 1 and 2 are present, meaning that consolidation was likely occurring during the legislative closure. For QIV, K=1 if consolidation clue 3 is present, meaning the legislature likely played no role in preventing nationalization.

In some sense, the essential step of the analysis is already complete. In 14 out of the 19 cases potentially consistent with consolidation theory, qualitative evidence reveals support for the theory. Again, if one does not believe that these clues sufficiently distinguish between the causal types, then the subsequent BIQQ analysis is of little value. Uninformative clues will simply leave us where we started. With that said, assuming the clues are informative, the BIQQ analysis does help illustrate the plausibility of the consolidation argument. Our hypothesis predicts that the clues will increase the

difference between the A types and the B types for the analysis where we searched for consolidation clues, but not where we search for the binding clues.

BIQQ analysis produces three sets of primary estimates: the probability of causal type (λ), the probability of assignment (π), and the probability of observing the clue for each type under each treatment condition (ϕ). Following Humphreys and Jacobs, we assume a Dirichlet distribution for the λ's, with flat priors. We use a Beta distribution for the probability of assignment and the likelihood of finding the clues, and we start with flat priors (α=β=1) on these parameters. Using the baseline BIQQ model, we then estimate the following likelihood function:

$$\Pr(D|\theta) = Multinomial(n_{XY*}|n-k, w_{XY*}) \times Multinomial(n_{XYK}|k, w_{XYK})$$

where $\theta = (\lambda, \pi, \phi)$. The first part of the likelihood function accounts for the cases in which we have no clue data, while the second includes the cases in which we search for a clue. We focus our interpretation of the results on our ability to distinguish between different causal types in the various specifications of the BIQQ model.

Table 4 shows the results.[10] Column 1 in ***Table 4*** illustrates what we might infer from the purely "correlational" component of the model. It assumes we have searched for no clues on any of the 31 cases and that we only observe treatments and outcomes. We can see there is a difference between the A and B types, but the proportion of B types is relatively similar given the substantial proportion of C and D types. Column 2 includes

[10] All of the models that follow were estimated with the Stan package in R. All model diagnostics suggest no convergence issues.

information on whether or not we observe a clue across the different treatment conditions and outcomes but maintains flat priors on all the parameters. The model in Column 2 treats the category of X = 1, Y = 0 as 12 cases where no clue was sought. We see nothing of value has been added to the analysis, as the flat priors on the clues means that we have no expectations that the clues actually help distinguish between the causal types.

Table 4: Results from BIQQ Analysis – Consolidation Clues

	No Clues Sought	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Flat Priors on Clues	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Weak Priors on Clues	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Strong Priors on Clues
λ_a	0.16 [0.00, 0.44]	0.16 [0.00, 0.44]	0.16 [0.04, 0.45]	0.14 [0.00, 0.45]
λ_b	0.33 [0.03, 0.63]	0.34 [0.03, 0.63]	0.43 [0.17, 0.65]	0.45 [0.27, 0.63]
λ_c	0.37 [0.04, 0.68]	0.37 [0.04, 0.68]	0.35 [0.04, 0.66]	0.37 [0.06, 0.63]
λ_d	0.14 [0.00, 0.39]	0.13 [0.00, 0.39]	0.06 [0.00, 0.26]	0.04 [0.00, 0.15]

Note: λ_b-λ_a is the causal effect of legislatures on no nationalization through consolidation theory.

The third column contains the estimates when we incorporate our prior expectations of the probative values of clues across the causal types and treatment conditions, while continuing to treat the 12 X=1, Y=0 cases (QIII) as not having clues. The difference is that we have now specified relatively weak priors on several of the ϕ parameters, meaning that we have added information about the types of cases that we are more likely to observe given the presence of a clue. To reflect our expectations, we use a

Beta distribution with $\alpha = 3$, $\beta = 6$ for likelihood of observing the clue if Type B and $\alpha = 6$, $\beta = 3$ for observing the clue if the case is Type C. With these priors, the average probability of observing the clue is twice as large for Type C (2/3) as it is for Type B (1/3) if no treatment is observed. If we have an open legislature, Type A and Type D are more likely if a clue is present. We use the same Beta distribution ($\alpha = 6$, $\beta = 3$) for the likelihood of observing the clue for treated Types A and D. We use flat priors for the remaining treated and untreated ϕ's.

Two related findings emerge from the results when moderately informative priors are placed on the value of the clues. We see that the probability that a case is a B Type increases from .34 to .43, while the probability of a Type D case drops by half (0.13 to 0.06). Column 4 presents results with a higher probative value assigned to the clues. In this model, we use beta distributions with parameters $\alpha = 18$, $\beta = 2$, which represents a 90% probability of a causal type given the presence of the clue. The stronger priors result in greater precision in the estimate of the Type B cases, but crucially, the general conclusions are the same as with the moderate priors. Our estimates therefore do not depend on strong assumptions about the probative values of the clues.

What the results suggest is that with the clues, there is an increase in the number of B types, but still a large number of C types. This makes sense – there are still some cases like Syria, Hungary, and Bangladesh where we cannot be sure that another factor such as ideology may cause nationalization despite the legislative closure. However, there are a number of cases where we have evidence of a link between closures and nationalizations. Furthermore, within quadrant IV, the overwhelming evidence is that single-party legislatures are pliant and unlikely to resist nationalization, which is

consistent with consolidation theory. This reduces the D types. Therefore, while the proportion of C types does not fall substantially, the proportion of B types does increase due to confirmation that some of the potential C types are in fact B types, and also that nearly all of the potential D types are likely B types. For those reasons, the difference between Type A and Type B – and thus the estimated causal effect of legislatures preventing nationalization via consolidation – increases.

Binding Theory Results

We now turn to the binding theory. In this analysis, the binding clues increase the probability of a B type. ***Table 5*** provides a decomposition of the treatment-outcome pairs and the clues. The results show that only Belarus features clues consistent with the B type in Quadrant IV and only Syria consistent with a B type in Quadrant I. ***Table 6*** presents the results of the BIQQ model, with the four columns implementing the same priors as the corresponding columns in ***Table 4***. We see that once we place moderate priors on the binding clues, the probability of a B Type drops precipitously, while the probability of C and D Types increases. The increase in Type C cases is especially illuminating because it suggests that nationalizations occur for some reason other than the lack of a constraint from the legislature. Our previous consolidation analysis provides one possible explanation. It is not the binding nature of the legislature that links its absence to nationalization, but more likely the consolidation process. Column 4 shows that the evidence against the binding theory does not depend on strong priors on the meaning of the clues.

Table 5: Binding Clues and Causal Types

	Y = 0 (Nationalization)	Y = 1 (No Nationalization)
X = 0 (Closed Legislature)	**Quadrant I (QI):**	**Quadrant II (QII):**
K = 0	N = 8 [Evidence of Causal Type C]	N = 0 [No cases]
K= 1	N = 1 [Evidence of Causal Type B]	N = 0 [No cases]
X = 1 (Open Legislature)	**Quadrant III (QIII):**	**Quadrant IV (QIV):**
K= 0	N = 12 – No Clue Sought	N = 9 [Evidence of Causal Type D]
K= 1		N = 1 [Evidence of Causal Type B]

Table 6: Results from BIQQ Analysis – Binding Clues

	No Clues Sought	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Flat Priors on Clues	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Weak Priors on Clues	Clues Sought for 19 of 31 Cases – Strong Priors on Clues
λ_a	0.16 [0.00, 0.44]	0.16 [0.00, 0.44]	0.14 [0.04, 0.43]	0.14 [0.00, 0.43]
λ_b	0.33 [0.03, 0.63]	0.33 [0.02, 0.64]	0.13 [0.04, 0.44]	0.06 [0.00, 0.19]
λ_c	0.37 [0.04, 0.68]	0.37 [0.03, 0.69]	0.47 [0.15, 0.72]	0.50 [0.22, 0.73]
λ_d	0.14 [0.00, 0.39]	0.14 [0.00, 0.40]	0.26 [0.02, 0.45]	0.30 [0.15, 0.46]

Note: λ_b-λ_a is the causal effect of legislatures on no nationalization through binding theory.

More substantively, the lack of support for the binding theory is driven by our inability to find any qualitative evidence that the authoritarian legislatures provided any constraint against expropriation or that autocrats incorporated their primary rivals in the

legislatures once they opened them. Challenging our findings would require either a different set of clues that better captures the binding theory of authoritarian legislatures or additional qualitative evidence showing that the clues actually did occur despite our inability to find such evidence.

Considering this, we acknowledge several concerns with our approach. First, we may have missed some information. The search for clues across 19 cases with varying levels of quality in secondary sources is a burdensome process. We recognize the possibility that we have missed evidence across our cases. However, if any further evidence of legislative opposition to nationalization during an open legislature is found (or any other clue), it can be transparently incorporated into the analysis. It is also important to note that additional information could *strengthen* our findings. For instance, if further research shows that Cuba, Angola, Syria, or Bangladesh had evidence of the clues, the consolidation findings would strengthen.

Second, our results depend explicitly on our prior expectations regarding the likelihood of observing the clues of several of the causal types. If we have not been convincing in our explanation for the probative value of the clues, then the support for the consolidation hypothesis is weakened. However, if qualitative information provides any additional information, then the weak priors we use should be seen as a conservative estimate in the proportion of B Types relative to A Types.

An additional concern is that communist countries drive the results. While binding theorists suggest that their theories apply to communist and non-Communist countries alike, one could nonetheless argue that a particular type of Leninist regime drives our results. To account for this possibility, we rerun the analyses from the previous

section dropping the communist countries and find that the results actually strengthen (see ***Appendix C***). Indeed, several strong cases for our theory – Algeria, Iraq, and Iran – are in fact non-communist countries.

An additional concern is the generalizability of oil nationalizations to the protection of property rights under authoritarian rule. We consider oil partly due to empirical necessity. Because we expect that our argument can make a more general point about expropriations and legislatures under authoritarian rule, to provide evidence of the generalizability we look at the countries in our sample to see if oil nationalizations were coupled with nationalizations of other sectors. As ***Appendix B*** shows, in nearly every case countries nationalized oil and other non-oil, non-resource sectors simultaneously.

Party versus Non-Party Regimes

Finally, this paper also considers the difference between non-party versus party based regimes. For space reasons, we do not show the full results of our analysis here. but in ***Appendix D*** we compare the assertiveness of legislatures in non-party based regimes, such as monarchies, personalist regimes, and military regimes. This analysis shows that consistent with our theory, legislatures in non-party regimes are *more* constraining than party-based regimes, particularly when the autocrat does not control the legislature. For this reason, consistent with the qualitative evidence from Gandhi (2008b) as well as North and Weingast (1989), most of the assertive legislatures under autocratic rule come from monarchies, military regimes, or personalistic regimes.

Conclusion

This paper assesses whether legislatures play a causal role in preventing autocrats in single-party regimes from engaging in expropriation. We find that legislative closures and expropriations are linked, but not in the manner suggested by existing theory. These findings help resolve a disjuncture between research by country-level observers and the conclusions of cross-national research, suggesting that analysts are correct to downplay the importance of legislatures in preventing expropriation. This is not to say that single-party legislatures play *no* role or that they should be ignored, but that single-party legislatures do not provide a meaningful check on autocratic expropriation.

Additionally, our paper considers the dynamics of authoritarian rule as a central causal variable, rather than as a peripheral factor to be controlled for. By demonstrating that legislative closures nearly always occur during a consolidation process, the theory and findings could have implications for other effects commonly attributed to authoritarian legislatures such as economic growth (Gandhi 2008b; Wright 2008), protection for human rights (Gandhi 2008b), and terrorism (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012). If consolidation has an impact on these variables, it could be that the consolidation plays a more important role than the presence or absence of the legislature.

With regards to power sharing and co-optation, our findings do not necessarily contradict the intent of the original theories of co-optation and power sharing. However, they challenge idea that party-based legislatures constrain. With regards to power sharing, it is possible that the power sharing logic applies within party institutions and not legislative institutions. With regard to co-optation theory, we think it applies most to military regimes and monarchies. Indeed, Gandhi's case studies highlight Morocco,

Kuwait, and Ecuador as cases where fluctuation in oil or natural resource rents led to institutionalization of the legislature (2008b). This is consistent with North and Weingast (1989), who also consider a monarchy. In short, the co-optive role of legislatures appears more present in regimes *without* strong parties than in those *with* strong parties.

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Supplemental Materials Table of Contents

Appendix A: Single-Party Regimes with Oil

Case*	Oil Nationalized?	Legislature Ever Closed	Oil Nationalized During Closure?	Total Regime Years	Total Years Leg. Closed
Afghanistan 78-92	No	Yes	No	14	10
Afghanistan 96-01	No	Yes	No	5	5
Albania 44-91	Yes	No	No	47	0
Algeria 62-92	Yes	Yes	Yes	30	12
Angola 75-NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	41	5
Bangladesh 71-75	Yes	Yes	Yes	4	2
Belarus 91-94	No	No	No	3	0
Bolivia 52-64	No	No	No	12	0
Bulgaria 44-90	Yes	No	No	46	0
Cameroon 60-83	No	No	No	23	0
China 49-NA	Yes	Yes	No	67	13
Congo-Brz 63-91	Yes	Yes	No	28	5
Cuba 59-NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	57	16
Egypt 52-NA	Yes	Yes	No	59	7
Gabon 60-NA	Yes	No	No	56	0
Hungary 47-90	Yes	Yes	Yes	43	2
Indonesia 66-99	No	Yes	No	33	6
Iran 79-NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	37	1
Iraq 68-79	Yes	Yes	Yes	11	11
Ivory Coast 60-99	No	No	No	39	0
Malaysia 57-NA	Yes	Yes	No	59	2
Mexico 15-00	Yes	No	No	85	0
Poland 44-89	Yes	Yes	Yes	45	3
Romania 45-89	Yes	Yes	No	44	2
Soviet Union 17-91	Yes	No	No	74	20
Syria 63-NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	53	10
Tunisia 56-NA	No	Yes	No	55	2
Turkmenistan 91-NA	No	No	No	25	0
Uzbekistan 91-NA	No	No	No	25	0
Vietnam 54-NA	Yes	No	No	62	0
Yugoslavia 45-90	Yes	No	No	45	0

* Cases are drawn from the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset.

Appendix B1: Cases and Clues for Consolidation Theory

	Expropriation/Legislative History				Clues				Generalizability
	Oil Nationalized?	Legislature Ever Closed	Oil Nationalized During Closure	Quadrant (see Table 4 in text)	Legislature opened when strong vis-à-vis rivals (Clue 1)	Competing Leftist Groups Calling for Nat'lization (Clue 2)	Legislature never opposes oil policies (Clue 3)	**Presence of Clue (K)***	Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries
Afghanistan 78-92	0	1	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Afghanistan 96-01	0	1	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Albania 44-91	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Algeria 62-92	1	1	1	I	1	1	1	**1**	Yes
Angola 75-NA	1	1	1	I	0	1	1	**0**	Yes
Bangladesh 71-75	1	1	1	I	0	1	1	**0**	Yes
Belarus 91-94	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**	N/A
Bolivia 52-64	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Bulgaria 44-90	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Cameroon 60-83	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
China 49-NA	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Congo-Brz 63-91	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Cuba 59-NA	1	1	1	I	0	0	1	**0**	Yes
Egypt 52-NA	1	1	0	III	1	1	1	**1**	Yes
Gabon 60-NA	0	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hungary 47-90	1	1	1	I	1	0	1	**0**	Yes
Indonesia 66-99	0	1	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Iran 79-NA	1	1	1	I	1	1	1	**1**	Yes
Iraq 68-79	1	1	1	I	1	1	1	**1**	Yes
Ivory Coast 60-99	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Malaysia 57-NA	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	**No**
Mexico 15-00	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Poland 44-89	1	1	1	I	1	1	1	**1**	Yes
Romania 45-89	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Soviet Union 17-91	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Syria 63-NA	1	1	1	I	0	1	1	**0**	Yes
Tunisia 56-NA	0	1	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Turkmenistan 91-NA	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Uzbekistan 91-NA	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**	N/A
Vietnam 54-NA	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes
Yugoslavia 45-90	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**	Yes
Total	20	18	9		6	8	19	**14**	

Notes: K = 1 if Clues 1 & 2 =1 when oil nationalized during closure or Clue 3=1 under conditions when oil never nationalized; K always = 0 when oil nationalized under open legislature; Gray bars indicated cases consistent with consolidation and binding theories

Appendix B2: Cases and Clues for Binding Theory

	Expropriation/Legislative History				Clues			
	Oil Nationalized?	Legislature Ever Closed	Oil Nationalized During Closure	Quadrant (see Table 4 in text)	Legislature opened when needing elite, opposition cooperation (Clue 1)	Legislature includes primary elite, opposition rivals (Clue 2)	Legislature opposes any oil policies (Clue 3)	**Presence of Clue (K)***
Afghanistan 78-92	0	1	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Afghanistan 96-01	0	1	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Albania 44-91	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Algeria 62-92	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Angola 75-NA	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Bangladesh 71-75	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Belarus 91-94	0	0	0	IV	0	0	1	**1**
Bolivia 52-64	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Bulgaria 44-90	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Cameroon 60-83	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
China 49-NA	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Congo-Brz 63-91	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Cuba 59-NA	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Egypt 52-NA	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Gabon 60-NA	0	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Hungary 47-90	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Indonesia 66-99	0	1	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Iran 79-NA	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Iraq 68-79	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Ivory Coast 60-99	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Malaysia 57-NA	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Mexico 15-00	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Poland 44-89	1	1	1	I	0	0	0	**0**
Romania 45-89	1	1	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Soviet Union 17-91	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Syria 63-NA	1	1	1	I	1	1	0	**1**
Tunisia 56-NA	0	1	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Turkmenistan 91-NA	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Uzbekistan 91-NA	0	0	0	IV	0	0	0	**0**
Vietnam 54-NA	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Yugoslavia 45-90	1	0	0	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	**N/A**
Total	20	18	9		1	1	1	**2**

Notes: K = 1 if Clues 1 & 2 =1 when oil nationalized during closure; Clue 3=1 when oil never nationalized; K always = 0 when oil nationalized under open legislature; Gray bars indicated cases consistent with consolidation and binding theories

Appendix C: Qualitative Information for Cases

Afghanistan (78-92; 96-05)

- Details on cases
  - Oil Nationalizations: None; No foreign oil companies operating in Afghanistan during the period of rule under Daoud, Soviet Union, or the Taliban: "Whatever other faults th Afghan rulers possessed, they were Afghan nationalists, successfully maintaining independence from foreign commercial interests and rivalries – unlike contemporary Iran, where the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. had a dominant influence, an where during the Second World War British and Soviet forces intervened to occupy vit provinces from 1941, deposing the ruler Reza Shah." (Hyman 1992, 25)
  - Legislative closures: 1978-1988. 1988 there were elections in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. Legislature existed under monarchy until 1973 when the Communists cam to power; they shut down the legislature. Legislature closed by Daoud in 1973 (Hyman 1992, 65-70)

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure a the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A**

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/**

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.**

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or oppositi cooperation. **No.**

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.**

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No**

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization: **N/A**

Albania (1944-1991)

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: 1944 (Prifti 1978, 52-53) . Oil discovered 1928 (Tsui 2006); land nationalized in 1945-1946 with the agreement of the national assembly (Skendi 1958, 2 27) nationalized in December 1944: "All wells were in working condition at the time o their seizure by the Communists at the end of November 1944." (Skendi 1958, 180); ". they introduced a 'command'-type or centrally directed economy system The 'comman economy' had almost irresistible appeal to the country's new rulers, because it seemed offer the most promise toward the solution of the nation's urgent economic problems… Albania's first stem in this direction was to nationalize all factories. This occurred in December of 1944. There followed in rapid order the nationalization of all industry, banks, the transportation system, foreign and wholesale trade, mineral resources, bodie of water, pastures, and forests." (Prifti 1978, 52-53)
  - Legislature: Never closed.

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure a the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no cl sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization: **Yes.** "Albania's new leaders at this point seemed to have three main objectives in mind, in their drive to nationalize 'the main means of production' and to industrialize the country as rapidly as possible. One objective was to extricate the country from the oppressive economic and technical backwardness of the past." (Prifti 1978, 53)

Algeria (1962-1992)

- Details on case
  - Nationalization: Started in 1966 and lasted until 1971: "…nationalization of foreign-owned business and industry took place starting with the banks, insurance companies, and some mining interests in 1966, moving slowly into the oil-gas complexes in 1968 and 1969 and culminating with the take-over of the remaining French oil interests in 1971. With this action, the major sources of rent-producing natural resources were under Algerian control. (Nellis 1977, 532)
  - Legislative closure: Legislature closed from the Boumedienne coup in 1965 until 1977.

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: **Yes.** "In power, Houari Boumedienne dismantled whatever political institutions and organizations had been established under his predecessor… The National Assembly, the Political Bureau, and the Central Committee of the FLN were immediately dissolved, the constitution was suspended, and presidential elections were abolished." The elections were then held when the regime was strong vis-à-vis rivals. "[Boumedienne] announced that elections would be held for a new National Assembly, but also that an election would be held for the Presidency of the Republic. Having thus obtained popular ratification for his own position, he would be able to preserve the substance of his power from encroachment by the new assembly." (Causey 1984, 573)

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** "Algeria's governing elite rely upon Sonatrach for revenue from which they gain power, patronage, and privileges." (Entelis 2012, 558); "Between 1966 and 1971, the oil sector and other foreign concerns were completely nationalized. Oil rents, transiting through state-owned enterprises that controlled close to 80 percent of all economic activity, were invested in rapid growth via far-reaching development projects. They were earmarked, as well, for the provision of extensive social insurance: free, universal education and health care, as well as subsidized foodstuffs and public transportation. Many Algerians also came to enjoy virtually free housing." (Lowi 2009, 83).

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** 'There is a tendency to use this forum [the legislature] to discuss publicly the

affairs of the Party, to judge the Party, whereas one should limit oneself here to discussion of government actions… The elaboration of the nation's political thought is reserved for the Party." (Quandt 1969, 193); Parliament passes petroleum law, preventing foreign investment (Entelis 2012, 585)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** "In power, Houari Boumedienne dismantled whatever political institutions and organizations had been established under his predecessor… The National Assembly, the Political Bureau, and the Central Committee of the FLN were immediately dissolved, the constitution was suspended, and presidential elections were abolished." The elections were then held when the regime was strong vis-à-vis rivals. "[Boumedienne] announced that elections would be held for a new National Assembly, but also that an election would be held for the Presidency of the Republic. Having thus obtained popular ratification for his own position, he would be able to preserve the substance of his power from encroachment by the new assembly." (Causey 1984, 573)

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** See binding clue 1.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** 'There is a tendency to use this forum [the legislature] to discuss publicly the affairs of the Party, to judge the Party, whereas one should limit oneself here to discussion of government actions… The elaboration of the nation's political thought is reserved for the Party." (Quandt 1969, 193); Parliament passes petroleum law, preventing foreign investment (Entelis 2012, 585)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** "… nationalisation of foreign-owned business and industry took place starting with banks, insurance companies, and some mining interests in 1966, moving slowly into the oil-gas complexes in 1968 and 1969, and culminating with the take-over of the remaining French oil interests in 1971." (Nellis 1977, 532)

Angola (1975-present)

- Details on Case
  - Nationalization: Occurred between 1975 and 1980.
  - Legislative closure: 1975-1980

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No evidence either way.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** "During these early years, first Neto and then dos Santos exercised high levels of control but did so within the MPLA structure and had to maneuver within the party to minimize the influence of rivals and officially link their policies to the visions dictated by the party's formal ideology." (Heller 2012, 849); Oil revenue used to fund government; the high ranking officials were networked within the MPLA: "The key figures in Sonangol's core team were well-networked MPLA party members who enjoyed the confidence of President Neto." (Soares de Oliveira 2007, 601)

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "Angola's parliament was also extremely weak, and through most of the war period other government ministries lacked the knowledge or the political clout to challenge Sonangol's positions on the sector." (Heller 2012, 872); "The National Assembly and provisional assemblies have basically ratifying functions; they meet infrequently and their business is carried on by permanent commissions that again include all senior figures in the leadership." (Young 1988, 172)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No evidence either way.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No evidence either way.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "Angola's parliament was also extremely weak, and through most of the war period other government ministries lacked the knowledge or the political clout to challenge Sonangol's positions on the sector." (Heller 2012, 872); "The National Assembly and provisional assemblies have basically ratifying functions; they meet infrequently and their business is carried on by permanent commissions that again include all senior figures in the leadership." (Young 1988, 172)

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** "President Neto announced that the MPLA government would take over all abandoned economic assets as well as other strategic sectors of the economy. The nationalized sectors included a major steel works, a cement plant, textile and sugar mills, twelve agricultural complexes, all newspapers, all radio stations, the central bank, all commercial banks, and the insurance industry." (Kongwa 1990, 191)

Bangladesh (1971-1975)

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: 1972 and 1975.
  - Legislative closure: 1971-1973

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No Evidence.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** Clear evidence that the nationalization of 1972 was included to head off leftists by the Awami League: "In order to preempt the attraction of the leftists to workers and peasants, in the manifesto, the party promised the implementation of the following measures: (1) establishment of a socialist economy and, as a first step toward the achievement of this objective, nationalization of banking and insurance companies, the jute industry, the cotton textile as well as other basic and heavy industries; (2) implementation of land reforms and change in the system of ownership of land with a view to redistributing land among the landless laborers; and (3) reform of the tax and revenue system and, specifically, abolition of the salt tax and land revenue in all land-holdings below eight acres." (Islam 1985, 187)

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "On January 25, 1975, on the initiative of Sheikh Mujib and against the private sentiments of the majority of the members of parliament belonging to the Awami League, the Constitution was amended to provide for a presidential form of government… The constitutional amendment was passed without any reading and discussion in parliament, since the normal rules of procedure of the House were suspended." (Maniruzzaman 1976, 120); Legislature was inoperative until march 1973, when the first election was held: "The life of a sovereign parliament

in Bangladesh was supposed to have begun with the convening of the Constituent Assembly, consisting of the members of the National Assembly ad provincial Assembly elected in the elections held in December 1970 and January 1971 respectively, of what was then East Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly, which as entrusted with the task of framing a constitution, was also to act as the legislature of the country. The latter function of the Constituent Assembly, however, remained inoperative while Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibar Rahman ruled the country through Presidential Ordinances. The Constitution was adopted on 16 December 1972, and Sheikh Mujib, true to his pledge, held a general election on 7 March 1973, and got a fresh mandate to rule the country for the next five years." (Chaudhury 1994, 116); "From the above discussion of the functioning of the first Jatiyo Sangsad, it becomes crystal clear that the Sangsad could not fulfill the glorious vision of its role, i.e., check and control the arbitrary actions of the executive as envisaged in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh…. The difference in the legislative strength of the government and the Opposition was so huge that it could neither focus on the government's blunders and arbitrary actions nor project itself of the electorate as an alternative government." (Chaudhury 1994, 124)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No Evidence.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No Evidence.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "On January 25, 1975, on the initiative of Sheikh Mujib and against the private sentiments of the majority of the members of parliament belonging to the Awami League, the Constitution was amended to provide for a presidential form of government… The constitutional amendment was passed without any reading and discussion in parliament, since the normal rules of procedure of the House were suspended." (Maniruzzaman 1976, 120); Legislature was inoperative until march 1973, when the first election was held: "The life of a sovereign parliament in Bangladesh was supposed to have begun with the convening of the Constituent Assembly, consisting of the members of the National Assembly ad provincial Assembly elected in the elections held in December 1970 and January 1971 respectively, of what was then East Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly, which as entrusted with the task of framing a constitution, was also to act as the legislature of the country. The latter function of the Constituent Assembly, however, remained inoperative while Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibar Rahman ruled the country through Presidential Ordinances. The Constitution was adopted on 16 December 1972, and Sheikh Mujib, true to his pledge, held a general election on 7 March 1973, and got a fresh mandate to rule the country for the next five years." (Chaudhury 1994, 116); "From the above discussion of the functioning of the first Jatiyo Sangsad, it becomes crystal clear that the Sangsad could not fulfill the glorious vision of its role, i.e., check and control the arbitrary actions of the executive as envisaged in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh…. The difference in the legislative strength of the government and the Opposition was so huge that it could neither focus on the government's blunders and arbitrary actions nor project itself of the electorate as an alternative government." (Chaudhury 1994, 124)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** "In order to preempt the attraction of the leftists to workers and peasants, in the manifesto, the party promised the implementation of the following measures: (1) establishment of a socialist economy and, as a first step toward the achievement of this objective, nationalization of banking and insurance companies, the jute industry, the cotton textile as well as other basic and heavy industries; (2) implementation of land reforms and change in the system of ownership of land with a view to redistributing land among the landless laborers; and (3) reform of the tax and revenue system and, specifically, abolition of the salt tax and land revenue in all land-holdings below eight acres." (Islam 1985, 187)

Belarus (1991-1994)

- Details on case:
    - Nationalizations. 1993. Oil was denationalized only in one refinery, the other was nationalized under pressure from Russia. The Supreme Soviet and Lukashenka were on the same page on the decision *not* to denationalize the refinery: "In contrast to the Mazyr Refinery, the Naftan Refinery is strictly government property. Indeed, in informal discussions, both members of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet and Lukashenka have expressed the opinion, 'We 'gave' [Russian investors] one of our country's most important economic objects [the Mazyr Refinery] and we won't give them another.'" (Balmaceda 2002, 175)
    - Legislative closure: No

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** Legislature proposed some "pro-market reforms" but opposition to nationalization of oil immediately following independence. "Pazniak saw the issues differently: he perceived the independence vote as a remarkable victory for the policies of the BPF and his own leadership. The Supreme Soviet perpetuated this perspective for some time by passing laws that supported the development of national culture and market reforms." (Marples and Padhol 2002, 60)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** Legislature proposed some "pro-market reforms" but opposition to nationalization of oil immediately following independence. "Pazniak saw the issues differently: he perceived the independence vote as a remarkable victory for the policies of the BPF and his own leadership. The Supreme Soviet perpetuated this perspective for some time by passing laws that supported the development of national culture and market reforms." (Marples and Padhol 2002, 60)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **N/A.**

Bolivia (1952-1964)

- Details on case:
    - Oil nationalizations: None in this regime. Nationalization already carried out in previous regimes.
    - Legislative closure: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** Legislature never closed.

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** Oil nationalization had already occurred. Congress and the parties were *pushing* for expropriation; Leaders tried to reform nationalized oil industry over Congress: After the revolution, the MNR increased production by transferring money from mining to oil, but it was inefficient: Foreigners were allowed *in opposition to public opinion* in 1955 "Therefore, with considerable embarrassment to himself and the MNR, and with the assistance of North American advisers, he drafted the petroleum code of 1955 which offered concessions on favorable terms to foreign oil companies." (Thorn 1971, 191); Paz Entenssoro *decreed* the code over the legislature's head: "Late in 1955, Paz Entenssoro decreed a Petroleum Code which abandoned the nationalist policy began in 1937. (Smith 1971, 171); Oil was nationalized again in 1969 by Candia (Klein and Peres-Cajias 2014, 150)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** Legislature never closed.

- Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** Oil nationalization had already occurred. Congress and the parties *pushing* for expropriation; Leaders tried to reform nationalized oil industry over Congress: After the revolution, the MNR increased production by transferring money from mining to oil, but it was inefficient: Foreigners were allowed *in opposition to public opinion* in 1955 "Therefore, with considerable embarrassment to himself and the MNR, and with the assistance of North American advisers, he drafted the petroleum code of 1955 which offered concessions on favorable terms to foreign oil companies." (Thorn 1971, 191); Paz Entenssoro *decreed* the code over the legislature's head: "Late in 1955, Paz Entenssoro decreed a Petroleum Code which abandoned the nationalist policy began in 1937. (Smith 1971, 171); Oil was nationalized again in 1969 by Candia (Klein and Peres-Cajias 2014, 150)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **N/A.** No nationalization.

Bulgaria (1944-1990)

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: Oil and other nationalizations were carried out in 1946 (Sipkov 1958, 484).
  - Legislative closure: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Cameroon 1962-1980

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: No oil nationalization. Oil not discovered until 1977. Ahidjo allows French companies to exploit it while he puts it in a private bank account.
  - Legislative closures: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Legislature not closed.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Legislature not closed.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** National assembly largely ceremonial: "Deputies in the National Assembly are positions with more prestige than political power." (Kofele-Kale 1986, 70); "The awesome power of the president was vividly in evidence in the way the constitution defined his relationship with the new unicameral legislature. As is traditional with the one-party system, the president, as chairman, was to draw up a single list of faithful militants, theoretically in consultation with the CNU central committee, to become members of the National Assembly. The institution had limited *real* legislative powers. It was to meet twice every year with a duration of 30 days for each session. The opening date of each session was to be decided by the assembly's steering committee after consultation with the president of the republic. Owing to the fact that the National Assembly was composed of members of a single party, who were themselves chosen by Ahidjo (more or less), its meetings were intended not to propose, debate, change and enact legislation but endorse the government's proposals." (Ngenge 2003, 68); No role in overseeing oil: "The legislature cannot oversee the president either, emasculated as it is after more than forty years of executive dominance of the other branches of government." (Ngenge 2003, 79); On the "strong" presidency: "Mention should be made of the fact that France was involved, albeit in an advisory manner, in drawing up the first constitution of Federal Republic of Cameroon that established a 'strong presidential system' which Ahidjo exploited in establishing himself as the de facto and de jure authority in Cameroon." (Takougang 1993, 282)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Legislature not closed.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Legislature not closed.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation**. No.** National assembly largely ceremonial: "Deputies in the National Assembly are positions with more prestige than political power." (Kofele-Kale 1986, 70); "The awesome power of the

president was vividly in evidence in the way the constitution defined his relationship with the new unicameral legislature. As is traditional with the one-party system, the president, as chairman, was to draw up a single list of faithful militants, theoretically in consultation with the CNU central committee, to become members of the National Assembly. The institution had limited *real* legislative powers. It was to meet twice every year with a duration of 30 days for each session. The opening date of each session was to be decided by the assembly's steering committee after consultation with the president of the republic. Owing to the fact that the National Assembly was composed of members of a single party, who were themselves chosen by Ahidjo (more or less), its meetings were intended not to propose, debate, change and enact legislation but endorse the government's proposals." (Ngenge 2003, 68); No role in overseeing oil: "The legislature cannot oversee the president either, emasculated as it is after more than forty years of executive dominance of the other branches of government." (Ngenge 2003, 79); On the "strong" presidency: "Mention should be made of the fact that France was involved, albeit in an advisory manner, in drawing up the first constitution of Federal Republic of Cameroon that established a 'strong presidential system' which Ahidjo exploited in establishing himself as the de facto and de jure authority in Cameroon." (Takougang 1993, 282)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **N/A.** No nationalization.

China (1949-present)

- Details on case
    - Nationalization: Nationalizations in general occurred from 1950-1957. Private industry slowly swallowed up. Land reform initiated (Walder 1984)
    - Legislative closures: The legislature operated until 1960 on a fairly regular basis, but was irregular from 1965-1978 (Cultural Revolution).

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Congo Brazzaville (1963-1991)

- Oil Nationalizations:
    - Nationalizations and large state sector ***forced*** by pressure from radical forces and those in the legislature. (Decalo 1985, 49-50). However, most nationalizations were of unprofitable areas, not the most profitable.

- Mentions of legislature: "… the sharpest battles in the National Assembly and the Central Committee of the party have been over the future of the public sector, with no regime able to impose its will for a partial contraction, and forced instead to adjust budget allocations to cover ever-increasing deficits." (Decalo 1985, 51)

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Cuba (1959-present)

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: Little information, but likely in 1960.
  - Legislative closure: 1959-1975: Legislature created in 1975 with the new constitution, which was supposed to institutionalize the revolution.

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No evidence available.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** No evidence available.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "The cumulative effect was that the executive arm dominated the legislative element of the state, reducing the National Assembly to a largely deliberative body." (Lievesley 2004, 134); "The National Assembly continues to review, modify and approve legislation but still does not initiate it. Debates are designed to pursue consensus rather than stimulate real argument, and proceedings are still dominated by leading politicians and pre-eminently by Castro himself. Meeting every two years, the bulk of its work is done in permanent commissions and plenary sessions… In 1999, the National Assembly Vice-President Ernesto Suarez criticized delegates for failing to reach their potential but this is hardly surprising given their circumstances. (Lievesley 2004, 138)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No evidence available.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No evidence available.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "The cumulative effect was that the executive arm dominated the legislative element of the state, reducing the National Assembly to a largely deliberative body." (Lievesley 2004, 134); "The National Assembly continues to review, modify and approve legislation but still does not initiate it. Debates are designed to pursue consensus rather than stimulate real argument, and proceedings are still dominated by leading politicians and pre-eminently by Castro himself. Meeting every two years, the bulk of its work is done in permanent commissions and plenary sessions… In 1999, the National Assembly Vice-President Ernesto Suarez criticized delegates for failing to reach their potential but this is hardly surprising given their circumstances. (Lievesley 2004, 138)

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** All industry nationalized.

Egypt (1952-2013)

- Details on Case
  - Nationalization: July 1961: "The year 1961, with the state in control of the largest economic institutions in Egypt, witnessed the completion of the etatist project. The main laws which led to the takeover by the state of the most of the remaining private enterprises in industry and trade were enacted in July of that year – hence the epithet the July Socialist Laws (they were decree-laws)." (Wahba 1994, 83)
  - Legislative closures: 1952-1956; September1961-1964: Elections took place for the UAR in 1959 and National Assembly met regularly after 1960 until its dissolution in September 1961 (Parker 1962, 20, 23, Jankowski 2002, 123).

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** (Decalo 1985, 49-50)

Gabon (1960-present)

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: 1973, 1976; Oil was partially nationalized (only 25% stake taken) in 1973 (Yates 1996, 68).
    - Legislative closures: Legislature exists throughout

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

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Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Hungary (1947-1990)

- Details on Case
    - Nationalizations: 1948. All property nationalized in 1948 under the Hungarian Nationalization Act (Doman 1948, 1152).
    - Legislative closure: 1947-1949

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **Yes.** The SDP (Social Democratic Party) and the SHP (Smallholder Party) were still in parliament as of 1947 (they won in the 1945 elections), and were not eliminated until 1947: "In communist historiography the period from early 1947 to mid-1948 is known as the 'year of the turning point'. This encompasses the liquidation of the 'conspiracy,' the launching of the three-year plan on 1 August, the national elections of 31 August, the failure of the SDP moderates to regain control of the party, the progressive nationalization of banks and other private enterprises, and the merger, in June 1948, of the two major left-wing parties. With this phase, recalled Revai in 1950, Hungary 'crossed the Rubicon between a bourgeois and a people's democracy.'" (Kovrig 1979, 211); "At the May 1949 general elections the People's Independence Front was the sole contender, with a single program and a list of candidates. Dissent could only be expressed by way of a negative ballot, a form of protest that was encouraged by the clergy in particular and that in some districts accounted for over one-quarter of the vote." (Kovrig 1979, 252)

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** No evidence.

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** The legislature actually did not convene during the 1948 law (August 1, 1948) as it was the cabinet that passed it in their stead: "Meanwhile, even the semblance of parliamentary rule had become superfluous for the impatient communists. On 15 November 1947 the national assembly had delegated its powers to the cabinet and did not reconvene for over a year." (Kovrig 1979, 225); "The national assembly would meet for a few days each year to ceremonially ratify a few bills, but most rules took the form of presidential or ministerial decrees. 'This is the way the Soviet comrades are doing it' was the answer to party members' questions regarding the inactivity of parliament." (Kovrig 1979, 254) ; "Although the legislature still does not have the power to force the Government to comply with the will of Parliament, the urgency and seriousness of some of the issues under examination have served to complement the investigative authority of the National Assembly…. [However], the reform affective legislative operations has not to date improved the effectiveness of the National Assembly as a whole." (Toma and Volgyes 1977, 50); "… the Presidential Council implements a copious legislative program through 'decree-laws' that have the force but not the form of normal laws. To remain operative, decree-laws must be presented for approval to the 'next session of the National Assembly"; however, the National Assembly always rubber-stamps the decisions of the Presidential Council. What is even more distributing to some students of constitutional law is that most of the 21 members of the council have important full-time jobs, and the drafts of the decrees are never discussed by members of the permanent committees." (Toma and Volgyes 1977, 71)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **Yes.** The SDP (Social Democratic Party) and the SHP (Smallholder Party) were still in parliament as of 1947 (they won in the 1945 elections), and were not eliminated until 1947: "In communist historiography the period from early 1947 to mid-1948 is known as the 'year of the turning point'. This encompasses the liquidation of the 'conspiracy,' the launching of the three-year plan on 1 August, the national elections of 31 August, the failure of the SDP moderates to regain control of the party, the progressive nationalization of banks and other private enterprises, and the merger, in June 1948, of the two major left-wing parties. With this phase, recalled Revai in 1950, Hungary 'crossed the Rubicon between a bourgeois and a people's democracy.'" (Kovrig 1979, 211)

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** "At the May 1949 general elections the People's Independence Front was the sole contender, with a single program and a list of candidates. Dissent could only be expressed by way of a negative ballot, a form of protest that was encouraged by the clergy in particular and that in some districts accounted for over one-quarter of the vote." (Kovrig 1979, 252)

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** The legislature actually did not convene during the 1948 law (August 1, 1948) as it was the cabinet that passed it in their stead: "Meanwhile, even the semblance of parliamentary rule had become superfluous for the impatient communists. On 15 November 1947 the national assembly had delegated its powers to the cabinet and did not reconvene for over a year." (Kovrig 1979, 225); "The national assembly would meet for a few days each year to ceremonially ratify a few bills, but most rules took the form of presidential or ministerial decrees. 'This is the way the Soviet comrades are doing it' was the answer to party members' questions regarding the inactivity of parliament." (Kovrig 1979, 254) ; "Although the legislature still does not have the power to force the Government to comply with the will of Parliament, the urgency and seriousness of some of the issues under examination have served to complement the investigative authority of the National Assembly…. [However], the reform affective legislative operations has not to date improved the effectiveness of the National Assembly as a whole." (Toma and Volgyes 1977, 50); "… the Presidential Council implements a copious legislative program through 'decree-laws' that have the force but not the form of normal laws. To remain operative, decree-laws must be presented for approval to the 'next session of the National Assembly"; however, the National

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Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** All industry nationalized.

Indonesia (1965-1998)

- Details on case
  - Oil Nationalizations: None under Suharto; all carried out previous under Sukarno.
  - Legislative closure: 1965-1971

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No evidence

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if expropriation used to win support of a rival or the supporters of a rival **No.** No evidence

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "In the terms of one enumeration of possible functions of legislatures – elite recruitment, elite socialization, regime legitimation, system transformation, constituency representation, law-making, investigation of the bureaucracy, and acting as a safety valve for the expression of grievances – the DPR in Indonesia in 1969 was basically a legitimating safety valve." (Emmerson 1976, 167); "… the DPR only had influence when it wanted to do something the government wanted done; another member doubted that the DPR would ever come into its own until it could review the implementation of those bills it did manage to pass." (Emmerson 1976, 170)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No evidence

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No evidence

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "In the terms of one enumeration of possible functions of legislatures – elite recruitment, elite socialization, regime legitimation, system transformation, constituency representation, law-making, investigation of the bureaucracy, and acting as a safety valve for the expression of grievances – the DPR in Indonesia in 1969 was basically a legitimating safety valve." (Emmerson 1976, 167); "… the DPR only had influence when it wanted to do something the government wanted done; another member doubted that the DPR would ever come into its own until it could review the implementation of those bills it did manage to pass." (Emmerson 1976, 170)

Iran (1979-present)

- Details on case
  - Nationalization: Oil nationalization occurred in November 1979.
  - Legislative closures: 1979-1980

Consolidation Clues

- Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **Yes.** There was a period after the revolution where the secularists and the fundamentalists were battling for control of the legislature: The legislature under Shah included loyalists, although dissent from ultra-nationalists mounted. Khomeini's religious followers were not included (Baktiari 1996, 47-50); The post-revolutionary Majles reduced the number of seats, marginalized secular nationalists, and appointed mostly pro-religious members: "Again, the fundamentalists successfully defeated the secular nationalists' attempts to create a constituent assembly with a larger number of deputies so that it would be representative of all the political groupings. The fundamentalists wanted a seventy-three-seat assembly. With Khomeini's backing, they got the desired institutional structure. The election results for the assembly were hardly surprising: fifty-five out of the seventy-three seats were taken by the pro-IRP clerics." (Baktiari 1996, 56);
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- Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** The nationalization was a concession to supporters of the revolution against the wishes of the leadership: "With the revolutionary fervor running high outside the assembly, a suggestion by Ali Golzadeh Ghaffuri to drop the role of the Majles and clearly state that [oil] concessions to foreigners are 'absolutely prohibited' was well received… Therefore, the moderate tone of the article in the draft document was completely changed, and the government was prohibited from granting any concessions regardless of whether the Majles approved ore disapproved." (Baktiari 1996, 59)

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** Legislative leadership explicitly asked not to have authority to act on oil expropriation: "… Rafsanjani explained to Khomenei that a sizable number of the Majles' members believed that the institution of the Majles did not have the authority to act on this issue. According to the letter, Rafsanjani said that these members thought that the property question is in the purview of the faqih." (Baktiari 1996, 87); To the extent that the Majles had any influence, it was to resist de-nationalization. The national oil company and government wanted to allow more foreign companies in to the oil sector, but social conservatives in the Guardian Council and ***Majles*** rejected this (Mahdavi 2012, 268).

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** There was a period after the revolution where the secularists and the fundamentalists were battling for control of the legislature: The legislature under Shah included loyalists, although dissent from ultra-nationalists mounted. Khomeini's religious followers were not included (Baktiari 1996, 47-50); The post-revolutionary Majles reduced the number of seats, marginalized secular nationalists, and appointed mostly pro-religious members: "Again, the fundamentalists successfully defeated the secular nationalists' attempts to create a constituent assembly with a larger number of deputies so that it would be representative of all the political groupings. The fundamentalists wanted a seventy-three-seat assembly. With Khomeini's backing, they got the desired institutional structure. The election results for the assembly were hardly surprising: fifty-five out of the seventy-three seats were taken by the pro-IRP clerics." (Baktiari 1996, 56)

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Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** There was a massive nationalization of a number of other industries: "The massive nationalization of industries, enacted in July 1979, was another contributing factor and the primary reason for much of the low productivity and inefficiency." (Ghasimi 1992, 601)

Iraq (Iraq 68-79)

- Details on case
    - Nationalizations: 1972, 1973, 1975, 1977. Nationalization of IPC in 1972 did not nationalize Mosul and Basra out of pragmatism (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 154); rest of oil was taken in 1973,1975
    - Legislative Closures: 1968-1980 when Saddam Hussein holds first election.

Consolidation Clues

- Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **Yes.** Internal struggles in 1960s and early 1970s. Turns to communists in the last 1970s; "In general, the period between the autumn of 1968 and the middle of 1969 is one of extreme chaos and confusion, in which the only thread that can be followed is the Ba'th leadership's clear determination to stay in power this time at all costs, to smash all actual or potential opposition, to entrench itself in key positions, and to extend and develop the machinery of the party as an instrument of control."; "At this point (1969) the real struggle was between al-Bakr (backed by Saddam Husayn), 'Ammash, and Hardan al-Takriti, all of whom had some kind of following in the armed forces, which , if properly activated, could easily constitute a threat to the others. It was not long before the disputes between the three came to the surface." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 119); Saddam and al-Bakr "Ba'thized" the military ahead of 1970; The communists still in coalition; Ba'th turns on them. They take up arms along with the Kurds; al-Bakr resigns for "health reasons" in 1979 and Saddam takes power. Elections instituted immediately after he comes to power.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** "… the ICP was closely monitoring the government's policies, and was evidently impressed by the Soviet oil contracts in June and July 1969 and the ware of a major concession for sulphur extraction to a Polish Company a few weeks earlier…. It was of the utmost importance for the Ba'th to be able either to weaken or in some way to absorb the Kurdish and Communist movements, which were still the two most important political forces in the country…" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 127); The ICP "… regarded the regime's… apparent desire to end the IPC monopoly as mounting and ultimately convincing evidence of commitment to a left-leaning

political line." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 146); Land nationalization also carried out in 1969 [cancellation of payments to landlords] as a way of building party support. (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 138); Explicitly pitches oil nationalization as a way to win over the communist party: "However, at the end of 1971 the final rupture still lay some way ahead, and the Ba'th's National Action Charter, announced in mid-November, seemed to represent another attempt to gather support for the regime from as many quarters as possible. The Charter reiterated the main points of the March Manifesto on Kurdish autonomy; spoke about reorganizing the national economy, freeing it from foreign dependence and developing relations with 'friendly and socialist countries'… and that the target of the revolution would be the 'liberation of oil wealth from foreign domination and exploitation.'" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 143-144)

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** No evidence that the legislature challenged Saddam Hussein on anything: "Until the middle of 1990 the only obvious function of the assembly was to act as a further mouthpiece for the leadership, in that its powers to question and criticize ministers and senior civil servants and, in certain circumstances to vote for their dismissal, meant that such action could be presented as having emanated from the popular, rather than the president's, will. However, given the constellation of power in Iraq and the almost total absence of the rule of law, every Iraqi knew that genuine criticism of the leadership or its policies was at best foolhardy and at worst suicidal." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 277); "The RCC is accountable to no one, except to the Ba'ath Party; even this degree of accountability is no more than formal. As far as the two other institutions are concerned, the cabinet has never exercised more than technocratic authority, and the national assembly, which eventually came into being in 1980, has rarely if every exercised more than decorative functions. Hence, with an absolute monopoly of all judicial, legislative and executive authority, the RCC, at least while al-Bakr was still at the helm, is best described as a form of collegiate dictatorship." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 118)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** Internal struggles in 1960s and early 1970s. Turns to communists in the last 1970s; "In general, the period between the autumn of 1968 and the middle of 1969 is one of extreme chaos and confusion, in which the only thread that can be followed is the Ba'th leadership's clear determination to stay in power this time at all costs, to smash all actual or potential opposition, to entrench itself in key positions, and to extend and develop the machinery of the party as an instrument of control."; "At this point (1969) the real struggle was between al-Bakr (backed by Saddam Husayn), 'Ammash, and Hardan al-Takriti, all of whom had some kind of following in the armed forces, which , if properly activated, could easily constitute a threat to the others. It was not long before the disputes between the three came to the surface." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 119); Saddam and al-Bakr "Ba'thized" the military ahead of 1970; The communists still in coalition; Ba'th turns on them. They take up arms along with the Kurds; al-Bakr resigns for "health reasons" in 1979 and Saddam takes power. Elections instituted immediately after he comes to power.

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Generalizability

Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.** See above.

Ivory Coast (1960-1999)

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: None
    - Legislative closure: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No. No legislative closure.**

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No. No legislative closure or expropriation.**

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** The legislature was changed in 1980 so that there were finally more candidates than seats (prior to 1980 there was not even intra-party competition). (Widner 1994, 135); Despite the changes, there was not much increase in the role of the deputy: "As the country plunged more deeply into economic recession, Houphouet and Bedie tried to control discontent among the elite by expanding the opportunities for elected officials to raise issues for discussion in parliament, within a tightly controlled format. For example, in July 1986 the assembly inaugurated a general debate during which *deputes* could express their views more openly. The president of the assembly set the themes for discussion, however, and when one *depute* asked to address topics not included on the list, Bedie did no oblige. Bedie's reiteration that *deputes* could, nonetheless, speak openly met with laughter from the participants." (Widner 1994, 136); Then the shift to multiparty in 1990: "If the shift to multicandidate elections forced political aspirants to pay somewhat greater attention to voters, it had little effect on the ability of *deputes* to monitor and influence policy."

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No legislative closure.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No legislative closure.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** The legislature was changed in 1980 so that there were finally more candidates than seats (prior to 1980 there was not even intra-party competition). (Widner 1994, 135); Despite the changes, there was not much increase in the role of the deputy: "As the country plunged more deeply into economic recession, Houphouet and Bedie tried to control discontent among the elite by expanding the opportunities for elected officials to raise issues for discussion in parliament, within a tightly controlled format. For example, in July 1986 the assembly inaugurated a general debate during which *deputes* could express their views more openly. The president of the assembly set the themes for discussion, however, and when one *depute* asked to address topics not included on the list, Bedie did no oblige. Bedie's reiteration that *deputes* could, nonetheless, speak openly met with laughter from the participants." (Widner 1994, 136); Then the shift to multiparty in 1990: "If the shift to multicandidate elections forced political aspirants to pay somewhat greater attention to voters, it had little effect on the ability of *deputes* to monitor and influence policy."

Malaysia (1957-present)

- Details on Case
  - Nationalization: Proposed Petroleum Development act in 1975: "…. Petronas shocked the companies with its innovative 'management shares' clause put forth in the Petroleum Development Act of 1975. This entitled Petronas to gain voting control over the personnel policies while holding only one percent of equity shares. This mechanism cleared the way for 'nationalization of the companies themselves without fair compensation.' The scheme was abandoned in mid-1976, after prolonged negotiations and oil company slowdowns forced Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn to intervene personally." (Goldberg 1980, 250)
  - Legislative closure: May 1969-February 1971

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Mexico (1915-2000)

- Details on case
  - Nationalization: Oil nationalization occurred on March 18, 1938
  - Legislative closures: Legislature was never closed.

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Poland (1944-1989)

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: All nationalizations happened with the Polish Act of Nationalization in 1946. (Doman 1948, 1146)
    - Legislative closure: 1947. Legislature was closed until 1947 when there were parliamentary elections (the last to elect any opposition). (de Weydenthal 1986, 51). This allowed for the immediate passage of a law limiting the length that the parliament would be in power.
    -

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **Yes.** "A delay [in holding elections] was apparently necessary to further soften the opposition and to carry out changes in the social and economic structure, such as nationalization of industry, banking, and commerce, which would consolidate the party's grip on the country." (Dziewanaowski 1976, 195)

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** "Although the reform failed to produce all the results hoped for by the peasants, it fulfilled the expectations of the party. The distribution of land appeased and consequently neutralized the peasantry during a crucial period in the struggle for power." (Dziewanaowski 1976, 195)

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "The history of the Polish Sejm under the constitutions adopted on 22 July 1952 raises serious questions about its capacity to gain institutional influence within the political system. As has been the case with other communist legislatures, the image of the body as either a 'rubber stamp' or as serving primarily symbolic functions has often been applicable… Its role in legislative formulation and public critical discussion has been constrained and it has often served to provide endorsement and approval for decisions made elsewhere by the party and/or government." (Olson and Simon 1982, 48)

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Generalizability

- Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **Yes.**

Romania (1945-1989)

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: Oil industry nationalized in 1948 (Jordan 1955, 33)
    - Legislative closure: 1945-1947

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Soviet Union (1918-1991)

- Details on Case
    - Oil Nationalizations; Oil nationalized immediately under the Supreme Council of the National Economy in 1918 (Campbell 1968, 26); the management was dispersed in a number of industries (Campbell 1999, 16)
    - Legislative Closure: No legislative closure.

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Syria (1963-present)

- Details on case
  - Nationalizations: 1963 (Al-Akhrass 1972, 185) see also: (Galvani 1974, 6); Oil production did not really begin until the mid 1970s and then again in the late 1980s with the help of foreign oil companies. (Matar 2017, 12); Nationalizations in general primarily occurred in January of 1965: "In January 1965 Jundi became minister of agrarian reform and for the first time the reforms decreed in 1958 were implemented with determination. At the same time, a large-scale nationalization program was launched, resulting in the takeover of 108 companies. Other measures included the prohibition of oil concessions to foreign companies, the reform of tax laws, and restrictions on currency exchange (designed to stem the flight of capital which, by early 1965, had reached truly alarming proportions)." (Kerr 1973, 695)
  - Legislative Closure: 1963-1973

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **Yes.** Asad did eliminate key rivals in the military and was in a strong position vis-à-vis the co-opted rivals when he instituted elections in 1973: "… things have changed since Asad took over in November 1970. When Asad emerged as the strong man of the regime, he was concerned, at least for a number of months, with the consolidation of his hold on political power in the country. He named a Sunni, Ahmad al-Khatib, as President. However, in March 1971 the General was nominated to be President for the following seven years by the Provincial Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party. Until then Asad and his supporters had been engaged in restructuring not only the party apparatus but that of the State as well. He had been successful in concluding an alliance with the Communist Party as well as a number of pan-Arab groups…" (Kelidar 1974, 17); "In January 1973 the Syrian People's Assembly adopted a permanent Constitution to restore political normalcy and to pave the way for parliamentary elections in the following months. It was to be the culmination of General Asad's attempt to consolidate his political power and to provide his regime with the basis of legitimacy that would make it acceptable to the majority of Syrians." (Kelidar 1974, 18)

- Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **Yes.** "In January 1965 Jundi became minister of agrarian reform and for the first time the reforms decreed in 1958 were implemented with determination. At the same time, a large-scale nationalization program was launched, resulting in the takeover of 108 companies. Other measures

included the prohibition of oil concessions to foreign companies, the reform of tax laws, and restrictions on currency exchange (designed to stem the flight of capital which, by early 1965, had reached truly alarming proportions)." (Kerr 1973, 695); "While the Ba'th's now chiefly rural base was de-mobilized, the urban opposition was mobilized and concentrated. As such, in the first two years of its rule the Ba'th found itself virtually isolated in the still urban-dominated political arena and dependent on military repression to stay in power; it was probably only the fragmentation and organizational weakness of its rivals which allowed it to survive. But its leaders knew that to retain power and carry out their revolution they would have to break out of their isolation by re-mobilising their potential village constituency… In Syria, a 'socialist revolution' would be carried out. The new credo held that the bourgeoisie was bankrupt and capitalism in developing countries was inevitably a foreign-dependent comprador enterprise…. This ideological mutation was set of by the rise to power inside the party of leaders from the lower social strata, whose closeness to village grievances made them much more antagonistic to the traditional urban establishment than the party's older urban middle class leaders. It was also a strategy for consolidating the new regime. Nationalizations would undercut the economic power of its upper class enemies while expanded control of the economy and a growing bureaucracy would give the regime a source of jobs and other patronage for its supporters. The Ba'th party would be refashioned into a disciplined Leninist type party capable of mobilizing the masses… " (Hinnebusch 2001, 50-51)

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "Parliament has remained very much on the margins of political life. From the mid-1970s to date, all laws that were passed by parliament have been introduced by the government, and never have government bills been defeated… The installation of a parliament, whatever its powers, and the regular holding of legislative and local and provincial elections, as well as of presidential referendums, represented an element of regime legitimation by establishing legal institutions and formalized procedures. The distribution of parliamentary seats was, of course, also a means of patronage. Deputies were suppose to, and usually did, rubberstamp government projects, and not challenge the government on its policies." (Perthes 1995, 167); "The parliament as a whole is supposed to support the supreme authority of the President and his policies, and has duly done so by unanimously nominating him for re-election in 1991. But parliament may discuss, even critically so, economic and social policies and the performance of the government, and may take initiatives in this respect." (Perthes 1995, 169); "From the beginning of the 1990s, business representatives have voiced reform wishes more clearly, particularly so in parliament. They have not tried, however, to organize and exert pressure on the government in order to make it speed up economic reform or follow a particular policy direction. A substantial part of Syria's private sector was not eager, in the first place, to accelerate liberalization and reform measures and thereby risk monopolies and other selectively granted privileges…" (Perthes 1995, 254-255)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **Yes.** There were major riots by Sunnis (Kelidar 1974, 18).

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **Yes.** The legislature did include a small number of communist and member of Pan-Arab parties (Dawisha 1978).

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "Parliament has remained very much on the margins of political life. From the mid-1970s to date, all laws that were passed by parliament have been introduced by the government, and never have government bills been defeated… The installation of a parliament, whatever its powers, and the regular holding of legislative and local and provincial elections, as well as of presidential referendums, represented an element of regime legitimation by establishing legal institutions and formalized procedures. The distribution of parliamentary seats was, of course, also a means of patronage. Deputies were suppose to, and usually did, rubberstamp government projects, and not challenge the government on its policies." (Perthes 1995, 167); "The parliament as a whole is

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Turkmenistan

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: Nationalized oil industry derived from Soviet Union (Luong and Weinthal 2010).
    - Legislative closure: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** No nationalization.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** There was no independent legislative or judicial authority, and no opportunity for civic initiative or meaningful political participation. The government sector crowded out the private sector, quashing individual initiative and making all business activity dependent upon government decisions." (Gleason 2010, 81); Hydrocarbon Law that protected little in the way of private property rammed through legislature with little debate: "President Niyazov signed into law the country's first and only piece of comprehensive legislation governing the petroleum sector…, the Law on Hydrocarbon Resources… Importantly, the 1996 Petroleum Law was not designed to meet international standards for the protection of foreign direct investment (FD); in fact, the foreign investor community scoffed at the inclusion of several articles that allowed the government to 'annul a petroleum license unilaterally and to have the associated contract terminated and deemed invalid.'" (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 84)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** Legislature never closed.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No nationalization.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** There was no independent legislative or judicial authority, and no opportunity for civic initiative or meaningful political participation. The government sector crowded out the private sector, quashing individual initiative and making all business activity dependent upon government decisions." (Gleason 2010, 81); Hydrocarbon Law that protected little in the way of private property rammed through legislature with little debate: "President Niyazov signed into law the country's first and only piece of comprehensive legislation governing the petroleum sector…, the Law on Hydrocarbon Resources… Importantly, the 1996 Petroleum Law was not designed to meet international standards for the protection of foreign direct investment (FD); in fact, the foreign investor community scoffed at the inclusion of several articles that allowed the

government to 'annul a petroleum license unilaterally and to have the associated contract terminated and deemed invalid.'" (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 84)

Tunisia (1956-2013)

- Details on cases
  - Oil Nationalizations: None
  - Legislative closures: 1956-1957

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No nationalization

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** No nationalization

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** "The ruling party's pre-1994 parliamentary monopoly and the exigencies of party discipline meant that support for legislation almost always came unanimously, rendering parliament a marginal, sounding-board type institution. This is still the case today." (Angrist 1999, 98); On pluralism: "Given the relative political impotence of the Tunisian legislative branch, allowing a tiny minority of MPs to hail from the opposition does not change the political game dramatically. Indeed, and ironically, bringing opposition deputies into parliament may be making the exercise of power more authoritarian. Several interlocutors reported and increase in RCD discipline in the post 1994-parliament. Prior to that, RCD deputies apparently had more leeway to criticize laws and, at times, to abstain or vote against them in plenary sessions. With the entry of opposition deputies into the chamber, such behavior is no longer tolerated." (Angrist 1999, 99); "For a number of reasons, despite Tunisia's constitutional separation of powers, the legislative branch could not be considered as a balance to the executive branch of government. At the inaugural session of the National Assembly, Bourguiba lectured the deputies about their role under the new constitution… Bourguiba's meaning seemed clear: he was not to be challenged by the Assembly; rather, the latter would cooperative with him on is terms. Constitutionally the powers of the Assembly were sharply limited, and the internal organization of the Assembly ensured discipline and subservience to the government. The nine-man bureau of the Assembly effectively directed the work of the Assembly. It was elected annually, by acclamation, on the basis of a list drawn up by the Political Bureau." (Moore 1965, 182-183)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No nationalization.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No nationalization.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** "The ruling party's pre-1994 parliamentary monopoly and the exigencies of party discipline meant that support for legislation almost always came unanimously, rendering parliament a marginal, sounding-board type institution. This is still the case today." (Angrist 1999, 98); On pluralism: "Given the relative political impotence of the Tunisian legislative branch, allowing a tiny minority of MPs to hail from the opposition does not change the political game dramatically. Indeed, and ironically, bringing opposition deputies into parliament may be making the exercise of power more authoritarian. Several interlocutors reported and increase in RCD discipline in the post 1994-parliament. Prior to that, RCD deputies apparently had more leeway to criticize laws and, at times, to abstain or vote against them in plenary sessions. With the entry of opposition deputies into the chamber, such behavior is no longer tolerated." (Angrist 1999, 99); "For a number of reasons, despite Tunisia's constitutional separation of powers, the legislative branch could not be

considered as a balance to the executive branch of government. At the inaugural session of the National Assembly, Bourguiba lectured the deputies about their role under the new constitution… Bourguiba's meaning seemed clear: he was not to be challenged by the Assembly; rather, the latter would cooperative with him on is terms. Constitutionally the powers of the Assembly were sharply limited, and the internal organization of the Assembly ensured discipline and subservience to the government. The nine-man bureau of the Assembly effectively directed the work of the Assembly. It was elected annually, by acclamation, on the basis of a list drawn up by the Political Bureau." (Moore 1965, 182-183)

Uzbekistan

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: Nationalized oil industry derived from Soviet Union (Luong and Weinthal 2010). State maintains control of the economy in general (Murtazashvili 2012, 85)
    - Legislative closure: No

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **No.** No closure.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **No.** No nationalization.

- Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **Yes.** On the legislature: "So-called 'drafts' of their respective tax codes, for example, were published preceding the legislature's approval that were almost identical to the final document, suggesting that there was little room for open debate. As one former high-ranking officials who participated in this process in Uzbekistan explained, 'when it came to drafting tax legislation, a special committee was convened… [and' it was not publicly released until we had the version the President wanted the deputies [in the Oliy Majilis] to approve.'" (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 114); In terms of oil and private investor protections, the legislature played no role: "At the same time, those investors who nonetheless showed interest were subjective to the whims of Karimov who 'ma[de] deals at will." (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 86)

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **No.** No closure.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **No.** No nationalization.

- Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **No.** On the legislature: "So-called 'drafts' of their respective tax codes, for example, were published preceding the legislature's approval that were almost identical to the final document, suggesting that there was little room for open debate. As one former high-ranking officials who participated in this process in Uzbekistan explained, 'when it came to drafting tax legislation, a special committee was convened… [and' it was not publicly released until we had the version the President wanted the deputies [in the Oliy Majilis] to approve.'" (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 114); In terms of oil and private investor protections, the legislature played no role: "At the same time, those investors who nonetheless showed interest were subjective to the whims of Karimov who 'ma[de] deals at will." (Luong and Weinthal 2010, 86)

- Contemporaneous nationalization of other industries? **N/A**

Vietnam

- Details of case
    - Oil Nationalizations: Oil not found until later, but state dominance of the economy carried out between 1954 and 1960: "… the preparations for the 1956 elections did soften the dictatorship's policies to a certain extent. Direct state control over economic and cultural life seems to have been achieved relatively slowly and gradually. For example, in 1957 the private sector's share of industrial production was still as high as 63%. The overwhelming majority of such entrepreneurs were actually craftsmen, of whom only 12% belonged to cooperatives at the time… As late as 1959 there were 299 printing shops, 214 publishing houses and 37 cinemas (mostly small-scale enterprises) in private hands. While later in that year the VWP launched a nationalization drive, in January 1960 Hungarian charge d'affaires Laszlo Kovacs stressed that Hanoi still preferred the slow economic strangulation of private enterprises to outright expropriation…" (Szalontai 2005, 400). Full nationalization began in 1960 (Yvon 2008, 77)
    - Legislative closure: No

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 2: The clue is found if legislature includes primary elite or opposition rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Yugoslavia

- Details on case
    - Oil Nationalizations: Nationalizations carried out in 1945.
    - Legislative closure: None

Consolidation Clues

Consolidation Clue 1: The clue is found if rivals were eliminated during the legislative closure and the legislature opened when the legislature was strong relative to the rivals. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 2: The clue is found if competing leftists were calling for nationalization. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Consolidation Clue 3: The clue is found if legislature never opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

Binding Clues

Binding Clue 1: The clue is found if legislature opened when the regime needed elite or opposition cooperation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought.

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Binding Clue 3: The clue is found if the legislature opposed the regime on major legislation. **N/A.** Off path, no clue sought

Appendix D: Non-Communist BIQQ Consolidation Analysis

	No Communist Regimes – Strong Priors
λ_a	0.12 [0.00, 0.33]
λ_b	0.62 [0.39, 0.82]
λ_c	0.11 [0.08, 0.29]
λ_d	0.16 [0.01, 0.39]

Appendix E: Comparing Party and Non-Party Based Regimes

Our analysis suggests that authoritarian legislatures appear to close and open following the consolidation logic and do not prevent autocrats from expropriating. A final question is whether party regimes operate differently from non-party regimes. As Wright suggests, personalist and non-party regimes should be *less likely* to have binding legislatures (2008, 323). Our theory suggests the opposite. Legislatures should be more constraining in non-party contexts, particularly where the executive does not simultaneously control the political institutions that dominate the legislature. In this section, we look at a sample of oil producing regimes that have legislatures and non-party based regimes. To do this, we took a random sample of 12 regimes from the Geddes, Wright and Frantz dataset of authoritarian regimes (2014), blocking on their regime type codes to ensure that we had four personalist, military, and monarchic regimes. We then assessed whether the legislature played a constraining role on any major policies.

We then looked to secondary source materials to assess whether the executive led the same organization that headed the legislature. For our theory, this distinction is critical. If the same organization controls the legislature, we would not expect the legislature to ever oppose the autocrat. However, for military, personalistic, or monarchic regimes that do have separate organizations controlling the legislature, we expect potentially combative behavior. In all of the party based regimes, the autocratic party controls the legislature. For non-party regimes, while all monarchs come from different organizations compared to their legislatures, some military leaders, such as Burma's Ne Win, create and lead parties that rule the legislature. Others, such as Pakistan under Musharraf do not control parliamentary. Similarly, in some regimes coded as personalistic, the autocrat controls the parliamentary majority. Peru under Fujimori is an example. Others, such as Yeltsin in Russia, do not. Based on our theory we should expect the legislature to be relatively more constraining in cases where the autocrat does not control the legislature.

Table E1: Legislative Activism in Non-Party Regimes

Geddes, Wright, Frantz Case*	Geddes, Wright, Frantz Regime Type	Leader/Leading Group	Executive/ Legislature Led by Same Organization?**	Did the Legislature Ever Challenge the Executive?**
Peru 92-00	Personal	Fujimori	Yes	No
Russia 93-NA (pre-2003)	Personal	Yeltsin	No	Yes
Russia 93-NA (post-2003)	Personal	Putin	Yes	No
Georgia 92-03 (pre 1995)	Personal	Shevardnadze	No	No
Georgia 92-03 (post-1995)	Personal	Shevardnadze	Yes	Yes
Azerbaijan 91-92	Personal	Mutalibov	Yes	Yes
Brazil 64-85	Military	Military	No	Yes
Pakistan 99-08	Military	Musharraf	No	Yes
Algeria 92-NA	Military	Bouteflika	Yes	No
Myanmar 62-88	Military	Ne Win	Yes	No
Afghanistan 29-73	Monarchy	King Zahir Shah	No	Yes
Kuwait 61-NA	Monarchy	Al-Sabah Family	No	Yes
Jordan 46-NA	Monarchy	Hashemite Monarchy	No	Yes
Libya 51-69	Monarchy	King Idris	No	Yes

Notes

* These cases include a random sample of oil producing countries, with four cases from each of the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz non-party regime types.

** See Appendix F for description of cases.

Table E1 shows the results of the analysis with the qualitative evidence in ***Online Appendix F***. The evidence is striking. In contrast with our analysis of party regimes, where we found only one case of a legislature challenging – even mildly – the autocrat, in seven of the 12 cases there is clear qualitative evidence that the legislature played some role in checking the autocrat. In Brazil, as Desposato (2001) lays out in detail, delegates were frequently willing to challenge the military regime. Similarly, in Kuwait, the

National Assembly frequently challenges to government policy, even on foreign oil contracts (Herb 2014, 103). The only case potentially contrary to our predictions among this sample is Georgia, where the parliament became more assertive after Shevardnadze gained control of the parliament. However, even in this case, a closer examination reveals support for our theory. While Shevardnadze's party indeed had the majority of the parliament, the party was not well-institutionalized and was a relatively new creation (Devdariani 2004). In short, nearly *all* of the cases from a random sample of oil producing, non-party regimes show that legislatures are more likely to bind autocrats than legislatures in party-based regimes. This helps explain why despite the quantitative results, most case studies of influential legislatures in autocracies, such Gandhi (2008b) or North and Weingast (1989), are from monarchies or military regimes.

Appendix F: Non-Party Cases

Peru (1992-2000)

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Yes***. Fujimori's "New Majority" had a majority after the 1992 Constituent Assembly election and after the 1995 election (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 8).

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***No.*** "Fujimori's legislative majority limited the utility of the congress as a vehicle for checking executive power." (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 14); Fujimori did away with the legislature that was opposing his reforms in the autogolpe and simply passed his orders by decree (Champion 2001); "Despite the letter of the new constitution, in practice the power of the chief executive and his military allies remained unchecked by civilian institutions. The CCD proved to be the quintessential rubber stamp legislature, the judiciary had been purged of potential opponents, and the NM-C90 congressional majority refused to name a new tribunal constitucional (TC) as mandated by the 1993 charter." (Schmidt 2000, 104)

Russia (1992-present)

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Not before 2003; Yes after 2003.*** The presidency under Yeltsin did not control the dominant party in the legislature (Remington, Putin and the Duma 2001). Putin did control the Duma after 2003 (Remington 2008). Reuter and Turovsky (2014) suggest that the level of party control over the executive branch is less pervasive than would exist in a party based system. However, Putin, though not officially a member of United Russia, was its chair.

- Did the legislature check the executive if executive controlled the legislature? ***Yes before 2003, no after.*** "To be sure, Putin's efforts in the modernization agenda were not always successful. Resistance came not from the parliament, however, but from the state bureaucracy." (Remington 2008, 973). Indeed, on a particularly controversial social benefits bill, United Russia overwhelmingly passed the bill despite its unpopularity, even within the party (Remington 2008, 977). The one area where the legislature did continue to have influence was over pork barrel projects and redistribution, but this reflected intra-party divisions rather than legislative opposition. With regards to oil expropriation specifically, Yukos was expropriated in 2003 with no sign of Duma involvement or opposition; ***after 2003*** "President and parliament were able to reach agreement on a number of issues, but on many more, including land privatization, tax reform, social policy, labor relations, and many areas of judicial process, they were unable to find agreement." (Remington 2001, 285-286)

Georgia (1992-2003)

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Yes***. Shevardnadze's Georgia Citizens United Party had the majority between 1995 and 2003.

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***No before 1997, Yes after 1997.*** The legislature began to challenge the executive after 1997, as members of Shevardnadze's ruling party began to break away: "The period of 1995-1997 was marked by undeniable progress as stability increased, influence of the armed militias subsided, and the new economy showed signs of recovery. As a result of general growth and stability, new groups in the electorate started to take shape. Simultaneously, the ambitions of SMK leadership to impact executive decision-making increased." (Devdariani 2004, 95)

Azerbaijan

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Yes***. "With Soviet military help, Mutalibov won the parliamentary elections in September 1990 against a demoralized opposition." (Murphy 1992, 81)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "In 1990, 43 out of 450 seats in the newly elected Supreme Soviet were won by democratic forces. Though in a minority, they were active enough to turn the parliament into an arena of acute political debates, closely watched by the entire population. On October 18, 1991 President Ayaz Mutalibov singed the Constitutional Act of the Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan; there is not doubt that this act came as a result of the young democrats' activities, both within and beyond the walls of the Supreme Council." (Badalov and Mehdy 2005, 154)

Brazil (1966-1986)

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No***. The military regime created a pro-military ruling party, but the military itself was not composed of party members.

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. The Brazilian legislature voted against the military on several occasions, forcing the military to close the legislature on several occasions. (Desposato 2001)

Algeria

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Yes***. "Ouyahia and his party, the Rally for National Democracy, are part of the three-party 'presidential alliance' that has held a parliamentary majority since 2002." (Aghrout 2009, 5)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***No.*** "As a result, parliament has been completely marginalized as presidential decrees have become the preferred way of legislating, even (and especially) on important issues of fiscal and economic policy." (Darbouche 2011)

Pakistan (99-08)

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No***. "The military's efforts failed to create immediately a submissive political class or a rubber-stamp parliament. The PPP won more votes than the PML-Q and Sharif's PML secured more votes but fewer seats than the MMA. This mean that the combined votes of the anti-Musharraf parties exceeded those of the pro-military ones." (Haqqani 2006, 112)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "For several months, the government failed to secure parliamentary ratification of its package of constitutional amendments, mainly because of MMA's insistence (most likely egged on by Islamists within the military) that Musharraf take off his military uniform. In order to secure parliament's approval of his desired constitutional changes, Musharraf promised to give up his military uniform by 31 December 2004." (Haqqani 2006, 112)

Myanmar

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***Yes.*** Single-party elections ruled by the Burma Socialist Party Program.

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***No***. "Burmese politics function on two levels: the symbols of power are wielded by the leaders and members of parliament while the levers of power are manipulated by the Burma Socialist Program Party leadership." (Silverstein 1982, 181)

Afghanistan

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No.*** "The Wolesi Jirgah, in effect, houses 216 distinct parties – one for each member. Aside from the occasional regional cooperation among legislators and the unity of a few ideologues, the chamber is largely unorganized and unled." (Weinbaum 1972, 61).

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "The cabinet is also reluctant to ask the king to endorse legislation that may be voided later by the parliament. A 1967 muncipalities law and an

education law decreed in 1968 were both rejected when the parliament reconvened." (Weinbaum 1972, 65)

Kuwait

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No.*** Delegates are non-partisan. "… election flaws have not prevented opposition victories in recent elections (when the opposition has competed), suggesting that the government has limited ability to shape the outcome of elections." (Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE 2014, 31)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "In recent years, the National Assembly has mounted increasingly determined challenges to the political primacy of the ruling family, culminating in an episode in late 2011 when the National Assembly forced the resignation of the prime minister—who was also a senior shaykh in a central branch of the ruling family." (Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE 2014, 103); "But a few weeks after the Kuwaiti government signed the detail, at the end of December 2008, the Kuwait government canceled the contract. This left Kuwait vulnerable to a claim by Dow for $2.5 billion for breaking the contract. Ostensibly, Kuwait pulled the plug on the detail because the global economic crisis and the consequent decline in the price of oil made the price that Kuwait was to pay for its share… to high… The Kuwaiti government pulled out of the deal as a direct response to a threat by members of the National assembly to interpellate the prime minister over the deal." (Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE 2014, 171)

Jordan

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No.*** Opposition parties almost won a majority in parliament, but even the non-opposition party members are independents. "The big story was that despite glaring malapportionment, the opposition factions combined to win 39 House seats." (Lucas 2003, 139)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "This new parliament used its constitutional powers to test successive prime ministers and cabinets in confidence votes and grill them in budget debates. It also helped push King Hussein into his neutralist policy during the Gulf War, which was popular at home even as it dismayed Jordan's Western allies." (Lucas 2003, 139)

Libya

- Did executive control organization in charge of legislature? ***No.*** Political parties did not exist. "Most of the minor political organizations which proliferated after World War II and enjoyed a temporal degree of local popularity at the time Libya acquired its independence have since become moribund." (Lewis and Gordon 1954, 46-47)

- Did the legislature check the executive? ***Yes***. "The budgetary debate in Parliament have proved extremely spirited, and it is evident that no administration can expect a rubber stamp approval…" (Lewis and Gordon 1954, 49)

Appendix G: Works Cited in Appendix

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