

E-commerce and Regional Inequality: A Trade Framework and Evidence from Amazon's Expansion

Elmer Zongyang Li

Department of Economics
Cornell University

April, 2024

Brick-and-mortar vs. E-commerce


Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results



- Secular ↑ online retail sales (**e-commerce**)
- "Opening to trade" challenges *regional equality*
 - Comparative advantages, worker specializations
 - Pre-existing trade & input-output linkages

E-commerce as a
unique trade shock \Rightarrow Spatial GE and reallocation
(welfare, empl. dispersion)

- **Empirics:** New facts on Amazon sales, retailers, facilities
 - Online retailer concentration, sales & trade
- **Theory:** multi-region & -sector (retail) trade model
 - Consumer search & shipping
 - Location choice of online retailer \Rightarrow ↑agglomeration
- **Policy:** place-based public finances & online market design

Contribution: new data & extend trade theory \Rightarrow e-commerce on regions

Related Literature

Motivation

- E-commerce's Impact on Retail Market Structure

- stores: ↓ demand ↑ product. mark-up. Stanchi(2019), Goldmanis et. al (2010)
 - consumer: ↑ welfare. Dolfen et. al (2021); Fan et. al (2018); Forman et. al (2009)

This paper: spatial GE related to employment & real GDP

Empirical Facts

- Inter-national/regional Trade, Urban

- LM effects under Ricardian trade model: Caliendo et. al (2018); Caliendo, Dvorkin & Parro (2019); Lee (2020); Galle, Rodríguez-Clare & Yi (2022)

This paper: apply & extend + new data & ID strategy

A Spatial Trade Model

- Local LM shocks

- trade & technology: Autor, Dorn & Hansen (2013), Firpo, Fortin & Lemieux (2013), Pierce & Schott (2016); Autor & Dorn (2013), Chava et. al (2022)

This paper: GE regional heterogeneity, welfare (beyond ATE)

Quantification

Results

Table of Contents

Motivation

Motivation

Empirical Facts

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

A Spatial Trade
Model

Quantification

Quantification

Results

Results

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade
Model

Quantification

Results

Empirical Facts

Data Sources

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- Amazon Retailers and Products ([Keepa.com](#))
 - A random sample of products on Amazon (36 categories, 2016-2020)
 - Information on prices, and sales ranking, converted to sales
 - Collect sellers' addresses, FBA status
- Amazon Facilities ([MWPVL](#))
 - Addresses, square feet, date, type.[[Houde, Newberry & Seim \(HNS,2021\)](#)]
 - Focus on large fulfill. & distr. centers; drop specialized, small-package
- DOT Commodity Flow Survey (CFS)
 - Origin-destination data on trade value, volume, NAICS category
- Other Datasets
 - Surveys: CBP, BEA, ACS
 - Geography Datasets (topography, climate)

Empirical Patterns

Motivation

Empirical Facts


A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification


Results

- 1a: Online retail sales is more concentrated than average retail sales...

(1) Regional Share of E-commerce Sales
(HHI = 0.16)



(2) Regional Share of Retail Sector Sales
(HHI = 0.05)



Empirical Patterns

Motivation

- 1a: Online retail sales is more concentrated than average retail sales...
- 1b: ...and those that are FBA more concentrated than non-FBA

Empirical Facts


A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results


(3) Regional Share of E-commerce Sales with FBA

(HHI = 0.17)



(4) Regional Share of E-commerce Sales without FBA

(HHI = 0.13)



- 1c (New): ...and the concentration aligns with truck routes

Peak-Period Congestion on the High-Volume Truck Routes



- 1c (New): ...and the concentration aligns with truck routes
- 1d (New): ...and non-durable/standardized ones are less concentrated

Table: HHI Index by Sales Categories

Category name	HHI Index
Toys & Games	0.12
Patio, Lawn & Garden	0.12
Arts, Crafts & Sewing	0.07
Sports & Outdoors	0.14
Office Products	0.16
Grocery & Gourmet Food	0.08
Tools & Home Improvement	0.21
Movies & TV	0.08
Musical Instruments	0.10

Empirical Patterns

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- 2: Online retail is less correlated with population or taxes

Dependent Variable (Log Sales)	Online Retail (Non-FBA)	Online Retail (FBA)	Overall Retail		
Corporate tax	-0.88 [0.55]	1.41*** [0.52]	0.29 [0.83]	0.92 [0.81]	-0.81 [1.90] 1.07*** [0.28]
% Total population	3.05 [2.43]	-9.05 [15.51]	0.15*** [0.05]	15.63** [7.66]	-0.02 [0.02] 0.96*** [0.05]
Year, State FE		X		X	X
Observations	230	230	230	230	230
R-squared	0.11	0.36	0.13	0.55	0.99
				1.00	

Empirical Patterns

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- 3a: Destinations with ↑ online retailers **import more** WS goods
- 3b: Origins with ↑ online retailers **export less** WS goods
- 4: Regions near to fulfillment centers **import & export less** WS goods

Dependent Variable:	In(Shipment)
Share (%) of online sellers - destination	1.5* [0.8]
Share (%) of Online sellers - origin	-3.7*** [1.0]
Bilateral distance via Amazon facility	-0.20** [0.08]
Origin, Destination FE	✓
Year, Industry FE	✓
Observations	19,739 43,715
R-squared	0.2 0.4

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade
Model

Quantification

Results

A Spatial Trade Model

The Online Retail Business Model


Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results



Agglomeration: Trade frictions (HME, CA)

↔

Dispersion: Factor prices

- Environment

- N regions: n (destination), m (origin)
- J sectors: j (durable, non-durable)
- 3 subsectors: M (manufacturer), R (online retailer), B (brick-and-mortar)

1. **Demand:** Consumer search → CES with demand shifter
2. **Intermediate:** comparative advantages → manuf. trade flow
3. **Online Seller:** Location choice → agglomeration, retail trade flow
Two approaches: Arkolakis et al. (2018, 2017) vs. Chaney (2008)
Key difference: multiple origins & destinations
4. **Worker:** Roy labor supply

Consumer Search

Motivation

- Set-up

Empirical Facts

- A continuum of consumers (n), purchase retail & service (η^j)

A Spatial Trade Model

- For retail, pick 1 among $O + 1$ sellers ($i = 0$ BM; $i \geq 1$ online)

Quantification

- $v_{ni}^j = \ln \eta^j y_n - \ln p_{ni}^j + \varepsilon_{ni}^j$ (ε_{ni}^j the match value)

Results

- ▶ ε_{ni}^j unknown: i.i.d. $E(\varepsilon_{ni}^j) = 0$ for $i = 0$ and $E(\varepsilon_{ni}^j) = \ln(\mu)$ for $i \geq 1$

- To find the seller, they search sequentially (SOM) Weitzman (1979)

- ▶ each step, whether to pay cost k to observe $p_i^j, \varepsilon_{ni}^j$, or continue

1. Any SOM has a discrete choice model (DCM) w/. same demand [proof](#)
2. CES demand is a special case of DCM with extreme type I error [proof](#)

Theorem

A rep. consumer in n with weights η^j has nest CD-CES demand as below under sequential ordered search and if $\min\{\varepsilon_{ni}, r(k)\}$ is distributed extreme type I

$$C_n = \prod_{j=1}^J (C_n^j)^{\eta^j}, \quad C_n^j = [(c_{n0})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \mu \sum_{i=1}^N (c_{ni})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}]^{\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1}} \text{ for } j \geq 2$$

- Intermediate Varieties (M)

- A rep. firm in (n, j, M) produces varieties $e^j \in [0, 1]$

$$q_n^{j,M}(e^j) = a_n(e^j)l_n(e^j)$$

- Retail Sector (R/B)

- Collect varieties $e^j \in [0, 1]$: $q_n^{j,R/B} = [\int_0^1 q_n^{j,M}(e^j)^{\frac{\alpha^j-1}{\alpha^j}} d\phi^j(a^n(e^j))]^{\frac{\alpha^j}{\alpha^j-1}}$

$$Q_n^{j,R/B} = z_n^{j,R/B} \left[(h_n^{j,R/B})^{\beta_n} (l_n^{j,R/B})^{1-\beta_n} \right]^{\gamma_n^j} \left[q_n^{j,R/B} \right]^{1-\gamma_n^j}$$

- Fréchet $\phi^j(a_n(e^j)) = \exp(\sum_n -T_n^j z^{-\theta^j})$, exp. share: $x_{nm}^{j,M} = \frac{(\kappa_{nm}^M c_m^{j,M})^{-\theta^j} T_m^j}{\sum_{g=1}^N (\kappa_{ng}^M c_g^{j,M})^{-\theta^j} T_g^j}$
- Unit cost: $c_n^{j,R/B} = (\omega_n^{j,R/B})^{\gamma_n^j} (p_n^{j,M})^{1-\gamma_n^j} / z_n^j$. For online: $c_{nm}^{j,R} = c_m^{j,R} \kappa_{nm}^R$

Online Retailer Location

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- Optimal Location (R) alternative

- Online retailer char. by $(z_1^{j,R}, \dots, z_N^{j,R})$, entry cost f_m . Optimal location:

$$m^* = \operatorname{argmin}_m \left\{ \frac{\tilde{\sigma}}{z_m^{j,R}} c_m^{j,R} \sum_n \left(\frac{\kappa_{nm}^R}{P_n^{j,R}} \right)^{\sigma^j - 1} X_n \right\} \quad (\equiv \frac{\tilde{\sigma} \xi_m^j}{z_m^{j,R}})$$

- Entry: $\sum_n \left(\frac{p_{nm}^{j,R}/\mu}{P_n^{j,R}} \right)^{1-\sigma^j} \eta^j X_n \geq \sigma^j w_m^{j,R} f_m$. Thold: $\bar{c}_m^j = \frac{\mu}{\tilde{\sigma}^j} \left[\frac{\sigma^j}{\eta^j} \frac{w_m^{j,R} f_m}{\sum_n \kappa_{nm}^R P_n^{j,R} X_n} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^j}}$

- Aggregate Retail Trade

- Multi-variate Pareto : $P(Z_1^j < z_1, \dots, Z_N^j < z_N) = 1 - \left(\sum_{m=1}^N [A_{jm} z_m^{-\phi}]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho}$

$$\Psi_m^j = P(m = \operatorname{argmin}_m \{ \tilde{\sigma} \xi_m^j / z_m^j \} \cap c_m^{j,R} < \bar{c}_m^j) = \psi_m^j(\bar{c}_m^j)^\phi$$

- where $\psi_m^j = A_{jm} (\xi_m^j)^{\frac{-\phi}{1-\rho}} / \sum_{m=1}^N [A_{jm} (\xi_m^j)^{-\phi}]^{\frac{-\rho}{1-\rho}}$

- Bilateral online retail exp. share $x_{nm}^{j,R} = \frac{\psi_m^j(\bar{c}_m^j)^\phi (c_{nm}^{j,R}/\mu)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_h \psi_h^j(\bar{c}_h^j)^\phi (c_{nh}^{j,R}/\mu)^{1-\sigma} + \frac{1}{D} (c_{n0}^{j,R})^{1-\sigma}}$

- Employment Rate

- L_n HHs choose sector of employment (includ. home production)
- Draw $z_n = \{z_n^0, z_n^S, z_n^{2,M}, z_n^{2,R}, z_n^{2,B}, z_n^{3,M}, z_n^{3,R}, z_n^{3,B}\}$ from i.i.d. Fréchet ($v_n, A_n^{j,K}$)
- Probability of working in $\{j, K\}$:

$$\pi_n^{j,K} = \frac{A_n^{j,K}(w_n^{j,K})^{v_n}}{\Phi_n}, \text{ where } \Phi_n = \sum_{j=0}^J \sum_{K=M,R,B,\emptyset} A_n^{j,K}(w_n^{j,K})^{v_n}.$$

E-commerce and General Equilibrium Outcomes

Motivation

- General Equilibrium

- market clearing [details](#)
- comparative statics w/. exact hat algebra [details](#)

Empirical Facts

- E-commerce

- \uparrow match efficiency μ (Dinerstein et. al 2018; Goldmanis et. al 2010)
- \downarrow transportation cost of retail κ_{ni}^R (Houde, Newberry & Seim 2021)

A Spatial Trade Model

- Welfare

- Definition: real income per capita $W_n = \frac{Y_n}{P_n}$, its change:

$$\hat{W}_n = \underbrace{\hat{w}_n^0(\hat{\pi}_n^0)^{\frac{-1}{v_n}}}_{\text{non-emp. worker special.}} \times \Pi_{j=1}^J \underbrace{(\hat{x}_{n0}^{j,R})^{\frac{-\eta_j}{\sigma^{j-1}}}}_{\text{industry composition}} \underbrace{(\hat{c}_n^{j,B})}_{\text{input-output local pref.}}$$

Quantification

Results

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade
Model

Quantification

Results

Quantification

Calibration Outline

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification




Results

Section	Param.	Description	Estimation/Calibration
Consumer	η_n^j	Sector share of consumption	CFS 2007
	σ^j	Elasticity of subs. across retailers	Keepa + IV
Labor Supply	π_n^j	Share of empployment	CBP, ACS
	v^n	Fréchet shape of worker product.	Galle, Rodríguez-Clare & Yi (2022)
Production	β_n^j	Share of structures	BEA + Greenwood et. al (1997)
	θ^j	Fréchet shape of sector product.	Caliendo and Parro (2015)
	γ_n^j	Value-added share of retail goods	BEA, CFS
Trade	$x_{ni}^{M,j}$	Interm. expenditure share	CFS 2007

Baseline Economy (2007): Model vs. Data

Motivation

- Can use model to back out regional income (untargeted)



Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

Estimation: Amazon Shock

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

Section	Param.	Description	Estimation/Calibration
Amazon Shock	$\hat{\kappa}_{nm}^R$	Iceberg cost change	Amazon data + CFS 2007 + IV
	μ	Matching efficiency	E-stats + CES
	Ψ_m^j	Online retailer location probability	Keepa
	O	Measure of online retailers	E-stats
	T_n^j	Fréchet scale of sectoral product.	Assume constant
	A_n^j	Fréchet scale of labor product.	Assume constant

Estimation: Amazon Shock

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- Extrapolate Amazon Ice-berg cost shock

- **Intuition:** Ice-berg is increasing in distance
 - Estimate coefficient of ice-berg cost on shipping distance [details](#)

$$\ln(\kappa_{nm}^{j,R}) = \delta^j \text{Distance}_{nm} + X'_{nm} \theta + \delta_n^j + \delta_m^j + \varepsilon_{nm}^j$$

- Estimate reduction in shipping distance due to Amazon
 - ▶ Build counterfactual facilities based on exog. factors as IV for actual ones

- Back-out online matching efficiency

- **Intuition:** % online exp. should inform matching, conditional on shipping

$$\sum_{m=1}^N x_{nm}^{j,R} / x_{n0}^{j,R} = (\mu)^{\sigma^{j-1}} \sum_{m=1}^N M_m (p_m^{j,R} \kappa_{nm}^R / p_{n0}^{j,R})$$

- ▶ Use Keepa for M_m , above estimated κ_{nm}^R , CES for $p_m^{j,R}, p_{n0}^{j,R}$

δ^{dur}	δ^{nondur}	$\hat{\kappa}$	μ
1.5 [0.2]	2.1 [0.6]	0.97 [0.15]	1.27 [1.46]

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade
Model

Quantification

Results

Results

Result: Welfare

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results




Figure: Total Welfare Change

- ↓ welfare overall (avg: 0.33%)

- Reduction in price index
1.45%
 - Reduction in income 1.01%

- ↑ inequality

- Gini: $0.11 \rightarrow 0.38$

Result: Employment

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

Sector	All States		Below 75th Percentile Online Sales Density		Below 50th Percentile Online Sales Density	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Manufacturing	-4.3	(7.6)	-2.9	(6.0)	-1.8	(1.1)
Online Retail	109.8	(97.8)	87.6	(73.8)	63.3	(64.8)
Brick-and-Mortar	-11.1	(8.0)	-9.8	(6.2)	-8.6	(1.2)
Service	-1.6	(7.9)	-0.1	(6.2)	1.2	(1.2)
Non-Employment	-1.3	(8.1)	0.3	(6.3)	1.7	(0.8)

Table: Employment Changes by Sector and State Groups

Conclusion

Motivation

Empirical Facts

A Spatial Trade Model

Quantification

Results

- E-commerce as **trade** shock
- Online retailer concentration plays an important role
- Spatial retail trade model
- **Amazon** ⇒ efficiency equality tradeoff (welfare, employment)

Appendix

Search is *ordered*: Weitzman (1979) optimal stopping

- Assign thresholds/scores \bar{v}_i st. $E[\max\{\hat{x}_i + \tilde{\varepsilon}_i - \bar{v}_i, 0\}] = 0$, where
$$\hat{x}_i = \ln y - \ln p_i$$
- Therefore, $\bar{v}_i = \hat{x}_i + \gamma_{\varepsilon_i}^{-1}(\ln s_i)$, where $\gamma_{\varepsilon_i}(z) = E[\max\{\varepsilon_i - z, 0\}]$, decreasing function
- Search in decreasing order of the scores
- Stop if find a \bar{v}_i exceeding all remaining

Proposition: For any OSM, there is a DCM with same demand & payoff.

- Under OSM, consumer's optimal choice is the one for which

$v_i^* = \min\{v_i, \bar{v}_i\}$ is largest (Armstrong and Vickers (2015),

Armstrong(2017), Choi, Dai and Kim(2018)), where

$\bar{v}_i = \hat{x}_i + \gamma_{\varepsilon_i}^{-1}(\ln \mu_i) = \hat{x}_i + r(\ln \mu_i)$, and $\gamma_{\varepsilon_i}(z) = E[\max\{\varepsilon_i - z, 0\}]$, the upside gain function

- Consumer's demand for i , D_i is thus:

$$P[v_i^* > \max_{j \neq i} v_j^*] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} P[z > \max_{j \neq i} v_j^*] f_{v_i^*}(z; x_i, \hat{x}_i) dz = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \prod_{j \neq i} F_{v_j^*}(z; x_j, \hat{x}_j) f_{v_i^*}(z; x_i, \hat{x}_i) dz.$$

- Under advertised price, $x_j = \hat{x}_j, \forall j$. D_i then simplifies to

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \prod_{j \neq i} F_{\omega_j}(\varepsilon_j) f_{\omega_i}(\varepsilon_i) d\varepsilon, \text{ where } \omega_i = \min\{\varepsilon_i, r(\ln \mu_i)\}.$$

Thus, D_i is equivalent to the demand of a DCM: $v_i = x_i + \varepsilon_i^{DC}$, iff

Proposition: The CES demand is a special case of DCM with extreme type I error.

The following proof follows Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1987, 1989) closely

- Consumer's utility $u_i = \ln c_i$, income y . Let price of i : $\tilde{p}_i = \mu_i p_i$
- Random utility/match value ε_i with i , st. net value: $v_i = \ln y - \ln \tilde{p}_i + \varepsilon_i^{DC}$

Further, re-scale $\varepsilon_i^{DC} = \chi \tilde{\varepsilon}_i$ st. $\tilde{\varepsilon}_i$ mean 0 and unit variance

- The demand for i , D_i is then

$$P[v_i > \max_{j \neq i} v_j] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \prod_{j \neq i} F_{\varepsilon_j^{DC}}(\varepsilon_j^{DC}) f_{\varepsilon_i^{DC}}(\varepsilon_i^{DC}) d\varepsilon.$$

- And if $\tilde{\varepsilon}_i$ is distributed extreme type I, D_i then simplifies to

$$D_i = \frac{\mu_i p_i^{-1/\chi}}{\sum_{j=1}^n p_j^{-1/\chi}},$$

- Retail and intermediate goods:

$$X_n^{R,j} = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{in}^{R,j} (I_i L_i), \text{ where } I_i L_i = \sum_{k=0}^J [r_i^{g,k} g_i^{R,k} + \sum_{K=M,R} (r_i^{h,k} h_i^{K,k} + w_i^k l_i^{K,k})] - \Omega_i,$$

$$X_n^{M,j} = \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - \gamma_i^j) x_{in}^{M,j} X_i^{R,j}.$$

- Trade balance:

$$\sum_{j=0}^J \sum_{i=1}^N (x_{ni}^{M,j} X_n^{M,j} + x_{ni}^{R,j} X_n^{R,j}) + \Omega_n = \sum_{j=0}^J \sum_{i=1}^N (x_{in}^{M,j} X_i^{M,j} + x_{in}^{R,j} X_i^{R,j}).$$

- Labor market: $w_n^{M,j} l_n^{M,j} = \beta_n X_n^{M,j}, \quad w_n^{R,j} l_n^{R,j} = \gamma_n^j m_n^{R,j} \beta_n X_n^{R,j}$
- Structure: $r_n^h h_n^{M,j} = (1 - \beta_n) X_n^{M,j}, \quad r_n^h h_n^{R,j} = \gamma_n^j \frac{1}{\rho_n^{R,j}} (1 - \beta_n) X_n^{R,j}$
- Capital: $r_n^g g_n^{R,j} = (\frac{\rho_n^{j-1}}{1-\beta_n}) w_n^{R,j} \pi_n^{R,j} L_n$

- Employment shares:

$$\hat{\pi}_n^0 = \frac{\hat{A}_n^0(\hat{w}_n^0)^{v_n}}{\hat{\Phi}_n}, \quad \hat{\pi}_n^{K,j} = \frac{\hat{A}_n^{K,j}(\hat{w}_n^{K,j})^{v_n}}{\hat{\Phi}_n}, \text{ where } \hat{\Phi}_n = \sum_{h=0}^J \sum_{K=M,R} \pi_n^{K,h} \hat{A}_n^{K,h} (\hat{w}_n^{K,h})^{v_n}.$$

- Input costs: $\hat{c}_n^{M,j} = \hat{\omega}_n^{M,j}$, $\hat{c}_n^{R,j} = (\hat{\rho}_n^{R,j} \hat{\omega}_n^{R,j})^{\gamma_n^j} (\hat{P}_n^{M,j})^{1-\gamma_n^j}$, where

$$\hat{\omega}_n^{K,j} = \hat{w}_n^{K,j} (\hat{l}_n^{K,j})^{\beta_n} = (\hat{w}_n^{K,j})^{1+\beta_n} (\hat{\pi}_n^{K,j})^{\frac{(v_n-1)\beta_n}{v_n}}, \text{ and } \hat{P}_n^{M,j} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N x_{ni}^{M,j} (\hat{\kappa}_{ni}^M \hat{c}_i^{M,j})^{-\theta_j} \hat{T}_i^j \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_j}}.$$

- Trade shares: $x_{ni}^{'M,j} = x_{ni}^{M,j} \left(\frac{\hat{\kappa}_{ni}^M \hat{c}_i^{M,j}}{\hat{P}_n^{R,j}} \right)^{-\theta_j} \hat{T}_i^j$, $x_{ni}^{'R,j} = x_{ni}^{R,j} \left(\frac{\hat{\kappa}_{ni}^R \hat{c}_i^{R,j}}{\hat{\mu}_{ni}^j \hat{P}_n^{R,j}} \right)^{1-\sigma_j}$.
- Market clearing:

$$X_n^{'R,j} = \sum_{i=1}^N x_{in}^{'R,j} \eta^j \left[\sum_{k=0}^J \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta_i} \right) (\hat{\rho}_i^{R,k} \hat{w}_i^{R,k} \hat{l}_i^{R,k} \rho_i^{R,k} w_i^{R,k} L_i^{R,k} + \hat{w}_i^{M,k} \hat{l}_i^{M,k} w_i^{M,k} L_i^{M,k}) - \Omega_i \right],$$

$$X_n^{'M,j} = \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - \gamma_i^j) x_{ni}^{'M,j} X_n^{'R,j},$$

$$\hat{w}_n^{M,j} \hat{l}_n^{M,j}, \quad \hat{w}_n^{M,j} L_n^{M,j} = \beta \hat{w}_n^{M,j}, \quad \hat{w}_n^{R,j} \hat{l}_n^{R,j}, \quad \hat{w}_n^{R,j} L_n^{R,j} = \frac{1}{1-\sigma_j} \beta \hat{w}_n^{R,j}$$

- Pareto productivity: $P(Z^j < z) = G^j(z) = 1 - z^{-\rho}$
- Enter: $\sum_n \left(\frac{p_{nm}^j / \mu}{p_{nj}^R} \right)^{1-\sigma} \eta_n^j \geq \omega_m^j f_m^j. \quad c_m^j = \mu \left(\frac{\sigma}{\tilde{\sigma}_n} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[\frac{w_m^j f_m^j}{\sum_n (k_{nm}^R / p_{nj}^R)^{1-\sigma} \frac{1}{y_n}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$
- Bilateral trade shares

$$x_{nm}^{j,R} = \frac{\lambda Y_m \left(\left(w_m^{j,R} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_m^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \frac{(\kappa_{nm}^R)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\rho}}}{\mu} \right)^{-\rho} \left[\frac{w_m^{j,R} f_m^j}{\sum_n \left(\frac{\kappa_{nm}^R}{P_n^{R,j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} Y_n} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\rho-1}{\sigma-1}}}{\Sigma_h \lambda Y_h \left(\left(w_h^{j,R} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_h^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \frac{(\kappa_{nm}^R)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\rho}}}{\mu} \right)^{-\rho} \left[\frac{w_h^{j,R} f_h}{\sum_n \left(\frac{\kappa_{nh}^R}{P_n^{R,j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} Y_n} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\rho-1}{\sigma-1}} + \left(\left(\omega_n^{j,B} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_n^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \right)^{1-\sigma}}$$

$$x_{nm}^{j,B} = \frac{\left(\left(\omega_n^{j,B} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_n^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \right)^{1-\sigma}}{\Sigma_h \lambda Y_h \left(\left(w_h^{j,R} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_h^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \frac{(\kappa_{nm}^R)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\rho}}}{\mu} \right)^{-\rho} \left[\frac{w_h^{j,R} f_h}{\sum_n \left(\frac{\kappa_{nh}^R}{P_n^{R,j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} Y_n} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\rho-1}{\sigma-1}} + \left(\left(\omega_n^{j,B} \right)^{\gamma^j} \left(P_n^{j,M} \right)^{(1-\gamma^j)} \right)^{1-\sigma}}$$




Estimation: Amazon Transportation Shock

[back](#)

Appendix

- Data: Amazon's Facility Network

- address, square feet, date, type.[[Houde, Newberry & Seim \(HNS,2021\)](#)]
- focus on large fulfill. & distr. centers; drop specialized, small-package



- Need to specify how:

origin → facility → destination

- HNS (2021): 90% of orders from 3 closest centers to dest.
- Assume order is processed by among the 3 closest to destination, the closest to origin

Year	Mean	Std. Dev	P25	P75
2007	490.2	376.3	234.9	739
2017	287.9	225.6	124.7	409
Diff.	-202.2	295.6	-249.8	-12.5
Log Diff.	-.5	.6	-.9	0

- Spatial Simulated IV

- concern: endogeneity of facilities
- simulate facilities' locations based only on geo. cost factors, to be used as IV (Duflo et.al, 2007; Lipscomb et.al, 2013; Faber 2014)
- need orthogonality of geo. factors

Dependent 1{AMZ Center}		
<i>Temperature (Lag)</i>	Mean	-0.011 [0.018]
	Minimum	-0.002 [0.009]
	Maximum	0.046*** [0.012]
<i>Precipitation (Lag)</i>	Mean	-0.032 [0.040]
	Minimum	0.043 [0.044]
	Maximum	-0.015 [0.013]
<i>Elevation</i>	Mean	-0.001*** [0.000]
	Minimum	0.000 [0.000]
	Maximum	0.001*** [0.000]
<i>Tornado</i>	Magnitude	-0.051 [0.086]
	Injuries	-0.110 [0.153]
County, Year FE		X
Observations		55,259
Psudo R-squared		0.1663

- Spatial Simulated IV


- concern: endogeneity of facilities
- simulate facilities' locations based only on geo. cost factors, to be used as IV (Duflo et.al, 2007; Lipscomb et.al, 2013; Faber 2014)
- need orthogonality of geo. factors

- Simulation Steps

- based on observed # of new centers, determine AMZ's budget
- rank counties by geo. factors
- highest ranks get new centers

Dependent 1{AMZ Center}		
<i>Temperature (Lag)</i>	Mean	-0.011 [0.018]
	Minimum	-0.002 [0.009]
	Maximum	0.046*** [0.012]
<i>Precipitation (Lag)</i>	Mean	-0.032 [0.040]
	Minimum	0.043 [0.044]
	Maximum	-0.015 [0.013]
<i>Elevation</i>	Mean	-0.001*** [0.000]
	Minimum	0.000 [0.000]
	Maximum	0.001*** [0.000]
<i>Tornado</i>	Magnitude	-0.051 [0.086]
	Injuries	-0.110 [0.153]
County, Year FE		X
Observations		55,259
Pseudo R-squared		0.1663

Estimation: Amazon Transportation Shock

[back](#)[Appendix](#)

Year	Mean	Std. Dev	P25	P75	Corr
2007	623.4	400.3	349.6	897.4	0.10
2017	335.2	278.4	143.9	412.1	0.58
Diff.	-288.2	361.8	-355.9	0	-0.22
Log Diff.	-.7	.8	-1.1	0	-0.02

	Dependent Variables	
	Actual log distance	Counterfactual log distance
First Stage Results		
Counterfactual log distance	0.399*** [0.015]	
F-Stats	670	
Robustness		
Avg. lag GDP		0.000 [0.000]
Avg. GDP growth		-0.004*** [0.001]