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- Impact of a Switch from Monolith to Microservices

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1 Introduction

In recent years, mobile applications and web services which cater to them have revolutionized our daily lives by infiltrating social life, shopping and almost every aspect of our existence. The rapid expansion and, at times, even faster decline of these web services needs a matching architecture to meet their very specific needs.

There are many web services already in use which were designed and implemented before the onslaught of microservices. Some of these services have already made the switch such as Netflix but this is not the case for the whole industry. Also, when a new service is being created the business domain might not be established yet. Additionally there might exist a fair amount of uncertainty in what exactly is to be developed. This is furthermore amplified by using agile software development methods in which the change in requirements is welcome even in later stages of the development (Beck et al., 2001).

When new development is carried out by a startup, the initial architecture might still be a monolith one. Newman (2019) states that, due to limited resources, a monolith might be a better fit to these companies trying to navigate to the actual product they are to offer. In the case of success, the need to rapidly scale the offering emerges. Newman (2019) refers to these companies as "scale-ups". Newman (2019) also states that it is much easier to refactor an existing service than to create a new one and thus the need to split monoliths to microservices is and probably will be relevant to the near future.

Kalske et al. (2018) finds that as the codebase becomes large the Monolith Architecture (MA) leads to slower development. This is due to the possible complexity inherent in the entwined monolith. The amount of code to refactor is much larger than in a small microservice. Microservice should do one thing and, as such, it should be more understandable.

The Stack Overflow annual survey (Stack Overflow) conducted on developers found that half of the respondents identified as full-stack or backend developers. 40% of the respondents had less than five years of professional experience.

New developers entering the workforce have a very different mindset than the older more seasoned professionals. Thus, it is very clear that the ways of working and paradigms to be used are constantly changing.

Microservices are not the proper choice for all web services (Newman, 2019). Microservices offer multiple benefits such as easier scalability and more modular structure for the application. When the architecture needs to be changed, the process needs to happen in an orderly and safe way. Often overlooked security aspects need to be identified and addressed as early as possible.

Microservice Architecture (MSA) differs in many ways from the more traditional

Monolithic Architecture (MA). This shift entails very specific security issues.

In this thesis, the MSA and related security literature is surveyed and the main differences between MA and MSA on security aspects are discussed.

The first chapter discusses the ... The last chapter in the thesis contains the conclusions and presents further research topics.

2 Architectural Comparison




Figure 1: Traditional Monolithic Architecture (Kalske et al., 2018)

MA can be visually presented as in figure 1. The web service is a layered structure in which all of the different layers have a specific task to perform. This follows the Model-View-Controller design pattern (Reenskaug, 2018). The UI is the View, the business logic is the Controller, and the database is the Model.

The MSA presented in figure 2 has many problem areas of which one is the challenging security implementation. This is due to the fact that every microservice accessible to the client can also be accessed or contacted by other more malicious parties in the same network. The network in the case of web services is the internet. The attack surface available for the malicious party is the entirety of the APIs offered by the microservices.

One solution to limit the attack surface is the addition of API Gateway to the architecture as in figure 3. Montesi and Weber (2016) present an API Gateway design pattern. In this pattern, there exists only one web service accessible to clients. The API Gateway allows for a natural place for a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and other more MSA




Figure 2: Microservice Architecture (Kalske et al., 2018)

specific features such as service discovery. The security features can be implemented in the API Gateway making it a critical component. Since all communication is to either flow through or be sanctioned by the API Gateway the performance and accessibility are critical.

3 Changing the architecture

The changing of the architecture of an already deployed service from MA to MSA should be a gradual process. This ensures a smooth transition and minimizes outages to the customers. Sometimes, though this is not possible. Newman (2019) states that when a monolithic application is implemented following a design patterns such as the MVC (Reenskaug, 2018) this can lead to difficulties in the refactoring. The codebase is not split according to the business domain but follows a rigid design pattern.

In order for the process to be as simple as possible, the MA is or at least should be split into modules with separation of concerns (Yarygina, 2018). The actual splitting of the monolith can be carried out in various ways, one of which is Domain Driven Design (Newman, 2019).

The MSA differs from a MA in fundamental ways. According to Fowler and Lewis (2014), one main difference is the communication between the components. In a




Figure 3: Microservice Architecture With API Gateway (oid, 2020)

monolith application the processes can send function calls or method invocations amongst themselves. In MSA, the messaging is based on sending messages or HTTP requests. Function calls entail a stackframe creation in the call stack, execution of the function code, and finally popping the stackframe and returning the result. Compilers can optimize the code further and inline the function calls to eliminate the stackframe creation and the following procedures.

Communication using the network is extremely slow compared to local function calls. Zari et al. (2001) studied the response times of web sites offered to the public. The websites response times were measured in seconds. The requests sent to other microservices through the network are much slower than function calls within one computer. Therefore, the communication patterns should be changed to take into account the change in communication path. If the architecture is changed in such a way that the previous communication model amongst the components is preserved, there would be an excessive amount of communication and the resulting system would not be as performant (Fowler and Lewis, 2014).

4 Security

Richter et al. (2018) implemented a test system mimicking the Deutsche Bahn seat reservation system using MSA. The purpose of the test system was to analyze security risks that were introduced by the implementation. In the study they categorized the solution to three layers: first of which was the compute provider, the second was the encapsulation technology, and the third one was the deployment. The technologies for these layers were: Amazon Web services, Docker for containers, and Kubernetes (k8s) nodes, respectively. They found out that the cloud-based infrastructure when used in MSA resulted in a more complex solution than in MA. The added layers such as the K8s, have to be configured correctly and an error in one could potentially compromise the whole system. In addition, implementation of security is very difficult and resource intensive. The rewards from a good security are invisible. When microservices are implemented or even planned the security should be taken into account as early as possible. Implementing security later in the project or as an after thought can be more expensive and very difficult. Implementing security is hard. A theoretical proof for this can be found in Andersson (2001). His main finding was that an attacker has an advantage over the developers trying to defend a system. For the system to be secure the defending developers have to find all of the bugs where as the attacker has to find only one.

5 Authentication and Authorization

In the cases where the user has to be authenticated, the web service needs a way to do this securely. Usually authentication is done using a tuple containing user credentials i.e. a username and a password for the user. The user is authenticated and a key or token is transmitted to the user via the network. This communication in both MA and MSA, should be encrypted in a way that none of the actors in the transfer path can intercept the message and misuse the credentials.

The credential counterparts i.e. the secret shared by the server and the user have to be available for the web service for verification. When using MSA, the service should own its own data. Whenever information is available it is a target for thieves and hackers. The services in MSA are to be individually deployable and the service scalable. Authentication service implementation has to take this into account. The service has to adhere to practices that minimize the risks of data breaches.

As has been mentioned previously implementing security is hard and resource intensive. Therefore, the authentication implementation should adhere to an already existing framework or another entity providing the authentication. This is the case for both

the MA and MSA. The available choices include Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), OpenID Connect (OIDC), Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), and Kerberos.

5.1 Authentication and Authorization in MA

In MA, it is possible to implement features in such ways that a session can carry user information. This information can consist of the granted roles and rights for the user. This session can be queried when access control is needed to execute an action or operation or a specific authorization service or module can exist. An example of a web service implemented in MA is presented in figure 4. The user accessing the web service sends a request to load balancer which has all the information on the currently operational services. Each of the services is a single process in which an authentication and authentication service are present. When a user is first accessing the service credentials are to be verified and in a succesful case a session is created for the process.




Figure 4: Traditional load balanced MA web service (He and Yang, 2017)

Authorization of the user rights can be implemented in various ways. One of which is an authorization service which can contain the access control matrix. Services being accessed verify from the authorization service that the client user or the role that the user has can access the requested service or functionality. In MA, the access rights to functionality can be implemented using annotations within the source code. The authorization is verified in memory and without any communication over the network.

In MSA accessing the access control matrix or matrices is not as easy as it is in MA. In order to verify that a specific right exists, the service would have communication with the authorization service. This communication would need to happen every time a user tries to access a functionality with access restrictions. This could potentially lead to extremely lively communication from all the services forming a bottleneck at to the authorization service. An example of such architecture is presented in figure 5.




Figure 5: MSA authorization service (He and Yang, 2017)

5.2 OIDC

OIDC is an identity layer to accompany OAuth 2.0 authorization framework based protocol.

An example of an OIDC flow is presented in figure 6. The process flow steps are: the client application requests an authentication from the identity provider, the end user is authenticated and authorization is obtained, the identity provider responds to the initial authentication request by sending ID token and a possible access token, the client application can request the end user claims from the authorization server with the access token, and finally the authorization service returns the claims to the client application.




Figure 6: OIDC steps (oid, 2020)

5.3 Java Script Object Notation Web Token (JWT)

JWT is a format to represent claims. It is base64 encoded, point separated strings, which can easily be carried in the HTTP request or response. The contents is key value pairs, and the token may or may not be signed and encrypted (Jones et al., 2015b). The token may contain an expiration time. If the token is used to validate requests without a server side implementation that can revoke a token, it will be valid until this time. The JWT token is issued by an authority trusted by the service. In figure 7 a basic bearer token based authentication and authorization is depicted. A client initially enters credentials to a login page and the authorization service issues a token for the user. This token is used in place of the credentials to access restricted resources.




Figure 7: Bearer token based authentication (He and Yang, 2017)

The signing of JWT can be carried out in various ways. These are presented in the Jones et al. (2015a). The signature is computed using the algorithm and keys or certificates

specified in the header values. When the token is signed using a private key it can be verified by all parties in possession of the public key.

5.3.1 Known Vulnerabilities

The choices for the algorithm for signing the JWT algorithm contain "none" as one of the choices. This was found to be troublesome by McLean (2015). He found that many libraries did not operate in the desired way. The receiving party could be fooled to validate a mutated token without any signature with the "none" as it's algorithm. In addition to this vulnerability McLean (2015) found that the verification suffered from another fatal flaw. When a token was created by using a symmetric algorithm, the servers could be fooled in to believing that a token signed by just the public key and not the secret HMAC key was a valid one.

5.4 Opaque Token

He and Yang (2017) compared several authentication and authorization solutions. One of the solutions discussed in the paper was the usage of an opaque access token for the client and API Gateway communication and map an Opaque token to JWT in the API Gateway. This would be used in all other communication as the means to authenticate and authorize the user. The main problem the opaque token is said to solve is the logout problem. A bearer token is valid until expiration and the client can not invalidate the token. The opaque token flow is presented in figure 8.

The use of two tokens has many advantages. The token granted to the client allows access only to the API Gateway. This token can not be used to access the services directly. Furthermore, the opaque token be can revoked by simply removing it from the storage for the token pairs. The usage of an internal JWT can alleviate some of the issues when MA is to be changed to MSA. Though not advisable, the JWT can carry session information and the whole session. This allows for more of the previous MA implementation to be used without as many changes.

6 Communication

As already explained, in MA, the service components can communicate using events, procedure calls or other methods available within a single server machine. Usually all this communication stays within a single computer and thus does not easily compromise confidentiality.




Figure 8: API Gateway and opaque token (He and Yang, 2017)

6.1 Representational State Transfer (REST)

Fielding (2000) presented REST in 2000. REST has become a very successful architectural style. The style was derived using various constraints, one of which is stateless communication. This entails that a request must contain all the information needed to fulfill the request because the server does not keep track of the client. All session state is stored in the client, of which the server has no prior knowledge before a request. In her doctoral thesis, Yarygina (2018) critiques the REST paradigm from the security perspective. She states that the design of the architecture does not meet the security requirements for web applications. She also states that REST does not allow for any server side sessions and thus token revocation is impossible. Tokens can be validated only for the correct issuer by signature and for expiration. As such tokens are more compatible with REST, but there still has to be the public keys in the server for signature verification.

6.2 Coping With Failure in Communication

Montesi and Weber (2016) present widely used design pattern for MSA. The Circuit Breaker can be used to mitigate the very likely case that a microservice operates slower than the other services calling it and runs out of resources to fulfill the requests in time. The circuit breaker is either implemented in the microservice or as a proxy between the client and the microservice. When the microservice does not service requests as intended, the circuit breaker trips and sends a failure message to the clients immediately when requests are received, thus allowing the microservice time to service the prior requests.

The circuit breakers can prevent an application from becoming completely unresponsive and crashing when a denial of service attack is carried out on the service.

7 Other MSA specific security matters

When software is developed using MA, it is usually deployed as a whole and the program code can be compiled, tested and used as a single unit or multiple modules. In contrast, a service implemented in MSA can be deployed in single microservice units, and thus each component can be worked upon individually and deployed once ready.

The immediacy in the deployment of the microservices entails a very specific security risk. Ahmadvand et al. (2018) present threats from malicious insiders working on the services as developers or other positions with access to sensitive information. In microservice development, the finished implementations are to be immediately released to production. There are steps in the CD pipeline prior to this but once tests pass in the test environments the pipeline is supposed to publish the changes to the actual production environment. The paper presents four specific threats. The first one is that the knowledge of sensitive information is spread among the developers more widely than in MA. This is due to access needs by developers. The second threat is that the insiders monitoring and operating the running system intentionally harm the system by making malicious changes. The third threat is the developers knowing the configurations and their ability to make almost instantaneous changes to them or the microservices themselves. The last presented threat in the paper is the non-repudiation. The system is not able to disallow malicious requests when the developers have had access to the keys and other configurations. They can effectively implement services or requests that emit malicious requests or responds. Malicious attempts in a MA are more easily screened by performing security audits and by peer reviewing the code. In a MSA the knowledge of a single service and its inner workings are shared by a more limited number of people. Finding the compromised actions from the interoperability of the distinct microservices is a daunting task.

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by peer reviewing the code. In a MSA the knowledge of a single service and its inner workings are shared by a more limited number of people. Finding the compromised actions from the interoperability of the distinct microservices is a daunting task.

7.1 Service discovery

Service discovery as presented in Montesi and Weber (2016) is a design pattern in which a registry is kept on currently running microservices. The microservices register themselves to the service discovery registry. This registry is used by either a router to route client service calls to running microservices or by the client directly.

7.2 Externalized configuration

To allow for easy configuration change management there should exist a configuration orchestration service. This service should have an API from which services in their startup can load their appropriate configuration. The configuration of the whole system can be easily maintained through the API.

The contents of the configuration is highly sensitive information. It consists of addresses, credentials and other information that alter the behaviour of the system. Therefore, the content must be stored safely and not allowed to be read or altered by unauthorized users.

8 Conclusion

This paper discussed the security aspects of changing the architecture from MA to MSA. MSA has higher complexity due to more tools needed and having more potentially exposed attack surface. Security can be thought of as being as good as its weakest link. In general, a MSA deployment has multiple layers which all have to be consistent and correct. One example is the configuration of the operating system on the server running the virtualization environment. All of the layers from the server hardware to the handling of errors in the actual code have to be of ample quality to mitigate a failure in security.

The communication that was in monolith a simple in-process call might not be possible as such in a MSA web service. The individual services communicate via the network with high overhead in comparison to a simple function call. Furthermore, the identity and authorization of the entity requesting an action or data can usually be trusted in an in-process call. The mechanisms to allow for proper authentication and authorization amount to even higher overhead for the MSA. There exists a very real risk for the development team to implement an insufficient security scheme.

In MSA the security should be implemented in depth. There must be a healthy mistrust on all requests and security should be built in to the system.

Security has to be taken into account right from the beginning of the project in which the architecture is to be changed. The choices made in the development of the web service when following a MA do not carry to the MSA as such.

Future research...

The research carried out...

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