

Aalto University  
School of Science  
Bachelor's Programme in Science and Technology

# **Security in Microservice Architecture**

## **- Impact of a Switch from Monolith to Microservices**

**Bachelor's Thesis**

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# 1 Introduction

In recent years the mobile app has revolutionized our daily lives. These services have infiltrated social life, shopping and almost every aspect of our existence. The services and their apps compete for our time and markets are reinventing themselves constantly. The rapid expansion and at times even faster decline of these web services need a matching architecture to meet these very specific needs.

There are many web services already in use which have been designed and implemented before the onslaught of microservices. Some of these services need to evolve to be of use in the future. In many cases the monolith services have already started to use certain aspects from the microservice world, such as access tokens and REST APIs. The pressure from new competitors adopting new technologies right from the start and the fact that the industry and its developer base are extremely young dictates that the old and established services have to address the situation somehow or the other. Monoliths have served us well but the time has come to evolve with the customer needs.

Stackoverflow annual survey (Stack Overflow) conducted on developers finds that half of the respondents identified as full-stack or backend developers. The professional developers had very little experience and about 40% of them had less than five years of professional experience.

The new developers entering the work force have very different mindset than the older more seasoned professionals. Thus, it is very clear that the ways of working and paradigms to be used are in constant change. The old and established have to embrace the change and refactor their architecture before it is too late. Microservices are not the proper choice for all needs (Newman, 2019) but in many cases there simply is no other valid choice. This change needs to happen in an orderly and safe way and the security aspects need to be addressed.

Microservice Architecture (MSA) differs in many ways from the more traditional Monolith Architecture (MA). This shift entails very specific security issues.

In this thesis the MSA and security literature is evaluated and the main differences between MA and MSA on back end security aspects are found.

Chapter 2. presents the definitions used in this thesis. Chapter 3. discusses the Confidentiality aspect of a switch from MA to MSA. In chapter 4. Integrity of the information is discussed in the context of MA and MSA. Chapter 5. presents Availability when changing from MA to MSA. In Chapter 6. other relevant security aspects are presented. Chapter 7. contains the conclusions and presents further research topics.

## 2 Definitions

This thesis uses the following definitions.

### 2.1 Microservice

Microservice architecture is in essence an extension of the service oriented architecture (SOA). It's guiding principles are stated in the SOA manifesto (Arsanjani et al., 2009) and one is to prioritize:

- *Business value over technical strategy*
- *Strategic goals over project-specific benefits*
- *Intrinsic interoperability over custom integration*
- *Shared services over specific-purpose implementations*
- *Flexibility over optimization*
- *Evolutionary refinement over pursuit of initial perfection*

A microservice is a service that: is independently deployable, is modeled around business domain, that owns the data that they need to operate, that communicates via network, is technology agnostic, that encapsulates data storage and retrieval and that has stable interface (Newman, 2019).

### 2.2 Security

Security can be defined in multiple ways but in this thesis security and more specifically information security is defined as consisting of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) as is stated in the pocket book on ISO/IEC 27001 -standard for information security (Calder, 2008).

The ISO/IEC 27001 standard defines confidentiality as such that information or property is available to the authorized user only. The authorized users can consist of persons, processes or entities to whom the information or property can be disclosed. Integrity means that the data or property is safeguarded for accuracy and completeness. Availability in this web service context is defined as such that the property or information is available when it is needed.

### 3 The Switch of Architectures

To change the architecture from MA to MSA is a gradual process. The MA is split to modules with separation of concerns (Yarygina, 2018).

## 4 Confidentiality

Confidentiality in a web service is usually critical security feature. There are specific services which do not need information confidentiality regarding some of the data such as public weather services and other similar data. Some of the information is still regarded sensitive and must be kept confidential. These data can consists of personal, user, logs or other similar content. Users should not be able to use or view content not authorized to him/her. A user has to authenticate him/her self and authorization is acquired to access to information or property. In an MA access control can be implemented using sessions. A user authenticates using appropriate channels and a session with a session key is created. The session can have an expiration time and the messages originating from the user interface (UI) carry this key. Sessions and session keys can be used in a distributed system which MSA is but the implementation is more difficult (He and Yang, 2017).

### 4.1 Authentication

In these cases where the user has to be authenticated the web service needs a way to do this securely. Usually authentication is done using a tuple containing user credentials i.e. a username and a password for the user. The user is authenticated and a key or token is transmitted to the user via the network. This communication should in both MA and MSA be encrypted in a way that none of the actors in the transfer path can intercept the message and be able to use the credentials.

The credential counterparts i.e. shared secret by the server and the user have to be available for the web service for verification. When using MSA the service should own it's own data. When ever such information is available it is a target for thieves and hackers. The services in MSA are to be individually deployable and the service scalable. Authentication service implementation has to take this into account. The service has to adhere to practices that minimize the risks of data breaches.

#### 4.1.1 Attacks

Authentication can be attacked by a multitude of methods.



- Cracking
- Impersonation attacks
- Hacking the system
- Malware
- Social engineering
- Cracking the encryption on the communication channel exchanging credentials and keys or tokens.

From 2013 onwards malware and data breaches performed by hackers have increased and the scale of the damage is massive. The user data containing also the user passwords or hash thereof is valuable commodity which can be traded in the black markets. The damage of the dataloss can be substantial. The estimated value from the Yahoo data breach is over \$440 billion. The attacks seem to have been targeted to entities with valuable data and also to such targets that are lacking secure infrastructure. The least likely target to be hacked where non profit organisations and the most likely were medical related organizations (Hammouchi et al., 2019).

The hacked account credentials have to some extent been available for download from the web. Hunt (2020) created a service where everyone can verify whether any of their accounts are amongst the ones added to the service. The service named as ”;– have i been pwned ?” allows users to enter their username or password to the site and see a result.

## 4.2 Authorization

Authorization

## 4.3 Component Communication

In an MA service components can communicate using events, procedure calls or other methods available within a single server machine. Usually all this communication stays within a single computer and thus does not compromise confidentiality.

In MSA single services communicate via a network typically using a HTTP or HTTPS (). can use internet Content must be encrypted. AccessTokens SessionKeys

## **4.4 Effects on Confidentiality**

## **4.5 Example case**

# **5 Integrity**

Information integrity in an MA web service is usually left to a single database and sound architectural choices (REALLY? SOURCE). Transactions can be used when updating database constants to make sure that atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability (ACID) (Haerder and Reuter, 1983) is followed. When using MSA according to the definition each of the micro services should contain or have access to it's own data i.e. database. This leads to extreme difficulties in information integrity. TODO

## **5.1 Introduction**

## **5.2 Effects on Integrity**

## **5.3 Example case**

# **6 Availability**

Availability in this web service context is defined as such that the property or information is available when it is needed.

## **6.1 Possible Attacks**

D-o-S

## **6.2 Comparison**

## **6.3 Introduction**

## **6.4 Effects on Availability**

## **6.5 Example case**

# **7 Other security matters**

## **7.1 Platforms**

Docker Swarm Kubernetes (K8s) Azure  
sandbox virtualization

## **7.2 Software Development**

## **7.3 Deployment**

Developing software using the MA the structure the whole application or service is usually deployed as a whole and the program code can be compiled, tested and used as a single unit or multiple modules. In contrast to this a service implemented by using a MSA can be deployed in single microservice units and thus a single service can be worked upon individually and deployed once ready.

## **7.4 Service discovery**

The MSA can have a service discovery service into which all available services can register them selves. This service has an API to which

# **8 Conclusion**

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