Discussion of "Common Fund Flows: Flow Hedging and Factor Pricing"

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- 1. Show one way the above can happen in **GE**
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- Bottom line: results should be of interest to profession and worth exploring further.

Comments and Questions

▶ Empirical part

► Theoretical part

Empirical Part Comments and Questions Outline

- 1. More on primitive economic shocks that drive CFFs (common fund flows).
- 2. Flow betas v.s. betas for economic fundamentals in the pricing of stock returns
- 3. Equity characteristic anomaly portfolio returns and common fund flows?

- ► More on primitive economic shocks that drive CFFs (common fund flows).
 - Shocks to uncertainty may drive some, but correlations low enough that other shocks must play role. *Which shocks* are most important for fund flows?


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- Question of Causality:
 - Does uncertainty cause fund flows or the other way around?
 - ► Funds hold 44% of US equity market => volatility in flows should cause stock market volatility (e.g., VIX, VXO, even EPU)
 - ► *Macroeconomic uncertainty* less obviously endogenous to fund flows.

▶ 3 variable SVAR (U_M, CFF, U_F) identify causality without exogeneity assumptions


IRFs to Uncertainty and Fund Flow Shocks



The figure reports identified set of impulse response to positive, one standard deviation shocks for system $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{I}_{M'}\mathsf{CFF}, \mathbf{U}_F)'$. The uncertainty measures are from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) and shocks identified using the approach of Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2019) based on event and external variable constraints. The sample spans the period 1991:02 to 2018:02.

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
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
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 \blacktriangleright High U_M does cause **fund outflows**–channel operates through *macro* uncertainty

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Q2: Flow Betas vs Betas for Economic primitives

On the marginal role of flow betas vs primitive betas

- ▶ In model, eq. AUM and h_t uncertainty or other primitive shocks *perfectly correlated*.
 - 1. Modulo non-linearities, **in the model**, flow betas and primitive betas should **drive each other out** in XS AP regressions. Wrong?
 - 2. In reality primitives other than uncertainty play a role, in which case an extended model => flow betas and uncertainty betas should both be priced. Wrong?
 - 3. Simulate model and run these regressions—to do 2 need augment model to allow for **at least two** mutually orthogonal primitive shocks.

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- ▶ Table 5: In data, flow betas drive out primitive betas, seems inconsistent with 1. or 2.
 - ▶ In number 1 (taking model literally): uncertainty and CFF betas should drive each other out
 - ▶ In number 2 (more realistic): both betas should be significant.
 - Model's fundamental story: whatever reason for CFFs, MFs try to hedge against it
 - Unclear why flow betas *only* are significant when uncertainty betas are included.
- ▶ Helpful to see simulations to answer whether this is correct, and if not why not.

Q3: Important for XS of Anomaly Portfolios?

Is XS of returns on characteristic anomaly portfolios explained by common fund flows?

- ▶ Puzzle that MFs don't tilt toward profitable return factors (e.g., book-market, etc.)
- ▶ DKW show common flow beta and BM ratio are imperfectly correlated => funds have incentive to tilt toward value stocks after controlling for β_{flow} .
- Doesn't address question of whether CFF exposure helps explain e.g., value premium?.
- More generally, how much of XS of equity-characteristics portfolio returns do flow betas explain?

Q3: How Important for XS of Anomaly Portfolios?

How much of XS of returns on equity characteristic anomaly portfolios explained by fund flows?

Expected Return-Beta Regressions: Equity Portfolios

$\mathbb{E}\left(R_{i,t}^{e} ight)=\lambda_{0}+\lambda'eta_{i}^{flow}+\epsilon_{j}$									
Estimates of Factor Risk Prices λ									
Common Fund Flows as Factor									
	Size-BM	Size-Inv	Size-Oper	Rev.	Total				
Coeff	-0.06	-0.12	-0.25	-0.85	-0.12				
[t-Sh]	-0.33	-0.58	-1.26	-0.98	-0.63				

Fama-MacBeth regressions of average returns on factor betas. The table reports estimates of risk prices λ. All estimates are multiplied by 100. Shanken corrected *t*-stats are reported in square bracket. The sample spans the period 1990:02 to 2018:12.

Q3: How Important for XS of Anomaly Portfolios?

How much of XS of returns on equity characteristic anomaly portfolios explained by fund flows?

► Greater exposure to fund flows doesn't explain high-return anomaly portfolios

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Model Questions and Comments

What's the main purpose of the model?

- ▶ All theory results driven by fee structure proportional to AUM (itself a puzzle).
- Model not designed to explain optimal fee structure; instead take as given observed fee structure. OK.
- ▶ But once we take AUM fee structure as given, why do we need the model?
 - Empirical investigation would naturally flow from the simple observation on fees.
- Presumably model useful to show how empirical findings can obtain in GE, and explain pro-cyclical fund flow and counter-cyclical α .
 - ▶ But then specifics of the model matter => 2 questions

Q1: What of Poor Performance?

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- 1. What about large body evidence showing poor performance?
 - ▶ Preface: I'm not an expert on funds.
 - ▶ Numerous studies: Actively managed MFs **in aggregate** provide investors lower avg returns than passive benchmarks.
 - ▶ Not much discussion. Model presumes AMMFs in aggregate provide value to clients.
 - ▶ DKW cite Berk and Green 2004
 - ▶ B&G focus on *cross section* of funds: those with good track records grow, those with bad shrink.
 - In reality, aggregate track record of AMMF poor.
 - ► How to account for this in the model? Lean heavily on "non-pecuniary utility benefit" of active management?

Q2: How to Think About Value Added

2. Why is valued added proportional to AUM? **Payout to clients**:

$$TP_t = \underbrace{\bar{\alpha}Q_t}_{\text{value added}} - \Psi(q_t)W_t - fQ_t$$

- ▶ Decreasing returns captured via costs $\Psi(\cdot)$.
- At industry level, are decreasing returns entirely the result of convex cost functions? Without it, we'd have *increasing* returns to scale due to specification of value added.
- ▶ Pástor and Stambaugh (2012): decreasing returns at industry level caused by more money chasing the same opportunities to outperform => prices are affected.
 - ▶ Better modeled with value added a constant $\bar{\alpha}$ or value added *decreasing in AUM* along with convex costs?
- ➤ Possibly doesn't matter. Would be nice to know what role (if any) this plays.

Conclusion

Bottom line:

- 1. Intriguing results
- 2. Contributions to our understanding of funds
- 3. Points to fruitful future work

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APPENDIX