




Ramnit Blue Team Lab

Category: Endpoint Forensics

Volatility Memory

 c159-Ramnit.zip	2/3/2024 7:07 PM	Compressed (zipp...	1,830,871 ...
 memory.dmp	2/1/2024 11:56 AM	DMP File	4,194,312 ...

python [vol.py](#) -f D:\CTF\test\volatility3\memory.dmp windows.pslist




PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	F
4	0	System	0xca82b0e88040	165	-	N/A	False	2024-02-01 19:48:22.000000	N/A	Disabled
108	4	Registry	0xca82b0eeb080	4	-	N/A	False	2024-02-01 19:48:15.000000	N/A	D
isabled	4	smss.exe	0xca82b1a95040	2	-	N/A	False	2024-02-01 19:48:22.000000	N/A	D
320	4	csrss.exe	0xca82b1f68080	11	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
440	440	wininit.exe	0xca82b2843080	2	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
524	440	csrss.exe	0xca82b287f140	13	-	1	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
624	516	winlogon.exe	0xca82b28cb080	4	-	1	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
660	524	services.exe	0xca82b28e9080	8	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
676	524	lsass.exe	0xca82b2923080	10	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:23.000000	N/A	D
808	660	svchost.exe	0xca82b299a240	15	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:24.000000	N/A	D
836	624	fontdrvhost.exe	0xca82b299c140	6	-	1	False	2024-02-01 19:48:24.000000	N/A	D
844	524	fontdrvhost.exe	0xca82b299d080	6	-	0	False	2024-02-01 19:48:24.000000	N/A	D

I didn't see anything interesting

So let's see command line information

python vol.py -f D:\CTF\test\volatility3\memory.dmp windows.cmdline



PID	ImageFileName	CommandLine
6216	RuntimeBroker.exe	C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
6252	SearchIndexer.exe	C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe /Embedding
6504	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc
6964	LockApp.exe	"C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.LockApp_cw5nlh2txyewy\LockApp.exe" -ServerName:WindowsDefaultLo
ckScreen.AppX7y4nbzq37zn4ks9K7amqjywdat7d3j2z.mca		
7068	RuntimeBroker.exe	C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
5592	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc
2928	RuntimeBroker.exe	C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
7104	smartscreen.exe	C:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exe -Embedding
7540	SecurityHealth	"C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"
7580	SecurityHealth	C:\Windows\system32\SecurityHealthService.exe
7684	vmtoolsd.exe	"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe" -n vmusr
7780	OneDrive.exe	"C:\Users\alex\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe" /background
6904	WmiPrvSE.exe	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
6500	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo
7272	audiodg.exe	C:\Windows\system32\AUDIOLOG.EXE 0x4b8
4628	ChromeSetup.exe	"C:\Users\alex\Downloads\ChromeSetup.exe"
7380	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s lfsvc
4792	SkypeApp.exe	"C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SkypeApp_14.53.77.0_x64__kzf8qx38zg5c\SkypeApp.exe" -Se
rverName:AppXffn3yxqvgaw9fpmhy90fr3y0d1t5b.mca		
7018	RuntimeBroker.exe	C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding

This one is interesting So now we can answer the following questions

Q1: We need to identify the process responsible for this suspicious behavior. What is the name of the suspicious process?

Answer: ChromeSetup.exe

Q2: To eradicate the malware, what is the exact file path of the process executable?

Answer: C:\Users\alex\Downloads\ChromeSetup.exe

Q3 Identifying network connections is crucial for understanding the malware's communication strategy. What is the IP address it attempted to connect to?


python [vol.py](#) -f D:\CTF\test\volatility3\memory.dmp windows.netstat

netstat provides statistics about all active connections so you can find out which computers or networks a PC is connected to.

python [vol.py](#) -f D:\CTF\test\volatility3\memory.dmp -o "dump" windows.dumpfile --pid 4628


```
PS D:\CTF\test\volatility3> python vol.py -f D:\CTF\test\volatility3\memory.dmp -o "dump" windows.dumpfile --pid 4628
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.2
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
Cache FileObject FileName Result
ImageSectionObject 0xca82b8202cd0 winmm.dll file.0xca82b8202cd0.0xca82b79ab4b0.ImageSectionObject.winmm.dll.img
DataSectionObject 0xca82b85325a0 ChromeSetup.exe Error dumping file
ImageSectionObject 0xca82b85325a0 ChromeSetup.exe file.0xca82b85325a0.0xca82b7e06c80.ImageSectionObject.ChromeSetup.exe.img
```

Get the File and Let's analyze it for virustotal Sandbox

 file.0xca82b85325a0.0xca82b7e06c80.ImageSectionObject.ChromeSetup.exe.img
D:\CTF\test\volatility3\dump Type: Disc Image File

Date modified: 2/11/2024 6:27 PM
Size: 980 KB

Result:

 1ac890f5fa78c857de42a112983357b0892537b73223d7ec1ef43f8fcb7496

64
/ 72

64 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Reanalyze Similar More

1ac890f5fa78c857de42a112983357b0892537b73223d7ec1ef43f8fcb7496

Size 980.00 KB

Last Analysis Date 7 days ago

EXE

peexe detect-debug-environment checks-network-adapters spreader checks-user-input persistence

Community Score

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label virus:nimnul/vjadtre

Threat categories virus trojan

Family labels nimnul vjadtre wapoml

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

Acronis (Static ML)	Suspicious	AhnLab-V3	Win32/Vjadtre.Gen
Alibaba	Trojan:Win32/Mikcer.35a	ALYac	Win32/Vjadtre.3
Antiy-AVL	Virus/Win32.Nimnul.f	Arcabit	Win32/Vjadtre.3
Avast	Other:Malware-gen [Trj]	AVG	Other:Malware-gen [Trj]
Avira (no cloud)	W32/Vjadtre.B	Baidu	Win32/Virus.Otmycal.d

Let's Compare The netstat command with Relations in virus total

The matched ip address **Answer:** [58.64.204.181](#)

Q4 To pinpoint the geographical origin of the attack, which city is associated with the IP address the malware communicated with?

1
/ 90

1 security vendor flagged this IP address as malicious

58.64.204.181 (58.64.204.0/22)
AS 17444 (HKBN Enterprise Solutions Limited)

HONG KONG

HK

Last Analysis Date
1 day ago

Answer: HONG KONG

Q5 Hashes provide a unique identifier for files, aiding in detecting similar threats across machines. What is the SHA1 hash of the malware's executable?

64
/ 72

1ac890f5fa78c857de42a112983357b0892537b73223d7ec1e1f43f8fc6b7496
file.0xca82b85325a0.0xca82b7e06c80.ImageSectionObject.ChromeSetup.exe.img

peexe detect-debug-environment checks-network-adapters spreader checks-user-input persistence

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Basic properties

MD511318cc3a3613fb679e25973a0a701fc

SHA-1280c9d36039f9432433893dee6126d72b9112ad2

Answer: 280c9d36039f9432433893dee6126d72b9112ad2

Q6 Understanding the malware's development timeline can offer insights into its deployment. What is the compilation timestamp of the malware?

History

Creation Time

2019-12-01 08:36:04 UTC

Q7 Identifying domains involved with this malware helps in blocking future malicious communications and identifying current possible communications with that domain in our network. Can you provide the domain related to the malware?

In virustotal check for Contacted Domains

Contacted Domains (2)

Domain	Detections	Created	Registrar
ddos.dnsnb8.net	11 / 90	2020-08-13	Dynadot Inc
dnsnb8.net	7 / 90	2020-08-13	Dynadot Inc

Answer: dnsnb8.net