

On State—Religion Dynamics The Rwandan Genocide

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Abstract

How may one justify a systematic ethnic cleansing of 800,000 – 1,000,000 people? In a study of Rwandan State—Church dynamics, the Rwandan Genocide exemplifies a catastrophic consequence of religious institutions being co-opted as tools of the state. With a moral compass in the hands of the state, it dictates ethical standards that serve its own interests – often at the cost of human dignity. Once this framework is set, no atrocity is beyond justification.

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1 A Prelude

In terms of social impact and resources, the Church was an undisputed political powerhouse. Building up to the genocide, it controlled the power distribution in the Rwandan society. Churches were centers for education, health, and agriculture – key drivers of wealth and investment. With great influence in the hands of missionaries, the Church grew to be an attractive avenue to access, which in turn increased conversions. To an extent, aligning with the Church became synonymous with securing power.¹

This held its truth in every sense. A patrimonial hierarchy, priests and pastors pledged their obedience to the state in exchange for their positions. This would span through the lower ranks, creating a system where authority becomes a private asset rather than a public responsibility. From there, two natural questions arise:

1. How did the Church, as a moral authority, allow itself to become an extension of the regime?
2. What happens to morality when those entrusted with it serve power instead of principles?

One only needs to understand simple politics, where a drive to maintain power overshadows all moral responsibilities. It is completely rational that Church leaders conveniently align with the ruling power, which in turn eliminates political opposition and protects their own personal interests.

1.1 *Divide et Impera* – A Racial Framework under Belgian Mandate

The systematic slaughter was a tragic culmination of a racial-political framework established during Belgian rule. This colonial legacy continues to ripple Rwanda's social, political, and cultural fabric to this day. With the start of the Belgian Mandate in 1916, the regime focused on establishing a racial framework with the goal of establishing a division between the people of Rwanda.²

1. *Tutsi* were the elite minority.
2. *Hutu* were subordinate commons.
3. *Twa* were primitive savages.

Under Belgian mandate, the Church became an integral pillar of the colonial administration, merging spiritual authority with state governance. After the Belgian military occupation, the colonial regime initiated an *intellectual occupation*, embedding the Church deeply into Rwandan society. It functioned as a religious sanctuary, a dominant economic force, and a critical educational resource. With a Belgian strategy to "divide and conquer," the Church became a mechanism of mass control.

This intellectual occupation manifested itself in the sermons of the Catholic *White Priests*, European-Christian missionaries who served as agents of colonial influence. They preached the *Hamitic Hypothesis*, a pseudo-scientific theory that claimed the Tutsi were descendants of the biblical Ham, from whom the Caucasian race allegedly came.³ Thus, everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites. This positioned the Tutsi race as racially superior due to their supposed Hamitic ancestry, a narrative that not only elevated the Tutsi but also deepened divisions between Rwanda's Hutu and Twa ethnic

¹Timothy Longman. "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda". In: *Journal of Religion in Africa* (2001).

²Mahmood Mamdani. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press, 2001.

³Edith R. Sanders. "The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective". In: *The Journal of African History* 10.4 (2009). Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2009, pp. 521–532. DOI: [10.1017/S0021853700009683](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700009683). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700009683>.

groups.

Missionaries focused their efforts on the Tutsi elite, leveraging their pre-existing socioeconomic status to create a mutually reinforcing system of conversion and privilege. Access to mission schools and Catholic institutions was disproportionately granted to Tutsi; all ideas of *Léon-Paul Classe*, who favoured the Tutsi minority.⁴

Classe played a key role in co-opting the monarchy. The Rwandan king *Yuhi V Musinga* was replaced by his son *Mutara III Rudahigwa*, who became Catholic. Unlike his father, *Rudahigwa* accepted to be baptized, becoming the first Rwandan king to do so. The masses followed suit, lured by promises of inclusion under the Church's growing influence. Through its integration into the colonial apparatus, the Church became both a beneficiary and an enabler of a morally questionable ideology. The White Priests' message extended beyond spiritual salvation, advancing a social hierarchy that fostered systemic resentment and inequality.

This fusion of religion and colonial racial ideology laid the foundation for a dangerously polarized society. Ethnic identity became deeply entrenched, to an extent that tragically reconciled ethnic violence with Christian teachings. In a disturbing paradox, people would attend mass to pray and then partake in massacres. This may only be justified through a warped moral lens, one that contorts human conscience to sanction unspeakable atrocities.⁵

Slowly but surely, The Church transformed from a religious institution into a political powerhouse, amassing wealth, authority, and loyalty. Its dual role as a spiritual guide and political instrument left a devastating legacy, one that continues to haunt Rwanda's collective memory.

1.2 The Rwandan Revolution

While it does seem that the Tutsi minority were privileged, it is in reality not the case. This narrative of a ruling Tutsi minority had merely been a facade to a *de facto* Belgian mandate. Upon the Belgian departure amidst a Hutu Revolution, the Tutsis would experience insurmountable heights of injustice and discrimination, inflicted by a marginalized, repressed Hutu majority that lacked the political wit to discern that their true enemy was not the Tutsis.

The Rwandan (Hutu) Revolution, represents a dramatic shift in Rwanda's political and social structure. Post-*WWII* Rwanda saw the emergence of dissent within the Church itself, as missionaries began to question the deep inequalities they had long fostered, particularly against the Hutu population. Instead of calling for equality, the Church adapted its stance in response, promoting a Hutu counter-elite, and contributing to the rise of Hutu political dominance.⁶

On March 3, 1957, eleven politically significant Hutu officials published the Hutu Manifesto. The nine-page document outlines two key enemies,

1. Belgium, the absentee ruler of Rwanda;
2. Tutsi *Hamites*, the descendants of colonizers;

⁴Uwizeyimana Bonaventure. *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*. Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 140.

⁵Longman, "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda", see n. 1.

⁶*Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

in a call for Hutu nationalism against the aggressor.⁷ The manifesto explicitly criticized the Tutsi monarchy whilst calling for Hutu-superiority. A stance that does not call for equality and co-existence, it is one that aligns itself closer to tribalism than to Christianity.

Upon a mysterious death of King Mutara III Ruhawinga in July 1957, fingers were pointed towards the Belgian administration. In 1959, the Catholic Church, assisted by the Belgian government, removed the Tutsi king from power, ending the monarchy.⁸ This was followed by an attack by Tutsi monarchists on *Dominique Mbonyumutwa*, a Hutu-nationalist, in what would spark the Hutu Revolution — a retaliatory series of riots and arson attacks on all Tutsi.⁹

The burning and killings took place in plain sight of the authorities. Waves of Tutsi exiles fled to neighboring Uganda and Burundi, marking a significant diaspora.¹⁰ The Church went on to back the newly established Hutu-led government.¹¹ It is interesting to note that *Dominique Mbonyumutwa* became the first interim president of the new government in 1961, succeeded by *Grégoire Kayibanda*, a primary author of the manifesto, in the following year.

The nationalization of Catholic schools in 1966 meant that the government had full control to instill a patrimonial hierarchy that serves the Hutu government¹². Priests and teachers who wished to keep their positions may not speak up against the adopted policies of ethnic discrimination.¹³ Kayibanda systematically excluded Tutsis from political power, education, and economic opportunities. Most notably, and as pledged in the manifesto, the regime continued to issue ID cards with ethnic affiliations to discriminate against the Tutsi.¹⁴

These policies did not go unnoticed, as the regime faced periodic attacks by Tutsi exiles, known as *inyenzi* — or cockroaches in the Kinyarwandan language. This only exacerbated already existing tensions, with violent, brutal reprisals by the regime against Tutsis within Rwanda.¹⁵

1.3 Habyarimana Seizes Power

Between 1973 and 1975, Rwanda underwent a significant political transformation. Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in a military coup, marking the beginning of an authoritarian regime.¹⁶ Kayibanda had sought to consolidate power in his home region of Gitarama in central Rwanda, favoring southern Hutus for government positions and resources. Discontent grew amongst an alienated northern Hutu group due to regional favoritism and economic stagnation, who eventually accompanied Habyarimana on his new shift in power.¹⁷

⁷Mary M. Fertitta. “When Priests Forgot About God: An Analysis of the Catholic Church’s Role in Genocide”. In: *The Kennesaw Journal of Undergraduate Research* 7.1 (2020). DOI: [10.62915/2474-4921.1202](https://doi.org/10.62915/2474-4921.1202). URL: <https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/kjur/vol7/iss1/4>, p. 4.

⁸Fertitta, see n. 7.

⁹André Guichaoua. *From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994*. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. ISBN: 9780299298203, p. 7.

¹⁰Sanders, “The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective”, see n. 3.

¹¹Longman, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda”, see n. 1.

¹²Longman, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda”, see n. 1.

¹³Fertitta, see n. 7.

¹⁴Mamdani, see n. 2.

¹⁵Ian Linden. *Church and Revolution in Rwanda*. Manchester University Press, 1977.

¹⁶Britannica. *Juvénal Habyarimana*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juvenal-Habyarimana>.

¹⁷Mamdani, see n. 2.

1975 marked an establishment of Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND) – the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, which became the sole political party in the country. While the MRND does seem to be a nationalist ideology that calls for unity and development, it was a facade for a fascist party that endorsed northern-Hutu superiority, with Habyarimana leading the ranks.¹⁸

The Catholic Church in particular legitimized MRND policies. This was evident in sermons, pastoral letters, and public statements of some clergy, who echoed the MRND vision of national unity and fairness. Not only that – the Church enforced the government’s policy of ethnic quotas, which restricted Tutsi access to education, seminaries, and positions of influence.¹⁹

This favoritism extended beyond quotas to the growing Tutsi diaspora caused by earlier waves of ethnic violence. The Habyarimana regime had its hardline stance on Tutsi refugees²⁰, echoing a claim that Rwanda was overpopulated and could not accommodate their return. While some individual clergy members did call for reconciliation of exiled Tutsis, the Church as an institution generally avoided clashing with the regime. It failed to condemn the dehumanization and suffering of Tutsi refugees. This action – or perhaps lack of it – may be better understood upon considering the oppression some clergy suffered from, as well as the power and influence other clergy possessed (and thus feared losing).²¹

Erosion of democratic principles, growing social disparities, and heightened polarization between the Hutu, Northern Hutu, Tutsi people of Rwanda – these conditions created an atmosphere of increasing tension, one that lays groundwork for the atrocities of that would follow later on.²²

2 Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), established in 1987 by Tutsi exiles in Uganda, played a pivotal role in Rwanda’s history during the early 1990s. Their emergence and subsequent military actions significantly influenced the nation’s socio-political landscape, marked by escalating tensions and tragic massacres.

2.1 Establishment of the RPF

The RPF was formed by Tutsi refugees who had fled ethnic violence in Rwanda during the late 1950s and early 1960s.²³ Many of these individuals had integrated into Ugandan society, with some joining the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni. Their military experience and desire to return to their homeland culminated in the creation of the RPF, aiming to address the plight of Tutsi exiles and challenge the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government.

¹⁸Edith R. Sanders. “The Hamitic Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective”. In: *The Journal of African History* (1969). Available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/179896>.

¹⁹J. J. Carney. *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

²⁰Longman, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda”, see n. 1.

²¹Saskia Van Hoyweghen. “The Disintegration of the Catholic Church of Rwanda: A Study of the Fragmentation of Political and Religious Authority”. In: *African Affairs* (1996).

²²BBC News. *Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506>. 2014.

²³Britannica. *Rwandan Patriotic Front*. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front>.

2.2 Tensions and Massacres

On October 1, 1990, the RPF launched an invasion into Rwanda from Uganda, initiating a civil war that would last until 1994. This movement was intended to pressure the Rwandan government into addressing the issues faced by Tutsi refugees and to democratize the political system. However, the invasion intensified the ethnic tensions within the country, leading to severe repercussions.

In response to these advances led by the RPF, the Rwandan government led by Juvénal Habyarimana declared a state of emergency and began mobilizing its forces.²⁴ Propaganda campaigns were launched, insinuating that the Tutsis were collaborating with the RPF and accusing them of wanting to dominate or eliminate the Hutu. These messages built upon historical resentment between the ethnic groups that dated back to colonial-era policies that favored the Tutsi minority, reigniting old grievances and making Hutus increasingly suspicious and hostile toward Tutsis.

Massacres orchestrated by extremist elements within the government and military were not solely isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern of violence.²⁵ The aim was to eliminate any support for the RPF and to deter Tutsi civilians from aiding the rebel forces. The international community's response was limited, with few interventions to halt the escalating violence.²⁶

3 The Tutsi Question

3.1 Arusha Peace Talks and Records

With the ongoing civil war, the Arusha Peace Talks were a series of negotiations held between the Rwandan government, led by President Juvénal Habyarimana, and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The talks were driven by a combination of military stalemate, domestic unrest, economic challenges, and international pressure. The main aim was to resolve the Rwandan Civil War that began in 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda, seeking to overthrow the Hutu-led government and secure the return of Tutsi refugees.²⁷

Key goals of the talks included:

- Negotiating a framework for a coalition government that would include both Hutus and Tutsis.
- Emphasizing the cessation of hostilities between the RPF and government forces.
- Integrating RPF fighters into the national military.
- Facilitating the return of Tutsi refugees, many of whom had been living in exile since the Hutu Revolution of 1959.
- Committing to introduce multi-party elections and democratic governance in Rwanda.

Despite the intentions, the Arusha negotiations faced significant resistance from extremist factions within Habyarimana's government and the military. These extremists viewed the peace talks as a betrayal of Hutu interests and a potential return to Tutsi dominance.²⁸

²⁴Britannica. *Rwanda genocide of 1994*. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994>.

²⁵History.com. *Rwandan Genocide*. <https://www.history.com/topics/africa/rwandan-genocide>.

²⁶BBC News, see n. 22.

²⁷Peace Accords. *Overview of the Arusha Peace Accords*. <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-accord-4-august-1993>. 1993.

²⁸National Security Archive. *Challenges faced during the Arusha negotiations*. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB469/>.

The media in Rwanda, under a Hutu-led government, played a crucial role in exacerbating tensions, particularly through the infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). The station broadcast propaganda framing the Arusha Accords as a concession to the RPF's "foreign invaders" and encouraged the population to prepare for a "final solution" to the Tutsi question.²⁹

The Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993, signaling a fragile agreement between the RPF and the government. However, the implementation of the accords was stalled due to:

- Habyarimana's hesitance to fully commit, as he faced pressure from Hutu extremists who saw the accords as a threat to their power.
- A lack of trust between the parties, with the RPF suspecting the government of insincerity and the Hutu elite fearing the RPF's military strength.

Despite international optimism, the accords did little to ease tensions on the ground. The continual dehumanization against Tutsis intensified, with extremists portraying them as enemies both within and outside Rwanda.

3.2 Escalation Toward Genocide

Between January and March 1994, the months leading up to the genocide, Rwanda witnessed a chillingly systematic effort by Hutu extremists to prepare for mass violence against Tutsis. These preparations were deliberate and well-organized, with clear intent to execute a genocidal campaign.

Hutu militias were trained extensively, with recruits drawn from young, unemployed men who were easily indoctrinated into extremist ideology. Weapons stockpiling became a national project, with the government importing vast quantities of machetes, grenades, and small arms, often disguised as farming tools. These weapons were then distributed across the country, sometimes under the guise of community defense initiatives, but with the clear purpose of arming those who would later participate in the killings.

The preparation extended beyond arming militias; local governance structures were co-opted into the plan, with roadblocks strategically planned and supplies of food and fuel stockpiled to sustain prolonged violence.

Perhaps the most insidious element of these preparations was the use of propaganda to prime the population. Hate radio, particularly Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), became a powerful tool to disseminate fear and hatred. Broadcasts dehumanized Tutsis by referring to them as "cockroaches" and "snakes," erasing their humanity and justifying their extermination.³⁰ These messages were not confined to the airwaves; community meetings and political rallies spread the word, creating an atmosphere where ordinary citizens were conditioned to see their Tutsi neighbors as enemies.

Dehumanization worked because it normalized violence; by portraying Tutsis as less than human, it absolved perpetrators of guilt and silenced bystanders who might otherwise have opposed the killings. The meticulous nature of these preparations ensured that, when the violence was unleashed, it could be carried out swiftly, efficiently, and with horrifying coordination.

²⁹ Al Jazeera. *Music to kill to: Rwandan genocide survivors remember RTLM*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/6/7/music-to-kill-to-rwandan-genocide-survivors-remember-rtlm>. 2020.

³⁰ Al Jazeera, see n. 29.

4 God has abandoned the Tutsis!

4.1 Genocide Trigger

On April 6, 1994, the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana served as the final spark that ignited the genocide. His plane was shot down as it approached Kigali, killing him and several other high-ranking officials. Theories regarding the perpetrators vary: some suggest that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) orchestrated the attack to destabilize the regime and create an opening for their advance, while others argue that Hutu extremists within Habyarimana's own ranks carried out the assassination to eliminate a leader they saw as too conciliatory toward Tutsis.³¹

Regardless of the true perpetrators, the event provided the pretext that Hutu extremists had been waiting for. Within hours of the assassination, Kigali descended into chaos. Roadblocks were erected throughout the city, and militias were armed and mobilized, marking the beginning of the atrocities.

4.2 Church Involvement in Atrocities

Churches, traditionally seen as sanctuaries, became sites of horrific massacres during the genocide. Tutsi civilians seeking refuge were often betrayed by clergy members who collaborated with Hutu militias. Notable examples include:

- **Ntarama Church:** Over 5,000 Tutsis were killed after being surrounded and attacked by Hutu militias.³²
- **Nyamata Church:** An estimated 10,000 Tutsis were brutally massacred after being trapped inside the building.³³

These massacres were not spontaneous but were often coordinated with the assistance of local priests and church officials, betraying the trust of their congregants. The systematic betrayal not only led to the loss of thousands of lives but also shattered the perception of the Church as a moral sanctuary. For survivors, the memory of clergy members betraying their congregants remains one of the most painful legacies of the genocide.³⁴

5 Closing Remarks

5.1 The Church is Complicit – Moral and Ethical Failures

The Church's complicity extended beyond physical acts of violence to ideological and moral reinforcement of the genocide. Some clergy members used their platforms to echo the extremist rhetoric of the Hutu Power movement, portraying Tutsis as enemies of the state and even of God. Sermons and public statements often mirrored the propaganda disseminated by hate radio, reinforcing the narrative that Tutsis were a threat that

³¹Britannica, *Juvénal Habyarimana*, see n. 16.

³²Genocide Archive Rwanda. *Massacre in Ntarama Church*. https://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Ntarama_Memorial.

³³Genocide Archive Rwanda. *Nyamata Church massacre*. https://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Nyamata_Memorial.

³⁴National Geographic. *Revisiting the Rwandan genocide: How churches became death traps*. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/photography/article/revisiting-the-rwandan-genocide-how-churches-became-death-traps>.

needed to be eradicated. In some cases, priests and church leaders justified the killings as a means of protecting the Hutu population, framing the violence as a tragic necessity.

³⁵

Religious language was twisted to lend divine legitimacy to the atrocities, absolving perpetrators of guilt and encouraging ordinary citizens to participate in the killings. By aligning themselves with the extremist agenda, these clergy members weaponized faith to fuel hatred and violence on an unprecedented scale.

The actions of clergy members who participated in the genocide revealed a profound moral failure within the Church's leadership. Rather than standing as a voice of conscience or resistance, many clergy prioritized their ethnic loyalties or political alliances over their spiritual responsibilities.

In doing so, they betrayed not only the Tutsi victims but also the principles of faith they were sworn to uphold. While there were individual priests, nuns, and laypeople who risked their lives to protect Tutsis, their bravery was overshadowed by the widespread complicity of the institutional Church. This failure was not merely passive; it was active and deliberate in many cases, contributing directly to the scale and efficiency of the genocide.³⁶

5.2 Comparison with the Holocaust

The Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust share profound similarities that underscore the devastating consequences of unchecked hatred and systemic dehumanization. Both atrocities were meticulously orchestrated by authoritative regimes that leveraged state machinery to execute mass exterminations.

In Nazi Germany, the regime employed industrial methods, including gas chambers and concentration camps, to annihilate six million Jews and millions of others deemed undesirable. Similarly, in Rwanda, the Hutu-led government mobilized militias and civilians, utilizing weapons like machetes and firearms, to systematically eliminate approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within a span of 100 days.

Central to both genocides was the pervasive use of propaganda to incite violence and justify the killings. The Nazi regime disseminated anti-Semitic ideology through media and education, portraying Jews as sub-human and a threat to society. In Rwanda, hate radio broadcasts and political rhetoric dehumanized Tutsis, referring to them as "cockroaches" and calling for their extermination. This dehumanization facilitated widespread participation in the atrocities, as perpetrators were conditioned to perceive their victims as less than human.³⁷

Another striking similarity lies in the international community's failure to intervene promptly. During the Holocaust, despite reports of mass killings, global powers were slow to respond, resulting in millions of preventable deaths. In the case of Rwanda, the international community, including the United Nations, hesitated to label the crisis as genocide and failed to take decisive action to halt the massacres. This inaction in both instances highlights the catastrophic consequences of global indifference and the dire need for timely intervention in the face of mass atrocities.³⁸

5.3 Reflection

With 800,000 – 1,000,000 casualties, the Rwandan genocide is by far one of the most brutal and swift massacres in modern history. A mere 100 days were the culmination of decades of ethnic tension, exacerbated

³⁵Timothy Longman. "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda". In: *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31.2 (2001), pp. 163–186. DOI: [10.1163/157006601X00130](https://doi.org/10.1163/157006601X00130).

³⁶*Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches?* <https://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Genocide-in-Rwanda-Complicity-of-the-Churches.html>. Paragon House, 2004.

³⁷SpringerLink. *Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust Reconsidered*. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230523890_3.

³⁸University of Minnesota. *Rwanda — Holocaust and Genocide Studies*. <https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/rwanda>.

by colonial policies that entrenched divisions between the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu populations. Not only did the Church fail to oppose this inequality, it became one of the driving powers of it. Without question or opposition, their allegiance was always to whatever ruling power is instated.

One idea we attempt to portray with this thesis is that the Christianity introduced to Rwanda was tainted by its colonial origins. Tribalism, politics and the strive for power marginalized the true Christian message of genuine spiritual values and moral teachings. It remains certain that the Church set itself on a path to a slow and inevitable demise, one that irrevocably shatters any trace of trust. Here, we beg the question — is secularism the cure?

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