CODEBOOK

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I. IDENTIFYING VARIABLES

country
Country Name
The dataset includes 167 countries and territories that exist between 1990 and 2018.

ccode
ISO 3166 Alpha-3 Country Code
The ISO has not assigned a code for Kosovo. Alternatively, I use “XKX” for Kosovo in accordance with the World Bank.

ccode1
INSCR Standard Numeric Country Code
The Polity5 code used for Ethiopia is 530 during 1990~1992 and 529 during 1993 onward. The Polity5 code used for Sudan is 625 during 1990~2010 and 626 during 2011 onward.

year
Year
(1990~2018)

cyear
Country-Year
(ccode+year)

region
IDEA Region
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and Iran, Europe

rcode
IDEA Region Code
(Source label: ID_region)

subreg
IDEA Subregion
The country groupings primarily follow a geographical logic, but also take account of cultural and historical links, particularly in the regional subdivisions. Subregions include: East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, North Africa, Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, South America, North America, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Oceania, Middle East and Iran, East-Central Europe, Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe, North and West Europe, South Europe.

scode
IDEA Subregion Code
(Source label: ID_subregion)

II. POLITICAL VARIABLES

2.1 Regime Characteristics and Transitions

polity
Combined Polity Score (Polity5, Center for Systemic Peace)
The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from 10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Note: The POLITY score was added to the Polity IV data series in recognition of its common usage by users in quantitative research and in the overriding interest of maintaining uniformity among users in this application. The simple combination of the original DEMOC and AUTOC index values in a unitary POLITY scale, in many ways, runs contrary to the original theory stated by Eckstein and Gurr in *Patterns of Authority* (1975) and, so, should be treated and interpreted with due caution Its primary utility is in investigative research which should be augmented by more detailed analysis. The original theory posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct patterns of authority, elements of which may co-exist in any particular regime context. The inclusion of this variable in the data series should not be seen as an acceptance of the counter-proposal that autocracy and democracy are alternatives or opposites in a unified authority spectrum, even though elements of this perspective may be implied in the original theory. The POLITY variable provides a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects in analyses but researchers should note that the middle of the implied POLITY "spectrum" is somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking various combinations of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score. Investigations involving hypotheses of varying effects of democracy and/or autocracy should employ the original Polity scheme and test DEMOC and AUTOC separately.

polity2
Revised Combined Polity Score (Polity5, Center for Systemic Peace)
This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ""fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

> -66 Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."
> -77 Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0."
> -88 Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year (2018) are converted to "system missing" values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value "0."

regime1
DD Regime Type Code (Bjørnskov & Rode)
Regime category, following Cheibub, Ghandi and Vreeland (2010) (Parliamentary democracies = 0, Mixed democracies (with weak presidents) = 1, Presidential democracies = 2, Civilian autocracies = 3, Military dictatorships = 4, and Royal dictatorships = 5) [From Bjørnskov and Rode's codebook]

commu
Communist or Socialist Country (Bjørnskov & Rode)
Is the country's regime communist or socialist? (No=0, Yes=1)

2.2 Security Environment

seceff
Security Effectiveness / Total Residual War (State Fragility Index, Center for Systemic Peace)
It is a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, 1994-2018 (25 years). Source: Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2018, (www.systemicpeace.org), variable name "actotal." The formula to calculate this score is based on two assumptions: (1) the residual effects of low level and/or short wars diminish relatively quickly; and (2) the residual effects of serious or protracted wars diminish gradually over a 25-year period. Three indicators are used to calculate each country's "residual war" score (reswartot): warsum1-4 (sum of annual scores for all wars in which the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict); yrnowar1-3 (interim years of "no war" between periods of armed conflict); and yrpeace (years of peace, or no war, since the end of most recent war period). For states with one war episode: reswartot = warsum – [yrpeace + (0.04yrpeace x warsum)]. For countries with multiple periods of war, a reswar value is calculated for each, in chronological order. Thus, for a state with two episodes of war, to calculate the first episode: reswar1 = warsum1 – [yrnowar1 + (0.04yrnowar1 x warsum1)]; and for the second episode: reswartot = (reswar1 + warsum2) – {yrpeace + [.04yrpeace x (reswar1 + warsum1)]}; and so on. Any negative residual war (reswar) scores are converted to zero before calculating additional residual war scores. The final reswartot value is then converted to a four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100.

2.3 Capacity of the Government and Governance Quality

pbur
Bureaucratic Quality / v_42_04 (GSoD, IDEA)
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). One of the indicators to calculate the predictable enforcement score. The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.

2.4 Capacity of the Civil Society

cs
IDEA Civil Society Score / C_SD51 (GSoD, IDEA)
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). The measurement of civil society participation relies on three V-Dem indicators measuring CSO participatory environment and CSO participation in policy making. They result from an expert survey and consider the extent to which the population is engaged in civil society activities. The three indicators on civil society participation clearly tapped into a common dimension and were aggregated into an index using BFA.

2.5 Regional and International Effects

demsreg
Regional Average of Democracy Score
Average Polity scores of all countries in a subregion (defined by IDEA, see "scode") in a particular year

demwd

Global Average of Democracy Score
Average Polity scores of all countries in the world in a particular year

III. SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

gdppc
GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2017 International $) (World Bank)
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2017 international dollars.

popu
Total Population (World Bank)
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

oil
Oil Rents (% of GDP) (World Bank)
Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production.

ngas
Natural Gas Rents (% of GDP) (World Bank)
Natural gas rents are the difference between the value of natural gas production at world prices and total costs of production.

fuel
Oil and Natural Gas Rents (% of GDP)
fuel = oil + ngas

muslim
Muslim Majority (Pew Research Center)
1 = over 50% of a country's total population is Muslim, 0 = otherwise.

IV. ICT-RELATED VARIABLES
(ICT: Information and Communications Technology)

internet
Internet Penetration (ITU)
Percentage of Individuals using the Internet

internet0
Internet Penetration Change (ITU)
Annual change in percentage of Individuals using the Internet

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