


Oblivious Transfer

- Sender has $m_1, \dots, m_n \in M$.
- Receiver has $i \in [1 \dots n]$
- Goal: (1) Receiver learns m_i , and no other m_j .
(2) Sender does not learn i .


OT from El Gamal

- Group G ; $|G| = q$; hash func $H: G^2 \rightarrow M \times k$
- CPA secure (E_s, D_s) channel.




- The article i which Bob wants to read is encrypted with Bob's public key.
- Other articles encrypted with some other public keys (unknown).
- Bob can decrypt and read u_i , the article

Digital Signatures



Security Game.



Adv wins if $V(pk, m, \sigma) = \text{'accept'}$ and $m \notin \{m_1, \dots, m_q\}$.

Secure
Signature
Scheme

Def $SS = (\text{Gen}, S, V)$ is secure if for all eff A :

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}}[A, SS] = \Pr[A \text{ wins}] < \text{negl.}$$

Example. $SS = (\text{Gen}, S, V)$. Attacker can find $m_0 \neq m_i$ s.t.

$$V(pk, m_0, \sigma) = V(pk, m_i, \sigma) \quad \forall \sigma, (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}$$

Q: Can this SS be secure?

→ No, signatures can be forged: (1) Ask to sign m_0 gives σ_0 .
(2) Forge (m, σ_0) .

Euler Theorem.

- $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$ is called a cyclic group, that is

$$\exists g \in (\mathbb{Z}_p)^* \text{ such that } \{1, g, g^2, g^3, \dots, g^{p-2}\} = (\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$$

g is called a generator of $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$.

Example. $p=7$

$$\{1, 3, 3^2, 3^3, 3^4, 3^5\} = \{1, 3, 2, 6, 4, 5\} = (\mathbb{Z}_7)^*$$

- Not every element is a generator:

$$\{1, 2, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5\} = \{1, 2, 4\}$$

$$1, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2$$

Solving Quadratic Equations (mod p)

- Solve: $ax^2 + bx + c$ in \mathbb{Z}_p

- Solution: $x = (-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}) / 2a$ in \mathbb{Z}_p

1) Find $(2a)^{-1}$ in \mathbb{Z}_p using Euclid

2) Find square root of $b^2 - 4ac$ in \mathbb{Z}_p (if exists) using a square root algorithm.