

Congress skips turn again: Agenda obstruction and interbranch bargaining in Chile

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Abstract

Unlike presidents with mostly (when not only) reactive formal powers in the legislative arena, Chile's enjoys formidable proactive ones. Key among them are urgency messages. A bill declared urgent confronts the considering chamber with a short deadline to discuss and vote it. Urgency, research has shown, improves the odds of passage, and most executive-initiated bill become urgent at some stage. I investigate the decision to declare or not legislation urgent, an aspect that has received less scholarly attention. Analysis of original data distinguishes messages in the 1998–2014 period that set forth urgency (40% of 20 thousand), messages that extended the deadline (29%), and messages to withdraw the bill's urgency (31%). Isolating bill and session traits that correlate with urgencies sheds light on the president's power to constantly obstruct the legislative agenda and its use in executive-legislative negotiation with separation of power.

1 NegBin regressions

Committee reporting is one step of the legislative process where the effects of urgency usage can be gauged. Unless the floor votes an exception unanimously, every bill in Chile is referred to a standing or special committee upon first introduction to each chamber. In this prefloor stage, a committee chooses to schedule or not a bill for discussion and hearings towards drafting a proposal for the plenary. Discretion to prioritize legislation could in principle translate into negative or gatekeeping power, and bill drafting into positive power—possibly turning standing committees into formidable actors in their jurisdiction (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Fenno 1973, Shepsle and Weingast 1987). No explicit discharge procedure exists in the Reglamento, but presumably is the same—unanimous consent—to except a bill from referral to committee.

The Hacienda (Finance) committee has special status in the committee system and deserves attention. It stands apart from other committees because it has jurisdiction over any

Urgency message	Report observed within deadline		
	% yes	% no	N
Act now	63	37	475
2-week notice	27	73	2192
4-week notice	25	75	1678
Deadline shortened	41	59	241
Deadline extended	23	77	3454
Withdrawn	6	94	211
All	27	73	8251

Table 1: Urgency messages and committee reports within deadline, 2006–2014

bill authorizing spending in any domain (multiple referrals are common, how many?). Bills with authorizations *must* be referred to Hacienda. Committee members, who work along with Finance Ministry personnel, may or may not appropriate funds from the budget when reporting the bill to the floor. Not unlike the Appropriations committee in the U.S. House, Hacienda is a control committee, a key link towards agenda control (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

Yet urgencies may well undermine the gatekeeping potential of committees. Unless urgency messages can be ignored with ease, committee inaction on undesirable but urgent legislation becomes impossible.

Measuring the consequences of urgencies is difficult in many steps of the process. Whether or not they lead to vote exchange, for example, requires more detailed studies than the information available so far. But committee reports are observable. And helps detect if urgencies are heeded in Congress.

Bill may have been reported and be stuck in bottleneck down the stream. So failure to observe a report after an urgency should not immediately conclude that urgencies are dead weight. But unless there is a reason to suspect that all or most urgency messages arrive after the committee has reported—there is no a priori reason to expect this—a fair number of messages should be followed by a report. And the wait should bear relation to the degree of the urgency.

Stats: Number of urgencies followed by no report within five weeks, by report within five weeks, average time it took. N bills with at least one report.

This is tested with bill histories data.

Weekly aggregates were computed from the data. The dependent variable is the number of bills reported by some chamber of deputies committee any given week. Weeks when the chamber did not meet were dropped, adding any bill reported to the closest next week with

Urgency messages of type	Effect on committee reports (cur.=current week, 1=next week...)									
	Exec. bill reports					MC bill reports				
	cur.	1	2	3	4	cur.	1	2	3	4
<i>Urg. in exec. bill referred to Hacienda committee</i>										
Act Now	++	+	--				++			
2-week notice		++		--		++	-	++		
4-week notice				++	++					
Shorten deadline		++								
<i>Urg. in MC bill referred to Hacienda committee</i>										
Act Now						++	++			
2-week notice		(not estimated)						++	++	
4-week notice										
Shorten deadline										
<i>Urg. in any exec. bill</i>										
Act Now	++	++	--							
2-week notice		+	++			+				--
4-week notice										++
Shorten deadline										

++, -- : $p < .05$; +, - : $p < .1$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 2: Effect of weekly urgency messages in committee reports, chamber of deputies 2006–2014. Entries report signs and significance (one-tailed) of regression coefficients. Negative binomial method of estimation, with fixed Legislature effects (see text).

a session.¹ Two figures were produced for analysis: weekly Hacienda committee reports, and weekly reports from any committee. The Hacienda aggregate seems preferable, letting analysis search for correlation with urgency messages explicitly targeting bills that were referred to that committee at some point. The total aggregate offers less control, but a more comprehensive picture. The average week in the 2006–2010 period had xx Hacienda reports (std. dev. xx), xx from any committee

Included in the right side are weekly urgency messages. Aggregates distinguish different urgency messages: the number of act-now, 2-week, and 4-week notices, deadlines shortened, extended, and withdrawals. If some bill is given an act now message, an effect should be observed almost immediately, the present week or the next week at most. But other urgency message effects, if any, should not necessarily be so immediate—legislators must react, and that takes time. In order to capture this, weekly lags of the regressors were included in the analysis.

¹Bill histories date reports when officially received (*cuenta*), but some cases have prior mention to the report's finalization, which the algorithm incorrectly coded as the date. The same is true for weekly urgency messages, with figures for weeks with diputados not meeting corrected likewise.

2 logit regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	dv	
	(1)	(2)
dmocion	−2.978*** (0.090)	
dmocionAllOpp		−3.597*** (0.137)
dmocionMix		−2.517*** (0.114)
dmocionAllPdt		−2.969*** (0.126)
drefHda	1.761*** (0.111)	1.782*** (0.111)
dmajSen	−0.304*** (0.086)	−0.302*** (0.086)
dinSen	0.184* (0.096)	0.415*** (0.111)
pterm	0.004*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)
legyr	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Constant	−0.047 (0.140)	−0.113 (0.141)
Observations	6,987	6,987
Log Likelihood	−2,057	−2,029
% predicted correctly	89	89
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 3: Regression results

3 Elements for a model of the urgency

3.1 Visibility

3.2 Impatience

Intuitively, the urgency points to executive impatience. Yet the key ingredient may well be impatience by some legislators.

Some assumptions. Decision theoretic.

Two legislators (A, B) and the executive (E). Each legislator has one pet project, the president has two. There are two stages to negotiate, only one project can be voted up or down in each period—the rest will have to wait, indefinitely. There is an understanding between legislators to trade votes for their projects.

At the start, four separable status quos may be challenged: a_0, b_0, e_0 , and f_0 . Legislators' pet projects aim at the first two, the executive's at the last pair. If all could change, then a_1, b_1, e_1 , and f_1 would replace the status quos. To economize on notation, the same subscripted letters can denote legislator A 's payoffs for the alternatives. We will be interested in net policy gains, such that $a_0 = b_0 = e_0 = f_0 = 0$ and $a_1 > 0$. It also seems reasonable to constrain payoffs for A 's pet project vis-à-vis other proposals: $a_1 > b_1$ and $a_1 > e_1$.

Under a time constrain, not all can change under, actors need to determine what to prioritize. The agenda becomes critical. Agenda $abef$ states that a is moved first, then b , then e , then f —but negotiations ends before the agenda is exhausted. The urgency lets the executive change the agenda unilaterally. Declaring an urgency in round 1 changes the agenda to $eabf$, and to $efab$ if another were declared in round 2 as well.

A discount factor $0 \leq d \leq 1$ captures impatience (shrinking the value of policy at round 2) so payoffs can be associated to each agenda. With agenda $abef$, policy in round 1 is a_1, b_0, e_0, f_0 , at round 2 it is a_1, b_1, e_0, f_0 .

Round	Policy	A's net gain
0	a_0, b_0, e_0, f_0	0

Agenda <i>abef</i>		
1	a_1, b_0, e_0, f_0	a_1
2	a_1, b_1, e_0, f_0	$(a_1 + b_1)d$

Agenda <i>eabf</i>		
1	a_0, b_0, e_1, f_0	e_1
2	a_1, b_0, e_1, f_0	$(a_1 + e_1)d$

Agenda <i>efab</i>		
1	a_0, b_0, e_1, f_0	e_1
2	a_0, b_0, e_1, f_1	$(e_1 + f_1)d$

		$a_1(1 + d) + db_1$

4 Institutions and divided government

Lijphart (1984) describes bicameral legislatures in terms of congruence and symmetry, the similarity of interests represented by the chambers and how equal is their authority over legislation. Incongruence arises from differences in size, electoral systems and calendars of the lower and upper chambers. Chile's Congress gained in congruence when a reform in 2006 removed unelected senators.² With about one unelected member for every four elected senators, it was virtually impossible for the victor at the polls to control the upper chamber. The reform that removed unelected senators in 2006 also made Congress much more congruent—differences in size (120 members in the lower chamber, 38 in the upper) and calendar (deputy elections take place every four years, senate elections every eight) remain, but are tempered by the same electoral system.

Asymmetry here. The general rule is that bills must pass both chambers and the president to become law. But there are important exceptions that make for asymmetric bicameralism—no chamber is advantaged a priori, depends on where a bill initiated.

From 1990 and until a reform in 2006, the Senate had 38 elected members, 9 appointed senators, and former 6-year term presidents. Since 2006, only elected senators remain. Up to 2005, vacant seat from elected senators were filled by their electoral list-mates for the remainder of the term (what if list won both seats?); since lists nominated candidates from different parties, the swap affected the party balance in the legislature. Since a constitu-

²When a new legislature convened, three senators were appointed by the serving president, two by the Supreme Court, and one by each branch of the armed forces and the national police. Former presidents were senators for life (Londregan 2000, Siavelis 2000).

Coalition	1990–94	1994–98	1998–2002	2002–06	2006–10	2010–14
President’s	60	58	58	53	51	50
Opposition	40	42	42	48	47	48
Regional					3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 4: The aligned chamber. Percent seats won by electoral lists in the chamber of deputies. Between 1990 and 2010, the president’s and opposition lists were Concertación and Alianza, respectively; they switched from 2010 on. The regional list includes splinters from each major list (Christian Democrats and UDI members). Source: prepared by the author with information from the chamber’s web page at www.camara.cl (some data kindly shared by Guillermo Rosas).

tional reform to article 51 that year, parties appoint substitute senators, keeping the party balance intact. Neither appointed senators, nor former presidents were replaced in case of a vacancy.

Despite a near tie between the major list for a good while, seen in Figure 1, the upper chamber has overwhelmingly been in opposition to the president’s coalition. Only two presidents enjoyed Senate majority status in the period: Lagos for nearly two years upon inauguration; and Bachelet for the duration of her term. Aylwin, Frei, Lagos for most of his term, and more recently the right coalition’s Piñera, all faced opposition that, if cohesive, could stop legislation passed in the other chamber.

5 Bicameral rules

Chilean bicameralism operates on a limited navette and conference sequence (Londregan 2000, Tsebelis and Money 1997). Bills can originate in the chamber of deputies or the senate, by motion of any member to the parent chamber or by message from the executive. They need approval in both chambers of Congress, but the rules to approve can vary drastically. Bicameral negotiation begins with a single trip of a French-style navette: bills are considered and voted in the origin chamber first; if approved, they migrate to the revising chamber for consideration and vote. If it concurs, the bill is sent to the executive for signature. But if the revising chamber rejects, or the origin chamber finds amendments to the bill unacceptable, the chambers appoint five members each to a U.S.-style conference committee to agree on a compromise that each chamber must subsequently vote up or down.

Exceptions apply, leading to bicameral rules variation. There is a general restrictive




Figure 1: The Conservative chamber. The blue, crenellated line reports, longitudinally, the percentage of Senate seats controlled by the president's coalition minus the percentage controlled by the opposition. Totals include 38 elected senators and, up to 2006, 9 appointed senators and two or fewer senators for life. Vacancies, if any, are excluded; see text for details. The Senate renews in full every eight years, and was partially renewed in 1994. Vacancies reported: Ruiz Danyau, Air Force appointee, died in office 11/1990; Pinochet detained in London 10/1998; Errázuriz stripped of immunity 1/1999 (reinstated 1/2002); Lavandero stripped of immunity 1/2005 (replaced upon conviction 8/2005).




Figure 2: Two second chance (*insistencia*) sequences. Nodes indicate moves by e = executive, c_1 = chamber rejecting the bill, and c_2 = other chamber.




Figure 3: The second chance game (*insistencia*). Nodes indicate moves by A, N = majorities in each chamber, e = executive, n = pivotal rejection member, and a = pivotal approval member.

rule, which the president can invoke in most circumstances, granting rejected bills a second chance.³ When the procedure known as *insistencia* is invoked, rejection of the bill by the recalcitrant chamber requires a two-thirds of members present vote. Passage by the other chamber also becomes more difficult, demanding a two-thirds of members present favorable vote. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of the second chance rule the asymmetry introduced for proponents and opponents alike. Two variants are considered, one applicable to executive-initiated bills rejected in the origin chamber or bills rejected in the revising chamber (part a); the other applicable to bills amended in the revising chamber that are rejected in the origin chamber (part b).

Figure 3 stylizes the restrictive rule as a game between the executive (e) and members of both chambers of Congress. N and A command majorities in the chamber that rejected a bill (the nay chamber) and the chamber where it gets a second chance (the aye chamber), respectively; n is the last member needed for two-thirds coalition against in the nay chamber, a the last member needed for a two-thirds coalition for the bill in the aye chamber. A makes a proposal that N may accept or reject. If the latter, the executive may opt to insist, letting a end the game or give n a chance to select between the proposal and the status quo. If played with full information, the sequence reveals that N 's limit to oppose a bill pleasing a supermajority of the other chamber and the executive depends on n 's (one third of the nay chamber) preferences.

This is important because of incongruence between the senate and chamber. Say how...

The restrictive rule should interact with urgencies. Consider the cases where the recalcitrant chamber will accept only if its amendments hold. Doing so, may prompt a second chance and they could lose. Rejecting may achieve the same. In such circumstances, the

³The sole circumstance when a rejected bill cannot be given a second chance ensues when, following rejection by the revising chamber, a compromise is reached in conference, accepted in the origin chamber, but rejected by the revising. See Const. art. 70, and compare to 68 and 71.

Figure 4: Bicameral negotiation with second chance rule

Bills	by legislators	by president	by either
introduced	5533	1469	7002
as %	79	21	100
passed	404	1066	1470
as %	27	73	100
as % introduced	7	73	21
with urgency message(s)	351	1016	1367
as %	26	74	100
as % introduced	6	69	20
as % passed	87	95	93

Table 5: Bills, laws, and urgency messages 1998–2014

optimal choice would be not to act on the bill. But the president can force them to do so.

6 Descriptives

About seven thousand bills were introduced to Congress between 1998 and 2014, 438 yearly on average. Unlike the U.S., the executive can initiate legislation directly. The president introduced one bill for every four by members of Congress, with markedly different success rates. Less than one in ten legislative bill passed, while more than seven in ten executive bills did so. Overall, legislators authored about one law for every three by the president (see Table 5).

An urgency message can be sent at any stage of the bicameral legislative process, compelling the chamber receiving it to act on a bill. Since urgencies expire once the chamber has finished, it is not uncommon for presidents to send messages at more than one step. Two-fifths of bills with urgencies were deemed so in two or three steps of the legislative process—the first chamber, the second, and/or the bicameral conference.

Step(s) with urgency declared	Proposer					
	president			member of Congress		
	% pass	% not	N	% pass	% not	N
1 only	41	59	285	12	88	103
2 only	84	16	102	52	48	96
3 only	90	10	10	75	25	4
<i>c</i> only	100	0	8	57	43	7
1 and 2	85	15	382	60	40	84
two of more	100	0	37	90	10	21
1, 2, and 3	94	6	89	90	10	10
three of more	96	4	55	86	14	14
1, 2, 3, and <i>c</i>	93	7	44	80	20	10
no urgency	67	33	457	5	95	5184

Table 6: Legislative steps, urgency messages, and bill passage by proposer 1998–2014. Steps are coded thus: 1 for the chamber of origin, 2 for the revising chamber, 3 for the chamber of origin’s response, and *c* for the conference committee. Cells report bill frequencies.

Number of messages	Bill frequency	%
1	215	15
2	244	17
3	145	10
4	115	8
5	104	7
6-10	236	16
11-20	185	13
21-40	99	7
41-71	123	8
Total	1466	100

Table 7: Urgent bills classified by number of urgency messages received

Urgency raised by	Percent Concertación sponsors						All	N
	0%	1–25%	26–50%	51–75%	76–99%	100%		
Concertación presidents	21	3	10	15	13	39	100	230
Right president	26	4	18	12	12	26	100	121

Table 8: Sponsorship of MC-initiated bills receiving at least one urgency messages. Entries are relative frequencies of Concertación sponsors among bills declared urgent by presidents elected by a given list. The first entry reports that 21 percent of bills declared urgent by a Concertación president had not a single sponsor elected by that list; and so forth.




Figure 5: Bills' paths in the legislative process. Orig. and Rev. are the originating and revising chambers, respectively, Conf. the conference committee, and Exec. the executive. Numbers are relative to base 100 (ie., frequency*100/total bills), rounded to nearest integer.




Figure 6: Weekly urgencies by legislative year. Deputies histogram above, Senate below the zero line. Asterisk atop column indicates off-the-chart urgency message frequency. Source: prepared with data from the Chilean Congress.

7 Dependent variable

The abundance of urgency messages is remarkable. Not taking the February Summer break into account,⁴ when Congress rarely convenes, less than one in three weeks in the period were free of urgency messages. The executive sent 7.6 weekly messages on average to the chamber of deputies, and 10.5 to the senate.

There are detailed plots, keep only one year

8 extras

9 In the law

Formal authority to interfere in the Congressional agenda is established in the Constitution (art. 74) and Congressional Organic Law (arts. 26 and 27). The constitution stipulates that

⁴Three February weeks with urgency messages are retained in the count.




Figure 7: Urgencies in one legislative year. Deputies and Senate data above and below the zero line, respectively. Vertical grey lines indicate that a session took place. One point for each urgency message, a circle for a newly declared urgent bill, a plus sign for an urgent bill with new deadline, an inverted triangle for a retired urgency. Point color indicates the urgency deadline, red for 3/6 days, yellow for 10/15 days, green for 30 days. Parentheses atop columns indicate off-the-chart urgency message frequency.

the president can urge action on any bill at any stage in the legislative process. The chamber receiving the urgency message is compelled to act on the bill (“discuss and vote it”) before a specific deadline. Since inter-cameral differences are dealt with in conference (*comisión mixta*, const. arts. 68–70), an urgency message at this stage compels Congress (ie. the conference and both chambers) to act before the deadline. The law defines the breadth of the interference, giving the president a choice of 30-day (simple urgency), 10-day (extreme urgency), or 3-day (immediate discussion) deadlines. As of July 2010, when the constitution was amended, the deadlines for the extreme and immediate urgencies were relaxed to 15 and 6 days, respectively. So at its maximum—an immediate discussion urgency to a bill in conference before 2010—the conference has one business day to report a compromise bill, and each chamber one day each to push the bill to the floor and vote it up or down.⁵ The president can retire the urgency at will, with immediate effects. Urgencies expire at the end of the regular session.

Urgent bills take precedence in the day’s order, the . How exactly? It affects one of 30/15/6 successive days.

How is the day’s order prepared? “Las urgencias determinan el orden de la tabla de discusión”)

What if Congress fails to act? Can urgency be ignored? Can a committee report kill the bill or does urgency compell a vote in the floor (law’s art. 27 “su discusión y votación en la Cámara requerida deberán quedar terminadas en el plazo”)?

10 Data

The Chamber of Deputies’ web page (www.camara.cl) has detailed information on bill histories, including business in the Senate, since the return to democracy in 1990. A request of information was sent by email to the Congressional staff. Upon their failure to respond, site contents were scraped. The javascript-rich web page posed difficulties for this, resolved with Python’s Selenium library. The script (posted in a web appendix at...) was inefficient (slow) but effectively downloaded bill histories for seven legislatures between March 1, 1990 and February 28, 2014.

Data has inconsistencies, but they are few and apparently much less prevalent since 1998, and especially since 2002. Inconsistencies in urgency reports can be gauged by comparison of their mentions in two of the web page’s tabs: the main tab with the bill’s timeline (*hitos de tramitación*) and the tab devoted to urgency messages (*urgencias*, see <http://www.camara.cl/urgencias>).

⁵Congressional practice is well summarized by the library of Congress at <http://www.bcn.cl/ecivica/formacion/>.

Period	<i>N</i> (and %) bills reporting urgency									
	in messages		in timeline		in both		in neither		All	
	but not	in timeline	but not	in messages	tabs				bills	
1990–1994	213	(19)	5	(.4)	25	(2)	897	(79)	1,140	(100)
1994–1998	168	(17)			18	(2)	775	(81)	961	(100)
1998–2002	128	(18)			77	(11)	518	(72)	723	(100)
2002–2006	59	(5)	2	(.2)	206	(18)	905	(77)	1,172	(100)
2006–2010	1	(<.1)	3	(.1)	438	(16)	2,261	(84)	2,703	(100)
2010–2014	1	(<.1)	1	(<.1)	457	(19)	1,945	(81)	2,404	(100)
2006–2014	2	(<.1)	4	(.1)	895	(18)	4,206	(82)	5,107	(100)
2002–2014	61	(1)	6	(.1)	1,101	(18)	5,111	(81)	6,279	(100)
1998–2014	189	(3)	6	(.1)	1,178	(17)	5,629	(80)	7,002	(100)
1994–2014	357	(4)	6	(.1)	1,196	(15)	6,404	(80)	7,963	(100)
1990–2014	570	(6)	11	(.1)	1,221	(13)	7,301	(80)	9,103	(100)

Table 9: Preliminary assessment of inconsistencies in the Chamber’s web site

www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=6952&prmBL=6560-10 for an example). Table 9 breaks down aggregates for the full 1990–2014 period in the first row, and since legislatures starting later in subsequent lines. Overall, about 6 percent of 9,103 bills initiated in six legislatures since redemocratization have urgencias reported in one tab but not the other. The pattern reveals that the *Urgencias* tab is more comprehensive than the timeline, which frequently fails to mention the urgency message that accompanied an executive initiative. But that difference has become negligible since 2002.

That both tabs are missing a substantial number of urgency messages remains possible. And likely in the early period, as a yearly breakdown of urgency usage in Table 10 shows. The proportion of bills deemed urgent during the first post-transition legislature (1990–1994) in data collected was 21 percent. This is shy of the 35 percent that Siavelis (2002) reports for the same period. Alemán and Navia (2009:404) report figures for executive-initiated legislation only in 1990–2006, approximately one-quarter of which received a simple urgency. They report that this is nearly twice as often as the other two urgency varieties (with ambiguity as to whether they are combined; I assume so), yielding 38% of executive initiatives with urgency in some degree in their dataset—below the 44% in my data.

Accordingly, this study shall focus the period since 1998, when urgency usage resembles the proportions reported by Siavelis. (Other reports?) Data reveals important variations above and below the mean usage that deserve scrutiny. It also shows that urgency messages are quite often attached to bills initiating in Congress. Alemán and Navia (2009) focus on

Year	Mociones			Mensajes		
	no	yes	N	no	yes	N
1990–1991	.98	.02	134	.71	.29	156
1991–1992	.97	.03	150	.59	.41	162
1992–1993	.92	.08	148	.68	.32	164
1993–1994	.95	.05	85	.62	.38	141
1994–1995	.94	.06	208	.64	.36	153
1995–1996	.94	.06	154	.64	.36	121
1996–1997	.95	.05	111	.70	.30	71
1997–1998	.92	.08	85	.47	.53	58
1998–1999	.92	.08	89	.29	.71	65
1999–2000	.84	.16	91	.43	.57	67
2000–2001	.91	.09	127	.53	.47	66
2001–2002	.93	.07	138	.42	.57	80
2002–2003	.96	.04	183	.49	.51	102
2003–2004	.93	.07	172	.38	.62	99
2004–2005	.94	.06	219	.58	.42	107
2005–2006	.92	.08	200	.32	.68	90
2006–2007	.94	.06	692	.27	.73	79
2007–2008	.94	.06	746	.17	.83	108
2008–2009	.93	.07	528	.19	.81	103
2009–2010	.95	.05	348	.29	.71	99
2010–2011	.94	.06	530	.13	.87	102
2011–2012	.92	.08	578	.12	.88	109
2012–2013	.94	.06	553	.10	.90	87
2013–2014	.96	.04	339	.30	.70	106
1990–1994	.95	.05	517	.65	.35	623
1994–1998	.94	.06	558	.63	.37	403
1998–2002	.90	.10	445	.42	.58	278
2002–2006	.94	.06	774	.45	.55	398
2006–2010	.94	.06	2,314	.23	.77	389
2010–2014	.94	.06	4,314	.20	.80	793
1990–2014	.94	.06	6,608	.44	.56	2,459
1998–2014	.94	.06	5,533	.31	.69	1,469
1990–2006	.93	.07	2,294	.56	.44	1,702

Table 10: Proportion of legislative- and executive-initiated bills receiving at least one urgency message by period

the urgency as means to accelerate and improve the chances of the president's agenda, leaving aside other possible usages of the urgency power that are interesting.

11 Some descriptives

Let's look at bills that received at least one urgency v those that none. About one of every five bills overall were tagged urgent since 1990. But the pattern has changed in time, especially Looking deeper into the data, we can summarize the stage(s) of the legislative process where urgencies were invoked.

MOCIONES 0 1 2 3 12 13 23 123 0 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 6021 1
0.66 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.06 587 MENSAJES 0 1 2 3 12 13 23 123 0 0.48 0.36
0.03 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 611 1 0.44 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.10 1884

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