

Restrictive rules in the Chilean Cámara

Fighting floor amendments with urgency authority

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What is urgency authority?

Lets the executive **interfere with legislative scheduling** at will
(Carey&Shugart 1998, Morgenstern 2002)

When a bill declared **urgent**:

- Colombia and Brazil: it goes to the top of the schedule and all voting activity in the floor stops
- Uruguay: must act in a pre-specified, short period, inaction turns bill into law
- Chile and Mexico: chamber must act in 30 days or less

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- Any bill at any stage can be declared urgent
- Chamber must “discuss and vote” before 30 days
- Law sets the breadth of the interference
 - 1 ‘act now’ (*discusión inmediata*, 6 days)
 - 2 ‘two weeks’ notice (*urgencia suma*, 15 days)
 - 3 ‘four weeks’ notice (*urgencia simple*, 30 days)
- Can retire the urgency, with immediate effects
- Non-compliance: reversionary schedule/policy indeterminate

- Speed of consideration (1990–94):
urgent 29.0 weeks rest 29.7
(Siavelis 2002)
- Yet 60 % exec. proposals urgent!
- And strongly associated with likelihood of passage

→ Berríos&Gamboa (2006),
Alemán&Navia (2009):
It's a **signaling tool**

Urgency \neq accelerator
Urgency \neq signal
Urgency = **cooperation-enhancing mechanism**
between president and coalition

Soto Velasco (2015)

Urgent bills are **much harder to modify** in the floor

→ closed rule protects vote-trading deals made in committee


One example and an intuition

	original version	amendments
Art 1.	appropriate \$200	\$300
Art 2.	split in two equal parts	$(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ split
Art 3.	one for students, one for teachers	—


Notation:

p	original version
q	status quo
p_1	art. 1 amended
p_2	art. 2 amended
p_{12}	both amended


The urgency as a restrictive rule



The urgency as a restrictive rule



A game (extends Dion&Huber1996)




Key result (spatial model):
standard consideration only when president and committee on
either side of the floor median

Hypothesis

$Pr(\text{bill urgent})$ up when president and committee chair co-partisan

Profile III: $C < F < P$



- Original dataset of bill histories 1998–2014
- Many missing records before 1998
- Covers 3+ presidencies, variance in president's status (coalition unity, Carey 2002, Alemán&Saiegh 2007)

Bills	by legislators	by president	by either
introduced	5,533	1,469	7,002
as %	79	21	100

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as %	27	73	100
as % introduced	7	73	21

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declared urgent	351	1,016	1,367
as %	26	74	100
as % introduced	6	69	20

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as %	26	74	100
as % introduced	6	69	20
declared urgent & passed	167	762	929
as %	18	82	100
as % declared urgent	48	75	68


Message types

	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010	2010–2014	1998–2014
Act now	5	6	3	4	4
2-week notice	16	14	9	23	16
4-week notice	29	22	13	12	17
Shorten deadline	2	2	2	4	3
Extend deadline	29	33	41	43	39
Withdraw (act now)	1	2	2	2	2
Withdraw (2-week)	7	10	14	8	10
Withdraw (4-week)	10	11	17	3	10
Total messages	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1,268)	(1,881)	(4,941)	(5,643)	(13,733)


	DV: Bill received urgency message			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Co-partisan comm. chair</i>	.221* (.092)			
<i>Coalition comm. chair</i>		.746*** (.004)	.831*** (.002)	.800*** (.002)
<i>Multiple referrals</i>	.856*** ($<.001$)	.867*** ($<.001$)	.883*** ($<.001$)	.882*** ($<.001$)
<i>Hacienda referral</i>	1.755*** ($<.001$)	1.695*** ($<.001$)	1.664*** ($<.001$)	1.668*** ($<.001$)
<i>Pres. approval</i>	.024 (.741)	.004 (.960)	.031 (.698)	.011 (.893)
<i>Introduced in Senate</i>	.211 (.198)	.239 (.147)	.248 (.141)	.255 (.129)
<i>Senate majority</i>	-.244 (.246)	-.298 (.151)		
<i>Year remaining</i>	.053 (.371)	.048 (.416)	.020 (.738)	.021 (.719)
<i>(Year remaining)²</i>	-.217*** ($<.001$)	-.228*** ($<.001$)	-.245*** ($<.001$)	-.243*** ($<.001$)
<i>Relax deadlines</i>	.696*** (.010)	.696*** (.008)		
Intercept	-.628*** (.009)	-1.148*** ($<.001$)	-1.754*** ($<.001$)	-1.231*** (.001)
Effects	none	none	fixed	mixed
Observations	1,461	1,461	1,461	1,461
LogL	-826	-823	-808	-816
% correct	89	89	90	89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (p-values in parentheses)

Marginal effects (95 % confidence intervals)



Predicted probability



- Urgency authority = closed rule
- Unlike Rules Committee, Chilean prez controls this
- Evidence for prediction on president–chair preference similarity
- More tests:
 - 1 Use nominate scores instead of partisan dummies
 - 2 Study amendments, admitted v. not:
 $\text{Corr}(\text{amendments}, \text{urgency}) < 0?$
 - 3 Shorten deadlines \rightarrow abort amendment threats?
- Ideas welcome

Thank you!

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Thank you!

Extra material

`www.camara.cl` very sharp

Scraped with Python's Selenium library → **bill histories 1990–2014**

The screenshot shows the website of the Cámara de Diputados de Chile. The browser window title is "Cámara de Diputados de Chile - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar shows the URL: `camara.cl/ley/ley_detalle.aspx?prmID=498&prml=2035-06`. The page title is "Proyectos de Ley".

On the left, there is a sidebar with the following links: "CÓMO TRABAJAMOS", "Elaboración de una ley", "Proyectos de ley", "Mociones", and "Mensajes".

The main content area displays the details of a bill project:

- Modifica la ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades, con el objeto de establecer sistema de elecciones separadas de alcaldes y concejales.**
- Legislatura:** 335
- Fecha de ingreso:** martes 03 de junio de 1997
- Estado:** Tramitación terminada (Ley N° 19.737 - D.Oficial 06/07/2001)
- Numero de boletín:** 2035-06
- Materia:** Alcaldes, Elecciones Municipales, Municipios
- Iniciativa:** Mensaje
- Cámara de origen:** Senado

Below the details, there is a navigation bar with tabs: "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN", "INFORMES", "OFICIOS", "INDICACIONES", "URGENCIAS", "AUTORES", "VOTACIONES", and "VETO". The "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN" tab is selected.

The "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN" table shows the following data:

Fecha	Sesión	Etapas	Sub-etapa	Documento
03 de Jun. de 1997		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Ingreso de proyecto	Ver
03 de Jun. de 1997	1ª / 335	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de proyecto. Pasa a Comisión de Gobierno, Descentralización y Regionalización	
21 de Abr. de 1998	9ª / 337	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	S.E el Presidente de la República incluye proyecto en la Convocatoria a Legislatura Extraordinaria.	
09 de Jun. de 1998		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Primer informe de comisión	Ver
09 de Jun. de 1998	3ª / 338	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de primer informe de comisión	

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Below the details is a table with the following columns: HITOS TRAMITACIÓN, INFORMES, OFICIOS, INDICACIONES, URGENCIAS, AUTORES, VOTACIONES, and VETO. The table contains historical data for the bill's progression.

Fecha Inicio	Fecha término	N°Oficio	N°Mensaje ingreso	N°Mensaje retiro
02 de May. de 2020		Suma	0020501	
18 de Abr. de 2001		Suma	419-343	
10 de Abr. de 2001	04 de May. de 2020	Suma	395-343	0020501
14 de Mar. de 2001	11 de Abr. de 2001	Suma	332-343	401-343
13 de Mar. de 2001		Discusión inmediata	322-343	
06 de Mar. de 2001	13 de Mar. de 2001	Simple	290-343	322-343
16 de May. de 2000		Discusión inmediata	437-341	
16 de May. de 2000	16 de May. de 2000	Suma	413-341	437-341

Partisan status of government

Coalition	1998–02	2002–06	2006–10	2010–14
Cámara de Diputados				
President's	58	53	51	50
Opposition	42	48	47	48
Regional			3	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Senate				
President's	50	50	55	45
Opposition	50	50	45	55
Total	100	100	100	100


Number of messages	Bill freq. %
1	16
2	18
3	11
4	8
5-10	25
11-20	14
21-71	9
Total	100
(N)	(1,367)

Micro-managing presidents? Look @ message contents

Urgency message incidence


Weekly messages in one legislative year
black = original urgency

2010-2011 (Piñera)



(Two histograms: Cámara above, Senate below **zero** line)

When all is urgent...




25 % urgencies were for member bills. Vote trading?

		Urgency by Concertación president	
Concertación sponsors		yes	no
	all	39	26
	some	40	48
	none	21	26
		100	100

Message	Report w/i deadline (%)
Act now	63
2-week notice	27
4-week notice	25
Deadline shortened	41
Deadline extended	23
Withdrawn	6
All	27

Three event count models




IndVar	DepVar	
	r^e	r^m
u^e	Mod. 1	Mod. 2
u^m		Mod. 3

Weekly counts: $r_t^e = \beta_0 + \beta_1 u_t^e + \beta_2 u_{t-1}^e + \dots$

Negative binomial regression

Three event count models



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
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
Message effects on Hacienda reports, Cámara

Type	Weekly reports					Weekly reports				
	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4
	$u^e \rightarrow r^e$					$u^e \rightarrow r^m$				
Act Now	++	+	--				++			
2-week notice		++		--		++	-	++		
4-week notice				++	++					
Shorten deadline		++								
	$u^{\bar{m}} \rightarrow r^e$					$u^{\bar{m}} \rightarrow r^{\bar{m}}$				
Act Now						++	++			
2-week notice		(not estimated)						++	++	
4-week notice										
Shorten deadline										


Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)




Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)



Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



schedule now \neq passage
certainly, but

1 Imperfect negative agenda control

- Committee gatekeeping \rightarrow silent death (Weingast&Marshall 1988)
- Could majority cartel operate? Must include president (Cox&McCubbins 2005)

2 Dilatory tactics

- Worsen legislative bottleneck (Cox 1987)
- Exploit impatience of those next in line (Wawro&Schickler 2007)