

Restrictive rules in the Chilean Cámara

Fighting floor amendments with urgency authority

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What is urgency authority?

Lets the executive **interfere with legislative scheduling** at will
(Carey&Shugart 1998, Morgenstern 2002)

When a bill declared **urgent**:

- Colombia and Brazil: it goes to the top of the schedule and all voting activity in the floor stops
- Uruguay: must act in a pre-specified, short period, inaction turns bill into law
- Chile and Mexico: chamber must act in 30 days or less

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Howell&Moe (2016) argue for constitutional reform to grant U.S. presidents **universal fast track authority**

- Any bill at any stage can be declared urgent
- Chamber must “discuss and vote” before 30 days
- Law sets the breadth of the interference
 - 1 ‘act now’ (*discusión inmediata*, 6 days)
 - 2 ‘two weeks’ notice (*urgencia suma*, 15 days)
 - 3 ‘four weeks’ notice (*urgencia simple*, 30 days)
- Can retire the urgency, with immediate effects
- Non-compliance: reversionary schedule/policy indeterminate

- Speed of consideration (1990–94):
urgent 29.0 weeks rest 29.7
(Siavelis 2002)
- Yet 60 % exec. proposals urgent!
- And strongly associated with likelihood of passage

→ Berríos&Gamboa (2006),
Alemán&Navia (2009):
It's a **signaling tool**

Urgency \neq accelerator
Urgency \neq signal
Urgency $=$ **cooperation-enhancing mechanism**
between president and coalition

Soto Velasco (2015)

Urgent bills are **much harder to modify** in the floor

→ closed rule protects vote-trading deals made in committee


One example and an intuition

	original version	amendments
Art 1.	appropriate \$200	\$300
Art 2.	split in two equal parts	$(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ split
Art 3.	one for students, one for teachers	—


Notation:

p	original version
q	status quo
p_1	art. 1 amended
p_2	art. 2 amended
p_{12}	both amended


The urgency as a restrictive rule



The urgency as a restrictive rule



A game (extends Dion&Huber1996)




Key result (spatial model):
standard consideration only when president and committee on
either side of the floor median

Hypothesis

$Pr(\text{bill urgent})$ up when president and committee chair co-partisan

Profile III: $C < F < P$



■ Original dataset of bill histories 1998–2014

Bills	by legislators	by president	by either
introduced	5,533	1,469	7,002
as %	79	21	100

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as %	27	73	100
as % introduced	7	73	21

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declared urgent	351	1,016	1,367
as %	26	74	100
as % introduced	6	69	20

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as %	27	73	100
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declared urgent	351	1,016	1,367
as %	26	74	100
as % introduced	6	69	20
declared urgent & passed	167	762	929
as %	18	82	100
as % declared urgent	48	75	68


Message types

	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010	2010–2014	1998–2014
Act now	5	6	3	4	4
2-week notice	16	14	9	23	16
4-week notice	29	22	13	12	17
Shorten deadline	2	2	2	4	3
Extend deadline	29	33	41	43	39
Withdraw (act now)	1	2	2	2	2
Withdraw (2-week)	7	10	14	8	10
Withdraw (4-week)	10	11	17	3	10
Total messages	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1,268)	(1,881)	(4,941)	(5,643)	(13,733)


	DV: Bill received urgency message			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Co-partisan comm. chair</i>	.221* (.092)			
<i>Coalition comm. chair</i>		.746*** (.004)	.831*** (.002)	.800*** (.002)
<i>Multiple referrals</i>	.856*** ($<.001$)	.867*** ($<.001$)	.883*** ($<.001$)	.882*** ($<.001$)
<i>Hacienda referral</i>	1.755*** ($<.001$)	1.695*** ($<.001$)	1.664*** ($<.001$)	1.668*** ($<.001$)
<i>Pres. approval</i>	.024 (.741)	.004 (.960)	.031 (.698)	.011 (.893)
<i>Introduced in Senate</i>	.211 (.198)	.239 (.147)	.248 (.141)	.255 (.129)
<i>Senate majority</i>	-.244 (.246)	-.298 (.151)		
<i>Year remaining</i>	.053 (.371)	.048 (.416)	.020 (.738)	.021 (.719)
<i>(Year remaining)²</i>	-.217*** ($<.001$)	-.228*** ($<.001$)	-.245*** ($<.001$)	-.243*** ($<.001$)
<i>Relax deadlines</i>	.696*** (.010)	.696*** (.008)		
Intercept	-.628*** (.009)	-1.148*** ($<.001$)	-1.754*** ($<.001$)	-1.231*** (.001)
Effects	none	none	fixed	mixed
Observations	1,461	1,461	1,461	1,461
LogL	-826	-823	-808	-816
% correct	89	89	90	89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (p-values in parentheses)

Marginal effects (95 % confidence intervals)



Predicted probability that bill is urgent



- Urgency authority = closed rule
- Unlike Rules Committee, Chilean prez controls this
- Evidence that president–chair preference similarity → surge
- More tests:
 - 1 Use nominate scores instead of partisan dummies
 - 2 Study amendments, admitted v. not:
 $Corr(\text{amendments}, \text{urgency}) < 0?$
 - 3 Shorten deadlines → abort amendment threats?
- Comments and critiques welcome

Thank you!

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Thank you!

Extra material

`www.camara.cl` very sharp

Scraped with Python's Selenium library → **bill histories 1990–2014**

The screenshot shows the website of the Cámara de Diputados de Chile. The browser window title is "Cámara de Diputados de Chile - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar shows the URL: `camara.cl/ley/ley_detalle.aspx?prmID=498&prmlBL=2035-06`. The page title is "Proyectos de Ley".

On the left, there is a sidebar with the heading "CÓMO TRABAJAMOS" and links: "Elaboración de una ley", "Proyectos de ley", "Mociones", and "Mensajes".

The main content area displays the details of a bill project:

- Modifica la ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades, con el objeto de establecer sistema de elecciones separadas de alcaldes y concejales.**
- Legislatura:** 335
- Fecha de ingreso:** martes 03 de junio de 1997
- Estado:** Tramitación terminada (Ley N° 19.737 - D.Oficial 06/07/2001)
- Numero de boletín:** 2035-06
- Materia:** Alcaldes, Elecciones Municipales, Municipios
- Iniciativa:** Mensaje
- Cámara de origen:** Senado

Below this information is a tabbed interface with the following tabs: "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN", "INFORMES", "OFICIOS", "INDICACIONES", "URGENCIAS", "AUTORES", "VOTACIONES", and "VETO". The "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN" tab is active.

The "HITOS TRAMITACIÓN" tab displays a table with the following columns: "Fecha", "Sesión", "Etapa", "Sub-etapa", and "Documento".

Fecha	Sesión	Etapa	Sub-etapa	Documento
03 de Jun. de 1997		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Ingreso de proyecto	Ver
03 de Jun. de 1997	1ª / 335	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de proyecto. Pasa a Comisión de Gobierno, Descentralización y Regionalización	
21 de Abr. de 1998	9ª / 337	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	S.E el Presidente de la República incluye proyecto en la Convocatoria a Legislatura Extraordinaria.	
09 de Jun. de 1998		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Primer informe de comisión	Ver
09 de Jun. de 1998	3ª / 338	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de primer informe de comisión	

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Below the details is a table with the following columns: HITOS TRAMITACIÓN, INFORMES, OFICIOS, INDICACIONES, URGENCIAS, AUTORES, VOTACIONES, and VETO. The table contains data for various dates and events related to the bill's history.

HITOS TRAMITACIÓN	INFORMES	OFICIOS	INDICACIONES	URGENCIAS	AUTORES	VOTACIONES	VETO
Fecha Inicio	Fecha término	N°Oficio	N°Mensaje ingreso	N°Mensaje retiro			
02 de May. de 2020		Suma	0020501				
18 de Abr. de 2001		Suma	419-343				
10 de Abr. de 2001	04 de May. de 2020	Suma	395-343			0020501	
14 de Mar. de 2001	11 de Abr. de 2001	Suma	332-343				401-343
13 de Mar. de 2001		Discusión inmediata	322-343				
06 de Mar. de 2001	13 de Mar. de 2001	Simple	290-343				322-343
16 de May. de 2000		Discusión inmediata	437-341				
16 de May. de 2000	16 de May. de 2000	Suma	413-341				437-341

Partisan status of government

Coalition	1998–02	2002–06	2006–10	2010–14
Cámara de Diputados				
President's	58	53	51	50
Opposition	42	48	47	48
Regional			3	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Senate				
President's	50	50	55	45
Opposition	50	50	45	55
Total	100	100	100	100


Number of messages	Bill freq. %
1	16
2	18
3	11
4	8
5-10	25
11-20	14
21-71	9
Total	100
(N)	(1,367)

Micro-managing presidents? Look @ message contents

Urgency message incidence


Weekly messages in one legislative year
black = original urgency

2010-2011 (Piñera)



(Two histograms: Cámara above, Senate below **zero** line)

When all is urgent...




25 % urgencies were for member bills. Vote trading?

		Urgency by Concertación president	
Concertación sponsors		yes	no
	all	39	26
	some	40	48
	none	21	26
		100	100

Message	Report w/i deadline (%)
Act now	63
2-week notice	27
4-week notice	25
Deadline shortened	41
Deadline extended	23
Withdrawn	6
All	27

Three event count models




IndVar	DepVar	
	r^e	r^m
u^e	Mod. 1	Mod. 2
u^m		Mod. 3

Weekly counts: $r_t^e = \beta_0 + \beta_1 u_t^e + \beta_2 u_{t-1}^e + \dots$

Negative binomial regression

Three event count models



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	r^e	r^m
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
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
Message effects on Hacienda reports, Cámara

Type	Weekly reports					Weekly reports				
	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4
	$u^e \rightarrow r^e$					$u^e \rightarrow r^m$				
Act Now	++	+	--				++			
2-week notice		++		--		++	-	++		
4-week notice				++	++					
Shorten deadline		++								
	$u^{\bar{m}} \rightarrow r^e$					$u^{\bar{m}} \rightarrow r^{\bar{m}}$				
Act Now						++	++			
2-week notice		(not estimated)						++	++	
4-week notice										
Shorten deadline										


Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)




Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)



Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



schedule now \neq passage
certainly, but

1 Imperfect negative agenda control

- Committee gatekeeping \rightarrow silent death (Weingast&Marshall 1988)
- Could majority cartel operate? Must include president (Cox&McCubbins 2005)

2 Dilatory tactics

- Worsen legislative bottleneck (Cox 1987)
- Exploit impatience of those next in line (Wawro&Schickler 2007)