

Restrictive rules in the Chilean Cámara

Fighting floor amendments with urgency authority

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Sept. 14th, 2017

What is urgency authority?

Lets the executive **interfere with legislative scheduling** at will
(Carey&Shugart 1998, Morgenstern 2002)

When a bill is declared **urgent**:

- Colombia and Brazil: it goes to the top of the schedule and all voting activity in the floor stops
- Uruguay: must act in a pre-specified, short period, inaction turns bill into law
- Chile and Mexico: chamber must act in 30 days or less

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→ Congress would vote exec. proposal up or down within deadline

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Urgency authority runs counter classic presidential democracy

- executive controls an important legislative power, but it is **negative**
- impatient presidents lack formal resources to press legislators to act on stagnant legislation

“In the legislature promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit” (Hamilton #70)

- Any bill at any stage can be declared urgent
- Chamber must “discuss and vote” before 30 days
- Law sets the breadth of the interference
 - 1 ‘act now’ (*discusión inmediata*, 6 days)
 - 2 ‘two weeks’ notice (*urgencia suma*, 15 days)
 - 3 ‘four weeks’ notice (*urgencia simple*, 30 days)
- Can retire the urgency, with immediate effects
- Non-compliance: reversionary schedule/policy indeterminate

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Indeterminacy: urgency = cheap talk?

- Speed of consideration in weeks, 1990–94:

urgent	rest
29.0	29.7

 (Siavelis 2002)

- Yet 60 % exec. proposals urgent!
- And strongly associated with likelihood of passage (Alemán&Navia 2009)

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Urgency \neq accelerator
 \neq signal
 = **cooperation mechanism**
 between president and coalition

Soto Velasco (2015)

Urgent bills are **much harder to modify** in the floor
(types 1 and 2 only)

→ closed rule protects vote-trading deals made in committee
(cf. Weingast&Marshall 1988)


One example and an intuition

	original version	amendments
Art 1.	appropriate \$200	\$300
Art 2.	split in two equal parts	$(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ split
Art 3.	one for students, one for teachers	—


Notation:

p	original version
q	status quo
p_1	art. 1 amended
p_2	art. 2 amended
p_{12}	both amended


The urgency as a restrictive rule



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
A game (extends Dion&Huber 1996)



- Dotted branch = anticipation of a veto later on
- Analysis with/without it (sustained/overridden veto)


Analysis (spatial model)

Profile III: $C < F < P$



Analysis (spatial model)

Profile II: $C \leq P \leq F$



Standard consideration only when
president and committee on either side of the floor median

Hypothesis 2: $Pr(\text{bill urgent})$

- a. up when president and committee chair **co-partisan**
- b. up when committee chair from president's **coalition**

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- Original dataset of bill histories 1998–2014

Executive bills	
<hr/>	
introduced	1,461

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Executive bills	
introduced	1,461
passed	1,059
as % introduced	72
declared urgent	834
as % introduced	57
declared urgent & passed	641
as % declared urgent	77

$$y = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if bill urgent in Cámara} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


$$\text{logit}(y) = \alpha + \beta \text{Co-partisan chair} + \gamma \text{controls} + \text{error}$$

- Co-partisan and coalition chair specifications
- Prediction: $\beta > 0$
- Controls include:
 - Multiple referrals
 - Hacienda referral
 - Introduced in Senate
 - Year remaining
- Fixed/mixed effects for verification


	DV: Bill received urgency (1) or not (0)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Co-partisan comm. chair</i>	.333*** (.009)			
<i>Coalition comm. chair</i>		1.056*** ($<.001$)	1.139*** ($<.001$)	1.110*** ($<.001$)
<i>Multiple referrals</i>	.603*** ($<.001$)	.623*** ($<.001$)	.631*** ($<.001$)	.631*** ($<.001$)
<i>Hacienda referral</i>	1.403*** ($<.001$)	1.324*** ($<.001$)	1.304*** ($<.001$)	1.308*** ($<.001$)
<i>Pres. approval</i>	-.015 (.837)	-.041 (.567)	.029 (.710)	.005 (.945)
<i>Introduced in Senate</i>	-.747*** ($<.001$)	-.733*** ($<.001$)	-.784*** ($<.001$)	-.771*** ($<.001$)
<i>Senate majority</i>	-.303 (.136)	-.382* (.057)		
<i>Year remaining</i>	.028 (.627)	.020 (.737)	.001 (.983)	.002 (.974)
<i>(Year remaining)²</i>	-.242*** ($<.001$)	-.259*** ($<.001$)	-.275*** ($<.001$)	-.273*** ($<.001$)
<i>Relax deadlines</i>	.647** (.012)	.591** (.018)		
Intercept	-.743*** (.002)	-1.465*** ($<.001$)	-1.977*** ($<.001$)	-1.627*** ($<.001$)
Effects	none	none	fixed	mixed
Observations	1,461	1,461	1,461	1,461
LogL	-864	-860	-849	-857
% correct	90	90	90	90

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (p-values in parentheses)

Marginal effects (95 % confidence intervals)



Predicted probability that bill is urgent



Urgency message types (incl. member bills)

	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010	2010–2014	1998–2014
Act now	5	6	3	4	4
2-week notice	16	14	9	23	16
4-week notice	29	22	13	12	17
Shorten deadline	2	2	2	4	3
Extend deadline	29	33	41	43	39
Withdraw (act now)	1	2	2	2	2
Withdraw (2-week)	7	10	14	8	10
Withdraw (4-week)	10	11	17	3	10
Total messages	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1,268)	(1,881)	(4,941)	(5,643)	(13,733)

- Urgency authority = closed rule
- Unlike Rules Committee, Chilean prez controls this
- Evidence that president–chair preference similarity → surge
- More tests:
 - 1 Use nominate scores instead of partisan dummies
 - 2 Study amendments, admitted v. not:
 $\text{Corr}(\text{amendments}, \text{urgency}) < 0?$
 - 3 Shorten deadlines → abort amendment threats?
- Comments and critiques welcome

Thank you!

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Thank you!

- 1 Framing
- 2 Sacar más jugo del puzzle del presidente como *Rules-maker*
- 3 Where to submit?

Extra material

www.camara.cl very sharp

Scraped with Python's Selenium library → bill histories 1990–2014

The screenshot shows the website of the Cámara de Diputados de Chile. The browser window title is 'Cámara de Diputados de Chile - Mozilla Firefox'. The address bar shows the URL: camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=498&prmlBL=2035-06. The page title is 'Proyectos de Ley'. The main content area displays the details of a bill project: 'Modifica la ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades, con el objeto de establecer sistema de elecciones separadas de alcaldes y concejales.' The details include: Legislatura: 335, Fecha de ingreso: martes 03 de junio de 1997, Estado: Tramitación terminada (Ley N° 19.737 - D.Oficial 06/07/2001), Numero de boletín: 2035-06, Materia: Alcaldes, Elecciones Municipales, Municipios, Iniciativa: Mensaje, and Cámara de origen: Senado. Below this, there is a table with tabs for 'HITOS TRAMITACIÓN', 'INFORMES', 'OFICIOS', 'INDICACIONES', 'URGENCIAS', 'AUTORES', 'VOTACIONES', and 'VETO'. The 'HITOS TRAMITACIÓN' tab is selected, showing a table with columns: Fecha, Sesión, Etapa, Sub-etapa, and Documento. The table lists five entries related to the bill's history from 1997 to 1998.

Fecha	Sesión	Etapa	Sub-etapa	Documento
03 de Jun. de 1997		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Ingreso de proyecto	Ver
03 de Jun. de 1997	1ª / 335	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de proyecto. Pasa a Comisión de Gobierno, Descentralización y Regionalización	
21 de Abr. de 1998	9ª / 337	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	S.E el Presidente de la República incluye proyecto en la Convocatoria a Legislatura Extraordinaria.	
09 de Jun. de 1998		Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Primer informe de comisión	Ver
09 de Jun. de 1998	3ª / 338	Primer trámite constitucional / Senado	Cuenta de primer informe de comisión	

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Scraped with Python's Selenium library → **bill histories 1990–2014**

The screenshot shows the 'Cámara de Diputados de Chile' website. The left sidebar lists navigation options: 'CÓMO TRABAJAMOS', 'Elaboración de una ley', 'Proyectos de ley', 'Mociones', and 'Mensajes'. The main content area displays details for a bill titled 'Modifica la ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades, con el objeto de establecer sistema de elecciones separadas de alcaldes y concejales.' The details include: 'Legislatura: 335', 'Fecha de ingreso: martes 03 de junio de 1997', 'Estado: Tramitación terminada (Ley N° 19.737 - D.Oficial 06/07/2001)', 'Numero de boletín: 2035-06', 'Materia: Alcaldes, Elecciones Municipales, Municipios', 'Iniciativa: Mensaje', and 'Cámara de origen: Senado'.

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Fecha inicio	Fecha término	N°Oficio	N°Mensaje ingreso	N°Mensaje retiro
02 de May. de 2020		Suma	0020501	
18 de Abr. de 2001		Suma	419-343	
10 de Abr. de 2001	04 de May. de 2020	Suma	395-343	0020501
14 de Mar. de 2001	11 de Abr. de 2001	Suma	332-343	401-343
13 de Mar. de 2001		Discusión inmediata	322-343	
06 de Mar. de 2001	13 de Mar. de 2001	Simple	290-343	322-343
16 de May. de 2000		Discusión inmediata	437-341	
16 de May. de 2000	16 de May. de 2000	Suma	413-341	437-341

Partisan status of government

Coalition	1998–02	2002–06	2006–10	2010–14
Cámara de Diputados				
President's	58	53	51	50
Opposition	42	48	47	48
Regional			3	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Senate				
President's	50	50	55	45
Opposition	50	50	45	55
Total	100	100	100	100


Number of messages	Bill freq. %
1	16
2	18
3	11
4	8
5–10	25
11–20	14
21–71	9
Total	100
(N)	(1,367)

Micro-managing presidents? Look @ message contents

Urgency message incidence


Weekly messages in one legislative year
black = original urgency

2010-2011 (Piñera)



(Two histograms: Cámara above, Senate below **zero** line)

When all is urgent...




25 % urgencies were for member bills. Vote trading?

		Urgency by Concertación president	
Concertación sponsors		yes	no
	all	39	26
	some	40	48
	none	21	26
		100	100

Message	Report w/i deadline (%)
Act now	63
2-week notice	27
4-week notice	25
Deadline shortened	41
Deadline extended	23
Withdrawn	6
All	27

Three event count models




IndVar	DepVar	
	r^e	r^m
u^e	Mod. 1	Mod. 2
u^m		Mod. 3

Weekly counts: $r_t^e = \beta_0 + \beta_1 u_t^e + \beta_2 u_{t-1}^e + \dots$

Negative binomial regression

Three event count models



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	r^e	r^m
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
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
Message effects on Hacienda reports, Cámara

Type	Weekly reports					Weekly reports				
	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4	$t = 0$	1	2	3	4
	$u^e \rightarrow r^e$					$u^e \rightarrow r^m$				
Act Now	++	+	--				++			
2-week notice		++		--		++	-	++		
4-week notice				++	++					
Shorten deadline		++								
	$u^m \rightarrow r^e$					$u^m \rightarrow r^m$				
Act Now						++	++			
2-week notice		(not estimated)						++	++	
4-week notice										
Shorten deadline										


Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)




Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



Sent to Senate ($N = 90$)



Sent to Cámara ($N = 314$)



schedule now \neq passage
certainly, but

1 Imperfect negative agenda control

- Committee gatekeeping \rightarrow silent death (Weingast&Marshall 1988)
- Could majority cartel operate? Must include president (Cox&McCubbins 2005)

2 Dilatory tactics

- Worsen legislative bottleneck (Cox 1987)
- Exploit impatience of those next in line (Wawro&Schickler 2007)