Restrictive rules in Chile's Congress

** Work in progress **

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What is the urgency authority?

The executive can **interfere with legislative scheduling** at will (Carey&Shugart 1998, Morgenstern 2002)

When a bill declared urgent

- Colombia: it takes precedence over other legislative business immediately
- Brazil: assembly must act in 45 days, else it takes precedence
 Since 2001, all medidas provisórias are urgent
- Mexico: must be scheduled for floor vote within 30 days (but 4 bills/year only)
- Chile: chamber must act in 30 days or less
- Uruguay: must act in a pre-specified, short period, inaction turns bill into law

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- Chile: chamber must act in 30 days or less
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Urgency authority in Chilean constitution and law

- Any bill at any stage can be declared urgent
- Chamber urged must "discuss and vote" before 30 days
- Law sets the breadth of the interference
 - 1 act now (discusión inmediata, 6 days)
 - 2 two weeks notice (urgencia suma, 15 days)
 - 3 four weeks notice (urgencia simple, 30 days)
- Can retire the urgency, with immediate effects
- Non-compliance: reversionary schedule/policy indetermined

Does it matter?

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Or perhaps irrelevant in the face of opposition: schedule now \neq passage

Under-investigated (Chile only?):

- 60 % exec. proposals 1990–94 urgent (Siavelis 2002)
- Strongly associated with likelihood of passage (Alemán&Navia 2009)

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Puzzle

- Speed of consideration (Siavelis): urgent 29.0 weeks rest 29.7 weeks
- Methodological obstacles: right censoring, selection bias...
- Urgency is a signalling device (Alemán&Navia)
- We explore a different rationale: urgency ≠ accelerator urgency = restrictive rule


Data

- Original dataset of bill histories 1998–2014
- Many missing records before 1998
- Covers 3+ presidencies, variance in president's status (coalition unity, Carey 2002, Alemán&Saiegh 2007)

Coalition	1998-02	2002-06	2006-10	2010-14	
	Cámara de Diputados				
President's	58	53	51	50	
Opposition	42	48	47	48	
Regional			3	2	
Total	100	100	100	100	
Senate					
President's	50	50	55	45	
Opposition	50	50	45	55	
Total	100	100	100	100	


Original data

www.camara.cl very sharp Scraped with Python's Selenium library \rightarrow bill histories 1990-2014



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	by	by	by
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declared urgent & passed	167	762	929
as %	18	82	100
as % declared urgent	48	75	68

Message types

	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006-2010	2010-2014	1998–2014
Act now	5	6	3	4	4
2-week notice	16	14	9	23	16
4-week notice	29	22	13	12	17
Shorten deadline	2	2	2	4	3
Extend deadline	29	33	41	43	39
Withdraw (act now)	1		2	2	2
Withdraw (2-week)	7	10	14	8	10
Withdraw (4-week)	10	11	17	3	10
Total messages	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1,268)	(1,881)	(4,941)	(5,643)	(13,733)


<u>Re</u>cidivism

Number of	Bill
messages	freq. $\%$
1	16
2	18
3	11
4	8
5-10	25
11-20	14
21-71	9
Total	100
(N)	(1,367)

Micro-managing presidents? Look @ message contents


Urgency message incidence

Weekly messages in one legislative year black = original urgency



(Two histograms: Cámara above, Senate below zero line)

When all is urgent...



Lend a helping hand

25 % urgencies were for member bills. Vote trading?

		Urgency by
	Conce	ertación president
Concertación sponsors	yes	no
all	39	26
some	40	48
none	21	26
	100	100


One example and an intuition

	original version	amendments
Art 1.	appropriate \$200	\$300
Art 2.	split in two equal parts	$(\frac{1}{4},\frac{3}{4})$ split
Art 3.	one for students, one for teachers	· —


Notation:

р	original version
q	status quo
p_1	art. 1 amended
p_2	art. 2 amended
D 12	both amended

The urgency as a restrictive rule



The urgency as a restrictive rule



Wrap-up

- \blacksquare Urgency \rightarrow closed rule
- Unlike Rules Committee, Chilean prez controls this
- Test?
 - 1 Study amendments, admitted v. not
 - 2 Corr(amendments, urgency)<0?
 - \blacksquare Role of shorter deadlines \rightarrow abort amendment threats?
- 2/5 messages extend deadline, 1/5 withdraw urgency

¡Muchas gracias!

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Determinants of bill urgency

	DV=1 if ur	gent, else 0
	(1)	(2)
Member bill	-2.978***	
Member bill, oppsponsored		-3.597***
Member bill, mixsponsored		-2.517***
Member bill, pres. coalsp.		-2.969***
Hacienda	1.761***	1.782***
Senate majority	-0.304***	-0.302***
Introduced Senate	0.184*	0.415***
Pres. term remaining	0.004***	0.004***
Year remaining	0.003	0.003*
Constant	-0.047	-0.113
N	6,987	6,987
Log <i>L</i>	-2,057	-2,029
% predicted correctly	89	89

Observable effects

Except

- bills exempt from committee referral
- bills already reported


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consequential urgency \longrightarrow committee report follows \longrightarrow report before deadline
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- Any authorization must be referred to Hacienda committee, no exception
- \blacksquare (2) above favors H_0

Committee report after an urgency

Message	Report w/i deadline (%)
Act now	63
2-week notice	27
4-week notice	25
Deadline shortened	41
Deadline extended	23
Withdrawn	6
All	27


Three event count models



Weekly counts:
$$r_t^e = \beta_0 + \beta_1 u_t^e + \beta_2 u_{t-1}^e + \dots$$

Negative binomial regression

Three event count models



$$\begin{array}{c|c} & \text{DepVar} \\ \text{IndVar} & r^e & r^m \\ u^e & \boxed{\text{Mod. 1} & \text{Mod. 2}} \\ u^m & \boxed{\text{Mod. 3}} \end{array}$$

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Negative binomial regression


Message effects on Hacienda reports, Cámara

	Weekly reports					Weekly reports				
Type	t = 0	1	2	3	4	t = 0	1	2	3	4
	$u^e ightarrow r^e$					$u^e o r^m$				
Act Now	++	+					++			
2-week notice		++				++	_	++		
4-week notice				++	++					
Shorten deadline		++								
	$u^{ar{m}} ightarrow r^{e}$					$u^{\overline{m}} \rightarrow r^{\overline{m}}$				
Act Now						++	++			
2-week notice	(not estimated)					++ ++				
4-week notice										
Shorten deadline										

Sequence: Piñera bills


Sent to Senate

$$(N = 90)$$



Sent to Cámara


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Sequence: Piñera bills


Sent to Senate

$$(N = 90)$$



Sent to Cámara

$$(N = 314)$$



Two intuitions

schedule now \neq passage certainly, but

- Imperfect negative agenda control
 - Committee gatekeeking \rightarrow silent death (Weingast&Marshall 1988)
 - Could majority cartel operate? Must include president (Cox&McCubbins 2005)
- 2 Dilatory tactics
 - Worsen legislative bottleneck (Cox 1987)
 - Exploit impatience of those next in line (Wawro&Schickler 2007)