Redistricting and the separation of incumbency and campaign effects: name recognition in Coahuila*

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Abstract

Estudiamos el reconocimiento del nombre de candidatos al Congreso del estado de Coahuila en 2017. El fenómeno ha sido asociado con el esfuerzo del representante en su distrito para preservar su reelegibilidad. Aprovechamos la redistritación del estado que antecedió a la elección para detectar diferencias en reconocimiento atribuibles al efecto del ocupante y no al efecto de campaña. Aunque la cobertura muestral de la encuesta preeelectoral que usamos impide una separación cabal de los dos efectos, detectamos diferenciales en reconocimiento de nombre significativos y consistentes con la teoría. Ofrecemos tres diseños de investigación alternativos para que futuros estudios de opinión separen el efecto de ocupante (*incumbency effect*) en elecciones que permitirán la reelección consecutiva a partir de 2018 en México.

1 Introduction

We rely on redistricting to separate campaign and incumbency effects in congressional elections. Both effects are well established. Incumbency is this (use existing coalition?). Big names (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Mayhew 1974*b*). Campaign effects are these (expand to new groups, lose some, scandals, opportunities?). More big names (Downs 1957, Moreno 2009, Popkin 1991, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).

Incumbency effects derive from the maintenance of and reliance upon a pre-existing coalition of voters. Associated to a specific individual = personal vote. Big names (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Mayhew 1974*b*).

Campaign effects, on the contrary, shift a prior coalition, due to opposition attempts to break it, or other attempts to expand it towards new groups in the electorate. More big names (Downs 1957, Moreno 2009, Popkin 1991, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).

Unless an incumbent retires (removing the incumbency effect), these phenomena occur simultaneously. We propose a separating method that relies on redistricting. Periodic changes in district boundary delimitations migrate some groups from one district to another. So even with incumbents running for another term in office, these voters will not find theirs' on the ballot.

We take advantage of the recent removal of single-term limits in Mexico to present the procedure. Prior to the reform, all incumbents had to retire. The reform coincided with redistricting. In the case we inspect—the state of Coahuila in northern Mexico, the first where incumbents were allowed on the ballot after the reform—however, district boundaries were redrawn after dropping term limits, such that ambitious members of the assembly who re-ran did it on a map more or less different from their freshman election's map.

Identifying precincts that changed districts from those that did not...

The instrument is name recognition (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Original survey data.

Procedure applicable to other systems promoting personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995) where districts are re-drawn periodically.

2   Political ambition and democracy

Contemporary legislative studies generate key hypotheses from Mayhew's (1974*a*) model of lawmakers. The iconic work on the electoral connection of members of the U.S. Congress views legislators as automatons with a unique, all-encompassing goal: reelection. The crucial premise in the argument is motivational: only one spring moves the incumbent, the ambition to stay another term in office. Mayhew does not deny that other worries might leave incumbents sleepless—turning some prioritary program into policy, climbing the chamber's hierarchy, her historical legacy are just some examples. But none could be achieeved if the incumbent failed at her attempt to reelect. Despite its parsimony, the model explains most activity that representatives engage in while in Congress.

Another premise is instrumental: reelection is a function of the incumbent's reputation among constituents. In personalistic systems, such as the U.S., reputation is mostly individual—to such degree that Mayhew discards the possibility that heterogneous American paties could be of theoretical interest (but revisionists rescued party relevance in Mayhew's framework, Aldrich 1995, Cox and McCubbins 1993). The instrumental premise merits three comments.

First, it does not involve every constituent in the district but a subset. Groups making reelection much harder if they dropped their support for the incumbent are more important

than others. Cox and McCubbins (1986) call them *core constituents*. From this perspective, it is rational and easier to work in preserving a coalition that made you win than attempting to build a new one.

Second, coalition maintenance requires delivering results, channeling new benefits to the core while preserving existing ones. As in all humen relations, perceptions matter as much as substance: the core must give the incumbent credit for delivering.

With collective production goods, where each member's effort is not immeadiately evident, the allocation of responsibility is far from automatic. Success has many parents. Thus the importance of particularistic goods, in contrast to more universalitic ones. Their distinguishing trait is that their production and/or delivery depends on the incumbnt's personal effort (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Classic examples are from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987): constituency service (service responsiveness) and spending earmarked for the district (allocation responsiveness). Incumbents have full control to direct pork where the political logic indicates, creating (this is crucial) a responsibility link.

To the extent that Mayhew's logic intersects with ascription problems, theory expects legislators to devote substantial time to cultivate their personal vote through delivery of particularistic goods. As a result, a closer link develops between lawmaker and her core constituents than the rest od the citizenry. As a consequence, better incumbent's name recognition is expected in the district than beyond.

3   A Minimal Effects Hypothesis

> We face the possibility of adopting reelection
> while failing to meet its goal, which is true
> representation and evaluation by voters
> –Senator Ríos Piter[1]

It is far from evident that the North American electoral connection model extends to Mexico (or to democracies in general, see Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi 2002, Samuels 2003). Sceptics feed on two lines of argument, the party lock and the lack of interest for reelection. We elaborate them.

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[1]"Estamos en la posibilidad de que se apruebe la reelección y de que no se cumpla el objetivo, que es la verdadera representación y evaluación por parte de los votantes", see `http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf`.

3.1 The lock

Mexican reformers gave the right of reelection not to the representative but to her party. Incumbents can run for reelection if, and only if, the party that elected them to office nominates them again. Pundits dubbed this the "party lock," granting party appartchik a veto on the representative's renomination. More often than not in competitive systems, parties let national leaders deny candidates the use of the party label if they choose to run (Ranney 1981:85). The party lock is more formidable, Mexican party leaders can veto an incumbent's renomination, *even by other parties*.[2]

As a consequence, a mayor or legislator sensing tension between core supporters' and party leaders' interests faces a predicament. Siding systematically with core supporters might expose her to the wrath of the leadership and, as retaliation, she may be prevented from being on the ballot—keeping the leadership discipline mechanism of single-term limits (Weldon 1997) intact. Towards the end of their post, Merino, Fierro and Zarkin (2013) claim that"we shall gain no political leverage over representatives, nor shall government be more responsive... with this pseudo-reelection." In other words, sceptics expect the incumbency effect in Mexico will be negligible, at best.

The party lock indeed aims at lessening incumbents' independence. As often happens with negotiation between legislative parties, reformers' intentions are easier to gauge by listening to opponents — the introduced bill's summary (*exposición de motivos*) does not even mention the padlock. Their plenary interventions seem to confirm leaders' fears of losing the firm grip they have held upon elected officeholders.[3]

Discussion so far has been black or white: whether or not consecutive reelection will develop a U.S.-style electoral connection in Mexico. A shade of grays seems more more attractive theoretically. Fully canceling the electoral connection requires incumbents /em-

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[2]Until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, Brazil's *candidato nato* clause imposed the reverse relationship between party and incumbent, giving the second power to override the leadership veto on renomination (Mainwaring 1991). Major parties in the United Kingdom rely on a mix, district parties selecting candidates that the national party can veto (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010).

[3]The diario de los debates for the December 3rd, 2013 session, when the reported bill was discussed and approved, registers the intervention (for the report) of Sen. Javier Corral (PAN–Chihuahua). He addressed legislators' opportunism against their parties: "I would have preferred a direct reelection" he claimed, "but I also believe that the report mitigates a phenomenon that cannot be ignored, that of political turncoats" ("Me hubiera gustado una reelección directa, pero también creo que el dictamen se encarga de un fenómeno que no podemos negar, el transfuguismo político"). Later on, Sen. Armando Ríos Piter (PRD–Guerrero) further elaborated while introducing a failed amendment to delete the padlock: "it is important to drop it", he argued, "[b]ecause if we wish the evaluation be made by citizens we cannot let it depend on a political party" whom, in roll calls, will be watchful that the "legislator does not escape the sheepfold" ("es importante quitar[lo]... [p]orque si queremos que la evaluación la hagan los ciudadanos pues no podemos dejar que dependa de un partido político" que, en las votaciones, velará por que el "legislador no se salga del redil." See `http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf`.

phfully lacking resources to defend from the leadership. Some politicians are, no doubt, in such a position — freshmen, personal appointees, etc. But *any* resource of this nature opens room for negotiation between incumbent and party. This is the essence of legislative party theory (Aldrich and Rohde 2001, Cox and McCubbins 1993).

One resource we have in mind is electoral competitiveness. Zaller (1998) models incumbents as prize fighters and the electoral arena as a selection mechanism: winners demonstrate better adaptation than defeated challengers. Personal electoral machines, political dynasties, or personal charisma are some elements feeding incumbents "natural advantages".

From this perspective, a party can stubbornly prevent a prize fighter's attempts to be on the ballot towards reelection, but does so the peril of losing the district. Given the padlock, the incumbent will be prevented from running at all in the consecutive race, but has the option of moving the machinery and resources to another party.[4]

Those with enough resources should therefore negotiate with the party without removing the electoral connection completely. In any event, whether or not the shades of gray argunment is correct can be resolved empirically. This paper does a first attempt to test it.

3.2 The lack

Pessimists also feed on reelection apathy. The lack of interest for reelecting to the assembly is so frequent among Latin American politicians that Morgenstern (2002) and Micozzi (2009) argue in favor of distinguishing between static and progressive ambitions. A look towards reelection rates in some of the continent's cases shows the usefulness of Schlesinger's (1966) original notion.

Consider, in Table 1, the values of three indicators for the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and U.S. Congresses. The first indicator is the percentage of incumbents who ran again for the same office at the end of their terms (column a), capturing static ambition: incumbents who bet for pursuing a career in the chamber and therefore tried to repeat in office. Variation is noteable. If 9 out of 10 U.S. incumbents regularly manifest static ambition, a bare quarter did in Argentina since the return to democracy. Brazil and Chile ocupy intermediate positions, although more similar to the U.S. than Argentina.

Because desire is not the same as ability, the Table also reports the conditional success

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[4]A sketch of a model is as follows. The vote share in the district or municipality has three components: $P + C + O = 100$ where P is the party's expected vote without the incumbent's machine, C is the vote share that the incumbent can mobilize personally, and O is the opposition's expected vote share. Any candidate controlling $C \geq |P - O|$ votes is in a position to impose his re-nomination to party leaders. Alternation in many states, districts, and municipalities since 1989 has been the result of such defections and splits towards another party [Ver manuscrito q me dio FEE].

| | Incumbents (%) who | | |
Case	sought reelection (a)	reelected (b)	returned (c = a × b/100)
Argentina 1983–2001	25	76	19
Brazil 1995	70	62	43
Chile 1993–2000	71	83	59
United States 1990–2010	91	94	85

Table 1: The willing and the able to return to Congress in four democracies. Columns (a) reports the percentage of incumbents in the lower chamber that were re-nominated, column (b) the percentage of them that reelected for another consecutive term, and column (c) the return rate. Sources: Jones et al. (2002:658) for Argentina; Morgenstern (2002:415–6) for Brazil; Navia (2000) for Chile; https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/reelect.php for the U.S.

rate (that is, among renominated incumbents only, column b). The case of the U.S. strikes the eye again, where 94 percent fulfilled their ambition. Below, Chilean incumbents' conditional success rate, at 78 percent, is quite impressive too. In Brazil is was more moderate, at 62 percent. The product of indicators (a) and (b) returns the third one: incumbents' rate of consecutive return to the chamber (column c). The four case cover most of the range: from 19 percent in Argentina (despite a pretty high conditional success rate) to 85 percent in the U.S.

Incumbents without static ambition fall in two categories: those with progressive ambition (who ran for a different office) and those with no ambition (who retired). The question of interest is which category will Mexican incumbents mostly populate and which they will shun in the near future? Will there be little if any static ambition, as in Argentina? It is improbable that is becomes near universal, an in the United States, but is there room to become similar to Brazil or even Chile?

History suggests that there might be. Table 2 reports the return rate of federal deputies observed by Godoy Rueda (2014) in the years prior to the adoption of single-term limits. The evidence is interesting and suggestive. The start of the series, when the Revolutionary constitution was adopted, bears similarity to present-day Argentina (just 18 percent of constitutional assembly members became deputies in the XXVIIth Legislature of 1917–18). But the return rate grew at an accelerated pace in the second hald of the 1920s. By 1928 it had doubled, reaching 40 percent. It then stabilized and dropped sharply when the reelection ban could be foreseen.[5]

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[5] 46 percent of the congressional districts were eliminated before the 1930 election—from 281 members, the chamber dropped to 153 only, see Godoy Rueda (2014:23). Since the return rate remained at 42 percent

Year	% returned
1916 (Constitutional Assembly)	—
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930	42
1932	27
1934 (single-term limits effective)	0

Table 2: Reelection in the Chamber of deputies up to 1934. Source: Godoy Rueda (2014).


Figure 1: Four clear and distinct lands arise from redistricting. FATHER and SON represent 2014 and 2017 map districts, respectively.

4 Redistricting as source of hypotheses

We examine name recognition in Coahuila, whose incumbents legislators could reelect consecutively in 2017. As in the rest of the country, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) redrew the boundaries of the sixteen state legislative districts in 2015 (Trelles, Altman, Magar and McDonald 2016). We exploit this coincidence to generate falsifiable hypotheses. The idea is simple. Incumbents who sought to return to office competed in districts more or less different from those they had represented. We hope that the degree of disimilarity in their constituents manifests in differenciated patterns of name recognition.

despite the sharp drop in the denominator shows that a good number of incumbents with static ambition were targeted and left orphans with no district.

To set the test, we start by identifyng 'father' and 'son' districts. We construe district genealogy as Cox and Katz (2002) do. We compare, one-by-one, districts in the new maps (the offspring) to those in the old map, in order to detect which they share the most voters with. This is the district's father. Figure 1 pictures a Venn diagram of a father (from the 2014 map) and son (from the 2017 map). Ovals are simplified versions of district boundaries (minus geographic accidents typical of real-world maps). Four terrains can be distringuished. Intersection r is land (and the voter who live there) from the father that the son has retained. By construction, r is never empty (else the district would have no father). To its left is land l from the father that the son has lost by the redistricting, and to its right lies land i that the son has incorporated from one or more other old-map districts. Lands l and i represent change in the map, and one, the other, or both could be empty. Land n not belonging to any of the ovals is no man's land, with no interest whatsoever for the incumbent at hand.

The approach quantifies the degree of change in an incumbent's electorate brought by redistricting. Comparing the land father and son share in common with land lost and gained yields an index of district similarity S_j for district j. If $\texttt{father}_j$ and $\texttt{son}_j$ denote, respectively, voters in the father and son districts, then $S_j = \frac{\texttt{father}_j \cap \texttt{son}_j}{\texttt{father}_j \cup \texttt{son}_j} = \frac{r}{l+r+i}$. The index reaches a maximum value $S_j = 1$ when father and son are identical (i.e., $l = i = \varnothing$) and drops gradually as intersection r shrinks relative to $l + i$. The index tends to zero when father and son intersect minimally (zero is never reached because r is never empty).

We report Coahuila's district simularity in 2017 in Table 3. We operationalize S with electoral *secciones* instead of voters. The survey we rely on identified the *sección* where interviewees regitered for voting, so this suffices for th test.[6] The median district, located between numbers III and XVI) in the Table, shares 55 percent secciones from the reunion with its father. Similarity looks scant: if the incumbent ran again for consecutive reelection and knew personally every citizen she represented during the term that is expiring, she would recognize only a bit more than half of her new constituents. S's inter-quartile range is .4–.7.

From the electoral connection's perspective, changes of this sort in electoral geography should discourage static ambition among incumbents, pushing them for retirement. And so it happened. We have no evidence to claim that redistricting pushed thirteen of sixteen single-member district incumbents to not seek reelection. But it is a fact that the three who

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[6]With our operationalization, S's value is the share of secciones that father and son share vis-à-vis secciones both districts share. If electoral secciones all had identical populations, our operationalization would be identical to Cox y Katz's, who rely on shared population instead of shared secciones. As population heterogeneity rises, so do discrepacncies between both versions of S across districts. Electoral secciones have relatively homogeneous populations: 99 percent had between 100 and 5,700 inhabitants in the 2010 census.

Son district (2017)	Father district (2014)	S	Incumbent	Revealed ambition
XII-Ramos Arizpe	V-Ramos Arizpe	1.000	Lily Gutiérrez B.	**static**
I-Acuña	XV-Acuña	.798	Georgina Cano T.	**static**
II-Piedras Negras	XVI-Piedras Negras	.791	Sonia Villarreal P.	progressive
X-Matamoros	VII-Torreón	.705	Shamir Fernández H.	none
XIV-Saltillo	I-Saltillo	.700	Javier Díaz G.	**static**
IX-Torreón	VIII-Torreón	.650	Irma Castaño O.	none
VII-Matamoros	VI-Torreón	.618	Verónica Martínez G.	none
XVI-Saltillo	II-Saltillo	.553	Francisco Tobías H.	none
III-Sabinas	XIII-Múzquiz	.551	Antonio Nerio M.	none
XIII-Saltillo	IV-Saltillo	.459	Martha Garay C.	none
IV-San Pedro	X-San Pedro	.444	Ana Isabel D.	progressive
V-Monclova	XII-Monclova	.408	Melchor Sánchez F.	none
VI-Frontera	XI-Frontera	.377	F. 'Lencho' Siller	progressive
XIII-Saltillo	III-Saltillo	.236	José María Fraustro S.	none
IX-Torreón	IX-Torreón	.204	Luis Gurza J.	none
III-Sabinas	XIV-Sabinas	.197	Martha Morales I.	none

Table 3: District similarity index in Coahuila

did represented districts with higher similarity indexes (the right-most column in the table reports incumbents' revealed ambition), which is consistent with the electoral connection. Lily Gutiérrez's constituents in Ramos Arizpe in fact changed nothing at all (she ran in the only district with $S = 1$). Georgina Cano from Acuña and Javier Díaz from Saltillo retained 8 and 7 of every 10 voters, respectively.

For our purpose, reistricing opens up room to separate and measure different effects in incumbents' name recognition among constituents, summarized in Table 4. Two forces must be distinguished as they operate jointly on name recognition: incumbency (discussed above) and campaign effects.

The bulk of effort in a legislative campaign takes place in the district (Langston n.d.). Billboards and wall paintings, printed flier distribution and robocalls, meetings with neighbors alone or in the company of candidates higher in the ticket, or even vote-buying with construction material and debit cards are some examples of focalized effort. The effect in the candidate's name recognition occurs *throughout the district* (i.e., the son). In contrast, the effect of incumbency in name recognition occurs in the area that father and son share. This generates our first predictions.

The probability that a voter picked at random among constituents (in lands *r* or *i*) recognizes the candidate's name is substantially higher than a voter picked at random from

	Incumbency effect	Campaign effect	Total effect
1	$r > i$	$r = i$	$r > i$
2	$r > l$	$r > l$	$r > l$
3	$r > n$	$r > n$	$r > n$
4	$l ? i$	$l < i$	$l ? i$
5	$l > n$	$l = n$	$l > n$
6	$i > n$	$i > n$	$i > n$

Table 4: Incumbency and campaign effects in name recognition (hypotheses). Cells give expected relations in name recognition in the areas defined in Table 1. Thus, the first line indicates that incumbency causes higher name recognition among voters in land retained than those in land incorporated, a difference not caused by the campaign effect; combining them gives the reported total effect.

outside the district (in l or in n). By itself, the campaign effect generates no difference in recognition between areas r and i. Neither does it among l and n. The seconf column in Table 4 reports these predictions. They can be summarized as $r = i > l = n$.

On the other hand, incumbency has an effect in area l to some degree only. The incumbent used to represent voters in both r and l. Upon seeing the new map, she realized having lost fragment l and its voters. She must have adjusted her finite effort: stop cultivating voters in area l in order to start doing it in area i. Despite re-balancing, previous effort in l (which includes the effect of the previous campaign) does not immediately vanish. Unlike r, whose voters experienced such efort for three full years, area i's experienced it less long. The first column reports these predictions: $r > i$ and $r > l$.

$l ? g$

$> n$

Incumbents running for reelection generate the sum of effects (reported in the third column), challengers generate campaign effects only. Vea el texto.

5   Data and methods

We analyze a face-to-face survey from May 19–21, 2017 in Coahuila, two weeks before the state legislative election (concurrent with a gubernatorial and municipal races).[7] The survey includes questions on name recognition inspired from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina

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[7] The survey was commissioned to Alejandro Moreno by *El Financiero* newspaper (published May 25). A sample of 1,008 registered voters was interviewed in households. Urban/rural electoral secciones were stratified, then a random sample taken to select 72 points throughout the state where interviews took place. The 95-percent confidence interval of inferences has a $\pm 3.1\%$ error. The non-response rate was 32%.

(1987). We coded name recognition indicators for six incumbents in Table 3 (all representing single-member districts). Three ran for reelection (static ambition) and three for election to municipal office (progressive ambition). We also coded indicators for three proportional-representation lawmakers who ran for municipal office.

In all cases, we relied on close-ended questions mentioning the incumbent's name while asking interviewees how much they remebered it (see the appendix) to code nine dependent variables. An incumbent's name recognition indicator $\texttt{recognize}_i$ takes value 1 if respondent i expressed remembering his/her name in any degree; 0 otherwise. *Descriptive here.

We analyze name recognition with equation

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{logit}(\texttt{recognize}_i) = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \texttt{retained}_i + \beta_2 \texttt{lost}_i + \beta_3 \texttt{delivered}_i \\
& + \beta_4 \texttt{interested}_i + \beta_5 \texttt{smartphone}_i + \beta_6 \texttt{panista}_i \quad (1) \\
& + \beta_7 \texttt{priista}_i + \beta_8 \texttt{morenista}_i + \texttt{error}_i.
\end{aligned}
$$

The model includes two geographic indicators: $\texttt{retained}_i$ equals 1 if respondent i is a voter registered in area r, 0 otherwise; and $\texttt{lost}_i$ equals 1 if respondent i is a registered voter in area l, 0 otherwise. The geographic regressors are mutually-exclusive but not exhaustive, thus avoiding the dummy trap. The omitted category is for respondents in area n, so these indicators' coefficients are interpreted against it. The model also includes indicators for incumbent responsiveness ($\texttt{delivered}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent said the incumbent did something for the district, 0 otherwise), for interest in politics ($\texttt{interested}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent expressed interest in politics, 0 otherwise), for socioeconomic status ($\texttt{smartphone}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent said owning such device, 0 otherwise), and controls for partisanship ($\texttt{panista}_i$, $\texttt{priista}_i$, and $\texttt{morenista}_i$ equal 1 if the respondent self-identified with the party in question, 0 otherwise).

Geographic variables test hypotheses. We hold three expectations: that variable $\texttt{retained}_i$'s coefficient is positive, that $\texttt{lost}_i$'s is positive, and that the first coefficient is larger than the second. Note that the equation excludes an indicator for area g. This is a weakness in our data and research design. Random sampling of survey points produced no secciones in areas incorporated by legislative districts. This shuts out the possibility to test some hypotheses, and leaves us less confident of separating incumbency from campaign effects.

Predictions $r > n$ and $r > l$ are common to both effects in Table 4. Only $l > n$ owes to incumbency only, so confirmation that $\texttt{lost}_i$ gets a positive coefficient is not attributable to campaigns. Future design should make sure to include respondents in area g in order to get more separating predictions. We might also have included questions on challenger and

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Incumbent	District/ municipio	Margin	Secciones				Interviewees			
			l	*r*	*g*	*n*	*l*	*r*	*g*	*n*
A. *Static ambition (SMD→SMD)*										
Javier PRI	Saltillo	−12	14	64	13	1,619	14	56	0	938
Lily PRI	R. Arispe	+14	0	117	0	1,593	0	56	0	952
Gina PRI	Acuña	−17	0	78	21	1,611	0	70	0	938
B. *Progressive ambition (SMD→municipio)*										
Lencho PRI	Frontera	+8	83	41	0	1,586	42	28	0	938
Sonia PRI	P. Negras	+12	0	88	0	1,622	0	56	0	952
AnaIsabel PRI	San Pedro	+3	48	75	0	1,587	14	42	0	952
C. *Progressive ambition (PR→municipio)*										
Armando PAN	Frontera	−8	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Lariza PAN	P. Negras	−12	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Leonel PPC	Matamoros	−7	1,648	62	0	0	966	42	0	0

Table 5: Incumbents and their terrain. Members with static ambition—from a single member district (SMD) running for a SMD—are distinguished from those with two types of progressive ambition—to a municipality from a SMD and from a PR seat. The margin is the percentage difference between the winner and runner-up, positive if the incumbent won, negative otherwise. The first set of *l*, *r*, *g*, *n* reports the number of electoral secciones (of 1,710 total in the state) in each category of terrain. The second reports the number of interviewees sampled (out of 1,008) in each terrain category.

open-seat candidate name recognition (they only experience campaign effects). A second survey at the start of the campaign would also have helped (campaigns swell incumbent and challenger name recognition in time, but incumbents should start from a substantially higher level).

Table 7 in the appendix reports full regression results. In the text we only sumarize relevant hypothesis tests in Table 6. Most clear the test. But many missing to be confident that effects are from incumbent and not campaign.

We illustrate results through simulation in Figure 2.

6 Conclusion

Despite an incomplete research design, we uncover evidence of name recognition consistent with the electoral connection model in Coahuila.

Figure 2: The probability of name recognition (x-axis). We portray simulations with Bayesian versions of regression models. The violet density is for respondents in area *n*, the green (when applicable) for respondents in area *l*, and the pink for respondents in area *r*. *With clear gaps between them, we expect the purple to lie to the left, the pink to the right, the green between them.* All other controls held constant to represent a PAN-identifier with a smartphone, who said the incumbent has delivered but is uninterested in politics.

| | Hypothesis | | |
Model and incumbent	$r > n$	$l > n$	$r > l$
SMD, static ambition			
1 Javier Díaz González	$< .001$	.029	.221
2 Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	$< .001$	—	—
3 Gina Cano Torralva	$< .001$	—	—
SMD, progressive ambition			
4 Lencho Siller	$< .001$	.003	.001
5 Sonia Villarreal Pérez	$< .001$	—	—
6 Ana Isabel Durán Piña	$< .001$	.036	$< .001$
PR, progressive ambition			
7 Armando Pruneda Valdez	.030	—	—
8 Lariza Montiel Luis	.385	—	—
9 Leonel Contreras Pámanes	$< .001$	—	—

Table 6: Hypothesis tests. Cells report one-tailed p-values. The top-right cell, for instance, indicates that the null associated to model 1's $r > l$ hypothesis can only be rejected at the .221 level, way above the conventional .05 confidence level. Columns 1 and 2 test that coefficients of `retained` and `lost` are positive, column 3 that `retained`'s coefficient is greater than `lost`'s.

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	(1) Javier	(2) Lily	(3) Gina	(4) Lencho	(5) Sonia	(6) A.Isabel	(7) Armando	(8) Lariza	(9) Leonel
retained	1.85*** (.33)	2.37*** (.33)	4.91*** (.41)	3.10*** (.43)	3.02*** (.32)	4.59*** (.44)	1.10* (.58)	−.22 (.75)	2.93*** (.38)
lost	1.29* (.68)			1.27*** (.47)		1.46* (.81)			
delivered	.86*** (.25)	.76*** (.27)	1.46*** (.34)	.51 (.30)	.93*** (.27)	.26 (.34)	.51 (.37)	.85*** (.27)	.26 (.33)
interested	.35 (.24)	1.03*** (.27)	1.34*** (.34)	.82*** (.28)	.52** (.26)	.74** (.33)	.71** (.36)	.28 (.27)	.57* (.31)
smartphone	−.27 (.24)	.37 (.27)	−.18 (.31)	−.47* (.28)	.21 (.26)	−.05 (.31)	−.43 (.35)	.26 (.27)	−.42 (.30)
panista	.15 (.39)	−.11 (.41)	−.03 (.52)	1.18*** (.35)	.02 (.41)	.80* (.44)	.78* (.47)	.34 (.39)	1.15*** (.41)
priista	.37 (.28)	.15 (.30)	−.01 (.38)	−.21 (.37)	.17 (.29)	.74** (.35)	.43 (.41)	.19 (.31)	.16 (.39)
morenista	−.07 (.63)	.59 (.51)	.26 (.74)	.76 (.55)	−1.17 (1.04)		−.26 (1.05)	−1.01 (1.03)	.88 (.56)
Intercept	−3.03*** (.25)	−3.82*** (.30)	−4.45*** (.39)	−3.48*** (.30)	−3.49*** (.28)	−3.99*** (.35)	−3.87*** (.37)	−3.29*** (.28)	−3.58*** (.30)
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	−262.32	−231.34	−169.84	−205.60	−235.20	−175.64	−147.10	−229.85	−182.89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Table 7: Regression results. All models estimated with logit, standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix

6.1 Regression results

6.2 Survey questions

Thirteen items in the survey questionnaire involved reelection and name recognition (from question 20 to question 25.i) . We used questions 25.a–25.i to code our dependent variables. Responses much/some/little (*mucho/algo/poco*) coded as 1 in the incumbent's name recognition indicator; 0 otherwise.

    * Add descriptives.

    We reproduce the relevant items in Spanish here.

```
20 ¿Está usted a favor, en contra o le es indiferente la reelección
consecutiva de legisladores?

1) A favor 2) En contra
3) Le es indiferente
4) NS/NC

21 El 3 de abril iniciaron las campañas para renovar el Congreso del Estado.
Si yo le preguntara los nombres de los candidatos a diputado en este
distrito, ¿usted me podría decir todos los nombres, algunos nombres o no
recuerda ningún nombre en este momento?

1) Todos 2) Algunos
3) No recuerda
4) No contestó

22 Ahora piense por favor en los diputados locales actuales. Si yo le
preguntara las cosas que ha hecho su diputado por esta comunidad, ¿usted
podría mencionarme muchas cosas, algunas, diría que no hizo nada o no
recuerda en este momento? [5=NS/NC]

1) Muchas
2) Algunas
3) No hizo nada
4) No recuerda

23 Si su actual diputado compitiera para buscar la reelección,
¿usted votaría por él o no votaría por él?

1) Sí votaría por él
```

2) No votaría por él

3) NS/NC (NO LEER)

24 Con base en el trabajo realizado por su actual diputado,
¿cree que merecería ser reelecto en su cargo o no?

[1=Sí; 2=No; 3=NC]

25 Le voy a leer unos nombres, para cada uno, ¿podría decirme si le es muy
conocido, algo conocido, poco o nada conocido?

[1=Muy conocido; 2=Algo; 3=Poco; 4=Nada conocido; 5=NS/NC]

a Javier Díaz González

b Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga

c Georgina Cano Torralva

d Ana Isabel Durán

e Sonia Villareal

f Lariza Montiel

g Armando Pruneda

h Leonel Contreras Pámanes

i Florencio ``Lencho'' Siller