

The removal of single-term limits, redistricting, and name recognition

The case of Coahuila's 2017 state races

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- 1 Use redistricting to separate **incumbency** and **campaign** effects
- 2 Study candidate **name familiarity** in the electorate
- 3 First exploration of reelection in Mexico with **survey evidence**



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The personal vote and familiarity

Reelection goal → credit claiming (Mayhew 1974)

But, with team production of legislation, ascription problems arise

Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina (1987)

Members prefer particularistic goods (effort/delivery observable)

- constituency service
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Limits of political ambition

- 1 Party lock: leaders can veto renomination
- 2 Lack of (static) ambition – cf. Schlesinger

		% returning
U.S.	1990–2010	86
Chile	1993–2000	59
Brazil	1994–2002	50
Uruguay	1985–1999	34
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Some room for optimism (Godoy 2014)

Year	% returning
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930	42
1932	27
1934	0

Survey evidence of the first election under the new rules: the state assembly of Coahuila in 2017



Mixed-member system, attention to the 16 SMD races only
3-year terms, 2017 concurrent with gubernatorial election

Few ambitious members

- 3 deputies re-nominated → static ambition
- 6 sought municipal presidencies → progressive ambition
- 16 retired → none

Moreno: questions on candidate name recognition in May's pre-election survey



Better name recognition among voters

- Due to incumbent's constituency service and responsiveness?
- Or a result of the electoral campaign?

Three approaches:

- 1 compare districts with/without incumbent running
- 2 compare beginning/end of the campaign
- 3 take advantage of redistricting to compare voters within constituency

Geographical groups of voters migrate in/out of districts, candidate name familiarity should vary in predictable ways

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
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
Using redistricting to separate incumbency effect



Name recognition expectations

	incumbency	campaign	
1	$r > g$	$r = g$	
2	$r > l$	$r > l$	
3	$r > n$	$r > n$	separation
4	$l > g$	$l < g$	
5	$l > n$	$l = n$	
6	$g > n$	$g > n$	

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Few ambitious incumbents

Incumbent	District/ municipio	Margin	Secciones				Interviewees			
			<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>
A. Static ambition (SMD→SMD)										
Javier PRI	Saltillo	-12	14	64	13	1,619	14	56	0	938
Lily PRI	R. Arispe	+14	0	117	0	1,593	0	56	0	952
Gina PRI	Acuña	-17	0	78	21	1,611	0	70	0	938
B. Progressive ambition (SMD→municipio)										
Lencho PRI	Frontera	+8	83	41	0	1,586	42	28	0	938
Sonia PRI	P. Negras	+12	0	88	0	1,622	0	56	0	952
Analsabel PRI	San Pedro	+3	48	75	0	1,587	14	42	0	952
C. Progressive ambition (PR→municipio)										
Armando PAN	Frontera	-8	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Lariza PAN	P. Negras	-12	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Leonel PPC	Matamoros	-7	1,648	62	0	0	966	42	0	0

For respondent i , we estimate equation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(\text{recognize}_i) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{retained}_i + \beta_2 \text{lost}_i \\ & + \beta_3 \text{delivered}_i + \beta_4 \text{interested}_i + \beta_5 \text{smartphone}_i \\ & + \beta_6 \text{panista}_i + \beta_7 \text{priista}_i + \beta_8 \text{morenista}_i + \text{error}_i.\end{aligned}$$

Results

	(1) Javier	(2) Lily	(3) Gina	(4) Lencho	(5) Sonia	(6) A.Isabel	(7) Armando	(8) Lariza	(9) Leonel
retained	1.85*** (.33)	2.37*** (.33)	4.91*** (.41)	3.10*** (.43)	3.02*** (.32)	4.59*** (.44)	1.10* (.58)	-.22 (.75)	2.93*** (.38)
lost	1.29* (.68)			1.27*** (.47)		1.46* (.81)			
delivered	.86*** (.25)	.76*** (.27)	1.46*** (.34)	.51* (.30)	.93*** (.27)	.26 (.34)	.51 (.37)	.85*** (.27)	.26 (.33)
interested	.35 (.24)	1.03*** (.27)	1.34*** (.34)	.82*** (.28)	.52** (.26)	.74** (.33)	.71** (.36)	.28 (.27)	.57* (.31)
smartphone	-.27 (.24)	.37 (.27)	-.18 (.31)	-.47* (.28)	.21 (.26)	-.05 (.31)	-.43 (.35)	.26 (.27)	-.42 (.30)
panista	.15 (.39)	-.11 (.41)	-.03 (.52)	1.18*** (.35)	.02 (.41)	.80* (.44)	.78* (.47)	.34 (.39)	1.15*** (.41)
priista	.37 (.28)	.15 (.30)	-.01 (.38)	-.21 (.37)	.17 (.29)	.74** (.35)	.43 (.41)	.19 (.31)	.16 (.39)
morenista	-.07 (.63)	.59 (.51)	.26 (.74)	.76 (.55)	-1.17 (1.04)		-.26 (1.05)	-1.01 (1.03)	.88 (.56)
Intercept	-3.03*** (.25)	-3.82*** (.30)	-4.45*** (.39)	-3.48*** (.30)	-3.49*** (.28)	-3.99*** (.35)	-3.87*** (.37)	-3.29*** (.28)	-3.58*** (.30)
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	-262.32	-231.34	-169.84	-205.60	-235.20	-175.64	-147.10	-229.85	-182.89










*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Results (name recognition in x-axis)

Static ambition

Progressive ambition SMD

Progressive ambition PR



Hypotheses: incumbency $n < l < r$
campaign $n = l < r$

Model and incumbent	Hypothesis		
	$r > n$	$l > n$	$r > l$
SMD, static ambition			
1 Javier Díaz González	< .001	.029	.221
2 Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	< .001	—	—
3 Gina Cano Torralva	< .001	—	—

Model and incumbent	Hypothesis		
	$r > n$	$l > n$	$r > l$
SMD, progressive ambition			
4 Lencho Siller	< .001	.003	.001
5 Sonia Villarreal Pérez	< .001	—	—
6 Ana Isabel Durán Piña	< .001	.036	< .001
PR, progressive ambition			
7 Armando Pruneda Valdez	.030	—	—
8 Lariza Montiel Luis	.385	—	—
9 Leonel Contreras Pámanes	< .001	—	—

- Survey evidence consistent with incumbency effect, but can't fully rule out campaign
- Separation needs more incumbents on the ballot
- Next step: municipal elections in 2022, two surveys
- Whether or not the reelection potential fulfilled = promising research area in Mexican politics

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