

The removal of single-term limits, redistricting, and name recognition

The case of Coahuila's state races

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Another nail in the coffin of Mexican exceptionalism

Costa Rica and Mexico were alone in prohibiting consecutive legislative reelection... **until 2014**



→ Reformers dropped single-term limits for state and federal legislators and municipal governments (effective since 1934)

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Paper examines survey evidence of the first election held with the new rules: the state assembly of Coahuila in 2017



Term limits diminish external checks on politicians

- Severs the electoral connection (Mayhew 1973):
collective reputation only
- Promoting personal vote → incumbent's **name recognition**
(Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987)

The 2014 reform

Surprising removal of the consecutive reelection ban

- Fed. deputies can reelect up to 4 consecutive three-year terms
- Senators up to 2 consecutive six-year terms
- Incumbent must be re-nominated by same party
- Kick-off: 2021 mid-term

Reformers gave states institutional discretion

- For state lawmakers: 2-, 3-, or 4-term limits
- For municipal officers: single- or 2-term limits
- Party clause mandatory
- Inapplicable to reformers themselves

Variable election calendars → incumbents on the ballot progressively

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Incumbents on the ballot on July 1st, 2018

State lawmakers only

Aguascalientes, Durango,
Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Veracruz

Mayors/municipal councils only

Coahuila, Quintana Roo,
Tamaulipas

Both

Baja California Sur, Campeche,
Colima, Chiapas, Chihuahua,
Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco,
México, Michoacán, Morelos,
Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Querétaro,
San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa,
Tabasco, Yucatán, Zacatecas

Will it matter?

Possible, but uncertain

High turnover in many democracies allowing reelection (Micozzi, Saiegh, ...)

Argentine Congress, 1983–2001

Terms served	%	
1	85	(progressive ambition)
2	11	
3+	4	(static ambition)

Incumbents and reelection

	seek	succeed	return
Brazil	70	60	42
Chile	71	83	59
U.S.	95	91	86

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Some room for optimism (Godoy 2014)

Year	% returning
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930	42
1932	27
1934	0

Pessimists see 'party clause' as undermining the electoral connection (Merino et al. 2014)

May be room for maneuver, perhaps a good deal

- Two types of candidates: prize fighters and rest (Zaller)
- Party can arrest first type's ambition at its own peril
- Therefore the game is more complex, dual threats

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First race with incumbents on the ballot since 1932

- 3 deputies re-nominated → static ambition
- 6 sought municipal presidencies → progressive ambition
- 16 retired → none

Moreno: questions on candidate name recognition in May's pre-election survey (Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987)



Better name recognition among voters

- Due to incumbent's constituency service and responsiveness?
- Or a result of the electoral campaign?

Three approaches:

- 1 compare districts with/without incumbent running
- 2 compare beginning/end of the campaign
- 3 take advantage of **redistricting** to compare voters within constituency


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Using redistricting to separate incumbency effect



	Effect	
	incumbency	campaign
Expectations (name recognition)	1 $r > g$	$r = g$
	2 $r > l$	$r > l$
	3 $r > n$	$r > n$
	4 $l > g$	$l < g$
	5 $l > n$	$l = n$
	6 $g > n$	$g > n$

The incumbents

Incumbent	District/ municipio	Margin	Secciones				Interviewees			
			<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>
A. Static ambition (SMD→SMD)										
Javier PRI	Saltillo	-12	14	64	13	1,619	14	56	0	938
Lily PRI	R. Arispe	+14	0	117	0	1,593	0	56	0	952
Gina PRI	Acuña	-17	0	78	21	1,611	0	70	0	938
B. Progressive ambition (SMD→municipio)										
Lencho PRI	Frontera	+8	83	41	0	1,586	42	28	0	938
Sonia PRI	P. Negras	+12	0	88	0	1,622	0	56	0	952
Analabel PRI	San Pedro	+3	48	75	0	1,587	14	42	0	952
C. Progressive ambition (PR→municipio)										
Armando PAN	Frontera	-8	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Lariza PAN	P. Negras	-12	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Leonel PPC	Matamoros	-7	1,648	62	0	0	966	42	0	0

For respondent i , we estimate equation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(\text{recognize}_i) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{retained}_i + \beta_2 \text{lost}_i + \beta_3 \text{delivered}_i \\ & + \beta_4 \text{interested}_i + \beta_5 \text{smartphone}_i + \beta_6 \text{panista}_i \\ & + \beta_7 \text{priista}_i + \beta_8 \text{morenista}_i + \text{error}_i.\end{aligned}$$

Results

	(1) Javier	(2) Lily	(3) Gina	(4) Lencho	(5) Sonia	(6) A.Isabel	(7) Armando	(8) Lariza	(9) Leonel
retained	1.85*** (.33)	2.37*** (.33)	4.91*** (.41)	3.10*** (.43)	3.02*** (.32)	4.59*** (.44)	1.10* (.58)	-.22 (.75)	2.93*** (.38)
lost	1.29* (.68)			1.27*** (.47)		1.46* (.81)			
delivered	.86*** (.25)	.76*** (.27)	1.46*** (.34)	.51* (.30)	.93*** (.27)	.26 (.34)	.51 (.37)	.85*** (.27)	.26 (.33)
interested	.35 (.24)	1.03*** (.27)	1.34*** (.34)	.82*** (.28)	.52** (.26)	.74** (.33)	.71** (.36)	.28 (.27)	.57* (.31)
smartphone	-.27 (.24)	.37 (.27)	-.18 (.31)	-.47* (.28)	.21 (.26)	-.05 (.31)	-.43 (.35)	.26 (.27)	-.42 (.30)
panista	.15 (.39)	-.11 (.41)	-.03 (.52)	1.18*** (.35)	.02 (.41)	.80* (.44)	.78* (.47)	.34 (.39)	1.15*** (.41)
priista	.37 (.28)	.15 (.30)	-.01 (.38)	-.21 (.37)	.17 (.29)	.74** (.35)	.43 (.41)	.19 (.31)	.16 (.39)
morenista	-.07 (.63)	.59 (.51)	.26 (.74)	.76 (.55)	-1.17 (1.04)		-.26 (1.05)	-1.01 (1.03)	.88 (.56)
Intercept	-3.03*** (.25)	-3.82*** (.30)	-4.45*** (.39)	-3.48*** (.30)	-3.49*** (.28)	-3.99*** (.35)	-3.87*** (.37)	-3.29*** (.28)	-3.58*** (.30)
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	-262.32	-231.34	-169.84	-205.60	-235.20	-175.64	-147.10	-229.85	-182.89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01










Model and incumbent	Hypothesis		
	$r > n$	$l > n$	$r > l$
SMD, static ambition			
1 Javier Díaz González	< .001	.029	.221
2 Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	< .001	—	—
3 Gina Cano Torralva	< .001	—	—
SMD, progressive ambition			
4 Lencho Siller	< .001	.003	.001
5 Sonia Villarreal Pérez	< .001	—	—
6 Ana Isabel Durán Piña	< .001	.036	< .001
PR, progressive ambition			
7 Armando Pruneda Valdez	.030	—	—
8 Lariza Montiel Luis	.385	—	—
9 Leonel Contreras Pámanes	< .001	—	—

Results (name recognition in x-axis)

Static ambition

Progressive ambition SMD

Progressive ambition PR



Hypotheses: $n < l < p$

- Results substantial & consistent with incumbency effect, but can't fully rule out campaign
- We suggest better designs for future elections
- Consecutive reelection has great potential to improve representation
- Whether or not the potential fulfilled = very promising research area in Mexican politics

Thank you!

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