Redistricting and the separation of incumbency and campaign effects: name recognition in Coahuila*

Eric Magar
ITAM

Alejandro Moreno
ITAM

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Abstract

Estudiamos el reconocimiento del nombre de candidatos al Congreso del estado de Coahuila en 2017. El fenómeno ha sido asociado con el esfuerzo del representante en su distrito para preservar su reelegibilidad. Aprovechamos la redistritación del estado que antecedió a la elección para detectar diferencias en reconocimiento atribuibles al efecto del ocupante y no al efecto de campaña. Aunque la cobertura muestral de la encuesta preeelectoral que usamos impide una separación cabal de los dos efectos, detectamos diferenciales en reconocimiento de nombre significativos y consistentes con la teoría. Ofrecemos tres diseños de investigación alternativos para que futuros estudios de opinión separen el efecto de ocupante (*incumbency effect*) en elecciones que permitirán la reelección consecutiva a partir de 2018 en México.

> In 1952, campaign buttons said "I like Ike," but at rallies people said "*We* like Ike." ... The transformation of "What have you done for me lately?" into "What have you done for *us* lately?" is the essence of campaigning.
>
> —Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter* (1991:12)

> Even if party identification continues to have primacy in vote choice, the syndrome of factors encapsulated by "incumbency" follows a close second
>
> —Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, *The Personal Vote* (1987:167)

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1 Introduction

We rely on redistricting to separate campaign and incumbency effects in congressional elections. Both effects are well established.

Vote swings can be viewed as the sum of long- and short-term forces. The district's economic and socio-demographic makeup determines long-term forces, which voters' party identifications encapsulate. This structure remains mostly unchanged from one election to the next, yielding the notion of a district's "normal vote" (Converse 1966). Short-term forces favor one candidate or another in a given year, with fluctuating intensity, but ultimately vanish, reverting the district back to its normal vote. Prominent short-term forces are the effects of campaigns (Downs 1957, Jacobson 1990, Moreno 2009) and incumbency (Erikson 1971, Gelman and King 1991, Mayhew 1974*b*), along with presidential (Ferejohn and Calvert 1984) and gubernatorial coattails (Magar 2012), national party tides (Cox and McCubbins 2007:104-7), and so forth.

Incumbency effects originate in the maintenance of and reliance upon a pre-existing coalition of voters. This would tend to place them among long-term forces, except that they are associated with a person, the candidate (and candidates can change in a snap). Incumbency effects are tantamount to the personal vote, "that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987:9). Conversely, campaign effects are successful attempts to shift a prior coalition, by breaking it or by expanding it towards new groups and interests. "Campaigns transform unstructured and diverse interests into a single coalition, making a single cleavage dominant" (Popkin 1991:12).

Short-term effects are simultaneous. Unless the seat is open, challengers campaign to unseat incumbents. Incumbents amass war chests to scare-off quality challengers. We propose a separating method that relies on redistricting. Periodic changes in district boundary delimitation migrate some groups from one district to another. So even with incumbents running for another term in office, these voters will not find theirs' on the ballot.

We take advantage of the recent removal of single-term limits in Mexico to present the procedure. Prior to the reform, all incumbents had to retire. The reform coincided with redistricting. In the case we inspect—the state of Coahuila in northern Mexico, the first where incumbents were allowed on the ballot after the reform—however, district boundaries were redrawn after dropping term limits, such that ambitious members of the assembly who re-ran did it on a map more or less different from their freshman election's map.

Identifying precincts that changed districts from those that did not...

The instrument is name recognition (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Jacobson and

Kernell 1983). Original survey data.

Procedure applicable to other systems promoting personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995) where districts are re-drawn periodically.

2 Political ambition and democracy

Contemporary legislative studies generate key hypotheses from Mayhew's (1974*a*) model of lawmakers. The iconic work on the electoral connection of members of the U.S. Congress views legislators as automatons with a unique, all-encompassing goal: reelection. The crucial premise in the argument is motivational: only one spring moves the incumbent, the ambition to stay another term in office. Mayhew does not deny that other worries might leave incumbents sleepless—turning some prioritary program into policy, climbing the chamber's hierarchy, her historical legacy are just some examples. But none could be achieved if the incumbent failed at her attempt to reelect. Despite its parsimony, the model explains most activity that representatives engage in while in Congress.

Another premise is instrumental: reelection is a function of the incumbent's reputation among constituents. In personalistic systems, such as the U.S., reputation is mostly individual—to such degree that Mayhew discards the possibility that heterogeneous American parties could be of theoretical interest (but revisionists rescued party relevance in Mayhew's framework, Aldrich 1995, Cox and McCubbins 2007). The instrumental premise merits three comments.

First, it does not involve every constituent in the district but a subset. Groups making reelection much harder if they dropped their support for the incumbent are more important than others. Cox and McCubbins (1986) call them *core constituents*. From this perspective, it is rational and easier to work in preserving a coalition that made you win than attempting to build a new one.

Second, coalition maintenance requires delivering results, channeling new benefits to the core while preserving existing ones. As in all human relations, perceptions matter as much as substance: the core must give the incumbent credit for delivering.

With collective production goods, where each member's effort is not immediately evident, the allocation of responsibility is far from automatic. Success has many parents. Thus the importance of particularistic goods, in contrast to more universalistic ones. Their distinguishing trait is that their production and/or delivery depends on the incumbent's personal effort (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Classic examples are from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987): constituency service (service responsiveness) and pork-barrel legislation, construction spending earmarked for the district (allocation responsiveness). Incumbents

have full control to direct pork where the political logic indicates, creating (this is crucial) a responsibility link.

To the extent that Mayhew's logic intersects with ascription problems, theory expects legislators to devote substantial time to cultivate their personal vote through delivery of particularistic goods. As a result, a closer link develops between lawmaker and her core constituents than the rest of the citizenry. As a consequence, better incumbent's name recognition is expected in the district than beyond.

3 A Minimal Effects Hypothesis

> We face the possibility of adopting reelection
> while failing to meet its goal, which is true
> representation and evaluation by voters
> –Senator Ríos Piter[1]

It is far from evident that the North American electoral connection model extends to Mexico (or to democracies in general, see Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi 2002, Samuels 2003). Skeptics feed on two lines of argument, the party lock and the lack of interest for reelection. We elaborate them.

3.1 The lock

Mexican reformers gave the right of reelection not to the representative but to her party. Incumbents can run for reelection if, and only if, the party that elected them to office nominates them again. Pundits dubbed this the "party lock," granting party apparatchik a veto on the representative's renomination. More often than not in competitive systems, parties let national leaders deny candidates the use of the party label if they choose to run (Ranney 1981:85). The party lock is more formidable, Mexican party leaders can veto an incumbent's renomination, *even by other parties*.[2]

As a consequence, a mayor or legislator sensing tension between core supporters' and party leaders' interests faces a predicament. Siding systematically with core supporters

[1] "Estamos en la posibilidad de que se apruebe la reelección y de que no se cumpla el objetivo, que es la verdadera representación y evaluación por parte de los votantes", see `http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf`.

[2] Until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, Brazil's *candidato nato* clause imposed the reverse relationship between party and incumbent, giving the second power to override the leadership veto on renomination (Mainwaring 1991). Major parties in the United Kingdom rely on a mix, district parties selecting candidates that the national party can veto (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010).

might expose her to the wrath of the leadership and, as retaliation, she may be prevented from being on the ballot—keeping the leadership discipline mechanism of single-term limits (Weldon 1997) intact. Towards the end of their post, Merino, Fierro and Zarkin (2013) claim that"we shall gain no political leverage over representatives, nor shall government be more responsive... with this pseudo-reelection." In other words, skeptics expect the incumbency effect in Mexico will be negligible, at best.[3]

We can also view the problem as a shade of grays instead of black or white. Fully canceling incumbency effects and the electoral connection requires incumbents *fully* lacking resources to fend off leadership pressure. Some politicians are, no doubt, in such a position—freshmen, personal appointees, etc. But any resource of this nature opens some room for negotiation between incumbent and party. This is the essence of legislative party theory (Aldrich and Rohde 2001, Cox and McCubbins 2007).

One resource is electoral competitiveness. Zaller (1998) models incumbents as prize fighters and the electoral arena as the selection mechanism: winners demonstrate having "natural advantages" than defeated challengers. Personal electoral machines, political dynasties, or personal charisma are some elements feeding incumbents' natural advantage. From this perspective, the party can stubbornly prevent a prize fighter's attempts to be on the ballot, but does so at the peril of losing the district. The party lock may prevent the incumbent from entering the race, but she retains the option of moving the machinery and resources making her competitive to another campaign, ensuring that her party is beaten.

Sketching a model might clarify. The vote share in the district or municipality has three components: $P+C+O=100$. Here P is the party's expected vote percentage without the incumbent's machine, C is the vote that the incumbent can mobilize personally, and O is the opposition's expected vote. Any candidate controlling $C \geq |P-O|$ votes is in a position to impose her re-nomination to party leaders.[4] Anyone resourceful enough should therefore negotiate with the party without removing the electoral connection completely.

Whether or not this shades of gray approach is correct can be resolved empirically. We

[3]Lessening incumbents' independence was in the minds of lawmakers. The reform bill's summary (*exposición de motivos*) does not even mention the party lock. But leaders' fears of losing their firm grip upon elected officeholders intentions transpired in the floor debate. The diario de los debates for the December 3rd, 2013 session, when the reported bill was considered and approved, registers the intervention (for the report) of Sen. Javier Corral (PAN–Chihuahua). Legislators' opportunism against their parties was mentioned: "I would have preferred a direct reelection" he claimed, "but also believe that this report mitigates... political turncoats" Later on, introducing a failed amendment to delete the party lock, Sen. Armando Ríos Piter (PRD–Guerrero) further elaborated: "it is important to drop it", he argued, "[b]ecause if we wish the evaluation be made by citizens we cannot let it depend on a political party" whom, in roll calls, will be watchful that the "legislator does not escape the sheepfold." See `http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf`.

[4]Alternation in many states, districts, and municipalities since 1989 has, in fact, been the result of such defections and party splits [Ver manuscrito q me dio FEE].

Case	Incumbents (%) who sought reelection (a)	reelected (b)	returned ($c = a \times b/100$)
United States 1990–2010	91	94	86
Chile 1993–2000	71	83	59
Brazil 1994–2002	75	66	50
Uruguay 1985–1999	61	56	34
Colombia 1994–2002	53	65	34
Mexico 2018-2024	47	72	34
Argentina 1983–2001	25	76	19

Table 1: The willing and the able to return to Congress in seven democracies. Column (a) reports the percentage of incumbents in the lower chamber that were renominated, column (b) the percentage of those renominated that won reelection for a consecutive term, and column (c) the return rate. Sources: Jones et al. (2002:658) for Argentina; Botero and Rennó (2007) for Brazil and Colombia; Navia (2000) for Chile; `https://emagar.github.io/2021-06-25-reeleccion-dipfed-6-jun.html` for Mexico (single-member-district deputies only); Altman and Chasquetti (2005) for Uruguay; `https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/reelect.php` for the U.S.

apply our procedure to this task.

3.2 The lack

Pessimism also feeds on reelection apathy, which would further dilute incumbency effects. Disinterest by Latin American politicians for reelecting to the assembly leads Morgenstern (2002) and Micozzi (2009) to distinguish between static and non-static ambitions. A look towards reelection rates in a handful of the continent's cases shows the need for Schlesinger's (1966) original intuition.

Consider three indicators comparing a handful of Latin American systems to the United States Congress in Table 1. Column a reports the percentage of lawmakers who ran again for the same office at the end of their terms, capturing the notion of static ambition: politicians pursuing a congressional career by trying to repeat in office. Variation is notable. If 9 out of 10 U.S. incumbents regularly manifest static ambition, a bare quarter did in Argentina since the return to democracy, and about half in Mexico and Colombia. Static ambition progressively rises in Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile, without any approaching the U.S. rate.

Desire requires ability for achievement, and columns b and c also report the conditional success rate (i.e., the percentage or renominated incumbents reelected) and the rate

Year	% returned
1916 (Constitutional Congress)	—
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930 (Congress size nearly halved)	42
1932	27
1934 (single-term limits effective)	0

Table 2: Reelection in the post-Revolutionary Chamber of Deputies up to 1934. Source: Godoy Rueda (2014).

of return (i.e., the percentage of all members returning to the chamber in the consecutive term), respectively. The U.S. strikes the eye again, where 94 percent fulfilled their ambition, for a 20-year average return rate of 86 percent. With the exception of Uruguay, whose short sample overlaps the collapse of two-party dominance, conditional success rates are decently high. Compounding them with the low prevalence of static ambition, however, yields remarkably low rates of return in Latin America. Brazil and Chile, with rates between 50 and 60 percent, still remained distant from the U.S. Return rates drop to one-third in Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay, and below 20 percent in Argentina (despite the second highest conditional success rate in the region).

The Mexican indicators in Table 1 are for the 2021 race only, when federal term limits were dropped (it excludes party-appointed members elected in the proportional representation tier of the mixed system from the counts). It stands second from the bottom. Is static ambition in Mexico doomed to remain at near Argentine levels? History suggests otherwise. Table 2 reports the return rate of federal deputies observed in the years prior to the adoption of single-term limits in 1934. At 18 percent, the return rate upon adoption of the Revolutionary constitution is almost indistinguishable from present-day Argentina. But it grew at rapid pace in the mid-1920s. The return rate had doubled by 1928, reaching 40 percent, *en route* to meet present-day Brazil. Progress was arrested in 1930 when, setting the stage for the centralization of authority under the PRI, reformers removed 128 of the 281 seats Congress had had in 1928, 46 percent of all, cunningly targeting opponents of Jefe Máximo Calles (see Godoy Rueda 2014:23). A stable return rate that year despite a sharp denominator drop implies that the apportionment *blitz* was orthogonal to static ambition.



Figure 1: Four clear and distinct lands arise from redistricting. FATHER and SON represent 2014 and 2017 map districts, respectively.

4 Redistricting as source of hypotheses

We examine name recognition in Coahuila. State legislators, with three-year terms, had single-term limits lifted in 2017 and their legislative district boundaries redrawn prior to the race (our focus is the sixteen single-member plurality districts, leaving the proportional representation lists of the mixed electoral system at the hind).[5] We exploit this coincidence to generate falsifiable hypotheses. The idea is simple. Incumbents who sought to return to office competed in districts more or less different from those they erstwhile represented. We expect the degree of dissimilarity in their constituents to reveal geographically differentiated patterns of name recognition.

For this purpose, we begin by identifying 'father' and 'son' districts. We construe district genealogy as Cox and Katz (2002) do. One-by-one, we compare districts in the new map (the offspring) to those in the old map, in order to identify the district it shares the most voters with. This is the district's father. Figure 1 pictures a Venn diagram of one father (from the 2014 map) and son (from the 2017 map) pair. Ovals are simplified versions of district boundaries (minus geographic accidents typical of real-world maps). Four terrains can be distinguished. Intersection r is land (and the voters who live there) that the son has retained from its father. By construction, r is never empty (else the district would be an orphan). To the left is land l that the son has lost from the father by the redistricting, and to

[5]The northern state of Coahuila, which shares a border with Texas in the United States, was the first instance where politicians could reelect consecutively after the 2014 electoral reform. As part of the same reform, state electoral boards were stripped of redistricting authority. The new national election board, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) was put in charge of periodically redrawing state district lines, and was obliged to produce new maps for the first post-reform legislative elections. See Trelles, Altman, Magar and McDonald (2016) and Magar (2017).

Son district (2017)	Father district (2014)	S	Incumbent	Revealed ambition
XII-Ramos Arizpe	V-Ramos Arizpe	1.000	Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	**static**
I-Acuña	XV-Acuña	.798	Georgina Cano Torralva	**static**
II-Piedras Negras	XVI-Piedras Negras	.791	Sonia Villarreal Pérez	progressive
X-Matamoros	VII-Torreón	.705	Shamir Fernández Hernández	none
XIV-Saltillo	I-Saltillo	.700	Javier Díaz González	**static**
IX-Torreón	VIII-Torreón	.650	Irma Castaño Orozco	none
VII-Matamoros	VI-Torreón	.618	Verónica Martínez García	none
XVI-Saltillo	II-Saltillo	.553	Francisco Tobías Hernández	none
III-Sabinas	XIII-Múzquiz	.551	Antonio Nerio Maltos	none
XIII-Saltillo	IV-Saltillo	.459	Martha Garay Cadena	none
IV-San Pedro	X-San Pedro	.444	Ana Isabel Durán Piña	progressive
V-Monclova	XII-Monclova	.408	Melchor Sánchez de la Fuente	none
VI-Frontera	XI-Frontera	.377	Lencho Siller Linaje	progressive
XIII-Saltillo	III-Saltillo	.236	José María Fraustro Siller	none
IX-Torreón	IX-Torreón	.204	Luis Gurza Jaidar	none
III-Sabinas	XIV-Sabinas	.197	Martha Morales Iribarrén	none

Table 3: District similarity index S in the state of Coahuila. Mexican legislative districts rely on Roman numerals for identification, hyphenated in the Table with the district's administrative seat (*cabecera distrital*.)

the right lies land w that the son has won from one or more other old-map districts. Lands l and w represent change in the map, and one, the other, or both could be empty. Land n not belonging to any of the ovals is no man's land, with no interest whatsoever for the incumbent at hand.

The approach quantifies the degree of change in any incumbent's electorate brought by redistricting. Comparing the land father and son share in common with land lost and won yields an index of district similarity S_i for district i. If $\texttt{father}_i$ and $\texttt{son}_i$ denote, respectively, voters in the father and son districts, then $S_i = \frac{\texttt{father}_i \cap \texttt{son}_i}{\texttt{father}_i \cup \texttt{son}_i} = \frac{r}{l+r+w}$. The index reaches maximum value $S_j = 1$ when father and son are identical (i.e., $l = w = \varnothing$), dropping gradually as intersection r shrinks relative to $l + w$. Index S tends to zero when father and son intersect minimally (as r is never empty, zero is not reached).

Table 3 reports Coahuila's district similarity in 2017. We operationalize S with electoral *secciones* an not voters directly.[6] The survey we rely on below identified the sección

[6]Data is from INE's official election returns and redistricting archives, available at `www.ine.mx`. *Secciones electorales* are analogous to U.S. census tracts (median sección population in the 2010 census was 1,280, with a maximum at 79,232; median tract population in the 2010 census was 3,995, with a maximum at 37,452). Secciones are the basic building blocks for district cartography. The old (called here 2014 for clarity, but inaugurated in 2011) and new (2017) maps relate 1,710 secciones in the state to 16 legislative districts (available at `https://github.com/emagar/mxDistritos/blob/master/mapasComparados/loc/coaLoc.csv`.) With our operationalization, S's value is the share of sec-

	Incumbency effect	Campaign effect	Total effect
1	$r > w$	$r = w$	$r > w$
2	$r > l$	$r > l$	$r > l$
3	$r > n$	$r > n$	$r > n$
4	$l \,?\, w$	$l < w$	$l \,?\, w$
5	$l > n$	$l = n$	$l > n$
6	$w > n$	$w > n$	$w > n$

Table 4: Incumbency and campaign effects in name recognition (hypotheses). Cells give expected relations in name recognition in the areas defined in Table 1. Thus, the first line indicates that incumbency causes higher name recognition among voters in land retained than those in land incorporated, a difference not caused by the campaign effect; combining them gives the reported total effect.

where interviewees registered for voting, so this suffices for the test. The median, located between districts XVI and III, shares only 55 percent secciones when reunited with its father. Similarity looks scant: if the incumbent ran again for consecutive reelection and knew personally every voter she represented during the term that is expiring, she would recognize only a bit more than half of her new constituents. *S*'s inter-quartile range is .4–.7.

From the electoral connection's perspective, changes of this sort in district geography should discourage static ambition, pushing incumbents to retirement. And so it did. We lack evidence to claim that redistricting, and not something else, forced thirteen of sixteen SMD incumbents to not seek reelection. But the fact is that the three who did represented districts with much higher similarity indexes (the right-most column in the table reports incumbents' revealed ambition), which is consistent with this interpretation. Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga's constituents in Ramos Arizpe in fact changed nothing at all (she ran in the only district with $S = 1$). Georgina Cano Torralva from Acuña and Javier Díaz González from Saltillo retained 8 and 7 of every 10 voters, respectively.

Eric: Aquí voy

For our purpose, redistricting offers leverage to separate and measure different effects in incumbents' name recognition among constituents, summarized in Table 4. Two forces must be distinguished as they operate jointly on name recognition: incumbency (discussed above) and campaign effects.

ciones shared by father and son share vis-à-vis secciones in any of them. If electoral secciones all had identical populations, our operationalization would be identical to Cox and Katz's, who rely on shared population instead. As population heterogeneity rises, so do discrepancies between both versions of *S* across districts. Electoral secciones have relatively homogeneous populations nationwide: 99 percent had between 100 and 5,700 inhabitants in the 2010 census.

The bulk of effort in a legislative campaign takes place in the district (Langston n.d.). Billboards and wall paintings, printed flier distribution and robocalls, meetings with neighbors alone or in the company of candidates higher in the ticket, or even vote-buying with construction material and debit cards are some examples of focalized effort. The effect in the candidate's name recognition occurs *throughout the district* (i.e., the son). In contrast, the effect of incumbency in name recognition occurs in the area that father and son share. This generates our first predictions.

The probability that a voter picked at random among constituents (in lands r or w) recognizes the candidate's name is substantially higher than a voter picked at random from outside the district (in l or in n). By itself, the campaign effect generates no difference in recognition between areas r and i. Neither does it among l and n. The second column in Table 4 reports these predictions. They can be summarized as $r = w > l = n$.

On the other hand, incumbency has an effect in area l to some degree only. The incumbent used to represent voters in both r and l. Upon seeing the new map, she realized having lost fragment l and its voters. She must have adjusted her finite effort: stop cultivating voters in area l in order to start doing it in area w. Despite re-balancing, previous effort in l (which includes the effect of the previous campaign) does not immediately vanish. Unlike r, whose voters experienced such effort for three full years, area w's experienced it less long. The first column reports these predictions: $r > w$ and $r > l$.

l ? g

> n

Incumbents running for reelection generate the sum of effects (reported in the third column), challengers generate campaign effects only. Vea el texto.

5 Data and methods

We analyze a face-to-face survey from May 19–21, 2017 in Coahuila, two weeks before the state legislative election (concurrent with a gubernatorial and municipal races).[7] The survey includes questions on name recognition inspired from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987). We coded name recognition indicators for six incumbents in Table 3 (all representing single-member districts). Three ran for reelection (static ambition) and three for election to municipal office (progressive ambition). We also coded indicators for three proportional-representation lawmakers who ran for municipal office.

[7]The survey was commissioned to Alejandro Moreno by *El Financiero* newspaper (published May 25). A sample of 1,008 registered voters was interviewed in households. Urban/rural electoral secciones were stratified, then a random sample taken to select 72 points throughout the state where interviews took place. The 95-percent confidence interval of inferences has a $\pm 3.1\%$ error. The non-response rate was 32%.

In all cases, we relied on close-ended questions mentioning the incumbent's name while asking interviewees how much they remembered it (see the appendix) to code nine dependent variables. An incumbent's name recognition indicator $\texttt{recognize}_i$ takes value 1 if respondent i expressed remembering his/her name in any degree; 0 otherwise. *Descriptive here.

We analyze name recognition with equation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(\texttt{recognize}_i) = \beta_0 &+ \beta_1 \texttt{retained}_i + \beta_2 \texttt{lost}_i + \beta_3 \texttt{delivered}_i \\ &+ \beta_4 \texttt{interested}_i + \beta_5 \texttt{smartphone}_i + \beta_6 \texttt{panista}_i \\ &+ \beta_7 \texttt{priista}_i + \beta_8 \texttt{morenista}_i + \text{error}_i.\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The model includes two geographic indicators: $\texttt{retained}_i$ equals 1 if respondent i is a voter registered in area r, 0 otherwise; and $\texttt{lost}_i$ equals 1 if respondent i is a registered voter in area l, 0 otherwise. The geographic regressors are mutually-exclusive but not exhaustive, thus avoiding the dummy trap. The omitted category is for respondents in area n, so these indicators' coefficients are interpreted against it. The model also includes indicators for incumbent responsiveness ($\texttt{delivered}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent said the incumbent did something for the district, 0 otherwise), for interest in politics ($\texttt{interested}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent expressed interest in politics, 0 otherwise), for socioeconomic status ($\texttt{smartphone}_i$ equals 1 if the respondent said owning such device, 0 otherwise), and controls for partisanship ($\texttt{panista}_i$, $\texttt{priista}_i$, and $\texttt{morenista}_i$ equal 1 if the respondent self-identified with the party in question, 0 otherwise).

Geographic variables test hypotheses. We hold three expectations: that variable $\texttt{retained}_i$'s coefficient is positive, that $\texttt{lost}_i$'s is positive, and that the first coefficient is larger than the second. Note that the equation excludes an indicator for area g. This is a weakness in our data and research design. Random sampling of survey points produced no secciones in areas incorporated by legislative districts. This shuts out the possibility to test some hypotheses, and leaves us less confident of separating incumbency from campaign effects.

Predictions $r > n$ and $r > l$ are common to both effects in Table 4. Only $l > n$ owes to incumbency only, so confirmation that $\texttt{lost}_i$ gets a positive coefficient is not attributable to campaigns. Future design should make sure to include respondents in area g in order to get more separating predictions. We might also have included questions on challenger and open-seat candidate name recognition (they only experience campaign effects). A second survey at the start of the campaign would also have helped (campaigns swell incumbent and challenger name recognition in time, but incumbents should start from a substantially higher level).

Incumbent	District/ municipio	Margin	Secciones l	r	g	n	Interviewees l	r	g	n
A. *Static ambition (SMD→SMD)*										
Javier PRI	Saltillo	−12	14	64	13	1,619	14	56	0	938
Lily PRI	R. Arispe	+14	0	117	0	1,593	0	56	0	952
Gina PRI	Acuña	−17	0	78	21	1,611	0	70	0	938
B. *Progressive ambition (SMD→municipio)*										
Lencho PRI	Frontera	+8	83	41	0	1,586	42	28	0	938
Sonia PRI	P. Negras	+12	0	88	0	1,622	0	56	0	952
AnaIsabel PRI	San Pedro	+3	48	75	0	1,587	14	42	0	952
C. *Progressive ambition (PR→municipio)*										
Armando PAN	Frontera	−8	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Lariza PAN	P. Negras	−12	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Leonel PPC	Matamoros	−7	1,648	62	0	0	966	42	0	0

Table 5: Incumbents and their terrain. Members with static ambition—from a single member district (SMD) running for a SMD—are distinguished from those with two types of progressive ambition—to a municipality from a SMD and from a PR seat. The margin is the percentage difference between the winner and runner-up, positive if the incumbent won, negative otherwise. The first set of l, r, g, n reports the number of electoral secciones (of 1,710 total in the state) in each category of terrain. The second reports the number of interviewees sampled (out of 1,008) in each terrain category.

	Hypothesis		
Model and incumbent	$r > n$	$l > n$	$r > l$
SMD, static ambition			
1 Javier Díaz González	$< .001$	.029	.221
2 Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	$< .001$	—	—
3 Gina Cano Torralva	$< .001$	—	—
SMD, progressive ambition			
4 Lencho Siller	$< .001$	.003	.001
5 Sonia Villarreal Pérez	$< .001$	—	—
6 Ana Isabel Durán Piña	$< .001$	.036	$< .001$
PR, progressive ambition			
7 Armando Pruneda Valdez	.030	—	—
8 Lariza Montiel Luis	.385	—	—
9 Leonel Contreras Pámanes	$< .001$	—	—

Table 6: Hypothesis tests. Cells report one-tailed p-values. The top-right cell, for instance, indicates that the null associated to model 1's $r > l$ hypothesis can only be rejected at the .221 level, way above the conventional .05 confidence level. Columns 1 and 2 test that coefficients of `retained` and `lost` are positive, column 3 that `retained`'s coefficient is greater than `lost`'s.

Table 7 in the appendix reports full regression results. In the text we only summarize relevant hypothesis tests in Table 6. Most clear the test. But many missing to be confident that effects are from incumbent and not campaign.

We illustrate results through simulation in Figure 2.

6 Conclusion

Despite an incomplete research design, we uncover evidence of name recognition consistent with the electoral connection model in Coahuila.

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

Figure 2: The probability of name recognition (x-axis). We portray simulations with Bayesian versions of regression models. The violet density is for respondents in area *n*, the green (when applicable) for respondents in area *l*, and the pink for respondents in area *r*. *With clear gaps between them, we expect the purple to lie to the left, the pink to the right, the green between them.* All other controls held constant to represent a PAN-identifier with a smartphone, who said the incumbent has delivered but is uninterested in politics.

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Appendix

6.1 Regression results

6.2 Survey questions

Thirteen items in the survey questionnaire involved reelection and name recognition (from question 20 to question 25.i) . We used questions 25.a–25.i to code our dependent vari-

	(1) Javier	(2) Lily	(3) Gina	(4) Lencho	(5) Sonia	(6) A.Isabel	(7) Armando	(8) Lariza	(9) Leonel
retained	1.85***	2.37***	4.91***	3.10***	3.02***	4.59***	1.10*	−.22	2.93***
	(.33)	(.33)	(.41)	(.43)	(.32)	(.44)	(.58)	(.75)	(.38)
lost	1.29*			1.27***		1.46*			
	(.68)			(.47)		(.81)			
delivered	.86***	.76***	1.46***	.51*	.93***	.26	.51	.85***	.26
	(.25)	(.27)	(.34)	(.30)	(.27)	(.34)	(.37)	(.27)	(.33)
interested	.35	1.03***	1.34***	.82***	.52**	.74**	.71**	.28	.57*
	(.24)	(.27)	(.34)	(.28)	(.26)	(.33)	(.36)	(.27)	(.31)
smartphone	−.27	.37	−.18	−.47*	.21	−.05	−.43	.26	−.42
	(.24)	(.27)	(.31)	(.28)	(.26)	(.31)	(.35)	(.27)	(.30)
panista	.15	−.11	−.03	1.18***	.02	.80*	.78*	.34	1.15***
	(.39)	(.41)	(.52)	(.35)	(.41)	(.44)	(.47)	(.39)	(.41)
priista	.37	.15	−.01	−.21	.17	.74**	.43	.19	.16
	(.28)	(.30)	(.38)	(.37)	(.29)	(.35)	(.41)	(.31)	(.39)
morenista	−.07	.59	.26	.76	−1.17		−.26	−1.01	.88
	(.63)	(.51)	(.74)	(.55)	(1.04)		(1.05)	(1.03)	(.56)
Intercept	−3.03***	−3.82***	−4.45***	−3.48***	−3.49***	−3.99***	−3.87***	−3.29***	−3.58***
	(.25)	(.30)	(.39)	(.30)	(.28)	(.35)	(.37)	(.28)	(.30)
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	-262.32	-231.34	-169.84	-205.60	-235.20	-175.64	-147.10	-229.85	-182.89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Table 7: Regression results. All models estimated with logit, standard errors in parentheses.

ables. Responses much/some/little (*mucho/algo/poco*) coded as 1 in the incumbent's name recognition indicator; 0 otherwise.

* Add descriptives.

We reproduce the relevant items in Spanish here.

```
20 ¿Está usted a favor, en contra o le es indiferente la reelección
consecutiva de legisladores?

1) A favor 2) En contra
3) Le es indiferente
4) NS/NC

21 El 3 de abril iniciaron las campañas para renovar el Congreso del Estado.
Si yo le preguntara los nombres de los candidatos a diputado en este
distrito, ¿usted me podría decir todos los nombres, algunos nombres o no
recuerda ningún nombre en este momento?

1) Todos 2) Algunos
3) No recuerda
4) No contestó

22 Ahora piense por favor en los diputados locales actuales. Si yo le
preguntara las cosas que ha hecho su diputado por esta comunidad, ¿usted
podría mencionarme muchas cosas, algunas, diría que no hizo nada o no
recuerda en este momento? [5=NS/NC]

1) Muchas
2) Algunas
3) No hizo nada
4) No recuerda

23 Si su actual diputado compitiera para buscar la reelección,
¿usted votaría por él o no votaría por él?

1) Sí votaría por él
2) No votaría por él
3) NS/NC (NO LEER)

24 Con base en el trabajo realizado por su actual diputado,
¿cree que merecería ser reelecto en su cargo o no?

[1=Sí; 2=No; 3=NC]
```

25 Le voy a leer unos nombres, para cada uno, ¿podría decirme si le es muy conocido, algo conocido, poco o nada conocido?

[1=Muy conocido; 2=Algo; 3=Poco; 4=Nada conocido; 5=NS/NC]

a Javier Díaz González
b Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga
c Georgina Cano Torralva
d Ana Isabel Durán
e Sonia Villareal
f Lariza Montiel
g Armando Pruneda
h Leonel Contreras Pámanes
i Florencio ‘‘Lencho’’ Siller