

Redistricting and the separation of incumbency and campaign effects: name recognition in Coahuila*

Eric Magar
ITAM

Alejandro Moreno
ITAM

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Abstract

Estudiamos el reconocimiento del nombre de candidatos al Congreso del estado de Coahuila en 2017. El fenómeno ha sido asociado con el esfuerzo del representante en su distrito para preservar su reelegibilidad. Aprovechamos la redistribución del estado que antecedió a la elección para detectar diferencias en reconocimiento atribuibles al efecto del ocupante y no al efecto de campaña. Aunque la cobertura muestral de la encuesta preelectoral que usamos impide una separación cabal de los dos efectos, detectamos diferenciales en reconocimiento de nombre significativos y consistentes con la teoría. Ofrecemos tres diseños de investigación alternativos para que futuros estudios de opinión separen el efecto de ocupante (*incumbency effect*) en elecciones que permitirán la reelección consecutiva a partir de 2018 en México.

1 Introduction

Mexico inaugurates the consecutive reelection of lawmakers at the state and federal levels, and of municipal governments in all but two states. For eight decades, every elected officer had to vacate the seat at the end of the term. Reelection is a major change in electoral institutions. Political scientists in American politics see it as the cornerstone of democratic accountability, the key of what Madison (1961) called external checks to the government.¹ Those with ambition to keep their job can stay another term if they convince constituents to support them again. The representative delivers in exchange for votes.

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¹See Schlesinger (1966), Mayhew (1974), Fenno (1978), Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987), McCubbins and Sullivan (1987), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Weingast and Marshall (1988), Jacobson (1997), among others.

From the U.S./ standpoint, institutional change adopted along the 2014 electoral reform has potential to instill much welcome oxygen to representation relations of Mexico's young democracy. But a comparative perspective serves as a reminder that there is no guarantee that such potential will be fulfilled. While most Latin American democracies allow legislative reelection, few exhibit return rates even remotely comparable to those observed in the U.S. Congress. In fact, pessimistic forecasts of the irrelevance and likely failure of Mexico's reform accompanied its adoption (Merino, Fierro and Zarkin 2013).

The paper elaborates reasons to be optimistic and those to be pessimistic, and examines the case of Coahuila, a northern state bordering the U.S.²

2 Political ambition and democracy

Contemporary legislative studies generate key hypotheses from Mayhew's (1974) model of lawmaker. The iconic work on the electoral connection of members of the U.S. Congress presents legislators as automatons with a unique goal: reelection. The crucial premise in the argument is motivational: only one spring moves the incumbent, the ambition to stay another term in office. Mayhew does not deny that other worries might leave incumbents sleepless—turning some priority program into policy, climbing the chamber's hierarchy, her historical legacy are just some examples. But none could be achieved if the incumbent failed at her attempt to reelect. Despite its parsimony, the model explains most activity that representatives engage in while in Congress.

Another premise is instrumental: reelection is a function of the incumbent's reputation among constituents. In personalistic systems, such as the U.S., reputation is mostly individual—to such degree that Mayhew discards the possibility that heterogeneous American parties could be of theoretical interest (but revisionists rescued party relevance in Mayhew's framework, Aldrich 1995, Cox and McCubbins 1993). The instrumental premise merits three comments.

First, it does not involve every constituent in the district but a subset. Groups making reelection much harder if they dropped their support for the incumbent are more important than others. Cox and McCubbins (1986) call them *core constituents*. From this perspective, it is rational and easier to work in preserving a coalition that made you win than attempting to build a new one.

Second, coalition maintenance requires delivering results, channeling new benefits to the core while preserving existing ones. As in all human relations, perceptions matter as much as substance: the core must give the incumbent credit for delivering.

²There is institutional variance among states. See Magar (2017).

With collective production goods, where each member's effort is not immediately evident, the allocation of responsibility is far from automatic. Success has many parents. Thus the importance of particularistic goods, in contrast to more universalistic ones. Their distinguishing trait is that their production and/or delivery depends on the incumbent's personal effort (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Classic examples are from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987): constituency service (service responsiveness) and spending earmarked for the district (allocation responsiveness). Incumbents have full control to direct pork where the political logic indicates, creating (this is crucial) a responsibility link.

To the extent that Mayhew's logic intersects with ascription problems, theory expects legislators to devote substantial time to cultivate their personal vote through delivery of particularistic goods. As a result, a closer link develops between lawmaker and her core constituents than the rest of the citizenry. As a consequence, better incumbent's name recognition is expected in the district than beyond.

3 A Minimal Effects Hypothesis

We face the possibility of approving reelection
while failing to meet its goal, that is true
representation and evaluation by voters
—Senator Ríos Piter³

It is far from evident that the North American electoral connection model can be extended to the Mexican democracy. Sceptics feed on two lines of argument, the partisan padlock and a more general lack of interest for reelection. We elaborate them.

3.1 The partisan padlock

Reformers in 2014 gave the right of reelection not to the representative but the party. Mexican incumbents can face constituents again in a general election if, and only if, the party that elected them to office nominates them again. This “padlock”, as it has been called, give the party nomenclatura an absolute veto on the representative's renomination, *even by other parties*.⁴

³“Estamos en la posibilidad de que se apruebe la reelección y de que no se cumpla el objetivo, que es la verdadera representación y evaluación por parte de los votantes”, see http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf.

⁴Until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, Brazil's *candidato nato* clause imposed the reverse relationship between party and representative, giving the second power to override the leadership veto on renomination (Mainwaring 1991). The United Kingdom uses a mix, giving the national and district parties

As a consequence, the mayor or legislator sensing tension between constituents' and party leaders' interests will face a predicament. Siding systematically with constituents will expose her to the wrath of the party and, as retaliation, she may be prevented from being on the ballot—the same source of discipline towards legislative leaders as single term limits (Weldon 1997). Merino, Fierro and Zarkin (2013) go as far as claiming that the padlock will fully remove the beneficial effects of consecutive reelection.

The institution looks intended to lessen incumbents' independence. As often happens with negotiation between legislative parties, reformers' intentions are easier to gauge by listening to opponents — the introduced bill's summary (*exposición de motivos*) does not even mention the padlock. Their plenary interventions seem to confirm leaders' fears of losing the firm grip they have held upon elected officeholders.⁵

Discussion so far has been black or white: whether or not consecutive reelection will develop a U.S.-style electoral connection in Mexico. A shade of grays seems more more attractive theoretically. Fully canceling the electoral connection requires incumbents /emphfully lacking resources to defend from the leadership. Some politicians are, no doubt, in such a position — freshmen, personal appointees, etc. But *any* resource of this nature opens room for negotiation between incumbent and party. This is the essence of legislative party theory (Aldrich and Rohde 2001, Cox and McCubbins 1993).

One resource we have in mind is electoral competitiveness. Zaller (1998) models incumbents as prize fighters and the electoral arena as a selection mechanism: winners demonstrate better adaptation than defeated challengers. Personal electoral machines, political dynasties, or personal charisma are some elements feeding incumbents “natural advantages”.

From this perspective, a party can stubbornly prevent a prize fighter's attempts to be on the ballot towards reelection, but does so the peril of losing the district. Given the padlock, the incumbent will be prevented from running at all in the consecutive race, but has the

mutual vetoes on nomination [*cite].

⁵The diario de los debates for the December 3rd, 2013 session, when the reported bill was discussed and approved, registers the intervention (for the report) of Sen. Javier Corral (PAN–Chihuahua). He addressed legislators' opportunism against their parties: “I would have preferred a direct reelection” he claimed, “but I also believe that the report mitigates a phenomenon that cannot be ignored, that of political turncoats” (“Me hubiera gustado una reelección directa, pero también creo que el dictamen se encarga de un fenómeno que no podemos negar, el transfuguismo político”). Later on, Sen. Armando Ríos Piter (PRD–Guerrero) further elaborated while introducing a failed amendment to delete the padlock: “it is important to drop it”, he argued, “[b]ecause if we wish the evaluation be made by citizens we cannot let it depend on a political party” whom, in roll calls, will be watchful that the “legislador does not escape the sheepfold” (“es importante quitar[lo]... [p]orque si queremos que la evaluación la hagan los ciudadanos pues no podemos dejar que dependa de un partido político” que, en las votaciones, velará por que el “legislador no se salga del redil.” See http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/135_DOF_10feb14.pdf.

Case	Incumbents (%) who		
	sought reelection (a)	reelected (b)	returned (c = a × b/100)
Argentina 1983–2001	25	76	19
Brazil 1995	70	62	43
Chile 1993–2000	71	83	59
United States 1990–2010	91	94	85

Table 1: The willing and the able to return to Congress in four democracies. Columns (a) reports the percentage of incumbents in the lower chamber that were re-nominated, column (b) the percentage of them that reelected for another consecutive term, and column (c) the return rate. Sources: Jones et al. (2002:658) for Argentina; Morgenstern (2002:415–6) for Brazil; Navia (2000) for Chile; <https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/reelect.php> for the U.S.

option of moving the machinery and resources to another party.⁶

Those with enough resources should therefore negotiate with the party without removing the electoral connection completely. In any event, whether or not the shades of gray argument is correct can be resolved empirically. This paper does a first attempt to test it.

3.2 Lack of interest towards reelection

Pessimists also feed on reelection apathy. The lack of interest for reelecting to the assembly is so frequent among Latin American politicians that Morgenstern (2002) and Micozzi (2009) argue in favor of distinguishing between static and progressive ambitions. A look towards reelection rates in some of the continent’s cases shows the usefulness of Schlesinger’s (1966) original notion.

Consider, in Table 1, the values of three indicators for the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and U.S. Congresses. The first indicator is the percentage of incumbents who ran again for the same office at the end of their terms (column a), capturing static ambition: incumbents who bet for pursuing a career in the chamber and therefore tried to repeat in office. Variation is notable. If 9 out of 10 U.S. incumbents regularly manifest static ambition, a bare quarter did in Argentina since the return to democracy. Brazil and Chile occupy intermediate

⁶A sketch of a model is as follows. The vote share in the district or municipality has three components: $P + C + O = 100$ where P is the party’s expected vote without the incumbent’s machine, C is the vote share that the incumbent can mobilize personally, and O is the opposition’s expected vote share. Any candidate controlling $C \geq |P - O|$ votes is in a position to impose his re-nomination to party leaders. Alternation in many states, districts, and municipalities since 1989 has been the result of such defections and splits towards another party [Ver manuscrito q me dio FEE].

Year	% returned
1916 (Constitutional Assembly)	—
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930	42
1932	27
1934 (single-term limits effective)	0

Table 2: Reelection in the Chamber of deputies up to 1934. Source: Godoy Rueda (2014).

positions, although more similar to the U.S. than Argentina.

Because desire is not the same as ability, the Table also reports the conditional success rate (that is, among renominated incumbents only, column b). The case of the U.S. strikes the eye again, where 94 percent fulfilled their ambition. Below, Chilean incumbents' conditional success rate, at 78 percent, is quite impressive too. In Brazil it was more moderate, at 62 percent. The product of indicators (a) and (b) returns the third one: incumbents' rate of consecutive return to the chamber (column c). The four cases cover most of the range: from 19 percent in Argentina (despite a pretty high conditional success rate) to 85 percent in the U.S.

Incumbents without static ambition fall in two categories: those with progressive ambition (who ran for a different office) and those with no ambition (who retired). The question of interest is which category will Mexican incumbents mostly populate and which they will shun in the near future? Will there be little if any static ambition, as in Argentina? It is improbable that it becomes near universal, as in the United States, but is there room to become similar to Brazil or even Chile?

History suggests that there might be. Table 2 reports the return rate of federal deputies observed by Godoy Rueda (2014) in the years prior to the adoption of single-term limits. The evidence is interesting and suggestive. The start of the series, when the Revolutionary constitution was adopted, bears similarity to present-day Argentina (just 18 percent of constitutional assembly members became deputies in the XXVIIth Legislature of 1917–18). But the return rate grew at an accelerated pace in the second half of the 1920s. By 1928 it had doubled, reaching 40 percent. It then stabilized and dropped sharply when the




Figure 1: Four clear and distinct lands arise from redistricting. FATHER and SON represent 2014 and 2017 map districts, respectively.

reelection ban could be foreseen.⁷

4 Redistricting as source of hypotheses

We examine name recognition in Coahuila, whose incumbents legislators could reelect consecutively in 2017. As in the rest of the country, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) redrew the boundaries of the sixteen state legislative districts in 2015 (Trelles, Altman, Margar and McDonald 2016). We exploit this coincidence to generate falsifiable hypotheses. The idea is simple. Incumbents who sought to return to office competed in districts more or less different from those they had represented. We hope that the degree of dissimilarity in their constituents manifests in differentiated patterns of name recognition.

To set the test, we start by identifying ‘father’ and ‘son’ districts. We construe district genealogy as Cox and Katz (2002) do. We compare, one-by-one, districts in the new maps (the offspring) to those in the old map, in order to detect which they share the most voters with. This is the district’s father. Figure 1 pictures a Venn diagram of a father (from the 2014 map) and son (from the 2017 map). Ovals are simplified versions of district boundaries (minus geographic accidents typical of real-world maps). Four terrains can be distinguished. Intersection r is land (and the voter who live there) from the father that the son has retained. By construction, r is never empty (else the district would have no father). To its left is land l from the father that the son has lost by the redistricting, and to its right

⁷46 percent of the congressional districts were eliminated before the 1930 election—from 281 members, the chamber dropped to 153 only, see Godoy Rueda (2014:23). Since the return rate remained at 42 percent despite the sharp drop in the denominator shows that a good number of incumbents with static ambition were targeted and left orphans with no district.

Son district (2017)	Father district (2014)	S	Incumbent	Revealed ambition
XII-Ramos Arizpe	V-Ramos Arizpe	1.000	Lily Gutiérrez B.	static
I-Acuña	XV-Acuña	.798	Georgina Cano T.	static
II-Piedras Negras	XVI-Piedras Negras	.791	Sonia Villarreal P.	progressive
X-Matamoros	VII-Torreón	.705	Shamir Fernández H.	none
XIV-Salttillo	I-Salttillo	.700	Javier Díaz G.	static
IX-Torreón	VIII-Torreón	.650	Irma Castaño O.	none
VII-Matamoros	VI-Torreón	.618	Verónica Martínez G.	none
XVI-Salttillo	II-Salttillo	.553	Francisco Tobías H.	none
III-Sabinas	XIII-Múzquiz	.551	Antonio Nerio M.	none
XIII-Salttillo	IV-Salttillo	.459	Martha Garay C.	none
IV-San Pedro	X-San Pedro	.444	Ana Isabel D.	progressive
V-Monclova	XII-Monclova	.408	Melchor Sánchez F.	none
VI-Frontera	XI-Frontera	.377	F. ‘Lencho’ Siller	progressive
XIII-Salttillo	III-Salttillo	.236	José María Fraustro S.	none
IX-Torreón	IX-Torreón	.204	Luis Gurza J.	none
III-Sabinas	XIV-Sabinas	.197	Martha Morales I.	none

Table 3: District similarity index in Coahuila

lies land i that the son has incorporated from one or more other old-map districts. Lands l and i represent change in the map, and one, the other, or both could be empty. Land n not belonging to any of the ovals is no man’s land, with no interest whatsoever for the incumbent at hand.

The approach quantifies the degree of change in an incumbent’s electorate brought by redistricting. Comparing the land father and son share in common with land lost and gained yields an index of district similarity S_j for district j . If father_j and son_j denote, respectively, voters in the father and son districts, then $S_j = \frac{\text{father}_j \cap \text{son}_j}{\text{father}_j \cup \text{son}_j} = \frac{r}{l+r+i}$. The index reaches a maximum value $S_j = 1$ when father and son are identical (i.e., $l = i = \emptyset$) and drops gradually as intersection r shrinks relative to $l + i$. The index tends to zero when father and son intersect minimally (zero is never reached because r is never empty).

We report Coahuila’s district similarity in 2017 in Table 3. We operationalize S with electoral *secciones* instead of voters. The survey we rely on identified the *sección* where interviewees registered for voting, so this suffices for the test.⁸ The median district, located

⁸With our operationalization, S ’s value is the share of *secciones* that father and son share vis-à-vis *secciones* both districts share. If electoral *secciones* all had identical populations, our operationalization would be identical to Cox y Katz’s, who rely on shared population instead of shared *secciones*. As population heterogeneity rises, so do discrepancies between both versions of S across districts. Electoral *secciones* have relatively homogeneous populations: 99 percent had between 100 and 5,700 inhabitants in the 2010 census.

	Incumbency effect	Campaign effect	Total effect
1	$r > i$	$r = i$	$r > i$
2	$r > l$	$r > l$	$r > l$
3	$r > n$	$r > n$	$r > n$
4	$l ? i$	$l < i$	$l ? i$
5	$l > n$	$l = n$	$l > n$
6	$i > n$	$i > n$	$i > n$

Table 4: Incumbency and campaign effects in name recognition (hypotheses). Cells give expected relations in name recognition in the areas defined in Table 1. Thus, the first line indicates that incumbency causes higher name recognition among voters in land retained than those in land incorporated, a difference not caused by the campaign effect; combining them gives the reported total effect.

between numbers III and XVI) in the Table, shares 55 percent secciones from the reunion with its father. Similarity looks scant: if the incumbent ran again for consecutive reelection and knew personally every citizen she represented during the term that is expiring, she would recognize only a bit more than half of her new constituents. S 's inter-quartile range is .4–.7.

From the electoral connection's perspective, changes of this sort in electoral geography should discourage static ambition among incumbents, pushing them for retirement. And so it happened. We have no evidence to claim that redistricting pushed thirteen of sixteen single-member district incumbents to not seek reelection. But it is a fact that the three who did represented districts with higher similarity indexes (the right-most column in the table reports incumbents' revealed ambition), which is consistent with the electoral connection. Lily Gutiérrez's constituents in Ramos Arizpe in fact changed nothing at all (she ran in the only district with $S = 1$). Georgina Cano from Acuña and Javier Díaz from Saltillo retained 8 and 7 of every 10 voters, respectively.

For our purpose, reistricting opens up room to separate and measure different effects in incumbents' name recognition among constituents, summarized in Table 4. Two forces must be distinguished as they operate jointly on name recognition: incumbency (discussed above) and campaign effects.

The bulk of effort in a legislative campaign takes place in the district (Langston n.d.). Billboards and wall paintings, printed flier distribution and robocalls, meetings with neighbors alone or in the company of candidates higher in the ticket, or even vote-buying with construction material and debit cards are some examples of focalized effort. The effect in the candidate's name recognition occurs *throughout the district* (i.e., the son). In contrast,

the effect of incumbency in name recognition occurs in the area that father and son share. This generates our first predictions.

The probability that a voter picked at random among constituents (in lands r or i) recognizes the candidate's name is substantially higher than a voter picked at random from outside the district (in l or in n). By itself, the campaign effect generates no difference in recognition between areas r and i . Neither does it among l and n . The second column in Table 4 reports these predictions. They can be summarized as $r = i > l = n$.

On the other hand, incumbency has an effect in area l to some degree only. The incumbent used to represent voters in both r and l . Upon seeing the new map, she realized having lost fragment l and its voters. She must have adjusted her finite effort: stop cultivating voters in area l in order to start doing it in area i . Despite re-balancing, previous effort in l (which includes the effect of the previous campaign) does not immediately vanish. Unlike r , whose voters experienced such effort for three full years, area i 's experienced it less long. The first column reports these predictions: $r > i$ and $r > l$.

$l > g$
 $> n$

Incumbents running for reelection generate the sum of effects (reported in the third column), challengers generate campaign effects only. *Vea el texto.*

5 Data and methods

We analyze a face-to-face survey from May 19–21, 2017 in Coahuila, two weeks before the state legislative election (concurrent with a gubernatorial and municipal races).⁹ The survey includes questions on name recognition inspired from Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987). We coded name recognition indicators for six incumbents in Table 3 (all representing single-member districts). Three ran for reelection (static ambition) and three for election to municipal office (progressive ambition). We also coded indicators for three proportional-representation lawmakers who ran for municipal office.

In all cases, we relied on close-ended questions mentioning the incumbent's name while asking interviewees how much they remembered it (see the appendix) to code nine dependent variables. An incumbent's name recognition indicator `recognizei` takes value 1 if respondent i expressed remembering his/her name in any degree; 0 otherwise. *Descriptive here.

⁹The survey was commissioned to Alejandro Moreno by *El Financiero* newspaper (published May 25). A sample of 1,008 registered voters was interviewed in households. Urban/rural electoral secciones were stratified, then a random sample taken to select 72 points throughout the state where interviews took place. The 95-percent confidence interval of inferences has a $\pm 3.1\%$ error. The non-response rate was 32%.

We analyze name recognition with equation

$$\begin{aligned} \text{logit}(\text{recognize}_i) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{retained}_i + \beta_2 \text{lost}_i + \beta_3 \text{delivered}_i \\ & + \beta_4 \text{interested}_i + \beta_5 \text{smartphone}_i + \beta_6 \text{panista}_i \\ & + \beta_7 \text{priista}_i + \beta_8 \text{morenista}_i + \text{error}_i. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

The model includes two geographic indicators: retained_i equals 1 if respondent i is a voter registered in area r , 0 otherwise; and lost_i equals 1 if respondent i is a registered voter in area l , 0 otherwise. The geographic regressors are mutually-exclusive but not exhaustive, thus avoiding the dummy trap. The omitted category is for respondents in area n , so these indicators' coefficients are interpreted against it. The model also includes indicators for incumbent responsiveness (delivered_i equals 1 if the respondent said the incumbent did something for the district, 0 otherwise), for interest in politics (interested_i equals 1 if the respondent expressed interest in politics, 0 otherwise), for socioeconomic status (smartphone_i equals 1 if the respondent said owning such device, 0 otherwise), and controls for partisanship (panista_i , priista_i , and morenista_i equal 1 if the respondent self-identified with the party in question, 0 otherwise).

Geographic variables test hypotheses. We hold three expectations: that variable retained_i 's coefficient is positive, that lost_i 's is positive, and that the first coefficient is larger than the second. Note that the equation excludes an indicator for area g . This is a weakness in our data and research design. Random sampling of survey points produced no secciones in areas incorporated by legislative districts. This shuts out the possibility to test some hypotheses, and leaves us less confident of separating incumbency from campaign effects.

Predictions $r > n$ and $r > l$ are common to both effects in Table 4. Only $l > n$ owes to incumbency only, so confirmation that lost_i gets a positive coefficient is not attributable to campaigns. Future design should make sure to include respondents in area g in order to get more separating predictions. We might also have included questions on challenger and open-seat candidate name recognition (they only experience campaign effects). A second survey at the start of the campaign would also have helped (campaigns swell incumbent and challenger name recognition in time, but incumbents should start from a substantially higher level).

Table 7 in the appendix reports full regression results. In the text we only summarize relevant hypothesis tests in Table 6. Most clear the test. But many missing to be confident that effects are from incumbent and not campaign.

We illustrate results through simulation in Figure 2.

Incumbent	District/ municipio	Margin	Secciones				Interviewees			
			<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>n</i>
<i>A. Static ambition (SMD→SMD)</i>										
Javier PRI	Saltillo	-12	14	64	13	1,619	14	56	0	938
Lily PRI	R. Arispe	+14	0	117	0	1,593	0	56	0	952
Gina PRI	Acuña	-17	0	78	21	1,611	0	70	0	938
<i>B. Progressive ambition (SMD→municipio)</i>										
Lencho PRI	Frontera	+8	83	41	0	1,586	42	28	0	938
Sonia PRI	P. Negras	+12	0	88	0	1,622	0	56	0	952
AnaIsabel PRI	San Pedro	+3	48	75	0	1,587	14	42	0	952
<i>C. Progressive ambition (PR→municipio)</i>										
Armando PAN	Frontera	-8	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Lariza PAN	P. Negras	-12	1,635	75	0	0	966	42	0	0
Leonel PPC	Matamoros	-7	1,648	62	0	0	966	42	0	0

Table 5: Incumbents and their terrain. Members with static ambition—from a single member district (SMD) running for a SMD—are distinguished from those with two types of progressive ambition—to a municipality from a SMD and from a PR seat. The margin is the percentage difference between the winner and runner-up, positive if the incumbent won, negative otherwise. The first set of *l*, *r*, *g*, *n* reports the number of electoral secciones (of 1,710 total in the state) in each category of terrain. The second reports the number of interviewees sampled (out of 1,008) in each terrain category.

Model and incumbent	Hypothesis		
	<i>r</i> > <i>n</i>	<i>l</i> > <i>n</i>	<i>r</i> > <i>l</i>
SMD, static ambition			
1 Javier Díaz González	< .001	.029	.221
2 Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga	< .001	—	—
3 Gina Cano Torralva	< .001	—	—
SMD, progressive ambition			
4 Lencho Siller	< .001	.003	.001
5 Sonia Villarreal Pérez	< .001	—	—
6 Ana Isabel Durán Piña	< .001	.036	< .001
PR, progressive ambition			
7 Armando Pruneda Valdez	.030	—	—
8 Lariza Montiel Luis	.385	—	—
9 Leonel Contreras Pámanes	< .001	—	—

Table 6: Hypothesis tests. Cells report one-tailed p-values. The top-right cell, for instance, indicates that the null associated to model 1's *r* > *l* hypothesis can only be rejected at the .221 level, way above the conventional .05 confidence level. Columns 1 and 2 test that coefficients of retained and lost are positive, column 3 that retained's coefficient is greater than lost's.




Figure 2: The probability of name recognition (x-axis). We portray simulations with Bayesian versions of regression models. The violet density is for respondents in area n , the green (when applicable) for respondents in area l , and the pink for respondents in area r . *With clear gaps between them, we expect the purple to lie to the left, the pink to the right, the green between them.* All other controls held constant to represent a PAN-identifier with a smartphone, who said the incumbent has delivered but is uninterested in politics.

6 Conclusion

Despite an incomplete research design, we uncover evidence of name recognition consistent with the electoral connection model in Coahuila.

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Appendix

6.1 Regression results

6.2 Survey questions

Thirteen items in the survey questionnaire involved reelection and name recognition (from question 20 to question 25.i) . We used questions 25.a–25.i to code our dependent variables. Responses much/some/little (*mucho/algo/poco*) coded as 1 in the incumbent's name recognition indicator; 0 otherwise.

* Add descriptives.

We reproduce the relevant items in Spanish here.

20 ¿Está usted a favor, en contra o le es indiferente la reelección consecutiva de legisladores?

- 1) A favor 2) En contra
- 3) Le es indiferente
- 4) NS/NC

21 El 3 de abril iniciaron las campañas para renovar el Congreso del Estado. Si yo le preguntara los nombres de los candidatos a diputado en este distrito, ¿usted me podría decir todos los nombres, algunos nombres o no recuerda ningún nombre en este momento?

- 1) Todos 2) Algunos
- 3) No recuerda
- 4) No contestó

	(1) Javier	(2) Lily	(3) Gina	(4) Lencho	(5) Sonia	(6) A.Isabel	(7) Armando	(8) Lariza	(9) Leonel
retained	1.85*** (.33)	2.37*** (.33)	4.91*** (.41)	3.10*** (.43)	3.02*** (.32)	4.59*** (.44)	1.10* (.58)	-.22 (.75)	2.93*** (.38)
lost	1.29* (.68)			1.27*** (.47)		1.46* (.81)			
delivered	.86*** (.25)	.76*** (.27)	1.46*** (.34)	.51* (.30)	.93*** (.27)	.26 (.34)	.51 (.37)	.85*** (.27)	.26 (.33)
interested	.35 (.24)	1.03*** (.27)	1.34*** (.34)	.82*** (.28)	.52** (.26)	.74** (.33)	.71** (.36)	.28 (.27)	.57* (.31)
smartphone	-.27 (.24)	.37 (.27)	-.18 (.31)	-.47* (.28)	.21 (.26)	-.05 (.31)	-.43 (.35)	.26 (.27)	-.42 (.30)
panista	.15 (.39)	-.11 (.41)	-.03 (.52)	1.18*** (.35)	.02 (.41)	.80* (.44)	.78* (.47)	.34 (.39)	1.15*** (.41)
priista	.37 (.28)	.15 (.30)	-.01 (.38)	-.21 (.37)	.17 (.29)	.74** (.35)	.43 (.41)	.19 (.31)	.16 (.39)
morenista	-.07 (.63)	.59 (.51)	.26 (.74)	.76 (.55)	-1.17 (1.04)		-.26 (1.05)	-1.01 (1.03)	.88 (.56)
Intercept	-3.03*** (.25)	-3.82*** (.30)	-4.45*** (.39)	-3.48*** (.30)	-3.49*** (.28)	-3.99*** (.35)	-3.87*** (.37)	-3.29*** (.28)	-3.58*** (.30)
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	-262.32	-231.34	-169.84	-205.60	-235.20	-175.64	-147.10	-229.85	-182.89

*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Table 7: Regression results. All models estimated with logit, standard errors in parentheses.

22 Ahora piense por favor en los diputados locales actuales. Si yo le preguntara las cosas que ha hecho su diputado por esta comunidad, ¿usted podría mencionarme muchas cosas, algunas, diría que no hizo nada o no recuerda en este momento? [5=NS/NC]

- 1) Muchas
- 2) Algunas
- 3) No hizo nada
- 4) No recuerda

23 Si su actual diputado compitiera para buscar la reelección, ¿usted votaría por él o no votaría por él?

- 1) Sí votaría por él
- 2) No votaría por él
- 3) NS/NC (NO LEER)

24 Con base en el trabajo realizado por su actual diputado, ¿cree que merecería ser reelecto en su cargo o no?

[1=Sí; 2=No; 3=NC]

25 Le voy a leer unos nombres, para cada uno, ¿podría decirme si le es muy conocido, algo conocido, poco o nada conocido?

[1=Muy conocido; 2=Algo; 3=Poco; 4=Nada conocido; 5=NS/NC]

- a Javier Díaz González
- b Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga
- c Georgina Cano Torralva
- d Ana Isabel Durán
- e Sonia Villareal
- f Lariza Montiel
- g Armando Pruneda
- h Leonel Contreras Pámanes
- i Florencio ``Lencho`` Siller