

PT J
 AU Cameron, C
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 TI Models of vetoes and veto bargaining
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 AB Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal
 institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto
 bargaining and some of its more interesting and useful extensions,
 focusing on one of the best developed applications, the presidential
 veto over legislation. One of the primary attractions of these models
 is that they often produce crisp, testable empirical predictions. Our
 review focuses on 18 such predictions. We conclude with a brief review
 of the empirical evidence related to these hypotheses.
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