

The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections

Peter Siavelis

Bianzuan Lingdao Xiaozu, ed., *Nanxiong Caishui Zhi* [Nanxiong, Guangdong: 1988] p. 47; interview

Xiaozu, p. 49.

The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in March 1991), 1-32; Christine P. W. Wong, "Central-Local Model of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," *The* 11-715; Christine P. W. Wong, ed., *Financing Local* Hong Kong: Published for the Asian Development Bank

Guangdong under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

uanhui, ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo de Guangdong* [Modern uo Chubanshe, 1991], p. 687; Zhu Jiajian, "Guangdong's ent and with Other Provinces/Municipalities," in Toyojito nic Development Strategy (Hong Kong and Tokyo: Centre d Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1992), pp. uanhui, ed., *Guangdong Nianjian 1991* [Guangdong in Chubanshe, 1991], p. 308.

ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo de Tianjin* [Modern China's banshe, 1989], pp. 465-66; Li Kejian, ed., *Tianjin Quan* min Chubanshe, 1991), p. 328.

he late 1980s varied considerably, from 53 percent of all poorer Jixian. Interviews JH-FN-01 and JX-FN-01.

d by an enterprise or government office for its own use, reporting to, superordinate levels. Usually acceptable

en" and the central government's attempts to limit it to 5 Lü, "The Politics of Peasant Burden in Reform China," 113-38; Wong, *Financing Local Government*; Andrew ional Corruption and the 1992 IOU Crisis," *The China*

ed a professional, laissez-faire ideological approach to some the most politically and economically "liberated" is a better explanation of the different levels of coercion use Jinghai county, Tianjin, relied heavily on coercion in maintaining at that time the wealthiest village in the whole

ark Selden, eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and*

The political consequences of Chile's two member district (binominal) parliamentary electoral system have been the subject of much academic and political debate.¹ Most analyses of the electoral formula have focused on its consequences for the country's party system.² Nonetheless, little has been written on how the system affects parliamentary candidate selection and electoral list composition.

The process of candidate selection is little understood by Chileans and students of Chilean politics alike. Very little has been written on internal party processes in Chile or in Latin America generally. In addition, most studies of candidate selection focus on European parliamentary governments or the United States and are less relevant to Latin America's predominantly multiparty, presidential systems.

This article makes some preliminary generalizations concerning the process of parliamentary candidate selection in Chile. It sets out the context of electoral reform and its connection to candidate selection and goes on to suggest some of the impediments to understanding the process in Chile. It then explores the actual mechanisms of candidate selection for legislative elections on three interrelated, yet analytically distinct, levels. First, it suggests what makes candidates attractive to political parties and analyzes how parties choose candidates. Second, it explores the rationale of party elites in forming pacts and coalitions and discusses the most important variables that determine which of the subpacts' constituent parties are awarded candidacies in which districts. Third, it analyzes the incentives that shape candidate selection within major coalitions and the way these coalitions determine the composition of national lists. It establishes generally applicable rules that govern candidate selection within coalitions and provides a schematic diagram of these rules. The final section provides evidence of these rules through empirical discussion of the candidate selection process, underscoring some of the paradoxes in candidate choice produced by this unique electoral system.

Contrary to simplistic assumptions concerning the desire of parties and coalitions to maximize votes, a much more complex constellation of variables influences where and with which coalition partners candidates run. Leaders attempt to achieve a series of discrete objectives, many of which are contradictory and some of which are not particularly well thought out in terms of their political consequences. Maximizing

in *Comparative Politics* 34(4): 419-38
(July 2002).

and bipolar party competition in Chile. However, as Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuel's demonstration based his analysis on single member districts, and the bipolar dynamic produced by magnitudes of two differs from that explored by Downs and may even encourage centrifugal competition. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: HarperCollins, 1957); and Eric Magar, Marc Rosenblum, and David Samuel, "On The Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double Member Districts: The Case of Chile," *Comparative Political Studies*, 31 (December 1998), 714-39.

5. This alliance was known as *Democracia y Progreso* for the 1989 elections and *Unión por el Progreso de Chile* in 1993.
6. Siavelis and Valenzuela; Valenzuela and Scully; Siavelis.
7. "You readjust your load as you proceed down the road."
8. While other coalitions present candidates, these two garnered over 80 percent of the vote in the 1989, 1993, and 1997 elections.
9. National councils are composed of senators, deputies, and representatives elected by each regional party council.
10. Michael Gallagher, "Introduction," in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective* (London: Sage, 1988), p. 4.
11. These conclusions are based on interviews during 1999 and 2000 with leaders charged with list composition in every major party and on anecdotal press accounts.
12. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, "Introduction," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 6.
13. John Carey, "Parties, Coalitions and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Naef, eds., *Legislatures and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
14. Siavelis; Valenzuela and Scully.
15. The Radical Party secured more candidacies than its national level of support suggests that it should have received. In 1993 the Radicals secured eleven of the 120 *Concepcion* states (almost ten percent), and won only 3 percent of the vote nationally.
16. See "Las corrientes ocultas tras las negociaciones," *La Segunda*, Feb. 19, 1993, p. 13.
17. The PS and PPD are treated as a single anchor party for the purposes of this discussion (as would other parties that agree on the overall number of subcompact candidacies for each party before coalition-level negotiations).
18. For a complete breakdown of the *Concepcion*'s parties (there were other minor parties in addition to the eleven listed in Figure 2), see *El Mercurio*, May 21, 1989, p. C5.
19. The sixty-five PDC subcompact candidacies were distributed as follows: forty-eight for the PDC, eleven for the PR, four for the SD, and two for associated independents. In the PS-PPD subcompact they were distributed as follows: twenty-eight for the PS, twenty-five for the PPD, and two for independents. Data from the ministry of the interior, 1993.
20. See "Pitiera al Borde del Si," *El Mercurio*, Mar. 30, 1997, p. D1.
21. Rabkin, p. 346.
22. Aulh, pp. 353-55.
23. An alternative explanation is that larger parties with more negotiating power reserved these districts for themselves.
24. I am indebted to Andrés Allamand for his insights on the evolution of competition on the right.
25. Servicio Electoral de Chile.
26. It is now the *Unión del Centro Centro Progresista*.
27. Interview with Andrés Allamand, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1998.

Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey

Ziya Onis and Unut Türem

Business leaders and business associations are key political actors in late industrializing societies. The relationship between business and democracy has been a source of continued controversy in comparative studies of democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. In the traditional view, businessmen are typically interested in stability. Whenever considerations relating to stability come into conflict with political pluralism and democratic opening, they tend to swing in the direction of authoritarian solutions. However, more recent studies have drawn attention to the increasingly progressive or favorable role that business or entrepreneurial groups can play in the process of democratic transition and consolidation.¹ Why did business interests, notably big business, tend in the past to favor—or at least not to reject outright—authoritarian practices, while they have given growing support to liberal democracy and political pluralism in recently emerging second and third wave democracies?

Turkey is an interesting case to examine from a comparative standpoint. It is an example of the second wave democracy. A broadly open polity has existed, albeit with certain interruptions, over a period of four decades, yet the democratic order falls considerably short of being fully consolidated judged by the norms of western-style liberal democracies. The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) is a voluntary interest association representing big business and large conglomerates in Turkey. The segment of the business community represented by TUSIAD has become increasingly vocal in recent years in favor of further democratic opening. Indeed, its recent publications and the pronouncements of its leaders in public have concentrated almost singlemindedly on legal and constitutional reforms. This position contrasts sharply with the earlier pattern in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the organization's efforts focused primarily on issues of economic reforms and largely evaded open discussion of issues relating to democratization and constitutional reform. Clearly, a number of challenging questions of wider interest from a comparative perspective emerges in this context. How can the striking shift in the preferences of the business community in the direction of participating in or even actively leading the prodemocratization coalition be explained? What does big busi-