IDENTIFIERS--KeyWord Plus(R): DOUBLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS; PARTY SYSTEM

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4/9/2   (Item 2 from file: 7)

03785304   GENUINE ARTICLE#: 570BH   NUMBER OF REFERENCES: 17
TITLE: Institutional gamblers: majoritarian representation, electoral
     uncertainty, and the coalitional costs of Mexico's hybrid electoral
     system

AUTHOR(S): Calvo E (REPRINT); Medina JMA
CORPORATE SOURCE: Northwestern Univ,Dept Polit Sci,601 Univ
     Pl/Evanston//IL/60208 (REPRINT); Northwestern Univ,Dept Polit
     Sci,Evanston//IL/60208; Univ San Martin,Dept Polit & Gobierno,RA-145
     Parana//Argentina/; Flacso,Mexico City/DF/Mexico/

ABSTRACT: An unintended result of Mexico's hybrid electoral system is
that
     40% of the candidates may increase their chances to be elected for
     Congress as their party loses votes, while 60% of the candidates
     increase their chances to be elected as their parties gain votes.
     Because parties have to decide how to distribute candidates among
     single-member and multi-member districts some time before the
election,
     this "double road" to representation sets the scenario for a new type
     of institutional gambling. Candidates face a dilemma: their chances
of
     being elected improve dramatically if they run as single-member
     district candidates (lower tier) of the winning party or in the
closed
     list (upper tier) of losing parties. This article shows that both
     electoral uncertainty and party switching incentives grow as a
function
     of the majoritarian bias found in the single-member districts of

Mexico's hybrid system. We introduce an extension of King and
Browning's (American Political Science Review 81 (1987) 1252) model
that represents a party's expected seat gain under both a mixed and a
hybrid electoral system, and that captures the distortions produced
by
a ceiling on the maximum number of representatives that a party can
elect to congress. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
reserved.
DESCRIPTORS--Author Keywords: majoritarian representation ; bilogit ;
Mexico ; elections
IDENTIFIERS--KeyWord Plus(R): ELECTIONS; CENTRIPETAL; INCENTIVES
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4/9/3   (Item 3 from file: 7)
DIALOG(R)File   7:Social SciSearch(R)
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03349176   GENUINE ARTICLE#: 214AK   NUMBER OF REFERENCES: 38
TITLE: Assessing the effectiveness of gender quotas in open-list
proportional representation electoral systems
AUTHOR(S): Jones MP (REPRINT); Navia P
CORPORATE SOURCE: MICHIGAN STATE UNIV,DEPT POLIT SCI/E LANSING//MI/48824
(REPRINT); NYU,/NEW YORK//NY/10012
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LANGUAGE: English   DOCUMENT TYPE: Article
SUBFILE: CC SOCS--Current Contents, Social & Behavioral Sciences
JOURNAL SUBJECT CATEGORY: SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
ABSTRACT: Objective. Gender quota laws are an increasingly popular method
of addressing the legislative underrepresentation of women. It is
unclear, however, if quotas will result in a notable increase in the
percentage of women elected in countries that employ open-list
proportional representation. Methods. We analyze Chilean municipal
election data to explore the effect of the percentage of women
candidates on the percentage of women elected. Results. While the
percentage of women candidates has a robust overall effect on the
percentage of women elected, there is a diminishing rate of return as