

- PT J  
 AU Negretto, GL  
 TI Government capacities and policy making by decree in Latin America -  
 The cases of Brazil and Argentina  
 SO COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES  
 LA English  
 DT Article  
 DE presidentialism; decree powers; policy making; Latin America; Brazil;  
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 ID PRESIDENTIALISM; PARLIAMENTARISM; REFORM; MENEM  
 AB What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the  
 policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts  
 to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the  
 literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow  
 presidents  
 to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a  
 separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances  
 executives' ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however,  
 is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of  
 decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an  
 executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to  
 three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the  
 executive's partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of  
 the Presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a  
 comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the  
 implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argent in a, two cases  
 presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.
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