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Business Interests and the Party Coalitions: Industry Sector Contributions to U.S. Congressional Campaigns

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Abstract

We identify the economic interests in the United States that have a partisan alignment. We disaggregate corporate and trade association political action committees by economic sector, using the most fine-grained classifications available. We then analyze the campaign contributions to House incumbents from each sector, controlling for the majority party, economic geography, committee membership, and electoral competition. We find wide variation in how economic sectors relate to the parties. More than one third have a clear party tilt, with far more leaning toward Republicans than to Democrats. The remainder have no discernible partisan preference, either giving without reference to party or opportunistically to the majority. Republican-leaning sectors concentrate in particular enterprises, especially natural resources extraction, while most professional service sectors are nonpartisan. Business is not a monolith, to be contrasted with "labor" or "ideological interest groups," but embedded in economic sectors that are more or less *politicized* in partisan terms.

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This research investigates how different types of business interests in the United States relate to the two major political parties. Although corporations tilt toward Republicans in aggregate, we know much less about how or whether specific businesses or economic sectors are aligned with the parties. On one hand, scholars typically characterize the broad-based peak organizations representing business interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business, as siding with the Republican Party in a manner analogous to the way labor unions are allied with the Democratic Party. On the other hand, a dominant tradition of research portrays particular business interests as donating to powerful officials regardless of party to facilitate access and win favorable treatment on narrow policy issues of special concern (Lowery & Brasher, 2004; Truman, 1955).

Rather than contrasting the behavior of "business" as a group with labor or ideological interest groups, we instead examine corporations as parts of economic sectors that may be more or less *politicized* in partisan terms. To do so, we analyze the campaign contributions that corporate and trade association political action committees (PACs) make to members of the House of Representatives across different industry sectors. We disaggregate all the business interests that are consistently active in congressional elections using a fine-grained classification scheme, drawing on the most detailed data available from the U.S. Census Bureau.[1] We examine a full decade of contributions, encompassing two Congresses controlled by Democrats and three by Republicans. In doing so, our aim is to pinpoint which sectors have a measurable preference for a political party and which do not, after controlling for other factors that drive campaign contributions, such as majority control of Congress, economic geography (as in, where the economic sector has firms and employees), committee membership, and the competitiveness of seats.

In recent years, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in partisan political economy, with a number of major new studies examining how partisan politics affects economic inequality in American society at large (Bartels, 2008; Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Kelly, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006). This literature focuses on what the parties mean for entire economic classes or for the gap between the haves and the have-nots. It has not delved into how disparate economic interests relate to the major parties. Instead, social science scholarship typically portrays "business" either as a common bloc of political interests generally aligned with the Republican Party or as

aloof from partisanship but eager to curry favor with members in powerful party or committee positions. Rather than supposing business to be a monolith, our research reveals businesses to be a more variegated constellation of interests, exhibiting different stances toward the political parties across sectors of economic activity.

The lack of recent work on the partisan coloration of different business interests is surprising because party systems in the United States are traditionally characterized not just by their different social bases and policy positions but also by the economic interests included in the party coalitions. The first party system, for example, is typically described as pitting New England mercantile and manufacturing interests in the Federalist Party against the agrarian interests represented by the Democratic-Republicans. The cleavage of the party system of 1896-1932 is similarly rendered as southern and western agricultural interests (along with northern Catholics and immigrants) in the Democratic Party vying against the Republicans, the party of American business and industry. Today's party system expresses no such tension between agriculture and industry. But this does not mean that different economic interests remain uniformly neutral between the parties or that they are all, as a bloc, generically Republican leaning. The contemporary U.S. economy is heterogeneous and complex. A close look at how different business interests ally themselves with or remain aloof from the parties is required to gain a better understanding of the contemporary party system.

A new look at the partisan leanings of economic sectors becomes particularly pressing in a polarized era in which the parties define themselves in opposition to one another in so many other ways. Partisan voting in Congress is at levels not observed in a hundred years (McCarty et al., 2006). Voters themselves are choosing sides with more clarity, with split-ticket voting having declined. Geography has become a sharper line of cleavage (Oppenheimer, 2005; Theriault, 2008). To what extent do particular economic interests in the United States take sides in party politics, also?

Although not focusing on economic interests per se, Sinclair (2006) writes, "Interest groups are increasingly firmly aligned with one or the other of the major parties, and, in many cases, are functioning as full-fledged members of one of the two party teams" (p. 308). Similarly, journalist Jeffrey H. Birnbaum (2004, E1) has observed, "More than any time I can remember, business interests have decided to choose sides . . . Everywhere you look, there are signs that corporate America is growing less and less evenhanded, and more and more Republican." Taking a global look at all the economic sectors that regularly participated in campaign contributing to House members across a decade, this article seeks to gauge the extent to which party polarization extends to American business interests and to identify specifically which sectors are affected.

We find substantial variation in the extent to which industry sectors are allied with the parties. More than a third of industry sectors (36.4%) exhibit a party preference. Far more favor the Republican (34.6%) than the Democratic Party (1.8%). On the contrary, more than 60% of the sectors show no discernible partisan preference at all. Some of these nonpartisan sectors (7.4%) favor members of whatever party holds a majority. Others donate without any apparent attention to members' party affiliation (56.2%). Certainly, other criteria may steer their giving, but partisan affiliation is not one of them.

Furthermore, we find that the sectors that prefer one party are highly concentrated in particular industries. In particular, businesses in natural resource extraction and raw materials manufacturing have a marked and pervasive Republican tilt. In fact, nearly one quarter of all the business sectors that we identify as having a Republican orientation are in these industries alone. Others sectors, such as finance, insurance, hotel and motel accommodation, and food service, also slant toward the Republican Party. Almost no sectors exhibit a preference for Democrats, but vast swaths of the economy do not take sides in party politics. The bulk of the service economy is largely nonpartisan, in that most of these sectors treat the two parties equitably. Nonpartisan sectors include health care and social assistance services; utilities; and most professional, educational, scientific, and technical services. The few service sectors that tilt Republican are low-wage sectors such as food service, accommodations, and grocery stores. This research sheds new light on the rich assortment of economic interests that make up the party coalitions in the United States and suggests interesting implications for both partisan political economy and the study of political influence.

Prior Work on Economic Interests and the Parties

The existing interest groups literature fails to address the relationship between *particular* economic interests and the political parties. Research on corporate political activity rarely distinguishes among different kinds of business enterprises. Instead, scholars have focused on how corporate interests align differently than labor or ideological groups (Brunell, 2005; Herrnson, 2012; Rozell, Wilcox, & Franz, 2012; Wilcox, 1989). Corporate PACs have long given more heavily to Republicans than labor or nonaffiliated PACs; the tilt became more pronounced after the 1994 election (Herrnson, 2006). Very few scholars, however, have examined variability across different economic interests. Gopoian (1984), as one exception, compares the contribution behavior across four economic sectors in the 1978 elections. Handler and Mulkern (1982), as another, detail variation in corporate contribution strategies in 1980.

What is most striking about the scholarly literature on corporate political activism is the relative lack of interest in the partisan leanings of specific economic interests. An extensive, often sophisticated literature emerged out of theories of collective action, addressing when and why corporations will be active in politics at all (Andres, 1985; Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Humphries, 1991; Masters & Keim, 1985; Pittman, 1977). But once individual corporations do engage in politics, the relative partisan orientation of that involvement has not been a subject of much research. The *Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups* (Maisel & Berry, 2010), a current and comprehensive survey of the literature, contains no chapter on the extent to which political parties in the United States encompass or exclude particular economic interests. The lack of such a chapter is not an omission; it is simply not an active area of inquiry in recent political science.

Compared with political scientists, sociologists have devoted more attention to how different economic interests relate to the political parties. Burris (2001) and Burris and Salt (1990) examine corporate giving to Republican and Democratic candidates and find that contributions from defense, transportation, banking, and utilities firms are less Republican leaning than other types of industries. Sociological studies, however, fail to control for factors that are known to shape corporate giving, such as party control of Congress, economic geography, electoral competition, and committee structure. The lack of such controls makes it impossible to ascertain the extent to which an industry's campaign contributions to a particular party are merely an artifact of other considerations, such as giving to members who represent districts where a sector's firms and employees are located, or giving to members locked in hard-fought reelection campaigns. Most of this work also predates the far more polarized political parties of the contemporary era.

Campaign Contributions as a Window on Partisan Alliances

Following Hall and Deardorff (2006), we view campaign contributions as a signal that "the group has policy objectives in common with the legislator" (p. 80). Birnbaum (2006, D1) explains the intuitive logic:

> The best way to identify Democrats' friends and foes is to examine patterns of campaign contributions. Groups that have given much of their money to Democrats can be considered their true allies and will likely benefit from the items that Democrats push on Capitol Hill. Groups that have been delivering

most of their campaign largesse to Republicans will probably see their druthers suffer under a more Democratic-leaning Congress.

This view has a solid grounding in the empirical literature in that PACs are known to give primarily to political allies, rather than to opponents or fence-sitters (Hojnacki & Kimball, 2001; Wright, 1985).[2] PAC directors are also well aware that the staffs of party leaders and other House members scrutinize Federal Election Commission disclosures to ascertain any partisan biases (Rozell et al., 2012) so that donating more money to candidates of one party than the other sends a political message that will be visible to both sides.

Before drawing any inferences about the partisan leanings of economic sectors, however, it is essential to take account of other considerations that drive business campaign contributions. Corporations also give to campaigns to curry favor with powerful members of Congress. They exhibit a long-standing preference for giving to members of the majority party (Cox & Magar, 1999; Rudolph, 1999). They donate to members of committees with jurisdiction over the policy issues of most concern (Bennett & Loucks, 2011; Rozell et al., 2012). They step up contributions to members facing difficult election campaigns (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, & Bartels, 2005; Herndon, 1982; Jacobson, 1980). Perhaps most importantly, economic interests donate to members who represent districts where they have firms and employees (Hojnacki & Kimball, 2001; Wright, 1985).

Failing to account for appropriate controls in the analysis might, in some cases, make firms appear to have a partisan preference even when they do not. It is especially necessary to take into account the geographic distribution of an economic sector's firms and employment as a possible source of spurious correlation. For example, oil and gas interests are concentrated in states that vote solidly Republican, such as Texas, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Louisiana (Kirkland, 2008). One would expect such an industry to donate heavily to Republican House members as a consequence of economic geography, independently of partisanship. Similarly, if a particular party's incumbents face a more challenging electoral climate, one would expect contributions to its members to rise as corporations donate additional funds to those who are actively asking for help. The partisan preferences of economic sectors can be appropriately ascertained only via multivariate analysis of the manifold forces at work.

Data

Our contribution data originate from the FEC detailed files on committee contributions to candidates for five election cycles beginning in 2000, the

election of the 107th Congress; and ending in 2010, with the close of the 111th Congress.[3] These files contain information on the names and addresses of the interest groups and PACs that contributed to federal candidates during each cycle. The contribution recipient, the recipient's political party, and the amount contributed are recorded. For this article, we examined only general election contributions to incumbents. Challengers receive a very small percentage of PAC contributions, and the considerations driving contributions to incumbents and challengers are sufficiently different as to require separate analysis.

The major task of data preparation was to classify the PACs into industry sectors, according to the North American Industry Classification System (hereafter NAICS) codes utilized by the U.S. Census.[4] These codes are a standard used by federal agencies to classify businesses for data collection. NAICS classifications range in their level of detail from 2-digit codes, for very broad industry sectors (e.g., Finance and Insurance, Health Care and Social Assistance) to highly specific subsectors coded with 6-digit codes (e.g., Commercial Banking, Offices of Physicians). Our goal was to assign the FEC reported committees and PACs as closely as possible to their appropriate NAICS 6-digit codes. While arduous and time-consuming, the effort was successful, as we were able to classify 3,478 PACs out of 4,017 listed in the original files (~87%).[5]

This fine-grained classification of economic sectors permits far more accurate controls, particularly for the economic geography of employment. To capture corporate PACs' well-known tendency to donate to House members representing districts where they have an industry presence, we are able to use the Zip Code Business Patterns data set to estimate the number of firms and employees for each sector within every congressional district. Similarly, a detailed classification allows for more accurate determination of the committee of jurisdiction most relevant to an economic interest. The more one aggregates sectors together, using broader classification schemes, the less precise such indicators will be.

In most cases, classifying PACs according to industry sector was surprisingly straightforward. The government watchdog site, www.OpenSecrets.org, sponsored by the Center for Responsive Politics, lists industry codes associated with many business-related PACs and we drew on their coding in many cases.[6] In other instances, however, we had to use Internet search tools to identify the appropriate industry, or dominant sector of business.

It is important to note that these are industry codes, *not* occupation codes. The codes do not single out, for example, nurses as an occupation, but would instead capture nursing under a variety of detailed medical industry sectors (e.g., Nursing Homes, Hospices, Home Health Care, Offices of Physicians).

PACs formed to represent occupations that run across multiple sectors, such as actuaries or aerospace engineers are coded as business or professional associations.

We also classified union membership entities separately. Many previous studies have analyzed labor union campaign contributions (e.g., Francia, 2010; Herrnson, 2012; Rozell et al., 2012), and there is little question about the nature of their relationship to the national party system. The exclusion of union organizations here does not mean, however, that the PACs we include are only those associated with firm ownership and management. Some employee groups are represented, such as organizations representing workers in a segment of the health care or aerospace industries, but in all cases the ones we included are nonunionized.[7]

After coding PACs and committees into industry sectors, we made the additional decision to restrict our analysis to the sectors that participated in each of the five cycles and contributed at least US$200,000 in total across this period. By including only the sectors that consistently participated, we could have greater confidence that any patterns in contributing were not attributable to the idiosyncrasies of a particular election cycle. The US$200,000 minimum is a low floor, allowing us to examine the contribution behavior of a wider array of industry sectors than has been attempted in any previous study. The average sector in our data contributed US$4.5 million over the decade. The smallest sector in the analysis contributed US$205,950 across the period; the largest contributed US$50.1 million.

A First Look

Figure 1 displays each economic sector's ratio of giving to Republican or Democratic House members across the five election cycles between 2000 and 2011. Sectors are ranged left to right from most Democratic to most Republican leaning.

We have grouped the sectors using three colors. "Strongly Republican-Leaning Sectors," shown in red, include all sectors ($n = 66$) that donated at least 1.5 as much to Republican members as to Democratic members over the entire decade. "Modestly Republican to Neutral Sectors," shown in purple, displays all sectors ($n = 63$) with a Republican-to-Democrats donation ratio of 1.49 to 1. "Neutral to Modestly Democratic-Leaning Sectors," shown in blue on the far left of the graph, includes all sectors ($n = 33$) that gave more money to Democrats than to Republicans. A few of the larger contributors in each category are labeled, for purposes of illustration. A complete list of all sectors and the amount they contributed is available in an online appendix.[8]



Figure 1. Partisanship of campaign donations to members of the U.S. house of representatives, by economic sector, 107th-111th Congresses.
Note. Two outliers have been deleted due to extreme values.

Just a cursory look at Figure 1 makes an obvious case for closer analysis of the relationship between economic interests and the political parties. It is clear from the data that there is wide variability in how corporate interests relate to the parties. A marked overall preference for Republicans is evident, in that there are far more sectors that give more to Republicans than to Democrats.[9] But within this broad picture, business interests are not by any means uniformly Republican leaning. The range is wide, with a few sectors (10%) giving at least 3 times as much to Republicans as to Democrats and 34 sectors (21%) giving at least twice as much. At the same time, there are many venues of economic activity that are generally neutral between the parties.

Multivariate Methods and Models

As discussed above, it is not possible to infer the partisan preferences of economic interests from the basic descriptive data on their campaign contributions. It is necessary to control for other factors that are known to shape allocation decisions. To that end, we use regression analysis, examining PAC giving for each economic sector separately.

The dependent variable in these analyses is the individual PAC's contribution (or noncontribution) to each member of Congress in each election cycle. Because PACs typically give to only a small number of members, rarely to even half the House membership, the distribution of contributions exhibits a right-skew. To facilitate regression estimation, we took the natural log of contribution amounts, adding an offset to account for the zeros. When this data edifice was finally constructed, it summed to just more than 3.5 million observations, totaling almost US$750 million in contributions.[10]

We organized the data using a standard cross-sectional time-series design, with election cycle as the temporal variable, and the PAC id code as the between subjects or "panel" variable. As not all PACs participate in every cycle, the data are considered unbalanced for most of the 162 sectors we report.[11] The number of cases analyzed varies by sector, depending on the number of PACs encompassed by the sector, ranging from a minimum *N* of 1,991 to a maximum of 295,123. The reported regression estimates were generated using generalized least squares with fixed effects for individual PACs described by Wooldridge (2002), adjusted for clustering of the observations by PAC (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009; Stock & Watson, 2008). Ordinary least squares estimation is inappropriate because key assumptions about the behavior of the error term are violated (Baltagi, 1995; Beck & Katz, 1995; Kmenta, 1986). Hausman specification tests favors fixed effects, and reject the assumption, necessary for unbiased random-effects estimates, that there is no correlation between the individual unit effects and the explanatory variables.[12]

The model below was estimated for each economic sector. The model is designed to identify whether economic sectors have a consistent preference for a political party, after controlling for other factors. Controls are included to account for the fact that corporate PACs tend to donate more to members (a) of the majority party in Congress, (b) who represent districts where the industry has firms or employees, (c) who face competitive races for reelection, (d) who serve on standing committees important to the industry's interests, and (e) in party or committee leadership positions.

$$\begin{aligned} LnAmount_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \sum_k \beta_k Cmte_{kjt} + \beta_{16} RParty_{jt} + \beta_{17} Partycont_t + \\ \beta_{18} RParty_{jt} \times Partycont_t + \beta_{19} Cycle_t + \beta_{20} Firms_{jt} + \\ \beta_{21} Employ_{jt} + \beta_{22} Compete_{jt} + \beta_{23} Compnext_{jt} + \beta_{24} Majlead_{jt} + \\ \beta_{25} Minlead_{jt} + \beta_{26} Cmtechair_{jt} + \beta_{27} Ranking_{jt} + \mu_{ijt}, \end{aligned}$$

where i = 1, . . . , n PACs in each economic sector (n varies by sector);

$j = 1, \ldots, J$ incumbent members (arbitrarily indexed, by session);
$t = 1, \ldots, 5$ time points;
$k = 1, \ldots, 15$ standing congressional committees;
α = PAC-specific intercepts;
μ = the error term;

LnAmount is the natural log of PAC *i*'s contribution (or noncontribution), in thousands of dollars, to member *j* in cycle *t*;

RParty is a 0/1 variable indicating if the member is a Republican;

Partycont is a 0/1 variable indicating that Republicans have a majority in the House;

RParty × *Partycont* is an interaction term permitting partisanship and party control to have nonadditive effects;

Firms is the number of establishments or firms in the sector in the congressional district, as reported by Zip Code Business Patterns, an annual count;

Employ is the number of employees per firm in the sector, using the midpoints of employee estimate ranges as reported in the Zip Code Business Patterns data;

Compete measures district competition in the previous election, as 100-|(Republican vote %-Democratic vote %)|;

Compnext is a 0/1 variable indicating races that are designated as competitive or leaning for the next election by the *Cook Political Report* in early September;

$Cmte_k$ are a series of 0/1 variables indicating that member *j* serves on particular standing committees of Congress, namely, Agriculture; Budget; Education and the Workforce; Energy; Financial Services; Government Reform; Homeland Security; International Relations; Judiciary; Armed Services, Natural Resources; Science, Space, and Technology; Transportation; and Ways and Means;

Cmtechair is a 0/1 variable indicating that member *j* chairs a standing committee;

Ranking is a 0/1 variable indicating that member *j* is the ranking minority member on a standing committee;

Majlead is a 0/1 variable denoting the House speaker, majority leader, and whip;

Minlead is a 0/1 variable denoting the minority leader and whip;

Cycle is the election cycle, coded from 1 to 5, used as an explanatory variable chiefly to account for increasing contribution amounts over time.

The presentation of results for 162 cross-sectional time-series regression models is challenging within the conventional confines of an article-length manuscript. Full results are available for closer inspection in an online appendix.[13]



Figure 2. Key control variables affecting U.S. house incumbents' campaign receipts, 107th-111th Congresses.
Note. Bars identify the share of sectors in which the variables have a positive, statistically significant effect on House incumbents' receipts.

Results for Control Variables

Before turning to our main emphasis, the partisan leanings of economic sectors, we briefly address the results for the important control variables in the model. These controls perform largely as expected, though there is variability across sectors. Figure 2 summarizes the frequency with which these control variables had the expected, statistically significant effects across the various regression analyses.

Most economic sectors exhibit a preference for giving to members of a particular congressional committee. The favored committee varies in unsurprising ways, with mining sectors donating more to members of the Energy and Natural Resources committees, transportation sectors preferring members of the Transportation committee, health care sectors contributing more to members of Ways and Means, banking and finance sectors giving more to members of the Financial Services Committee. Overall, 77% of sectors showed a preference for members of a particular committee or set of committees.[14]

Similarly, a large share of business PACs focused their contributions on members representing districts where their commercial-industrial sector has

firms or employees. For 51% of sectors, one of the two measures of economic geography, number of sector firms (*Firms*) or average number of employees (*Employ*), had a statistically significant, positive effect on contributions. Typically, one but not both of these variables would perform as anticipated. Given that some industries are far more labor-intensive than others, it is not surprising that the performance of these two measures varied across types of economic enterprise, though we were not able to predict *a priori* which of the two would perform better for any given sector.[15] Impressionistically, the results suggest that capital intense sectors with large investments in factories or facilities (e.g., manufacturing and mining sectors) were more likely to target contributions toward members according to economic geography. Meanwhile, sectors that have a presence across most parts of the country (e.g., real estate agencies, grocery stores) were less likely to show a geographic effect.

Consistent with previous research (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2005; Herndon, 1982; Jacobson, 1980), electoral competition had an undeniable influence. Most sectors stepped up their giving to incumbents facing tough races. The variable designating the races rated as competitive or leaning by the *Cook Political Report*, takes a positive, statistically significant coefficient in 46% of the models. The measure reflecting the competitiveness of the district in the previous election, *Compete*, was a statistically significant predictor of additional contributions for 33% of sectors. At least one of these measures of competitiveness had the expected effect in 58% of the models, indicating that most business sectors sought to assist embattled incumbents, but used different contribution strategies for targeting them, some relying on early indicators of past electoral performance, other sectors reacting to indicators of electoral competition as the race unfolds.

Finally, a substantial share of sectors rewarded congressional leaders with additional funds. Model results indicated that 49% of sectors allocated additional funds to the majority party's elected leaders and 47% contributed more to the minority party's elected leaders. Around half (48%) of sectors contributed more to members who chaired standing committees.

Results for the Partisan Leanings of Economic Sectors

After having taken into account the major factors that influence how businesses allocate campaign contributions, we are now in a position to determine which economic sectors have a partisan tilt and which do not. The goal is to identify the sectors that systematically prefer members of one political party, after having controlled for the tendency of business interests to donate

to majority party members, to members from districts containing its firms or employees, to members in tough races, and to members on key committees.

As presented above, our model employs an interaction term in recognition that industry sectors may base contribution decisions on party, which party has a majority in the House of Representatives, and may vary in how they adjust for control, across parties. The inclusion of this interaction term complicates the task of model interpretation, rendering the estimates and statistical significance of the coefficients for the party-related variables (*RParty, Partycont*, and *RParty* × *Partycont*) inadequate for ascertaining a sector's party preference (if any).

To ease the task of interpretation, we used the model results to calculate every sector's predicted contributions to members of both parties under the different conditions of institutional party control.[16] In other words, we estimated each sector's contributions to (a) Republicans when they are in the majority, (b) Republicans when they are in the minority, (c) Democrats when they are in the majority, and (d) Democrats when they are in the minority. We then use these estimates to look for sectors that do not treat the two parties even-handedly. The appendix displays the point estimates and the standard errors for each sector.

A sector has a party preference when the model estimates indicate that the sector contributes an extra increment to members of one party but not to members of the other party. This pattern is evident when a sector has a positive, statistically significant contribution estimate for one party's members, either in the majority or the minority, but not for the other party, either in the majority or the minority. In short, a sector with a party preference will give a boost to members of only one party.

In some cases, a sector shows a definite party preference, but will also engage in pragmatic giving to the nonpreferred party when it holds a majority in Congress. This pattern of giving is evident when members of the preferred party receive an additional increment of contributions when they are in *both* the majority and when they are in the minority, but members of the nonpreferred party receive a comparable additional contribution only when they are in the majority. In such cases, the nonpreferred party's premium for being in the majority will still be less than the increment for the preferred party's members *even when they are in the minority*. For example, a Republican-leaning sector that engages in pragmatic giving to Democrats will have positive, statistically significant estimates for both Republicans in the majority and Republicans in the minority, but a positive, statistically significant estimate for giving to Democrats in the majority that is smaller than the estimate for Republicans in the minority.

Sectors without a party tilt fall into two categories: those that give without reference to party and those that boost their giving to whichever party is in the majority (purely pragmatic sectors). For sectors that give without reference to party, the model estimates for contributions to House Republicans and Democrats will either (a) always fall short of statistical significance or (b) not be ordered in a way that makes sense in terms of party preference. As an illustration of the latter, the Architectural Services sector has statistically significant, positive estimates for giving to House members in the following size order: Democrats in the majority (2.051), Republicans in the minority (2.022), Democrats in the minority (1.465), and Republicans in the majority (1.414). Even though the model for Architectural Services sector generates some results that reach statistical significance, this sector clearly exhibits no systematic preference for one party over the other. In most cases, however, sectors classified as "no party preference" have contribution estimates for Republicans or Democrats that are in all cases statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Pragmatic sectors with no party preference boost their contributions to both parties when they are in the majority. Such sectors will have positive, statistically significant estimates for contributions to Republicans in the majority and to Democrats in the majority that are greater in size than any statistically significant contributions to either party when it is in the minority. In other words, these are sectors that favor the party majority in their donations but do not systematically prefer one party to the other regardless of its majority party status.

Table 1 lists the sectors that fall into each category. The classifications make sense given the raw data displayed in Figure 1. Most (60%) of the sectors donating 1.5 times or more to Republicans than to Democrats were found to have a Republican preference after estimating the model with the control variables included; none of them had a Democratic preference. Most (75%) of the sectors that leaned to Republican over Democrats at a ratio of greater than 1:1 but less than 1.5 were found to have no party preference; 25% had a Republican preference, and none had a Democratic preference. Of the sectors that gave more to Democrats than to Republicans, nearly all (91%) were found to have no preference and the remainder (9%) were determined to lean Democratic.

Still, it is important to note that the inclusion of the control variables reveals that many sectors that contributed more to Republican than to Democratic House members did not have a genuine party preference, once other influences on their giving were factored into the model. About 40% of

Table 1. Campaign Donations to Republicans and Democrats, Controlling for Party in Power and Other Factors, by Sector, 107th-111th Congresses.

Republican Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (*n* = 39)		
Commercial Banking	Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining	Rice Milling
Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing	Beverages, Beer, Ale, and Malt Liquors, Manufacturing	Real Estate Property Management
Insurance Agencies and Brokerages	Automobile Manufacturing	Credit and Collection Agencies
Business Associations	Credit Card Banking	Coated and Laminated Packaging Paper and Plastics Film Manufacturing
Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers	Health Maintenance	Clothing Accessories Stores
Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control	Logging	Polish and Other Sanitation Good Manufacturing
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction	Freight Trucking	Plastic Packaging Film and Sheet Manufacturing
Limited Service Restaurants	Meat Processed From Carcasses	Bakeries
Farm Mortgage Lending	Pesticide and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing	Machine Tool (Metal Cutting Types) Manufacturing
All Other Miscellaneous Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	Paper (except Newsprint) Mills	Greeting Card Publishing
Software Publishers	Support Activities for Metal Mining	Financial Transaction Processing
Ship Building and Repairing	Semiconductor Devices Manufacturing	Food Service Contractors
Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communication	Direct Title Insurance Carriers	Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) Manufacturing
Republican Preference, With Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (*n* = 17)		
Aircraft Manufacturing	Couriers	Hotels (except Casinos) and Motels
Accounting	Tobacco Product Manufacturing	Sales Financing
Direct Life Insurance Carriers	Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing	Adhesive Manufacturing
Investment Banking and Securities Dealing	Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation	Current-Carrying Wiring Device Manufacturing
Electric Power Distribution	Grocery Stores	Commercial Property Managing
New Car Dealers	Light Fixture Stores	
Pragmatic Sectors, With No Party Preference (*n* = 12)		
Offices of Lawyers	Distilleries	Breakfast Cereal Manufacturing
General Hospitals	Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing	Photographic Film, Cloth, Paper, and Plate, Sensitized, Man
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation	Chiropractor's Clinics	Advertising Outdoor
Public Relations Agencies	Other Technical and Trade Schools	Real Estate Appraisers

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Sectors With No Party Preference (n = 91)		
Health Screening in Physicians' Offices	Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations	Automotive Engines and Parts
Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers	Business Support Services: Credit Bureaus	Tax Preparation Services
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance Aeronautical	Savings Banks	Architectural Services
Credit Unions	Dairy Canning	Waste Collection
Offices of Dentists	Alternative Energy Production—Wind	Commercial Lithographic Printing
Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings	Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and Perfume Stores	Truck Trailer Manufacturing
Consumer Credit Unsecured Cash Loans	Other Sound Recording Industries	Diagnostic Laboratories
Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing	Offices of Mental Health Practitioners	Textile and Fabric Finishing (except Broadwoven Fabric) Mill
Nursing Care Facilities	Nuclear Electric Power Generation	Glass Fiber Manufacturing
Bio Fuel and Petroleum Refining	Motion Picture and Video Production	Magazine Printing and Publishing
Instruments Manufacturing	Veterinary Services	Berries Canning Manufacturing
Crop Insurance	Military Armored Vehicle and Tank Manufacturing	Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
Offices of Physical, Occupational and Speech Therapists	Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing	All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers
All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation	Passenger Car Rental	General Rental Centers
Commodity Contracts Brokerage	Offices of Physicians, Mental Health Specialists	Computer and Office Machine Repair
Pharmacies	Funeral Homes and Funeral Services	Ambulance Services
Gas Pipeline Operation	Specialty Canning	Laboratory Equipment
Deep Sea Freight	All Other Misc. Fabricated Metal Manufacturing	Other Engine Equipment Manufacturing
Aircraft Charter Services	Kidney and Liver Dialysis Centers	Nuts Harvesting
Nurse Practitioners	Water Distribution	Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems
Miscellaneous Intermediation	Sports Teams and Clubs	Glass Product Manufacturing Made of Purchased Glass
Computers Manufacturing	Securities and Commodity Exchanges	Other Metal Container Manufacturing
Motion Picture and Video Distribution	Natural Gas Distribution	Forest Fire Prevention
Casino Hotels	Security Services	Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning Services
Forging Steel	Construction Equipment	Peanut Shelling
Engineering Services	Investment Trust Management	Automotive Engines and Parts

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Sectors With No Party Preference (n = 91)		
Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars	Boat Building	Construction, Mining, and Forestry Machinery
Gasoline Service Stations	Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing	Tax Preparation Services
Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing	Newspaper Publishers	Architectural Services
Home Health Agencies	Deep Sea Passenger	Waste Collection
Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing	Beverages Soft Drinks	Commercial Lithographic Printing
Administrative Management and General Management Consul	Carburetor, Piston, and Valve Manufacturing	Truck Trailer Manufacturing
Convention Centers	Construction, Mining, and Forestry Machinery and Equipment R	
Democratic Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (*n* = 1)		
Offices of Optometrists		
Democratic Preference, With Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (*n* = 2)		
Sugarcane Mills		
Beet Sugar Manufacturing		

Note. Classifications are based on the regression results for each sector. Sectors are ranged in descending order of their total contributions down the columns, so the largest givers in each category are in the left hand column.

the sectors that gave lopsidedly to Republicans overall were shown not to have a party preference, once the control variables like majority party, electoral competition, economic geography, and committee membership were taken into account.

The results indicate considerable variability in the relationship between economic interests and the political parties. There are some industrial-commercial sectors that clearly prefer one political party across the board. For purposes of illustration, Figure 3 displays giving patterns for three sectors with a consistent partisan preference. The figure shows the predicted contribution amounts for House members, under varying conditions of party control, along with confidence intervals around the estimates.

Each of these sectors prefers one party to the other, regardless of which party has a House majority. After taking account of all the other factors that influence its giving, the coal surface mining (aka strip mining and mountaintop removal) sector donates 6 times as much to Republicans as to Democrats, even when Democrats have a majority in Congress. When Republicans have a majority, its Republican preference is even starker. Similarly, the Meat Processing sector (which encompasses firms that slaughter animals, and



Figure 3. Predicted contribution amounts for three sectors with a party preference.

render, cut, can, and freeze meat products) donates at least twice as much to Republicans as to Democrats even when Democrats control the House. The Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction sector gives at least 3 times more to Republicans than to Democrats, even when Democrats have a majority.

Figure 4 illustrates the donation patterns of three sectors that reveal a party preference, but also engage in pragmatic giving to the nonpreferred party when it holds a House majority. As is evident here, and from the estimates in the appendix, each of these sectors donates more to its preferred party than to the nonpreferred party, regardless of party control. Nevertheless, each clearly steps up its giving to its nonpreferred party when it controls the House. The Tobacco Product Manufacturing sector prefers Republicans in that it donates 75% more to Republicans than to Democrats, even when Democrats have a House majority. Nevertheless, tobacco manufacturers substantially increase their contributions to Democrats when they have a House majority, boosting contributions to Democrats by more than 65% compared with the amounts Democrats receive when in the minority. However, the Beet Sugar Manufacturing sector prefers Democrats, in that the sector donates 32% more to Democrats than to Republicans even when Republicans hold a House



Figure 4. Predicted contribution amounts for three pragmatic sectors with a party preference.

majority. However, the sector responds pragmatically to House GOP majorities by raising their Republican contributions by more than 55% compared with the amounts Republicans receive when in the minority. ("Big Sugar" leans Democratic, because the Democratic party is more favorable to the import tariffs that raise the price of U.S. sugar.[17])

Figure 5 illustrates the contribution patterns for three pragmatic sectors. All three of these sectors donate more to members of the majority than to members of the minority, regardless of which party holds a majority. None of these sectors has a clear party preference, after taking into account which party has a House majority. For example, the Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation sector donates about 6% more to Democrats in the majority than to Republicans in the majority, but about 47% more to Republicans in the minority than to Democrats in the minority. Public Relations Agencies give 15% more to Republicans in the majority than to Democrats in the majority, but about 10% more to Democrats in the minority than to Republicans in the minority. The Offices of Lawyers sector (which encompasses private practices and law firms) appeared strongly Democratic when only the raw contributions were examined,[18] but law firms do not have a clear party preference once the model controls for majority party status. Democrats receive more from law firms than Republicans do when Democrats have a majority. But when Republicans hold a House majority, law firms donate slightly more to Republicans.



Figure 5. Predicted contribution amounts for three nonpartisan and pragmatic sectors.

Taken together, our results make known the extensive variation in how different economic interests relate to the two parties. More than half the sectors (n = 103, 64%) make campaign contributions without a systematic preference for one political party over the other. Of these, the majority (n = 91, 88%) show no responsiveness to political party *at all*, once other factors influencing their allocation decisions have been taken into account. The rest engage in pragmatic giving (n = 12, 12%), in which the majority party receives an increase, regardless of its identity. On the contrary, more than a third of all sectors (n = 59, 36.4%) has a party preference. Of these, the vast majority (n = 56, 95%) favor the Republican Party. Among sectors with a party preference, however, we also see variation in the extent to which they respond to shifts in party control of the House. A third of sectors with a party preference (n = 19) will give a boost to their nonpreferred party when it controls the House. But there is also a substantial group of partisan sectors (n = 40) that does not adjust its behavior when its less preferred party has a House majority.[19]

Each of these categories is important for a complete picture of how economic interests participate in campaign contributing. They all also encompass major sectors in terms of total campaign contributions. Across the board, however, the pragmatic sectors tend to be the largest contributors. Figure 6 compares the total amounts contributed by Republican and nonpartisan



Figure 6. Average totals contributed, pragmatic and nonpragmatic sectors.
Note. Democratic-leaning sectors not shown because of their small number (n = 3).

sectors, depending on whether they also engaged in pragmatic giving. Pragmatic Republican sectors are much bigger contributors on average than Republican sectors that do not exhibit pragmatic giving; the same is true among sectors that exhibit no party preference. The sectors that systematically increase their contributions to the majority party are much larger givers than those that do not. These findings reveal that the largest "players" in the campaign contributing universe are also more strategic in that they take greater cognizance of whatever party is in power.

Broader Patterns in Partisan Political Economy

The detailed analysis of contributions to House members presented here provides insight into the ways different economic interests relate to the contemporary party system. Using campaign contributions as a window into partisan alliances reveals that a subset of economic interests is politicized in partisan terms. Although corporate campaign contributions do favor Republicans overall, closer, disaggregated examination shows that this preference is not uniform across all sectors of the economy and is, in fact, concentrated within a relative few industries.

Table 2. Partisanship of Economic Sectors, Grouped By 2-Digit NAICS Code.

	n	Republican leaning (%)	Democratic leaning (%)	Nonpartisan (%)
Mining & Logging	5	80	0	20
Raw Materials Manufacturing	14	64		36
Accommodation and Food Services	5	60		40
Finance and Insurance	19	52		47
Retail Trade	8	50		50
Transportation and Warehousing	8	38		63
Food and Textile Manufacturing	14	36	14	50
Other services	3	33		67
Utilities	7	29		71
Information	7	29		71
Primary Metal Manufacturing	29	28		72
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing	9	22		78
Administrative and Support Services	5	20		80
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services	9	11		89
Health Care and Social Assistance	15	6	7	87
Agriculture and Forestry	3	0		100
Educational Services	1	0		100
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation	1	0		100

Note. Table 2 summarizes data in Table 1, listing the number and partisan tilt of the 6-digit NAICS sectors as grouped into broader 2-digit NAICS categories. These broader NAICS categories are ranged from most- to least-Republican leaning. NAICS = North American Industry Classification System.

Table 2 groups our findings on the partisan preferences of individual sectors under wider industry categories, as measured by 2-digit NAICS codes. These broader industry categories are ranged from most-to-least Republican leaning from the top to the bottom of the table. Grouping sectors within broad industries reveals clear patterns.

At the top of Table 2 are the strongly Republican-leaning extractive industries: *All* but one of the politically active sectors in mining shows a preference for Republicans. Included in this category are Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction; Bituminous Coal Surface Mining, and Support for Metal Mining (prospecting and site preparation services for extracting metal ores). Logging, also, leans Republican. The effect apparently carries downstream through related sectors of the economy. The manufacturing interests that are closest to the extractive industries also lean Republican. Among raw materials manufacturing sectors, those that bear a close relationship to mining in its various forms (involving mined or quarried minerals as well as chemical manufacturing) also exhibit a preference for Republicans. Republican-leaning sectors in raw materials manufacturing

include Paper Mills, All Basic Inorganic Chemicals, Pesticides, Pharmaceutical Preparation, Adhesive, Polish and Sanitation Goods, Nonmetallic Mineral Products, Plastic Packaging Film and Sheet, and Packaging Paper and Plastics. The nonpartisan sectors in raw materials manufacturing are generally smaller, specialized industries farther removed from raw material extraction, such as glass and commercial lithographic printing. Industries involved in resource extraction and raw materials manufacturing alone constitute almost a quarter (23%) of all the Republican-leaning sectors.

Outside the industries engaged in or closely connected to raw materials extraction, some major low-wage service sectors are also typically Republican leaning. The accommodation and food service sectors preferring Republicans include Hotels and Motels, Limited Service Restaurants (i.e., fast food), and Food Service Contractors. Other low-wage retail sectors also lean Republican, including Grocery Stores, and Clothing Accessory Stores, and Cosmetic and Beauty Supply Stores. It is likely that the Republican tilt in these sectors stems from the Democratic party's positions on the minimum wage and labor unions.

Finance and Insurance also stands among the more Republican-leaning sectors of the economy. In fact, all of the insurance sectors active in campaign contributing favor Republicans, including those for life, medical, title, and crop insurance. Financial services sectors either lean Republican in their giving or are nonpartisan or pragmatic; none are Democratic-leaning. The Republican-leaning financial sectors include Commercial Banking, Credit Card Banking, Investment Banking and Securities Dealing, Farm Mortgage Lending, Financial Transaction Processing, and Sales Financing.

Outside the extractive industries, finance and insurance, and low-wage service sectors, the remaining sectors that lean Republican are more varied. Generally speaking, it appears that Democratic Party positions on specific regulatory issues play a role in driving some sectors to the Republican Party. For example, in food manufacturing—a sector in which most sectors do not have a party preference—tobacco products and meat processing are supportive of Republicans, probably relating to partisan divisions over tobacco and the many workplace regulations affecting meat processing. Most utilities sectors do not have a party preference. The only two Republican-leaning utilities sectors involve electric power, an industry reliant on fossil fuels confronted by many environmental regulations.

Economic interests that are largely nonpartisan, however, include massive swaths of the U.S. economy, including most all

the professional service sectors: health care and social assistance services; professional, scientific, and technical services; information; arts, entertainment, and recreation. Among health care providers only the Health Maintenance Organization sector has a Republican tilt. With that exception, health care sectors are either nonpartisan or pragmatic, including offices of physicians, mental health therapists, chiropractors, dentists, offices of physicians, nurse practitioners, physical and speech therapists, dialysis centers, and diagnostic laboratories. Among professional, scientific, and technical services, only the Accounting sector is Republican leaning. None of the other sectors in this area—including law firms, veterinarians, public relations firms, architects, administrative consultants, and engineers—takes sides in party politics.

"The Business Community" and the Contemporary Party System

This study exploits the campaign contribution behavior of corporate PACs over a decade to gain systematic insight into the economic interests that align with the contemporary political parties. By differentiating among economic sectors using the maximum amount of detail available in Census Bureau industry classifications, we were able to ascertain whether particular industry sectors exhibit a preference for a political party, while using the most precise measures available to control for other factors known to affect corporate giving.

This detailed differentiation of industries allows for the most disaggregated look to date at the way different corporate interests orient themselves to political parties in the United States. We uncovered a wide variety of relationships and strategies that corporate interests pursue. Notably, some show a distinct preference for a party regardless of its majority or minority status in Congress. Others have a party preference, while allocating contributions pragmatically when their nonpreferred party commands a congressional majority. Others just give more to whatever party is in power, without a preference between them. Still others do not seem to even take party into account in their contributions.

"Business" is not monolithic. Even though corporate campaign contributions lean Republican in the aggregate, much insight can be gained by taking a closer look at precisely which industries favor one of the parties and which do not. We would not go quite as far as David M. Hart (2004) in concluding that "there simply is no such thing as 'business' in American politics" (p. 49). But we fully agree with his call for political science to pay more

attention to the wide variety of economic interests in the United States and the many different relationships they bear and forge to contemporary political parties.

Differing types of relationships between economic interests and the parties are not distributed randomly throughout the entire economy. The partisan sectors are heavily concentrated in a relatively small share of broad industry classifications. Meanwhile, expansive parts of the U.S. economy employing millions of people remain undefined by partisan cleavages, including most all professional service sectors outside of finance and insurance.

To return to the question of the party polarization of economic interests in the United States, nearly two thirds of the sectors that are consistently active in campaign contributions exhibit no partisan preference. Of those that do, these partisan alignments undoubtedly have much to do with the parties' diverging issue positions, especially on energy, environment, labor, and financial regulations. In particular, party differences on environmental issues clearly play a central role in organizing how different economic interests relate to the present party system. Industries either engaged in or bearing a clear relationship to natural resource extraction alone account for almost a quarter of all the economic sectors identified as having a Republican preference.

This variation in the way different economic interests interact with the parties sheds light on the specific interests that make up the parties themselves. After all, political parties exist to represent particular interests and policy preferences expressed within society. When specific industries exhibit a systematic and enduring preference for one party over another, the pattern contains information on what the party system is all about. Simultaneously, when whole segments of the economy seem to exhibit no partiality to party, we can also learn, to a great extent, what the party system is simply *not* about.

Authors' Note

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association and the DC-Area American Politics Workshop.

Appendix

Campaign Donations to Republicans and Democrats, Controlling for Majority Party, by Sector, 107th-111th Congresses

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Republican-tilting sectors (*n* = 55)				
Republican Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (*n* = 39)				
Logging (113310)	0.298*** (0.073)	0.137 (0.124)	0.007 (0.177)	−0.047 (0.194)
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction (211111)	0.462*** (0.095)	0.292+ (0.149)	−0.013 (0.234)	−0.137 (0.249)
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining (212111)	0.345*** (0.082)	0.196* (0.094)	0.029 (0.139)	−0.057 (0.159)
Support Activities for Metal Mining (213114)	0.131* (0.055)	0.01 (0.176)	−0.029 (0.16)	−0.081 (0.098)
Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control (221121)	0.303** (0.09)	0.136 (0.135)	0.147 (0.126)	0.146 (0.101)
Rice Milling (311212)	0.221+ (0.11)	0.174 (0.099)	0.116 (0.11)	0.129 (0.119)
Meat Processed from Carcasses (311612)	0.528*** (0.107)	0.353* (0.143)	0.164 (0.221)	0.097 (0.191)
Bakeries (311811)	0.413+ (0.134)	−0.087 (0.124)	−0.414 (0.371)	−0.141 (0.378)
Beverages, Beer, Ale, and Malt Liquors, Manufacturing (312120)	1.022* (0.306)	0.663 (0.429)	0.588 (0.512)	0.585 (0.474)
Paper (except Newsprint) Mills (322121)	0.883+ (0.29)	1.034 (0.576)	0.687 (0.547)	0.163 (0.491)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Coated and Laminated Packaging Manufacturing (322221)	0.47+ (0.156)	0.29+ (0.103)	0.095 (0.11)	0.086 (0.132)
Pesticide and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing (325320)	0.225 (0.155)	0.287+ (0.148)	0.219 (0.14)	0.024 (0.148)
Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing (325412)	0.483*** (0.132)	0.263 (0.178)	0.23 (0.182)	−0.026 (0.172)
Polish and Other Sanitation Good Manufacturing (325612)	0.299* (0.093)	0.254 (0.185)	0.172 (0.209)	0.163 (0.188)
Plastic Packaging Film and Sheet Manufacturing (326112)	0.364 (0.277)	0.031 (0.417)	−0.482 (0.402)	−0.472+ (0.265)
All Other Misc Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing (327999)	0.481* (0.187)	0.398 (0.24)	0.255 (0.258)	0.016 (0.252)
Machine Tool (Metal Cutting Types) Manufacturing (333512)	0.496* (0.015)	0.513 (0.129)	0.363 (0.123)	0.101 (0.186)
Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) Manufacturing (334119)	0.447* (0.202)	0.013 (0.303)	0.206 (0.293)	0.172 (0.194)
Radio and TV Broadcasting and Wireless Communication (334220)	0.673* (0.237)	0.381 (0.392)	0.377 (0.386)	0.404+ (0.214)
Semiconductor Devices Manufacturing (334413)	0.189** (0.05)	0.022 (0.153)	0.041 (0.173)	−0.017 (0.161)
Automobile Manufacturing (336111)	2.257* (0.639)	1.683 (1.129)	1.671 (1.052)	1.074 (0.776)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Ship Building and Repairing (336611)	0.602* (0.232)	0.345 (0.351)	0.359 (0.323)	0.176 (0.461)
Clothing Accessories Stores (448150)	0.197** (0.055)	0.123 (0.091)	0.116 (0.087)	0.091* (0.032)
Freight Trucking (484121)	0.38* (0.149)	0.241 (0.224)	0.224 (0.26)	−0.011 (0.271)
Greeting Card Publishing (511191)	0.642** (0.212)	0.42 (0.319)	0.484 (0.309)	0.231 (0.204)
Software Publishers (511210)	0.224* (0.106)	0.027 (0.138)	0.064 (0.15)	−0.002 (0.154)
Commercial Banking (522110)	0.267*** (0.055)	0.183** (0.067)	0.141+ (0.072)	0.148* (0.066)
Credit Card Banking (522210)	0.878* (0.247)	0.916 (0.766)	0.672 (0.715)	0.527 (0.362)
Farm Mortgage Lending (522292)	0.369* (0.138)	0.175 (0.237)	0.171 (0.223)	0.249 (0.163)
Financial Transaction Processing (522320)	0.343+ (0.126)	−0.126 (0.144)	−0.103 (0.095)	0.052 (0.022)
Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers (524114)	0.312** (0.107)	0.227* (0.105)	0.18 (0.115)	0.085 (0.116)
Direct Title Insurance Carriers (524127)	0.277+ (0.125)	0.129 (0.248)	0.016 (0.287)	0.121 (0.158)
Insurance Agencies and Brokerages (524210)	0.314*** (0.087)	0.231* (0.113)	0.14 (0.13)	0.02 (0.122)
Real Estate Property Management (531311)	0.343** (0.071)	0.469* (0.18)	0.24 (0.127)	0.037 (0.218)
Credit and Collection Agencies (561440)	0.649 (0.22)	0.591+ (0.062)	0.387 (0.355)	−0.285 (0.199)
Health Maintenance (621491)	0.237+ (0.135)	0.123 (0.156)	0.102 (0.168)	0.033 (0.179)
Limited Service Restaurants (722211)	0.682*** (0.138)	0.347+ (0.189)	0.261 (0.193)	0.009 (0.158)
Food Service Contractors (722310)	0.26* (0.044)	0.268* (0.041)	0.191 (0.1)	0.02 (0.2)
Business Associations (813910)	0.316*** (0.044)	0.25*** (0.067)	0.121 (0.123)	0.018 (0.124)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Republican Preference, w/Pragmatic Giving to Democrats in the Majority (n = 17)				
Electric Power Distribution (221122)	0.502*** (0.054)	0.488*** (0.071)	0.463*** (0.066)	0.309*** (0.065)
Tobacco Product Manufacturing (312229)	0.999*** (0.096)	0.938*** (0.12)	0.539+ (0.252)	0.324 (0.232)
All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing (325188)	0.423*** (0.068)	0.433*** (0.085)	0.39*** (0.074)	0.159* (0.069)
Adhesive Manufacturing (325520)	1.114** (0.057)	1.138* (0.147)	0.91* (0.201)	0.53 (0.276)
Current-Carrying Wiring Device Manufacturing (335931)	1.281*** (0.259)	0.75+ (0.388)	0.831* (0.375)	0.158 (0.247)
Aircraft Manufacturing (336411)	0.387* (0.155)	0.359+ (0.177)	0.368* (0.17)	0.122 (0.197)
New Car Dealers (441110)	1.205*** (0.136)	1.059*** (0.194)	0.767+ (0.345)	0.509 (0.447)
Light Fixture Stores (444190)	0.901* (0.211)	0.963** (0.126)	0.668* (0.213)	0.33 (0.338)
Grocery Stores (445110)	0.473** (0.154)	0.417* (0.177)	0.35+ (0.168)	0.214* (0.101)
Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation (481111)	0.592*** (0.103)	0.571* (0.261)	0.567* (0.231)	0.401*** (0.097)
Couriers (492110)	4.038** (0.341)	2.923** (0.295)	2.651* (0.401)	2.308* (0.267)
Sales Financing (522220)	1.837*** (0.353)	1.502** (0.524)	1.377** (0.506)	1.043** (0.337)
Investment Banking and Securities Dealing (523110)	0.429*** (0.107)	0.33+ (0.165)	0.305+ (0.165)	0.254* (0.107)
Direct Life Insurance Carriers (524113)	0.498*** (0.117)	0.451** (0.149)	0.402* (0.174)	0.305+ (0.169)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Commercial Property Managing (531312)	0.533** (0.203)	0.526+ (0.304)	0.628* (0.294)	0.237 (0.195)
Accounting (541219)	1.728*** (0.357)	1.451* (0.517)	1.057+ (0.546)	0.503 (0.602)
Hotels (except Casino Hotels) and Motels (721110)	0.296* (0.098)	0.351* (0.154)	0.315+ (0.148)	−0.002 (0.184)
Democratic-tilting sectors (*n* = 3)				
Democratic Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (*n* = 1)				
Offices of Optometrists (621320)	0.873 (1.009)	1.762 (0.747)	2.281* (0.346)	0.981 (0.951)
Democratic Preference, w/Pragmatic Giving to Republicans in the Majority (2)				
Sugarcane Mills (311311)	0.905*0.756	0.756 (0.453)	1.01* (0.347)	1.265** (0.276)
Beet Sugar Manufacturing (311313)	0.576**0.371	0.371 (0.24)	0.676*** (0.144)	0.758*** (0.117)
Pragmatic Sectors With No Party Preference (*n* = 12)				
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation (221112)	0.4*** (0.052)	0.327*** (0.087)	0.425*** (0.061)	0.222* (0.095)
Breakfast Cereal Manufacturing (311230)	0.697** (0.036)	0.404* (0.088)	0.471* (0.104)	0.446* (0.061)
Distilleries (312140)	0.24* (0.101)	0.272 (0.142)	0.328* (0.12)	0.148 (0.087)
Photographic Film, Cloth, Paper, and Plate, Sensitized, Man (325992)	1.106*** (0.283)	1.03* (0.425)	1.267** (0.411)	0.553* (0.271)
Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing (334210)	0.362*** (0.051)	0.235+ (0.115)	0.303** (0.085)	0.257* (0.086)
Real Estate Appraisers (531320)	0.99*** (0.229)	0.745* (0.336)	0.829** (0.323)	0.741*** (0.215)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Offices of Lawyers (541110)	0.301*** (0.05)	0.276*** (0.068)	0.388*** (0.068)	0.288*** (0.052)
Public Relations Agencies (541820)	0.323*** (0.086)	0.184 (0.122)	0.279* (0.11)	0.204+ (0.101)
Advertising Outdoor (541850)	0.385** (0.091)	0.307* (0.107)	0.34* (0.087)	0.183+ (0.082)
Other Technical and Trade Schools (611519)	0.168+ (0.081)	0.32 (0.178)	0.358+ (0.168)	0.117 (0.066)
Chiropractor's Clinics (621310)	0.349*** (0.023)	0.306*** (0.05)	0.308*** (0.036)	0.272*** (0.053)
General Hospitals (622110)	0.257** (0.088)	0.238+ (0.119)	0.3** (0.092)	0.195* (0.088)
Sectors With No Consistent Party Preference (*n* = 92)				
Nuts Harvesting (115113)	0.053 (0.048)	0.129+ (0.012)	0.151+ (0.015)	0.064 (0.049)
Peanut Shelling (115114)	−0.101 (0.167)	−0.217 (0.149)	0.087 (0.21)	−0.086 (0.094)
Forest Fire Prevention (115310)	−0.085 (0.133)	−0.28 (0.175)	−0.193 (0.136)	−0.119 (0.146)
Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations (213112)	0.176 (0.116)	0.189 (0.144)	0.058 (0.185)	−0.032 (0.176)
Nuclear Electric Power Generation (221113)	0.06 (0.363)	0.06 (0.34)	−0.088 (0.391)	−0.14 (0.399)
Alternative Energy Production—Wind (221119)	−0.148* (0.063)	−0.186+ (0.107)	−0.132 (0.117)	−0.199*** (0.049)
Natural Gas Distribution (221210)	0.201 (0.246)	0.065 (0.336)	0.059 (0.349)	0.116 (0.332)
Water Distribution (221310)	0.071 (0.092)	0.009 (0.095)	0.099 (0.087)	−0.0001 (0.088)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Berries Canning Manufacturing (311421)	0.304 (0.233)	0.305 (0.481)	0.38 (0.478)	0.246 (0.322)
Specialty Canning (311422)	0.731 (0.73)	0.653 (0.819)	0.541 (0.732)	0.272 (0.561)
Dairy Canning (311514)	0.73 (0.705)	0.616 (0.694)	0.383 (0.76)	0.19 (0.412)
Beverages Soft Drinks (312111)	0.578** (0.086)	0.627** (0.072)	0.616** (0.056)	0.494*** (0.032)
Textile & Fabric Finishing (except Brdwoven Fabric) Mill (313312)	0.092 (0.082)	0.209 (0.129)	0.205 (0.104)	−0.002 (0.081)
Commercial Lithographic Printing (323110)	0.497 (0.083)	0.499 (0.137)	0.121 (0.423)	0.034 (0.404)
Bio Fuel and Petroleum Refining (324110)	0.009 (0.264)	−0.049 (0.303)	−0.42 (0.503)	−0.394 (0.416)
Glass Fiber Manufacturing (327212)	0.417 (0.182)	0.058 (0.065)	−0.029 (0.08)	0.04 (0.097)
Glass Product Manufacturing Made of Purchased Glass (327215)	0.108 (0.214)	−0.043 (0.6)	0.093 (0.539)	−0.088 (0.335)
Forging Steel (331111)	−0.089 (0.104)	−0.006 (0.112)	0.062 (0.101)	−0.203 (0.126)
Other Metal Container Manufacturing (332439)	0.091 (0.081)	−0.029 (0.205)	−0.088 (0.271)	−0.102 (0.263)
All Other Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing (332999)	−0.04 (0.129)	−0.195 (0.182)	−0.32 (0.235)	−0.321 (0.268)
Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing (333111)	0.289 (0.228)	0.047 (0.357)	−0.049 (0.458)	−0.149 (0.556)
Construction Equipment (333120)	0.03 (0.101)	−0.05 (0.114)	−0.006 (0.117)	−0.033 (0.144)
Laboratory Equipment (333314)	0.083 (0.054)	0.055 (0.043)	0.066 (0.082)	−0.026 (0.054)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Other Engine Equipment Manufacturing (333618)	−0.541+ (0.277)	−0.262 (0.415)	−0.602 (0.401)	−0.562* (0.264)
Computers Manufacturing (334111)	0.05 (0.143)	−0.09 (0.191)	−0.005 (0.189)	0.035 (0.134)
Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing (334310)	0.177 (0.203)	−0.282 (0.068)	−0.343 (0.16)	−0.412 (0.266)
Search, Detection, Navigation, Missile Manufacturing (334511)	0.096 (0.172)	0.084 (0.183)	0.116 (0.162)	−0.083 (0.196)
Instruments and Related Products Manufacturing for Measuring (334513)	−0.595 (1.972)	0.748 (0.776)	0.511 (0.75)	−1.035 (2.463)
Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing (336120)	0.266 (0.228)	−0.042 (0.296)	−0.303 (0.496)	−0.505 (0.857)
Truck Trailer Manufacturing (336212)	0.226 (0.204)	0.271 (0.186)	0.302 (0.191)	−0.017 (0.174)
Carburetor, Piston, Piston Ring, and Valve Manufacturing (336311)	0.298 (0.281)	0.062 (0.423)	0.298 (0.408)	−0.064 (0.27)
Automotive Engines and Parts (336312)	0.968 (0.547)	1.222 (0.908)	1.241 (0.892)	0.636 (0.385)
Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing (336414)	0.061 (0.089)	0.136 (0.211)	0.122 (0.217)	0.025 (0.201)
Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing (336510)	0.735 (0.324)	0.598 (0.292)	0.403 (0.044)	0.36 (0.053)
Boat Building (336612)	0.168 (0.166)	−0.411 (0.506)	−0.332 (0.396)	−0.224 (0.359)
Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component Manufacturing (336992)	0.005 (0.308)	−0.169 (0.356)	−0.222 (0.348)	−0.224 (0.361)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing (339113)	0.091 (0.114)	0.03 (0.15)	0.095 (0.142)	−0.038 (0.114)
All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers (441229)	0.251+ (0.096)	0.315* (0.11)	0.344* (0.105)	0.18 (0.112)
Pharmacies (446110)	−0.08 (0.575)	0.007 (0.508)	0.102 (0.446)	−0.14 (0.502)
Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and Perfume Stores (446120)	0.449* (0.105)	0.486* (0.157)	0.535* (0.192)	0.223 (0.313)
Gasoline Service Stations (447190)	0.507 (0.342)	0.126 (0.447)	0.144 (0.479)	0.039 (0.407)
Aircraft Charter Services (481211)	−0.39 (0.884)	−0.409 (0.661)	−0.398 (0.667)	−0.967 (1.182)
Deep Sea Freight (483111)	0.157*** (0.039)	0.171** (0.06)	0.199** (0.07)	0.149* (0.058)
Deep Sea Passenger (483112)	0.662* (0.232)	0.437** (0.097)	0.5** (0.08)	0.56* (0.205)
Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems (485113)	0.783*** (0.243)	1.183*** (0.365)	1.433*** (0.354)	0.873*** (0.235)
Gas Pipeline Operation (486210)	0.179 (0.127)	0.232 (0.149)	0.108 (0.178)	−0.04 (0.142)
Newspaper Publishers (511110)	0.649 (0.071)	0.563** (0.004)	0.485 (0.075)	0.588* (0.011)
Magazine Printing and Publishing (511120)	0.227 (0.114)	0.227 (0.138)	0.243 (0.143)	0.091 (0.116)
Motion Picture and Video Production (512110)	0.717*** (0.118)	0.588 (0.374)	0.517 (0.354)	0.517* (0.177)
Motion Picture and Video Distribution (512120)	1.688* (0.282)	1.559 (0.646)	1.341 (0.644)	1.582* (0.17)
Other Sound Recording Industries (512290)	0.276 (0.152)	0.345 (0.252)	0.291 (0.249)	0.329 (0.28)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Savings Banks (522120)	0.189** (0.053)	0.233* (0.1)	0.245* (0.112)	0.165*** (0.045)
Credit Unions (522130)	0.312*** (0.092)	0.277+ (0.141)	0.27+ (0.139)	0.302*** (0.086)
Consumer Credit Unsecured Cash Loans (522291)	0.77*** (0.175)	0.973*** (0.242)	1.053*** (0.241)	0.665*** (0.171)
All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation (522298)	1.902 (0.479)	1.501 (0.384)	1.702 (0.484)	1.198 (0.994)
Commodity Contracts Brokerage (523140)	1.006* (0.345)	0.516 (0.524)	0.61 (0.465)	0.757* (0.282)
Securities and Commodity Exchanges (523210)	0.164 (0.245)	0.28 (0.458)	0.196 (0.447)	0.132 (0.264)
Miscellaneous Intermediation (523910)	1.132 (0.857)	1.048 (1.072)	0.934 (1.171)	0.301 (1.323)
Investment Trust Management (523920)	0.153 (0.401)	−0.169 (0.746)	−0.284 (0.763)	−0.108 (0.53)
Crop Insurance (524126)	0.198 (0.118)	−0.016 (0.201)	−0.024 (0.217)	0.023 (0.141)
Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings (531110)	0.199 (0.214)	−0.029 (0.289)	−0.078 (0.294)	−0.086 (0.27)
Convention Centers (531120)	1.376* (0.164)	2.326*** (0.079)	1.803* (0.318)	0.861 (0.537)
Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers (531210)	3.218*** (0.362)	3.421*** (0.302)	3.56*** (0.252)	3.096** (0.47)
Passenger Car Rental (532111)	0.399 (0.36)	0.024 (0.381)	0.067 (0.344)	0.125 (0.385)
General Rental Centers (532310)	0.618+ (0.059)	1.277+ (0.133)	1.226 (0.285)	0.715* (0.037)
Construction, Mining, & Forestry Machinery and Eqpt Rpr (532412)	0.554 (0.38)	0.502 (0.636)	0.516 (0.676)	0.227 (0.464)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Tax Preparation Services (541213)	1.339+ (0.136)	1.496 (0.334)	1.616 (0.214)	1.348* (0.102)
Architectural Services (541310)	1.414** (0.083)	2.022** (0.085)	2.051** (0.081)	1.465** (0.081)
Engineering Services (541330)	−0.101 (0.115)	−0.185 (0.184)	−0.131 (0.181)	−0.2 (0.136)
Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Services (541611)	−0.023 (0.141)	−0.12 (0.153)	−0.072 (0.124)	−0.095 (0.169)
Veterinary Services (541940)	0.193 (0.916)	0.446 (0.895)	0.61 (0.733)	0.296 (0.817)
Business Support Services: Credit Bureaus (561450)	0.126 (0.09)	0.219 (0.163)	0.088 (0.075)	−0.058 (0.111)
Security Services (561621)	0.025 (0.175)	−0.272 (0.38)	−0.236 (0.333)	−0.218 (0.257)
Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning Services (561740)	−0.015 (0.191)	−0.472 (0.277)	−0.347 (0.264)	−0.09 (0.177)
Waste Collection (562111)	0.079 (0.144)	0.002 (0.005)	0.156 (0.028)	−0.045 (0.051)
Health Screening in Physicians' Offices (621111)	0.174 (0.133)	−0.017 (0.168)	0.097 (0.155)	−0.078 (0.145)
Offices of Physicians, Mental Health Specialists (621112)	−0.66 (0.625)	−0.979 (0.933)	−0.741 (0.767)	−0.462 (0.538)
Offices of Dentists (621210)	0.755*** (0.105)	0.858*** (0.129)	0.842*** (0.111)	0.585*** (0.117)
Offices of Mental Health Practitioners (except Physicians; 621330)	0.233* (0.084)	0.075 (0.158)	0.246 (0.146)	0.589+ (0.25)

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

	Republican in the majority	Republican in the minority	Democrat in the majority	Democrat in the minority
	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)	Estimate (*SE*)
Offices of Physical, Occupational and Speech Therapists (621340)	0.259 (0.304)	−0.124 (0.495)	0.165 (0.446)	0.315 (0.283)
Nurse Practitioners (621399)	0.498** (0.133)	0.503* (0.214)	0.647* (0.206)	0.451* (0.17)
Kidney and Liver Dialysis Centers (621492)	0.024 (0.397)	0.014 (0.362)	0.14 (0.403)	−0.134 (0.448)
Diagnostic Laboratories (621511)	0.094 (0.116)	0.097 (0.182)	0.175 (0.183)	0.046 (0.156)
Home Health Agencies (621610)	0.117 (0.086)	0.061 (0.116)	0.044 (0.133)	−0.003 (0.117)
Ambulance Services (621910)	0.288+ (0.116)	0.327 (0.164)	0.284 (0.158)	0.171+ (0.063)
Nursing Care Facilities (623110)	0.096 (0.137)	−0.041 (0.216)	0.038 (0.201)	−0.176 (0.234)
Sports Teams and Clubs (711211)	0.538** (0.048)	0.571** (0.055)	0.619* (0.081)	0.59* (0.102)
Casino Hotels (721120)	0.171 (0.104)	0.062 (0.164)	0.139 (0.166)	0.248 (0.142)
Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars (722213)	1.492** (0.249)	1.513** (0.222)	1.68* (0.293)	1.145** (0.182)
Computer and Office Machine Repair and Maintenance (811212)	0.22 (0.385)	0.151 (0.432)	0.227 (0.39)	0.099 (0.298)
Funeral Homes and Funeral Services (812210)	0.054 (0.209)	0.008 (0.261)	−0.042 (0.25)	0.007 (0.242)

Source. Estimates generated with the *Stata*™ lincom command based on the model shown on p. 13. Eqpt Rpr = Equipment Rental and Leasing.

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Notes

1. In compiling the County and Zip Code Business Patterns data set, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Census Bureau queries all known business establishments with a fixed address located in the United States every year, collecting such information as kind-of-business activity, number of employees, and firm location. In defining commercial-industrial sectors, we employ the 6-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, the most detailed classification available.
2. For a review of this literature, see Baumgartner and Leech (1998), as well as Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech (2009), Chapter 10.
3. Files are downloadable from http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml, accessed June 30, 2012.
4. For more on NAICS codes, see http://www.census.gov/eos/www.naics/. New NAICS codes are added as the U.S. economy becomes increasingly diverse, and wholly new industries emerge. For this analysis, we used the 2002 NAICS coding scheme.
5. These problem cases proved difficult due to the extraordinarily mixed or heterogeneous nature of their mission and market, but some may yet be classifiable with more extensive research. In less muddled cases, when businesses were discovered to be involved in the production of multiple goods and services across several industry sectors, we classified them within the sector that constituted their largest market.
6. In a small number of instances, our choice of industry sector differed from Opensecrets.org, and in other cases they did not provide an industry code. We drew upon Dun and Bradstreet's business and industry website, Hoovers.com for appropriate NAICS coding. With these procedures and admonitions set forth, we cannot claim that every one of the 2,556 political action committees (PACs)

included in the final analysis have been correctly classified by NAICS sector, or that there were not some "informed guesses" that went into the classification.

7. Helpfully, the FEC data provide a designation of which PACs and committees are union affiliated and which are not.
8. Online Appendix A containing a list of all sectors, along with their total amounts donated and their Republican:Democratic ratio of giving is downloadable at https://sites.google.com/site/onlineappendix/. We do not include it with the text because of its large size.
9. There are 66 sectors that gave at least 1.5 times as much to Republicans as to Democrats, but only 3 sectors that gave 1.5 times as much to Democrats as to Republicans.
10. While this may seem like a modest sum—the two major party nominees for president easily surpassed this level of fundraising and spending in 2012—bear in mind that federal contribution limits permit a multicandidate PAC to give a maximum of only US$5,000 to each candidate per election cycle. As many PACs give less than the maximum, there are more contributions spread across more candidates than one might appreciate at first glance.
11. Note that all the analyzed industry sectors participated in every cycle, but not every individual PAC included within each sector participated across all five cycles.
12. Admittedly, direct examinations of the tenability of this assumption for a number of random-effects models for various sectors demonstrated that the correlations were small in magnitude, and that there were often few differences between fixed and random-effects estimates. The authors will make the random-effects estimates available upon request. All models were estimated with the *Stata*™ xtreg routine.
13. Online Appendix B containing all model results is downloadable at https://sites.google.com/site/onlineappendix/.
14. It appears that the sectors that were less likely to show a preference for members of a particular committee were ones where jurisdictional lines are less clear. For example, only 63% of the sectors in retail favored a particular committee, given that policy matters affecting retail are handled by a variety of committees. Meanwhile, all of the sectors in agriculture, mining, and utilities had a committee preference, all areas where jurisdictional authority are more clear.
15. There is some correlation between the number of firms and employees across congressional districts, though not extremely high (for 2009-2010 cycle, $r = .379$; $p \leq .01$).
16. Estimated contributions calculated with the *Stata*™ lincom command.
17. Prominent Republicans, including Presidential candidate Mitt Romney and Republican Agriculture Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar, have supported measures to end the sugar subsidy, as have key Republican-leaning interest groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Americans for Tax Reform, headed by Grover Norquist (Green, 2012).

18. As shown in Figure 1, the Republican:Democratic ratio of total contributions for Offices of Lawyers is .57, making it one of the most strongly Democratic of all economic sectors.
19. There are not systematic differences between partisan and nonpartisan sectors in terms of how well the control variables perform. The allocation decisions of all sectors, both partisan and nonpartisan, are shaped to some extent by factors such as economic geography, electoral competition, and committee jurisdiction.

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