

In its final months, the Pinochet regime engineered a number of institutional reforms with the intent of bolstering the right side of the spectrum and of promoting centripetal political competition once democratic procedures were reintroduced in 1989. One of the most important reforms created 60 double-member districts for elections to the lower house. Although some analysts have claimed that the new system does in fact promote centrist position taking, using game theory and spatial modeling, the authors demonstrate that the incentives of the Chilean electoral system encourage politicians to take noncentrist positions along a left-right spectrum. The combination of double-member districts with the d'Hondt seat allocation method and open-list voting creates a Rival Partners Game, creating perverse incentives for Chilean candidates. The authors' theoretical results help clarify the debate about the effects of post-authoritarian institutional reforms in Chile and should encourage empirical research on the same issues.

ON THE ABSENCE OF CENTRIPETAL INCENTIVES IN DOUBLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS The Case of Chile

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In the wake of Chile's 1988 plebiscite against General Pinochet's continued rule, the authoritarian regime initiated major electoral reforms that took effect with the 1989 legislative elections, the first democratic elections in Chile in 16 years. The primary effect of the reform was to redraw

Chile's electoral map from one with 28 electoral districts, ranging in district magnitude from 1 to 18, to one with 60 districts, each with a magnitude of 2. Prevailing opinion is that the military regime enacted these reforms to ensure (or augment) representation of rightists and to encourage the emergence of bipolar, centripetal electoral competition (Garretón, 1991; Rabkin, 1996; Scully, 1995). In sum, when its exit from power became imminent, the military government strove to preserve its base of support and to reduce the probability of a recurrence of polarized pluralism in Chilean politics.

Scholars have made two specific claims about the new electoral system. (a) The new system promotes bipolar competition, instead of multipolar competition, and (b) the system promotes centrist position taking. In this article, we will address the question of whether the new electoral system in fact promotes centripetal competition, in contrast to the more permissive pre-1973 electoral system, which allegedly permitted the emergence of polarized pluralism. Although we do not dispute the claims that the electoral reforms promote bipolar electoral competition, we argue that the effect of the reforms is not, in fact, to encourage centripetal competition; rather, we argue that candidates have incentives to adopt positions away from the median voter.

The actual effect of the electoral reforms is important because conventional wisdom has it that the breakdown of democracy in 1973 resulted from extreme polarized pluralism, which was encouraged by the pre-reform electoral system (Sartori, 1976; Valenzuela, 1978); a crucial issue in Chilean party politics has historically been whether the "center can hold" (Scully, 1994). Furthermore, there is a broad consensus that centripetal, bipolar competition encourages democratic stability (Downs, 1957; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Mainwaring, 1993; Shugart & Carey, 1992).

An emerging literature has begun to address the effects of the 1989 reform (e.g., Guzmán, 1993; Rabkin, 1996; Valenzuela & Siavelis, 1991). Thus far, analysts have concluded that the new electoral system has not significantly affected the number of parties but that the reform tends to reduce the number of lists running candidates in a given district to two. That is, instead of each party running an independent list of candidates, parties now engage in feverish pre-election negotiations over the distribution of the two candidacies on the two dominant lists in each district.

There is disagreement, however, about the degree to which this institutional change has fundamentally altered the post-authoritarian party system. At root of the disagreement lies empirical ambiguity: Although some have argued that "the center had become the most habitable space within the Chilean political landscape" (Scully, 1995, p. 134), others claim that the center of the party spectrum contains "the most important intra-alliance tensions" (Rabkin, 1996, p. 349). To date, the effects of the new institutional

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