

# ***The Concertación's Defeat in Chile's 2009–2010 Presidential Elections***

*Mauricio Morales Quiroga*  
*Translated by Camila Vergara*

---

## ABSTRACT

The Concertación lost the recent presidential elections in Chile after 20 years in office. This article proposes three explanations for this result. First, the Concertación's candidate selection process through primaries was exclusionary, without opening up participation to all potential applicants. This combined with a deep erosion of the coalition, reflected in the resignation of deputies and senators from parties that compose it. The process was accelerated with the emergence of an independent candidate, formerly from the Concertación. Second, the candidate from the right increased his vote in the poorest sectors and expanded the right's constituency to middle-class segments, traditional Concertación electoral strongholds. Third, the right achieved greater electoral consistency than the Concertación by reducing the number of voters who split their tickets. Its presidential candidate obtained almost the same percentage as its list of deputies.

Despite the widespread popularity of President Michelle Bachelet (2006–10), the Concertación (center-left coalition) lost Chile's 2009 presidential election. Its candidate, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and former president of the republic (1994–2000), lost against the representative of the Coalition for Change (center-right), the businessman Sebastián Piñera from the National Renewal Party (RN). The portions of the vote obtained by the candidates in the run-off were 48.39 percent and 51.6 percent, respectively. This marked the end of a long cycle that began in 1990 with the first democratic government after the regime of Augusto Pinochet (1973–90). This article proposes three hypotheses to explain the defeat of one of the most successful coalitions in Latin America.

To begin with, there was considerable murkiness in the process of selecting the Concertación's presidential candidate. Even though primary elections were held, they were not inclusive, and left out a candidate who would later become instrumental in the defeat of the ruling coalition. Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a deputy for the Socialist Party (PS), decided to compete as an independent candidate after the Concertación's leaders refused to include him in the primaries. In addition,

former President Ricardo Lagos and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, withdrew from the process. Therefore, the coalition's strongest possible nominees stepped aside. The resignation of deputies and senators, who decided to compete as independents under the wing of other parties or under the parliamentary list of Enríquez-Ominami, aggravated the situation. This sped up the Concertación's decomposition process. Probably, both Lagos and Insulza left the presidential race anticipating the Concertación's defeat, clearing the way for the nomination of Frei.

Overall, the public's perception of Piñera's likely triumph in the upcoming elections was higher than that of any representative of the Concertación. According to the October 2008 Universidad Diego Portales survey, 52 percent believed that Piñera would become the next president. At that point, voting intentions for Piñera reached 36 percent, and his closest challenger, former President Lagos, was 20 points behind. Meanwhile, in the December 2008 survey by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, Lagos fell in all attributes. This is explained by the fierce campaign launched by the opposition to discredit the work of Lagos's government, putting forward a series of corruption allegations. On December 4, 2008, Lagos irrevocably ended his candidacy.

Given the primary election's characteristics, Frei was weakened by the process. Generally, primaries reinforce the winning candidate (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006) and bring transparency to nomination processes (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). In Frei's case, however, the primaries' impact was extremely negative. Instead of gaining popular legitimacy, his election was seen as a new imposition by the parties' leadership. This led to the emergence and consolidation of the independent candidacy of Enríquez-Ominami. After the primaries, Frei fell slowly but steadily in the polls for voting intention, while Enríquez-Ominami increased his popularity. If the primaries had included Enríquez-Ominami, the process probably would have acquired more uncertainty, competitiveness, and participation, unlike the primaries held in 1993 and 1999 (Navia 2005a; Altman 2008).

While the primaries can be understood as an effect of the parties' crisis and inability to be transparent to the public, more than the cause of the defeat, the post-run-off analyses agreed that the primaries were poorly carried out (Tironi 2010; Morales and Navia 2010). The fact that the nomination of the candidate was virtually decided "behind closed doors" can be advanced as a strong short-term argument explaining the defeat. Clearly, it reflects the unwillingness of the parties to conduct open primaries to increase competition. Some leaders of the coalition, in fact, recognized this after the defeat. They concluded that the Concertación's electoral offer did not represent renewal or change. In addition, since Frei's government ended with very low presidential approval ratings, he

was easy prey for criticism from the opposition. So, while the primary elections evidenced the parties' crisis, they also explained the emergence of Enríquez-Ominami and the subsequent defeat of the Concertación.

A second hypothesis for the victory of the Coalition for Change relates to Piñera's ability to consolidate the right's vote in the popular sectors and to expand its support in middle-income sectors, which were the Concertación's historical electoral stronghold. In addition, and as in 2005, Piñera achieved significant support from centrist voters. Unlike other right-wing candidates, Piñera managed partly to break the ideological wall that divided Chileans in the postauthoritarian era (Huneus 2003). In contrast to other candidates from the right, he balanced support both from the ideological axis and the income level of voters.

Historically, for example, in 1999, Joaquín Lavín came 31,000 votes short of winning the presidential election against Lagos. Lavín's strength was in the popular segments, but he had trouble reaching voters from the center. In 2005, Piñera captured center votes, mainly supporters of the Christian Democrats (Izquierdo et al. 2008), but found it difficult to reach the poorest voters, and especially middle-income segments. In 2009, Piñera consolidated his support from poor and middle-class segments, and also obtained significant support from centrist voters.

A third reason for the right's triumph was its electoral cohesion and consistency. Unlike previous concurrent elections (1989, 1993, and 2005), the right united under a single candidate. This explains the decrease in its split-ticket voting rate.<sup>1</sup> In the first round, Piñera's percentage of the vote was almost identical to his parliamentary list, which contrasts with that of the Concertación. Because the latter had two competing candidates, the magnitude of split-ticket voting increased substantially. The split-ticket voting is seen as a sign of party disloyalty (Campbell and Miller 1957; Maddox and Nimmo 1981, Cain et al. 1987; Bawn 1999) and even as a lack of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring 1999). If the split-ticket voting was higher in the Concertación, it is reasonable to think that its constituents, at least for this election, were more volatile and less loyal.

This observation has at least two implications. First, voters of the Socialist Party had, in practical terms, three candidates: Frei (the Concertación's official candidate), Marco Enríquez-Ominami (former deputy of the party), and Jorge Arrate (a Communist Party representative but a former PS militant). This resulted in a greater dispersion of the Socialist vote and, in consequence, an increase in the percentage of split-ticket voting. In other words, there was support for a presidential candidate other than Frei and for a Socialist candidate for Congress. In fact, in the municipalities, where the PS achieved stronger support for its candidates, split-ticket voting increased significantly. Second, Piñera received early support from the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). This

party, unlike what happened in previous presidential elections, did not have a strong candidate. Piñera was by far the most important figure in the Coalition for Change and did not have a visible opponent. The UDI had no choice but to support Piñera. Expectations of triumph prompted both the party's leadership and its list of candidates for Congress to work resolutely for Piñera.

These three explanations are related, but they capture different dimensions of the result. The primaries were a critical element that could have changed the course of events. The exclusion of Enríquez-Ominami from the internal competition in the Concertación explains why an important portion of its voters decided not to support Frei in the run-off. Open primaries probably would have given greater legitimacy to the winner, increasing his chances of success. On the other hand, and in a longer-term trend, the right consolidated its support among the popular sectors and opened spaces for itself in middle-income segments. This trend had been brewing since the 1999 presidential election, in which Lavín strongly reached out to the popular world. Meanwhile, in 2009, Piñera obtained support from middle-income sectors, traditionally controlled by the Concertación. The candidate's strength and the coalition's unity were evident in the joint campaign of Piñera and his parliamentary list. This allows us to understand why the right's split-ticket voting rate in this election dropped so substantially.

Since 1999, elections have become much more competitive. The Concertación may well have lost in 2005, but the candidate's nomination was key. In that instance, Bachelet represented renewal and change; that is, she made her own the two characteristics that defined the presidential candidacies of the right in 1999 and 2005. This prevented the Concertación's defeat. In other words, the correct selection of the candidate was crucial to maintain a narrow but sufficient advantage over the right. In 2009, the Concertación failed in the selection mechanism and the nomination of its candidate. Frei was far from representing renewal and change. Another process that had been consolidating was the unity of the right. It competed divided in 1989 and 1993, but in 1999 it united under Lavín, inaugurating the new phase of competitive presidential elections. In 2005, it again split, with two candidates who, even though they jointly obtained more votes than the Concertación, were unable to defeat it in the run-off. The 2009 election would mark the relaunching of the united right.

The simultaneous presence of these three conditions helps to explain the Concertación's ultimate defeat. In 1999, even if the right was clearly more competitive than in 1993, it faced Ricardo Lagos, a very strong candidate from the Concertación. The right managed to move substantially toward the popular sectors but still lost the election. In 2005, while the right was also competitive with two strong candidates,

the Concertación responded with a bid that represented renewal and change: Michelle Bachelet. In addition, the right's parliamentary list was ten points below the sum of votes obtained by its presidential candidates. Then, in 2009, the three conditions were present. The right united under one candidate; Piñera managed to reach the poorest segments while expanding his support to the middle class; and the Concertación erred in the selection of its candidate.


This article will analyze this process in four sections. The first describes Chile's political party system. The second section analyzes the selection process of the Concertación's candidate. The third part shows the socioeconomic bases of the coalitions according to the communal Human Development Index (HDI) and the socioeconomic status of respondents. Last, the electoral consistency of the Coalition for Change is explained, according to split-ticket voting.

## **THE CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM**

The Chilean party system is one of the most institutionalized in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Payne et al. 2003). This is due basically to the low levels of volatility and to the political and economic stability achieved during the four governments of the Concertación. After a "difficult" transition (Garretón 1991; Huneeus 1994; Otano 1995; Cavallo 1998), Chile moved systematically toward democratic consolidation and the alleviation of poverty, which declined from 38.6 percent in 1990 to 13.7 percent in 2006 (see Ffrench-Davis 2003; MIDEPLAN 2006; Haindl 2007). While there were strong "authoritarian enclaves" inherited from the Pinochet regime (Garretón 1999), democracy became the only game in town (Przeworski 1991). The Christian-Democratic governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990–94) and Frei (1994–2000) made progress on national reconciliation and the investigation of human rights violations under the dictatorship (Huneeus 2001), even if, according to some, insufficiently (Portales 2000). Similarly, they worked toward the international economic reintegration of Chile through multiple free trade agreements (Muñoz and Stefoni 2002). Meanwhile, Lagos (2000–2006) and Bachelet (2006–10) were the socialist presidents of the new century. They closed the cycle with significant reforms to the constitution and profound changes to the pension and health systems.

Regarding electoral dynamics, the left-right axis has defined Chilean parties' positioning since the beginning of the twentieth century (Gil 1969; Drake 1978). Competition among the so-called political thirds collapsed with the high programmatic polarization in the late 1960s. The process culminated in the coup d'état of September 11, 1973 (Valenzuela 2003). Once democracy was reinstated, the party system was relaunched with more continuity than change (Valenzuela 1995). The PDC, PS, and

Figure 1. Percentage of Registered Voters and Validly Cast Votes According to Voting-age Population (VAP)



Legend: P=Presidential Election; M= Municipal Election; D= Parliamentary Election (deputies); C= Council Members Election.

Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP, SERVEL, and INE.

the Radical Party (PR) competed with the same names as in the pre-1973 democracy. The nascent Party for Democracy (PDP) brought together some of those who were active in the PS. RN sheltered relevant members of the former National Party. The most important discontinuity was the emergence of the UDI, a right-wing party with deep roots among the popular sectors (Huneus 2001; Morales and Bugueño 2001). The discussion revolved around the validity of the “thirds” (Valenzuela 1999) and the binomial electoral system’s effect on coalition formation (Navia 2005b; Magar et al. 1998).

While the party system in Chile is characterized by a stable competition, there are worrisome signs. Progress in poverty alleviation and economic growth has coexisted with a decline in some indicators of democratic quality (Siavelis 2009). Specifically, these are the dimensions of participation and competition. In the 1989 inaugural elections, for example, of the total voting-age population (VAP, 18 years or older), 89 percent were registered to vote. In contrast, during the recent presidential elections, that percentage fell to 69.2 percent. Because Chile has a system of voluntary registration and compulsory voting, those who fail to register with Electoral Services are disqualified from voting. Figure 1 shows the drop in the percentage of registered voters and valid votes (i.e., excluding null and blank), according to the VAP.

Moreover, if in 1989 more than 82 percent of the VAP cast a valid vote, in 2009 only 58 percent did so. For these elections, the VAP was close to 12 million. Piñera won about 3.5 million in the run-off. That is, he was elected by about 29 percent of the VAP. But because, among the 12 million people of voting age, only about 8.2 percent were registered

to vote, and only 7.2 of them voted in this election, Piñera won the presidency with an absolute majority.

Like participation, competition has also been depressed. This downward trend is basically due to the implementation of the binomial electoral system. In this formula, parties are virtually forced to form coalitions (Garretón 1991; Navia 2005b; Altman 2005). Because it may be expected that in most of the districts one candidate from each coalition will be elected, the level of competition is very low. This, according to Siavelis (2009), is part of an elitist policy that was established in 1990 and that constitutes one of the "transition enclaves."

These failures do not question Chile's democratic soundness, but they do evidence problems in the quality of democracy. It is in this context that the December 2009 presidential elections were held; that is, with a drop in participation levels and also in party identification. According to CEP surveys, only about 40 percent of Chileans identify with parties. This marks a substantial difference from the opening years of democracy, when party identification bordered on 70 percent. The 2008 LAPOP study ranks Chile as second to last in Latin America regarding percentages of identification. So, while Chile has one of the least volatile and most stable party systems in the region, this status coexists with very low levels of party membership. This combination (low volatility and low identification) is exceptional for the theory of institutionalization (Mainwaring 1999, 27). Thus, according to Zucco (2009), Chile falls into the category of "hydroponic party system."

## **THE CONCERTACIÓN'S CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCESS: POLLS AND RESULTS**

In the first round of the 2009 presidential elections there were four candidates: Piñera for the Coalition for Change; Frei for the Concertación; PS deputy Enríquez-Ominami, now competing as an independent; and Jorge Arrate, former Socialist Party member and minister in the Frei government, who was running for the Communist Party.

The Coalition for Change quickly agreed unanimously to support Piñera. In mid-December 2008, the UDI's leadership virtually confirmed him as the sole candidate, formalizing its backing in August 2009. In the Concertación, after the declines of Lagos and Insulza, it appeared that Frei would quickly be proclaimed as the official candidate, given the support of the three largest parties in the coalition (PDC, PS, and PPD). However, the president of the Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD), Senator José Antonio Gómez, declared his own candidacy and got in Frei's way. Even though senior members of the coalition asked Gómez to renounce his candidacy, he decided to continue to the end.

Meanwhile, Enríquez-Ominami, still a PS deputy, requested the implementation of open primaries with the participation of registered and unregistered voters. On January 12, 2009, he sent a letter to the chairpersons of the Concertación's parties and received the formal endorsement of three deputies and a senator from the PPD. However, the Concertación decided that each party could present only one candidate in the primaries. Because the PS had already proclaimed Frei as its candidate on January 17 and the period for registering candidacies expired on January 26, Enríquez-Ominami was excluded from the competition.

The primaries' mechanism had some peculiarities. The elections would be carried out in certain regions of the country on April 5, 2009. The process would begin in regions 6 and 7, and if one candidate obtained a lead of 20 points or more, he would be automatically declared the winner. This led to reasonable suspicion. It was presumed that Frei's strength as a candidate, based on all the Concertación's machinery, was in the rural segments. It is precisely in these regions that much of this population is concentrated and also where the PRSD was particularly weak in its parliamentary representation. If nationally the percentage of the rural population is about 13 percent, in these regions it reaches 30 percent. In the cases in which the distance between the candidates was less than 20 points, the primaries would continue in the northern regions, from the 14th to the 4th (Concertación 2009, 12).


The results were clearly favorable to Frei. Of a total of 62,382 votes, he won 64.9 percent, compared to 35.1 percent for Gómez. Frei was proclaimed the Concertación's candidate that same night. However, disapproval regarding the lack of competition persisted. The opposition, and especially Marco Enríquez-Ominami, sharply criticized the process.

Indeed, Frei did obtain stronger electoral support in rural and smaller communities. As figure 2 shows, there is a positive relationship between the percentage of rural population and electoral support for Frei. The coefficient is 0.42. This shows that, as critics claimed, the PDC candidate took advantage of the Concertación's electoral machinery to achieve victory in smaller municipalities. However, Frei's ample triumph cannot be ignored. Among the 63 municipalities where the primaries were held, he won in 62. Gómez was more competitive in the major urban centers.

Theoretically, presidential candidates who compete in primaries increase their chance of success (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006). For Frei, however, the primaries had a boomerang effect: instead of strengthening his candidacy, they weakened it. In fact, after the primaries, the Concertación's internal bleeding was unstoppable. Enríquez-Ominami resigned from the PS on June 12, 2009, and deployed a campaign strongly covered by the media. He received the support of the



Figure 2. Rural Population by Municipality and Electoral Support for Frei, 2009




Source: Author's calculation with data from Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia 2009; SINIM.

Humanist Party (PH) and the Green Party (*Partido Ecologista*, PE), besides other movements and groups. The Electoral Service required about 36,000 signatures to register him as an independent presidential candidate; he surpassed 70,000 signatures. Enríquez-Ominami formally registered his presidential candidacy on September 10. Twelve days later, Alejandro Navarro, a senator and former member of the PS and, at that time, presidential candidate of the Ample Social Movement (*Movimiento Amplio Social*, MAS), gave him his support.

The candidacy of Enríquez-Ominami joined a series of defections from the Concertación. In 2008, five deputies resigned from the PDC (Alejandra Sepúlveda, Pedro Araya, Jaime Mulet, Carlos Olivares, and Eduardo Díaz), while a senator (Adolfo Zaldívar) was expelled in late 2007. Some of them went to the Regionalist Party of Independents (PRI). In the PS, two senators resigned (Carlos Ominami and the abovementioned Alejandro Navarro), while two senators (Fernando Flores and Roberto Muñoz) and two deputies (Alvaro Escobar and Esteban Valenzuela) left the PPD.

Meanwhile, polls showed the effect that the primary elections had on voting intentions for candidates. While Enríquez-Ominami surged, Frei declined slowly but steadily. Piñera, on the other hand, remained

Figure 3. Vote Intention for Presidential Candidates, 2009




Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP.

solidly in first place. As shown in figure 3, Frei's rates fell from 30 percent to 26 percent between May and September, while Enríquez-Ominami's rose from 13 percent to 19 percent. The gap between them decreased, but Enríquez-Ominami's increase was insufficient to allow him into the run-off. Some media, such as the newspapers *La Tercera* and *El Mercurio*, had bet in favor of a very tight competition between the two candidates. Moreover, the October 2009 survey of *La Tercera* gave advantage to the independent candidate. This climate affected Frei. While criticism of the primary process was piling up, he was facing bilateral competition against Enríquez-Ominami and Piñera. In fact, the latter was particularly critical of both Frei's government and his candidacy.

As previously mentioned, the primaries may reflect the parties' crisis and inability to open up the candidate selection process, but they also may be seen as a critical juncture that could have changed the course of events. The failure to incorporate Enríquez-Ominami was decisive in the fracture of the Concertación's constituencies. The October 2009 Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) poll showed that in a run-off scenario between Frei and Piñera, only 45.3 percent of Enríquez-Ominami's voters and 68.6 percent of Arrate's supporters would vote for Frei.

Statements by the Concertación's political leaders confirm that the primaries were a critical event that could have changed the outcome. In the words of Ricardo Lagos Weber, a senator elected by the PPD in 2009 and former minister secretary-general in the Bachelet government, who recognized the mistake of leaving Enríquez-Ominami out of the process: "Due to our lack of primaries we began losing legitimacy in the way we

Figure 4. Voters' Ideological Self-positioning According to Voting Intentions, October 2005



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP survey, October 2005.


did things. We lacked humility, and humility has been absent in the post-defeat debate" (LaTercera.com 2010). José Antonio Gómez, president of the PRSD, said something similar: "We lost due to our pride, due to bullying and not being able to hold open primaries as we should have" (*Terra* 2010).

### The Left-Right Axis and the Result of the Parliamentary Election

The political scale is one of the variables that helps to explain the vote intention in Chile (where 1 is far left and 10 is far right). The following analysis shows each candidate's voters positioned on this axis with data from the CEP pre-election survey. These data are compared with the 2005 results to identify continuities and changes and to emphasize Piñera's ability to reach centrist voters.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the presidential candidates' constituencies in 2005. As noted, the base most similar to the national total corresponds to that of Bachelet, albeit with some bias toward left-wing values. In the case of Piñera, his center choices (preferably 5 values) are almost identical to the national total, showing that his message of moderation actually had some success. Lavín's bases, on the other hand, have a very uneven distribution compared to the national total, growing significantly, especially in the value 10. Thus, the winning bid in 2005 followed more strictly the behavior of the national total in the left-right axis. While Bachelet was stronger in the sectors of the left, this was

Figure 5. Voters' Ideological Self-positioning According to Voting Intentions, October 2009



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP survey, October 2009.

no impediment to winning that election. Meanwhile, Lavín, the candidate with the most extreme bases in the right, finished in third place.

Figure 5 shows this same distribution with data from the 2009 survey. Frei's and Enríquez-Ominami's bases are very similar to the total. Piñera appears more weighted toward the right, but with a presence in the values 5 and 6. Thus, the hypothesis that Piñera attracted center votes makes sense, which shows continuity with his 2005 candidacy. Adding to this his strength among the popular segments and his inroads into the middle sectors, we already have two strong factors to explain his success in the recent presidential election.

Regarding the election results, it may be concluded that Enríquez-Ominami's success was partial. While he managed to capture 20 percent of the electorate, he failed to reach the run-off, being beaten by Frei by more than nine points. Meanwhile, Piñera obtained 44 percent of the national vote. Arrate, for his part, became the best candidate of the extraparlimentary left, with 6.2 percent of the vote (see table 1). In the run-off, as expected, the winner was Piñera. Frei shortened the gap between them, but the Concertación's fracture was too deep. Frei would have needed to get about 70 percent of Enríquez-Ominami's votes and 100 percent of Arrate's votes to win.

Meanwhile, in the parliamentary election, the Concertación elected 57 deputies, 8 fewer than in 2005 (see table 2). This is explained in that, among other things, some former members of the Concertación won while competing for another party. The Coalition for Change achieved

Table 1. Results of the 2009 Presidential Election,  
First Round and Run-off

	First Round		Run-off	
	Votes	Percentage	Votes	Percentage
Jorge Arrate (PC)	430,824	6.21		
Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independiente)	1,396,655	20.13		
Sebastián Piñera (Coalición por el Cambio, RN)	3,056,526	44.05	3,582,800	51.6
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación, DC)	2,053,514	29.60	3,359,801	48.39
Valid votes	6,937,519		6,942,601	
Void votes	199,355	2.76	189,176	2.63
Blank votes	85,014	1.17	54,567	0.75
Total voters	7,221,888		7,186,344	

Source: [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)

58 seats, 4 more than in 2005. The remaining deputies correspond to 3 from the PRI and 2 independents.

Despite including two former Concertación incumbent deputies (Alvaro Escobar and Esteban Valenzuela), the list that supported Enríquez-Ominami won only 4.55 percent of the national vote and no seats in Congress. This uneven performance may be attributed partly to the psychological effects of the electoral system. While in the two-round systems voters have the option of selecting their first preference ("lost votes" are eliminated), in the binomial system they are practically forced to vote for a candidate of the two main coalitions. This is because the probability of success of independent candidates or candidates who compete for third lists is substantially lower.

This discussion depicts the changes that have occurred in the Chilean party system. In 2009, an independent candidate achieved 20 percent of the vote, but his list did not exceed 5 percent. This shows the level of personalization of politics in Chile and the problems with institutionalizing a movement around a candidate. Such characteristics are associated with the abovementioned classification of Chile as a hydroponic party system.

Consequently, and according to this first hypothesis, we can conclude that the candidate selection process was a critical juncture to understand the result of the election. Instead of implementing an inclusive system, the Concertación chose to reproduce elite decisions. Thus, it extended one of the transition's enclaves by selecting the candidate from the leadership of the parties (Siavelis 2009). The primaries were

Table 2. Results of the 2009 Election of Deputies  
by Coalition and Party


Parties and Coalitions	Votes	Percentage	Number of	
			Candidates	Seats
Concertación y Juntos Podemos por más Democracia				
Partido Demócrata Cristiano	931,789	14.24	39	19
Partido por la Democracia	827,774	12.65	27	18
Partido Socialista de Chile	647,533	9.9	24	11
Partido Comunista de Chile	132,305	2.02	9	3
Partido Radical Socialdemócrata	247,486	3.78	14	5
Independientes Lista A	114,616	1.75	7	1
Total Concertación	2,901,503	44.34	120	57
Coalición por el Cambio				
Renovación Nacional	1,165,679	17.82	51	18
Unión Demócrata Independiente	1,507,001	23.04	56	37
Chileprimero	17,749	0.27	4	0
Independientes Lista B	150,885	2.3	9	3
Total Coalición por el Cambio	2,841,314	43.43	120	58
Nueva Mayoría para Chile				
Partido Humanista	94,216	1.44	38	0
Partido Ecologista	3,818	0.05	2	0
Independientes Lista C	200,731	3.06	39	0
Total Nueva Mayoría	298,765	4.55	79	0
Chile Limpio Vote Feliz				
Partido Regionalista de los Independientes	262,269	4.01	63	3
Movimiento Amplio Social	26,121	0.39	7	0
Independientes Lista D	64,935	0.99	22	0
Total Chile Limpio Vote Feliz	353,325	5.39	92	3
Independientes (Fuera de Pacto)	144,663	2.21	18	2
Valid votes	6,539,570		429	120
Void votes	437,371	6.09		
Blank votes	202,821	2.82		
Total voters	7,179,762			

Source: [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)

seen as an event of artificial competitiveness that lacked uncertainty. The public witnessed how the parties imposed a candidate and gave up on competition. The whole process seemed deliberately designed to ward off competitive candidates and fast-track Frei's nomination.

Enríquez-Ominami transformed the primary issue into the basis of his candidacy. Consistently, he argued that the Concertación had closed the

Figure 6. Vote Intention for Piñera 2005 and 2009 by Socioeconomic Status, First Round



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP surveys, October 2005 and October 2009.


doors for him. According to him, under these conditions he had no choice but to compete as an independent. The animosity rose to such a level that Enríquez-Ominami claimed that an eventual Frei government would be characterized by “unspeakable moral turpitude.” This accentuated the division among the Concertación’s elites and then among its constituencies.

## THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE RIGHT IN THE POPULAR SECTORS AND ITS GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE CLASS

Piñera consolidated the support for the right in the popular sectors and moved toward the middle segments that had traditionally supported the Concertación (see Aninat and Elaqua 2010). This can be explained by the UDI’s work in the poorest municipalities; this is a party that from the beginning disputed the popular vote with the PC (Morales and Bugueño 2001; Joignant and Navia 2003). Progress toward the middle class had already been observed in the 2005 election, but it was more evident in 2009.

Figure 6 shows the relation between voting intentions for Piñera and the socioeconomic status of respondents in the first round. As noted, in 2005 there was a linear relationship between the variables. That is, the lower the position in the income scale, the lower the support for Piñera. If in the ABC1 segment Piñera obtained over 40 percent of the vote, in the E stratum his support fell to 10 percent. In 2009 this

Figure 7. Vote Intention for Piñera 2005 and 2009 by Socioeconomic Status, Run-off



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP surveys, October 2005 and October 2009.

situation changed. While the trend was approximately similar to that of 2005, the biggest difference was in segment E. The vote intention for Piñera in this sector exceeded 40 percent.

The comparison of vote intention for Piñera in the early stages of 2005 and 2009 is problematic because in 2005 he competed with Lavín and in 2009 he was the only candidate for the right. The trend nevertheless shows the consolidation of the right's vote in the poorest segments. However, when comparing voting intentions in the run-off, there is a central difference (see figure 7). Piñera substantially increased his support in the middle segments (C2 and C3), which traditionally voted for the Concertación (Altman 2004; López 2004). As noted, this progress had been observed since 2005. Therefore, one might think the popular segments the Concertación lost in 1999 became part of middle-class groups in 2009, confirming their support for candidates from the right. Another hypothesis is the division of the Concertación's constituencies. As the CEP December 2009 survey shows, Enríquez-Ominami's voters who were unwilling to vote for Frei in the run-off were primarily from the middle sectors. Thus, 41 percent of Enríquez-Ominami's voters who belonged to the higher socioeconomic segment would support Frei, a proportion that falls to 28.6 percent in the middle segments and to 29.5 percent in the lower segments.

To show some of these results, we can compare the October 2005 and 2009 CEP pre-election polls, building a probit regression model for each survey. The dependent variable is the vote intention for each can-



Table 3. Voting Determinants for the Presidential Candidates, 2009

	Piñera 2005 First Round	Piñera 2005 Run-off	Piñera 2009 First Round	Frei 2009 First Round	Enríquez- Ominami 2009	Arrate 2009
Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.141 (1.34)	-0.061 (0.60)	-0.323 (2.81)**	0.073 (0.66)	0.143 (1.20)	0.319 (1.48)
Age	-0.002 (0.54)	-0.001 (0.19)	-0.080 (1.21)	0.157 (2.32)*	-0.207 (2.97)**	-0.134 (1.09)
Area (1 = Urban, 2 = Rural)	-0.083 (0.48)	0.105 (0.65)	0.015 (0.09)	0.564 (3.63)**	-0.331 (1.65)	
Political Scale (1 = Left; 10 = Right)	0.169 (6.87)**	0.309 (12.14)**	0.375 (12.44)**	-0.212 (7.77)**	-0.151 (5.24)**	-0.296 (5.01)**
Religion (1 = Catholic, 0 = Other)	-0.163 (1.41)	-0.042 (0.37)	0.122 (1.00)	-0.046 (0.39)	0.072 (0.58)	-0.077 (0.36)
Income level	0.044 (2.37)*	0.041 (2.30)*	0.035 (1.70)	-0.064 (3.17)**	0.043 (1.93)	0.080 (1.97)*
Constant	-1.525 (3.73)**	-2.294 (5.70)**	-2.090 (4.63)**	-0.171 (0.39)	0.200 (0.40)	-1.250 (1.65)
Observations	753	753	682	682	682	583
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.18	0.25	0.13	0.08	0.2

\*\* and \* represent statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP surveys, October 2005 and October 2009.

didate. The independent variables correspond to the socioeconomic, sociodemographic, and political characterization of respondents. That is, sex, age, area of residence (urban or rural), self-positioning on the political scale, and income level. The models consider only those registered on the electoral rolls; that is, potential voters.

Table 3 shows the results. There are substantial differences in Piñera's constituencies in 2005 (first and run-off) and 2009 (first round).<sup>2</sup> In the first and run-off models, we can observe that income has a positive affect on Piñera's support. This means that the higher the income, the more likely one is to vote for Piñera. Meanwhile, in 2009 the coefficient is not statistically significant. A quadratic income model was tested to capture possible diminishing marginal returns, but the variable still does not discriminate between the support for Piñera and other options. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the descriptive analysis. What the model tells us is that in 2005, the income of the voter had an effect on the support for Piñera, an issue that disappears in 2009.


This temporal comparison between the vote for Piñera in 2005 and 2009 is consistent with a synchronic comparison between Piñera and Frei. While Piñera reached both middle and popular sectors, Frei had a greater hold among the poor. The model shows that the coefficient is negative and significant. This implies, *ceteris paribus*, that an income increase made support for Frei decrease. In addition, his support bases were highly distinguishable. He had strong support among older voters and the rural sectors. Thus, his electorate was narrow and identifiable. Naturally, in the run-off these determinants vanished, because Enríquez-Ominami's and Arrate's voters joined in, making Frei's constituency more heterogeneous.

Enríquez-Ominami's voters, on the other hand, correspond to the other side of the Concertación. Mainly young people backed him, unlike Frei's voters. If the model included education levels, a second difference between the two candidates would be detected. Enríquez-Ominami was stronger in the more educated segments. As with Frei, his voting intention increased among respondents identifying with the center-left. Furthermore, the relationship between income level and the vote for Arrate is surprising. According to the model, *ceteris paribus*, the higher the income, the more likely the vote for the candidate of the PC. This marks strong differences with the performance of the PC in the pre-1973 democracy, when its constituents were clearly workers and low-income sectors (Cruz-Coke 1984; Scully 1992; Faúndez 1992). In the last election, the PC candidate was stronger in the upper-middle segments.

Consequently, the candidates' electoral bases allow us partly to understand the result. On the one hand, we observe a single, consolidated candidate from the right, and on the other, the evident fracture of the Concertación. This was demonstrated in the run-off. Enríquez-Ominami's votes were far from being automatically transferred to Frei.

The data in figure 8 complement poll analyses with electoral information by municipality. In order to measure income levels, the HDI is used. Figure 8 shows the relationship between HDI and the vote for all candidates in the first round. The results are consistent with the surveys. There is no significant linear relationship between the HDI and the vote for Piñera. At first glance, the relationship appears to be quadratic; that is, with high percentages in wealthy communities and poor communities. With Frei, on the other hand, the situation is different: an inverse linear relationship is noted. In fact, the correlation coefficient is  $-0.5$ , which confirms the greatest support in the poorest segments. Meanwhile, Enríquez-Ominami's candidacy shows a positive relationship with the HDI, but with diminishing marginal returns. That is, his vote increases with the HDI but falls in the wealthiest municipalities. The correlation coefficient is  $0.44$ . Finally, the relationship between HDI and Arrate's vote is confirmed. The coefficient is  $0.5$ , indicating that his elec-

Figure 8. Communal HDI and the Percentage of Voting for Piñera, Frei, Enríquez-Ominami, and Arrate (First Round 2009)




Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP and SINIM.

toral performance improves as the municipalities' socioeconomic status increases, but diminishing marginal returns are also present.

The HDI can also be related with the vote for the candidates in the run-off. According to Altman (2004), the Concertación's vote has a ratio of an inverted *U* with the HDI. This means that it achieves better results in middle-income communities and decreases at the edges. The right, on the other hand, has a relationship of *U*, with better yields in wealthier and poorer communities.

This finding is supported by a linear regression analysis that uses as its dependent variable the vote of each candidate, and as independent variables the HDI and its quadratic. The model is also controlled by a fixed effect by region and by the vote of every coalition in the 2005 presidential election. A statistical simulation was conducted using the Zelig software package R (Imai et al. 2007). Figure 9 confirms the hypothesis of Altman (2004). Indeed, Piñera achieved better perform-

Figure 9. Voting Simulations for Piñera and Frei (Run-Off) by HDI



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP and SINIM

ance in communities at the far ends of the spectrum, while Frei had better results with middle-income levels. This accounts for a high continuity in the coalitions' voting patterns.

According to this hypothesis, one of the reasons for Piñera's triumph was his stronger engagement with the poor segments and a meaningful approach to the middle sectors. Part of this result may be attributable to the active work of the UDI. As never before in Chile's recent history, the right agreed, early and unanimously, to support a sole candidate. In 2005, by contrast, Pablo Longueria, one of UDI's main leaders, said that if Piñera were the one to make it to the run-off instead of Lavín, he would "go on vacation."

An additional element corresponds to the changes that occurred between 1999 and 2009. While in 1999 the Concertación lost support in poor municipalities, in 2009 it lost in those of medium HDI. If we calculate the difference in votes between Frei in 1993 and Lagos in 1999, the loss is centered in the communities of low HDI. Then, when calculating the difference in votes between Bachelet in 2005 and Frei in 2009, the loss is concentrated in municipalities of medium HDI. One could argue that the poor municipalities where the Concertación lost in 1999 were the same ones that developed into part of the medium HDI municipalities ten years later. This trend has been observable since 2005. In those elections, Bachelet performed better than Lagos, but with less strength precisely in municipalities of medium HDI. Thus, whereas in 1999 Lavín did well in the poorest municipalities, the Concertación held its vote in the municipalities of medium HDI.

Meanwhile, in 2009, Piñera (unlike in 2005) took the popular support that the right garnered in 1999 and, in addition, defeated the Concertación in its historical stronghold, municipalities of medium HDI. The Concertación continued to be stronger in this type of community, but to a lesser extent than in previous elections. Therefore, one might think that the Concertación's first major defeat was in 1999. In 2005, such a defeat was averted by the emergence of a renewed candidacy. In 2009, without a renewed candidacy capable of stopping the Concertación's electoral bleeding, the right made progress in the middle sectors, which ensured its victory.

### **SPLIT-TICKET VOTING IN THE CONCERTACIÓN AND THE COALITION FOR CHANGE**

Mainwaring (1999) has argued that split-ticket voting is a proxy of loyalty to the party. This is because when measured in concurrent elections, it shows just how entrenched parties are with the voters. Therefore, what is expected in an institutionalized system, for example, are low rates of split-ticket voting, which show the voters' consistency when supporting candidates from the same party or coalition.

The split-ticket voting generates, in an important number of cases, a divided government. Two different parties or coalitions control the presidency and Congress (Garand and Lichtl 2000). Voters who tend to split their votes are characterized by little or no party identification and by a close relationship with local leaders. Therefore, their vote is not mediated by loyalty to a party or to a specific coalition (Campbell and Miller 1957; Maddox and Nimmo 1981).

In this way, voters might prefer divided government in order to moderate the implementation of public policies, even though this is not always done consciously (Fiorina 1992, 1994; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Carsey and Layman 2004). Such a view is nuanced by Jacobson (1990), who argues that voters do not necessarily aim at generating a divided government but simply react to presidential and congressional campaigns. To this is added, according to the same author and the work of Burden and Kimball (1998), the strength of incumbents. These candidates, especially under open-list electoral systems, tend to cultivate their personal attributes rather than to strengthen party loyalties, encouraging split-ticket voting (see Beck et al. 1992; Born 1994; Alvarez and Schousen 1993).

In Chile, the magnitude of split-ticket voting has increased substantially (Navia and Saldaña 2009). In 1989 and 1993 the Concertación's presidential candidates won more votes than its parliamentary list, while in 2005, Bachelet was 6 points below the list. In 2009, Frei was 15 points below his list of deputies.

Table 4. Split-ticket Voting in the Coalition for Change and the Concertación, 1989–2009 (percent)

	Coalition for Change			Concertación		
	Presidential (a)	Deputies (b)	Differential (a–b)	Presidential (c)	Deputies (d)	Differential (c–d)
1989	44.83	34.18	10.65	55.17	51.49	3.68
1993	30.59	36.68	–6.09	57.98	55.4	2.58
2005	48.64	38.72	9.92	45.96	51.76	–5.8
2009	44.05	43.44	0.61	49.73	44.36	5.37
2009 (only Frei)	—	—	—	29.6	44.36	–14.76

Source: Author's calculation with data from [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl), in Morales and Sánchez 2010.


In the case of the Coalition for Change, in 1989 and 1993 the list of deputies received more votes than the presidential candidates. In 1989, Hernán Büchi obtained almost 5 points less than the list, a number that rose to more than 12 points in 1993. However, there are some caveats. In both 1989 and 1993, there were two competing candidates from the right: Büchi and Errázuriz in 1989 and Alessandri and José Piñera in 1993. When this is acknowledged, the interpretation changes, but the imbalance between the percentage of the right in presidential and congressional elections remains (see table 4).

In the 2005 presidential election, the Coalition for Change presented two candidates. The sum of their votes surpassed by nearly ten points their list of deputies. Both candidates were competitive. Lavín had been close to victory in 1999, and Piñera saw a sustained rise in the polls since June 2005. In 2009, Piñera achieved a marginally higher percentage than that of the Coalition for Change, with 44.05 percent versus 43.44 percent.

For the Concertación in 2009, two calculations were made. Frei and Enríquez-Ominami were added; then only Frei was kept. Naturally, the extent of split-ticket voting grows substantially in the second stage. However, even if adding Frei and Enríquez-Ominami, the magnitude remains high in comparison to 1989 and 1993.

The difference between Piñera's percentage and that of his list was 0.61 percent. As with volatility, however, the aggregate calculation hides relevant regional and district variations. Figure 10 shows Piñera's vote distribution and that of his coalition in the 60 districts. While distributions are similar, there are important differences; for example, in districts 7, 8, and 9. Here, the parliamentary list of the Coalition for Change obtained a percentage significantly lower than that of the Concertación and Piñera

Figure 10. Percentages of Piñera and the Coalition for Change, 2009  
(by district)



Source: Author's calculation with data from CEP, in Morales and Sánchez 2010.

(in fact, in districts 8 and 9, no Coalition candidate was elected). Meanwhile, in some districts of regions 6 and 7, the opposite effect was observed. Piñera's percentage was below that of the Coalition.

Meanwhile, in the Concertación, and considering only Frei's votes, differences are substantive. In the vast majority of the districts, the Concertación was stronger than Frei. Only in District 34 was Frei able to surpass his coalition; this is explained not by Frei's strength but because running in that district was a representative of the coalition Clean Chile, Alejandra Sepúlveda (45.59), who won the first majority. The Concertación was left without representatives in that district. Something similar happened in district 9 with the high vote obtained by Luis Lemus of the PRI.

Adding the votes of Frei and Enríquez-Ominami, the picture changes significantly. The distributions of the sum of candidates' votes and the percentage of the Concertación by district tend to resemble each other. The most substantive differences appeared in the north, due to the presence of independent candidates or the PRI, who subtracted votes from the Concertación. To this we have to add the good performance of Enríquez-Ominami in those areas. Then, the decrease in split-ticket voting may be seen as an indicator of the institutional strength of the coalitions. Piñera balanced the presidential and parliamentary support for the pact. In the case of the Concertación, the results clearly show the fragmentation effect of presidential candidates. As noted above, PS voters had three choices for this election. When correlating the extent of split-ticket voting in the Concertación and the vote of their parties in the election of deputies, it is observed that the highest coefficient is with the PS (0.4), decreasing with the PDC and the PPD (0.2). This shows that in the municipalities where the PS was stronger, split-ticket voting increased substantially. That is, it is very likely that there was a significant group of voters who supported candidates of the PS for Congress, but who did not vote for Frei in the first round.

The Concertación also fell in the election of deputies. In 2005 it obtained 51.76 percent, while in 2009 it reached 44 percent, including the PC vote. Therefore, the Concertación's defeat is not only attributable to its poor performance in the first round of the 2009 presidential election. It is true that strong presidential candidates strengthen their parliamentary list, but there are other scenarios. The closest is the 2008 municipal election, when the Concertación lost in districts of high population density. If in 2004 its mayors presided over nearly 57 percent of the population, in 2008 this share fell to 36.5 percent. While in 2004 the Concertación gained 203 mayors, in 2008 it triumphed in only 146 municipalities. Moreover, in 2008 it competed in two separate lists for council elections, fueling internal divisions.



## CONCLUSIONS

The outcome of the 2009–10 presidential elections in Chile is explained by the simultaneous presence of three conditions. First, the Concertación implemented a closed primary system. This exacerbated internal divisions in the coalition, which had previously been expressed in the desertion of some deputies and senators, who migrated to other parties or who distanced themselves from the official roster. The emergence of Enríquez-Ominami was a reflection of the parties' crisis and their unwillingness to open the primaries to other candidates.

Second, the right joined together early under Piñera's candidacy. The 1999 experience proved that unity allowed, at least, for a competitive election to take place. The UDI's commitment was vital. Piñera, continuing a trend that had been under way since 2005, consolidated support for the right among the popular segments and advanced toward the middle sector, which traditionally had voted for the Concertación. Third, the electoral outcome reflected this unity. The list of candidates for Congress of the UDI and RN worked actively for Piñera. Since the probability of success was high in comparison to 2005, party leaders and congressional candidates were responsible for enhancing Piñera's vote in their respective districts and constituencies. This explains why the magnitude of split-ticket voting on the right was the lowest in the history of Chile's new democracy, indicating a process of growing institutional strength.

We should not rule out the influence of other variables on the outcome of the election, although they are not included in the argument. One of them corresponds to the role of former president Michelle Bachelet. Although her popularity reached over 85 percent before she left office, this was not the case for the Concertación's presidential candidate. Thus, it might seem that the former president neglected her parties, opting instead to strengthen her presidential image. Another variable not discussed in detail here corresponds to the negotiation and outcome of the 2008 municipal election. The Concertación was divided into two lists for the election of councilors and lost heavily populated municipalities. A third variable is the attributes of the candidates and the content of their campaigns. Although Piñera never stood out in the polls for the attribute of "honesty," he did so in the "ability to govern." It seems that Chileans decided their vote on that second attribute. Frei, on the other hand, had serious problems regarding the coordination of his campaign command and the design of his strategy.

Therefore, there are many variables that can explain the outcome of the election. This study selected those that arguably are the most relevant. Certainly, a more thorough analysis of the time series is required to identify longer-term causes. One hypothesis is that the Concertación

actually suffered two defeats before leaving office. The first was in 1999, when it lost a significant part of its support among the popular segments; in 2005 and 2009, it would be the middle classes' turn. Thus, what seems particularly interesting to analyze regarding dominant parties or coalitions is not only the exact moment of defeat but also the phase when elections became competitive. At least in the case of Chile, it appears that since 1999, the dose of uncertainty regarding the outcome of elections has increased significantly. Since then, the chances of success for government and opposition appear balanced.

## NOTES

This work was supported by Fondecyt project number 1085243 and Semilla project number 160325034, funded by the Universidad Diego Portales. I am particularly grateful to Patricio Navia for his comments on a preliminary version of the text and to the three anonymous reviewers of *LAPS*. Naturally, errors or omissions are my sole responsibility.

1. Split-ticket voting means voting for the presidential candidate from party A and for a candidate for deputy from party B. The difference in votes between the presidential candidate from party A and a candidate for deputy also from party A corresponds to the split-ticket voting rate (Taagepera and Grofman 2003; Nohlen 1995).

2. The table does not include a model for Piñera's votes in the run-off because the determinants are very similar in comparison to his first-round electoral support.

## REFERENCES

- Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Altman, David. 2004. Redibujando el mapa electoral chileno: incidencia de factores socioeconómicos y género en las urnas. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 24, 2: 49–66.
- . 2005. Reforma al binominalismo: sistema paralelo de acumulación. Documento de Trabajo. Santiago: Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. September.
- . 2008. Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990–2006. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 241–70.
- Alvarez, Michael, and Matthew Schousen. 1993. Policy Moderation or Conflict-Expectations? Testing and Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting. *American Politics Quarterly* 21: 410–38.
- Aninat, Cristóbal, and Gregory Elaqua. 2010. El electorado que decidió las elecciones 2009. Análisis estadístico de los segmentos socioeconómicos clave que definieron las últimas presidenciales. Documento de Trabajo. Santiago: Instituto de Políticas Públicas, Expansiva/Universidad Diego Portales.

- Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany. *British Journal of Political Science* 29, 3: 487–505.
- Beck, Paul Allen, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen, and Charles E. Smith. 1992. Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting. *American Political Science Review* 86, 4: 916–28.
- Born, Richard. 1994. Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19, 1: 126–29.
- Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 1998. A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting. *American Political Science Review* 92, 3: 533–44.
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, Angus, and Warren E. Miller. 1957. The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting. *American Political Science Review* 51, 2: 293–312.
- Carey, John, and John Polga-Hecimovich. 2006. Primary Elections and Candidate Strength in Latin America. *Journal of Politics* 68, 3: 530–43.
- Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2004. Policy Balancing and Preferences for Party Control of Government. *Political Research Quarterly* 57, 4: 541–50.
- Cavallo, Ascanio. 1998. *La historia oculta de la transición*. Santiago: Grijalbo.
- Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP). Various years. Electoral surveys. [www.cepchile.cl](http://www.cepchile.cl)
- Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. 2009. Rules of Votes and Ballots, Primaries 2009. [www.primariasconcertacion.cl/documento.htm](http://www.primariasconcertacion.cl/documento.htm)
- Cruz-Coke, Ricardo. 1984. *Historia electoral de Chile: 1925–1973*. Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile.
- Drake, Paul W. 1978. *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–1952*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Faúndez, Julio. 1992. *Izquierdas y democracia en Chile, 1932–1973*. Santiago: Ediciones BAT.
- Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. 2003. *Entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad. Tres décadas de política económica en Chile*. Santiago: J. C. Sáez.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. *Divided Government*. New York: Macmillan.
- . 1994. Divided Government in American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism. *American Political Science Review* 88: 304–16.
- Garand, James C., and Marci Glascock Lichtl. 2000. Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing and Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting. *British Journal of Political Science* 30, 1: 173–91.
- Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1991. La redemocratización política en Chile. Transición, inauguración y evolución. *Estudios Públicos* 42: 101–33.
- . 1999. Balance y perspectivas de la democratización política chilena. In *La caja de pandora. El retorno de la transición chilena*, ed. Amparo Menéndez Carrión and Alfredo Joignant. Santiago: Planeta/Ariel. 49–88.
- Gil, Federico. 1969. *El sistema político de Chile*. Santiago: Andrés Bello.
- Haindl, Eric. 2007. *Chile y su desarrollo económico en el siglo XX*. Santiago: Andrés Bello.
- Huneus, Carlos. 1994. La transición ha terminado. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 16, 1–2: 33–40.

- . 2001. *El régimen de Pinochet*. Santiago: Sudamericana.
- . 2003. *Chile un país dividido. La actualidad del pasado*. Santiago: Catalonia.
- Imai, Kosuke, Gary King, and Oliva Lau. 2007. LS: Least Squares Regression for Continuous Dependent Variables. In *Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software*, ed. Imai, King, and Lau. <http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig>
- Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE). Various years. Electoral statistics. [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl)
- Izquierdo, José Miguel, Mauricio Morales, and Patricio Navia. 2008. Voto cruzado en Chile. ¿Por qué Bachelet obtuvo menos votos que la Concertación en 2005? *Política y Gobierno* 15, 1: 35–73.
- Jacobson, Gary. 1990. *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Joignant, Alfredo, and Patricio Navia. 2003. De la política de individuos a los hombres del partido. Socialización, competencia política y penetración electoral de la UDI (1989–2001). *Estudios Públicos* 89: 129–72.
- Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). 2008. Presentación de resultados encuesta LAPOP 2008 Chile. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.
- López, Miguel Ángel. 2004. Conducta electoral y estratos económicos: el voto de los sectores populares en Chile. *Política* 43: 285–98.
- Maddox, William, and Dan Nimmo. 1981. In Search of the Ticket-Splitter. *Social Science Quarterly* 62: 401–8.
- Magar, Erica, Marc Rosenblum, and David Samuels. 1998. On the Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double-Member Districts: The Case of Chile. *Comparative Political Studies* 31, 6: 714–39.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. La institucionalización de los sistemas de partidos en América Latina. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 17, 1–2: 63–102.
- MIDEPLAN. 2006. Serie análisis de resultados de la Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN 2006). [www.mideplan.cl](http://www.mideplan.cl)
- Morales Quiroga, Mauricio, and María José Sánchez. 2010. La segunda es la vencida. Piñera y sus bases de apoyo. In Morales and Navia 2010. 57–78.
- Morales Quiroga, Mauricio, and Patricio Navia. 2010. *El sismo electoral de 2009. Cambio y continuidad en las preferencias políticas de los chilenos*. Santiago: Ediciones UDP.
- Morales Quiroga, Mauricio, and Rodrigo Bugueño. 2001. La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile. *Estudios Sociales* 107: 215–48.
- Muñoz, Oscar, and Carolina Stefoni, eds. 2002. *El período del Presidente Frei Ruiz-Tagle*. Santiago: Universitaria.
- Navia, Patricio. 2005a. La elección presidencial de 1993. Una elección sin incertidumbre. In *Las elecciones presidenciales en la historia de Chile. 1920–2000*, ed. Angel Soto and Alejandro San Francisco. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. 435–62.
- . 2005b. La transformación de votos en escaños: leyes electorales en Chile, 1833–2004. *Política y Gobierno* 12, 2: 233–76.
- Navia, Patricio, and José Saldaña. 2009. Voto cruzado en las elecciones parlamentarias y presidenciales en Chile (1993–2005). In *El genoma electoral*

- chileno. *Dibujando el mapa genético de las preferencias políticas en Chile*, ed. Navia, Mauricio Morales, and Renato Briceño. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales. 141–64.
- Nohlen, Dieter. 1995. *Sistemas electorales y partidos políticos*. Mexico City: FCE.
- Otano, Rafael. 1995. *Crónica de la transición*. Santiago: Planeta.
- Payne, Mark, Daniel Zovatto, Fernando Carrillo, and Andrés Allamand. 2003. *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina*. Washington, DC: BID/Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral.
- Portales, Felipe. 2000. *Chile: una democracia tutelada*. Santiago: Sudamericana.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Scully, Timothy. 1992. *Los partidos de centro y la evolución política chilena*. Santiago: Stanford University/CIEPLAN/University of Notre Dame.
- Servicio Electoral, República de Chile. Various years. Election data. [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl)
- Siavelis, Peter. 2009. Enclaves de la transición y democracia chilena. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 29, 1: 3–21.
- Siavelis, Peter, and Scott Morgenstern. 2008. Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Siavelis and Morgenstern. University Park: Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 3–37.
- Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (SINIM). Various years. Database. [www.sinim.gov.cl](http://www.sinim.gov.cl)
- Taagepera, Rein, and Bernard Grofman. 2003. Mapping the Indices of Seats: Vote Disproportionality and Inter-Election Volatility. *Party Politics* 9, 6: 659–77.
- La Tercera (Santiago). 2009. Encuesta: Frei y Enríquez en empate técnico primera vuelta. October 10: 6.
- La Tercera.com. 2010. Lagos Weber por derrota de Frei: “El candidato no era el mejor para este minuto.” May 10. [http://latercera.com/contenido/674\\_258330\\_9.shtml](http://latercera.com/contenido/674_258330_9.shtml)
- Terra.cl (Santiago). 2010. Concertación hace autocritica por derrota presidencial en el marco de aniversario socialista. April 19. [www.terra.cl](http://www.terra.cl)
- Tironi, Eugenio. 2010. *Radiografía de una derrota*. Santiago: Uqbar.
- Universidad Diego Portales (UDP). Various years. Election surveys. [www.encuesta.udp.cl](http://www.encuesta.udp.cl)
- Valenzuela, Arturo. 2003. *El quiebre de la democracia en Chile*. Santiago: Colección Ciencia Política, Universidad Diego Portales.
- Valenzuela, Samuel. 1995. Orígenes y transformación del sistema de partidos en Chile. *Estudios Públicos* 58: 5–80.
- . 1999. Respuesta a Eugenio Tironi y Felipe Agüero: reflexiones sobre el presente y futuro del paisaje político chileno a la luz de su pasado. *Estudios Públicos* 75: 273–90.
- Zucco, Cesar. 2009. Stability Without Roots: Party System Institutionalization in Brazil. Working paper. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro.