EIGHT

Contingents and Parties

In the previous chapter we explored a key expectation of our model—namely, that party leaders would have a systematic influence on committee assignments. If party leaders do influence committee assignments, one might expect that the overall composition of each party's contingents on the standing committees would be affected. In this chapter we consider how they ought to be affected and then turn to data pertinent to testing our expectations.

In thinking about whether or not one should expect contingents to be representative, we appeal to two different perspectives on how the appointment process works: the self-selection model and the partisan selection model. We have already discussed the first of these perspectives in chapters 1 and 3. In a nutshell, the self-selection model posits, first, that members request appointment to committees based primarily on the interests of their constituencies and, second, that members' requests are routinely accommodated by each party's CC. As Shepsle (1978) puts it, committee assignments are made in a way that "permits 'interesteds' to gravitate to decision arenas in which their interests are promoted" (248) and allows "most members for most of their careers [to be] on the committees they 'want' " (236). Given this view of the assignment process, one would expect a committee contingent to be representative only if the committee's jurisdiction was broad enough to attract a representative cross-section of the party. Other committees with less widely appealing jurisdictions would be expected to have more or less unrepresentative contingents.

An alternative view of the appointment process is embodied in what we call the partisan selection model. In this model of the appointment process, assignments to committees are made in order to further some collective goal, such as the number of seats that the party will win at the next election. Although this would seem to be a polar opposite of the self-selection model, in many cases the predictions the two models make about which contingents will be representative are indistinguishable. After all, a CC interested in winning as many seats as possible for its party may well be one that gives its members the opportunity to participate in policy arenas of interest to their constituents. Committees that have very narrow jurisdictions—and whose decisions do not adversely affect other members of the party—can be allowed to be unrepresentative of the party as a whole. Committees with broad and important jurisdictions, by contrast, will be kept more firmly in hand by making sure that the party's contingent is broadly representative of the party as a whole.

In the next section we sketch out the partisan selection model in a bit more detail. Section 2 elaborates the predictions that this model makes about each standing committee (do we expect it to be representative or not?). Section 3 then tests these predictions against the empirical record, with section 4 concluding.

1. A MODEL OF PARTISAN SELECTION

The simplest and starkest model of a committee assignment process in which partisan interests are represented is one in which the leaders of both parties decide which of their followers should serve on which committees. Having themselves internalized their party's collective interests along the lines discussed in chapter 5, party leaders would structure committees to further those collective interests.

What exactly this structuring would mean depends on what the collective interests of the party are. We shall assume that party leaders make appointments in order to maximize the number of seats that their party will win at the next election. Although this sounds rather precise, in fact the discussion to follow will be intuitive rather than formal.

There are two basic ways for a party to use committee appointments in order to increase its number of seats at the next election. First, it can furnish party members with opportunities to advertise themselves, claim credit for particularistic benefits delivered to their constituents, and in other ways enhance their personal standing with their voters (cf. May-

hew 1974). Second, it can foster the kinds of elaborate intraparty deals that are needed to unite the party behind broad legislation with national impact, thereby affecting the party's collective reputation with the electorate. Most issues involve trade-offs: if everyone claims credit for delivering public works projects to their districts, the party as a whole may find itself saddled with a "tax and spend" reputation; unqualified support for fundamentalist Christian values may be an attractive addition to the party reputation as far as some Republicans are concerned, but it would be deleterious to others. Seat-maximizing party leaders must be sensitive to these trade-offs.

What this means in terms of committee appointments depends on the committee's jurisdiction. Consider first a hypothetical committee whose jurisdiction is composed of very narrowly targeted issues that affect only a small, fairly well defined subset of districts. By definition, this committee's decisions have minimal impact on the individual electoral standing of members whose districts are *not* in the affected subset. Moreover, the impact of committee decisions on the party's national reputation will also likely be small. To the extent that this is so, a seat-maximizing leader need not be much concerned with negative electoral externalities from this committee. The optimal strategy is to let those members who are interested in the policy area join the committee and do what they will. If they occasionally deal with issues that potentially have major effects on other members of the party, the leader can rely on the Rules Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and his own scheduling powers to ensure that these effects are taken into account. In the case of low-externality committees with narrow jurisdictions, then, both the self-selection hypothesis and the partisan selection hypothesis would lead to the prediction that such committees will tend to be unrepresentative.

By contrast, a committee whose jurisdiction concerns "national" policy—defined as policy whose costs and benefits reach every constituency—will need to be handled differently. The seat-maximizing leader will be concerned with regulating the electoral externalities that such a committee's decisions can entail. The most straightforward way to regulate potential externalities is to ensure that the contingent on the committee is representative of the party as a whole. Contingents that are representative of the important currents of opinion in the party will be able to "decentralize" intraparty arguments so that the outcome of the arguments in the party's committee contingent are representative of the

outcome of the arguments in the party as a whole; all the party's varied electoral interests will be internal to the committee's decisions.

2. WHICH COMMITTEES' CONTINGENTS WILL BE REPRESENTATIVE?

The previous section sketched the beginnings of a partisan selection model, the gist of which is that committee contingents will be structured so that they internalize all of the party's significant electoral interests.[1] We do not argue that the postwar appoint process has been purely partisan, but we do think that each party's CC has internalized collective goals enough so that the partisan selection model is a useful benchmark. Accordingly, we use it to answer the question, Which committees should we expect to be representative and which to be unrepresentative?

The key variable in determining whether a committee will be representative or not, according to the partisan selection model, is the character of the committee's jurisdiction. We characterize jurisdictions along two (closely related) dimensions: an "external effects" dimension and an "extramural effects" dimension. We first discuss the notion of external effects and offer a three-way classification of committees in terms of the kind of potential external effects of their decisions. We then return to the notion of extramural effects and further differentiate committees on this basis. That approach allows us to make specific predictions about each committee and to test those predictions against the empirical record.

2.1 THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF HOUSE COMMITTEE DECISIONS

By *external effects* we mean essentially what an economist would mean: effects that are external to the narrowly self-interested calculus of committee members. Because we define self-interest here in terms of electoral prospects, *external effects* refers to the effects that committee decisions have on the probabilities of victory of party members not on the committee.

The external effects for a single issue might be described both in

1. A similar notion concerning the effects of one committee's decisions on another committee's members is articulated by Collie and Cooper's (1989) work on multiple referral.

terms of size—how much the issue, on average, affects probabilities of reelection—and distribution—whether everyone is affected to about the same extent or whether there are subsets of affected and unaffected members. It is a bit harder to characterize the pattern of external effects of committee *jurisdictions* because a single jurisdiction may contain all kinds of issues. Here we ignore the full complexity of jurisdictions and attempt to classify them simply on the basis of central tendency.

In particular, we distinguish three classes of jurisdiction, based on the uniformity or skewness of their typical external effects. Jurisdictions whose external effects on average fall about equally on all noncommittee members are described as "uniform" or possessing "uniform externalities"; those whose external effects usually fall primarily on a well-defined subset of noncommittee members and leave the rest largely unaffected are described as "targeted" or possessing "targeted externalities"; and those whose external effects do not fall into either of the first two categories are put in a residual category and said to be "mixed" or to possess "mixed externalities."

Note that a jurisdiction can be uniform without being particularly important. We think of a jurisdiction as uniform if it touches most districts about equally, regardless of how much it touches them. A targeted jurisdiction, in contrast, has a very skewed distribution of external effects: a small, well-defined subset of noncommittee members care a lot, the rest relatively little.

We recognize that these definitions are loose, but they should be sufficiently precise to categorize the committees. We think it is noncontroversial to say that the committees on Appropriations, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Rules, and Ways and Means possess among the widest-ranging jurisdictions in Congress; accordingly, as they offer "something for everyone," we put them in the uniform externalities category. The other fifteen committees (we do not deal with Small Business, Official Conduct, HUAAC, or Budget) are somewhat less clear and deserve individual discussion.

2.1.1 Committees with Uniform Externalities The decisions of committees that authorize "projects" on a national scale can affect most districts in the nation simply because most districts can qualify for a project (grant, contract, subcontract) at some point. The construction projects authorized by the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, for example, leave few districts unaffected (Murphy 1974; Ferejohn 1974). Similarly, although the outlays may not be as great, the Science Committee authorizes projects, contracts, and grants in virtually every congressional district (Cohen and Noll 1991). Accordingly, we put both of these committees in the uniform externalities category.[2]

The Committee on Post Office and Civil Service has jurisdiction over policies affecting federal and postal employees. Once the core patronage committee of the majority party, Post Office is now a relatively minor panel. Nonetheless, the policies recommended by the committee affect virtually every congressional district: the average congressional district in 1970 had 6,820 federal or postal employees (or roughly 3 percent of the average district employment); of the 262 below-average districts, only 37 had fewer than 3,000 employees. Not surprisingly, the distribution of federal employment is quite even across congressional districts. Because Post Office policies concern a vocal minority in essentially every district, so that its policy decisions have the potential to affect the electoral prospects of virtually every member, we put this committee in the uniform externalities category.

The Committee on Veterans' Affairs oversees the two hundred thousand employees of the Veterans' Administration and recommends policies with respect to pensions, insurance, health, and housing programs for the nation's more than twenty million veterans. The effects of these programs are important to constituents in every congressional district: the average number of veterans per district in 1970 was over fifty-one thousand, and the district with the smallest number of veterans still had more than twenty-four thousand. Thus, for reasons similar to those articulated above, we put Veterans' Affairs in the uniform externalities group.

The committees on House Administration and Government Operations perform management or "housekeeping" functions for the House of Representatives and the executive branch, respectively.[3] Most of the decisions these committees make have little electoral impact on any member. Nonetheless, each occasionally is in a position to affect a wide range of members. The House Administration Committee may not produce any direct electoral externalities, but many of its allocational decisions are of great interest to members generally. The Government Op-

2. It is true that virtually nobody other than the member in whose district the project is placed cares about single projects. But projects are usually packaged in omnibus bills, and most members care about these bills because most members have a project in them.

3. On House Administration, see Bolling 1974, 11. On Government Operations, see Ornstein and Rohde 1977b, 209, 246–52; and Bolling 1974, 1.

erations Committee can, by conducting oversight hearings, poke its nose into virtually anything that the executive bureaucracy does. We thus place both House Administration and Government Operations in the uniform externalities category.

2.1.2 Committees with Targeted Externalities According to Ornstein and Rohde (1977b, 230), the Agricultural Committee serves "a very limited and specific set of interests." Moreover, agricultural policy has been of central importance in an ever-shrinking minority of districts in the postwar period. The court-ordered redistricting of the 1960s led to a rapid decline in the number of members elected from predominantly rural districts so that by 1973 only 130 remained (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988, 391). Further, the crop subsidy and loan programs administered by the committee, which once accounted for over 6 percent of federal spending, now account for little more than 1 percent (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988, 409). Most of the commodity-support programs, moreover, have little or no effect on the prices consumers pay for food (Cochrane 1958). Thus, the effects of agriculture policy are largely concentrated on a narrow set of constituents in a small and decreasing number of districts, with few significant externalities on constituents in other districts. For these reasons, we put Agriculture in our targeted externalities category.[4]

An even purer case of a narrowly targeted, regional policy committee is the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The federal land-use policies overseen by the committee are important to only a few western states, with virtually no external effects outside of these areas and with correspondingly small general budget effects.[5] Indeed, the narrow clientele interests of the committee were recognized in the report of the Bolling Committee, which proposed to broaden the Interior Committee's jurisdiction by making it an energy and environment committee, a plan that was only modestly successful (Davidson 1977, 42). Interior, too, is classified in the targeted externalities group.

The Bolling Committee also remarked on the narrow jurisdiction of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee—responsible, as its name suggests, for regulating the United States' merchant fleet and fisheries (Davidson 1977, 40). Its decisions have little impact outside a hundred or so coastal and riverine districts, and so we put it in the targeted externalities group.

District of Columbia is a housekeeping committee, most of whose decisions have little electoral impact. However, the large African-American population in the District of Columbia has meant that the district's governance has been of special concern to the Black Caucus in Congress. Thus, we categorize District of Columbia as having a targeted jurisdiction.[6]

2.1.3 Committees with Mixed Externalities The Judiciary Committee is hard to categorize. Much of its work is of a housekeeping nature, with little electoral impact.[7] This fact would argue for a uniform classification, but the committee's long-standing involvement with civil rights legislation has made it of special interest to southern conservatives and northern liberals.[8] Thus, we put Judiciary in the mixed externalities category.

4. Ornstein and Rohde (1977b, 230) note that clientelism in agricultural policy has not been altered by expansion of the Agriculture Committee's jurisdiction to include consumer interests and some social social welfare programs: "The lack of a major urban or consumer focus on agricultural policy is . . . related to the nature of subcommittee assignments on Agriculture. Through a process of self-selection, the few urban-oriented members . . . have avoided the commodity subcommittees and have chosen operational subcommittees like Domestic Marketing and Consumer Relations for their first assignment option and their major time commitment. Thus the agricultural legislation which goes through the commodity subcommittees remains dominated by legislators who represent particular commodity interests." The makeup of the committee, however, has changed as a result of this jurisdictional expansion. As Ornstein and Rohde (1977b, 195) show, the membership of the committee, especially the Democrats, became significantly more liberal, on average, relative to the House, between the Ninety-first and Ninety-fourth Congresses.

5. Land-use policies include grazing rights, park management, and so forth. The federal government owns about one-third of all land in the United States, but about two-thirds of all land in western states (*Economist,* 22 Oct. 1988, 21). Although these resources represent public assets, for most of our nation's history the problem facing the central government has not been a "tragedy of the commons," where too many people have tried to use public resources. Rather, from the perspective of national income, the problem has been underutilization. Thus, for the most part, particular interests have held sway over collective ones. The committee also oversees the regulation of coal, coal mines, and mine reclamation, all of which are narrowly targeted regional matters.

6. Perhaps District of Columbia should be classified as having uniform externalities for the Republican party; however, we do not bother here to differentiate between the parties.

7. Perkins (1980, 381) relates that members "expressed a lack of interest in Judiciary Committee legislation, calling it unimportant and of a 'housekeeping' nature." An examination of Judiciary Committee reports for the Ninety-second and Ninety-third Congresses shows that the bulk of the committee's work is on private bills (2,658 in the Ninety-second Congress), mostly relating to immigration and naturalization. Most of the rest of the committee's activities related to revisions and codification of the laws, holidays and commemorations, antitrust law, the courts, and prisons. The committee occasionally deals with civil rights and congressional redistricting issues. Unlike the Senate Judiciary Committee, the House committee has no formal role in the appointment of federal jurists.

8. According to Ogul (1976), the Judiciary Committee was a sought-after appoint-

The Committee on Foreign Affairs also has a mixed jurisdiction. On the one hand, it handles such issues of national importance as international relations and disarmament negotiations. (These jurisdictional items do not attract much attention because the committee's constitutional position is weak in comparison to its Senate counterpart, but their external effects are more or less uniform.) The foreign aid bill, on the other hand, attracts fairly lively interest from the narrow subset of members whose districts contain a large number of recent immigrants, Jews, or favored export industries.[9]

Throughout its history the Committee on Education and Labor has been concerned with the political agenda of organized labor. According to Munger and Fenno (1962), "When the Committee was established in 1946, its main focus was considered to be the field of labor—not education" (111), and this focus continued to the time of their study (177). Davidson (1974, 53), too, emphasizes the union labor focus of the committee, noting that "the AFL-CIO informally clears prospective Democratic committee members."[10] Constituents affected by these activities are largely concentrated in the Northeast and the Great Lakes region. From this perspective, the committee's jurisdiction is targeted. But occasionally, as with the Taft-Hartley Act, the committee is responsible for labor legislation of national significance. Moreover, the committee's educational jurisdiction also includes some policies of national importance.[11] Thus, the committee's jurisdiction falls into neither pure case, consisting as it does of much that is of only regional significance with occasional forays into nationally important issues.

The jurisdictions of the remaining two committees—Banking and Armed Services—changed dramatically in the postwar period, a shift that makes them particularly difficult to classify. The Banking Committee shapes public programs that deal with the nation's financial institutions and with a wide variety of urban policy matters. In the 1950s—when only about 130 members were elected from central city districts—

ment in the late 1950s and 1960s (138–39), with civil rights being the committee's most attractive (if not most important) subject matter. This view of the committee changed in the early 1970s, however, as the flood of civil rights legislation that the committee processed from 1957 to 1970 dried up (Ogul 1976, 151). See also Bolling 1974, 1.

9. Many foreign aid programs are not simply handouts; rather, they provide subsidies to foreign countries to purchase particular U.S. export goods. This connection means that foreign aid is likely to be of considerable particularistic interest.

10. The committee's report of activities in the Ninety-third Congress indicates that it spent about three-fourths of its time on labor matters.

11. However, many large educational programs were placed under the jurisdiction of other House committees.

these programs had a substantial effect on relatively few districts and imposed relatively modest externalities on the rest. As a result of court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s, however, the number of substantially urban districts grew from 221 in 1964 to more than 300 by 1974.[12] This growth, coupled with an expansion in jurisdiction in the 1960s to include the urban renewal and housing programs of the Great Society, meant that a much greater proportion of members were affected by the committee's policies in 1973 than had been affected a decade earlier. One option is to put the committee in different categories depending on the period of time under discussion. Here, however, we shall simply put it in the mixed externality group.

The Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction over matters that can simultaneously be of great national and local importance: every major weapons system is simultaneously a contribution (positive or negative) to our national defense and a cornucopia of targetable defense contracts. The other major policy in the committee's jurisdiction, the deployment of our armed forces, is of much less widespread concern now than it used to be. From 1952 to 1974, 125 major military installations were closed (Arnold 1979). By 1970, 255 districts had fewer than 1,000 military personnel stationed within their borders, and 20 percent of all districts had no defense-related employment (Goss 1972, 217); only 59 districts had more than 10,000 military personnel (roughly two standard deviations from the average of 4,500). By the early 1970s base closing had become an important matter for many of the members representing districts with major military installations threatened by closure (Arnold 1979, 126). At any one time, of course, base closing is an important issue to only a few handfuls of the roughly 150 members representing districts with major military installations (Arnold 1979). These members, largely from rural districts, have a stake in the committee's deployment policies. The remaining members of Congress have little or no stake in the issue.

The jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, then, was transformed in the early 1970s. During the early postwar period, the committee had a national policy jurisdiction with substantial external effects on all members of Congress. After the changes described by Arnold

12. For sources on changes in district composition, see McCubbins and Schwartz 1988. The categories *central city* and *substantially urban* are defined somewhat differently. *Substantially urban* includes all districts with more than 60 percent of the district's residents living in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). It is impossible to get consistent and meaningful measures of the degree of urbanization of particular districts.

(1979), the committee's jurisdiction was somewhat more mixed, containing national as well as more narrowly targeted policy issues. We put Armed Services, too, in the mixed externalities category.

2.1.4 Summary We have classified House committees into three groups based on the character of their jurisdictions. In the first group (uniform externalities) are Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Works and Transportation, Science, Post Office and Civil Service, House Administration, Government Operations, and Veterans' Affairs. The second group (targeted externalities) consists of Agriculture, District of Columbia, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries. In the third group (mixed externalities) are Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Education and Labor, Banking, and Armed Services.

We expect that committees in our uniform externalities group will tend to have contingents that are microcosms of their party caucuses. There is, by definition, no strong bias in the type of member willing to serve on these committees; everyone is equally interested in the important uniform jurisdictions and, perhaps, equally uninterested in the unimportant uniform jurisdictions. Moreover, neither party's CC has an incentive to prefer one type of member over another, for it wishes to create a committee that will produce legislation consistent with the maximization of seats. Appointing a committee that is not representative of the party as a whole simply runs the risk of its members' pursuing their own individual or factional interests at the expense of others' individual or factional interests. This risk, of course, is not very great if the committee's jurisdiction is unimportant (generates uniformly low externalities). Thus, the more important the committee's jurisdiction, the stronger the expectation of a representative contingent.

We expect the committees in our targeted externalities group to have party contingents that are unrepresentative of the party caucus on one or more dimensions. Indeed, if the committee's legislation produces no externalities outside of a well-defined group, we would expect only members of that group to be appointed to the committee. This pattern of appointment would serve the collective interests of the party because, by hypothesis, no "uninterested" member's probability of reelection can be affected much by committee decisions. Thus, because the interested members fully internalize everything of collective interest, there is no electoral need for uninterested members to be on the committee. In this case, of course, the contingent would be unrepresentative at least with

respect to the characteristics that differentiate interested members from uninterested ones.

Finally, it is harder to say anything definitive about committees with mixed externalities jurisdictions. The closer they are to the uniform externalities end of the spectrum, the more representative they should be; the closer they are to the targeted externalities end, the more unrepresentative they may be.

2.2 EXTRAMURAL EFFECTS

The notion of external effects may be clear enough as a broad abstraction, but it is difficult to measure with any operational precision. A check on our classification can be provided by looking at extramural effects.

By *extramural effects* we mean effects that are felt by organized actors outside of Congress: pressure groups, trade associations, and the like. A clue to the breadth of a committee's jurisdiction is the number and diversity of groups that (regularly) attempt to influence the committee's deliberations by lobbying, appearing at hearings, and so forth. In principle, one might conduct a census of groups appearing at each committee's hearings in order to measure the size and character of extramural effects. All we do here is to subdivide each of our three categories—targeted, mixed, and uniform—based on an impressionistic judgment of which committees faced a more homogeneous and which a more heterogeneous group of lobbyists on a regular basis.

The result of this exercise is our final classification of committees (table 25). In addition to our expectations regarding committees with targeted, mixed, and uniform jurisdictions, we expect that *within* each of these categories the committees with the more homogeneous set of clientele groups will be less representative. The rationale behind this expectation is that a more homogeneous group of lobbyists is evidence that a narrower group of issues dominates the committee's jurisdiction.[13] Moreover, extramural actors may lobby for a particular kind of member to be appointed to "their" committee (recall the AFL-CIO's influence over Democratic appointments to Education and Labor), and

13. It should be noted that less-representative committees do not necessarily produce more targeted external effects, since the narrow group of issues may be important to a minority that is evenly distributed among congressional districts. But within each category of external effects, homogeneity of lobbying groups seems a reasonable clue that external effects may be more targeted.

TABLE 25. CLASSIFICATION OF COMMITTEES BY TYPE OF EXTERNALITY

		Externalities		
		Targeted	*Mixed*	*Uniform*
Clientele Groups	*Homogeneous*	Dist. of Columbia	Education and Labor Armed Services Banking	Science Post Office Veterans Public Works
	Heterogeneous	Agriculture Interior Merchant Marine	Judiciary Foreign Affairs	Appropriations Rules Ways and Means Commerce Gov. Operations House Admin.

committee members, once appointed, may be exposed to incentives (such as campaign contributions) that induce them to vote in distinctive ways. This last point is relevant when the representativeness of a committee contingent is assessed in terms of how its members vote in comparison to the party as a whole.

2.3 A DIGRESSION

The discussion thus far has proceeded as if there were no constraints on a party CC's ability to appoint members. But in fact there are constraints, both in the form of various norms that are commonly thought to regulate CC behavior and, possibly, in the form of interactions with the other party. We discuss each of these kinds of constraint in turn.

The best-known and most obviously constraining regulatory norm is the seniority norm—which, among other things, confers security of committee tenure on members. If the CC could violate members' security of tenure with impunity, remaking committee rosters anew each session, it could ensure that the membership of each committee reflected the party's position on the issues before them. But CCs typically have been reluctant to violate members' tenure, even in the postreform era.

Barring a change in this equilibrium, both parties' ability to alter the composition of committees will depend, at least in the short run, on the number of vacancies to be filled.[14] As it turns out, the typical number of vacancies on most committees with uniform jurisdictions seems to have been enough for the parties' CCs, were they so inclined, to fashion a representative contingent. In other words, the vacancies constraint has not often been binding.

The primary exception to this observation is the Appropriations Committee. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) report that cumulative turnover among Democrats on the Appropriations Committee in the postwar era has been 10 percent less than among all House Democrats. This low turnover has made it difficult for appointments to Appropriations to keep pace with the steady liberalization of the Democratic party (as the southern conservative wing has disappeared).

Other norms that regulate CC behavior pose little or no constraint on the fashioning of balanced or representative contingents. For example, Democratic appointments to the larger and more important committees are influenced by three "group-retentive" norms: one that stipulates replacing a departing member from a medium-sized or large state with another member from the same state; one that stipulates replacing a departing female member with another female member; and one that stipulates replacing a departing African-American member with another African-American member (Bullock 1971; Friedman n.d.). Each of these norms can be viewed as furthering rather than hindering the achievement of balance on Democratic committee contingents.

With regard to interactions with the other party, we have two points to make. First, the majority party decides both the total number of seats that each committee will have and how many of these seats each party will get. In principle, it can use this power to "pack" committees—as was done, for example, with Rules in 1961 and Ways and Means in 1975 (Shepsle 1978). The minority party, lacking this power, faces an additional constraint in achieving balance in its contingents.

Second, one might suppose that each party's CC anticipates the appointments to be made by its opposite number. This supposition would make particular sense if, as much of the formal modeling literature explicitly supposes, parties matter little in committee and committee pol-

14. Of course, the mere existence of this constraint on each party's ability to structure its committee contingents indicates an element of party weakness. Before the revolt against Boss Cannon, members did not enjoy security of tenure on committees, and Speakers could restructure rosters as thoroughly as they wished.

icy recommendations reflect the interests of the median committee member. If everyone knows that the median committee member determines policy, should not those empowered to make appointments take this fact into account? If they do, a game results between the two parties' CCs. We shall not say much about this game except to note that, if it is analyzed under the standard spatial modeling assumption that parties do not matter, it generates predictions that are falsifiable and false.[15]

3. RESULTS

We turn now to an empirical investigation of the representativeness of party contingents. We begin, in sections 3.1 through 3.5, with a series of "static" tests that assess the degree to which contingents have been, at a given time, representative of the parties from which they were drawn. One might assess representativeness along any number of different dimensions: Is the contingent representative in terms of its general policy predispositions? Is it representative in terms of some more specific policy predispositions pertinent to the committee's jurisdiction? Is it representative in terms of the geographic location of its members' constituencies? Our strategy is to look at each of these kinds of representativeness using an array of different measures and methodologies.

Following the static tests, we look in section 3.6 at some "dynamic" tests that compare two sets of committee members: new appointees and continuing members. In any given Congress, the continuing members on a committee contingent may be unrepresentative of their party as a whole simply because of other party members who failed to secure reelection, retired, or transferred to another committee. If the continuing members on a uniform externality committee *are* unrepresentative in some fashion, we expect that the party CC will attempt to remedy the situation by appointing new members who restore the contingent's balance.

15. Consider the Democratic CC's appointments to a committee with thirty Democrats and twenty Republicans. The median member of the Democratic CC ("Ernie") wants to ensure that the median member of the committee being appointed ends up as close to his ideal point as possible. Suppose that all twenty of the Republican appointees are to Ernie's right. Then Ernie wants twenty Democrats to be to his left to balance the Republicans, and the other ten split evenly around him, for a total of twenty-five out of thirty Democrats to his left. This is not, of course, how appointments turn out.

3.1 CONTINGENT VERSUS PARTY MEANS: ADA SCORES

The ADA has rated the roll call voting records of members of Congress since 1947, with higher scores going to more liberal members. In tables 26 (for the Democrats) and 27 (for the Republicans) we investigate whether the mean ADA score on each committee contingent differs significantly from the mean ADA score of the party from which it was drawn. In each table a plus sign (+) indicates that the contingent had a mean ADA score significantly greater than the mean for the party (thus indicating that the contingent was more liberal than the party), whereas a minus sign (−) indicates a mean ADA score significantly lower than the party's.[16] Both tables rate all committees—except Budget, HUAAC, and Small Business—for the Eighty-seventh through Ninety-seventh Congresses.

First, the Democratic contingents on seven of our ten "uniform externalities" committees *never* had mean ADA scores that differed significantly from the mean for the remainder of the party (table 26). The only uniform committees that were ever unrepresentative in terms of their ADA scores were Public Works (in one Congress), Government Operations (in two), and Veterans' Affairs (in four).

Second, among the "mixed externalities" committees, Democratic contingents were occasionally unrepresentative on three (Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Banking) and often unrepresentative on two (Armed Services and Education and Labor). Democrats on Education and Labor were significantly more liberal in all Congresses, whereas those on Armed Services were significantly more conservative starting in the Ninety-second Congress.

Finally, among the "targeted externalities" committees, two (Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries) never had unrepresentative Democratic contingents, whereas two (Agriculture and District of Columbia) were unrepresentative in almost half the Congresses covered. In interpreting these results, it should be remembered that committees with targeted jurisdictions are predicted to be unrepresentative along some, but not necessarily all, dimensions. In the case of Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries the cleavage between committee and noncommittee members is easiest to discern in geographical terms, as discussed in section 3.5.[17]

16. The .05 significance level is used throughout. We thus ignore the comments of Hall and Grofman 1990 in this section. They are addressed in the following sections.

17. We also ran difference-of-means tests for two other scores: the ACA score and

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TABLE 26. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCE-OF-MEANS TESTS ON ADA RATINGS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS AND THE PARTY, EIGHTY-SEVENTH TO NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESSES

	Congress										
Committee	*87*	*88*	*89*	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*
Agriculture	−			−	−	−				−	
Appropriations											
Armed Services						−	−	−	−	−	−
Banking		+					+				
Commerce											
Dist. of Columbia	−	−					+				+
Education and Labor	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Foreign Affairs					+				+		
Gov. Operations		+							+		
House Admin.											
Interior											
Judiciary					+	+	+				+
Merchant Marine											
Post Office											
Public Works									−		
Rules											
Science											
Veterans		−		−					−		−
Ways and Means											

NOTES: − = Mean contingent ADA score significantly lower than party mean.
+ = Mean contingent ADA score significantly higher than party mean.

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TABLE 27. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCE-OF-MEANS TESTS ON ADA RATINGS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS AND THE PARTY, EIGHTY-SEVENTH TO NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESSES

	Congress										
Committee	*87*	*88*	*89*	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*
Agriculture	−	−	−	−	−						
Appropriations	−										
Armed Services							−	−	−	−	−
Banking									+		
Commerce				−	−	−					
Dist. of Columbia		+							+		
Education and Labor	−						+				
Foreign Affairs						+	+	+		+	+
Gov. Operations					+		+	+			
House Admin.								−		−	
Interior			−					−	−		−
Judiciary					+	+	+				+
Merchant Marine					+	+	+	+			
Post Office						−					
Public Works				−			−	−	−	−	
Rules	−	−									−
Science											
Veterans											
Ways and Means		−	−	−	−	−	−			−	

NOTES: − = Mean contingent ADA score significantly lower than party mean.
+ = Mean contingent ADA score significantly higher than party mean.

The results for Republican contingents are presented in table 27. Somewhat surprisingly, in seven of the eleven Congresses investigated, the average member of the Republican contingent on Ways and Means was significantly less likely to support the position advocated by ADA than was the average member of the party; in other words, Ways and Means Republicans have tended to be significantly more conservative than their party as a whole. Also contrary to expectation, the Republicans on Public Works were frequently more conservative than their party. The Republican contingents on Rules, Commerce, and Government Operations were unrepresentative of their party in three of the eleven Congresses. The remaining Republican contingents fit more clearly with our expectations.[18]

What explains the Ways and Means and Public Works Republicans? One might answer this question with a careful historical analysis of Republican factional politics or of their traditional opposition to New Deal "tax and spend" politics—the "tax" side of which went through Ways and Means and much of the "spend" side of which went through Public Works. But it should also be noted that getting committee appointments right matters less for a hopeless minority than it does for a majority party. The value of fashioning representative contingents for the majority is that the deals struck within such contingents are likely to stick within the party as a whole. If they do stick, then they are likely to pass, since the party has a majority. For the minority party, however, equally representative contingents may agree on alternative legislation, and they may even carry their colleagues on the floor, but they can rarely hope to succeed in passing it; so the payoff to careful balancing is somewhat less.

3.2 CONTINGENT VERSUS PARTY MEDIANS: NOMINATE SCORES

In chapter 3 we introduced Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores as a more informative alternative to the use of interest group ratings such as ADA. Here we use the Wilcoxon difference-of-medians test to assess whether each contingent in each Congress is representative of the party from which it is drawn in terms of its NOMINATE scores.[19] Thus, in contrast with the previous section we use both a different measure of general ideological predisposition (NOMINATE rather than ADA scores) and a different measure of central tendency (the median rather than the mean). The point is simply to show that the findings sketched in the previous section do not depend crucially on a particular measure or methodology. An additional benefit from using NOMINATE scores, beyond the technical advantages indicated in chapter 3, is that these scores are available for every postwar Congress in our purview (the Eightieth through the Hundredth).

The null hypothesis in the Wilcoxon tests is that each contingent is as if drawn at random from the party as a whole. If this null is rejected, we take the committee to be unrepresentative; otherwise, we take it to be representative.[20]

Our results are given in tables 28 (for the Democrats) and 29 (for the Republicans). Because NOMINATE scores are larger for more conservative members, plus signs indicate contingents that are more conservative than their party, and minus signs indicate contingents that are more liberal.

We look first at Democratic contingents and differences significant at the .05 level. There are four groups among the "uniform externalities" committees: the contingents on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House Administration, Rules, and Ways and Means were never significantly different from the rest of the Democratic party; those on Public Works, Science, and Post Office were each significantly different in two of the twenty-one Congresses; those on Appropriations and Government Operations were significantly different in three Congresses; and that of Veterans' Affairs was significantly different in five Congresses. Among the "mixed externalities" committees, one finds two groups: Judiciary and Foreign Affairs both differ significantly in about a quarter of the Congresses investigated; by contrast, the three intermediate com-

the conservative coalition support score compiled by *National Journal*. The results were similar to those reported in table 26, the chief difference being that the Democratic contingent on Veterans' Affairs was unrepresentative in seven of twelve Congresses on the basis of ACA scores, rather than four of eleven on the basis of ADA scores.

18. The results in table 27 for Republican ADA scores are closely replicated for Republican ACA scores, with two exceptions. The Republicans on Agriculture and Armed Services are only rarely unrepresentative of the Republican party in terms of their ACA scores. The results for Republican conservative coalition scores also closely approximate

19. We discuss this test more fully in chapter 3.

20. It is obvious that contingents are not chosen at random, so one may ask what the point is of testing the null hypothesis that they are. The reasoning—implicit in previous studies that use the same basic methodology—is as follows: The difference between the contingent median and party median is a rough measure of the contingent's unrepresentativeness—the larger the difference, the more unrepresentative. If one wishes to classify contingents as either "representative" or "unrepresentative," however, where should the cutoff be made? The cutoff here is the .05 critical value for rejecting the null. The interpretation is that differences that might have arisen by chance, *had assignment been ran-*

TABLE 28. SUMMARY OF WILCOXON DIFFERENCE-OF-MEDIANS TESTS ON NOMINATE RATINGS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS AND THE PARTY, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

	Congress								
Committee	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*
Agriculture		+	+	+		+	+	+	.15
Appropriations							.10		+
Armed Services	+			.10	.15				
Banking		−	−	−	−	−	−.10	−	−
Commerce									
Dist. of Columbia			−.15				−.15		
Education and Labor					−	−	−	−	−.10
Foreign Affairs	−	−.10	−.15		.15		−.15		−.10
Gov. Operations		−.10		−	−.10				−
House Admin.		.15							
Interior				.15					
Judiciary									
Merchant Marine									
Post Office									
Public Works									
Rules				.15					
Science	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			
Veterans			+					.10	
Ways and Means									

	Congress											
89	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*100*
+	+	+	+	+		.10	+	.10	+	+	+
.10	.15	+	.10	+	.10						
.10	.15	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
−	−			−				−.10			
				−			−	−	−	−	−
−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−.10	−.10
−.10	−.10	−	−.15		−.15	−	−.15		−	−	−
−.15		−			−.10	−.10					
							−.15				
.15											
		−.10	−	−	−		−.15		−	−.10	−
									.10	.10	.10
		−.15		−.10	−.10	−		−	−.10	−.10	−.10
	.15					+	+				
							−.10				
				.10		.15	.15			+	+
						.10	+	+	+	+	.10

NOTES: + = Contingent median is significantly greater than the party median at the .05 level.
− = Contingent median is significantly smaller than the party median at the .05 level.
.10 (−.10) = Contingent median is significantly greater (smaller) than the party median at the .10 level.
.15 (−.15) = Contingent median is significantly greater (smaller) than the party median at the .15 level.

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TABLE 29. SUMMARY OF WILCOXON DIFFERENCE-OF-MEDIANS TESTS ON NOMINATE RATINGS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS AND THE PARTY, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

	Congress								
Committee	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*
Agriculture						+		.10	+
Appropriations				+		.10	.15	+	.10
Armed Services						−		−.10	
Banking									
Commerce	−			−.10	−.10				
Dist. of Columbia				−.15	−			−	−
Education and Labor	.15		.10		+				
Foreign Affairs	−.10			−			−.10	−	
Gov. Operations									−.10
House Admin.	.15								
Interior	−.15		.10						
Judiciary									
Merchant Marine		−.10	−.10						−
Post Office		−.10		−					
Public Works									
Rules					.15		.10	.10	.10
Science	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	−.15		−.10
Veterans	−.15	−.15	−	−				−.15	
Ways and Means	+	+						+	.10

	Congress											
89	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*100*
.10	+	+	+								
									−.10	−	
			.15	+					.15		.10
−.15											
									.15		+
					−.15	−.15					
					−.10						
			−.10	−	−		−.10	−.15			−.15
	−.10	−	−.10	−	−.15						
					+	.15	.15			+	+
		.15			.10			.10		+	+
	−	−								+	
−.10	−.10		−					−.15			−.10
			+	.15							
	.15			.10		.15	+				.10
.10								.10			
								−.15			
	−.15								−.15	−.15	
.10	.15			.15	.10				.15		

NOTES: + = Contingent median is significantly greater than the party median at the .05 level.
− = Contingent median is significantly smaller than the party median at the .05 level.
.10 (−.10) = Contingent median is significantly greater (smaller) than the party median at the .10 level.
.15 (−.15) = Contingent median is significantly greater (smaller) than the party median at the .15 level.

mittees with the most homogeneous clientele groups—Armed Services, Banking, and Education and Labor—differ significantly about half the time. Finally, among the "targeted externalities" committees, the Democratic contingents on Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries never differed significantly from the rest of the Democratic party, while the contingent on DC differed eight times and that on Agriculture fifteen times.

These results jibe, for the most part, with our expectations and with the results using ADA scores reported in the last section.[21] We expected that committees with uniform jurisdictions would not differ significantly on any politically important dimension. If we arbitrarily say that a committee contingent is "generally representative" if it differs significantly from its party less than 10 percent of the time, we find that only three of the uniform committees—Appropriations, Government Operations, and Veterans' Affairs—fail to qualify as generally representative. As Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) have argued at length, the Appropriations case seems to be one in which there were not enough vacancies on the committee to keep up with changes in the caucus. Veterans' Affairs may be a case in which the influence of a monolithic clientele group—organized veterans—outweighs the possible external effects.

Hall and Grofman (1990), in a critique of Krehbiel (1990), have noted that conventional Type I error rates—.05 in our case—may not be appropriate if one wishes to show that a committee *is* representative. The logic is simply that the probability of a Type II error (acceptance of a false null) is quite large when the probability of a Type I error (rejection of a true null) is set to .05; but the Type II error ought to be set to a lower value by a researcher who wishes to infer from acceptance of the null that committees are representative (cf. Blalock 1979, 157–65).[22] The only way of obtaining a lower probability of Type II error, of course, is by choosing a somewhat higher significance level (Type I error probability). Accordingly, table 28 also reports contingent-party differences

21. The primary differences between the ADA difference-of-means test and the NOMINATE difference-of-medians test concern two committees: Appropriations and Banking. Democratic contingents on both committees are judged more frequently unrepresentative in terms of their median NOMINATE scores than in terms of their mean ADA scores.

22. Although this point is well taken in some contexts, we are not sure that this is one of them. After all, the null hypothesis—that contingents are drawn at random from their respective parties— is obviously false, as demonstrated by the fact that any previous member who wishes to stay on a committee may do so. In the present context, the .05 level is being used simply as a benchmark, a slightly less arbitrary way of deciding which contingents are representative and which are unrepresentative.

that are significant at the .15 level; this modification substantially changes the results for only five of the uniform externalities committees—Science, Post Office, Appropriations, Government Operations, and Veterans' Affairs—all of which are found to differ significantly in three to six more Congresses. It should be noted that after Veterans' Affairs, Post Office and Science have the most homogeneous clientele groups among the committees with uniform jurisdictions.

The results in table 29 (taking the .05 significance-level results first) generally show Republican contingents on the "uniform externalities" committees to be less unrepresentative than they were in terms of ADA scores. In particular, Ways and Means and Public Works Republicans, as well as those on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Government Operations, and Rules, were less frequently unrepresentative of their party in terms of their median NOMINATE scores than they had been in terms of their mean ADA scores.[23] Otherwise, the NOMINATE results are similar to the ADA results. Differences at lower levels of significance show the Republican contingents on both Rules and Ways and Means as unrepresentative considerably more often (in six or more Congresses).

3.3 CONTINGENT VERSUS PARTY DISTRIBUTIONS: NOMINATE SCORES

The Wilcoxon tests just reported reveal whether the median member on a contingent differed significantly from the median member of the party as a whole. It remains possible, of course, that the *distribution* of NOMINATE scores on a contingent is unrepresentative even if the median is not. For example, the members on a contingent might be more (or less) tightly clustered around the median than are their party colleagues in general. But our model suggests that the entire distribution of scores on a "uniform externalities" committee will be representative of that in the party.

Accordingly, in this section we use a quintile-based chi-square to assess the representativeness of party contingents. To compute this statistic, we first rank the members of each party from most liberal to most conservative, based on their NOMINATE scores, then divide each party into fifths. The chi-square measures under- or overrepresentation of each

23. Recall that we suggested in explanation of the ADA results that the Republicans were emphasizing their opposition to New Deal policies by putting their most committed opponents on the relevant committees. If this line of thought has merit, then the results just noted in the text presumably show that ADA scores are more focused on the traditional New Deal political agenda than are the more broadly based NOMINATE scores.

TABLE 30. SUMMARY OF QUINTILE-BASED CHI-SQUARES ON NOMINATE RATINGS FOR DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

	Congress								
Committee	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*
Agriculture			+			+	.10	.15	
Appropriations									.10
Armed Services							.15		
Banking					.15	+		.15	.15
Commerce									
Dist. of Columbia					.15			.15	+
Education and Labor					+	.10	+	.10	
Foreign Affairs		.10	.10						
Gov. Operations				+					
House Admin.		+		.15					
Interior								.10	
Judiciary									
Merchant Marine				.15					
Post Office									
Public Works								.15	
Rules				.10					
Science	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			
Veterans									+
Ways and Means				.15					

NOTE: + = Chi-square values are significantly greater than zero at the .05 level; .10 and .15 denote significance at those lower levels.

	Congress											
89	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*100*
.10	+	+	.10	.15					+		+
				.15							
	.15	.15	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	+			.15							
+											
+	.15			+			.15	.15	.15	+	+
+	+	+	+	+	.15		.15	.15	.10		
	.10	+				.10			+		+
					+	+					
.15					+		.15				.15
					.15						
			+	+			.15	+		+	.10
		.15				+					
	.15					.15	.10				
	.10		.10	.15							
										.15	.15
.10		+	.15	.10		+	+	+	.10		

TABLE 31. SUMMARY OF QUINTILE-BASED CHI-SQUARES ON NOMINATE RATINGS FOR REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CONTINGENTS, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

	Congress								
Committee	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*
Agriculture				.15					+
Appropriations				+	.10				
Armed Services						.15			
Banking									+
Commerce				.15					
Dist. of Columbia	.15			.15				.15	
Education and Labor		.15			.15				
Foreign Affairs			.15	.15				+	
Gov. Operations									.15
House Admin.									.15
Interior				.10	+				+
Judiciary	+							+	
Merchant Marine			.10		+				
Post Office	.15	.15							
Public Works									
Rules	.10					.10			
Science	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			
Veterans	.15			+					
Ways and Means									

NOTE: + = Chi-square values are significantly greater than zero at the .05 level; .10 and .15 denote significance at those lower levels.

	Congress											
89	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*100*
								.15			
										+	
				+							
						+		.10	.10		
+				.15				+			
					.15	.15	.15				
										+	
				+	+		.10				
		.10								.10	+
										.15	
		+									
		+								+	
.10	.10		.10	+	.15			.15			
										.15	.10
		.10					+				
	+		+								
.10								.15			
			.15						.15		
									.10		

of these quintiles: the greater the departure from equal representation for each, the greater the value of the statistic. We present the results in tables 30 and 31. Chi-square values significantly greater than zero at the .05 level are denoted with a plus sign (+); values greater than zero at the .10 and .15 levels are explicitly labeled in the tables.

Five of the uniform externality committees had Democratic contingents that were never significantly different (at the .05 level) from the Democratic party as a whole (table 30). Of the five that did differ, two (Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Post Office) did so in only one Congress, while another two (Government Operations and House Administration) did so in three or fewer. Only Veterans' Affairs, with probably the most homogeneous clientele group of the lot, tended to have unrepresentative contingents more frequently (in five of the twenty-one Congresses).

These results show that discrepancies between the distribution of opinion on Democratic contingents and the distribution of opinion in the Democratic party as a whole are even rarer than discrepancies between contingent medians and party medians—at least as regards the uniform externality committees. This result is particularly true of the Appropriations Committee, which, although it tended to deviate in terms of central tendency fairly often, did not in terms of overall distribution. Little is changed in this assessment if one counts differences at the .15 level as significant.

The results for contingents dealing with mixed jurisdictions are also similar to those obtained previously. Once again, one finds Democratic contingents on Judiciary and Foreign Affairs differing less often (three or four times in twenty-one Congresses), the contingents on Armed Services and Education and Labor—both with relatively homogeneous clientele groups—differing more often (seven to nine times). The only change involves the contingent on Banking, which in this analysis differs significantly from the Democratic Caucus in only two Congresses.

The results for Democratic contingents on targeted externality committees were essentially the same as those obtained with the difference-of-medians test. The contingents on Agriculture and District of Columbia differ significantly fairly often, while those of Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries never do.

The results for Republican contingents are presented in table 31. None of the contingents on uniform externality committees was unrepresentative in terms of the distribution of their NOMINATE scores in more than two Congresses. This finding is roughly in accord with the difference-of-medians tests, although there is a general tendency for contingents to be unrepresentative in terms of distribution less often than they are in terms of medians.[24]

3.4 CONTINGENT VERSUS PARTY BEHAVIOR ON COMMITTEE-RELATED ROLL CALLS

Thus far we have investigated the representativeness of committee contingents only in terms of their general ideological stance, as measured by ADA or NOMINATE scores. But a contingent may be representative in general terms and at the same time unrepresentative in terms of the specific issues with which the committee deals. To explore this possibility, we supplement the analyses of the previous three sections with one that looks for unrepresentative behavior on just those roll calls pertinent to the committee's jurisdiction.

One way of focusing the analysis on committee-specific roll calls—that employed in the previous literature (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1990)—is to rely on the evaluations of a special interest group. For example, one might use the National Security Voting Index compiled by the American Security Council to assess the behavior of members of the Armed Services Committee, the score compiled by the Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO to assess the behavior of members of the Education and Labor Committee, and so forth.

Although using interest group scores to measure behavior along more narrowly defined issue dimensions is convenient, there are some problems with this approach. First, one cannot find an appropriate interest group score for every committee. Second, as discussed in chapter 3, special interest groups often construct their scores in order to identify friends and expose enemies. This desire usually entails concentrating on a few litmus test votes rather than on the entire range of votes related to the issue of concern, so that the difference between friends and enemies will be put into starker relief. But the stark differences on the litmus tests may not be entirely representative of the milder differences on the whole range of votes.

Instead of relying on interest group scores to tap into each committee's jurisdiction, we have constructed our own scores. These, too, have substantial weaknesses, as we explain below, but they complement the more often used interest group scores.

24. The only uniform externality committee for which a distributional difference showed up more frequently than a difference in medians is Rules.

Our scores can be explained most easily by considering a specific example—say, the Agriculture Committee in the Ninety-eighth Congress. As it turns out, a total of twenty-three roll calls pertinent to bills were reported out by the Agriculture Committee in the Ninety-eighth Congress.[25] Our strategy is to gauge the representativeness of the Democratic members on Agriculture by comparing their voting behavior on these twenty-three votes to that of their noncommittee colleagues.

First, for each of the twenty-three roll calls we compute the difference between the proportion of the contingent voting yes and the proportion of the rest of the party voting yes. Second, we take the absolute value of each of these twenty-three differences and average them. This approach yields a straightforward statistic, the mean absolute difference (MAD), which is essentially Rice's "index of likeness" applied to the difference between contingents and parties instead of the difference between parties. If MAD is zero, then the contingent and the rest of the party never differed, and there is no evidence of unrepresentativeness; as MAD grows larger, the contingent appears more and more distinctive in its behavior vis-à-vis the rest of the party.

Although MAD is easy to calculate, there are two important problems of interpretation. First, the distribution of MAD under the null hypothesis of "no difference between contingent and party" is not known, so it is difficult to judge statistical significance. Part of the problem is that distributions involving absolute values are always a bit tricky. But even if we were interested in the mean difference rather than the mean absolute difference there would be a problem because one cannot assume that all the votes related to a given committee's bills are statistically independent. Often there will be several votes on a single committee bill, all of which concern procedural attempts to kill it; these votes are obviously not statistically independent. Indeed, they are essentially the same vote taken over and over again. More generally, even votes on different bills from the same committee are not independent for present purposes because the process by which votes are generated is nothing like a random draw from some big bin of possible votes. Votes on committee bills are generated in two steps, both of which may involve strategic calculation: first, the committee has to decide to report a bill; second, someone has to decide to call for a vote on some aspect of the bill. Because the membership of the committee contingent remains the same

25. This figure includes roll calls held on rules for the consideration of Agriculture's bills.

over all votes in a given Congress (ignoring midterm changes in personnel), the same selection pressures on bills will be evident throughout the term. Any procedure that counts votes as if they were independent draws from some fixed distribution will underestimate standard errors and hence be too likely to find statistically significant differences.

Second, and more serious, the size of MAD is far from being a direct and unproblematic measure of the representativeness of the committee contingent under investigation. Committee and noncommittee Democrats may vote differently on committee-related roll calls either because they have different underlying preferences on the issues at stake (i.e., the committee contingent is unrepresentative) or because committee Democrats are involved in a nexus of logrolls and side payments that boosts their support for committee handiwork above what it would otherwise be on preferential grounds alone. For example, if the proportion of Ways and Means Democrats voting yes on final passage of some tax bill exceeds the analogous proportion of noncommittee Democrats, is this because of an ideological difference or because some committee Democrats, who might have opposed the bill, were brought on board with generous transition rules or other particularistic favors incorporated in the bill? Similarly, if the proportion of Commerce Democrats voting yes on final passage of some energy bill exceeds the analogous proportion of noncommittee Democrats, is this because of some ideological difference or because some committee Democrats, who might otherwise have opposed the bill, were using their votes to purchase their committee colleagues' support on another committee bill?

A large MAD might indicate simply that a committee is highly integrated, in the sense that committee members trade with one another, using votes as the primary medium of exchange.[26] From this perspective, a high value of MAD for a particular committee might measure how much logrolling goes on within the committee. The extent of logrolling within a committee might in turn depend on both the breadth of its jurisdiction (broader jurisdictions creating the potential for more trades) and the availability of particularistic side payments (more side payments also creating the potential for more trades).

All these matters, of course, make the interpretation of MAD values

26. For some committees, members' ability to trade with one another might itself depend on underlying preference characteristics. For example, if most members of the Armed Services Committee have military bases in their districts, then member A will oppose closing B's bases in return for B's opposition to closing A's bases; the committee Democrats thus will support military spending more than noncommittee Democrats will.

difficult. For example, if MAD measures unrepresentativeness, we should expect Appropriations to have a small MAD value; but if MAD measures committee integration, we might expect Appropriations to have a high MAD value.[27]

With these caveats in mind we can turn to table 32, which gives the total number of pertinent roll calls for each committee in all even-numbered Congresses from the Eighty-fourth to the Hundredth, inclusive, together with the mean absolute difference between the proportion of the committee and noncommittee Dĕmocrats voting yes.

There are three points to note about these figures:

First, in substantive terms there does not seem to be much to distinguish the various committees. Only two stand out from the pack: Veterans' Affairs, which has the lowest MAD value (2.3 percent); and Armed Services, which has the highest MAD value (17.9 percent). Most of the rest cluster in the range from 7 to 13 percent.

Second, there is only a small correlation (.27) between a committee's MAD values in succeeding Congresses; that is, if one wanted to predict a committee's MAD value in Congress *t*, the same committee's value in Congress *t*-2 would be of little value. This suggests either that MAD does not measure unrepresentativeness very well or that committees change frequently in how they rank in terms of unrepresentativeness. If there were some stable ranking of committee representativeness—as indicated for example by the substantial stability of committee rankings based on NOMINATE scores—and MAD tapped into it well, then we should find the same ordering of committees in Congress after Congress. We do not.

Our conclusion from this analysis is that trying to measure how unrepresentative a committee contingent is with regard to (some subset of) issues within the committee's jurisdiction is problematic. Using roll calls that *do not* pertain to bills reported out by the committee in question, one faces Scylla: Are the bills actually relevant to the committee's jurisdiction? And if so, why are they not in it? Using roll calls that *do* pertain to bills reported out by the committee, one faces Charybdis: To what extent do differences between how committee contingents and their party colleagues vote reflect logrolling within committees rather than distinct preferences? This dilemma faces not just the method investigated here but also the traditional method of relying on the voting scores compiled by special interest groups.

27. With enough data, the uncertainty over the interpretation of MAD might be reduced. Suppose, for example, that we identified all Democrats who transferred to Armed Services in the postwar period. For each of them, we could calculate how frequently they supported the majority position among Armed Services Democrats in (1) the Congress just before they joined the committee and (2) the Congress in which they joined. If MAD measures underlying preference disparity, and committees are fairly stable over time in terms of the preferences of their members (as suggested in the literature on self-selection), then we should find little difference in the voting behavior of transferees before and after transfer. They have a general predisposition similar to that of the rest of the committee Democrats, and they express this predisposition both before and after they join the committee. By contrast, if MAD measures the extent of intracommittee logrolling, then one would expect higher rates of support for committee Democrats after than before transfer. Unfortunately, we do not at present have the data to perform this analysis.

TABLE 32. MEAN ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE (MAD) IN PERCENT VOTING YES BETWEEN COMMITTEE AND NONCOMMITTEE DEMOCRATS, SELECTED CONGRESSES

Committee	MAD (%)	Roll Calls (*N*)
Agriculture	11.5	203
Appropriations	10.3	866
Armed Services	17.9	254
Banking	9.7	232
Budget	15.6	13
Commerce	7.0	348
Dist. of Columbia	11.9	60
Education and Labor	11.9	304
Foreign Affairs	12.4	217
Gov. Operations	8.0	101
House Admin.	10.4	33
Interior	8.2	179
Judiciary	8.6	270
Merchant Marine	7.0	128
Post Office	12.2	89
Public Works	11.1	118
Science	8.9	107
Veterans	2.3	48
Ways and Means	10.7	352

NOTE: The first column gives the MAD between the percentage of committee Democrats voting yes and the percentage of noncommittee Democrats voting yes on committee-related votes. The second column gives the number of these votes in the Eighty-fourth, Eighty-sixth, Eighty-eighth, Ninetieth, Ninety-second, Ninety-fourth, Ninety-sixth, and Ninety-eighth Congresses. The average is taken over all votes from all Congresses.

3.5 REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVENESS

In this section we consider the geographic representativeness of committee contingents. Part of the motivation for doing so is to shore up the evidence on the targeted externality committees. We have predicted that contingents on these committees will tend to be unrepresentative of their parties along some dimension. Two of these committees—Interior and Merchant Marine and Fisheries—have shown no tendency toward *ideological* unrepresentativeness, as measured either by ADA or NOMINATE scores. It is well known, however, that both are *geographically* unrepresentative, with Merchant Marine and Fisheries attracting coastal members and Interior attracting western members (see, for example, Smith and Deering 1990). We have found that this committee-wide tendency is reflected in both parties' contingents. For example, the pattern of regional representation on the Interior Committee's contingents is sufficiently unusual so that it is unlikely to have arisen by chance in any postwar Congress. It should also be noted that both parties' contingents on another targeted externality committee—Agriculture—are geographically unrepresentative in virtually every postwar Congress.

A second motivation for discussing the issue of geographic representativeness is simply to test the uniform externality committee contingents along another dimension. The investigation proceeds by first categorizing members into three regions—North, South, and West—and then testing each contingent (with a chi-square statistic) to see if the overall pattern of regional representation was different from that in the party as a whole. The results (not reported here) show that on only two uniform externality committees—Veterans' Affairs and Public Works—were contingents of either party geographically unrepresentative in more than two of the twenty-one postwar Congresses in our purview.

3.6 CONTINUING MEMBERS AND NEW MEMBERS

Thus far, all of our investigations have been "static" in the sense that they compare the characteristics of a contingent to the party from which it was drawn at a given time. In this section we ask a slightly different and more "dynamic" question: if the *continuing* members of a contingent are unrepresentative in some fashion, will the party CC attempt to use whatever new appointments it has to redress the balance?[28]

28. By *continuing members* we mean members of the committee who both won re-

In the case of uniform externality committees, we expect that each party will attempt to restore balance on its contingent if electoral vagaries or unusual transfer patterns disrupt it. One crude way to test this expectation is as follows: First run the Wilcoxon difference-of-medians test on the continuing members of the contingent only, then on the full membership.[29] Classify each committee in a two-by-two table, according to whether (1) the continuing members' median was or was not significantly different from the party median and (2) the full membership's median was or was not significantly different from the party median.[30] We expect that if the median of the continuing members' NOMINATE scores does not differ significantly from the party's, then the contingent will be "left alone": the new appointments will not push the median into the "significantly different" range. By contrast, if the continuing members are unrepresentative, we expect that the new appointments will be used to pull the contingent back into greater conformity with the party as a whole.

How these expectations stack up against the data can be seen in tables 33 (for Democratic contingents) and 34 (for Republican contingents). In this analysis we consider only Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means.

For the Democrats, our predictions are confirmed. The returning Democratic members of both the Rules and the Ways and Means committees were unrepresentative of their party only once in the postwar era. In both cases the new appointments made to the committee counterbalanced the returning members enough so that the full contingent was no longer unrepresentative. Moreover, when the continuing Democratic members of Rules or Ways and Means were already representative of their party, the new appointees never disturbed this relationship sufficiently to produce an unrepresentative contingent.

The evidence is slightly more complicated for the Appropriations Committee. The returning Democratic members of Appropriations were unrepresentative of their party on seven occasions—and on only four of these occasions did the new appointees move the contingent back into greater conformity with the party. The explanation for the three "failures," however, is straightforward: there simply were not enough vacant seats to move the median enough to produce a representative contingent (cf. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chap. 5).

29. *Full membership* refers to the membership at the beginning of the Congress, just after committee assignments have been announced.

30. We can construct the same tables comparing quintile-based chi-square statistics

TABLE 33. DEMOCRATIC REALIGNMENT OF CONTROL COMMITTEES, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

Appropriations

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	12	0
	S	4	3

Rules

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	18	0
	S	1	0

Ways and Means

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	18	0
	S	1	0

Control

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	48	0
	S	6	3

NOTES: NS = Wilcoxon test was not significant for this group.
S = Wilcoxon test was significant for this group.

TABLE 34. REPUBLICAN REALIGNMENT OF CONTROL COMMITTEES, EIGHTIETH TO HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES

Appropriations

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	17	1
	S	0	1

Rules

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	19	0
	S	0	0

Ways and Means

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	14	1
	S	2	2

Control

Full Membership

		NS	S
Returning Members Only	NS	50	2
	S	2	3

NOTES: NS = Wilcoxon test was not significant for this group.
S = Wilcoxon test was significant for this group.

The Republicans do not seem to have balanced their contingents on the control committees as consistently as the Democrats have. The continuing Republican members on the Rules Committee were never unrepresentative, and the new appointees never made the contingent as a whole unrepresentative.[31] The returning Republican members of Ways and Means were unrepresentative on four occasions, yet the imbalance was corrected only twice. Moreover, in one instance the Republicans' new appointees to Ways and Means created an imbalance where none had existed before. Finally, the Republicans failed to redress one imbalance and actually created another on Appropriations.

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has sketched out a partisan selection model of the committee appointment process in which each party's CC seeks to maximize the number of seats that the party will win at the next election. We suggested that pursuit of this goal would entail allowing a considerable amount of self-selection while at the same time keeping an eye out for electoral externalities. We characterized the pattern of the external effects that each committee's decisions were likely to entail on nonmembers as either uniform, mixed, or targeted and argued that committees whose decisions imposed uniform externalities on everyone in the party would need the most careful regulation, whereas those that affected only a small subset of the party could be left more or less to the vagaries of self-selection.

Our empirical analysis shows that Democratic contingents on uniform externality committees were generally representative of the party both in ideological and geographical terms. The primary exception, the contingent on Veterans' Affairs, is influenced by a particularly homogeneous and powerful clientele group.

Democratic contingents on mixed externality committees were as a class more likely to be unrepresentative than were the uniform externality committees. Among mixed externality committees, however, there was a clear distinction between the "housekeeping" committees (Judiciary and Foreign Affairs), which were rarely unrepresentative, and the substantive committees (Armed Services, Banking, and Education and Labor), which were more often unrepresentative.

Democratic contingents on targeted externality committees were the most likely to exhibit unrepresentativeness of some kind. The Agriculture Committee was unrepresentative in most postwar Congresses both in terms of the geographical location of its members' constituencies (they tended to be southern and western) and in terms of their general voting stance (which tended to be conservative). District of Columbia was unrepresentative in terms of its members' voting stance in most Congresses. Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Interior were unrepresentative in terms of the location of their members' constituencies (with the former overrepresenting coastal and riverine districts, the latter overrepresenting western districts).

Although these results are broadly consistent with the predictions of the partisan selection model, they are also consistent with self-selection, so they can hardly be taken as definitive. Nonetheless, we believe that one can choose between these two models. Partisan selection has in its favor not only the surface facts—appointments to the standing committees of the House are formally made by party committees—but also some key statistical evidence. In particular, in chapter 1 we show that over 40 percent of Democrats' assignment and transfer requests in the Eighty-sixth through Ninety-seventh Congresses were denied by their CC, and in chapter 7 we show that members who were more loyal to the party leadership were generally more likely to receive desirable transfers.

Self-selection, it seems to us, is only half the story. The other half, equally important, is the regulatory effort of each party's committee on committees. This effort appears both in the form of attentiveness to the loyalty of members who seek appointment to important committees and in the form of an attempt to keep committees with significant external effects more or less in line with overall sentiment in the party.

31. In any event, there are so few Republican members of Rules that statistical significance is hard to attain.