Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress

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Cartel Theory (and partisan theory more generally) expertly explains the functioning of the U.S. Congress. However, as a theory originally developed to study a single legislature where the institutional context differs greatly from that found in other presidential democracies, its applicability to these democracies has been questioned. Between one extreme represented by the United States (where legislators control their own political future) and the other represented by centralized party systems (where the national party leadership controls legislators' future) exists an intermediate group of democracies where subparty bosses are the key actors, controlling the future of subsets of a party's legislative delegation. We analyze one of these intermediate democracies, Argentina, and demonstrate the general applicability of Cartel Theory to an institutional context that differs notably from that found in the United States. We highlight how the theory can be adapted to a political system where subparty bosses, not individual legislators, are the most relevant political actors.

U.S. Congressional Studies is arguably the most theoretically and methodologically advanced subfield in Political Science. However, while this subfield has dramatically improved our understanding of the U.S. Congress, its contribution to the development of general legislative theory has been more limited (Gamm and Huber 2002).

United States-based theories of congressional behavior, for instance Cartel Theory and Conditional Party Government (CPG) Theory, were developed within an institutional context that differs dramatically from that found in virtually all other presidential democracies. U.S. legislators are unique in the level of control they exercise over their political career, in large part the product of the use of single-member districts, use of open nomination rules, and lack of term limits (Mayhew 1974; Morgenstern 2003). In an overwhelming majority of presidential democracies, party leaders, not the individual legislators, control the legislators' political destiny. At the opposite extreme from the United States are centralized party systems (e.g., El Salvador, Honduras, pre-1993 Venezuela), where the national party leadership controls legislators' political careers (Crisp 2000). This control is primarily the product of the use of closed party lists in multimember districts and the centralization of the candidate nomination process in the hands of the national party.

Between the extremes represented by the United States and the centralized party systems exists an intermediate group of democracies. In these democracies multiple subparty (state-level or intraparty faction) bosses, not the individual legislators or the national party leadership, control the legislators' political future. Within these intermediate democracies the electoral laws, candidate nomination rules, and structure of political career pathways provide these state/faction bosses with considerable influence over the legislators' political careers (Morgenstern 2003).

This intermediate arrangement is found in several federal democracies, where the state-level party leaders, not the national party leadership, dominate state-level politics, and, by extension, the political careers of

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copartisan deputies from their state. Examples include such prominent countries as Argentina (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002), Mexico since 2000 (Langston 2004), and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Brazil (Samuels 2003). This intermediate arrangement however is not restricted to these federal systems and also can be found in unitary systems where relatively institutionalized intraparty factions exist, and hence where intraparty faction bosses exercise considerable influence over the political future of legislators belonging to their faction. Examples include Paraguay (Hernández Sánchez 2001), Taiwan (Winckler 1999), and Uruguay (Morgenstern 2003). Nonetheless, given the greater institutional structure and resources present in the federal systems (i.e., autonomous state governments) and the more permanent nature of state boundaries (compared to factional boundaries), the power exercised by state-level party bosses over legislators' careers is likely to be greater than that exercised by intraparty faction bosses.

The most promising route by which to improve general theory of legislative institutions is to apply theories and methodologies developed to study the U.S. Congress to legislatures in other countries (Gamm and Huber 2002). However, Cartel (and CPG) Theory was not originally designed to explain the functioning of political systems with the characteristics of the "intermediate" democracies described above.[1] Cartel Theory is grounded on the assumption that the political parties have virtually no direct impact on whether a legislator is elected and hence possess little leverage with which to influence the legislators (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). In the United States, the individual representative, not the party leadership, controls the representative's political future, in particular the ability to successfully run for reelection (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991), an assumption that is invalid in almost all other presidential democracies.

Given the noteworthy differences between the institutional context found in the United States and that found in other presidential democracies, some scholars argue theories developed to study the U.S. Congress, such as Cartel Theory, are of little use in explaining the functioning of legislatures in other presidential democracies (e.g., Weyland 2002). We however contend the theoretical foundations of Cartel Theory are sufficiently robust and flexible that they can be adapted to institutional contexts that are quite distinct from that found in the United States. In this article we demonstrate how a theory originally developed to explain U.S. congressional organization can be utilized to explain legislative organization and the functioning of legislative politics in one of these intermediate cases: Argentina.

The contemporary literature on Argentine politics underscores the vital importance of provincial-level factors for the functioning of the country's political system. It highlights the provincial-based nature of congressional career paths as well as Chamber deputies' generally strong dependence on provincial party bosses. Based on this literature we would expect a legislature dominated by provincial party bosses, with the legislative behavior of deputies determined by the preferences of their provincial bosses.

However, when Argentine Chamber deputy behavior is examined through roll-call vote analysis, no provincial (or regional) effects are uncovered. To the contrary, this analysis points to the powerful role in the legislative process played by the majority party in the Chamber of Deputies. Based on this roll-call analysis, the Argentine Chamber appears to be dominated by the national party, with provincial party bosses and their preferences of scant relevance for the functioning of legislative politics in Argentina.

The Argentine institutional context bears little resemblance to that in the United States (see the next section). Thus, at first glance, Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993) would appear to be inapplicable to Argentina, since contrary to the case in the United States, provincial party bosses, not the individual legislators, control the legislators' political destiny. Nevertheless, we are able to explain this apparent disjuncture between the extant literature and the results obtained from roll-call vote analysis through the application of a modified version of Cartel Theory. Informed by Cartel Theory, it becomes clear that there actually exists no disjuncture between the literature and the roll-call results. Provincial bosses do in fact exercise a great deal of influence over the Argentine legislative process, but this influence is not observed in roll-call vote behavior due to the powerful agenda control possessed by the majority party in the Chamber, which functions as an effective cartel.

The origins of the cartels in the Argentine Chamber are nonetheless distinct from those in the U.S. House. In the United States, the representatives are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leadership, while in Argentina the provincial party bosses are the key players who engage in this delegation, but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar. The majority party leadership uses its majority status (especially negative and positive agenda control) to dominate the legislative process.

[1] Following Finocchiaro and Rohde (2002), Cartel and CPG Theory are considered complementary. For stylistic reasons we thus refer primarily to Cartel Theory in this article.

The structure of the article is as follows. First, we provide an overview of Argentine party politics that underscores its provincial-centric nature. Second, we identify the number of dimensions present in Argentine roll-call votes. Third, we examine the effect of the power of provincial party bosses on deputy roll-call vote behavior. Fourth, we discuss the applicability of Cartel Theory to Argentina. Fifth, we respectively provide tests of the applicability of Cartel Theory to the Argentine Chamber via an analysis of the internal Chamber rules and of floor and committee roll rates. We conclude with a discussion of the article's principal findings and of avenues for future research in this area.

Party Politics and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

This article examines the 1989–2003 period. It covers the two terms of President Carlos Menem (1989–95, 1995–99) of the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the abbreviated tenure of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001) of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), which formed a governmental alliance with the Frente País Solidario (FREPASO), and the tenure of interim President Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003) of the PJ. In this section we provide a series of general conclusions from the extant literature on contemporary Argentine politics.

First, Argentina is a presidential democracy. The president is endowed with considerable constitutional powers, including a strong veto and decree authority. It has a bicameral legislature and a federal system of government in which provincial governors exercise substantial autonomy (Eaton 2002; Spiller and Tommasi N.d.). The 24 provinces receive a number of deputies (minimum of five) proportional to their 1980 population. The Argentine Congress, while more a reactive blunt veto player than proactive agenda setter, is nevertheless an important actor in the policy process (Eaton 2002; Jones et al. 2002).

Second, during the 1989–2003 period two political parties (the PJ and UCR) dominated the political arena. For instance, in the Chamber the PJ occupied nearly half of the seats (median of 45%, range of 38–51%), and the UCR nearly one-third (32%, 25–45%). The remaining seats were held by a multitude of minor parties, with the third largest delegation (a status held by four parties) only accounting for a median of 5% of the seats.[2]

Third, the locus of partisan politics is the province (Calvo and Murillo 2003; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Eaton 2002; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Remmer and Wibbels 2000; Spiller and Tommasi N.d.). Political careers are normally provincial-based (with even positions in the national government often determined by provincial factors), and the base of political support for politicians and parties is concentrated at the provincial level.

Fourth, a single person or small group of leaders generally dominates political parties at the provincial level (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Jones et al. 2002). In provinces where the party controls the governorship, with rare exceptions the governor is the undisputed (or at least dominant) boss of the provincial party. In other provinces where the governorship is not held by the party, the party is nonetheless often dominated in a comparable manner (with a greater amount of space for intraparty opponents) by a single individual. Finally, in the remaining provinces where the party does not control the governorship and there is not a dominant boss, there is a small group of leaders who predominate in party life.

Fifth, this dominance of the provincial party is based principally on patronage, pork barrel politics, and clientelism (Calvo and Murillo 2003; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Remmer and Wibbels 2000). Dominance of the provincial party requires a boss be able to defeat any rival in a party primary. Patronage, pork barrel activities, and clientelism are important for success in general elections, but are indispensable for success in primary elections. In addition, patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic-based support often has the same anticipated reaction effect on potential intraparty challengers that a large campaign war chest has in the United States; it causes them to desist from any attempt to defeat the party boss.[3]

The electorate for primaries is party members alone or party members and independents.[4] When a primary is held, success depends almost entirely on material resources. As former (1999–2003) Chubut governor José Lizurume recently stated, "la interna es aparato puro" [the primary is pure machine] (*Diario El Chubut*, 7/18/03).

Sixth, Chamber deputies are elected from closed party lists in multimember districts, lists that are created at the

[2]The distribution of governors (elected for four year terms) by party for the 1987–2003 period is: 1987–91: PJ (17), UCR (2), Others (3); 1991–95: PJ (14), UCR (4), Others (5); 1995–99: PJ (14), UCR (6), Others (4); 1999–2003: PJ (14), UCR (7), Others (3).

[3]Challenging the party boss is always an option. It is however a decision that is taken with great care, since failure often entails serious negative consequences for the challenger.

[4]Between 1987 and 2003, in PJ provincial-level Chamber deputy primaries restricted to party members and open to independents respectively, the median percentage of registered voters who participated was 7% and 14%. The comparable UCR figures were 3% and 5%.

provincial level through elite arrangement or party primary (primaries are held using closed lists) (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). In most instances the reelection decision for deputies (as well as their political future) lies primarily with the provincial party boss(es), not with the individual deputy. Furthermore, these bosses practice rotation, with the consequence being very low reelection rates for deputies. Between 1989 and 2003 only a median of 19% (20% and 12% for the PJ and UCR, respectively) of deputies achieved immediate reelection, with an overwhelming majority returning to political posts in their province, or going to national level posts, often in "representation" of their province (Jones et al. 2002). Once a deputy obtained a position on the party list however, his/her probability of reelection skyrocketed to a median of 73% (92% and 69% for the PJ and UCR), illustrating the importance of the influence exercised by the party boss over the list creation process. In sum, deputies are in most cases dependent on the provincial party boss and hence possess limited political autonomy.

The above description suggests we should expect provincial factors to have a powerful effect on deputy behavior in the Chamber. Provincial party bosses generally exercise a profound amount of influence over both who is elected as a deputy as well as what the political future of a deputy will be. The following two sections test for a "provincial" influence in two ways. First, an analysis of the number of issue dimensions present in Chamber roll-call voting is conducted. Second, the influence of provincial party bosses (especially governors) on the behavior of their provincial copartisans in the Chamber is examined.

Roll-Call Voting Dimensions in the Argentine Chamber

Poole and Rosenthal's seminal work identifies two dimensions to roll-call voting in the U.S. House. The dominant first dimension "almost always picks up the fundamental economic issues that separate the two major parties of the time" (1997, 27). This dimension "can be thought of as ranging from strong loyalty to one party (Jeffersonian Republicans or the Democrats) to weak loyalty to either party and to strong loyalty to the second, opposing party (Federalists, Whigs, or Republicans)" (46). The second, regional, dimension "divides the parties internally over regional issues" (27).

The above discussion of the prominent role of the provinces and provincial actors in Argentine politics suggests that, in addition to a partisan dimension, a similar, regional, dimension may also be present in Argentina. In particular, several authors (Calvo and Murillo 2003; Eaton 2002; Gibson 1997; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Sawers 1996) contrast the stark differences between the populous advanced industrial (metropolitan) provinces (Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Córdoba, Santa Fe) and their less populous and developed counterparts in the interior (periphery). They underscore the salient metropolitan-periphery cleavage that exists among the Argentine provinces, suggesting its potential to serve as a second, regional, dimension comparable to that observed in the United States.[5]

We examine roll-call votes held between July 8, 1989 and May 24, 2003.[6] These data represent six full two-year legislative periods, corresponding to the Chamber's biennial partial renovations (1989–91, 1991–93, 1993–95, 1995–97, 1997–99, 1999–2001), and two partial periods (July 8 to December 9, 1989 and December 10, 2001 to May 24, 2003).

To evaluate the dimensionality of Chamber roll-call votes we use the Bayesian estimation procedure developed by Jackman and his colleagues (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Jackman 2001).[7] With a one-dimensional model, the roll-call vote analysis is expressed as:

$$y^*_{ij} = U_i(\zeta_j) - U_i(\psi_j) = X_i\beta_j - \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

where y^*_{ij} is a choice between a "Yes" position, ζ_j, and a "No" position, ψ_j, for each deputy i on each bill j. In this one-dimensional context, Equation (1) for the utility differential y^*_{ij} can be expressed as a linear regression with the unobserved ideal points X_i and unknown parameters β_j and α_j. We assume $\varepsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, 1)$. X_i is a (n × 1) matrix of ideal points, β_j is a (1 × m) matrix of discrimination parameters, and α_j is a m-vector of intercepts. By the assumption of utility maximization, $y_{ij} = 1$ if $y^*_{ij} > 0$, $y_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Using a hierarchical probit model estimated by a Bayesian simulation, we obtain the parameters. We utilize truncated normal sampling to operationalize the probit model (positive and negative

[5]The four metropolitan provinces account for 51% of the Chamber deputies. During the 1987–2003 period the PJ occupied the governorship in a median of 67% (range of 50–75%) of the metropolitan provinces and 60% (55–79%) of the periphery provinces. The UCR occupied the governorship in a median of 33% (0–50%) and 20% (5–35%), respectively.

[6]Only 39 valid roll-call votes were held between December 10, 1983 and July 7, 1989. For more information on roll-call votes in Argentina, see Appendix A.

[7]For additional information on this procedure see the cited authors and Appendix B.

infinity are operationalized as +10 and −10). Using a Gibbs sampler, we generate a large number of samples from the joint posterior density of the parameters and obtain the summary statistics used for inference. We let the Gibbs sampler run for a long burn-in period of between 130,000 and 350,000 iterations and then saved the last 10,000 (or 5,000) iterations for inference.[8] The estimation procedure provides us with the deputies' mean and median ideal points and their 95% posterior confidence interval.

Uniform (1.0, −1.0) priors are given to the density over the ideal points X_i. These uniform priors result in ideal points located within the intervals of 1.0 and −1.0. For one-dimensional fits we assigned initial values for the ideal points, with the PJ at 1.0, and the UCR at −1.0.[9] Most other parties were placed at 0.0. Normal priors are given for the discrimination parameters β_j: $\beta_j \sim N(0, 2)$.[10]

After obtaining discrimination parameters for each period, we can determine how many discrimination parameters are distinguishable from zero. The discrimination parameters β_j show "how change in X_i translates into support for proposal j" (Jackman 2001, 229). If only a small number of discrimination parameters are distinguishable from zero in a one-dimensional model, then there may exist higher dimensions in the data.

Table 1 provides information on the extent to which the roll-call votes achieved discrimination on this single dimension for each of the eight legislative periods. The lowest percentage of votes that achieved discrimination is 86.2% (1997–99), while the highest is 98.8% (1999–01). The median percentage of votes that achieved discrimination with respect to the recovered policy continuum is 95%. These results indicate there exists only one dimension underlying the observed policy space in the Chamber between 1989 and 2003.

In addition, by plotting discrimination parameters (posterior means) against the percentage of deputies voting "Yes," we obtained a figure for each period in which the roll-call votes that achieved discrimination on the single dimension are distinguished from those that did not. By examining these eight figures (available upon request), we can determine if a one-dimensional model is a reasonable fit to the data (Jackman 2001). Since there are few votes that were close and failed to discriminate among deputies simultaneously, it is very unlikely that a higher-dimensional model would provide a better fit to the data.

TABLE 1 One-Dimensional Analysis of Chamber Roll Call Vote Data via Bayesian Simulation

Legislative Period	Number of Roll Call Votes	Rate of Correct Discrimination (Percentage of Roll Call Votes)	Number of Iterations
1989	23	95.7%	350,000
1989–1991	110	90.9%	140,000
1991–1993	54	87.0%	160,000
1993–1995	79	94.9%	130,000
1995–1997	56	94.6%	200,000
1997–1999	29	86.2%	200,000
1999–2001	81	98.8%	140,000
2001–2003	41	97.6%	210,000

Furthermore, all votes that failed to discriminate on this dimension were examined in detail (through analysis of parliamentary debates and newspaper coverage as well as interviews with deputies in office at the time of the vote) in search of any common trait shared among any of them. No conceivable second dimension was detected. These votes were on transient topics that do not belong to any consistent dimension.

Similar to the United States, roll-call vote behavior in Argentina occurs along a partisan dimension. One end of that dimension is occupied by the PJ (where the median ideal point of the party's deputies for the eight periods was 0.58), and the other by the UCR (with a median ideal point of −0.63), with a considerable gap (median of 1.14) separating the two parties. The amount of overlap between the PJ and UCR legislators also is extremely low, with a median of only 4% of the PJ and UCR deputy ideal points having to be moved to yield complete separation between the two parties.

However, unlike in the United States, where a less salient regional dimension has coexisted with the dominant partisan dimension, in Argentina virtually all roll-call vote behavior occurs along this single partisan dimension. In spite of the large literature demonstrating the importance of provincial politics as well as highlighting a

[8]The decision to save the last 10,000 or 5,000 iterations was based on technical considerations, and, especially given the long burn-in period, has no effect on the results.

[9]The assignment of priors is based on over a dozen years of study of Argentine politics, including extensive fieldwork in the Chamber. The priors only provide starting values. If a deputy's prior does not match their vote behavior, the latter determines the results obtained.

[10]The variance prior of 2.0 (which is not overly informative) was the highest possible while still allowing us to achieve convergence in all eight periods (given infinite time and computer capacity, this problem could be resolved, although the present results suggest the benefit would be very modest). For those periods where convergence was achieved with higher priors (e.g., 8.0), the results were substantively similar to those obtained with a prior of 2.0.

prominent metropolitan-periphery cleavage, no provincial or regional based dimension was detected.

Provincial Sources of Deputy Behavior

The combination of the provincial-centric nature of Argentine politics and the powerful control wielded by provincial party bosses over the election of deputies and their political future leads us to expect governors to exercise an important degree of influence over the behavior of their provincial copartisans in the Chamber (Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller and Tommasi N.d.). Given their superior resources and institutional advantages, a provincial boss who is a governor will on average be more powerful and thus have a greater ability to affect the political future of deputies belonging to their provincial party delegation (PPD), than a boss who does not control the governorship.

In their innovative work on Brazil, Carey and Reinhardt (2004) present a model where this gubernatorial effect is hypothesized to influence legislator behavior under two separate conditions. Where the governor and the national party (i.e., the president and/or legislative party leadership) share the same position on the legislation being voted upon (reinforcing principals), when a PPD is from a province where a copartisan is governor, PPD behavior is more homogenous than when a copartisan is not governor. The more powerful this governor is, the greater the level of homogeneity. Where the governor and the national party do not share the same position (competing principals), there is a curvilinear relationship between governor power and PPD homogeneity, with homogeneity initially decreasing as a governor becomes more influential and then, at the point of national party-governor power parity, homogeneity increasing. Given its curvilinear nature, we cannot fully test the competing principals hypothesis, but we can test the portion most relevant for Argentina, where governors possess at least power parity with the national party.

The analysis population consists of the PPDs, of two deputies or more, of the PJ and the UCR during each of the eight legislative periods. Given the different conditions under which the parties' respective deputies functioned, homogeneity data for the PJ and UCR are not entirely comparable. Since pooling data for the two parties obfuscates more than it elucidates, we examine them separately.

PPD homogeneity is measured using the deputy ideal points discussed earlier. First, the standard deviation (SD) of each PPD (the standard deviation of its deputies' median ideal points) of two deputies or more is calculated for each of the eight periods. Second, the grand mean of these respective PJ and UCR PPD SDs is calculated for each of the eight periods. Third, PPD homogeneity is measured as the difference between the party's grand mean SD for the respective period and the SD of each PPD. Higher (positive) values signify the PPD is more homogeneous than the party delegation's grand mean, while lower (negative) values signify the PPD is less homogenous. This dependent variable (PPD HOMOGENEITY) ranges from −0.36 to 0.25 for the PJ and −0.31 to 0.25 for the UCR.

Carey and Reinhardt (2004) measure governor influence using a binary variable (1 if the PPD was from a province governed by a copartisan, and 0 if not). We employ an identical variable (GOVERNOR). The relationship between GOVERNOR and the level of PPD homogeneity is expected to be positive (Carey and Reinhardt 2004).

Given Brazilian data limitations, Carey and Reinhardt (2004) could not distinguish among governors in terms of their power. We, however, are able to control for two vital factors that influence gubernatorial power. First, the rules on the immediate reelection of the governor vary across provinces and within provinces over time. Governors eligible to run for reelection (and hence much more likely to be able to continue influencing deputies' careers) are hypothesized to have more homogenous PPDs than their lame duck counterparts (Carey and Reinhardt 2004). GOV. REELECTION is coded 1 if the governor was eligible to run for immediate reelection, and 0 if not. Second, governors vary in their level of intraparty opposition at the provincial level. An excellent measure of the extent of this opposition is whether the governor faced a serious primary challenge to obtain the party's nomination for governor. Governors who did not face a significant level of intraparty opposition are considered more powerful (resulting in higher levels of PPD homogeneity) than governors who faced significant opposition. In the event the governor's candidacy was uncontested or he/she won a primary by a margin of more than 50% of the vote, GOV. PARTY CONTROL is coded 1, otherwise it is coded 0 (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002).

Because of the data's pooled cross-sectional structure, two sets of control variables are incorporated. Binary variables (splines) are included for the different PPD sizes (two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine members), with delegations of 10 or more the excluded category. Splines also are included for seven of the eight

legislative periods (1989 is the excluded category). Since they are employed solely for control purposes, and due to space limitations, the results for these variables are omitted from Table 2.

Table 2 provides 10 models.[11] Models 1 and 6 (PJ and UCR, respectively) display the results when, among the influential variables, only GOVERNOR is included. Models 2 and 7 include all three influential variables, but exclude the splines. Models 3 and 8 include all of the variables, while Models 4 and 9 are identical with the exception that a fixed effects model (the cross sectional unit is the PPD) is utilized. Models 5 and 10 are limited to PPDs from provinces where the PJ and UCR held the governorship.

The fact that a PPD is from a province where a copartisan is governor exercises no influence on PPD homogeneity. Furthermore, whether or not the governor is powerful (i.e., can seek reelection, faces insignificant intraparty opposition) also has no effect on PPD homogeneity. This is the case both when examining the complete population, as well as when examining the subset of cases where the PPD was from a province governed by a copartisan (Models 5 and 10).

These results provide no support for the reinforcing principals hypothesis. In a similar vein, support for the competing principals hypothesis would have entailed powerful governors having PPDs that were significantly more homogenous than those of less powerful governors. No such effect was detected. In sum, analysis of PPD homogeneity uncovers no provincial related effects.[12]

Cartel Theory and the Argentine Chamber

A review of the contemporary literature on Argentine politics underscores the vital importance of provincial-level factors for the functioning of the country's political system. When, however, Chamber deputy behavior is analyzed using roll-call vote data, no provincial effects are detected. This article explains this apparent disjuncture between the literature and the roll-call vote analysis through the application of a modified version of Cartel Theory.

Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993) was developed to explain the functioning of the U.S. House. In spite of the dramatic differences between the institutional contexts in which the United States and Argentine legislatures are located, this study demonstrates how Cartel Theory can be adapted to explain the functioning of the legislature in an "intermediate" democracy such as Argentina.

Legislator Autonomy and Delegation

Under Cartel Theory, U.S. House members are considered to be independent entrepreneurs, exercising a great deal of control over their political careers (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). Aldrich and Rohde (2000) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) highlight the manner in which individual representatives delegate power to the House party leadership to further their own reelection efforts both generally (party reputation) and specifically (perks of office, pork) as well as to influence public policy. This delegation to the party leadership helps the representatives achieve their collective goals.

Argentine deputies do not possess a level of autonomy comparable to that of U.S. representatives, but most Argentine provincial party bosses do. Hence, in both legislatures delegation occurs. But whereas delegation is by the representatives to the House party leadership in the United States, delegation is by the provincial party bosses to the Chamber party leadership in Argentina. These bosses delegate in order to further their collective goal of maintaining control of the provincial party machine and maintaining (governors) or obtaining (bosses in the opposition at the provincial level) control of the governorship.

Another difference between the two countries is the extent to which one can separate the party leadership in the legislature from the President. In the United States these two institutions are relatively separate political entities (although see Rohde 1991), whereas in Argentina the majority party leadership in the Chamber is in most instances a faithful servant of the President (e.g., between 1989 and 2003 the Chamber majority party leadership always was comprised of individuals loyal to the President). As a consequence, and similar to the case in most presidential democracies, the distinction between the President and his party's leadership in the Congress is not as clear cut in Argentina as is the case in the United States (Cox and Morgenstern 2001).

[11] Hausman specification tests comparing fixed and random effects models indicate the models are not statistically distinct. The relationship between GOVERNOR and the two governor power variables also was treated as interactive, providing results substantively similar to those here. Wald tests indicate Models 5 and 10 do not suffer from any bias induced by selection effects (Wald tests reach a similar conclusion regarding the other models). Autocorrelation is not a concern, with AR1 values ranging from 0.04 to −0.05. Diagnostic exercises indicate heteroskedasticity does not pose a problem for the substantive interpretation of these results (standard error inflation/deflation is very modest).

[12] The use of alternative measures of PPD homogeneity, based on uncorrected and corrected PPD roll-call vote cohesion "Rice" scores (Desposato 2003), provides comparable findings on the absence of provincial-based PPD voting differences. Analysis by Desposato and Jones (2003) demonstrates that the PPDs are not significantly more cohesive than their respective national party delegations.

TABLE 2 Governors and Provincial Party Delegation (PPD) Homogeneity in the Chamber of Deputies

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
GOVERNOR	0.024	0.025	0.039	0.055		−0.016	0.020	0.025	0.003	
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.040)		(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.053)	
GOV. REELECTION		−0.006	−0.022	−0.002	−0.015		0.002	0.005	0.008	−0.034
		(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.030)		(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.053)
GOV. PARTY CONTROL		−0.005	−0.007	0.006	−0.009		−0.064	−0.070	−0.086	−0.087
		(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.025)		(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.057)
CONSTANT	−0.078	−0.012	−0.084	−0.044	−0.068	−0.037	0.005	−0.039	−0.092	−0.020
	(0.057)	(0.016)	(0.058)	(0.151)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.107)	(0.115)
R-SQUARED	0.061	0.007	0.066	0.037	0.106	0.060	0.030	0.086	0.066	0.499
ROOT MEAN SQUARED ERROR	0.125	0.124	0.126		0.127	0.110	0.105	0.109		0.107
DELEGATION SIZE SPLINES (8)	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
LEGISLATIVE PERIOD SPLINES (7)	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS	176	176	176	176	112	127	127	127	127	31
METHOD	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS FE	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS FE	OLS
POLITICAL PARTY	PJ	PJ	PJ	PJ	PJ	UCR	UCR	UCR	UCR	UCR

*Significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Preference Coordination and the Majority Leadership's Carrots and Sticks

The U.S. House majority leadership employs a number of mechanisms to insure it has as complete information as possible on the preferences of its rank-and-file members and at the same time to insure these members are aware of the leadership's positions and strategy. These mechanisms include the activities of the party whips, the representation of different party sectors in leadership positions, and the holding of regular caucus meetings (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991). The leadership then uses this information to draft legislation that will obtain passage (positive agenda control), to manipulate the legislative agenda to insure legislation is only voted upon when conditions are appropriate (negative agenda control), and to determine to what extent individual, or groups of, representatives will have to be pressured or enticed into supporting legislation (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991). The leadership possesses a variety of tools with which to pressure and entice representatives such as its control over the distribution of committee assignments and the flow of legislation (e.g., its ability to coordinate across policies), and its power to influence the amount of pork that flows to a representative's district.

The Argentine Chamber majority leadership employs a number of mechanisms to insure it has as complete information as possible on the preferences of the party's provincial bosses as well as to insure the bosses (and deputies) are aware of the leadership's preferences (which are generally also those of the President). These mechanisms are of two types: intralegislative and extralegislative.

The intralegislative mechanisms include guaranteeing that most provincial bosses have a representative on the party leadership committee. Between 1989 and 2003 a median of 66% of the majority party's deputies came from a province with a member on the leadership committee. Another mechanism is the party caucus meeting held prior to every session, where the leadership explains its positions/strategy on upcoming legislation and listens to the deputies' concerns (and indirectly those of their provincial bosses). Finally, the leadership maintains direct lines of communication with the provincial bosses, though the latter normally interact with the leadership via their deputies.

The extralegislative mechanisms stem from the prominent role of the President (Executive Branch) in the functioning of the majority party in the Chamber. The Executive thus serves as an additional nexus between the provincial party bosses and the Chamber leadership, and at the same time plays a prominent role in informing the provincial bosses of the Executive's policy preferences. The Executive utilizes several methods to learn the bosses' preferences and to inform them of the Executive's preferences. The most basic is the ability of most copartisans (especially governors) to contact the President directly to discuss important issues. On a more day-to-day basis, the Executive maintains fluid relations with the provinces through the activities of different individuals. While these individuals have varied over time (in name, number, and the formal position occupied), they share the common trait of possessing the confidence of, and direct access to, the President. Party bosses (especially governors) and national cabinet ministers also maintain an open dialogue, and in the most important policy areas (e.g., education, public works) there exist formal ministerial working groups consisting of all provincial cabinet ministers in that area.

The Chamber leadership (often in conjunction with the Executive) uses the information gleaned from these interactions to obtain the legislative passage of the party's (normally the President's) policy agenda. On legislation that directly affects the provinces it insures the provincial bosses' interests are incorporated (positive agenda control) either in the specific piece of legislation or through some type of side-payment.[13] For legislation that does not directly affect the provincial bosses' interests, the Chamber leadership has the necessary information to know to what extent (if any) it has to entice or pressure the provincial bosses to obtain the support of their deputies for the legislation. In a similar manner, provincial bosses gather information on the extent to which they can employ the votes of their deputies in the Chamber to extract benefits on this nonprovincial-oriented legislation. While the bosses generally leave the Chamber's day-to-day functioning to the Chamber leadership, they remain alert for instances where the President needs to pass vital or unpopular legislation, and hence may be willing to provide additional benefits to the bosses in exchange for their support. The default however is for the deputies, absent instructions to the contrary from their provincial boss, to follow the instructions of the Chamber leadership. Finally, in the event an agreement cannot be reached on legislation, the leadership can insure the legislation does not reach the floor (negative agenda control).

The Chamber leadership possesses a variety of tools, primarily economic and wielded by the Executive, with which to pressure and entice provincial bosses. During the 1989–2003 period, the median province obtained 72% of its revenue from national government transfers,

[13] For analysis of specific legislation and the manner in which the PPDs obtained benefits for their respective provinces, see Eaton (2002) and Sawers (1996).

over which the Executive possesses a great deal of discretional control (Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). While the Executive is legally obligated to transfer approximately one-half of the funds, even with these "guaranteed funds" it possesses considerable latitude. For instance, it can delay transfer for a few months, which often wreaks havoc on provincial finances (it also can send less than the amount merited). Conversely, it can advance funds by a few months, thereby allowing provinces to resolve immediate financial crises. The Executive possesses even greater discretion regarding other transfers ranging from the implementation of national government programs (e.g., targeting specific provinces and municipalities for disproportional benefits) to the distribution of purely discretionary funds (Gibson 1997; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). In addition, the Executive regularly assists provinces by implementing programs that bail out bankrupt pension systems, rescue provincial bonds, etc. (Eaton 2002; Sawers 1996; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). Finally, the Executive is continually creating and modifying a host of programs that subsidize agriculture, employment, energy, industry, social assistance, and transportation in the provinces. Provincial party bosses (especially governors) who support the majority party initiatives in the Chamber are rewarded via the above mechanisms by the Executive, while those who fail to support the initiatives receive fewer transfers and subsidies and are less likely to be included in the bail-out programs.

Institutions and the Incentive to Cultivate a Personal Vote via Roll-Call Voting

In the United States, the institutional rules provide representatives with a strong incentive to cultivate a personal vote through their roll-call vote behavior (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). This often causes them to vote against the party line when it conflicts with the preferences of their constituencies (geographic, primary), an action often condoned by the party leadership if it believes voting the party line will undermine the representative's reelection chances. Since the representative's reelection constituency is concerned with a wide range of issues, this potential leadership-constituency conflict is latent in a majority of the roll-call votes.

In Argentina, the institutional rules (see our earlier discussion) provide deputies with a very weak incentive to cultivate a personal vote through their roll-call vote behavior; their career is determined by the provincial party boss, not the voters. Furthermore, unlike the case for the U.S. representatives, provincial bosses are primarily concerned with a limited range of legislation (that affecting the resources they receive), and hence a potential leadership-constituency conflict between the Chamber leadership and the provincial bosses is latent in a more limited percentage of the roll-call votes (primarily issues that directly affect the resources received by/interests of the provinces, which represented a median of 34% of the votes during the 1989–2003 period). Finally, since the Chamber leadership realizes that maintaining the provincial bosses' support is vital to the broader goal of implementing the President's policy agenda (e.g., the leadership coordinates across policies), when legislation that directly concerns the provinces is on the floor, the leadership attempts to insure the bosses' preferences are accounted for (either in the legislation or through side payments).[14]

The Foundation of Majority Control

Majority control of the legislature in the United States is based on a ideological, reputational, and, to a lesser extent, distributive logic (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). In Argentina, majority control of the legislature is based on a similar mix, but with the distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation. The goals of the provincial party bosses are best served by distributive policy, since their hold on power is based primarily on patronage, pork, and clientelism. However, provincial bosses also are concerned with the national reputation of their party, since its success at the national level affects them in three ways. First, the success of their party at the national level is vital to its maintaining (or obtaining) control of the presidency, and hence the distributive benefits they receive from "their" president. A similar argument applies to majority control of the legislature and the benefits it provides. Finally, the party's electoral success in the province is affected by the national party's reputation (Kellam and Alemán 2004; Remmer and Gélineau 2003).

There is considerable variance in the level of control exercised by Argentine provincial party bosses over the political careers of deputies and other politicians. At one extreme are situations where there is a single boss who is governor, is unencumbered by any constraints on his/her immediate reelection, and faces no significant intraparty opposition. At the other extreme are situations where the party does not control the governorship and no one person exercises dominance over the provincial party. Most

[14] As a result, Argentine deputies are less likely to register a vote against the leadership's position on the floor than their U.S. counterparts. The only principal they normally need to satisfy is the provincial party boss, and thus they lack strong incentives to publicly register a vote against the party line, except when instructed to do so by the provincial boss.

PJ deputies have come from provinces with a PJ governor, who in all but a few instances was the undisputed party boss. Between 1989 and 2003 a median of 73% of the PJ delegation came from provinces with a PJ governor (range of 69–80%). In contrast, only a median of 24% of the UCR delegation came from provinces where the UCR held the governorship (range of 11–38%; 34% for 1999–2001). In the PJ an overwhelming majority of delegation was by provincial bosses to the Chamber party leadership, with the individual deputies most commonly following orders from the provinces. In the UCR, there was a broader mix in the distribution of deputies for whom provincial bosses were delegating power on their behalf and who themselves were the bosses delegating power, although the former easily represented the majority of the UCR delegation.

In the United States, the representatives are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leadership, while in Argentina provincial party bosses are the key players who engage in this delegation (on behalf of their deputies), but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar. Just as U.S. representatives delegate power to the House party leadership to achieve collective goals, so too do the Argentine provincial bosses delegate power to the Chamber party leadership (and indirectly to the President in the case of the majority party). The majority party leadership uses its majority status (especially negative and positive agenda control) to dominate the legislative process, excluding legislation it believes may pass despite its objection, as well as implementing legislation it desires. The opposition, lacking this agenda control, is left in a very reactive position.

The normal operating procedure in Argentina is for the majority party leadership (generally following presidential directives) to manage the functioning of the Chamber. In equilibrium, the party leadership, not the provincial bosses, exercises the principal day-to-day influence over deputy voting behavior. The decisions made by the party leadership are though constantly influenced by the preferences of the provincial bosses (generally on topics that directly affect the provinces), both in terms of what they place on the legislative agenda and in terms of the drafting of the legislation they want to pass.

The above reality in large part explains the absence of provincial factors affecting the dimensions underlying the roll-call votes and PPD homogeneity. Of course, provincial bosses reserve the right to dissent (via their deputies), and at times they must be called on by the party leadership to control their deputies. Serious dissent by the provincial bosses is however relatively uncommon due to the skill of the majority party leadership (and the President) in internalizing their preferences (i.e., the leadership is a good agent of the provincial bosses).

There is considerable evidence that in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies the majority party functions as an effective cartel (à la Cox and McCubbins 1993). Given space limitations however, we restrict our focus to two key pieces of evidence that provide support for the applicability of Cartel Theory to the Chamber.

Cartel Theory and the Internal Chamber Rules

As would be expected in a legislature where the majority party functions as an effective cartel (Cox and McCubbins 1993), the Chamber rules provide the majority party leadership with substantial power and nearly complete control over the legislative agenda (Danesi 2003; Jones 2002). This can be seen in the allocation of the most coveted committee chairs, partisan composition of the key committees, and construction of the legislative agenda in the Rules Committee (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria [CLP]).

Between 1989 (December) and 1999, and 2001 and 2003, the PJ delegation was the dominant force in the Chamber, enjoying either an absolute majority or near majority of the seats. The UCR-FREPASO Alianza occupied a similar position between 1999 and 2001. While an absolute majority was rarely achieved, the majority party possessed a sufficient number of seats (median of 47%, range of 45–51%) such that it was able to exercise majority control of the Chamber, either alone or via the tacit support of a subset of the numerous minor parties. This latter ability was enhanced by the fact that the majority party was always the party of the President, who was in the unique position of possessing substantial resources with which to influence the behavior of nonmajority party deputies.

While the formal and informal Chamber rules provide for the allocation of some committee chairs to the opposition parties, the majority party generally maintains control of the most politically important committees (e.g., the Budget Committee always has a majority party chair; Danesi 2003). The majority party also receives a number of chairs far out of proportion to its number of seats. During the 1989–2003 period, the majority party occupied a median of 77% of the chairs, but only 47% of the seats. Furthermore, the majority party insures it always possesses a working majority on the politically important committees. Finally, the majority party determines which committee(s) will review a bill (allowing it to further refine the partisan distribution of those reviewing key legislation) and which will be the lead committee (Danesi 2003). This latter power is very important, since

the lead committee chair can keep a bill from emerging from the committee process, a veto power also held by the chair of the Budget Committee if it is assigned the bill.

Prior to all legislative sessions, the CLP drafts the agenda. While the CLP operates in part based on consensus, when a disagreement occurs the majority party's position prevails. When the CLP meets is left to the majority party's discretion. The CLP decides which bills will be discussed during the session, who will speak during the floor debate, the session hours, etc. The majority leadership often unilaterally modifies the agenda without consultation or warning when it considers the modification to be in its best interest (Danesi 2003). Furthermore, the agenda customarily contains more bills than actually can be discussed, thereby providing additional flexibility to the majority leadership.

Finally, the majority party leadership possesses several resources with which to directly influence deputy behavior. They include committee assignments (especially chairs), modest budgetary resources, and control over the flow of legislation (Jones 2002).

Roll Rates on the Chamber Floor and in Committee

The above presentation indicates that in Argentina the majority party functions as an effective cartel. In this section we evaluate this premise employing the methodology advocated by Cox and McCubbins (2002) as the ideal empirical test for the applicability of Cartel Theory to a given legislature. Cox and McCubbins (2002) employ data on majority and minority roll rates, on the floor and in committees, to assess the agenda control exercised by the majority party over the legislative process in the U.S. House (a party is rolled when a majority of its members are on the losing side of a vote that results in legislation being passed). A complete information model derived from Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 2002) predicts the majority party will never be rolled. Through negative agenda control the majority party leadership keeps legislation that divides the party (and which might lead to the party being rolled) off the floor. Through positive agenda control the majority party leadership obtains the passage of legislation by drafting it (or making alternative arrangements) so as to achieve (at least) the minimum threshold of party support necessary.

Neither the PJ nor Alianza possessed an absolute majority of the seats during most of the 1989–2003 period. However, the combination of the majority party's at least near-majority status in all instances, the fact the opposition was fragmented among a large number of parties, and the reality that the majority party was also the party of the President, turned these near majorities into absolute majorities in terms of negative agenda control and functionally absolute majorities in most instances for positive agenda control.

Table 3 provides the majority and minority floor roll rates for the 1989–2003 period. Following Cox and

TABLE 3 Chamber and Budget Committee Roll Rates for the Majority and Minority Parties: 1989–2003

	Floor Roll Rates			Budget Committee Roll Rates				
Legislative Period	Majority Roll Rate	Minority Roll Rate	Total Votes	Majority Roll Rate	Minority Roll Rate	Total Votes	Majority Party	Minority Party
1989–1991	1.4	54.9	71	0.0	41.2	34	PJ	UCR
1991–1993	0.0	57.1	28	0.0	16.3	49	PJ	UCR
1993–1995	0.0	58.3	48	0.0	20.0	75	PJ	UCR
1995–1997	2.8	72.2	36	0.0	13.0	77	PJ	UCR
1997–1999	0.0	80.0	19	0.0	10.8	74	PJ	UCR
1999–2001	0.0	83.3	48	0.0	16.3	80	ALIANZA	PJ
2001–2003	0.0	16.7	24	0.0	10.4	48	PJ	UCR

Note 1: The 1989 (July 8 to December 9) period was peculiar given that the UCR held the majority of the seats, but due to the early transfer of power agreement between President Raúl Alfonsín (UCR) and President-Elect Carlos Menem, to obtain the latter's early assumption of office, the UCR delegated majority status to the PJ (Jones 2002). This period is therefore excluded from our analysis.
Note 2: Six votes took place during the final six weeks of the De la Rúa Administration (1999–2001), at which time a majority of the FREPASO deputies had officially (or unofficially) left FREPASO and/or the UCR-FREPASO Alianza, thereby effectively eliminating the Alianza's majority status. In these six votes, the Alianza "Majority" was rolled twice while the PJ "Minority" was not rolled at all. These six votes are not included in this table.
Note 3: The FREPASO floor roll rate was 86.1% during the 1995–97 period and 80.0% during the 1997–99 period. Due to the small number of FREPASO Budget Committee members, comparable roll rates are unavailable for the Budget Committee analysis.

McCubbins (2002), analysis is restricted to simple majority final passage votes. During this time the PJ was the majority party, except for 1999–2001 when the UCR-FREPASO Alianza was in the majority. The principal minority party was the UCR, except for 1999–2001, when the PJ occupied this role.

In line with Cartel Theory, the majority party is almost never rolled on the Chamber floor. The majority roll rate ranges from 0% to 2.8%, with a median of 0%. These roll rates are indicative of a majority party with strong negative agenda control. With the exception of 2001–03, the minority roll rates are very high, ranging from 55% to 83%.

Table 3 also provides majority and minority roll rates for legislation involving the Chamber's most prestigious and powerful committee: the Budget Committee (Danesi 2003). The majority party was never rolled on legislation considered by the Budget Committee. In contrast, the minority party roll rate ranged from 10% to 41%. The lower minority roll rate for committee votes is due to the fact that while roll calls on the Chamber floor are generally held on only controversial issues, all legislation must be voted on nominally in committee.

This section provides substantial evidence suggesting the majority party in the Argentine Chamber functions as an effective cartel. The majority party's control over the agenda results in it being rolled very infrequently, while the minority party suffers rolls on a consistent basis. The majority party provincial bosses delegate a considerable amount of power to the Chamber party leadership. The leadership in turn uses its majority power to obtain distributive and reputational benefits for the bosses. The minority party often has weak incentives to support the majority party's agenda, and strong incentives to oppose it, given the general lack of distributive benefits for the minority party and the reputational benefits (these legislators are the party's only national-level counterweight to the President) that can be achieved through opposing some legislation.

Conclusion

In spite of a large literature demonstrating the strong province-based nature of Argentine politics, analysis of roll-call vote behavior in the Argentine Chamber failed to uncover any provincial effects. To the contrary, the roll-call data highlighted the prominent role played by the national party. The solution to this apparent puzzle lies with the nature of delegation by provincial party bosses. In order to further their collective goal of maintaining control of the provincial party machine and maintaining (governors) or obtaining (opposition provincial bosses) control of the provincial administration, provincial bosses delegate substantial power to their party's leadership in the Chamber, which for the majority party also can be considered delegating to the President, due to the influence he wields over the Chamber majority party leadership. As a consequence of this delegation, the majority party leadership controls the day-to-day functioning of the Chamber. In sum, provincial factors have a powerful effect on deputy behavior in the Chamber. Due however to the influence wielded by provincial bosses over political careers in Argentina, and the consequent ability of these bosses to delegate power to the Chamber party leadership, this provincial effect is unobserved in roll-call analysis of deputy behavior.

This article highlights the utility of Cartel Theory for the understanding of legislatures outside of the United States. The U.S. Congress literature occupies the pinnacle of legislative scholarship, providing the ideal theoretical foundation for those interested in improving general legislative theory. While theories developed to explain U.S. politics cannot be blindly applied to other countries, it is possible to adapt these theories and successfully employ them in other contexts (Gamm and Huber 2002). The development of general theories of legislative institutions in fact requires such extensions and adaptations of existing theory, and given its status as one of the premier theories of legislative organization in the United States, Cartel Theory represents an ideal candidate for extension and adaptation to other democracies.

The institutional context in which U.S. congressional politics occurs is rather unique: legislators in virtually all other presidential democracies possess far less autonomy over their political future than their U.S. counterparts. A fundamental assumption undergirding most U.S. theories of congressional organization (including Cartel Theory) is, however, the existence of autonomous legislators. Therefore, in order for many of these theories to be useful for explaining behavior outside of the United States, they need to be adapted to take account of the different institutional context present in other democracies.

In this article, a modified version of Cartel Theory was utilized to help explain why, in spite of the provincial-based nature of Argentine politics, no provincial effects were observed in analyses of roll-call vote behavior. The article highlights the strong potential for a similar modified version of Cartel Theory to explain legislative politics in other presidential democracies where neither the individual legislators nor a single centralized national party leadership control the political future of the members of the party's legislative delegation. In these intermediate democracies, state-level party bosses (e.g.,

Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) and intraparty faction bosses (e.g., Paraguay, Taiwan, Uruguay) exercise considerable influence over the careers of legislators. Future research should therefore attempt to analyze legislative politics in these and other intermediate presidential democracies using a modified version of Cartel Theory. In doing so, these studies will provide invaluable further evidence on the viability of Cartel Theory to serve as a foundation for the development of a general theory of legislative institutions.

Appendix A

Roll-Call Votes in the Argentine Chamber

Roll-call votes are infrequent and normally taken on conflictual issues where party leaders (generally of the opposition) want their vote or that of others (generally of the majority party) to be on record or, to a much lesser extent, where party leaders (generally of the majority) use them to enforce discipline and enhance legitimacy. In addition, roll-call votes are mandatory in some instances (e.g., veto overrides).[15] During the eight legislative periods, a majority of the roll-call votes were called for by the opposition (median of 57%), followed in frequency by those that were called for by the majority party (19%), those that were mandatory (15%), ending with those called for by majority party dissenters (0%, mean of 1%). The legislative record does not reveal who called for a median of 4% of the votes.

Despite their infrequent occurrence, an overwhelming majority of the most important legislative initiatives during the 1989–2003 period were at least partially adopted (or rejected) based on a roll-call vote. A review of legislation upon which roll calls were taken and not taken indicates the former legislation is representative of the most salient legislation (Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999) debated in Argentina during the 1989–2003 period.

Additional evidence of the representativeness of the roll-call votes is provided by an analysis of Budget Committee votes (where all legislation must be voted on via the signing of committee reports) using the same methodology described earlier (except with a burn-in period of 1,000,000 iterations). The Budget Committee analysis (for the seven post-1989 periods) provides results comparable to those obtained using the floor roll-call votes regarding the existence of a single partisan dimension underlying deputy voting behavior. A median of 88% of the committee votes discriminated on a single dimension (compared to 95% of the floor votes). Similar to the case for the floor votes, the dimension was highly partisan in nature, with the PJ deputies clustering at one end of the continuum (with a median ideal point of 0.72 for this period, compared to 0.55 for the floor votes) and the UCR deputies clustering at the other (with a median ideal point of −0.71, compared to −0.61 for the floor votes). Lastly, in spite of the different legislation being voted upon, and the distinct rules governing committee votes (which, ceteris paribus, result in fewer observable defections from the party line since it is impossible to determine abstentions and those present but not voting), the individual Budget Committee members' median floor ideal points during this period (0.53 and −0.43 for the PJ and UCR committee members, respectively) were not substantively different from their median committee ideal points.

For every Chamber session an attendance list is compiled. There are five categories: Present, On Leave, On Leave (approval pending), Absent With Notice, and On An Official Mission. For those voting, there are three categories: Yes, No, and Abstain. Deputies who at some point were present at the session, but were not on the floor at the time of the vote (or chose not to vote) are considered to be Present But Not Voting.

Deputies who oppose the position taken by the party leadership generally will leave the floor at the time of the vote or less frequently will abstain. Only on rare occasions will deputies vote against the party line. Extensive qualitative analysis leads to the conclusion that the most common method of opposing the party position on a vote is to be absent from the floor at the time of the vote.

There are two principal ways to deal with the reality of Chamber roll-call voting. The first is to only consider votes cast as "Yes" or "No," and code all other actions as missing. Such an approach excludes valuable information on deputy preferences and fails to account for the most prominent method of expressing dissent with the official party position.

Another method is that employed by Ames (2001) and Haspel, Remington, and Smith (1998). This general approach treats "Yes" and "No" votes in a manner identical to that above. In contrast, deputies who were present at the session, but left the floor at the time of the vote or abstained (Present But Not Voting, Abstain), are coded as voting contrary to the majority of their party.[16] All other deputies are coded as missing (along with the acting Chamber President who only votes in the event of a tie). An alternative way to conceptualize voting under

[15] A nonmandatory roll-call vote is taken when a motion for a roll call is supported by at least one-fifth (1989–1996) or one-tenth (1997–2003) of the deputies in attendance.

[16] The median percentage of deputies who were "Abstain" and "Present But Not Voting" is 20%. Deputies receive virtually no public or media censure for failing to vote.

this coding rule is it measures whether or not the deputy supported the party leadership's position on the vote.

We adopt this latter method. We strongly believe the amount of additional information provided (compared to the first method) outweighs any error introduced through the coding of deputies as opposing the party position when in fact their absence from the floor at the time of the vote was due to some other factor. Based on over a dozen years of study of the Argentine Congress, we are confident this methodology provides the most valid measure of deputy preferences on roll-call votes. Under this methodology, the median roll call cohesion "Rice" score for the PJ is 54%, while that for the UCR is 50%.

The consequence of this methodology is that we overstate the level of intraparty heterogeneity and understate the level of interparty heterogeneity. Any error introduced will however be constant, thereby not affecting intertemporal comparisons. The error introduced by this methodology is much less severe than that introduced by limiting the analysis to instances of "Yes" and "No" votes (which severely understates the level of intraparty heterogeneity and severely overstates the level of interparty heterogeneity). Analysis using this latter methodology is not as valid, is less precise, provides reliable information on fewer deputies, and creates convergence related problems. Nevertheless, its use does not lead to substantive conclusions that differ from those in this article.

Appendix B

Bayesian Estimation Diagnostics

Included in the initial population are all valid roll-call votes held during the eight legislative periods. Following Jackman (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997), we exclude lopsided votes in which fewer than 2.5% of the deputies were on the losing side.

To insure the sample obtained through the Gibbs sampler is representative of the underlying stationary distribution, we employ a combination of convergence diagnostics as well as a visual inspection of the trace plots. To perform convergence diagnostics and statistical and graphical analysis of Gibbs sampling output we use BOA (Bayesian Output Analysis program; Smith 2003). We utilize two distinct convergence diagnostics (i.e., Geweke and Heidelbergen and Welch; Cowles and Carlin 1996; Smith 2003).

These diagnostics indicate that, in the eight periods, the sample output almost perfectly converges to the posterior distribution. More than 96% of the parameters (in the case of both votes and deputies) are statistically significant at the 5% level in the convergence tests. With a few exceptions, deputies who did not achieve convergence did so due to the small percentage of roll calls on which they voted. Following the general methodology of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), deputies who failed to register a preference on more than 70% of the roll-call votes were excluded from the analysis in which the Bayesian ideal points are employed.

Assessing Markov Chain convergence is crucial in Markov Chain Monte Carlo analysis. One strategy for insuring convergence is to run the chain as long as possible. Another strategy is to use multiple chains with widely dispersed starting points (Gelman and Rubin 1992). In our analysis we employ the former strategy. However, as a diagnostic we also conducted the analysis using the latter (with two chains) strategy. Our rates of correct discrimination, estimates of ideal points, goodness of fit results, and discrimination parameters are virtually identical when employing the one chain and two chain strategies (Smith 2003).

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