Interpetación regresiones aplicadas

Garfias (*APSR* 2018)

- Concepto e importancia de la capacidad estatal
- Cambio de la unidad de análisis, política comparada subnacional
- Influencia de eventos de largo plazo, persistencia

Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico

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International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidation increases rulers' chances of surviving an economic elite's challenge, it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity. These ideas are evaluated in post-revolutionary Mexico, where commodity price shocks induced by the Great Depression affected the local economic elite differentially. Negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity, which persist to the present.

FIGURE 1. Land Redistribution in Mexico (1916–1960)



Source: Sanderson (1984). Irrigated land. Dates correspond to the official date of redistribution; usually lag actual redistribution date by a couple of years.

FIGURE 2. Commodity Prices Before and After the Great Depression

Source: Global Financial Data, from various primary sources.

$$lny_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 ln\bar{V}_{it} + \lambda_t \times X_{i,1930} + \lambda_t + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

where $\bar{V}_{it}$ is a measure of commodity potential in time t for *municipio* i, $X_{i,1930}$ is a vector of time invariant pre-shock controls that are interacted with the time fixed effect λ_t, γ_i are *municipio* fixed effects, and ε_{it} is an error

TABLE 1. Commodity Shocks and Bureaucrats

	(1) Bureaucrats per 1,000 people (*Haciendas*)	(2) Bureaucrats per 1,000 people (*Haciendas*)	(3) Bureaucrats per 1,000 people (No *haciendas*)	(4) Bureaucrats per 1,000 people (*Haciendas*)
Commodity potential (log)	−7.92*	−9.39**	2.14	
	(4.33)	(4.11)	(3.14)	
Placebo commodity potential (log)				−0.34
				(0.54)
Population in 1930 (log) × 1940		0.12	0.97**	−0.29
		(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.51)
Municipal surface area, Ha. (log)		0.090	0.15	0.49
× 1940		(0.29)	(0.42)	(0.38)
Localities per Ha. in 1930 × 1940		474.0	437.0	418.7
		(351.0)	(459.7)	(348.2)
Population in agriculture in 1930		−0.022	−0.019	−0.034
(%) × 1940		(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Population in cities in 1930 (%)		−0.042	0.036	−0.035
× 1940		(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Commodity potential (log) in 1930		0.011	0.013	0.050
× 1940		(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.17)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Within-*Municipio* Mean of DV	4.23	4.23	2.49	4.23
Within-*Municipio* SD of DV	2.34	2.34	1.75	2.34
R^2	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.74
Observations	3019	3019	1489	3019
Number of *municipios*	1557	1557	762	1557

OLS estimations. See Equation (1) for the econometric specification. The unit-of-analysis is the *municipio* year. Standard errors (clustered at the *municipio* level) in parentheses.
$p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Cox y Magar (*APSR* 1999)

- Comprueba un efecto esperable de partidos fuertes en EE.UU.
- Estado de naturaleza legislativa: solución coasiana = committee government
- En dicho mundo, los partidos son epifenomenales
- PACs y contribuciones de campaña

How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?

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A key premise of partisan theories of congressional organization is that majority status confers substantial procedural advantages. In this article, we take advantage of changes in party control of the House and Senate, such as that following the Republicans' historic victory in the midterm elections of 1994, to assess the value of majority status in terms of contributions from access-seeking political action committees (PACs). We estimate that majority status in the House was worth about $36,000 per member *in receipts from corporate and trade PACs circa 1994—even controlling for the usual factors cited in the literature as affecting members' ability to raise money (such as committee assignments and voting record). The value of majority status in the Senate is even larger in absolute terms, although smaller in proportion to the total amount of money raised. Our results show that majority status is a valuable asset, one worth considerable collective effort to attain.*

have:

$$C_{i2} - C_{i1} = (\alpha_2 - \alpha_1) + \beta(Maj_{i2} - Maj_{i1})$$

$$+ \gamma(Rep_{i2} - Rep_{i1}) + \lambda(Z_{i2} - Z_{i1}) + (\varepsilon_{i2} - \varepsilon_{i1}).$$

Here, Maj_{it} is 1 if member i's party is in the majority in the election cycle ending in year t, 0 otherwise; Rep_{it} is 1 if member i runs as a Republican in the election cycle ending in year t, 0 otherwise; Z_{it} is a vector of observed time-varying covariates (such as committee assignments or voting records); and X_i is a vector of member-specific time-invariant covariates. Note that we assume

TABLE 1. Change in PAC Contributions to Members of U.S. House Continuing from 103d to 104th Congress

	Dependent Variable Change in Receipts			
	From Business PACs		From Labor PACs	
Independent Variable	Coefficient Estimates (Robust Standard Errors[a])	*p*-value (1-tailed[b])	Coefficient Estimates (Robust Standard Errors[a])	*p*-value (1-tailed[b])
Constant	34,516	.001	7,131	.033
	(9,917)		(3,854)	
Change in majority status (ΔMaj)	35,986	.000	−3,077	.102
	(6,971)		(2,413)	
Change of party status (ΔRep)	13,279	.397	−25,916	.001
	(50,480)		(7,415)	
Change in lagged electoral safety	−34,361	.072	−25,352	.013
	(23,410)		(11,275)	
Change in freshman status (ΔFrosh)	23,345	.002	7,831	.032
	(7,666)		(4,216)	
Change in prestige committee status	8,319	.277	−5,694	.191
	(14,044)		(6,498)	
Change in voting record (difference in rescaled W-nominate)	865	.177	632	.033
	(933)		(342)	
Joined leadership	496,509	.000	7,559	.001
	(9,487)		(2,165)	
Number of observations	293		293	
$F_{(7,285)}$	3125.65		11.20	
Prob($F \geq F_{(7,285)}$	.0000		.0000	
R^2	.34		.06	

Note: OLS method of estimation. For variable definitions, see Appendix.
[a]Cf. White 1980.
[b]*P*-value for null hypothesis that coefficient is of opposite sign to that expected.

$$\bar{V}_{it} = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \frac{\bar{P}_{gt} \times Suitability_{ig}}{Avg.\ Suitability_g},$$

where $\bar{P}_{gt}$ is the average price of crop g in time $t \in \{1920s, 1930s\}$, $Suitability_{ig}$ is a *municipio*-specific crop suitability measure (in metric tonnes) determined by agroclimatic conditions, and $Avg.\ Suitability_g = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} Suitability_{ig}$ is a national average. $\bar{V}_{it}$ captures the relative availability of resources for the landed elite, who produce commodities for the market.[13] Parameter β_1 in the equation can quantify the effect of the price shock through the channel that the theory suggests: the temporary weakening of the landed elite, associated with a decline in commodity prices, leads to the expropriation of land, along with an increase in the incentives to invest in local capacity by local rulers.