

# Elección Pública III

Departamento de Ciencia Política ITAM, otoño 2020

Profesor: Eric Magar Meurs {emagar@itam.mx}

Lunes y miércoles 13:00–14:30, salón 308

ITAM Depto. de ciencia política, primavera 2021

## **Elección Pública III**

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*Objetivo:* El último curso de la serie de elección pública del programa estudia cómo toman decisiones las democracias. El hilo conductor que engloba la temática del curso es la negociación. En la parte sustancial, tras hacer un repaso de la elección social y sus dilemas, buscaremos entender cómo influyen las preferencias, las reglas y los partidos en las decisiones colectivas. Para esto revisaremos modelos canónicos de negociación en democracia. El curso hará hincapié en la conexión fundamental entre teoría y evidencia empírica.

*Horas de oficina:* Mientras dure el confinamiento, haga cita por mail. Cuando volvamos a las clases presenciales, serán los lunes y miércoles de 16:30 a 17:30, o con cita.

*Evaluación:* Habrá un examen parcial y otro final. En su momento anunciaré el formato. A priori, cada uno contará 40% de la calificación final y el 20% restante valorará la participación en clase y la impresión general que deje en su profesor.

*Notas:* (1) La página del curso es <https://github.com/emagar/ep3/>. Alberga este temario y las lecturas. (2) El temario sufrirá modificaciones marginales en el transcurso del semestre para quitar, añadir o cambiar la secuencia de algunos temas. Anunciaré esto con antelación en clase. (3) Coordinaré reposición de clases faltantes más adelante.

*Días de asueto:* 2021-02-01, 2021-03-15, 2021-03-29, 2021-03-31.

*No habrá clase:* 2021-02-15, 2021-02-17.

*Última clase:* 2021-05-12.

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## 1 Los modelos y el método científico

- Clarke y Primo (2007) "Modernizing political science: a model-based approach" 12 pp.
- McCubbins y Thies (1996) "Rationality and the foundations of PPT" 39 pp.
- Borges (1944) "Funes el memorioso" 8 pp.

## 2 Representación política

- Pitkin (2004) "Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance" 8 pp.
- Urbinati (2000) "Representation as Advocacy" 22 pp.

## 3 Elección social I

- Szpiro, *Numbers Rule* (2010)

- Prefacio 3 pp.
- cap. 5 The Officer 13 pp.
- cap. 6 The Marquis 16 pp.
- cap. 11 The Pessimists 22 pp.
- Riker, *Liberalism against Populism* (1981)
  - Prefacio 2 pp.
  - cap. 1 The connection between the theory of social choice and the theory of democracy 19 pp.
  - cap. 2 Different choices from identical values 20 pp.

## 4 Coordinación electoral

- Cox, *Making Votes Count* (1997)
  - cap. 2 Duverger's propositions 21 pp.
  - cap. 3 On electoral systems 32 pp.
  - cap. 4 Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems 29 pp.
  - cap. 5 Strategic voting in multimember systems 24 pp.
  - cap. 7 Some concluding comments on strategic voting 10 pp.
  - cap. 8 Strategic voting, party labels, and entry 24 pp.
  - cap. 9 Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: Evidence from Japan 6 pp.
- Duverger, Riker, Bogdanor

## 5 Prueba de hipótesis y regresión lineal, un repaso

- Shively (1974) *The Craft of Political Research*,
  - cap. 7 "Introduction to statistics: measuring relationships for interval data" 22 pp.
- Garfias (2018) "Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico" 19 pp.

## 6 Negociación y coaliciones en regímenes parlamentarios

- Laver y Shepsle (1990) "Coalitions and cabinet government" 18 pp.
- Laver y Shepsle (1996) *Making and Breaking Governments*
  - cap. 1 "Theory, institutions, and government formation" 15 pp.
  - cap. 2 "The social context of government formation" 25 pp.
  - cap. 3 "The government formation process" 16 pp.
  - cap. 4 "Government equilibrium" 29 pp.
  - cap. 5 "Strong parties" 33 pp.
  - cap. 6 "Two cases: Germany 1987; Ireland 1992-3" 22 pp.
  - cap. 7 "Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization" 11 pp.
  - cap. 8 "Exploring the model: a comparative perspective" 16 pp.
  - cap. 9 "A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation" 19 pp.

- Bawn y Rosenbluth (2006) "Short versus long coalitions" 15 pp.
- Huber (1996) "The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies" 14 pp.
- Heller (2001) "Making policy stick: why government gets what it wants in multiparty Parliaments" 19 pp.
- Miller y Schofield (2003) "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States" 16 pp.

## **7 La teoría espacial del voto (Elección social II)**

- McKelvey (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control 12 pp.

## **8 El control de la agenda**

- Ehrenberg et al. (2004) "Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?" 16 pp.
- Romer y Rosenthal (1978) "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo" 17 pp.

## **9 Aplicaciones del modelo de manipulación de la agenda**

- Gerber (1996) "Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives" 30 pp.
- Kiewiet y McCubbins (1988) "Presidential influence on congressional appropriations" 14 pp.
- Dion y Huber (1996) "Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules" 28 pp.
- Krehbiel (1998) *Pivotal Politics*
  - cap. 2, "A theory" 29 pp.
- Cameron (2000) *Veto Bargaining*
  - cap. 1, "Divided government and interbranch bargaining" 32 pp.
  - cap. 2, "A natural history of the veto" 35 pp.
  - cap. 4, "Models of veto bargaining" 40 pp.
  - cap. 5, "Explaining the patterns" 29 pp.
  - cap. 6, "Testing the models" 27 pp.
- Magar (2007) "A model of executive vetoes with testable predictions" 27 pp.
- Magar (2003) "The incidence of executive vetoes in comparative perspective: the case of US state governments" 31 pp.
- Alemán y Schwartz (2006) "Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions" 23 pp.
- Heller y Weldon (2003) "Reglas de votación y la estabilidad en la Cámara de Diputados" 35 pp.
- Tsebelis *Veto Players*.
- Morgenstern y Nacif, algunos capítulos.
- Talbert y Potosky (2002) "Setting the Legislative Agenda: The Dimensional Structure of Bill Cosponsoring and Floor Voting" 27 pp.
- Sinclair on rules (Brady+McCubbins).
- Cox y McCubbins (2005) "Agenda power in the US House of Representatives, 1877-1986" 39 pp.

## 10 Ideología

- Poole y Rosenthal (1997) *Congress*,
  - cap. 1 "The liberal/conservative structure" 8 pp.
  - cap. 2 "The spatial model and Congressional voting" 16 pp.
  - cap. 7 "Sophisticated voting and agenda manipulation" 20 pp.
- Estévez, Magar y Rosas (2008) "Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: Evidence from Mexico's IFE" 15 pp.
- Magar, Magaloni y Sánchez (2010) "No self-control: the dimensional structure of the Mexican Supreme Court" 22 pp.

## 11 El mercado de los votos

- Cox y McCubbins (1986) "Electoral politics as a redistributive game" 20 pp.
- Díaz Cayeros, Estévez y Magaloni (2016) *The Political Logic of Poverty Relief*
  - Introduction 20 pp.
  - cap. 6 "Saving lives: social programs and infant mortality rates" 14 pp.
- Cox (2010) "Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics" 23 pp.
- Nichter (2008) "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot" *American Political Science Review* 102(1):19-31.

## 12 Herestética

- Shepsle (2003) "Losers in politics" 9 pp.
- Riker (1986) *The art of political manipulation*
  - cap. 1 "Lincoln at Freeport" 9 pp.
  - cap. 2 "Chauncey DePew and the seventeenth amendment" 8 pp.
  - cap. 7 "Pliny the Younger and parliamentary law" 11 pp.

## 13 Causalidad y método comparativo

- Holland "Fundamental problem of causal inference"

## 14 Cuotas de género y acción afirmativa

- Leslie Schwindt
- Piscopo
- India

## 15 La reelección legislativa

- Mayhew
- Cain, Ferejohn y Fiorina, *The personal vote*
  - Introduction 24 pp.
  - cap. 1 Member visibility and member images 23 pp.
  - cap. 5 Unravelling a paradox 14 pp.
- Kerevel (2015) *Pork-Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress*
- Carson y Engstrom (2005) *Assessing the Electoral Connection in the Early United States*.
- Magar y Moreno, *Reelección en Coahuila*.
- Cox (1987) *The Efficient Secret*.

## 16 Argumentos y validez deductiva

- Schwartz (1980) *The Art of Logical Reasoning* (extractos), pp. 3-31, 133-158.
- Grossman y Lewis (2014) "Administrative Unit Proliferation" 22 pp.

**Tarea:** reconstruya el argumento deductivamente válido (à la Schwartz) de Garfias y de Grossman-Lewis.

## 17 Dinastías

- Smith (2017) *Dynasties and Democracy*
  - cap. 1 Introduction 27 pp.
  - cap. 2 Japan into comparative perspective 20 pp.
  - cap. 3 Theory of dynastic candidate selection 34 pp.
  - cap. 5 Inherited incumbency advantage 25 pp.

## 18 Redistribución

- Szpiro, *Numbers Rule* (2010)
  - cap. 9 The Founding Fathers 15 pp.
  - cap. 10 The Ivy Leaguers 31 pp.
  - cap. 12 The Quotarians 15 pp.
- Lujambio y Vives (2008) "From politics to technicalities: Mexican redistricting" 12 pp.
- McDonald (2008) "United States redistricting: comparative look at the 50 states" 18 pp.
- Johnston, Pattie y Rossiter (2008) "Electoral distortion despite redistricting by independent commissions" 20 pp.
- Magar et al polGeo
- Engstrom *Partisan gerrymandering*

## 19 La teoría de la empresa

- Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (extractos), pp. 33-43.
- Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," pp. 72-85.
- Alchian y Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," pp. 111-134.
- Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," pp. 196-208.

## 20 Negociación en el Congreso estadounidense

- Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974), pp. 18-29.
- Shepsle y Weingast, "Institutional foundations of committee power" (1987) 20 pp.
- Weingast y Marshall, "The industrial organization of Congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets" (1988), 31 pp.
- Shepsle y Weingast, "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions," pp. 5-36.
- Hammond y Miller (1987) "The core of the constitution"
- Baron y Ferejohn (1989) "Bargaining in legislatures" 26 pp.
- Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," pp. 25-44.

## 21 Los partidos como agentes de gobierno

- Krehbiel (1993) "Where's the party"
- Cox y McCubbins (1993) *Legislative Leviathan*,
  - Introduction, 15 pp.
  - cap. 3 "Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees" 21 pp.
  - cap. 5 "A theory of legislative parties" 30 pp.
  - cap. 8 "Contingents and parties" 42 pp.
- Cox y McCubbins (1995) "Bonding, structure, and the stability of parties" 17 pp.
- Cox y Magar (1999) "How Much is Majority Status in US Congress Worth?" 12 pp.
- Cox (1987) *The Efficient Secret*.
- DenHartog and Monroe (2010) *Parties in the Senate*.
- Jones y Hwang (2005) "Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory beyond the U.S. Congress" 16 pp.

## 22 La delegación: piedra nodal del gobierno y de la democracia

- Kiewiet y McCubbins (1991) *The Logic of Delegation*,
  - cap. 2 "Delegation and agency problems" 17 pp.
- McCubbins y Schwartz (1984) "Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols vs. fire alarms" 15 pp.
- Raustiala (2004) "Police patrols and fire alarms in the NAAEC" 25 pp.

## **23 Proceso legislativo**

- Power et al Brasil.
- Magar, Urgencia en Chile
- Magar, Urgencia en Brasil
- Cox y Morgenstern, Proactive reactive
- Magar y Moraes (2008) "Facciones y legislación en Uruguay".
- Palanza y Sin, veto.

## **24 Decretos**

- O'Donnell Delegative Democracy
- Carey y Shugart
- Amorim Neto en Brasil