

La coordinación

McCubbins-Rosenbluth

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Outline

- 1 Sanae Takaichi
- 2 SNTV
- 3 Clasificación del presupuesto
- 4 La regresión lineal múltiple

El emperador transmite el poder

 vid

El sistema electoral japonés clásico

SNTV = single non-transferable vote

- $M > 1$ pero $V = 1$
- Los M candidatos más votados resultan electos (sistema de pluralidad con ganadores múltiples)
- Japón hasta 1998, Taiwán, Sudcorea, Afganistán (elección judicial mexicana en algunos casos)

Problema de coordinación del LDP

Caso $M = 4$ donde

partido A	tiene	100	electores fieles
B		24	
C		11	

Dos problemas

1 ¿cuántos nominas?

- Si B manda uno, A puede ganar cuatro
ssi coordinación perfecta de votantes
- Si B manda dos, puede elegirlos ambos
si A se concentra en alguno
- ...

2 ¿cómo coordinas a tus votantes?

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Ministerios particularistas

EXPENDITURE ITEMS

GENERAL ACCOUNT

Prime minister's office

Science and Technology Agency

1. Promotion of research into peaceful uses for nuclear power
2. Science and Technology Agency research laboratory
3. Science and Technology promotion

Hokkaido Development Agency

4. Hokkaido road construction
5. Hokkaido fishing port facilities
6. Hokkaido housing construction industry

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance (internal)

7. Supplement to People's Finance Corporation

Ministry of Education

Ministry of Education (internal)

8. National Treasury subsidies for educational expenses for the handicapped
9. Supplements to private schools

Ministry of Health and Welfare

10. Maintenance of environmental health and sanitation facilities
11. Support for the disabled

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Ministry of Health and Welfare

10. Maintenance of environmental health and sanitation facilities
11. Support for the disabled
12. Welfare for the elderly
13. Support for women
14. Support for children

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

15. Fishing harbor facilities
16. Strategic restructuring of agriculture
17. Agricultural pensions
18. Silk cultivation and horticulture promotion
19. Diffusion of agriculture improvement
20. Strengthening of wet rice agriculture
21. Sugar price stabilization
22. Strategic planning of food product distribution

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (internal)

23. Economic cooperation
24. Promotion of industrial relocation
25. Promotion of the computer industry
26. Industrial plumbing facilities

Agency of Industrial Science and Technology

27. Promotion of mining and manufacturing technology

28. Large-scale industrial research and development

29. Agency of Industrial Science and Technology experimental research laboratory

Agency of Natural Resources and Energy

30. Measures for underground resources

Small and Medium Enterprise Agency

31. Measures for small and medium enterprises

Ministry of Transportation

Ministry of Transportation (internal)

32. Subsidies to account of Japan National Railway
33. Subsidies to Japan National Railway Construction Corp.
34. Subsidies for railroad track maintenance
35. Coastline enterprises
36. Subsidies for maritime transportation
37. Stabilization of shipbuilding industry

Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications

38. Integrated Telecommunications Research Lab
39. Local Telecommunications Administration Bureau

Ministry of Labor

40. Career change planning
41. Labor Protection Office
42. Employment Security Office

Ministry of Construction

Ministry of Construction (internal)

43. Strategic planning regarding crumbling of steep inclines and related expenses
44. Coastline enterprises
45. Housing construction
46. City planning
47. Work related to stream and river disasters
48. Restoration of streams and rivers after disasters

Ministry of Home Affairs

Ministry of Home Affairs (internal)

49. Adjustment grants to cities, towns, and villages that are the sites of [defense] facilities

SPECIAL ACCOUNTS

1. Foodstuff control
2. Measures for the improvement of farm management
3. Harbor improvement
4. Airport improvement
5. Road improvement

Para el ministerio particularista m en el año t

$$\mathbb{Y}_{mt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \mathbb{Y}_{\text{resto}_{mt}} + \beta_2 \%LDP_{t-1} + \dots + \text{error}_i$$

Hipótesis

Todo lo demás constante, $\beta_2 > 0$

Estimación

Table 3.1 *Japanese budget regression*^a

Independent variable	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	t-statistic
Constant	-0.63695	0.12224	-5.21082
Percentage change in budget remainder	1.24191	0.23015	5.39599
Percent LDP	1.04807	0.23272	4.50362
Lower House election	2.77452e-02	1.98918e-02	1.39480
Upper House election	1.94724e-02	2.27005e-02	0.85780
Ministry of Education	6.96370e-02	2.48803e-02	2.79888
Ministry of Posts & Telecom	-5.60421e-02	1.76490e-02	-3.17536

Note: Number of observations = 1,593

R-squared = 5.69691e-02

^aDependent variable: Partial Log of Real Budget for item i in year t .

Ecuación

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Ejemplo

$$Dvote_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{arrastre del gobernador}_1 + \dots + \text{error}_i$$

TABLE 2 Four Models of Coattail Effects on Congressional Elections


Variable	1997-2009		1979-2009					
	(1) Shares		(2) Shares		(3) Shares		(4) Residuals	
	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p
Part A. PAN								
Constant	.135	.000	.084	.000	.074	.000	-.022	.004
<i>RecentDvote</i>	.586	.000	.671	.000	.787	.000		
<i>GovOnlyConcurs</i>	-.151	.005	-.057	.002			.017	.021
<i>PresOnlyConcurs</i>	-.097	.054	-.058	.011	-.047	.051	.042	.000
<i>Gov&PresConcur</i>	-.106	.102	-.063	.033			.038	.012
<i>Gvote GovOnlyConcurs</i>	.584	.000	.405	.000			.760	.000
<i>Gvote Gov&PresConcur</i>	.444	.043	.500	.002			.163	.325
<i>Pvote PresOnlyConcurs</i>	.446	.002	.421	.000	.341	.000	.875	.000
<i>Pvote Gov&PresConcur</i>	.018	.956	-.096	.638			.930	.000
<i>IncumbentGovernor</i>	.045	.021	.020	.155	.008	.583	.017	.123
<i>IncumbentPresident</i>	-.047	.004	-.025	.120	-.027	.128	.001	.926
<i>Economy</i>	-.145	.465	.204	.141	.206	.176	.110	.233
<i>PartyCoalescal</i>	.016	.416	-.001	.990	.007	.802	-.014	.382
N	160		352		352		352	
R ²	.82		.84		.81		.58	
Part B. PRI								
Constant	.187	.000	.092	.050	.062	.213	.017	.507
<i>RecentDvote</i>	.418	.000	.746	.000	.808	.000		
<i>GovOnlyConcurs</i>	-.288	.001	-.190	.000			-.019	.092
<i>PresOnlyConcurs</i>	-.249	.000	-.224	.000	-.199	.000	-.059	.005
<i>Gov&PresConcur</i>	-.235	.052	-.232	.001			-.045	.081
<i>Gvote GovOnlyConcurs</i>	.620	.002	.291	.000			.737	.000
<i>Gvote Gov&PresConcur</i>	.231	.478	.378	.270			.332	.185
<i>Pvote PresOnlyConcurs</i>	.640	.000	.315	.000	.270	.005	.839	.000
<i>Pvote Gov&PresConcur</i>	.362	.329	-.050	.876			.661	.013
<i>IncumbentGovernor</i>	.086	.000	.027	.168	.016	.449	.031	.062
<i>IncumbentPresident</i>	-.063	.006	-.033	.350	-.038	.298	-.014	.596
<i>Economy</i>	-.438	.005	.402	.090	.438	.087	.048	.815
<i>PartyCoalescal</i>	-.018	.132	.006	.801	.005	.834	-.003	.901
N	160		352		352		352	
R ²	.76		.88		.87		.56	

Estimación

Variable	1997–2009	
	(1) Shares	
	$\hat{\beta}$	p
Part A. PAN		
Constant	.135	.000
<i>RecentDvote</i>	.586	.000
<i>GovOnlyConcurs</i>	-.151	.005
<i>PresOnlyConcurs</i>	-.097	.054
<i>Gov&PresConcur</i>	-.106	.102
<i>Gvote GovOnlyConcurs</i>	.584	.000
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<i>Economy</i>	-.145	.465
<i>PartyCoalesced</i>	.016	.416
N	160	
R^2	.82	

Simulaciones

FIGURE 3 Gubernatorial Coattails in Congressional Elections 1997–2009



Note: Plots prepared with MCMC estimates of model 1 in Table 2. Panels report the median, 50%, and 95% intervals of the posterior distribution. The simulation scenario for each party has the following features: the last deputy vote share is set at the party's median value for the period; there is a concurrent gubernatorial but not presidential election; the party has no incumbent governor nor president; the state's economic performance set at the median value for the period; and no party coalesced in the congressional election. The non-concurrence baseline is the median of the posterior distribution when *GovOnlyConcurs* = 0 in the same scenario. Dots are the party's actual gubernatorial vote shares (y -jittered for visibility), heavier points for races concurrent with congressional elections.