

Partisanship among the experts

The dynamic party watchdog model of IFE, 1996–2011

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MPSA

How do IFE and parties relate?

DEFORMA
EN CIERNES



Before: static ideal point estimation 1996–2007
(Estévez, Magar, and Rosas 2008)

- Party watchdog model: expect party segmentation of Council General (same-sponsor councilors align).

Now: dynamic estimation 1996–2011

- Same general hypothesis, finer tests.
- Longitudinal estimates: track realignment, effect of new entrants, compare electoral semesters/rest...
- Link dynamics to analytical narratives.

- Nine-member, non-partisan regulatory board
- Decisions affect all aspects of party life
 - ① party finance
 - ② candidate selection
 - ③ campaign contents
 - ④ leaders v. rank-and-file
 - ⑤ vote count
 - ⑥ ...
- Members appointed by Chamber of Deputies (super-majority) for 7-year terms. Party quota/veto (informal) system
- Public roll call votes

Parties designed election referee that they can influence

Delegation dilemmas:


IFE (the agent) affects parties' (the principal) welfare

Careful delegation → **party** trust → citizen trust

Contract design (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991)

- screening
- monitoring
- rewards and sanctions
- checks and balances

Stochastic spatial voting



Vote propensity: $v_j^* = \text{signal}(x_j - m) + \text{error}$.

Voting is sincere: $v_j = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ ('aye')} & \iff v_j^* \geq 0 \\ 0 \text{ ('nay')} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

Small assembly: Bayesian estimation via MCMC simulation.

Approach 1—Martin&Quinn (2002):


- For **quarter** t : $x_{j,t} \sim N(x_{j,t-1}, \text{slack})$
- *Drawback*: votes vary considerably across quarters—ideal points sensitive to sheer volume of information (Desposato), so drift may be spurious

Approach 2—Bonica (2010):

- Allow estimates to vary over periods of very short duration: item $i \pm k$, $k = 15$
- **Vote-by-vote** estimation
- Periods mostly overlap, constraining short-term shifts
- IRT instead of OC


Contested votes

Votes: 3,907 unanimous, 1,446 contested (27 %)




Same members within each period (I, II, ...)


Results: 1996–2003 quarterly



Results: 1996–2003 vote-by-vote



Results: 2003–2011 quarterly




What lies behind drift?

<i>Type</i>	<i>Effect on ideal points</i>
1. Screening	Concomitant shifts among same-sponsor councilors
2. Constituent pressure	Shifts should <i>follow</i> change in principal's situation (eg. new Congress)
3. Gatekeeping	Removal of divisive issues pulls most together


Some empirical indicators

- 1 New Congress = new principal
- 2 Congressional party split = two new principals
- 3 Election quarters = less agenda control by IFE (party complaints)


Party complaints filed as % of all votes




Results: overlapping









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
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
Results: overlap in two models




Results: overlapping




Results: overlapping




Results: overlapping



Results: overlapping



Results: overlapping



New principal and inter-quarter change

	Posterior $ x_{j,t+1} - x_{j,t} $	Mean	Std. dev.
a	New Congress quarters	.140	.115
b	Rest	.108	.084
c	Prob. a>b		.560

Gatekeeping and signal-to-noise ratio

	Posterior $ signal_i $	Mean	Std. dev.
d	Electoral quarters	2.677	1.682
e	Rest	2.601	1.684
f	Prob. $d > e$.565

Posterior $signal_i$ s with .95 ci off zero		
g	Percentage electoral quarters	53 %
h	Percentage rest	45 %




FIGURA 7. Porcentaje de votos promedio del PRI, PAN y PRD en distritos de mayoría relativa, 1997 – 2006.

Source: Aparicio&Márques (2010).

- ➊ Preliminary inspection shows some promising routes
- ➋ Ideal points in IFE move considerably. Short-term shocks and long-term drift
- ➌ Movement seems tied to representation considerations (change in principal; less agenda power)
- ➍ Next: kernel smoother; committee-plenary interactions

Thank you!

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