

Slippage among the Experts?

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Slippage

MRE use roll call vote on IFE's General Council to illustrate the party watchdog model of electoral regulation.

- Theory: Councilors are chosen to represent the regulatory interests of their sponsoring parties.
- Evidence: Voting patterns consistent with partisan behavior.

Modeling

- Dynamic OC vs. Martin-Quinn
- Identification:
 - Respondents
 - Items
 - Sponsors (Londgrean 2000)

Interpretation

- Underlying latent space?
- One or Two dimensions?
- Watchdog Ideal Point (Anchor)? (for example all move together against same party)
- Partisanship: prospective or retrospective?

Results

- Why relative position of watchdogs move during elections?
- Distribution of discrimination parameters? (Bootstrap)
- Why not look at the time-series of discrimination parameters?
- Cohesiveness – why not measure directly?