

Slippage among the Experts

Agency Costs in Partisan Election Regulation

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Mat McCubbins Memorial Conference, UCSD

Our work on Mexican election regulation

Before: Party watchdog model, congressional parties delegate

- Expect party segmentation of IFE's Council General
- Ideal point estimation confirms

Now: Longitudinal approach to study councilor drift
1996–2014

- Still exploratory
- New puzzles emerge

- Nine-member, non-partisan regulatory board
- Ran federal elections nationwide 1997–2012
- Congress appoints members by super-majority for 7-year terms
- Public roll call votes
- Upgraded in 2014 to also regulate subnational races (INE)

PRI (later others) conceded,
how did IFE achieve this?

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IFE's success story: conventional arguments

- IFE as *ombudsman* representing citizens directly
(Eisenstadt 2004, Ackerman 2004)
- Budget and tenure security
- Congressional appointment yet no inevitable bias in experts
(Schedler 2000, Woldenberg 2008)

Independence + impartiality → citizen trust

Public opinion

	% trust
Church	72
IFE	67
Army	65
Congress	35
Parties	34

Reforma poll May 2005

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Congressional parties (principal) structure a referee (agent) that they can influence

High stakes: IFE has authority over every aspect of party life

- voter registration
- allocates TV spots
- redistricting
- campaign finance
- nominations
- who clears subsidy hurdle
- campaign content
- ...

Careful delegation → **party** trust → citizen trust

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Contract design (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991)

- Screening
 - formally non-partisan
 - super-majority rule
 - party quotas/veto (informal)
- Monitoring
 - party reps in board and committees
 - constant signalling
- Carrots/sticks
 - routine impeachment threats, some took place
 - budget cuts
 - nuclear option (electoral reform)
- Checks and balances
 - split in thirds
 - electoral tribunal

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
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DEFORMA
EN CIERNES



From <http://reforma.com.mx> 8/29/2007

Stochastic spatial voting



Vote propensity: $v_j^* = \text{signal}(x_j - m) + \text{error}$

Voting is sincere: $v_j = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ ('aye')} & \iff v_j^* \geq 0 \\ 0 \text{ ('nay')} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Dynamics: $x_{j,t} \sim N(x_{j,t-1}, \text{slack})$ (cf. Martin&Quinn 2002, also Bonica 2010 [↗](#))


Small committee: Bayesian estimation via MCMC simulation

Identification [↗](#) Votes [↗](#)


Ideal point summarizes member's voting record vis-à-vis rest,
proximity = **vote likeness**

- ① Contiguity/superimposition of same-sponsor members
- ② Party segmentation
- ③ Move in tandem
- ④ Gatekeeping: blocking divisive issues brings most together
- ⑤ Vanishing principal: drift should *follow*


Evidence




Overview stability & change




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Clustering and overlaps




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



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


Ugalde: contingente PRI










Possible empirical indicators

- New Congress (also party splits) → principals mutate
- Election periods → party complaints up, agenda control down

Party complaints filed as % of all votes



New principal and inter-semester change

	Posterior $ x_{j,t+1} - x_{j,t} $	Mean	sd
a	New Congress semesters	.140	.115
b	Rest	.108	.084
c	Prob. a>b	.560	

Gatekeeping and signal-to-noise ratio

	Posterior $ signal_i $	Mean	sd
d	Electoral semesters	2.802	1.652
e	Rest	2.484	1.628
f	Prob. $d > e$.565	

Posterior $|signal_i|$ with ci off zero

g	Electoral semesters	64 %
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Contingent median polarization

	mean difference		
	election		rest
	Periods I and II		
PRI-PAN	0.155	>	0.091
PRI-PRD	0.417	≈	0.413
PAN-PRD	0.262	≈	0.323
	Period III		
PRI-PAN	0.639	>	0.369

Within-contingent cohesion

① How do 3 instead of 2 parties affect delegation?

- Party quotas → power-sharing
- Collective principal appoints a collective agent (\approx McNollgast)
- Same in other 'autonomous' regulatory boards (telecomm, energy, education...)

② Unstable environment

- Principal out of business?
- Auto-pilot analogy still flies?

③ Age structure

- Mean at appointment 44 yrs, min 31
- Young democracies?

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Thank you!

Approach 1—Martin&Quinn (2002):

- For **quarter** t : $x_{j,t} \sim N(x_{j,t-1}, \text{slack})$
- *Drawback*: votes vary considerably across quarters—ideal points sensitive to sheer volume of information (Desposato), so drift may be spurious

Approach 2—Bonica (2010):

- Allow estimates to vary over periods of very short duration: item $i \pm k$, $k = 15$
- **Vote-by-vote** estimation
- Periods mostly overlap, constraining short-term shifts
- IRT instead of OC

Table 5


Votes used to anchor policy space for each Council

Date (vote number)	Minority vote	Substance
Woldenberg I		
12/16/1997 (vote 28)	PRI, Barragán (Nay)	Agenda power for President (PRI-sponsored): should Council-General ratify President's appointee for one administrative office?
11/14/2000 (vote 228)	PRI, Barragán (Aye)	Scope of IFE authority: should PAN be held responsible and fined for the case of a clergyman who campaigned illegally on its behalf?
Woldenberg II		
4/6/2001 (vote 27)	Cárdenas, Cantú, Luken (Nay)	Money in elections: should IFE drop investigation of complaint by Alianza Cívica against the PRI for clientelistic practices in Chiapas?
5/30/2003 (vote 206)	PRI (Aye)	Scope of IFE authority: should PAN be fined for a TV campaign spot that PRI considers libelous?
Ugalde		
8/23/2004 (vote 33)	PAN minus Morales, Latapí (Nay)	Agenda power for President (PRI-sponsored): should candidate for top-level appointment, proposed by Council President without relevant commission's consent, be ratified?
1/31/2005 (vote 43)	Andrade, López Flores, Morales, Gómez Alcántar (Nay)	Scope of IFE authority: must PVEM statutes make party leaders accountable to rank-and-file?

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Data = contested votes (in black)

Votes: 5,202 unanimous, 1,640 contested (24 %)



Same members within each period (I, II, ...)

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