Speech in Mexico's Cámara de Diputados[*]

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Abstract

Text as data: speaches in lower chamber of Mexico's federal Congress. Analysis covers three pre-midterm election legislative terms since 2006. Argument, findings.[1]

Keywords: Speach, Congress, presidentialism, Mexico

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[1]Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the following repository (`https://github.com/emagar/legdeb`). Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

1   Introduction

[max 500 words]

2   Case selection

I had to limit data span due to a hard time constraint. Focus is on the Cámara de Diputados only. The chambers of the bicameral Congress have symmetric powers over most legislation, but the Senate is excluded from adoption of the annual budget, and I left it out. The limit is also in the time span. Only three legislative terms out of eight since democratization are included. I examine the 60th, 62nd, and 64th Legislatures. All are pre-midterm election, more similar among them. I opted for inclusion of the partial 64th Legislature (2018-21) instead of the 58th (2000-03) in order to investigate effects of electoral reform in debate.

3   Institutional and party system background

[ca 500-1000 words]

Mexico has a presidential constitution. For most of the 20th century a hegemonic party, the PRI, controlled the strings of political influence nationwide. While the PRI's electoral fortunes suffered from societal change and from formidable economic setbacks in the 1980s, it was not until 1997 that competitive politics became the norm (Cornelius 1996; Cosío Villegas 1981; Molinar 1991). The PRI lost control of the lower house of Congress in that year's midterm election, something unseen in over six decades. Three year later the country's long-standing right-of-center opposition, the PAN, beat the PRI in the presidential race.

With democratization, two decades of divided government ensued. The executive's control of the legislative process ended abruptly, inaugurating relative balance between the branches (Lujambio and Vives 2000; Weldon 1997). The president retained a prominent role in lawmaking, but genuine negotiation with the opposition was required to get things done (Béjar Algazi 2012; Casar

3

2013).

Competitive politics blended a - three party system (local two-party systems mostly) with - entry barriers - but weak links to society - bunch of opportunistic parties - two dims of competition

Partidocracia came crashing down in 2018.

3.1 parties in camara

```
|-----------------------------+------+------+--------|
|                             | 60th | 62nd |   64th |
| party                       |    % |    % |      % |
|-----------------------------+------+------+--------|
| pan                         |   41 |   23 |     16 |
| pri                         |   21 |   43 |      9 |
| prd                         |   25 |   20 |      4 |
| morena                      |      |      |     51 |
| opportunistic w/ president  |      |    8 |     14 |
| other opportunistic         |   13 |    7 |      6 |
|-----------------------------+------+------+--------|
| Total                     % |  100 |  100 |    100 |
|                           N |  500 |  500 |    500 |
|-----------------------------+------+------+--------|
| president's party           |  pan |  pri | morena |
|-----------------------------+------+------+--------|
```

Mandarins quote here. Frontbenchers pull the strings. Single-term limits with centralized nominations. Will change in 2021.

Cámara members elected mixed member plurality (Weldon 2001).

Unclear in past. Reelection should change things, incumbency times static ambition should matter more. Mention candado partidista?

4 The institutional setting of legislative debate in the Cámara

[ca 1500 words]

An overview of the structure of legislative debate shows members who have abdicated most formal speech rights to their parties. The Cámara's Rules (Reglamento 2019) set most prescriptions for debate, with general guidelines in Congress' Organic Law (Orgánica 2019).

4.1 The boards

There are two key actors in the legislative process, the Junta and the Mesa. The *Junta de Coordinación Política* is the Cámara's top decicion-making organ. The leaders of all parties with no fewer than five deputies are represented. The majority leader presides the Junta throughout the term. In the absence of a majority party, however, the leaders of the top-three seatholding parties preside the Junta, alternating one year each. The Junta appoints and replaces committee members, prepares each session's order of the day (/orden del día/), and in general reaches and enforces party leader agreements. It decides by majority rule, with members' votes weighted relative to group sizes in the plenary. So majority status is crucial to control the Junta (cf. Cox and McCubbins 2005).

The *Mesa Directiva* is the chamber's steering board. The Mesa chair is the Cámara president ex-officio. The Mesa makeup has consensual traits, regardless of there being a majority party or not. It is elected yearly by two-thirds supermajority of Cámara members from candidates proposed by the Junta. While Mesa members can reelect, the chair must rotate between the top-three seatholding parties, one year each.

Agenda control is frail. First, every committee report is guaranteed floor consideration and must be included in the order. If committees were adequate agents of the Junta majority, they might serve as gatekeepers by denying unwanted bills a report. But the Junta is required to distribute committee chairs (as well as committee seats) proportionally among the parties, so some committees are bound to be preference outliers.

Second, the open rule is the default for bill consideration in the floor. Debate takes place in two stages. The entire bill is first examined /en lo general/, then articles are considered individually for amendment or deletion /en lo particular/ (see Heller and Weldon n.d.). Members can always reserve articles for deletion or amendment, denying the Junta a useful prededural tool common in other assemblies: the closed rule (eg., Cox 2006; Magar, Palanza and Sin 2021; Weingast 1992).

Third, and most relevant, speakers can self-select. Individual members are entitled to take the floor when recognized by the presiding officer, for a duration set by rules or by party agreements.

Debate type (in Spanish)	Goal	Durat.	Selector	Veto
1. Introduce legislation (iniciativa)	Author			
– a new law	presents	– 10'	– member	– no
– amend a law	the bill	– 5'	– member	– no
2. Committee report (dictamen)	Move			
– Debate en lo general vs SQ, chair	for floor	– 10'	– comm.maj	– pres.^1
– " " " others	consideration	– 5'	– members	– pres.^1
– Amendments (debate en lo particular)		– 5'	– members	– no
– negative report		– 3'	– comm.maj	– pres.^1
3. Resolutions (puntos de acuerdo)	Position			
– standard, author	taking	– 10'	– member	– comm.ma
– urgent, author (obvia resolución)		– 5'	– Junta	– floor
– other speakers		– 3'	– party	– no
4. Current events (agenda política)	Position	< 2hrs		
– Junta proponent	taking	– 10'	– Junta	– no
– other speakers		– 5'	– member	– no
^1 = President can delay/prevent speech by granting recommit.				

Table 1: Types of debate

Party leaders allocate speaking time to a list of speakers but cannot preclude others from adding their names to that list, making debate resemble first-come-first-serve once parties have spoken.

4.2   The structure of debate

Rules set limits for different kinds of debate summarized in the Table. The first entry refers drafters of new legislation, who who get first recognition to take the floor in order to persuade fellow lawmakers. The time limit is ten minutes when the draft is a new law, five minutes when it amends existing statutes. Deputies who wish to debate then get five minutes each. Bills that cannot be presented before the session ends migrate to the next day's order upon author's request /viva voce/ (otherwise they are referred to committee.) The rightmost columns report who selects the speaker—self-selection by drafting a bill, in this case—and who, if anyone, can veto the speaker's recognition—no one here.

Other speech types grant right of first recognition differently. Debate /en lo general/ grants it

to the reporting committee chairperson or designated handler of the report for ten minutes (fifteen in constitutional amendments). The Cámara president can delay debate by recommiting the bill—and possibly prevent it if the committee kills the bill. /En lo particular/ amendments and Cámara resolutions grant it to the proposing member.

Party-appointed speakers get five minutes each, in reverse-size order, after the first /en lo general/ speech. Then members who request it then get five minutes each, the president arranging them in rounds, one for one against. After six such rounds, the floor can either proceed to vote, or continue with blocks of three such rounds. When the report deals with issues of great interest, debate can go on for several hours.

Cámara resolutions (/proposiciones con punto de acuerdo/) are taylor-made for members' position-taking needs, conditional on party leader support. If adopted, resolutions become the opinion of the chamber on some specific issue. But they require urgent status (/urgente u obvia resolución/) in order to avoid committee referral and move directly to the floor; only the Junta can request that the floor grants urgent status to at most two resolutions per session. If granted, the proposer takes the floor for five minutes. Parties then appoint one speaker each, for three minutes. The floor can then decide to vote, or open a rounds of debate with self-appointed speakers.

Current events (/agenda política/) are party leaders' position-taking venue. The Junta determines up to two themes for debate before consideration of reports and bills, party leaders appointing one speaker each. The promoting party speaker gets first recognition for 10 minutes, others 5 minutes each, and talk in reverse-size order. Current events debate cannot exceed two hours per session.

4.3 Recognition-granting motions

Debate under such rules becomes a succession of punctuated, mostly uninterrupted short speeches. Members can approximate back-and-forth talk, at least occasionally, by catching the president's eye from their seats in order to interrupt with a motion. The president has discretion to deny, or grant up to three minutes to elaborate. Such motions are distinct from points of order (which

members can also make, see Reglamento art. 114 for typified motions). They grant recognition to speak. One (/cuestionamiento al orador/) to interrogate the speaker, who must also accept the question be made. Another is (/alusiones personales/), to give right of reply to alluded members by recognizing them right after the speaker ends. And (/rectificación de hechos/) wind up an additional name at the end of the list of speakers.

4.4 Party discipline as alternative to centralized agenda power

The Cámara's debate rules are ill-designed to prevent plenary bottlenecks (Cox 2006). Even in the presence of a majority party, individual members retain speaking rights that water down attempts by the Junta to cartelize the legislative process. So how does the Cámara prevent dilatory motions to get things done? The answer is parties. Party discipline operates as an alternative to agenda cartelization in many systems (Prata 2001).

Cohesion is near perfect across parties. Téllez del Río (2018) computed frequencies with which deputies voted against a majority of their party (excluding unanimous votes). The mean he reports for the 1997–2018 period stands at 2 percent, 3.4 percent when abstentions are coded as votes against the party majority (p. 25).

Three former deputies from the larger parties offered quick impressions on internal party speech rules upon request. One commonality (at least in this very small sample) is the informal erosion of formal individual members' debate rights in favor of centralized speech allocation (cf. Cox 1987). The PAN relies on a debate whip (subcoordinador de debate parlamentario) in charge of selecting speakers in debates. When two members wish to speak at once, the whip would let them figure who would get the party's slot in the debate, who would then speak for or against.[2] The PRI leadership sets apart issues of party interest, appointing every speaker when debated. Members would communicate their wish to speak on unwhipped issues to their state caucus leader, who would seek authorization with party whips.[3] Rules give parties one speaking slot each

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[2]Email exchange with Fernando Rodríguez Doval, June 17th, 2020.
[3]Email exchange with Lupita Vargas Vargas, June 17th, 2020.

in many debates, regardless of size. Distributive conflict over speech is therefore more acute for larger parties, with longer speaker lists. A must for a member dissenting from "party mandarins" is a solid knowledge of the Rules. That member can thus make individual speaking rights effective by introducing suspensive motions or amendments, both of which come equipped with recognition to take the floor./footnoteEmail exchange with a former deputy from the left, who answered on condition of anonimity, June 17th, 2020.

Party leaders move the strings of lawmaking. Their influence, however, derives almost exclusively from party discipline (near-perfect across the board) and not from agenda power (which is quite diffuse).

4.5 Minority rights

Arg here: While parties sit atop the status pyramid, their agenda power is relatively limited. Two problems: can't easily prevent unwanted speeches as members retain right to talk; can't easily remove unwanted motions as committee reports proceed automatically to floor discussion. So negative agenda power is diffuse. Parties in fact rely on discipline towards leadership to avoid plenary bottlenecks and get legislation done.

suspension of rules typified only for discharge, two-thirds

The constitution sets the quorum at half chamber membership.

Reglamento amendments by 2/3 vote

Suspension of rules by Conferencia always a choice, but only typified for committee of the whole. Art 77 cpeum. Risks toma de tribuna.

Presiding officer can summon police to restore order. Can summon public force, but in practice never used. Can kill the mike, but others can raise their voices

4. Para atender una situación no prevista en el Reglamento, el Presidente podrá dictar una resolución de carácter general, siempre que haya la opinión favorable de la Mesa Directiva y de la Junta. En caso contrario, este tipo de resoluciones sólo tendrán efecto con la aprobación de la mayoría simple del Pleno.

5 The role of intra- and interparty politics in legislative debates?

[ca 2500]

5.1 Data and The dependent variable

Digitized speeches come from the stenographic service (scraped from http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/). I relied on regular expressions to de-htmlize the text and identify speakers and their speech, turning text into data for analysis.[4]

The dependent variable is a member's participation in plenary debate during a legislative period (see the appendix for terminology). Two specifications are analyzed, one absolute, one relative. The absolute *words(i,p)* is member i's speech in period p, measured as the number of words attributable to i. Days when deputy i spoke fewer than 50 words are arbitrarilly considered non-debates and dropped, adding zero towards the period's aggregate. Officers do not participate in legislative debate and all steering speech (as when the president recognizes a deputy or the secretary calls a voice vote to dispense reading of the bill) was also removed. So was speech by non-deputies, as in cabinet member hearings. Everything remaining is considered debate, members' daily totals added across sessions in the same period to produce aggregates for analysis.

The relative specification *words(i,p)/exposure* equals the absolute divided by the days that member i served as a proportion of all session days in period p (members can take leaves of absence). So the denominator for a member who spoke 5 thousand words and served uninterrupted throughtout period p is one, and both specifications are equavalent. If she had served only half of the period, then the denominator would be 0.5, making her relative words equal 5000/0.5=10000 in that period.

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[4]Data analysis was performed in R (R Dev. Core Team 2011), all code is available at https://github.com/emagar/legdeb. I relied on libraries lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker and Walker 2015), lubridate (Grolemund and Wickham 2011), margins (Leeper 2018), MASS (Venables and Ripley 2002), plyr (Wickham 2011), stargazer (Hlavac 2018), and zoo (Zeileis and Grothendieck 2005).

```
Part A: Continuous variables
|                               |  min | median |  mean |      sd |   max |    N |
|-------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------+-------|------|
| Total words (DV1)             |    0 |    593 |  1366 |  2682.3 | 50291 | 9494 |
| Total words / exposure (DV2)  |    0 |    607 |  1391 |  2716.3 | 50291 | 9494 |
| Days in office (exposure)     |    1 |     30 |  26.7 |    11.2 |    40 | 9494 |
| Party share                   |  0.4 |     25 |  29.2 |    15.9 |    51 | 9494 |
| Seniority                     |    0 |      1 |   1.7 |     2.2 |    17 | 9494 |
| Previous terms                |    0 |      0 |   0.3 |     0.6 |     4 | 9494 |

Part B: Dichotomous variables
|          |    0 |    1 | tot |    N |
|----------+------+------+-----+------|
| Spoke    | 37.6 | 62.4 | 100 | 9494 |
| Majority | 86.6 | 13.4 | 100 | 9494 |
| Leader   | 98.3 |  1.7 | 100 | 9494 |
| Chair    | 90.6 |  9.4 | 100 | 9494 |
| SMD      | 39.3 | 60.7 | 100 | 9494 |
| Suplente | 94.2 |  5.8 | 100 | 9494 |
| Female   | 64.2 | 35.8 | 100 | 9494 |
| 60th     | 68.2 | 31.8 | 100 | 9494 |
| 62nd     | 57.6 | 42.4 | 100 | 9494 |
| 64th     | 74.2 | 25.8 | 100 | 9494 |
| PAN      | 72.8 | 27.2 | 100 | 9494 |
| PRI      | 72.8 | 27.2 | 100 | 9494 |
| Left     | 70.0 | 30.0 | 100 | 9494 |
```

Table 2: Variable descriptives

Table 2 has a summary of the dependent and other variables of interest. Member-period obser-vations total 9494, of which more spoke than not. What is remarkable is that more than one-third of members (38 percent) on average did not utter a single word in the period, spoke, bMore than of Nearly 38 percent of members did not participate in debate at all in an average period. The median member spoke 593 words in a period, 607 when measured relative to days in office. Means are substantially higher (1400 words), denoting a right-skewed speech distribution.

5.2 Daily speech perspective

Figure 1 portrays debate distributions across periods. Solid points report periods' median speech length in words. It is quite clear in the plot that, with few exceptions, period medians are much the same as the overall median speech length of 599 words. Mild legislatura effects show up too,

Figure 1: Daily speech length in each legislative period observed. Non-speaking members excluded. Solid points indicate the median speech length in the period. Thick and thin lines connect the 25–75 and 10–90 percentiles, respectively. Hollow points are minima and maxima. Ordinary periods in black, extraordinary periods in gray.

the 60th medians slightly above and the 64th slightly below the overall median. Horizontal lines report the spread of the central portion of the density—the thicker line is the inter-quartile range, the thinner connects the first and ninth deciles. Period distributions are, in general, similar. The clearest exceptions are extraordinary periods, drawn in gray.

Hollow points are the periods' minima and maxima. Diputada Valentina Batres holds the record for delivering the longest speech in the three Legislaturas scrutinized. At 15,932 words, the speech delivered March 11th, 2008 is 50 percent longer than the runner-up and has about as many words as *Don Quijote de la Mancha*'s chapters 1 through 7 (forty-five pages in the edition I own). Batres and

legislators close to AMLO used dilatory tactics throughout the session, filibustering consideration of the new Sistema Nacional de Información Estadística y Geográfica.

The log scale magnifies the low side of the distribution. But it also blurs subtle but revealing differences in the high side. From 60th to 62nd, max went up while percentiles 75 and 90 remain at similar levels. Like Batres, an unusually high top decile consists of attempts to disrupt debate through filibustering. Dilatory tactics went down in 62nd compared with 60th, and sunstantially so in the 64th with a single party majority.

```
Words per day
| Legislatura    | min | 10% | 25% | 50% | 75% |  90% |   max |
| 60th           |  50 | 137 | 392 | 652 | 901 | 1215 | 15932 |
| 62nd           |  50 | 193 | 438 | 611 | 850 | 1254 |  9765 |
| 64th (partial) |  50 | 142 | 327 | 547 | 730 |  975 |  6358 |
```

5.3   Descriptive Analysis

```
|                  | % women |   of |
|------------------+---------+-------|
| Members          |      38 | 1774 |
| Cámara presidents|      35 |   31 |
| Party leaders    |      21 |   24 |
| - major party    |       0 |   12 |
| - opportunistic  |      42 |   12 |
| Committee chairs |      25 |  143 |
| Words spoken     |      41 | 17.5M |
|------------------+---------+-------|
```

Used nterms instead of seniority. Similar results, cleaner reading

```
FALSE   TRUE
   18     82
> sum(table(tmp.dips$repite=="no")) # all dips
[1] 1710
> sel <- which(data$dpresoff==0)
```

```
> table(data$nterms[sel])


   0    1    2    3    4
7558 1523  330   73   10
> summary(tmp <- lm(dv.nword ~ nterms   , data = data[sel,]))


Call:
lm(formula = dv.nword ~ nterms, data = data[sel, ])


Residuals:
   Min     1Q Median     3Q    Max
 -3428  -1224   -718    311  49067


Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  1223.80      30.04   40.73   <2e-16 ***
nterms        550.99      48.39   11.39   <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1


Residual standard error: 2664 on 9492 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.01348,Adjusted R-squared:  0.01337
F-statistic: 129.7 on 1 and 9492 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

5.4   Multivariate Analysis

The dependent variable quantifies a member's speech in floor debate over a legislative period. I rely

on two specifications: one absolute, one relative. The absolute $*words_{(i,p)} * is member i's total words in period p. Da$

$debates, adding zero towards the period's aggregate. The relative specification is *words_{(i,p)} * divided by the session$

10000.

    The right side of the equation includes explanatory variables in three groups: the member's

party, the member's position in the chamber hierarchy, and the member's personal traits. The partisan group includes *majority*, a dummy equal one if the member belonged to the majority party, zero otherwise. Given that one term only had a majority party, the variable indicates Morena party deputies in the 64th Legislature. Expectation. Next is *party size*, the seats that the member's party controlled in the chamber in the term as a proportion of all seats. Since rules allocate speaking time to the parties in proportion to their size, members of smaller parties have more opportunities to speak than members of larger parties, and the variable should have a negative effect.

A pair of dummies controls for the party's ideology. *Right* equals 1 for members of the right-of-center PAN, 0 otherwise. Left equals 1 for PRD members in 60th and 62nd, and Morena member in the 64th, 0 otherwise. The omitted group includes members of the PRI and the smaller opportunistic parties. The dummy should capture any systematic effect of left's more frequent filibustering attempts. (There is no a priori expectation associated with left and right.)

The chamber hierarchy group includes three explanatory variables. Seniority measures the terms as federal deputy that member i served befre the current term. With single-term limits, members were only eligible to run as diputados for non-consecutive terms, something few did. There are members of two types only in the data, those

hierarchy

seniority leader chair

member

female (age) smd sup

Figure 2 reports changes in the average predicted number of words associated with unit changes in explanatory variables. This exercise uses model 5 estimates. By translating into interpretable quantities, marginal effects are a convenient way to gauge negative binomial regression coefficients. It is clear in the plot that the larges effect is attributable to majority status. Other things constant (at mean values), members in the majority party each spoke between about 1,000 and 1,900 more words per period than the rest of the chamber. Multiplication of that average by Morena's 254 members in the 64th Legislatura produces 372 thousand additional words—47 percent of all

Table 3: Regression results

| | Words in period | | Words in period (relative to tenure | |
| | *negative binomial* | | *OLS* | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tenure (logged)	0.94***	0.97***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Majority	0.73***	0.67***	4,476.27***	5,258.27***
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(292.98)	(351.82)
Party size	−5.10***	−5.04***		
	(0.21)	(0.24)		
Right			−1,162.20***	−1,546.63***
			(59.95)	(71.42)
Left	0.01	0.09	−65.14	94.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(77.06)	(77.01)
Seniority	0.28***	0.33***	12.87	135.88*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(77.05)	(78.17)
Party leader	0.17***	0.18***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Comm. chair			363.47***	287.16***
			(83.26)	(82.49)
SMD	0.42**	0.40*	2,316.93***	2,386.04***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(210.89)	(208.99)
Suplente	0.35***	0.32***	−86.78	104.10
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(92.38)	(92.10)
62nd Leg.	−0.04	−0.04	−294.59***	−186.99***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(56.81)	(56.81)
64th Leg.	−0.34***	−0.33***	−464.64***	−388.86***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(113.82)	(112.58)
Female		0.23***		−691.36***
		(0.06)		(76.88)
Constant		0.18*		635.84***
		(0.10)		(94.29)

Figure 2: Average marginal effects from model 5. Dots report the effect in expected period speech length of a unit change in each independent variable, all else at mean values; bars are 95-percent confidence intervals.

words in the median ordinary period.

The report from a committee with a coalition chair experiences a 0.17 hike (0.06 standard error) in the likelihood of receiving a closed rule compared to a report by an opposition-chaired committee. The effect is as big as the average marginal effects of Hacienda Referral (0.18), which capures mostly high-significance draft laws, and that of Multiple Referrals (0.16), which we view as an indicator of issue complexity. We therefore find no statistical evidence to reject our Hypothesis 1. The results also confirm hypothesis 2, showing that a bill reported by a generally less friendly committe (chaired by the opposition), has a higher probability of receiving an open rule on the floor, thereby allowing the floor majority to bring back the bill to the median through floor amendments. Thus, presidents use open rules to control bills coming from preference distant committee chairs. The substantial effects of Hacienda Referral and Multiple Referrals deserve comment. They suggest, first, that when spending gets in the way, restrictive rules are the norm in Chile. Recall that Multiple Referrals exclude the Finance Committee, so there is an independent effect of bills with

jurisdictional overlaps worth investigating further, and which must be associated, in part at least, to influencing the report through a friendlier committee. 16 Furthermore, note that the Finance Committee was always chaired by a coalition member but, with the exception of the 1998–2000 period, never by a co-partisan of the president. This may explain the milder effect of the partisan specification of our key variable in model 1. Another effect worth highlighting is Introd. in Senate. Bills successfully passing the Upper Chamber first, where the opposition was systematically larger and attimes in control, were much less likely to get urgent status (the average marginal effect is 0.15 and significant). This suggests that agreements and compromises reached in the Senate ignited less, not more, protection from floor amendments in the Cámara's plenary, most likely as a consequence of the greater prefer- ence divergence between the President and the opposition-led Senate. Analysis of inter-chamber negotiation and the reliance on urgency in the Upper Chamber are interesting venues for future research. Finally, there are time trends in fast-track authority that simulations reveal neatly. Figure 5 portrays the predicted probability that a bill enters the fast-track throughout the legislative year. Regressors in model 3 are held constant to simulate a bill sent to the Cámara in the 2006–10 Legislature that was referred to a single committee, excluding Hacienda. Presidential Approval (insignificant across models) is set to the mean for President Bachelet's first term, coinciding in full with the 2006–10 Legislature. The inverted-U shape shows how fast-track probability, predicted at 0.17 for coalition-chaired committees at the start, and 0.08 for the rest, becomes much likelier in the first half of the legislative year. By the second quarter (June–August), the probability is at its peak, about 0.32 percent and 0.17, respectively. It then experiences a sharp drop, ending the austral Summer break at 0.13 for coalition-chaired committees, and 0.05 for others. And while 95- percent confidence bands overlap, they barely do so at the middle of the legislative year, lending confidence that we are picking up a signal and not just random noise.

Figure 3: Predicted speech length. Lines report point predictions using model 5.

5.4.1 Predicted words

6 Country-Specific Section

[ca 1000 words] In this section, you can feel free to make model extensions that have interest in the light of the chapter you are exploring. Please do not forget to explain the variables in use, as well as why they are important for your country. Include a table of results plus a plot for marginal effects.

7 Conclusions

[ca 500 words] concluding discussion of general patterns of speechmaking (institutions and empirical results in terms of background variables)

Stuff to add to EMM's text DONE 3. In terms of window of observation/time period under study: we don't have a particular guideline for this. Please use the window of observation that you believe is more representative of the politics of legislative debate in your country. Ideally we would like each chapter to include several legislative periods, but we are pragmatic here, considering data availability. EMM: Terminology - A Legislature (with Roman numerals for reasons I ignore) is an elected chamber for a legislative term, called a Congress in the U.S. Concurrent with presidential elections the chamber of deputies renovates in whole, and again at the presidential mid-term. Diputados remain three years in office and were single term-limited up to 2021. The 2021 midterm election will be the first since 1932 to allow incumbents on the ballot, a major change in Mexican legislative politics. - Legislative years break into two "ordinary periods", one covering the months of September through December, inclusive, another February through April, also inclusive. "Extraordinary periods" may be convened during the recess in order to consider a specific bill. Analysis aggregates each member's speeches in the duration of a given period (merging together all extraordinary periods that year, if any). So members in a legislative year like 2012-13 (that had no extraordinary periods) have two word aggregates in the dataset, one for each ordinary

period; in a year like 2013-14 (that did), they have three word aggregates in the data. Periods are the units of aggregation in the analysis. - A plenary session is a specific date in the calendar when diputados met. During ordinary periods, sessions are usually held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and may be scheduled in other weekdays if the Jucopo so decides. Diputados met on forty and thirty-one days in the first and second ordinary periods of 2013-14, respectively, and nine days in extraordinary periods, for a yearly total of eighty session days. (A session in North-American legislative parlance is a Mexican period.)

8   Appendix: Terminology

- A *Legislature* is an elected chamber for a legislative term, called a Congress in the U.S. Concurrent with presidential elections the chamber of deputies renovates in whole, and again at the presidential mid-term. Diputados remain three years in office and were single term-limited up to 2021. The 2021 mid-term election will be the first since 1932 to allow incumbents on the ballot, a major change in Mexican legislative politics. Analysis includes the 60th, 62nd, and 64th Legislatures (the Mexican Congress relies on Roman numerals to distinguish Legislatures since the second half of the Nineteenth century).

   - Legislative years break into two *ordinary legislative periods*, one covering the months of September through December, inclusive, another February through April, also inclusive. *Extraordinary legislative periods* may be convened during the recess in order to consider a specific bill. Analysis aggregates each member's speeches in the duration of a given period (merging together all extraordinary periods that year, if any). So members in a legislative year like 2012-13 (that had no extraordinary periods) have two word aggregates in the dataset, one for each ordinary period; in a year like 2013-14 (that did), they have three word aggregates in the data. Periods are the units of observation in the analysis.

   - A *plenary session* (or simply a session) is a specific date in the calendar when diputados met. During ordinary periods, sessions are usually held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and may be

scheduled in other weekdays if the Jucopo so decides. Diputados met on forty and thirty-one days in the first and second ordinary periods of 2013-14, respectively, and nine days in extraordinary periods, for a yearly total of eighty session days. (A session in North-American legislative parlance is a Mexican period.)

Acknowledgements

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