

IPS 220: Comparative Political Institutions

Instructor: Kenneth Mori McElwain
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Class Schedule:
Mon 2:15-5:05
Bldg. 160 Rm. 321

Office Hours:
Mon 1-2pm, Thu 1-3pm
Encina East, Rm. 103

Objectives

This course examines the origins, functions, and effects of political institutions. We will examine how the behavior of political actors are conditioned and funneled into different policy outputs by the institutional framework they operate in, going from the general – democracies vs. autocracies – to the specific – presidential vs. parliamentary systems or single-member vs. proportional representation electoral rules. In addition to studying the effect of political institutions, we will also explore new research on institutional endogeneity: namely, where institutions come from and how they change over time.

Requirements

You will have two different writing assignments for this class. First, you will write a **weekly 1-page paper describing the political institution of two different countries**. The institution in question will reflect the reading assignment for that week. You will get to choose the first country to study. I'll assign the second, based on interesting points of similarity and contrast. **The papers will be due on Monday before class, at 9AM.** Be prepared to discuss the readings in the context of your specialty countries.

Your second writing assignment is a **20 page take-home final / research paper**. During the final class, I will describe a country in the process of writing its constitution. I will detail that country's economic situation, distribution of wealth, ethnic composition, number of political parties, and the like. In your paper, you will outline your plan for that country's institutional architecture, referencing the readings and using similar countries as points of comparison. You'll need to weigh feasibility as well as utility: political elites won't necessarily support "optimal" institutions, so mix what "should" happen with what "would" happen.

Readings

There are three sets of readings for this class: 1) required books, available at the Stanford Bookstore (listed below); 2) journal articles, available through the e-journals section of the library homepage at http://library.stanford.edu/catdb/e_resources/index.html (denoted **ONLINE** in syllabus); 3) book chapters, available from <http://coursework.stanford.edu/> (denoted **COURSEWORK** in syllabus).

Required Books

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New York, Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 238-257

*Background Reading
(Not Required)*

North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Knight, J. (1992). *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Thelen, K. (1999). "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1999(2): 369-404.

Shepsle, K. A. (1989). "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2): 131-147.

Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New York, Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation.; Chpt. Introduction, 1-2

Alexander, G. (2001). "Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(3): 249-270.

Week 1: What's So Different about Democracies?

Olson, M. (1993). "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-576. **ONLINE**

Weingast, Barry R. "The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91. 2 (1997): 245-63. **ONLINE**

Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi (1997). "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49(2). **ONLINE**

Tsebelis, Chpt. 3

Lijphart, Chpts. 2, 3

Recommended

Bates, R. H. and D.-H. D. Lien (1985). "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government." Politics and Society 14(1): 53-70.

Boix, C. (2001). "Democracy, Development, and the Public Sector." American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 1-17.

Kitschelt, H. (2000). "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." Comparative Political Studies 33(6/7): 845-879.

Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems in Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Geddes, Barbara. "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association 1999.

Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Week 2: The Function and Behavior of Political Parties

Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Chpt. 2. **COURSEWORK**

Lijphart, Chpt. 5

Dalton and Wattenberg, Chpts. 4, 5, 8

Katz, R. S. and P. Mair (1995). "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." Party Politics 1(1): 5-28. **ONLINE**

Recommended

Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York, Wiley.

Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kirchheimer, O. (1990). "The Catch-All Party." The West European Party System. P. Mair. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 50-60.

Kalyvas, S. N. (1998). "From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon." Comparative Politics 30(3): 293-312.

Strom, K. (1989). "Inter-Party Competition in Advanced Democracies." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(3): 277-300.

Mainwaring, S. and T. R. Scully (1996). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Mair, P. (1997). Party System Change. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Gunther, R. and L. Diamond (2003). "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." Party Politics 9(2): 167-199.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press, 1967.

Hug, Simon. *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Week 3: Electoral Systems, or “Rules that Decide Who’s in Power”

Lijphart, Chpt. 8

Cox, G. W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., Chpts. 2-3, 8, 10-11

Carey, J. M. and M. S. Shugart (1995). "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." Electoral Studies 14(4): 417-439. **ONLINE**

Recommended

Caramani, D. (2003). "The End of Silent Elections: The Birth of Electoral Competition, 1832-1915." Party Politics 9(4): 411-443.

Rae, D. (1967). The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Reed, S. R. (1991). "Structure and Behavior: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case." British Journal of Political Science 29(1): 335-356.

Lijphart, Arend. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Gallagher, M. (1991). "Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems." Electoral Studies 10(1): 33-51.

Ordeshook, Peter, and Olga Shvetsova. "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994).

Taagepera, R. and M. S. Shugart (1989). Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, Yale University Press., Chpts TBA

Blais, A., D. Blake and S. Dion (1993). "Do Parties Make A Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies." American Journal of Political Science 37(1): 40-62.

Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics." *Journal of Political Economy* 89. 4 (1981): 642-64.

Horiuchi, Y. and J. Saito (2003). "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan." American Journal of Political Science 47(4): 669-682(14).

Week 4: Partisan Politics and Redistribution

- Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89. 5 (1981): 914-27. **ONLINE**
- Powell, G. B. and G. D. Whitten (1993). "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414. **ONLINE**
- Boix, C. (2000). "Partisan Governments, The International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93." *World Politics* 53(October): 38-73. **ONLINE**
- Chhibber, P. and I. Nooruddin (2004). "Do Party Systems Count? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(2): 152-187. **ONLINE**
- Dalton and Wattenberg, Chpts. 2, 10

Recommended

- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, Harper and Row., Chpts. 5-8
- Hibbs, Douglas. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977): 1467-87.
- Iversen, T. (1994). "The Logics of Electoral Politics: Spatial, Directional, and Mobilizational Effects." *Comparative Political Studies* 27(2): 155-189.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988.
- Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Stegmaier (2000). "Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 183-219.
- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Hallerberg, M. and J. Von Hagen (1999). "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union." *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*. J. M. Poterba and J. Von Hagen. Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 209-232.

Week 5: Presidential Systems

Shugart, M. S. and J. M. Carey (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., Chpts. 2, 6-7.

COURSEWORK

Frye, T. (1997). "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies." Comparative Political Studies 30(5): 523-552. **ONLINE**

Cheibub, Jose Antonio. "Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems." *American Political Science Review* 100. 3 (2006): 353-68.
ONLINE

Lijphart, Chpt. 7

Recommended

Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.; Chpts. TBA

Alt, J. E. and R. C. Lowry (1994). "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits - Evidence from the States." American Political Science Review 88(4): 811-828.

Moe, T. M. and M. Caldwell (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150(1): 171-195.

Poguntke, Thomas, and Paul Webb, eds. *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Skowronek, Stephen. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Week 6: Parliamentary Systems

Lijphart, Chpt. 6

Luebbert, Gregory M. *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986., Chpt. 3.

COURSEWORK

Strom, K., I. Budge and M. Laver (1994). "Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." American Journal of Political Science 38(2): 303-35. **ONLINE**

Huber, J. D. (1996). "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." American Political Science Review 90(2): 269-282. **ONLINE**

Laver, M. and K. A. Shepsle (1998). "Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival." American Journal of Political Science 42(1): 28-54. **ONLINE**

Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. "Short Versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50. 2 (2006): 251-63. **ONLINE**

Recommended

Cox, G. W. (1987). The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Mershon, Carol. *The Costs of Coalition*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Strom, K. (1990). Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., Chpts. TBA

Bowler, S., D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz (1999). "Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments." Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government. S. Bowler, D. M. Farrell and R. S. Katz. Columbus, Ohio State University Press: Chpt. 1.

Laver, M. and K. A. Shepsle (1990). "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics." British Journal of Political Science 20(4): 489-507.

Laver, M. (1998). "Models of Government Formation." Annual Review of Political Science 1: 1-25.

Week 7: Legislative Organization

Lijphart, Chpt. 11

Tsebelis, Chpt. 4, 7

Weingast, B. R. and W. J. Marshall (1988). "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 132-163. **ONLINE**

Huber, John D. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 86. 3 (1992). **ONLINE**

Bradbury, John Charles, and W. Mark Crain. "Legislative Organization and Government Spending: Cross-Country Evidence." *Journal of Public Economics* 82 (2001): 309-25. **ONLINE**

Recommended

Huber, J. D. and C. R. Shipan (2002). Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Gilligan, T. W. and K.rehbiel (1995). "The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis and Legislative Organization." Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press: 37-70.

Shepsle, K. A. and B. R. Weingast (1995). "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press: 5-35.

Shepsle, K. A. and B. R. Weingast (1984). "When do Rules of Procedure Matter?" The Journal of Politics 46(1): 206-221.

Iversen, T., and A. Wren. "Equality: Employment, and Budgetary Restraint - the Trilemma of the Service Economy." *World Politics* 50. 4 (1998): 507-+.

Londregan, John. *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

McNollgast. "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15. 1 (1999): 180-217.

Week 8: Federalism and Decentralization

Weingast, B. R. (1995). "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(1): 1-32. **ONLINE**

Tsebelis, Chpt. 6

Lijphart, Chpt 10

Scheiner, E. (2005). "Pipelines of Pork: Japanese Politics and a Model of Local Opposition Party Failure." Comparative Political Studies 38(7): 799-823. **ONLINE**

Rodden, Jonathan. "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." *American Journal of Political Science* 46. 3 (2002): 670-87. **ONLINE**

———. "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." *International Organization* 57 (2003): 695-729. **ONLINE**

Recommended

Tiebout, C. M. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." The Journal of Political Economy 64(5): 416-424.

Rodden, J. A. (2003). Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Chpts. TBA

Week 9: Endogenous Political Institutions

- Shepsle, K. A. (1979). "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 27-59. **ONLINE**
- Shugart, M. S. (1998). "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices." British Journal of Political Science 28(1): 1-29. **ONLINE**
- Boix, C. (1999). "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." American Political Science Review 93(3). **ONLINE**
- McElwain, Kenneth Mori. "Manipulating Electoral Rules: Intra-Party Conflict, Partisan Interests, and Constitutional Thickness." Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2005., Chpt. 3 **COURSEWORK**
- McElwain, Kenneth (2007). "Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance, Japanese Style." **COURSEWORK**

Recommended

- Riker, W. H. (1980). "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74(2): 432-446.
- Shvetsova, O. (2003). "Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects." Constitutional Political Economy 14: 191-212.
- Andrews, Josephine T., and Robert W. Jackman. "Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under Extreme Uncertainty." *Electoral Studies* 24 (2005): 65-84.
- Rogowski, R. (1987). "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." International Organization 41(2): 203-223.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4. 2 (1992): 207-23.
- Brady, David, and Jongryn Mo. "Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice." *Comparative Political Studies* 24 (1992): 405-29.
- Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, and Beatriz Magaloni. "Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico's Transition to Democracy." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13. 3 (2001): 271-93.