# A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas

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In a democracy the constitutional structure and electoral laws provide the basic framework within which the nation's political life functions. An informed understanding of the constitutional and electoral components of this framework is required to fully comprehend the political dynamics of any democracy. However, academic knowledge of the electoral systems of the Americas has not kept pace with the recent growth in the number of functioning democracies in the region. This article partially fills this void by providing a description of the prominent dimensions of the electoral systems of 33 countries in the Americas since 1945.

This article provides a concise description of the electoral systems of the Americas. In the past fifteen years the number of democratic systems in the Americas has increased exponentially. Unfortunately, this upsurge in democracy has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in the level of scholarly knowledge of the important dimensions of the electoral systems in the region. The goal of this article is to describe the key dimensions of electoral systems in the Americas in the post-1945 period. The description of the rules governing legislative elections in the region is comparable to that presented by Lijphart (1994) in his analysis of electoral systems in 27 primarily West European and Anglo-American democracies. Additional information is provided on dimensions related to the popular election of constitutionally powerful presidents and second legislative chambers, two features possessed by many of the systems in the Americas but not shared by most of the systems in Lijphart's study. The tables which follow demonstrate the many basic differences and similarities in the regime types, constitutional arrangements, and electoral laws employed by the nations of the Americas.

This article does not attempt to provide a review of the political origins or consequences of different electoral rules, nor a description or explanation of the logic of the different methods. For a discussion of these and related topics the reader is referred to works by Jones (1994), Lijphart (1984, 1994), Shugart and Carey (1992), and Taagepera and Shugart (1989).

Only systems that were independent and democratic for a minimum of five years are included in this article.[1] A system is considered democratic if its government has been elected via open and competitive elections. The merits of this institutional approach toward the classification of democratic systems have been discussed by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990) and Remmer (1991). Following the methodology of Powell (1982), if a democratic regime survived a minimum of five years, then it was included.

The years for which information is included extend from 1945 to 1994.[2] The time periods given in the tables indicate the years during which a particular system operated and when (or if) it ceased to function. For example in Table 1, the system 'Chile I' began in 1945 and ended in 1973. All time periods which lack an end date continue through 15 February 1994.

In a number of nations the electoral laws or institutional structures employed changed during the period of analysis. Nations which experienced a major change in one of the dimensions examined in this study are divided into separate systems in the table where that dimension is examined. This classification method is similar to that employed by Lijphart (1994). As will be noted in the following tables, many nations have changed important components of their electoral systems during the past twenty years. These modifications are representative of the tremendous salience of the issue of electoral law reform in many of the nations in the region.[3]

## Regime Type

The most prominent distinction among democratic systems is between presidential and parliamentary democracies. Presidential systems are those where the constitutionally powerful executive (1) is elected by a popular vote, and (2) holds office for a fixed term (i.e. is not dependent on legislative confidence).[4] Parliamentary regimes are those where the constitutionally powerful executive is (1) selected by the legislature, and (2) dependent on the confidence of the legislature.[5] There is a vast literature on the distinctions between presidential and parliamentary systems, which cannot be discussed here.

Table 1 lists the distribution of democratic presidential and parliamentary systems in the Americas in the post-1945 era. The distribution between the use of the two regime types falls roughly along the lines of colonial origin and date of independence. The former Spanish and Portuguese colonies, which all achieved independence in the first half of the nineteenth century, have presidential constitutions.[6] Conversely, the former British colonies, which, with the exception of the United States and Canada, achieved independence during the second half of the twentieth century, possess parliamentary systems. Exceptions to this general division are the presidentialist United States and presidentialist Guyana. Similarly, while many presidential and parliamentary systems possess bicameral legislatures, only in the presidential systems is the second chamber directly elected and endowed with a level of constitutional power which is *de jure* and *de facto* near or equal to that of the lower house.

## The Election of the President

A populace can select its executive in presidential systems in many ways. These popular elections can either be direct (in which the population directly chooses a

TABLE 1. Democratic electoral systems in the Americas since 1945

| System | Time period | Form of government | Legislative branch* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1981- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Argentina | 1983- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Bahamas | 1973- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Barbados | 1966- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Belize | 1981- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Bolivia | 1985- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Brazil I | 1945-64 | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Brazil II | 1986- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Canada | 1945- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Chile I | 1945-73 | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Chile II | 1989- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Colombia | 1974- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Costa Rica | 1953- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Dominica | 1978- | Parliamentary | Unicameral |
| Dominican Republic | 1978- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Ecuador | 1978- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| El Salvador | 1984- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Grenada | 1984- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Guatemala | 1985- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Guyana | 1992- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Honduras | 1981- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Jamaica | 1962- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Mexico | 1994- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Nicaragua | 1984- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Panama | 1989- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Paraguay | 1993- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Peru I | 1963-68 | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Peru II | 1980-92 | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Peru III | 1995- | Presidential | Unicameral |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 1983- | Parliamentary | Unicameral |
| Saint Lucia | 1979- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| Saint Vincent | 1979- | Parliamentary | Unicameral |
| Suriname I | 1975-80 | Parliamentary | Unicameral |
| Suriname II† | 1991- | Hybrid | Unicameral |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1962- | Parliamentary | *Bicameral* |
| United States | 1944- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Uruguay I | 1942-52 | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Uruguay II | 1952-66 | Collegial | Bicameral |
| Uruguay III‡ | 1966- | Presidential | Bicameral |
| Venezuela | 1958- | Presidential | Bicameral |

* In the 'Legislative branch' column, '*Bicameral*' in italics indicates that the second chamber (senate) is an appointed body.

† Suriname II: The arrangement is similar to that of a parliamentary system with a ceremonial president with the exception that the indirectly elected president is granted a considerable degree of constitutional power.

‡ Uruguay III: During the period 1973-84 Uruguay was governed by a military dictatorship and no democratic elections were held. In the post-1984 period the same electoral system employed prior to the 1973 coup is used.

candidate) or indirect (in which the citizenry selects electors who in turn choose the president). All of the presidential systems examined in this study directly elect their chief executive with the exception of Argentina, the United States, and to a certain extent Bolivia and Chile I.

Two separate methods of selection are employed by the systems which directly elect their president: the plurality and majority run-off formulas. Under the plurality formula the candidate who receives a relative majority of the popular vote in the first and only round of popular elections becomes president. In majority run-off systems a candidate who receives an absolute majority of the valid popular vote (over 50 per cent) in the first round of elections becomes president. If, however, no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote, then a run-off is held between the top two challengers from the first round with the second-round winner becoming president.[7]

A third formula which combines aspects of both direct and indirect election is the majority congressional system used by Bolivia and Chile I. Under this formula if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round of popular elections, then the president is chosen in a joint session of the bicameral legislature from among the top two (Chile I) or three (Bolivia) candidates from the first round. Finally, in both Argentina and the United States citizens vote for members of an electoral college, who in turn select the president.[8] In both nations presidential electors are chosen from within multi-member electoral districts corresponding to the nations' principal administrative units. However in contrast to the plurality rule employed in the United States to allocate electors at the district level, Argentina employs a proportional representation (PR) formula.

Table 2 lists the distribution of the different presidential formulas. While traditionally the plurality formula has been the favoured method of executive selection in Latin America, in recent years the majority run-off formula has grown in popularity.

The timing of presidential and legislative elections can be concurrent (where the presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day), nonconcurrent (where the presidential and legislative elections occur on separate dates), or 'mixed' (where the legislative elections are regularly held both concurrently and nonconcurrently with the executive contest).[9] As Table 2 details, concurrent election timing is by far the most popular method among these presidential systems.[10]

The issues of presidential re-election and, to a lesser extent, term length are topics of considerable importance in presidential systems. The issue of presidential re-election has been one of the principal points of contention in the current debate over constitutional reform in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, and Nicaragua. While the rule requiring a president to wait 'one interim term' prior to seeking re-election has historically been the most popular, a complete ban on re-election ('no re-election') now represents the modal rule. Midway between these two arrangements is the framework which requires the president to sit out 'two interim terms' before seeking re-election. Finally, a small number of systems allow unlimited ('no limit') presidential re-election. Presidential term lengths vary between four and six years.

## The Legislatures

Tables 3 through 6 outline the basic features of the electoral dimensions which govern the selection of the legislatures in the Americas. Basic dimensions common to many or all of these tables include: (1) the electoral formula employed to allocate the legislative seats; (2) the average assembly size; (3) the average number of electoral districts; (4) the average district magnitude; (5) the presence or absence of any type of district threshold; (6) the term length of the legislators.

There are two prominent general types of electoral formulas used to allocate legislative seats in these systems. Proportional representation (PR) is the most commonly used formula. The other popular method of seat allocation is the plurality formula.

There is a wide variety of PR formulas which can be utilized to allocate legislative seats. These formulas, however, tend to fall into one of three families: largest remainders, highest average, and single transferable vote (Lijphart, 1994). In the systems examined here, only formulas from the first two families are employed.[11]

Two types of largest remainders formulas are utilized. The Hare formula uses a set of quotas (i.e. the number of votes in a district divided by the number of legislative seats apportioned to that district) to distribute seats, with political parties receiving one seat for every full quota won. A system of largest remainders is used to allocate the seats which remain after the population of full quotas has been exhausted. The Hagenbach–Bischoff formula operates in the same manner, except that the quota is calculated by dividing the votes cast in the district by the number of legislative seats apportioned to a district plus one.[12]

Two types of highest average formulas are used. The d'Hondt formula utilizes a system of successive divisors (1, 2, 3, . . .) to allocate the legislative seats in sequential order to the political party with the highest average at each iteration until all seats are allocated. The pure Sainte-Laguë formula operates in the same manner, except that the divisors employed are odd integers (1, 3, 5, . . .). One method of semi-proportional representation (Semi-PR) used allocates two-thirds of the seats in a district to the plurality winner and one-third to the second place finisher.

While the previously mentioned PR formulas are all employed in systems with multi-member districts, the plurality formula is used (with a few minor exceptions) in single-member districts. Under this system, the candidate who receives the relative majority of the votes in a district is elected.

Other noteworthy dimensions for legislative elections include the average size of the legislative assembly and the average number of electoral districts employed for the assembly elections. The average district magnitude is a product of the number of legislative seats being contested divided by the number of electoral districts.[13] Single-member districts tend to be the general rule for the parliamentary systems, the United States, and many of the directly elected senates. Multi-member districts are used to select members of the lower house in all presidential systems, with the exception of the United States, as well as senators in a number of nations.

An important additional factor that is often overlooked is the use of thresholds or quotas which must be reached in order for a party to be eligible to receive legislative seats. In the systems examined here, with one exception, these thresholds and quotas are applied at the district level only. In all of these systems the quota is calculated by dividing the number of votes cast in a district by the number of seats being disputed in that district ($v / s$). For example, in a system with a one-quota threshold a party must receive a number of votes in the district greater than or equal to the quota in order to be eligible to receive any legislative seats in that district. Finally, the term lengths of the legislators are listed in all of the tables.

For the election of members of the lower/single houses many PR systems use more than one tier of districts. The most basic method of legislative election utilizes one tier. Table 3 lists the systems which employ PR and single-tier districting to select members of the lower/single house.

Table 4 provides information similar to Table 3 for the PR systems which use more than one tier to allocate seats in their lower/single house. The systems are

TABLE 2. Presidential systems: the election of the executive

| System | Time period | Presidential formula | Presidential-lower/single house election timing | Presidential term (years) | Presidential re-election |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 1983- | Electoral college | Mixed | 6 | One interim term |
| Bolivia | 1985- | Majority congressional | Concurrent | 4 | One interim term |
| Brazil I | 1945-54 | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | One interim term |
| Brazil II | 1954-64 | Plurality | Nonconcurrent | 5 | One interim term |
| Brazil III | 1986- | Majority run-off | Nonconcurrent | 5 | One interim term |
| Chile I | 1945-73 | Majority congressional | Nonconcurrent | 6 | One interim term |
| Chile II | 1989- | Majority run-off | Nonconcurrent[1] | 6 | One interim term |
| Colombia I | 1974-91 | Plurality | Concurrent[2] | 4 | No re-election |
| Colombia II | 1991- | Majority run-off | Concurrent[2] | 4 | No re-election[3] |
| Costa Rica | 1953- | Plurality[3] | Concurrent | 4 | No limit |
| Dominican Republic | 1978- | Plurality | Concurrent | 4 | No re-election |
| Ecuador | 1978- | Majority run-off | Mixed[1] | 4 | No re-election |
| El Salvador | 1984- | Majority run-off | Nonconcurrent | 5 | No re-election |
| Guatemala | 1985- | Majority run-off | Concurrent | 5 | No re-election |
| Guyana | 1992- | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | No limit |
| Honduras | 1981- | Plurality | Concurrent | 4 | No re-election |
| Mexico | 1994- | Plurality | Mixed | 6 | No re-election |
| Nicaragua | 1984- | Plurality | Concurrent | 6 | No limit |
| Panama | 1989- | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | Two interim terms |
| Paraguay | 1993- | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | No re-election |
| Peru I | 1963-68 | Plurality[5] | Concurrent | 6 | One interim term |
| Peru II | 1980-92 | Majority run-off[6] | Concurrent | 5 | One interim term |
| Peru III | 1995- | Majority run-off | Concurrent | 5 | One term limit[7] |
| United States | 1944- | Electoral college | Mixed | 4 | Two term limit |
| Uruguay I | 1942-52[8] | Plurality | Concurrent | 4 | One interim term |
| Uruguay II | 1952-66[8] | Plurality/Collegial[9] | Concurrent | 4 | One interim term |
| Uruguay III | 1966- | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | One interim term |
| Venezuela | 1958- | Plurality | Concurrent | 5 | Two interim terms |

1 Chile II: In 1989 elections for the Presidency and bicameral legislature were concurrent. In 1993 elections were held for the Presidency, Chamber and nearly one-half of the Senate. Prior to the 1993 elections the major political parties agreed to change the presidential term length to six years before March 1994. Additional constitutional reform (e.g. of the electoral timing cycle) is likely to occur during 1994.

2 Colombia I and II: For Colombia I (excluding the 1974 elections) and Colombia II the legislative elections are respectively held approximately three and two months prior to the presidential contest. In 1991 extraordinary legislative elections were held under the new 1991 constitution.

3 Costa Rica: The Costa Rican constitution specifies that to be elected a candidate must receive over 40 per cent of the vote, or else a run-off is held between the two candidates who received the largest number of votes. From 1953 until 1969 former presidents could seek re-election after being out of office for two interim terms. Since 1969 all presidential re-election has been prohibited, although a 'grandfather' clause was included allowing presidents elected prior to this amendment to be re-elected one more time.

4 Ecuador: The 1978-79 and 1984 legislative elections were concurrent with the second and first rounds respectively of the presidential election (except for the 12 national deputies who in 1978 were elected concurrently with the first round). Since 1986 Ecuador has employed a mixed timing system. For more information see Table 4.

5 Peru I: The candidate with the relative majority of the popular vote became president provided that he/she won a minimum of one-third of the vote. If no candidate reached this threshold then the Chamber and Senate meeting in joint session would choose from among the three candidates who received the most popular votes.

6 Peru II: For the 1980 election a one-time exception lowered the normal 50 per cent threshold to 36 per cent, with a run-off to be held in Congress if no candidate surpassed this threshold. For the 1985 and 1990 elections the 50 per cent threshold was calculated including both null and blank votes.

7 Peru III: After one interim term, former presidents may be re-elected. If re-elected, they are once again limited to two consecutive terms in office.

8 Uruguay I and II: In 1952 after a constitutional reform a collegial executive was elected by the Congress. The first popular election under the collegial framework took place in 1954.

9 Uruguay II: Under the collegial executive framework the plurality party in the election received six seats on the governing National Council while the party which finished second received three seats. The national presidency rotated annually among the Council members of the majority party.

TABLE 3. Lower/single Houses elected using proportional representation: single-tier districting

| System | Time period | Electoral formula | Average district magnitude[1] | Average number of districts[1] | Average assembly size[1] | District threshold | Term length (years) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 1983- | d'Hondt | 6.24[2] | 23.83[2] | 255 | 3% Padron Electoral[2] | 4 |
| Bolivia I | 1985 | LR-Hare | 14.44 | 9 | 130 | 1 quota | 4 |
| Bolivia II | 1989 | LR-Hare | 14.44 | 9 | 130 | | 4 |
| Bolivia III | 1993- | Sainte-Laguë | 14.44 | 9 | 130 | | 4 |
| Brazil I | 1945-50 | Hare[3] | 13 | 22 | 286 | | 5 |
| Brazil II | 1950-64 | d'Hondt | 13.65 | 25 | 341.25 | 1 quota[4] | 4 |
| Brazil III | 1986- | d'Hondt | 18.68 | 26.5 | 495 | 1 quota[4] | 4 |
| Chile I | 1945-73 | d'Hondt | 5.23 | 28.25 | 147.75 | 1 quota[4] | 4 |
| Chile II | 1989- | d'Hondt | 2 | 60 | 120 | | 4 |
| Colombia I | 1974-91 | LR-Hare[5] | 7.65 | 26 | 199 | | 4 |
| Colombia II | 1991- | LR-Hare | 4.88 | 33 | 161[6] | | 4 |
| Costa Rica | 1953- | LR-Hare | 7.83 | 7 | 54.82 | 1/2 quota | 4 |
| Dominican Republic | 1978- | d'Hondt | 3.96 | 28.5 | 112.75 | | 5 |
| Guyana | 1992- | LR-Hare | 53 | 1 | 53[7] | | 4 |
| Honduras | 1981- | LR-Hare | 6.47 | 18 | 116.5[8] | | 6 |
| Nicaragua II | 1990- | Hare[9] | 10 | 9 | 90[9] | | 5 |
| Panama | 1989- | LR-Hare[10] | 1.68 | 40 | 67 | 1/2 quota[10] | 5 |
| Paraguay | 1993- | d'Hondt | 4.44 | 18 | 80 | | 6 |
| Peru I | 1963-68 | d'Hondt | 5.83 | 24 | 140 | | 5 |
| Peru II | 1980-92 | d'Hondt | 7.01 | 25.67 | 180 | | 5 |
| Peru III | 1995- | d'Hondt[11] | 120 | 1 | 120 | | 4 |
| Uruguay I | 1942-66 | d'Hondt | 99 | 1[12] | 99 | | 5 |
| Uruguay II | 1966- | d'Hondt | 99 | 1[12] | 99 | | 5 |
| Suriname II | 1991- | d'Hondt | 5.1 | 10 | 51 | | |

1. The averages apply only to elections held prior to 15 February 1994.

2. Argentina: Following the 1983 election, half of the Chamber has been renewed every two years. In 1987 no deputies were elected from the then territory of Tierra del Fuego, resulting in only 23 districts for 1987. The Padron Electoral is the number of registered voters in the district.

3. Brazil I: All remainder seats were allocated at the district level to the party which won the plurality of the vote in the district.

4. Brazil I, II and III: The quota is calculated based on valid, null and blank votes.

5. Colombia I: For districts in which two deputies were elected the Hagenbach–Bischoff formula was employed.

6. Colombia II: The 1991 constitution allows for the establishment of special districts with up to five additional seats to provide for the representation of ethnic groups, political minorities, and Colombians residing in the exterior.

7. Guyana: In addition to these 53 directly elected members, the Guyanan National Assembly has ten members elected by the ten regional democratic councils (each council elects one member) and two elected by the National Congress of Local Democratic Organizations.

8. Honduras: In 1985 a second compensatory tier of six seats was employed. These seats are not included in the assembly average.

9. Nicaragua II: For the two smallest multi-member electoral districts (one with three seats and the other two) the Hagenbach–Bischoff allocation formula is employed. All remainder seats are allocated at the district level in descending order (one seat per party) to the parties which received the largest number of votes in the district. Not included in the average assembly size are unsuccessful candidates for the presidency who receive seats in the National Assembly if they win a percentage of the national vote equal to or greater than the average of the quotas in the nation's nine legislative electoral districts. In 1984 and 1990 six and two seats respectively were allocated under this rule.

10. Panama: remainder seats are allocated in a two-step process at the district level. The first allocation is to parties which achieved the 1/2 quota requisite, yet did not possess a full quota. If seats still remain after this allocation then they are allocated using the LR-Hare formula, but from a vote base calculated by subtracting 1/2 of a quota from each party's vote total for every seat already won. In the 28 districts which elect only one legislator the plurality formula is employed. Finally, any party which won a minimum of 3 per cent of the valid vote at the national level, yet received no legislative seats, receives one compensatory seat.

11. Peru III: No official decision regarding either the electoral formula or the use of a threshold/quota has been made as of yet. It is likely, however, that the d'Hondt formula will be adopted, with no use of any type of threshold.

12. Uruguay I and II: The Uruguayan Chamber seats are allocated in a three-stage process, with the ultimate tier the nation as a whole. The framework is functionally equivalent to the use of a single national district.

TABLE 4. Lower/single Houses elected using proportional representation: two-tier districting

| System | Time period | Tiers | Single ballot or separate ballots | Electoral formula | Average district magnitude[1] | Average number of districts[1] | Average number of members in tier[1] | District threshold | Term length (years) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ecuador | 1978– | District | Separate | LR–Hare | 2.94 | 20.33 | 59.83 | 0.6 of quota[2] | 2 |
| | | National | | LR–Hare | 12 | 1 | 12 | 0.6 of quota[2] | 4 |
| El Salvador | 1984– | District | Single | LR–Hare | 4.38 | 14 | 61.33 | | 3 |
| | | National[3] | | LR–Hare | 20 | 1 | 20 | | 3 |
| Guatemala | 1985– | District | Separate | d'Hondt | 3.52 | 23 | 81 | | 5 |
| | | National | | d'Hondt | 27 | 1 | 27 | | 5 |
| Mexico | 1994– | District | Single | Plurality | 1 | 300 | 300 | | 3 |
| | | National[4] | | LR–Hare | 200 | 1 | 200 | 1.5% of vote[1] | 3 |
| Nicaragua I | 1984–90 | District | Single | Hare | | 9 | full quotas[5] | 1 quota | 6 |
| | | National[5] | | LR–Hare | | 1 | remainders[5] | | 6 |
| Suriname I | 1975–80 | District | Separate | LR–Hare[6] | 2.7 | 10 | 27 | 1 quota[6] | 4 |
| | | National | | LR–Hare | 12 | 1 | 12 | 1 quota | 4 |
| Venezuela I | 1958–93 | District | Single | d'Hondt | | 23 | 174.29 | | 5 |
| | | Compensatory | | | | 1 | 15 | 1 quota[7] | 5 |
| Venezuela II | 1993– | SMD | Separate[8] | Plurality | 1 | 102 | 102[8] | | 5 |
| | | State | | d'Hondt | | 23 | 87 | | 5 |
| | | Compensatory | | | | 1 | 15 | 1 quota[7] | 5 |

[1] The averages apply only to elections held prior to 15 February 1994.

[2] Ecuador: Prior to 1987, parties that did not obtain half of a quota were ineligible to receive seats. This threshold was raised in 1987 to 0.6 of a quota, with parties reaching this minimum eligible to compete for remainder seats. If, however, no party receives above a half quota/0.6 of a quota then parties below these thresholds become eligible to receive seats. The law has further technical provisions of this type.

[3] El Salvador: The second tier (National District) was first introduced for the 1991 election. This a a separate, not compensatory, district.

[4] Mexico: No party may receive more than 63 per cent (315) of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. To be eligible to receive any national tier seats a party must receive a minimum of 1.5 per cent of the national vote.

[5] Nicaragua I: All remainder seats from the nine electoral districts were allocated at the national level. Ninety deputies were elected from the two tiers combined.

[6] Suriname I: Districts where two legislators were elected (three of the ten) employed a plurality formula with each voter given two votes (to be used for separate candidates). The threshold requirement applied only to districts where more than two legislators were elected.

[7] Venezuela I and II: Parties which are under-represented in the allocation of district level seats relative to the percentage of the national vote won by them are eligible to receive a limited number of compensatory seats (the maximum number per party, currently five for the Chamber and three for the Senate, has varied over time) proportionate to the percentage of votes won and seats already received. To be eligible for compensatory seats a party must win at least one quota. The Venezuelan quota is calculated by dividing the total number of votes nationally by the fixed number of district level seats. The same process is also used for the Senate. The total number of compensatory seats allocated is not fixed and varies each election.

[8] Venezuela II: While two separate ballots are used, the second PR ballot is the more important one for overall seat allocation (the same as in Germany). Although contrary to the case in Germany, the allocation process based on the two ballots is done at the state (i.e. district) level. A single ballot is maintained for the state (i.e. PR list) and compensatory seats. While technically 50 per cent of the fixed number of seats are to be from single-member districts (SMD), this percentage is likely to be higher given that the law states that half of the seats or the larger whole number of seats are to be elected from single-member districts (e.g. a state which has been apportioned seven deputies would elect four from single-member districts).

TABLE 5. Lower/single Houses elected using the plurality formula

| Electoral system | Time period | Electoral formula | Average number of districts[1] | Average assembly size[1] | Term length[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1981– | Plurality | 17 | 17 | 5 years max. |
| Bahamas | 1973– | Plurality | 44.75 | 44.75 | 5 years max. |
| Barbados I | 1966 | Plurality[3] | 12 | 24 | 5 years max. |
| Barbados II | 1971– | Plurality | 26 | 26 | 5 years max. |
| Belize | 1981– | Plurality | 28.33 | 28.33 | 5 years max. |
| Canada | 1945– | Plurality | 269.31[4] | 270.31 | 5 years max. |
| Dominica | 1978– | Plurality | 21 | 21[5] | 5 years max. |
| Grenada | 1984– | Plurality | 15 | 15 | 5 years max. |
| Jamaica | 1962– | Plurality | 56.38 | 56.38 | 5 years max. |
| St Kitts and Nevis | 1983– | Plurality | 11 | 11[6] | 5 years max. |
| St Lucia | 1979– | Plurality | 17 | 17 | 5 years max. |
| St Vincent | 1979– | Plurality | 13.67 | 13.67[7] | 5 years max. |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1962– | Plurality | 36 | 36 | 5 years max. |
| United States | 1944– | Plurality[8] | 433.85[8] | 435.15 | 2 years |

[1] The averages apply only to elections held prior to 15 February 1994.

[2] The term '5 year max.' signifies that term lengths are not fixed, but that their maximum duration is five years.

[3] Barbados I: Every district elected two deputies. Voters were provided with two votes, to be cast for separate candidates.

[4] Canada: From 1945 until 1968 there was a pair of two-member districts.

[5] Dominica: The House of Assembly is composed of 21 elected representatives and nine senators who can be appointed or elected. As of 1993 the senators have been appointed by the ceremonial president, five based on the advice of the prime minister and four on the advice of the leader of the opposition. Neither these nor the senators of the other nations where this arrangement is employed are listed in the average assembly size.

[6] St Kitts and Nevis: The National Assembly is composed of 11 directly elected members and a number of senators (up to two-thirds of the number of elected members) appointed by the governor general (two-thirds in accordance with the advice of the prime minister and one-third with the advice of the leader of the opposition). Currently there are three appointed senators.

[7] St Vincent: The St Vincent and the Grenadines House of Assembly is composed of 15 (13 prior to 1989) popularly elected members as well as six appointed members. These six additional members are appointed by the governor general, with four proposed by the prime minister and two by the leader of the opposition.

[8] United States: A small number of states at different points in time have used the majority run-off formula to elect members of Congress. There have also been a few minor deviations from the use of single-member districts.

almost evenly split between those which employ separate ballots for the separate tiers and those which use a single ballot. With the exception of Mexico, Nicaragua (1984) and Venezuela, the allocation of seats within the separate tiers are completely independent of each other.

Table 5 presents information for systems which utilize the plurality formula to elect the members of their lower/single house. With a few minor exceptions noted in the table, these systems all employ single-member plurality districts.

In Table 6 information is provided for those systems which directly elect members of a second chamber (i.e. senate) which shares equal or near equal constitutional power with the lower house.[14] The table provides information on the key

electoral dimensions similar to that supplied in the previous tables. In addition, details are given for two very important aspects of the senates which are most often not of equal importance when discussing the lower/single houses. First, the renovation cycle for some senates is quite distinct (e.g. the US Senate renews one-third of its members every two years). Secondly, many senates have apportionment schemes which are designed to represent geographic administrative units rather than population as tends to be the case for most lower/single houses. In a majority of the senates each principal administrative unit receives an equal number of senators regardless of its population. Other systems elect the senators from a national district. Intermediate between these two extremes are methods which provide a minimum number of senators per geographic unit, but then allocate additional seats based on population. Clearly, the two extreme apportionment schemes reflect differing views over the role of the senate in presidential systems. In the former case senators are the representatives of distinct geographic entities, while in the latter they are the representatives of the nation.

In Table 7 the number of electoral districts and assembly size as of the most recent legislative election is provided for the lower/single houses and senates of the current functioning democracies in the Americas. In all cases, the other electoral dimensions noted in the previous tables remain in force.

## Conclusion

The preceding discussion has focused on the salient dimensions of the electoral systems of the Americas. The region possesses a diverse population of regime types and methods of democratic selection. Both parliamentary and presidential systems thrive in the Americas, as do unicameral and bicameral legislatures. Many legislators are chosen from single-member plurality districts while others are selected from one national district using PR. Much research on the political causes and consequences of these different dimensions and arrangements remains to be done. It is hoped that the information provided in this article will help facilitate these endeavours.[15]

## Notes

1. This provision was violated to include Mexico and Peru III, which are scheduled to hold democratic elections in 1994 and 1995 respectively. There is, however, no guarantee that these elections, if they are held, will be democratic.
2. Elections held prior to 1945 in which officials were elected whose terms extended into the post-1945 period are also included.
3. During 1994 significant constitutional and electoral law reform is likely to take place in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.
4. With the possible exception of the hybrid case of Suriname II there are no semi-presidential systems in the Americas. However, among the region's presidential systems there exists considerable variation in the degree of constitutional power granted to the president. For an extended discussion of this variation see Shugart and Carey (1992).
5. This is a very basic definition of presidential and parliamentary systems. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, please see Lijphart (1992, 1994), Linz et al. (1990), Shugart and Carey (1992), and Súarez (1982).
6. Panama, which was formerly a department of Colombia, gained independence in 1903.
7. Costa Rica, a hybrid of these two methods, requires that a candidate receive over 40 per cent of the vote to be elected in the first round.
8. In each system an absolute majority of the electors is required to elect the president in the electoral college.

TABLE 6. The election of the second chamber (Senate) in strong Senate systems

| Electoral system | Time period | Electoral formula | Average district magnitude[1] | Average Senate size[1] | Average number of districts[1] | Term lengths (years) | Renovation | Timing cycle vis-à-vis President | Apportionment of Senate seats[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 1983- | Plurality[3] | 1 | 46.5 | 23.25 | 9 | 1/3 every 3 yrs | Nonconcurrent | 2 per province |
| Bolivia | 1985- | Semi-PR | 3 | 27 | 9 | 4 | Complete | Concurrent | 3 per department |
| Brazil I | 1945-54 | Plurality | 1.5[4] | 63 | 21 | 8[5] | 2/3 then | Mixed[5] | 3 per state |
| Brazil II | 1954-64 | Plurality | 1.5[4] | 64 | 21.33 | 8 | 1/3 every | Nonconcurrent | 3 per state |
| Brazil III | 1986- | Plurality | 1.5[4] | 76.5 | 25.5 | 8 | 4 years | Nonconcurrent | 3 per state |
| Chile I | 1945-73 | d'Hondt | 5 | 46.25 | 9.25 | 8 | 1/2 every 4 yrs[6] | Nonconcurrent | 5 per region[6] |
| Chile II | 1989- | d'Hondt | 2 | 38[7] | 19 | 8 | 1/2 every 4 yrs[7] | Nonconcurrent[7] | 2 per region/pop[7] |
| Colombia I | 1974-91 | LR-Hare[8] | 5.01 | 113.2 | 22.6 | 4 | Complete | Concurrent[9] | 2 per dept/pop |
| Colombia II | 1991- | LR-Hare | 100 | 100[10] | 1 | 4 | Complete | Concurrent[9] | National district |
| Dominican Republic | 1978- | Plurality | 1 | 28.5 | 28.5 | 4 | Complete | Concurrent | 1 per province |
| Mexico | 1994- | Semi-PR[11] | 4[11] | 128[11] | 32 | 6 | Complete[11] | Concurrent[11] | 4 per state |
| Paraguay | 1993- | d'Hondt | 45 | 45 | 1 | 5 | Complete | Concurrent | National district |
| Peru I | 1963-68 | d'Hondt | 1.88 | 45 | 24 | 6 | Complete | Concurrent | 1 per prov/pop[12] |
| Peru II | 1980-92 | d'Hondt | 60 | 60[13] | 1 | 5 | Complete | Concurrent | National district |
| United States | 1944- | Plurality[14] | 1 | 98.8 | 49.4 | 6 | 1/3 every 2 yrs | Mixed | 2 per state |
| Uruguay I | 1942-66 | d'Hondt | 30.5 | 30.5[15] | 1 | 4 | Complete | Concurrent | National district |
| Uruguay II | 1966- | d'Hondt | 30 | 30[15] | 1 | 5 | Complete | Concurrent | National district |
| Venezuela | 1958- | d'Hondt | 2[16] | 47.63[16] | 21.25 | 5 | Complete | Concurrent | 2 per state/comp |

1 The averages apply only to elections held prior to 15 February 1994.

2 For apportionment the geographic unit noted is the principal constitutional administrative unit, which varies in name throughout the region. The federal district in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela receives the same allocation of seats as the states/provinces. This is not the case in the United States where the federal district receives no Senate seats.

3 Argentina: The Argentine senators are elected by a plurality vote by the provincial legislatures. In the Federal Capital, however, an electoral college is employed.

4 Brazil I, II and III: Every other four years each state elects two senators. Voters are given two votes, to be used for separate candidates.

5 Brazil I: The 1946 constitution provided for nonconcurrent presidential and legislative elections. However, a transitory provision provided for concurrent elections in 1950. In 1945 two-thirds and in 1947 one-third of the senators were elected. Beginning in 1954 (Brazil II) the nonconcurrent electoral cycle was observed.

6 Chile I: During the period 1945–65, every four years five of the nine districts elected their senators (25) and four years later four of the nine districts (20 senators) would do the same. There existed some latitude over the formation of the regions, although only one minor modification was made between 1945 and 1973.

7 Chile II: In addition to the popularly elected members listed in the average senate size above, there are additional senators (currently eight): ex-presidents who hold the status of senators for life, up to nine senators who are appointed for eight-year terms by a set of different governmental institutions. The constitution originally provided two senators for each of the nation's thirteen regions. However to make the senate distribution more proportional, six of the larger regions were divided into two districts. Odd then even numbered regions elect both of their senators every other four years. For information on the timing cycle see Table 2.

8 Colombia I: For districts in which two senators were elected the Hagenbach–Bischoff formula was employed.

9 Colombia I and II: For districts in which two senators were elected the Hagenbach–Bischoff formula was employed.

10 Colombia II: The Senate elections are held at the same time as those for the Chamber. For more information on the timing cycle see Table 2.

11 Mexico: The arrangement listed here will not take effect in full force until the year 2000. The 32 senators elected by plurality (one from each state) in 1991 will remain in office until 1997. In 1997 32 senators will be elected in the same manner as in 1991, but for a three-year term. In 1994 three senators will be elected from each state for a six-year term using the same Semi-PR formula as in Bolivia. In 2000 four senators will be elected from each state for a six-year term. Three seats will be allocated to the party which wins the plurality of the vote and one seat to the party which receives the second largest number of votes.

12 Peru I: The maximum number of senators which a province could receive was nine.

13 Peru II: Not included are former presidents who as senators for life were full voting members of the Senate. There was an average of one of these senators each term.

14 United States: A small number of states have at different times during this period utilized the majority run-off formula.

15 Uruguay I and II: Under the presidential system (1942–52, 1966–) the Vice-President is a full voting member of the Senate (not included in the averages above). During the collegial executive period (1952–66) 31 senators were directly elected.

16 Venezuela: In addition to the 46 (42 prior to 1993) senate seats (two per state), the Venezuelan constitution provides for a limited number of compensatory seats for minor parties based on their vote in the Senate election. The exact number of compensatory seats allocated varies each election. These data do not include presidents who as senators for life are full voting members of the Senate. There has been an average of 2.38 of these senators each term.

TABLE 7. Current assembly size and number of electoral districts

| Countries | Most recent election | Lower House Assembly size | Lower House Number of districts | Senate* Assembly size | Senate* Number of districts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1989 | 17 | 17 | | |
| Argentina | 1993 | 257 | 24 | 48 | 24 |
| Bahamas | 1992 | 49 | 49 | | |
| Barbados | 1991 | 28 | 28 | | |
| Belize | 1993 | 29 | 29 | | |
| Bolivia | 1993 | 130 | 9 | 27 | 9 |
| Brazil | 1990 | 503 | 27 | 81 | 27 |
| Canada | 1993 | 295 | 295 | | |
| Chile | 1993 | 110 | 55 | 38* | 19 |
| Colombia | 1991 | 161* | 33 | 100* | 1 |
| Costa Rica | 1994 | 57 | 7 | | |
| Dominica | 1990 | 21* | 21 | | |
| Dominican Republic | 1990 | 120 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Ecuador-district | 1992 | 65 | 21 | | |
| Ecuador-national | 1992 | 12 | 1 | | |
| El Salvador-district | 1991 | 64 | 14 | | |
| El Salvador-national | 1991 | 20 | 1 | | |
| Grenada | 1990 | 15 | 15 | | |
| Guatemala-district | 1990 | 87 | 23 | | |
| Guatemala-national | 1990 | 29 | 1 | | |
| Guyana | 1992 | 53* | 1 | | |
| Honduras | 1993 | 128 | 18 | | |
| Jamaica | 1993 | 60 | 60 | | |
| Mexico-district† | 1994 | 300 | 300 | 128 | 32 |
| Mexico-national† | 1994 | 200 | 1 | | |
| Nicaragua | 1990 | 90* | 9 | | |
| Panama | 1989 | 67 | 40 | | |
| Paraguay | 1993 | 80 | 18 | 45 | 1 |
| Peru† | 1995 | 120 | 1 | | |
| St Kitts and Nevis | 1993 | 11* | 11 | | |
| St Lucia | 1992 | 17 | 17 | | |
| St Vincent | 1989 | 15* | 15 | | |
| Suriname | 1991 | 51 | 10 | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1991 | 36 | 36 | | |
| United States | 1992 | 435 | 435 | 100 | 50 |
| Uruguay | 1989 | 99 | 1* | 30* | 1 |
| Venezuela-SMD | 1993 | 102 | 102 | | |
| Venezuela-List | 1993 | 102* | 23 | 50* | 23 |

\* See the previous tables.

† The Mexican and Peruvian data are for the forthcoming elections in each country.

9. In all but two of the nonconcurrent systems the legislative elections take place in a separate year from the presidential contest. Information on the two exceptions, Colombia I and II, is provided in Tables 2 and 6.

10. Depending on the term lengths of the executive and legislators, legislative elections in some nonconcurrent systems occasionally are held at the same time as the presidential contest. These systems are nevertheless classified as nonconcurrent as that is the modal type of election. The point at which nonconcurrent elections take place during the presidential term is an important factor (Shugart and Carey, 1992).

11. Excellent discussions of the topic of electoral formula are provided by Lijphart (1994) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989).
12. With the number of votes cast in a district ($v$) and the number of seats to be allocated ($s$), the Hare formula is calculated by ($v/s$) and the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula ($v$ / ($s$ + 1)). The Hagenbach-Bischoff formula is also known as the Droop formula. The two formulas are functionally identical.
13. To calculate the true 'effective magnitude' for a system the following factors must be considered: the average district magnitude, the electoral formula, the use of thresholds/quotas, the number of district tiers. For two alternative methods of calculating a system's 'effective magnitude' see Lijphart (1994) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989).
14. The Argentine Senate is included despite the fact that its members are elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures. For more information, see Table 6.
15. Three recent works which provide a wealth of information on the electoral laws and/or election results of many of the systems included in this study are: Emmanuel (1992), Ministerio del Interior de España (1992), Nohlen (1993). Over three hundred different sources were consulted while preparing this article. In the reference section, however, only the most prominent general sources are listed.

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# A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas: An Update

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This note provides a brief update of "A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas" (*Electoral Studies* **14** (1), 5–21, 1995). Constitutional and electoral law reform continues to be very popular in the Americas. Here I provide information on significant electoral system changes that occurred between 16 February 1994 and 15 August 1996. Also included are a few minor corrections of dated, imprecise or inaccurate information contained in the article. These corrections are preceded in the tables by the abbreviation (AC). The reader should be aware that some important reforms, not discussed here, have obtained partial legislative approval in Mexico (related to the election of deputies and senators) and Uruguay (related to the election of the president and deputies).

I do not discuss minor changes in a nation's district magnitude and number of electoral districts or update the information reported in Table 7 of the original article. No information for the 1995 article's Tables 1 and 5 is included here due to a lack of any relevant reforms. This note's format follows that of the original article. All changes are italicized in the tables which follow. Unless otherwise noted all other rules remain the same. For information on the terminology used in the tables, please refer to the 1995 article.

## Acknowledgements

Table 2. Presidential systems: the election of the executive

| System | Time period | Presidential formula | Presidential-lower/single house election timing | Presidential term (years) | Presidential re-election |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina II | 1994– | *Hybrid Double Complement*[1] | Mixed | *4* | *Two-term limit*[1] |
| Bolivia II | 1994– | *Majority Congressional*[2] | Concurrent | 5 | *One interim term*[2] |
| Brazil IV | 1994– | Majority Run-off | *Concurrent* | *4* | One interim term |
| Dominican Republic II | 1995– | *Majority Run-off* | *Nonconcurrent* | 4 | *One interim term* |
| Ecuador II | 1994– | Majority Run-off | Mixed | 4 | *One interim term* |
| Guatemala II | 1994– | Majority Run-off | Concurrent | *4* | No re-election |
| Nicaragua II | 1995– | *Majority Run-off*[3] | Concurrent | 5 | *One interim term*[3] |

[1]Argentina II: If in the first round no candidate receives either: (a) over 45 per cent of the valid vote; or (b) a minimum of 40 per cent of the valid vote and at the same time is more than 10 per cent ahead of the second place candidate, then a run-off is held between the top two finishers from the first round. After one interim term, former presidents may be re-elected. If re-elected they are once again limited to two consecutive terms in office.

[2]Bolivia II: The run-off is now between the top two finishers from the first round. No one may serve more than two terms in office. All Bolivian reforms discussed in this note will apply beginning with the 1997 election.

[3]Nicaragua II: If no candidate receives at least 45 per cent of the valid vote then there is a run-off between the top two candidates. No one may serve more than two terms in office.

(AC) Ecuador I: The original 1978 constitution provided for a five-year presidential term. The constitution was subsequently amended reducing the term to four years for presidents elected from 1984 on.

(AC) Peru III: A 1996 law explicitly allows President Alberto Fujimori to run for a third term in 2000, since his first term began prior to the promulgation of the Constitution of 1993.

Table 3. Lower/single Houses elected using proportional representation: single-tier districting

| | |
|---|---|
| (AC) | Brazil I, II and III: The quota is based only on valid and blank votes. |
| (AC) | Chile II: The lower house seat and district data in Table 3 are correct while those in Table 7 are incorrect. |
| (AC) | Colombia II: Prior to the 1994 election a two-member national level district was created for the nation's 'black communities'. |
| (AC) | Honduras: The number of compensatory seats in 1985 was not fixed. Six were allocated. |
| (AC) | Panama: Prior to the 1994 election the threshold for a compensatory seat was raised to 5 per cent of the valid vote. |
| (AC) | Peru III: The d'Hondt formula is employed to allocate the legislative seats. |

Table 4. Lower/single Houses elected using proportional representation: two-tier districting

| System | Time period | Tiers | Single ballot or separate ballots | Electoral formula | District magnitude | Number of districts | District threshold | Term length (years) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bolivia IV | 1994– | SMD<br>Department | Separate[1] | Plurality<br>Sainte-Lagüe | I<br>6.89 | 68[1]<br>9 | 3% of vote[1] | 5<br>5 |
| Guatemala II | 1994– | District<br>National | Separate | d'Hondt<br>d'Hondt | 2.78<br>16 | 23<br>1 |  | 4<br>4 |
| Nicaragua III | 1995– | District<br>National I<br>National II | Separate[2] | Hare[2]<br>LR-Hare<br>LR-Hare[2] | full quotas[2]<br>remainders[2]<br>20 | 17<br>1<br>1 | 1 quota[2]<br><br>1 quota[2] | 5<br>5<br>5 |

[1]Bolivia IV: While two separate ballots are used, the department level party list ballot is the important one for the overall seat allocation (similar to the German method, with the exception that the compensatory allocation process is done at the department (i.e. district) level). The department party list ballot is on a fused ballot with that for the president and senators (i.e. the voter casts a single vote for all three offices). Single-member district (SMD) deputies are elected using a separate ballot. In each department one-half of the deputies are elected from SMDs. In departments with an odd number of seats the extra seat is an SMD seat. To receive any department level list seats a party must win more than 3 per cent of the valid vote at the national level.

[2]Nicaragua III: For the District and National I seats a single ballot is used. A separate ballot is used for the National II seats. In districts which elect one or two deputies the Hagenbach-Bischoff electoral formula is employed. If one or both seats are not allocated due to the failure of a party to achieve a full quota, then in the single-member districts the plurality party receives the seat, and in the binomial districts the two parties which received the largest number of votes each receive a seat. All remainder seats from the 11 departmental/regional districts which elect three or more members are allocated at the national level. Remainder votes from districts where all seats were allocated via the full quotas are excluded. Seventy deputies are elected from the two tiers (i.e. District and National I) combined. Only parties whose vote total is equal to or greater than the average quota of the nation's four electoral regions are eligible to receive remainder seats in the National II allocation. The rules governing the election of unsuccessful presidential candidates as legislators are the same as before. There are however now only four electoral regions, each containing multiple legislative electoral districts.

(AC) Ecuador: For districts in which two deputies are elected the d'Hondt formula is used.

(AC) Mexico: The maximum number of seats that can be won is 315 (63 per cent), but if a party receives 60 per cent or less of the vote the maximum is 300 (60 per cent). There also exist several minor (yet complicated) rules related to the allocation of the national tier seats.

(AC) Venezuela II: The correct distribution of the seats for the 1993 election is SMD-102, State-96, and Compensatory-5.

Table 6. The election of the second chamber (Senate) in strong Senate systems

| Electoral system | Time period | Electoral formula | District magnitude | Senate size | Number of districts | Term lengths (years) | Renovation | Timing cycle vis-à-vis President | Apportionment of Senate seats |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina II | 1994– | Semi-PR[1] | 3 | 72 | 24 | 6 | 1/3 every 2 years | Mixed | 3 per province |
| Brazil IV | 1994– | Plurality | 1.5 | 81 | 27 | 8 | 2/3 then 1/3 every 4 years | Mixed | 3 per state |

[1]Argentina II: Senators are elected using an incomplete list, with two seats going to the plurality winner and one seat going to the first minority. This framework will take full effect in 2001 at which time the entire Senate will be renewed. Until then senators will continue to be elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures (except in the Federal Capital in 1995) with no party allowed to hold more than two seats from any one province.