

# *Introduction: The Why, What, and How of Comparative Politics*

C OMPARATIVE POLITICS CLAIMS A VENERABLE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION dating from Aristotle's classification of Greek city-states according to the number of their rulers and the quality of their rule.<sup>6</sup> Throughout its evolution out of successive eras of classical and modern political philosophy into modern social science, comparative politics has served to promote a better understanding of diverse forms of politics. Comparative politics approximates laboratory conditions of systematic observation of political systems and subsystems across space and time by facilitating empirical, normative, and theoretical analysis of their similarities and differences. As Robert Dahl explains, empirical analysis focuses on descriptive data and typologies, normative study deals with the analysis of social values and preferences, and theoretical analysis seeks to formulate and test scientific propositions to promote better understanding of social phenomena and to predict behavioral consequences.<sup>7</sup>

Comparative politics emerged as a recognized subfield within the fledgling discipline of political science in the early part of the twentieth century.<sup>8</sup> Early Anglo-American practitioners concentrated on constitutional norms, institutional arrangements, and largely atheoretical descriptive studies of the established democratic systems of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and, for a time, Weimar Germany. Their European counterparts, in contrast, were more preoccupied with the critical analysis of social classes, elites, and ideologies as products of industrial and political development and their accompanying political conflicts.<sup>9</sup> A crisis of democracy and the rise of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes throughout much of Europe during the interwar period prompted the exodus of many continental scholars to Great Britain and the United States and the beginning of a synthesis of the Anglo-American and European approaches to social science.

As a result, post-World War II comparative scholarship became increasingly diverse and dynamic. The field was broadened to encompass the study of political parties, interest groups, elites and masses, citizen attitudes, and electoral behavior. Many of the most creative scholars focused their attention on problems of modernization, political leadership, and revolution in the developing countries of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa in an effort to devise more rigorous concepts and methods of comparative analysis.<sup>10</sup> Among the important innovations was Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, and G. Bingham Powell's formulation of structural functionalism, a concept based on David Easton's earlier work on general systems theory.<sup>11</sup> Others were Almond and Sidney Verba's path-breaking study of political culture in the United States, Mexico, and three European countries<sup>12</sup> and the rapid growth of survey research as a powerful instrument of political inquiry. A behavioral revolution swept social science and all its subfields, bringing with it new methodologies and a greater emphasis on theoretical analysis.<sup>13</sup>

A central feature of the postwar transformation of comparative politics was the burgeoning growth of area studies programs.<sup>14</sup> New centers for research and teaching were established throughout North America—and at a somewhat laggard pace in Europe—to promote greater academic and practical knowledge of Latin America, the communist bloc, western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. External funding for the centers was partially motivated by Cold War largesse on the part of governments, but much support was also generated by independent research institutions such as the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund. Area studies programs produced generations of scholars as well as young professionals training to enter public service.

### ***European Relevance to Comparative Politics***

Throughout the transformation of political science and related disciplines, European studies has remained a core component of comparative politics. A traditional rationale for the relevance of the European experience is the contributions of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, and other European countries to the basic philosophical, cultural, and institutional tenets of Western civilization. Immigrants from throughout Europe, including Russia and central Europe, helped to create new nations in the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, and elsewhere. On a personal intellectual level, many of their descendants understandably look to Europe to comprehend the significance of their national origins and the European roots of their own countries' constitutional and political development.

Europe also provides important insights into the comparative study of what Robert Dahl calls different "paths to the present."<sup>15</sup> The striking contrast between the success of Great Britain and Sweden in sustaining an evolutionary pattern of political change and the far more tumultuous trajectories of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Russia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provides crucial knowledge about underlying factors of system change and political performance.<sup>16</sup> During the postwar era, these historical differences have largely yielded to a series of "most similar cases" of political stability that are broadly comparable to other advanced industrial democracies in North America, parts of Asia, and most of the British Commonwealth—thereby providing additional rich comparative data. In comparison, the Russian Federation remains an authoritarian outlier.

Historical and postcommunist patterns of democratization constitute another compelling justification for the study of European politics. Transitions to democracy have assumed many forms, in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>17</sup> A minimal empirical definition is that democratization is a process by which a political system institutes effective procedures for the selection of leaders on the basis of free competitive elections.<sup>18</sup> Normatively, democratization also entails the institutionalization of constitutional norms embodying the rule of law, respect for minority rights, the peaceful resolution of conflict, institutional transparency, and executive–legislative–administrative accountability. To be effective and reasonably stable, a democracy must embrace elite–mass consensus on these basic principles. European countries provide both positive models and cautionary tales of the democratization process in comparative perspective.

Globalization constitutes an additional compelling reason to focus attention on Europe. Within the world of nations, economic forms of globalization have deep roots. As the authors of a survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have observed

Economic integration among nations is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the increasing integration of the world economy in recent decades can in many ways be seen as a resumption of the intensive integration that began in the mid-1880s and ended with World War I.<sup>19</sup>

During the postwar era, economic, social, and other forms of globalization accelerated at an exponential rate, propelled not only by an expansion of international trade and the internationalization of labor but also by the integration of world financial, investment, and energy markets. Cultural values have also been globalized to a significant degree through the diffusion of international access to the Internet and mass exposure to movies and pop culture.

According to international empirical data compiled by the Technical University in Zurich (ETH), Sweden ranks highest among the country case studies included in this volume in a 2012 aggregate globalization index (6th), followed by the United Kingdom (14th), Germany (22nd), Italy (24th), Poland (25th), and Russia (47th). In comparison, Canada ranked 15th and the United States 35th. Belgium ranks first on the aggregate list, followed by Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Singapore. (See Table I-1 below and, for more complete information, Table A-1 in the Appendix and online.)

Measures of economic globalization include trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investments; social globalization consists of data on

**Table I-1 Indices of Globalization, 2012**

Globalization (aggregate score)	Economic Globalization	Social Globalization	Political Globalization
1. Belgium 92.76	Singapore 97.39	Cyprus 91.76	Italy 98.45
2. Ireland 91.95	Luxembourg 94.63	Ireland 91.43	France 98.21
3. Netherlands 90.94	Ireland 93.27	Singapore 91.94	Belgium 97.91
4. Austria 90.55	Belgium 91.15	Belgium 89.75	Spain 96.68
5. Singapore 89.18	Netherlands 91.91	Switzerland 89.43	United Kingdom 96.43
6. Sweden 88.23	Austria 85.98	Slovak Republic 82.33	Netherlands 93.99
14. United Kingdom 85.54	Finland 83.54	Spain 81.20	Argentina 93.09
18. France 84.12	New Zealand 80.79	Hungary 80.59	United States 91.47
22. Germany 81.53	Spain 78.99	Australia 79.65	Romania 91.80
24. Italy 81.02	Switzerland 78.39	United Arab Emirates 77.91	Australia 91.77
25. Poland 80.81			
47. Russia 67.35	Lithuania 70.83	Serbia 66.19	Slovak Republic 85.66
<b>North American Comparisons</b>			
15. Canada 85.53	Cyprus 85.85	Norway 82.28	Denmark 93.76
35. United States 74.88	Canada 76.05	New Zealand 72.77	Senegal 88.42

Source: Adapted from KOF [Confederate Technical University of Zurich] Index of Globalization 2012, <http://globalization.KOF.ethz.ch/>

personal contacts (such as international tourism and foreign population), information flows, and cultural proximity (such as trade in books as a percent of GDP); and political globalization is measured by the number of embassies in a country, membership in international organizations, participation in UN Security Council missions, and international treaties. The first column in the table is a composite of these three indices. For a more complete listing of nations according to their globalization rankings, see Table A-1 in the Appendix.

A significant subset of economic and financial integration is the European Union, whose twenty-eight member states have progressively eliminated tariffs and most other discriminatory barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and people among themselves. In the process, much of Europe has achieved unprecedented levels of material prosperity and regional peace under the authority of the European Union as a new center of international (primarily economic) power. Socially, Europeanization has been accompanied by national efforts to promote greater gender and sexual equality among citizens through reform legislation sponsored primarily by moderate left parties and abetted by European court decisions. Among the countries at the forefront of equalization reforms are Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

At the same time, globalization has myriad debilitating consequences. Many of its critics have protested against globalization's discriminatory economic practices against developing countries through unruly street-level demonstrations during summit meetings of government leaders from the richer nations. International acts of terrorism are a much more virulent form of deadly protest by nongovernmental actors intent on conducting religious, ethnic, and political warfare against Western nations and their citizens. The September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon and subsequent bombings in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Stockholm in 2010 are territorial extensions of what Samuel P. Huntington has depicted as an epic "clash of civilizations" between the democratic West and religious-ethnic insurgents in the Middle East and Asia.<sup>20</sup> Virulent manifestations of domestic violence by errant individuals include the mass slaying of 77 young Norwegians at a Labor Party island retreat by a self-proclaimed white supremacist in July 2011 and the attempted bombing of the Polish Parliament in November 2012 by a disgruntled scientist with professed ties with European nationalist groups. Also included is the Boston marathon bombings in April 2013 by two Islamic brothers who had emigrated with their parents in 2002 from violence-torn provinces in southwestern Russia. They allegedly acted to protest American military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Increased economic interdependence has also made nations highly vulnerable to recurrent cycles of domestic fluctuations in housing, investments, banking, market performance, and employment. A devastating example is the international economic crisis that began in 2008 and engulfed the United States, most of Europe, and many parts of the developing world. By 2009 the average annual growth rate had declined precipitously in virtually all advanced nations, accompanied by a general increase in unemployment and a surge in public indebtedness triggered by government actions to mitigate the effects of the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The crisis threatened the very viability of the eurozone within the European Union and even the integration process itself. (See Part 8 in this volume and Tables A-3 and A-5 in the Appendix and the CQ Press website for this volume: [www.cqpress.com/cs/europe](http://www.cqpress.com/cs/europe)).

## The Universe of European Democracies

*The Political Handbook of the World* classifies forty European countries as democracies as defined previously. Of this total, three countries are characterized as semi-democracies (Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia); *The Political Handbook* lists one European state as a non-democracy (Belarus). Table I-2 provides an overview of basic similarities and differences among the forty cases.<sup>21</sup> They are grouped, from top to bottom, in three categories: (1) west European countries that joined the European Community between 1951 and 2004; (2) newer members of the European Union (since 2004); and (3) nonmember nations. The United States and Canada are included in the third category for comparative purposes.

**Table I-2 Typologies of European and North American Democracies**

Country	Unitary / Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
<b>Europe of 15, 1951–2004</b>				
Austria	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty limited competition	Interwar/postwar
Belgium	Federal	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Denmark	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Older
Finland	Unitary	Presidential–parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Interwar
France	Unitary	Presidential–parliamentary	Multiparty	Older/postwar
Germany	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Greece	Unitary	Presidential–parliamentary	Multiparty	Postwar
Ireland	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar
Italy	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Luxembourg	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Netherlands	Federal	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Portugal	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Postwar
Spain	Federal	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Sweden	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty	Older
United Kingdom	Quasi-federal	Constitutional monarchy–parliamentary	Multiparty–hyper competitive	Older
<b>New Member States, 2004–2007</b>				
Bulgaria	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty–limited competition	Postcommunist

(Continued)

Table 1-2 (Continued)

Country	Unitary / Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
Cyprus	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postwar
Czech Republic	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Interwar/ postcommunist
Estonia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Hungary	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Latvia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Lithuania	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Malta	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Two party	Postwar
Poland	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Romania	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Slovakia	Quasi-federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Slovenia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Postcommunist
<b>Non-EU European and North American States</b>				
Albania	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Croatia	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Georgia	Federal	Presidential—parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty—limited competition	Postcommunist
Iceland	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—limited competition	Older/postwar independence
Macadenia	Unitary	Presidential—parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Montenegro	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Norway	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy—parliamentary	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Older/postwar
Russia	Federal	Presidential—parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Serbia	Unitary	Parliamentary		Postcommunist

Table I-2 (Continued)

Country	Unitary / Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
Switzerland	Federal	Council form—rotating presidency	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Older
Turkey	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Ukraine	Federal	Presidential—parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty—hyper competitive	Postcommunist
United States	Federal	Presidential	Two party	Older
Canada	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Older

Source: Adapted from *Political Handbook of the World* (www.cqpress.com, 2012).

Table I-2 above reveals a significant distinction among European nations with respect to the timing of their democratic transitions. Seven countries achieved democratization during the latter decades of the nineteenth century or the early part of the twentieth century. All of them are situated in western Europe: France (except for the interregnum of German occupation and the authoritarian Vichy regime from 1941 to 1944), Great Britain, and four of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden). Fourteen other west European nations experienced stable democratization either during the interwar period (Finland) or after World War II: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and West Germany. Eight central and eastern European countries have undergone postcommunist democratic transitions. The most successful cases are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine manifest less institutionalized forms of democracy because of irregularities in their electoral processes, authoritarian governance, and a weaker elite–mass democratic consensus.

The historical timing of democratic transitions has important consequences for the development of national political parties and electoral competition. As Richard Rose has pointed out in his comparative study of Europe's new democracies, the formation of modern political parties preceded full democratization in Great Britain and Scandinavia, whereas the emergence of democratic opposition movements to communism coincided with abrupt transitions to democracy in Russia and central and eastern Europe.<sup>22</sup> This contrast has yielded sharply different kinds of party systems in the two aggregates: class-based parties drawn at an early stage into democratic electoral competition in the former case, more fragmented party systems based on conflicting national memories, ethnicity, and more exclusive ideological appeals in the latter. These differences are partially reflected in the column on “party systems” in Table I-2, which contains *The Political Handbook's* summary distinction between different types of electoral competition: limited competition, highly competitive, and two-party. Much deeper political analysis is required in each case to elicit adequate levels of information and understanding of the effects of these different types.

Two other salient features of European democracies include the constitutional distinction between unitary and federal political systems and between parliamentary and “mixed” presidential–parliamentary systems. As shown in Table I-2 above, twenty-three of the forty

European countries have unitary political systems (i.e., political power is concentrated in the hands of national executives and legislatures), and fourteen are federal systems (with power shared by national and regional or state governments). The United Kingdom and Slovenia can be considered “quasi-federal” because in both cases significant political powers have been “devolved” from the national level of government to regional assemblies. A second majority norm is the prevalence of parliamentary systems of government throughout Europe: thirty countries are parliamentary democracies, and ten are mixed systems with presidents exercising varying degrees of executive power alongside prime ministers who are accountable to parliament. France and Russia are notable examples. Switzerland has a unique council form of national government characterized by a rotating presidency.

The European Union constitutes a forty-first case of European democracy. The European Union’s equivalent of a constitution takes the form of a succession of treaties among its member states—most recently the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into effect in December 2009. Politically, the European Union is a confederal political system whose division of power between central community institutions and national governments resembles the historical precedent of the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789). The European Union has a distinctive form of executive authority consisting of an indirectly elected president of the European Council (which is made up of the heads of government and/or state of its twenty-eight member states) and a rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers (composed of cabinet officials representing the member states). It also has a directly elected European Parliament that shares legislative powers with the various councils. Earlier criticisms of the European Union’s “democratic deficit” have yielded to greater accountability and transparency in its decision-making processes and use of power.

### ***Choice of Cases***

Contributors to this volume concentrate their efforts on a sample of eight case studies from the larger universe of European politics. Their choice is based on a variety of considerations. The first is the traditional inclusion of France and the United Kingdom in most comparative courses on European politics. Both countries have made major contributions to the emergence of Western democracy and continue to play important political and economic roles in regional and world affairs. A second consideration is the significance of Germany as a compelling instance of fundamental system transformation over time. Theoretically and empirically, the German case offers crucial insights into the processes of socioeconomic and political development under successive historical conditions of regime discontinuity, postwar stability in the West, the failure of communism in the former German Democratic Republic, and unification in 1990. Third, the inclusion of Italy and Sweden provides important systemic contrasts with the more familiar case studies because of their distinctive patterns of alternating periods of earlier long-term political dominance by the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, respectively. Finally, Poland and Russia’s transitions to democracy and a market economy pose fundamental questions about system transformation and performance.

Part 8 of this volume deals with the European Union. Since the early 1950s, institutionalized economic and political cooperation has transformed the European Community into an increasingly important regional and global actor. This transformation is manifest



**Table I-3 Democracy Index, 2011**

Country	Rank	Overall Score	Electoral Process and Pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Civil Liberties
Norway	1	9.80	10.0	9.64	10.0	10.0
Iceland	2	9.65	10.00	9.64	8.89	9.71
Denmark	3	9.65	10.00	9.64	8.89	9.71
Sweden	4	9.50	9.58	9.64	8.89	10.0
Finland	9	9.06	10.00	9.64	7.22	9.71
Germany	14	8.34	9.58	8.21	6.67	9.12
United Kingdom	18	8.16	9.58	7.14	6.11	9.12
France	29	7.77	9.58	7.14	6.11	8.53
Italy	31	7.74	9.58	6.43	6.67	8.53
Poland	45	7.12	9.58	7.50	6.11	9.12
Russia	117	3.92	2.86	5.0	5.0	4.71
<b>North American Comparisons</b>						
Canada	8	9.08	9.58	9.29	7.78	10.00
United States	19	8.11	9.17	7.50	7.22	8.53

Source: [www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy\\_Index\\_2011\\_Updated.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011](http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2011_Updated.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011)

in the completion of an integrated Single Market and the attainment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) accompanied by the introduction of a common currency (the euro). A majority of EU member states have joined the eurozone since its inception in January 1999. The addition of the twelve new member states in central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean since 2004 further enforces the European Union's international economic status as both a partner of and competitor to the United States and its other principal trading partners, China and Russia.

Among the country case studies, Sweden ranks fourth on a global scale of democracy compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (closely following three other Nordic states); Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Poland cluster in the top teens-40s; and Russia ranks 117th. Canada and the United States rank 8th and 19th, respectively. See Table I-3.

### ***A Common Analytical Framework***

A major issue in comparative political analysis concerns the most appropriate methodology for addressing interactive themes of economic, social, and political change. One approach, which is largely quantitative, utilizes as many case studies as possible to analyze such themes. Important examples of "large *N*" studies include Ronald Inglehart's global surveys of the "cultural shift" from predominantly materialist values emphasizing survival and economic security to postmaterialist values embracing a greater appreciation of environmentalism and human rights.<sup>23</sup> An alternative methodology is the utilization of "small *N*" studies to allow for greater in-depth analysis of particular cases. The authors in this volume have chosen the latter approach, emphasizing the use of political power in eight political systems on the basis of a common analytical framework designed to facilitate both single-case and cross-national analysis. These country and regional specialists have divided their analysis of seven important European nations and the European Union along the following lines:

1. *The Context of \_\_\_\_\_ Politics.* These chapters describe the basic geographic and demographic factors, historical development, democratization, and political culture of each political system studied. The contextual chapters are intended to introduce students to each case study in turn.
2. *Where Is the Power?* In these chapters, readers are introduced to the formal decision-making institutions and implementation structures, including national executives, parliaments, and the civil service. Fundamental differences distinguish the parliamentary systems of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, and Sweden; the mixed presidential-parliamentary systems of France and Russia; and the unique system of governance in the European Union. Other differences include unitary political systems in France, Poland, and Sweden; federalism in Germany and Russia; and "quasi-federalism" in Italy and the United Kingdom, both of which have devolved power to their regions. Because of its complicated institutions and decision-making processes, the European Union also can be classified as "quasi-federal."
3. *Who Has the Power?* These chapters describe the central roles played by political parties, organized interest groups, and electoral behavior in the political process.

4. *How Is Power Used?* Policy processes and policy outcomes are highlighted in these chapters, with an emphasis on the distinctive features of both. Process and outcomes are closely related, but specific political decisions reflect a distinctive range of value preferences produced by historical patterns of development; dominant ideologies; and whichever leaders, institutions, parties, interest groups, and citizen coalitions happen to be most influential in the policy process.
5. *What Is the Future of \_\_\_\_\_ Politics?* These chapters address the pending effects of changing domestic, regional, and international conditions in each of the cases.

The emphasis on political power will enable students to more easily compare the seven countries and the European Union as they “travel” through their comparative course. Accompanying the country sections are photographs as well as tables and boxed features. Taken altogether, the eight case studies contained in this volume address the most relevant questions of comparative political analysis: who governs, on behalf of what values, with the collaboration of what groups, in the face of what kind of opposition, and with what socio-economic and political consequences? The European experience reveals illuminating answers to these questions.

## NOTES

6. Aristotle, who lived from 384 to 322 BCE, compiled and studied the constitutions of more than 150 Greek city-states in his work *Politics*, which became a classical cornerstone of modern social and political science. For a modern translation, see Stephen Everson, ed., *Aristotle, The Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
7. Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984).
8. Gabriel Almond provides a useful historical account of the emergence of political science in *Ventures in Political Science: Narratives and Reflections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). See also Bernard Brown, “Introduction,” in Bernard E. Brown, ed., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 10th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thompson/Wadsworth, 2006), 1–18.
9. Classical European contributions to comparative politics include Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1984; originally published in 1892 as *De la division du travail social*); Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936, and London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1936; reprinted in 1985, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; originally published in 1929 as *Ideologie und Utopie*); and Max Weber, a prolific German scholar of bureaucracy, different forms of authority, the role of religion in political development, and numerous other topics. For a sample of his work, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). Bernard E. Brown provides an informative and thoughtful overview of historical and contemporary approaches to comparative politics in “Introduction: On Comparing Nations,” in his edited volume *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*.
10. For a summary overview of innovation in postwar approaches to comparative political analysis, see Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). Standard sources on the methodology of comparative research include Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990); Adam

- Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970); and Robert Holt and John Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press, 1970).
11. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965), and Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).
  12. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). See also its sequel collection of essays by various contributors, Almond and Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
  13. A critical assessment of the failure of the behavioral revolution to live up to many of its promises can be found in Lawrence C. Mayer, *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise versus Performance* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Library of Social Research, 1989).
  14. For a more extensive discussion of the role of area studies programs in comparative research, see Almond, *Ventures in Political Science*.
  15. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*.
  16. See Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
  17. See Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
  18. This definition of democratization and democracy characterizes a number of texts in political science, especially in American politics. It is derived from Joseph Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, which was originally published in 1942. It has been republished many times, including by Harper and Row (New York, 1976). Schumpeter was one of many European scholars who emigrated from Europe to the United States in the 1930s to escape National Socialism.
  19. International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997), 45.
  20. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997).
  21. Table I-1 does not include systems such as Liechtenstein, Morocco, or Vatican City.
  22. Richard Rose and Neil Munro, *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003).
  23. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-National Sourcebook: Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies: Findings from the 1990–1993 World Values Survey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For a discussion of methodological issues related to large *N* studies, see Robert W. Jackman, "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (1985): 161–182.