

Efecto duradero de cuotas

Bhavnani (2009)

La acción afirmativa

- Intervención para romper la perpetuación de la desigualdad
- Diseñadas para ser temporales, tienden a perpetuarse
- Cortes EEUU han declarado inconstitucionales

Reservaciones en India

- 1992: reforma gobiernos locales
 - descentralización de gasto y vigilancia/contraloría
 - cuota para mujeres en nuevas juntas locales
- Asambleas estatales y federal: 3 a 9% mujeres

Aleatorización estratificada

- 1 Escaños reservados para intocables
- 2 Lotería para “reservar” $1/3$ de distritos restantes
- 3 Sólo mujeres compiten en reservados en año t
- 4 En $t+5$ nueva lotería

TABLE 1. Constituencywise Reservations in 1997 and 2002

Seats reserved for	1997		2002	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Open, regardless of caste	145	65.6	149	64.8
<i>Of which:</i> Reserved for women	48	21.7	50	21.2
Other Backward Classes	60	27.1	61	27.3
<i>Of which:</i> Reserved for women	20	10.0	20	9.3
Scheduled Castes	14	6.3	15	7.1
<i>Of which:</i> Reserved for women	4	1.8	5	2.2
Scheduled Tribes	2	0.9	2	0.9
<i>Of which:</i> Reserved for women	1	0.5	1	0.4
Total	221	100.0	227	100.0
Reserved for women	73	33.9	76	33.0
Other reservations	51	22.2	52	23.4
Open to all	97	43.9	99	43.6

Note: Constituencies reserved for Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, and Schedule Tribes were ones with the highest concentrations of Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, and Schedule Tribes, respectively. Constituencies were reserved for women using random, stratified, and independent draws in 1997 and 2002. See text for details.



Dudas

- No elabora la lotería, crucial para el tratamiento experimental (tómbola judicial...)
 - Aunque sí verifica que distritos de control/trat son iguales en sus demográficos
- Estado de Maharashtra adoptó cuotas en 1992, que reforma federal remplazó (redistribución impide controlar esto)

FIGURE 1. Control and Treatment Groups to Calculate the Next-Election Effects of Reservations

All wards ($n = 221$ in 1997, 227 in 2002)

Wards with mostly unchanged boundaries ($n = 173$)

		1997	
		Open	Reserved
2002	Open	 $n = 81$	 $n = 37$
	Reserved	$n = 37$	$n = 18$

Legend



 Control wards
 Treatment wards

TABLE 2. Contemporaneous, Within-Election Effects of Reservations in 1997 and 2002

	1997 Elections			2002 Elections		
	Reserved	Open	Difference	Reserved	Open	Difference
1 Percentage of female winners	100.0	3.4	96.6***	100.0	8.6	91.4***
2 Percentage of wards where at least one woman ran for office	100.0	43.9	56.1***	100.0	51.7	48.3***
3 Number of female candidates	8.2	0.7	7.5***	7.0	0.8	6.2***
4 Number of candidates	8.2	14.4	-6.2***	7.0	10.1	-3.1***
5 Female candidates as a percentage of candidates	100.0	4.5	95.5***	100.0	7.7	92.3***
6 Total percentage of votes received by female candidates	100.0	2.9	97.1***	100.0	6.9	93.1***
7 Average percentage of votes received by female candidates	16.1	2.0	14.1***	17.3	4.4	12.8***
8 Turnout, in percent of registered voters	42.5	47.0	-4.5**	41.2	42.6	-1.4*
9 Winning candidate vote margin	13.9	13.0	0.9	16.6	14.1	2.4
10 Number of wards	73	148	221	76	151	227

Note: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% using one-sided difference in proportions and means tests. Only women could run for office in reserved constituencies; men and women could run for office in open constituencies. Constituencies were reserved for women using random, stratified, and independent draws in 1997 and 2002. See text for details.

TABLE 3. Next-Election Effects of the 1997 Reservations on the 2002 Elections

	The Experiment		
	Open in 1997, Open in 2002	Reserved in 1997, Open in 2002	Difference
1 Percentage of female winners	3.7	21.6	17.9***
2 Percentage of wards where at least one woman ran for office	35.8	73.0	37.2***
3 Number of female candidates	0.5	1.1	0.7***
4 Number of candidates	9.1	10.6	1.5
5 Female candidates as a percentage of candidates	4.4	11.9	7.4***
6 Number of competitive female candidates ¹	0.1	0.5	0.3***
7 Number of competitive candidates ¹	3.9	4.1	0.2
8 Competitive female candidates as a percentage of competitive candidates ¹	3.2	11.8	8.6***
9 Number of new female candidates ²	0.3	0.7	0.4***
10 Percentage of wards where any female candidate was competitive ¹	13.6	43.2	29.7***
11 Total percentage of votes received by female candidates	3.3	15.0	11.7***
12 Average percentage of votes received by female candidates	2.4	10.0	7.5***
13 Turnout, in percent of registered voters	42.2	41.6	-0.6
14 Winning candidate vote percentage	42.8	41.0	-1.9
15 Winning candidate vote margin	15.3	13.5	-1.8
16 Number of wards	81	37	

Note: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% using one-sided difference in proportions and means tests. Only women could run for office in reserved constituencies; men and women could run for office in open constituencies. Constituencies were reserved for women using a random, stratified, and independent draws in 1997 and 2002. See text for details.

¹Competitive candidates are defined as those that received 5% or more of their constituency's vote.

²Candidates are coded as "new" if they did not run in 1997.

TABLE 4. Logistic Analysis of the Determinants of Whether a Female Corporator Was Elected in 2002

Dependent variable: Dummy for whether a female corporator was elected in 2002

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dummy for treatment	1.970 [0.711]***	0.798 [1.017]	1.166 [0.743]	2.636 [0.838]***	8.451 [3.612]**	0.579 [0.932]	11.073 [6.277]*
Dummy for whether the male incumbent ran for office		-0.247 [1.428]					0.538 [1.546]
Dummy for whether the female incumbent ran for office		3.570 [0.928]***				2.841 [0.934]***	2.584 [1.119]**
Dummy for whether any female candidate ran for office			-1.042 [2.406]				-0.622 [2.808]
Number of female candidates			4.305 [2.068]**			5.292 [2.555]**	3.216 [2.875]
Number of female candidates squared			-0.853 [0.490]*			-1.201 [0.630]*	-0.626 [0.716]
Turnout in 2002, in percent of registered voters				0.107 [0.067]			0.164 [0.156]
Change in male voters registered between 1997 and 2002 elections, in percent				-129.610 [74.398]*			44.847 [71.856]
Change in female voters registered between 1997 and 2002 elections, in percent				58.781 [68.363]			-49.465 [81.917]
Turnout in 1997, in percent of registered voters					0.080 [0.057]		-0.023 [0.102]
Dummy for treatment x Turnout in 1997, in percent of registered voters					-0.147 [0.078]*		-0.255 [0.135]*
Constant	-3.258 [0.588]***	-3.704 [1.010]***	-5.073 [1.442]***	-7.887 [3.069]**	-7.099 [2.942]**	-7.455 [2.368]***	-11.225 [6.744]*
Number of observations	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	0.12	0.40	—	0.22	0.17	0.52	—

Note: Regressions 3 and 7 use Firth's penalized-likelihood approach to deal with a separation problem. See footnote 22 for details. Standard errors in brackets. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.

Hallazgo

- Hay efecto perdurable de la cuota
¿mecanismo?
- Importancia de la representación descriptiva
- Faltaría ver 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022 vs 1997