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Populist psychology: economics, culture, and emotions

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Abstract

Historical trends seem to show that populism, defined here as movements that self-identify as representatives of a unified, good people confronting a corrupted or malevolent elite, tends to co-occur with major economic disruptions. However, research into this connection provides us with a puzzle: while populist surges often come in the wake of economic crises, cultural variables tend to be better predictors of support for populism in public opinion surveys. In this paper, we develop a theory (affective political economy) that can resolve this paradox by analyzing the influence of emotions on politics. Using survey experiments, we show that economic crises cause emotional reactions that activate cultural discontent. This, in turn, activates populist attitudes. This paper provides an elegant solution to a major impasse in the study of the demand side of populism and provides a useful way of analyzing how economics and culture may interact to cause political outcomes.

Word Count: 9082

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Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

New waves of scholarship sometimes raise as many questions as they answer. Such is the case with the recent spate of public opinion research on populism, specifically its most prominent debate: whether the political tendency towards populism is caused primarily by economic grievances or cultural backlash. The puzzle generated by this research is not a characteristic of the research itself; to the contrary, there is a strong and growing consensus in political science that both politicized prejudice and hostility toward political elites are driven by cultural backlash. These works found that, when controlling for cultural factors, economic grievances had little or no effect (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Norris and Inglehart 2018). The evidence seems clear: antisystem politics are driven by values, beliefs, and tensions between in-groups and out-groups, while materialistic concerns over benefits and losses that favor economics are much less important.

This consensus is puzzling, rather than illuminating, because it does not appear consistent with historical patterns or research in the field of political economy (see Rodrik 2018). Popular opinion often connects the rise of nationalism and populism with economic crises. Panics in the late 19th century gave birth to the eponymous Populists in the United States; the Great Depression contributed to the rise of Nazism and extreme rightist movements in Spain, Italy, and the United States; combined with economic damage wrought on the region by World War II, the Great Depression also aided the Peronist wave of populism in Latin America; the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s produced the right-wing neopopulism of Menem and Fujimori, while reactions against neoliberal attempts to overcome those crises brought about the leftist populism of the early 2000s (e.g. Chávez, Morales, Correa). The most current wave of populism coincided with the Great Recession of 2008, and research has indicated that trade shocks and economic insecurity can increase the likelihood of support for populist parties and leaders on the right

(Colantone and Stanig 2018a, b, Guiso et al. 2017) and the left (Rodrik 2018, Autor, Hanson, and Majlesi 2016). Even in cases where populism emerged slowly and was not linked to an economic crisis, as was the case for the populist right in Nordic Europe, potential links to long-term economic stressors, such as globalization and deindustrialization, exist. The pattern here seems too consistent to be entirely coincidental: economic turbulence and insecurity contribute to the rise of populism on both sides of the political spectrum. Yet if that is the case, why do such findings not reveal themselves in survey research?


Answering this question is no simple task. The debate between economic and cultural causes of populism is much more than a contest between variables. Theories privileging economic causes, either implicitly or explicitly, usually adopt materialistic assumptions about how citizens form political ideations and make choices. By this logic, citizens embrace populism because they have been left behind by the global economic system and believe that such movements will better protect their interests. Even if such theories do not embrace an explicitly rational view of economic attitudes, citizens are still conceptualized as calculating and concerned primarily with material self-interest. Conversely, cultural explanations rely on fears about cultural change and the growth and advancement of mistrusted outgroups; cost and benefit, particularly the material sort, has little to do with it. Our goal in this paper is to show that both factors matter without mixing incompatible theories; we do this by linking economic and cultural explanations through a single factor – the emotional responses of citizens.

The argument – Affective Political Economy

We resolve this problem by arguing that economic factors can influence attitudes through mechanisms other than the materialistic, self-interested pathways which are usually the focus in political economy. We do this by analyzing the influence of economic factors on political

attitudes through an emotional, rather than materialist, lens. This allows us to connect the usually disparate domains of economy and culture, with emotions providing a causal mechanism capable of binding these disparate areas of the political environment together and connecting them in a theoretically consistent manner. Our overall theory is stylized in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Affective Political Economy theory diagram¹



Our approach, which emphasizes economic antecedents, starts with economic crises or severe economic threat, which generate a great deal of anxiety and anger (Wagner 2014).² The historical proximity of populism to economic calamity suggests that the most hospitable environment for antisystem politics are those in which economic factors drive cultural resentments and populist antagonisms. Our theory then posits that while these feelings encourage

¹ We exclude anxiety from the chart, although it is included in our analyses, because its influence on populism is theoretically ambiguous, as we discuss later.

² We note here that while economic factors *can* cause this process to unfold, cultural change (especially if sufficiently rapid) can also trigger it without an economic stimulus. The fact that populism is influential in places like Nordic Europe, where inequality is relatively low and economic security is relatively high, suggests that cultural discontent can engender populist impulses on its own. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the National Science Foundation for making this argument.

support of populism directly, they also provoke cultural discontent, defined as a sense that one's values or identity are not respected in one's social environment. In turn, these feelings of cultural discontent also influence populism. We test our theory using two survey experiments conducted in the United States and an observational study conducted in Spain.

We should note that neither Figure 1 nor the theory it depicts are intended to be comprehensive; that would be much too ambitious for a single article. Our only goal is to derive and test specific relationships between economics, culture, emotions, and populism to resolve some important paradoxes in the study of populism. We do not theorize how cultural changes, such as those wrought by mass migration or demographic shifts, might trigger this process without economic threats, nor do we incorporate the supply-side of populism, i.e. the role of elites and parties. We hope that future research will elaborate on our approach and eventually produce a fully explicated model of populism.

This theory makes two significant contributions to the study of populist attitudes. First, it incorporates both economic and cultural causes, while also explaining why current public opinion research has not consistently found economic influence on populist support: when included in a single-equation model, a full mediator will appear relevant while the root condition will not. Second, it provides a broader framework for combining culture and economics when studying politics. By using emotions as a bridge between the two fields, we can gain greater insight into other political tendencies (such as prejudice, ideological extremism, political violence, etc.) that may be influenced by negative emotions. The APE framework also makes an important contribution to the study of society generally by providing an elegant mechanism (emotions) by which the domains of economics and culture may influence one another. We

expect many other political and social phenomena may benefit from analysis within this framework.

Defining populism

The debate over defining populism boils down to those who see it as a form of charismatic, personalistic leadership (Weyland 2017, 2001, De la Torre 2018, 2010) and the ideational approach (Hawkins 2018, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, Mudde 2007), which sees populism as a form of discourse or a “thin-centered” ideology, emphasizing a Manichean moral conflict between the elites and “the people.” While both these approaches have their merits and make important contributions to our understanding of populism, we opt for the ideational approach, which focuses on *individual-level* populist attitudes, rather than leadership-level measures of populism. We argue that, since these populist attitudes can vary at the individual level, the ideational approach to populism is most appropriate for this study. Some scholars have successfully converted definitions of populism based on personalism or charisma for use in public opinion research (Merolla, Ramos, and Zechmeister 2007, Andrews-Lee 2019). However, these works focus on attitudes toward particular leaders, whereas we intend to analyze ideas and sentiments that may exist with or without a personalistic leader.

There are clear limitations to the ideational approach. Populism in the real world never exists on its own; instead, it attaches itself and melds with existing ideologies that add flesh to the bones. There is considerable evidence that contextual factors (e.g. elite choices, recent events, government actions) shape this melding process: for example, poor reactions to the 2008 economic crisis were found to be a major cause of the rise of SYRIZA in Greece (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). As our theory focuses on how economics, culture, and emotions combine to give rise to the antisystem attitudes that form the core of the populist worldview, we do not attempt to

explain the conditions that determine which ideology (or ideologies) populism may mix with at a given juncture. Whichever ideological direction populism may take, the conceptual discussion above makes it clear that threat perception plays an important role in sparking it. Populism is a fundamentally suspicious, hostile set of ideas, with an underlying sense that other actors seek to unjustly harm the people or to usurp their rightful authority. This raises the question: what kind (or kinds) of threats are most relevant for predicting the proliferation of populist attitudes?

The debate between economics and culture in populism studies

Scholars have been arguing about whether economic or cultural concerns drive populism for as long as the topic has been studied. Richard Hofstadter's (1955) depiction of the People's Party in the United States argued that they were driven by racial resentment, antisemitism, anti-modernity, and paranoid xenophobia. As such, it served as a rejoinder to Hicks (1931a, 1931b), who argued that populism was a rural revolt driven by economic insecurity and the tyranny of Northeastern monopolists. The debate has continued along similar lines since then.

The economics vs. culture debate has raged particularly boisterously among those seeking to explain the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union (Brexit). Membership in the European Union has profound implications for both sides, as the UK faced strong economic competition from lower-wage EU member states and rapid cultural change engendered by mass migration from the EU to the UK. Colantone and Stanig (2018a) found that exposure to competition from other countries (especially China), in the absence of sufficient social insurance to compensate those affected, predicted support for Brexit. Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2017) found that unemployment, education, and depressed income influenced the Leave vote. Both works found little support for cultural variables (such as hostility toward immigrants). Ford and Goodwin (2014) and Goodwin and Heath (2016) also conclude that economic pressure

was the most important cause of voting Leave, although they did not rule out culture as conclusively as other works listed here.

It would be inaccurate to describe all these works as rationalist, but they all share materialist assumptions that populism primarily results from economic concerns over material well-being. There have been a few studies that have attempted to explain populism or radical-right support as a function of economic variables within a non-materialist framework. Burgoon et al. (2019) find that an individual's wealth relative to other social groups predicts populist voting: people falling behind richer groups tend to vote for left-wing populists, while those who are losing ground to poorer groups favor right-wing populism. Kurer (2020) makes a similar argument, finding that routine workers who fear economic decline due to automation support the populist right. Both these works focus on social status and relative position, neither of which mesh with the materialism of other studies we discuss here. Yet the exact mechanism that connects the self-interested calculation of economics with the norms, values, and identities that make up culture is not entirely clear in these works. We seek to fill this gap using emotions and political psychology, as we explain in a later section.

Despite all these works on the economic origins of populist movements and behavior, much of the recent public opinion research on this topic has concluded that cultural backlash, not economic factors, predict populist attitudes and support for populist leaders and movements. While cultural theories vary in detail, all suggest that a sense of discontent driven by conflict over values, ideas, and beliefs, rather than material interest, is the proximate cause of populism. The most systematic cultural argument has been explicated by Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Norris and Inglehart 2018, Inglehart and Norris 2019). According to their cultural backlash hypothesis, the rise of post-materialist values (e.g. LGBTQ rights,

environmentalism, racial egalitarianism, etc.) has alienated more traditionalist individuals, who view this as a rejection of their “traditional” values. This resentment drives traditionalists to express hostility towards elites they see as having turned against their values, and support outsiders who echo their disaffection (e.g. Trump, the Brexit leaders, and ethnonationalists throughout Europe).

Works supporting a cultural origin of populism focus on various factors, such as authoritarianism (MacWilliams 2016), racial resentment (Cox, Lienesch, and Jones 2017), an inability to find a positive and respected social identity (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016), or a sense that one’s cultural subgroup is in terminal decline (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). Although it has not been studied in detail, we believe a similar argument could be crafted for left-wing populists, such as supporters of Bernie Sanders or Podemos. Such individuals may well be driven by a sense that egalitarianism, diversity, and environmental consciousness are under attack by neoliberalism and xenophobic nationalism.

It should be noted that many of these works detect the influence of both cultural and economic concerns. This is not a problem in and of itself, but it does pose a challenge to their theoretical clarity, as each is supported by conflicting assumptions about what motivates attitude formation and behavior. The materialism of political economy clashes with the norms and identity issues that are culturalism’s fundamental concepts. This theoretical incoherence mars our understanding of why populism emerges when and where it does and how it can be combated.

Affective Political Economy and populist attitudes

Rather than debate the relative importance of cultural and economic factors on support for populism, we craft a theoretical framework that can accommodate both factors in a coherent and consistent manner. We are not the first to attempt such an approach. Inglehart and Norris

(2017) argue that economic insecurity has, over time, increased levels of authoritarianism in some social groups in the United States; Trump's rise is a direct result. Curtice (2016) takes a culturalist position when explaining Brexit vote decision but finds that concerns over Brexit's economic consequences dampened the motivation to vote Leave. Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler (2019) make a rationalist argument, finding that authoritarian values, usually considered a psychological or cultural concept, are a rational reaction by groups in developed countries to increasing pressure from economic globalization. These groups seek to maintain their social position vis-a-vis cultural minorities because that position is under economic threat from free trade. Historical analyses have also employed similar frameworks. Kazin's seminal study (1998) cites producerism, which holds that a person's social worth and deservingness of democratic rights flows from their economic contribution, as one of the core characteristics of populism in the United States. While these works are important, they paint a narrow picture of populist dynamics. These works unfold over decades (Inglehart and Norris 2016), ignore the irrationality of political attitudes (Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler 2019), and generally struggle to provide a clear model of exactly *how* economics should influence culture and populism. A new theoretical framework is needed to link economics, culture, and populism.

Our approach relies on assumptions from behavioral economics and psychology and centers on emotional responses to threat to connect economics and culture. We elect to focus on emotions for several reasons, including their dynamism, which can explain why populist attitudes seem to rise and fall so rapidly, and the fact that individuals involved with all levels of the populist movements seem to evince such extreme emotionality (Müller 2016, 3-4). Populist rhetoric, as employed by both leaders and followers, is so incendiary and melodramatic that the

centrality of emotion and affect to this style of politics seems clear. We call this approach Affective Political Economy (APE).

Although the threat of deprivation, moral threat, and threats to a person's identity differ dramatically in any number of ways, threats of any sort can be expected to produce negative affect. A theory of populism focused on emotions is consistent with a growing body of work that cites the importance of emotion and threat to populist ideations. Normative threat has been found to activate populist attitudes (Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins 2019). Scholars have also cited emotions as important for populism. Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher (2016) found that a lack of agreeableness predicted voting for the German far-right. George Marcus and colleagues (Marcus, Valentino, and Vasilopoulos 2019, Vasilopoulos et al. 2018) argue that anger encouraged voting for the populist right in Germany and France, while fear suppressed it. Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza (2017) show that increases in anger stemming from economic crises correlate with increasing levels of populism in Spain, where, at the time of their survey, the only politically viable populist party was on the left. Seawright (2012) argues that anger driven by corruption increases risk acceptance and thus willingness to support anti-system outsiders. Our approach seeks to leverage emotions to make more general predictions about how economic and culture connect to populism.

Emotions provide enormous analytical leverage because they provoke specific, predictable cognitive and behavioral changes that influence a person's orientation to everything in their social environment, not just the original source of the threat (Forgas 1995); this theory predicts similar effects as the spreading activation theory of memory (Anderson 1983). In other words, economic hardships can lead to a mental state that predisposes a person to embrace certain values, to develop and/or express certain attitudes, and increase the salience of specific

elements of a person's identity (Banks 2016). Furthermore, emotions, especially anger and fear, provoked by economic crises can generate a new or activate latent feelings of cultural discontent. Fear triggers information seeking (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, Brader 2005, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, Albertson and Gadarian 2015), and leads to an increased reliance on new information in voter decision making (Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman 2011). However, this information search is biased in favor of threatening information (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). In response, research suggests that people resolve fear by being warier of outgroups (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009); others suggest that biased information searching can also lead to increasingly negative attitudes about groups one is predisposed to dislike (Jost, Hennes, and Lavine 2013). In short, anxiety makes people pay more attention to the threatening elements of their environment and makes them more likely to see differences in identity or values as threatening.

Threats can also provoke a desire to assign blame; when people can find individuals or groups to blame, anger is triggered. Unlike fear, anger is generally seen as an "approach" emotion, causing citizens to participate in politics; it also leads individuals to rely more heavily on their pre-existing beliefs, rather than seek out new information (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, Brader 2006). Anger encourages individuals to punish those they deem responsible for wrongdoing (Brader and Marcus 2013, Van Prooijen 2017) as anger is commonly rooted in perceptions of intentional wrongdoing (Petersen 2010) or unfairness (Steenbergen and Ellis 2006). Additionally, angry individuals tend to interpret all undesirable events in their environment as resulting from intentional wrongdoing and have an increased desire to punish anyone whose conduct they disapprove of (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999). Studies have found that anger increases or activates negative attitudes towards cultural outgroups (Banks and

Valentino 2012) or can increase the salience of racial identities among privileged groups, which can in turn cause resentment toward marginalized outgroups (Jardina 2019). Relating this to cultural discontent, anger triggered by economic threat will lead to a more aggressive, hostile, and vengeful outlook on the social environment, and latent beliefs and values consistent with these motivations will rise to the surface and motivate behavior and shape political attitudes. This suggests that *how* an individual feels about their economic situation matters: when individuals are fearful, they should behave differently from individuals who are angry.

Economic Crises and Cultural Discontent

The most fundamental insight of our theory is that a threat is a threat, regardless of its subtype. Rapid cultural change or economic pressure both create uncertain and dangerous situations for some of the population. Although our theory is mediated, we also expect these emotions to influence populism directly. Given the hostile bent inherent in populism's view of the political elite, we expect angry individuals to be more likely to develop populist attitudes or act on existing attitudes. The direct effect of anxiety (or fear)³ on populism is less clear. Anxiety opens individuals to new ideas and breaks habits of mind which could lead to the questioning of the legitimacy and functionality of the current political order; however, anxiety is demotivating and encourages flight, not fight, which stands in contrast with the aggressive and punitive nature of populism. For the moment, we accept this ambiguity and leave its resolution to the empirics, although we expect anger to do more of the heavy causal lifting.

An important issue here is the emotional influences on cultural values, as this allows us to connect economics to culture. We expect both anger and fear to contribute to cultural discontent, or the sense that one's identity and values are ignored, disrespected, and generally not given the

³ Following the literature on this topic, we use the terms "anxiety" and "fear" interchangeably.

weight they deserve. Fear will lead individuals to question their place in society and to pay more attention to social cues that seem threatening, hostile, or marginalizing. Anger provokes a generally aggressive orientation toward anything an individual perceives to be contrary to their values and it encourages people to see cultural differences as a deliberate attack. In short, economic collapses can trigger fear and anger in some, but these emotions do not stay anchored to the economy: rather, these emotions affect how individuals deal with other aspects of society, leading to a questioning of society, government and the place of “people like them” within these structures. Regardless of the pathway, we expect those who feel *either* fear or anger to exhibit increased levels of cultural discontent. This leads to our first testable hypotheses:

H₁: Economic threat increases cultural discontent

H₂: The effect of economic threat on cultural discontent is mediated through anger

This discontent will lead to favorable attitudes towards all manifestations of populism (attitudes, leaders, movements, etc.). Recall that populism is defined here as the perception that the political elites have betrayed the people they are supposed to represent. When cultural discontent is triggered, individuals will likely blame the political class for embracing contrary values and favoring those who do not belong to “the people,” however defined, triggering populism. This leads to our third hypothesis:

H₃: Cultural discontent increases populist attitudes.

Finally, we expect emotional responses to have a direct impact on populism, as discussed earlier. To review, populism is an aggressive and hostile political worldview, and thus we expect these ideas to appeal to those who are already angry. Populism also contains elements of threat and paranoia; it also involves questioning the political status quo, which would resonate with anxious individuals. However, anxiety also tends to inhibit motivation and lead to information

searching, which is not consistent with the nature of populism. Given the ambiguous status of anxiety and populism, we only hypothesize the role of anger, although we include anxiety in our analyses. This leads to our final hypothesis:

H4: Anger will positively influence populist attitudes.

Testing Affective Political Economy: Measures, methods, and results

In this section, we test our theory using experimental and observational data. Our model of populist attitudes is mediated, with economic crises causing fear and anger, which in turn influence cultural discontent, which then affects the levels of populism. If this theory holds, the paradox of interest here unravels; cultural discontent may be the *proximate* cause of populism, but economic crises will be a *root* cause whose effects will be masked in analyses that do not specifically model the mediation. We should also note that our approach does not rule out cultural threats being a root cause as well; our theory has no quarrel with cases, like Nordic Europe, where economic threat is low, yet populism has still emerged due to anxieties over immigration, religious diversity, or changes in racial hierarchy. We also do not predict the ideological direction populism will take, as we are attempting to explain populism as a general phenomenon. Our theory does not explicitly pertain to either side of the ideological debate, and we find that individuals on both sides of the aisle may experience an increased sense that their values are marginalized in the emotional wake of an economic threat.

Measuring emotions

Key to our research is measuring emotions; however, separating negative emotions into discreet categories is surprisingly difficult. Anger and fear are highly correlated in individuals facing economic crises. The result is that even sophisticated methodological techniques have difficulty precisely attributing affects to the correct emotion, and the influence of treatments can

be masked if emotions push in opposing directions. We overcome these challenges using text to encourage some respondents in the treatment group toward fear and others toward anger, as well as by using a modified measure of emotional response, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Modified (PANAS-M), that has been shown to accurately measure anger and fear with a much-reduced correlation between the two (Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, and Utych 2020a). The PANAS-M first asks respondents if they felt any of an array of possible emotions, several of which are related to anger and fear; this allowed us to use multiple indicators of each latent emotion. Afterward, respondents were asked to rate the severity of each specific emotion; these responses were then combined using CFA techniques into measures of anger and fear. Results from the measurement model for emotions for Study 1 are presented in Table 1; see the appendix for results from Study 2, which used similar measures.

Table 1: Measurement model, emotions

Indicator	Factor loadings			Error variance	R ²
	Est.	SE	p-value		
Anger					
angry	.679	.023	.000	.538	.462
outraged	.696	.022	.000	.516	.484
furious	.548	.028	.000	.700	.300
irritated	.648	.023	.000	.580	.420
Fear					
tense	.540	.030	.000	.708	.292
scared	.475	.031	.000	.774	.226
nervous	.500	.031	.000	.750	.250
afraid	.686	.027	.000	.529	
Positive Affect					
encouraged	.735	.036	.000	.456	.541
enthusiastic	.738	.035	.000	.459	.544
proud	.552	.035	.000	.695	.305
Negative Affect					
ashamed	.515	.033	.000	.735	.265
uneasy	.964	.038	.000	.733	.267

Chi-square = 194.217 (p-value = .000); RMSEA = .049; CFI = .954.

Measuring populist attitudes

To measure our ultimate dependent variable, we follow the most recent literature on public opinion and populism (Castanho Silva et al. 2018), which finds the concept has three dimensions: antielitism, people-centrism, and Manichaeism. We use this scale because it has been shown to more precisely measure populist attitudes when compared to other, similar scales. Many scholars have argued that populism is a syndrome of attitudes, meaning a person is only as populist as their least populist constitutive attitude (Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen 2019). This complicates the construction of a single populism index because typical additive or second-order factor models assume that a high score on one dimension can compensate for a low score on another, which is not appropriate for populism. As such, we elect to keep the constitutive dimensions of populism separate because we believe they may respond differently to experimental manipulations. For example, while antielitism is an attitude with an external evaluative object, which may, therefore, be manipulable, Manichaeism appears to be a fixed world view that may not be subject to experimental priming; the indicators used to measure it are quite similar to items from the Dichotomous Thinking Index (DTI) (Oshio 2009), an index designed to measure a fairly stable cognitive trait. Even if populism requires high levels of all three dimensions, any causal factor that increases even one dimension increases the likelihood that an individual will evince populist attitudes.

Conceptualizing and measuring cultural discontent

Here, we focused on two subdimensions of discontent: value/belief discontent, and identity discontent. Table 2 below presents the items and their factor loadings. We used ten original measures, rather than relying on prejudice towards minorities, immigrants, or

ethnocentrism, because we wished to develop and test a general APE theory of populism that can apply to any of the ideologies to which populism grafts itself, from far-left to far-right and all points in between. There is growing evidence that the people on the extreme right are not the only ones who feel disconnected from their culture; leftists and marginalized groups can experience a sense of discontent, especially when the far right is in power (Navarre, Rhodes-Purdy, and Utych 2020). We do not wish to draw any moral equivalence between the understandable distress that marginalized groups feel when confronted with systematic bias against them and the frustrated entitlement of the far right, but we wish to determine if they have the same impact on populist attitudes and thus require an ideologically neutral measure. Furthermore, the translation of cultural discontent into specific policy and intergroup attitudes is not a straightforward process; cultural discontent interacts with pre-existing partisan, ideological, and cultural biases. This process is too complex for us to address in detail here; see Navarre, Rhodes-Purdy, and Utych (2020), Utych, Navarre, and Rhodes-Purdy (2020) for in-depth discussions on these issues. To test the validity of the cultural discontent measure in this specific research, we analyzed the data used in Study 2 by regressing a measure of negative intergroup prejudice and negative attitudes towards immigrants on an index that combined our two dimensions of cultural discontent. This showed that cultural discontent had an extremely strong influence on both these attitudes; details can be found in the appendix.

Table 2: Factor loadings and fit indices for cultural discontent

Question Text ⁴	Value Discontent		Identity Discontent		Err. Var.
	Loading	SE	Loading	SE	
My values are not respected in this country	.733	.189	-	-	.463

⁴ All questions had both pro- and con-trait versions, which were displayed randomly.


I often see my beliefs and values disrespectfully portrayed on television	.533	.029	-	-	.715
People with values like mine are treated poorly in this society	.763	.017	-	-	.417
The decisions our government makes usually violate my values and beliefs	.568	.025	-	-	.677
Institutions in this country disrespect values that are important to me	.568	.025	-	-	.677
People like me are marginalized in this society	-	-	.697	.020	.513
I typically am not treated as fairly as I deserve	-	-	.603	.023	.636
Regardless of who is in political power, things are generally pretty bad for people like me	-	-	.681	.020	.536
Society is generally pretty unfair to people like me	-	-	.759	.017	.423
The political system is not set up to benefit people like me	-	-	.623	.022	.611

*Chi-square 108.02 (p=.000); RMSEA .049; CFI .98. All loadings significant at the .001 level.

Methods and findings: Study 1

We use an experimental design to allow for the causal inferences needed to support this theory. For our first study, we obtained a sample of 997 adult US residents from Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (Mturk platform). These were divided into five conditions, each of which involved the completion of a short writing exercise about: brushing their teeth (Control); a time they felt anxious about the country's economy (Economic Anxiety); a time they felt angry about the country's economy (Economic Anger); a time they felt political leaders had betrayed the people they were supposed to represent (Populism); or a time they felt that people with values and beliefs like their own did not belong in this country (Cultural Discontent). We then asked each respondent a series of questions about their emotional reactions, populist attitudes, and sense of cultural discontent (the latter two were presented in random order). We begin our analyses by regressing each dimension of populism, cultural discontent, and each discrete emotion on the treatments. All variables were rescaled from 0-1 for comparability. Results are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Marginal Means of Emotions, Populism, and Cultural Discontent by Treatment



The results here are largely consistent with our theory. The Economic Anger condition had a significant influence on both value and identity discontent, as predicted in H₁. The Economic Anxiety condition did not influence discontent; as will be the case throughout this paper, anger seems to be the most important emotion for the causal process we analyze. As predicted by H₃, cultural discontent had a significant impact on two of the three dimensions of populism; Manichaeism was not influenced significantly by any treatment, which is consistent with what we have found over multiple studies and pilots. Two other results from this figure bear mentioning. First, the economic treatments did not significantly influence populism. Our second study came to a different conclusion, but this disparity is consistent with our theory. Recall that our approach has multiple layers of mediation (emotions, cultural discontent) between populism and the economy, leading to difficulty in detecting the relationship. It is therefore not surprising that the effect is not statistically detectable.

Second, the populism treatment had a quite strong impact on cultural discontent. In other words, it appears that priming someone to feel betrayed by political leaders also leads to feelings

of alienation from the national culture. This is crucial because it calls into question much of the literature finding a cultural cause of populism, the vast majority of which is based on observational data: this reciprocal relationship between cultural discontent and populism likely inflates the estimated impact of the former on the latter, due to unmodeled endogeneity.

To test the mediated parts of our theory (H2), we also conducted mediation analyses based on our theoretical predictions. We conduct mediation analysis per Breen, Karlson, and Holm (2013), using the khb Stata package. We use this atypical mediation technique because, unlike more standard methods, it can incorporate multiple mediators and multiple treatment groups within the same model. While this technique is typically used on nonlinear models, the estimates on generalized linear models remain accurate (Kohler, Karlson, and Holm 2011). These analyses allow us to compare the reduced model (constituted of only the treatments as independent variables) with a full model including mediators to determine if the relationships between treatment and outcome flow through the variables our theory predicts they should.

Results are presented in Table 3.⁵

Table 3: Mediation effects

Difference in treatment effects, reduced vs. full models	Treatments			
	Econ. Anxiety	Econ. Anger	Populism	Cult. Discontent
Treat effect on value discontent, mediated through anger and fear	.03*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)
Treat effect on identity marginalization, mediated through anger and fear	.03*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Treat effect on antielitism, mediated through cult. discontent dimensions and emotions	.03*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Treat effect on people-centrism, mediated through cult. discontent dimensions and emotions	.02** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)

*** p < .01; ** p < .05, * p < .1

⁵ Estimates for reduced and full models are omitted for brevity; these can be found in the appendix.

These results demonstrate how emotions mediate the influence of the treatments on cultural discontent, and how emotions and cultural discontent both mediate the effects of the treatments on populist attitudes. Importantly, every treatment except for Economic Anxiety led to an increase in cultural discontent. However, in both the Economic Anger and the Populism treatments, this effect was completely mediated by the role of anger and fear; the treatments tended to increase anger and fear, which in turn increased cultural discontent.

We further see that emotions and cultural discontent serve to dampen the effects of the treatments on the populist attitudes of antielitism and people-centrism. While both economic treatments have no direct effects on populist attitudes, accounting for emotions and cultural discontent causes the treatments to predict a *decrease* in both antielitism and people-centrism. Importantly, the cultural discontent treatment predicted an increase in each of the two measures of populist attitudes. However, these effects are completely mediated by anger, fear, value discontent, and identity discontent; once we account for these four factors, the effects of the treatments on populist attitudes approach zero. It is also of interest which of these mediators have a significant relationship with each dependent variable. Regression parameter estimates for each predictor are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Regression coefficient estimates, cultural discontent and populism regressed on cultural discontent, emotions, and treatments

Predictor	Value Discontent			Identity Discontent			Antielitism			People-centrism		
	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p
Cultural Discontent												
Value Discontent	-	-	-	-	-	-	.409	.089	.000	.251	.089	.005
Ident. Discontent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.169	.086	.051	-.247	.086	.004
Emotions												
Anger	.169	.028	.000	.147	.029	.000	.103	.025	.000	.103	.025	.000
Fear	.051	.035	.143	.067	.036	.060	.043	.030	.157	.049	.030	.104
Treatments												

Econ. Anxiety	-.005	.018	.772	-.004	.019	.836	-.026	.016	.104	-.026	.016	.092
Econ. Anger	.000	.018	.981	.005	.019	.778	-.027	.016	.093	-.027	.016	.098
Populism	.027	.019	.163	.031	.020	.116	-.005	.017	.782	-.009	.016	.600
Cult. Discontent	.069	.018	.000	.065	.019	.001	-.002	.016	.912	.006	.016	.703

The results presented in Table 4 help clarify the exact paths from economically induced emotions to populism. First, anger seems to be the most important discrete emotion: its effect was large and statistically significant on both dimensions of cultural discontent, while the effect of fear was much smaller and marginally significant only for identity marginalization. Anger also seems to be the dominant emotion for populism; it significantly influenced both antielitism and people-centrism. Cultural discontent also had the predicted effect on populism, but only value discontent was positive and significant: the effect of identity marginalization was negative for both dimensions of populism, although only significantly so for people-centrism. While we can only speculate why this may be, we suspect it is because value discontent is aggravating and thus motivating, while identity discontent may provoke a sense of hopelessness and distrust in one's fellow citizens that inhibits populism. Further research is necessary to clarify these relationships; but for the purpose of this paper, it is clear that both one emotion (anger) and one dimension of discontent (value discontent) act as our theory predicted.

To assuage concerns that a single experimental test on a convenience sample may not provide replicable support for our hypotheses, we include in the appendix another experiment testing the same relationships but using a nationally diverse sample, with slightly different measures and treatments. The results were largely consistent with the results presented here.

Study 2 – Observational study, Spain

Experiments are powerful tools for making causal inferences; yet like any tool, they are better for some purposes than others. External validity is always a concern; one can never be sure that the experiment has replicated real-world dynamics, nor that the effects observed in a short

experiment actually produce lasting change over time. Observational studies, while usually not capable of showing causal relationships, can at least determine if the associations seen in an experiment also appear in the real world. In other words, multi-method designs that incorporate both experiments and observational surveys are especially useful for analyzing political behavior, because the strengths of each method can compensate for the weaknesses of each. With that in mind, we conducted an observational study in Spain called the Political System Attitudes Survey (PSAS) from January 24 to February 3, 2020.⁶ The study used a simple random sample of 1,000 individuals drawn from a nationally representative pool of respondents recruited by the Forthright panel (information about the panel is available upon request to the authors).

Perceptions of economic threat were measured using a series of questions evaluating the respondents' personal economic situation (past, present, and future) and that of the national economy. We measure emotions using the same PANAS-M technique as in Study 1, with individuals asked to evaluate their emotional responses towards the current social situation in Spain. Cultural discontent was measured in the same manner as in Study 1, although one indicator (cd17) was omitted due to a survey programming error. Populism was measured using the Castanho Silva scale, with a minor modification (see appendix for details). As demographic controls, we also include education, social class, gender, and ideology in the model.

To test our theory with these data, we specified a model wherein perceptions of economic threat influenced emotional responses to the social situation of Spain, which in turn influenced cultural discontent, which then influenced the dimensions of populism. As our experimental analyses suggest that Manichaeism is relatively fixed and therefore unlikely to be influenced by malleable attitudes, we treat it as an exogenous predictor here. For consistency with existing

⁶ For more information and access to the data, see Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, and Utych (2020b)

literature, we include analyses with Manichaeism as a dependent variable in the appendix. None of our substantive conclusions were affected by this difference. Additionally, the inclusion of both cultural discontent and identity marginalization led to large standard errors and unstable estimates (i.e. estimates that changed wildly with minor changes in model specification). This indicates problems with multicollinearity, which makes sense given the high correlation between these two dimensions. As such, we excluded identity marginalization from the analysis.

We use a simultaneous equations path model (Path SEM) to evaluate our hypotheses. Such a model simultaneously estimates a measurement model (analogous to a CFA) and structural models (analogous to nonrecursive simultaneous regressions) at the same time. We then used MPLUS to estimate the model parameters; results are presented in Table 5 below.⁷ Results are standardized, meaning all variables were rescaled to have a mean of zero and a variance of one, to aid with comparison of substantive effect size.

Table 5: Structural parameter estimates from Path SEM analysis

Predictor	Anger	Fear	Cultural Discontent	Antielitism	People-Centrism
Economic Evaluation	-.487*** (.038)	-.477*** (.042)	-.519*** (.045)	-.070 (.053)	.229** (.080)
Manichaeism	.208*** (.052)	.175** (.054)	.260*** (.050)	.032 (.057)	-.064 (.080)
Anger	-	-	.157* (.065)	.139* (.077)	.122 (.102)
Fear	-	-	-.063 (.070)	-.115 (.082)	.072 (.110)
Cultural Discontent	-	-	-	.593*** (.051)	.215* (.072)
Female	-.006 (.033)	.014 (.036)	-.028 (.026)	.033 (.031)	.038 (.041)
Education	-.004 (.036)	.003 (.039)	-.005 (.034)	-.065 (.033)	-.045 (.044)

⁷ Results from the measurement portion of the model are included in the appendix.

Social Class	-.037 (.037)	-.070 (.039)	-.106** (.035)	.027 (.034)	-.021 (.045)
Age	.007 (.035)	-.086* (.037)	-.022 (.033)	-.126*** (.033)	.137** (.043)
Ideology	.084* (.040)	.173*** (.042)	.101** (.038)	.046 (.038)	-.176*** (.049)

*=sig at .05 level; ** = sig at .01 level; ***=sig at .001 level. Chi-square = 1507.60 (p=.000);

RMSEA = .046 (p=.992); CFI = .90.

The results are consistent with our theory and with the results of the experimental analyses. As expected, anger and fear responses to the current social situation in Spain were both significantly influenced by perceptions of economic threat (positive values of the evaluation variable mean less perceived threat, hence the negative relationship). In turn, anger, but not fear, significantly increased respondents' sense of cultural discontent. Economic threat perceptions also had a direct effect on cultural discontent; there appears to be a cognitive component to the relationship, as well as an affective component. Economic grievance may cause people to call into question the basic moral values of their society, as they view the harm wrought by economic hardship is unevenly (and thus in the minds of many, unfairly) distributed or attended to by the political system. Finally, two dimensions of populism (and a multiplicative index of populism, see the appendix for details) were significantly influenced by cultural discontent. The effect on antielitism was especially large; an increase of one standard deviation in cultural discontent produced over one-half of a standard deviation increase in that dimension of populism. In short, these results follow our theoretical model very closely.

Summary of results

To summarize the results of all studies in tandem: first, using experimental manipulations, we consistently show that negative economic priming induced cultural discontent. Regardless of what measures we used, economic disaster triggered a sense of being cut off and

neglected by the cultural mainstream (H₁). Each study confirmed that emotions were the link between economics and culture, as the relationship between economic treatments and cultural discontent was totally mediated by affect; anger was especially potent in this regard (H₂). Our observational study produced similar results. Finally, all studies consistently showed that cultural discontent influenced populism. Our cultural discontent treatment positively affected antielitism and people-centrism, and our measures of cultural discontent were positively associated with people-centrism (H₃). Finally, anger was consistently associated with populist ideation (H₄); the role of fear differed substantially across studies, leading us to believe its relationship with populism may be so complex and multifaceted that it may be difficult to demonstrate experimentally.

In short, although details varied from study to study, each of the hypotheses that collectively form our Affective Political Economic theory of populism were supported by observational and experimental evidence, taken from studies in both the United States and Spain. The fact that different methods, measures, and national populations were used across studies indicates that this is no mere artifact of the data, but the reflection of real relationships that are relevant across contexts.

Conclusion

The findings presented here go a long way toward resolving the dispute over the role of economics and culture in the study of populism. The paradox is an illusion, an artifact of an incorrect assumption that the economy and culture represent “non-overlapping *magisterial*,” as Stephen J. Gould once described science and religion. While this stark division between variables makes sense if one approaches the economy from within the usual materialist paradigm, from a behavioral standpoint, both culture and economics are just different ways in

which the social environment can emotionally trigger people. Once emotions are triggered, things play out more or less the same, no matter where the threat came from. In this light, the populist surge of recent years makes a great deal of sense: the trauma of the financial crisis was followed closely by a massive wave of refugees. For populism, this represents a one-two punch. We believe the use of emotions to connect disparate fields of study with apparently irreconcilable assumptions about human motivation (i.e. the rationalism of economics and the importance of values and norms in culturalism) would apply well beyond the study of populism.

Our findings also are only the first part of a multifaceted effort to show how threats and emotions influence populism. Our results echo those of Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza (2017) in Spain, even though that study considered only the link between economic crises and populism, without analyzing the role of culture, but it is important to remember that our study only uses experimental data from the United States and observational data from Spain. While both contexts have a left and right populist movement, this does not necessarily generalize to all contexts, and future work is encouraged to examine this in various other contexts.

We would also be remiss if we did not briefly discuss the implications these findings have for the relationship between populism and democracy. To be blunt, the prognosis is poor: even the most aspirational of populism's dimensions is a fundamentally aggressive attitude. Populist individuals are in an extreme emotional state, beset by anxiety and anger, and looking for someone to blame. We do not wish to repeat the mistakes criticized by Marcus (2010), automatically assuming that emotions equal irrationality and irresponsible citizenship. We do not believe that people holding populist attitudes are uniquely emotional; rather, emotions influence everyone's political behavior. Neither do we believe that populist supporters act on emotion because they are too dim to consciously understand their political environment and rationally

behave accordingly, an idea which Müller (2016, 15-17) points out is common and which he very effectively castigates. Yet the fact remains: populism is an aggressive and vindictive political tendency, and its potential as a source of some very unpleasant political behavior is impossible to ignore.

That said, our conclusions do not support works that advocate for fighting populism through institutional gatekeeping (e.g. Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Although we leave this to future research, we strongly suspect that attempts to suppress populism through the resurrection of the smoke-filled room would only exacerbate the emotional responses we identify as responsible for populism; we further guess that such repression would direct people toward populism's darkest aspects. Future research, especially work focused on the relationship of populism and democracy, should search for ways democracies can channel these emotions into productive forms of political behavior. Left to fester, the resentments, hostilities, and fears driven by economic crises and intensified by cultural paranoia will provide fertile ground for would-be demagogues.

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Populist Psychology: Online Appendix

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A1: Study 3: Replication of experimental results

In order to provide greater confidence in our experimental results, we present here an additional experiment. The study is not a perfect replication; in fact, Study 1 in the manuscript actually followed this study, and made a number of refinements to it. But the basic hypotheses and concepts are still here, although they are measured differently and use a different treatment strategy. In this study, we measure several specific cultural attitudes that we propose reflect a general sense of cultural discontent. To identify specific attitudes, we consulted literature on populism, both quantitative and qualitative, to identify ideas that have been shown to relate to populism. The study of populism from a public opinion standpoint is quite new, and theoretical development has lagged behind work focusing on populist leaders and parties, and on the relationship between populism and democracy. As such, while the literature does provide several possible latent indicators of cultural discontent that may relate to populism, there is not much of a roadmap to guide us toward one set of indicators over others. Given this, we identified concepts expressing negative attitudes toward cultural values with a wide variety of attitude objects (e.g. perceived wrongdoers, one's social group, the society as a whole). We also focused on attitudes that would be relevant across ideologies (with a few exceptions). With these criteria in mind, we specify the following as latent indicators of cultural discontent:¹

- **Political Punitivism (PP):** This concept describes a generally punitive attitude toward the political system (Rhodes-Purdy 2019).


¹ Astute readers may note that this list does not include measures of bias, prejudice, ethnocentrism, etc; this lacuna is all the more obvious as our experiment did include questions about these concepts. We find that political bias does respond to economic crises in a similar way to cultural discontent, but the effects are moderated by preexisting attitudes toward social groups in a way not shared by discontent. These findings are presented in another paper.

- **Declinism:** Declinism is a sense that one's society and/or social group is in moral decline or decay, generally expressed by statements like "our country's best days are behind it." (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016).
- **Producerism:** Producerism is a concept that evaluates the moral worth of individuals and their deservingness of political participation and attention based on their industriousness and productivity (Kazin 1998, Kindle location 351-352). Our battery measures the extent to which individuals feel that producerism is honored by society, or if "leeches" and "parasites" are unduly catered to by political elites. We identify two variants: producerism, which is directed at elites, and authoritarian producerism, which is directed at those who are poor and reliant on aid from the state for survival.
- **Social victimization:** Social victimization is the belief that one's social group is unfairly marginalized, one's identity maligned, and generally that the woes of the country fall disproportionately heavily on "people like me." This is also referred to as relative deprivation (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, Gurr 1971).
- **Authoritarianism:** Authoritarianism is a behavioral style characterized by the covariation of deference to those above oneself in the social hierarchy, aggression to those below, and extreme conventionalism (Stenner 2005).

We specify each of these attitudes as latent concepts that influence multiple observed indicators. We are not interested in the specific influence of any one of these values on populism; rather our theory focuses on a general sense of cultural discontent. As such, we use a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model to obtain our measure of cultural discontent. In a second order CFA, a latent factor is assumed to influence other latent factors, which in turn influence the observed indicators (see Rindskopf and Rose 1988 for a good summary of this type of CFA). In this model, the first latent factor, cultural discontent, influences the other latent

factors we have described above as cultural attitudes; the lower order latent factors then influence the observed responses to survey questions. Authoritarianism and authoritarian producerism did not significantly load on the cultural discontent latent factor, and thus these were excluded as indicators. This is not surprising as these attitudes were uniquely limited to one side of the ideological spectrum, being far more commonly associated with conservatism. A summary of the measurement model is included in Figure A1; results of the measurement portion of the model are presented with the measurement model results for other studies in a later section.

Figure A1: Second order CFA diagram for Study 3 cultural discontent and populism measures²



In addition to our substantive variables, we included several demographic controls (income, education, age, party identification, race, gender, region of residence, and Latinx self-identification), along with a measure of sociotropic evaluation of the economy.

² Indicators and method factor are omitted for space considerations.

Study 3 results

Given recent scandals in the social sciences, it is always highly desirable that experiments be replicated. If multiple surveys, especially when using slightly different treatments and measures, are consistent with a single theory, it lends far greater support for that theory than any single effort could. For our second study, after obtaining a sample ($n=801$) from a commercial survey firm, we exposed participants in this sample to one of four treatment videos:

1. A video of roughly equal length to the treatment videos of a man making a sandwich wrap (Control).
2. A video of Steve Bannon discussing race relations in the United States (Cultural Threat, CT).³
3. A video of a family devastated by a financial crisis; text placards were used to focus individuals on ongoing, unavoidable future economic calamities (Economic Threat, Dread)
4. The same video as in treatment 3, but with text placards encouraging blame cognitions over past economic wrongdoing and minimizing the possibility of future crises (Economic Threat, Grievance).


We include the Cultural Threat treatment because in Study 1 the Cultural Discontent treatment was very direct; here we wish to simulate a real-world challenge to individuals' values and identity, to determine if doing so has a similar effect as presenting them with negative economic

³ It was extremely difficult to find a video that will be roughly equally culturally threatening to respondents of all political persuasions. The Bannon video was chosen because it was unique in being culturally threatening to both the left (because someone who once held a high position in the US government was saying things about race that conflict with racial and ethnic egalitarianism) and the right (because of the content of Bannon's discussion, which aligns with racial and ethnic threats that have become endemic on the right). It also helps establish the causal influence of cultural discontent on populist attitudes. We concede that it is not a perfect treatment. We have far more confidence in the written analogue of this treatment from Study 1, as it allowed respondents to bring their own ideas and experiences to bear on the subject.

narratives. The economic threat treatments here are labeled as “Dread” and “Grievance” because we cannot encourage discrete emotional responses as directly with videos as we can with written prompts. Yet, we still wish to determine if crisis narratives have different effects when they emphasize ongoing danger (Dread) or past wrongdoing (Grievance).

For all treatment groups, respondents were asked a series of demographic questions prior to treatment. After treatment, we asked a battery of questions measuring the aforementioned lower-order factors that loaded on cultural discontent, and the dimensions of populism. The mediated structure of our theory requires that we conduct our analysis in stages. First, we regressed each emotion, dimension of populism, and our composite measure of cultural discontent on the treatments alone. We rescaled all variables from 0-1 for ease of comparison. Treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals are presented in Figure A2.

Figure A2: Treatment effects on emotions, cultural discontent, and dimensions of populism.



Of the dimensions of populism, antielitism was significantly influenced by all three treatments. Neither popularism nor Manichaeism were significantly influenced by any of the treatments. In the case of popularism, this may be due to the countervailing influence of fear and anger, which (as we show shortly) are associated with this dimension in opposite directions. As with Study 1, it seems likely that Manichaeism may simply not be manipulable in the same way as the other dimensions. All three treatments influenced cultural discontent, which suggests that this mediating factor can have either cultural or economic origins.

Although these findings are consistent with our theory, they are not proof positive. Our framework makes clear predictions of an emotional mechanism underlying these experimental findings. To test this aspect, we conducted another mediation analysis. We once again use KHB mediation analysis to test these predictions. Following our theoretical model, we first examine how the emotions of anger and fear influence our measure of cultural discontent.

Table A1: Effect of treatments on cultural discontent, mediated through anger and fear

	Cultural threat treatment	Economic threat, dread treatment	Economic threat, grievance treatment
Reduced	.23*** (.06)	.24*** (.06)	.17*** (.06)
Full	.04 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.09 (.06)
Difference	.19*** (.04)	.27*** (.05)	.27*** (.05)
<i>N</i>	801	801	801

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models is cultural discontent. The reduced model predicts cultural discontent with only the treatments (the control is suppressed for reference), while the full model predicts cultural discontent with the treatments, anger and fear. *** - $p > .0$. This note applies to Tables 2-5.

As shown in Table A1, the treatments predict an increase in cultural discontent, but once we account for anger and fear, the effect of the treatments goes away. There are significant differences between the full and reduced model for all treatments, suggesting that anger and fear

completely mediate the effects of the treatment on cultural discontent. This falls in line with our theoretical model, where we predict that the treatments will cause anger and fear, which each then cause an increase in cultural discontent.

The next step in our theoretical model suggests that cultural discontent should influence the three measures of populism – anti-elitism, popularism, and Manichaeism. We observe a direct effect of the treatments on anti-elitism, though not popularism and Manichaeism. As such, this model is most appropriate for anti-elitism, though we present results for popularism to demonstrate that cultural discontent still generally lowers the treatment effects of this factor as well. At this point, we are prepared to conclude that Manichaeism is not influenced by experimental treatments and therefore we do not include analyses of that factor from here forward.

Table A2: Effect of treatments on antielitism, mediated through cultural discontent

	Cultural threat treatment	Economic threat, dread treatment	Economic threat, grievance treatment
Reduced	.18*** (.04)	.15*** (.04)	.15*** (.04)
Full	-.00 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Difference	.19** (.08)	.19** (0.08)	.14* (.08)
<i>N</i>	801	801	801

Effect of treatments on People-centrism, mediated through cultural discontent

	Cultural threat treatment	Economic threat, dread treatment	Economic threat, grievance treatment
Reduced	-.00 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	.03 (.05)
Full	-.03 (.04)	-.04 (.05)	.01 (.05)
Difference	.03** (0.01)	.03** (0.01)	.02 (.01)

<i>N</i>	801	801	801
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Here, we see that cultural discontent fully mediates the effects of the treatments on anti-elitism. While we do not see direct effects for popularism and Manichaeism, we generally see a change in the magnitude of treatment effects in the negative direction once we account for cultural discontent. These models provide some support for our theoretical model. We see that the treatments all cause increases in anger and fear, which then both increase cultural discontent. We also see that cultural discontent influences populist attitudes. This formal mediation analysis tells us that our treatments influence populist attitudes by influencing emotions, which influence cultural discontent. Further, these models suggest a full mediation of the effects – once accounting for their impacts on anger and fear, the treatments have no direct effect on cultural discontent, and once accounting for cultural discontent, the treatments have no direct effect on populist attitudes. We also include parameter estimates for the mediators and treatments in Table A3.

Table A3: Regression of emotions on cultural discontent and emotions and cultural discontent on dimensions of populism (Study 3)

Predictor	Cultural Discontent			Anti-elitism			Popularism		
	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p
Cultural Discontent	-	-	-	.725 .140	.089 .000	.000	.116	.038	.002
Emotions									
Anger	.254	.034	.000	.140	.023	.000	.280	.038	.000
Fear	.208	.038	.000	-.190	.025	.000	-.189	.042	.000
Treatments									
Cult. Threat	.012	.016	.441	.005	.010	.637	-.019	.017	.277
Econ. Dread	-.008	.017	.652	.012	.011	.287	-.007	.018	.719
Econ. Grievance	-.026	.017	.116	.008	.011	.462	-.015	.018	.401

A2. Measurement details

Given the abstract nature of many of the concepts of interest in this study, random measurement error was a significant concern. To minimize the issue, we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) techniques. CFA assumes that multiple indicators of a concept are influenced by a latent, or unmeasured, variable. With sufficient indicators, it is possible to estimate the influence of the latent factor on each indicator, the extent of random measurement error, and predict scores on the latent factor for each observation. Our models are extensive, given the number of latent concepts and indicators, but their structures are simple: our factor complexity was one (meaning each indicator was only influenced by one latent factor), with two exceptions: several of the measures of populism were influenced by a method factor. This factor influenced questions that were worded in such a way that higher numbers indicated a more populist response. This variable captures common variation related to the direction of the questions (the other indicators were scaled the opposite way). The second exception was our use of a second-order factor to measure cultural discontent in Study 3.

The indicators of populism were taken from the scale developed by Castanho Silva et. al. (2018). This scale performs quite well compared to alternative scales. We modified the scale in a few small ways in Studies 2 and 3, in order to manage problems this scale seems to have on longer surveys when respondent attention might wane. The differences in Study 2 were discussed in the main manuscript. In Study 3, we included two additional indicators (ant4 and ppl4); pilot data indicated that these indicators loaded on the relevant factors and helped distinguish the factors from one another (the two are quite highly correlated). We also excluded one indicator of Manichaeism (man2) as its R^2 value was very small, its sign was positive (rather than negative as expected), and it was set in the opposite direction of the scale by a single word. As such, we

elect to eliminate this indicator as it seems to introduce more noise than signal. This seems to be an artifact of question presentation: the Castanho Silva scale seems prone to these problems when the questions are presented in matrix grid format (as they were in Study 2). In Study 1, the questions were presented one at a time (both studies randomized the order of the populism questions), and we thus did not experience any of these problems when estimating the CFA. Our measures of cultural discontent for Study 1 are listed in the main manuscript, as is our strategy for measuring discontent for Study 2. For Study 1, each conceptual block (populism, cultural discontent, and emotions) was estimated separately. For Study 2, they were estimated simultaneously.

Results of an estimation of our CFA model parameters for all studies are presented in Table A4.

Table A4: CFA measurement model results

Study 1⁴

Chi-square = 242.24(p-value = .000); RMSEA = .056; CFI = .953.

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Method factor⁵					
ant, ppl1, ppl3, man1, man3	.894	.095	.000	-	-
Antielitism					
ant1	<i>1.000</i>	-	-	.717	.599
ant2	.549	.054	.000	1.87	.275
ant3	.906	.076	.000	.835	.513
Popularism					
ppl1	<i>1.000</i>	-	-	.493	.519
ppl2	.879	.079	.000	2.03	.379
ppl3	.823	.040	.000	1.08	.253

⁴ Results for emotions and value and identity discontent and emotions are reported in the manuscript and thus are not included here.

⁵ Method factor loading constrained to 1 for ant1. All other loadings constrained to be equal.

Manichaeism

man1	1.000	-	-	1.17	.582
man2	1.08	.115	.000	.840	.586
man3	1.11	.062	.000	.830	.688

Chi-square = 49.59 (p=.000); RMSEA = .040; CFI = .98

Study 2

All estimates were standardized. See the questionnaire in this document for Spanish wordings.

Populism

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Method factor⁶					
ant, ppl1, ppl3, man1, man3	.894	.095	.000	-	-
Antielitism					
ant1	1.000	-	-	.717	.599
ant2	.549	.054	.000	1.87	.275
ant3	.906	.076	.000	.835	.513
Popularism					
ppl1	1.000	-	-	.493	.519
ppl2	.879	.079	.000	2.03	.379
ppl3	.823	.040	.000	1.08	.253
Manichaeism					
man1	1.000	-	-	1.17	.582
man2	1.08	.115	.000	.840	.586
man3	1.11	.062	.000	.830	.688

Chi-square = 67.50 (p-value = .000); RMSEA = .052; CFI = .976.

Emotional responses

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Anger					
angry	.679	.023	.000	.538	.462
outraged	.696	.022	.000	.516	.484
furious	.548	.028	.000	.700	.300
irritated	.648	.023	.000	.580	.420

⁶ Method factor loading constrained to 1 for ant1. All other loadings constrained to be equal.

Fear

tense	.540	.030	.000	.708	.292
scared	.475	.031	.000	.774	.226
nervous	.500	.031	.000	.750	.250
afraid	.686	.027	.000	.529	

Positive Affect

encouraged	.735	.036	.000	.456	.541
enthusiastic	.738	.035	.000	.459	.544
proud	.552	.035	.000	.695	.305

Negative Affect

ashamed	.515	.033	.000	.735	.265
uneasy	.964	.038	.000	.733	.267

Chi-square =194.217(p-value = .000); RMSEA = .049; CFI = .954.

Cultural discontent

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Cultural discontent					
cd1	.758	.019	.000	.426	.574
cd2	.516	.027	.000	.734	.266
cd4	.671	.022	.000	.549	.451
cd8	.620	.024	.000	.615	.385
cd9	.664	.022	.000	.559	.441
Identity Marginalization					
cd6	.639	.027	.000	.591	.409
cd16	.509	.030	.000	.741	.259
cd20	.605	.077	.000	.634	.366

Chi-square =67.50(p-value = .000); RMSEA = .052; CFI = .976.

Populism

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Method factor⁷					
ppl2	.409	.105	.000	-	-
Antielitism					
ant1	.817	.023	.000	.332	.668

⁷ Method factor loading constrained to 1 for ant1. All other loadings constrained to be equal.

ant2	.616	.043	.000	.582	.418
ant3	.744	.024	.000	.446	.554
Popularism					
ppl1	.605	.043	.000	.634	.366
ppl2	.501	.098	.000	.701	.299
ppl3	.666	.045	.000	.556	.444
Manichaeism					
man1	.815	.165	.000	.336	.664
man3	.378	.081	.000	.857	.143

Chi-square =62.16(p-value = .000); RMSEA = .065; CFI = .960.

Economic evaluation

Indicator	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
	Est.	SE	p-value		
Method factor					
Idiotropic now	.469	.028	.000	.780	.220
Idiotropic past	.613	.023	.000	.625	.375
Idiotropic future	.597	.025	.000	.643	.357
Egotropic now	.684	.020	.000	.532	.468
Egotropic past	.865	.015	.000	.251	.749
Egotropic future	.756	.018	.000	.429	.571

Chi-square =84.80(p-value = .000); RMSEA = .115; CFI = .970.

Study 3

	Factor loadings			Error variance	R^2
Indicator	Est.	SE	p-value		
Anger					
angry	1.000	-	-	1.077	.480
outraged	1.007	.061	.000	.950	.515
furious	.665	.042	.000	.500	.468
mad	.882	.055	.000	.823	.484
Fear					
afraid	1.000	-	-	.785	.337
anxious	1.221	.103	.000	1.165	.338
worried	1.894	.136	.000	1.258	.533
nervous	1.203	.095	.000	.838	.409
Negative Affect					
distressed	1.000	-	-	1.272	.361

disturbed	1.035	.089	.000	1.165	.277
upset	1.285	.096	.000	1.761	.403
Sociotropic Evaluation					
soct1	1.000	-	-	.261	.718
soct2	.934	.042	.000	.387	.663
Identity marginalization					
pr1	1.000	-	-	1.817	.408
pr2	1.362	.163	.000	.588	.798
pr3	1.000	-	-	1.844	.326
pr4	1.551	.107	.000	1.199	.641
pr5	1.362	.096	.000	1.256	.568
pr6	.961	.083	.000	2.255	.267
Declinism					
dec1	1.000	-	-	1.280	.520
dec2	.759	.063	.000	1.895	.296
dec3	.689	.053	.000	1.503	.305
dec4	1.082	.068	.000	1.228	.569
Manichaeism					
man1	1.000	-	-	1.032	.597
man3	.981	.081	.000	.989	.598
Political Punitivism					
pp1	1.000	-	-	1.023	.431
pp4	.859	.072	.000	.987	.368
pp6	.994	.087	.000	1.538	.332
Regime Support					
rs1	1.000	-	-	1.001	.680
rs2	.902	.038	.000	.995	.635
rs3	1.032	.042	.000	.964	.701
Authoritarianism					
auth1	1.000	-	-	.632	.306
auth2	.992	.119	.000	.678	.288
auth3	1.200	.139	.000	.526	.433
auth4	.812	.086	.000	.614	.230
Popularism					
ppl1	1.000	-	-	.654	.556
ppl2	1.570	.226	.000	2.323	.245
ppl3	.634	.096	.000	1.111	.365
ppl4	-.053	.157	.737	1.775	.226
Antielitism					
ant1	1.000	-	-	.834	.569
ant2	1.182	.129	.000	1.552	.349

ant3	.895	.077	.000	1.140	.474
ant4	.725	.072	.000	.960	.472
Social Victimization					
rd1	1.000	-	-	1.957	.313
rd2	1.301	.098	.000	.820	.648
rd3	1.143	.085	.000	1.267	.479
Regime-based Efficacy (RBE)					
eff3	1.000	-	-	2.319	.338
eff4	1.210	.086	.000	1.071	.618
eff5	1.256	.087	.000	1.243	.601
Performance					
perf1	1.000	-	-	1.013	.665
perf2	.894	.039	.000	1.443	.527
perf3	.849	.038	.000	1.322	.523
perf4	1.133	.042	.000	.937	.734
perf5	.969	.041	.000	1.275	.597
Conspiracism					
consp1	1.000	-	-	.659	.573
consp2	1.001	.046	.000	.698	.559
consp3	.966	.044	.000	.621	.571
consp4	.912	.043	.000	.548	.573
consp5	.982	.047	.000	.716	.544
consp6	.975	.045	.000	.580	.592
consp7	.831	.048	.000	.986	.382
consp8	.631	.041	.000	.813	.302
consp9	.591	.038	.000	.693	.309
Method factor					
ant1	1.000	-	-	-	-
All other indictors (ant1, ant3, ant4, ppl1, ppl3, ppl4)	1.048	.078	.000	-	-
Cultural discontent					
Punitive aggression	1.000	-	-	1.036	.173
Producerism	.731	.126	.000	1.126	.188
Declinism	.801	.104	.000	.368	.524
Social Victimization	1.006	.108	.000	.481	.461

A3. Experimental treatments

Writing exercise prompts (Study 1)

Control: Think about a time in your life when brushed your teeth. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could imagine brushing their teeth themselves.

Economic Anxiety: Think about a time in your life when you felt worried about the economic situation of the country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel economic anxiety themselves.

Economic Anger: Think about a time in your life when you felt angry about the economic situation of the country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel anger over the economy themselves.

Populism: Think about a time when you felt like the leaders of this country betrayed the people they were supposed to represent. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were. If you cannot recall such a time, try to imagine such a situation.

For the next 90 seconds, please write about how this statement makes you feel. Be as detailed as you can so that someone reading your answer could feel like you do.

Cultural Discontent: Think about a time in your life when you felt that you or people with values and beliefs like yours did not belong in this country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel like they themselves would feel as you felt in the circumstances you describe.

Video links and text (Study 3)

Control Video: https://youtu.be/pXe_Wt-Qu4E

Cultural Threat Video: <https://youtu.be/yHugFLdiI8Y>

Economic Threat, Fear Video: https://youtu.be/Tp8Kj1F_u7k

Economic Threat, Anger Video: <https://youtu.be/mVzaR5vFeHE>

Video scripts:

ANGER: Video text

Diane and Ted are a college educated, middle-class couple with three children. They lived comfortably for most of their lives; then the economic crisis hit. Ted lost his job due to economic downturn, and Diane was forced to step down to part time work. As a result, the family fell below the poverty line. They were forced to make major sacrifices: Diane often took leftover cereal from her job to feed her family, and the family once had to subsist on nothing but canned soup for two weeks. When they fell behind on the mortgage payment, foreclosure and homelessness became constant threats.

The economic crisis that caused this hardship is unlikely to happen again, as it was caused by unique problems that have since been resolved, and the economy has mostly recovered. However, most of the individuals in the banking and finance sectors who caused the crisis were never punished or suffered for their actions. None were arrested or convicted, and most did not suffer any significant financial hardship and remain extraordinarily wealthy and powerful. The politicians who allowed the crisis to happen, for the most part, remain in office. Meanwhile, hard-working people continue to suffer from the aftereffects of the crisis.

FEAR: Video text

Diane and Ted are college educated middle-class couple with three children. They live comfortably for most of their lives; then the economic crisis hits. Ted loses his job due to economic downturn, and Diane is forced to step down to part time work. As a result, the family falls below the poverty line. They are forced to make major sacrifices: Diane often takes leftover

cereal from her job to feed her family, and the family must subsist on nothing but canned soup for two weeks. They fall behind on the mortgage payment, and foreclosure and homelessness become constant threats.

The economic crisis that devastates Diane and Ted was unavoidable; no one understood the causes until it was too late, and thus no one could have prevented it. Experts say that another economic crisis is certain to happen in the near future, and it will be even worse than the one Diane and Ted faced. The nature of the modern economy makes such a crisis inevitable. Since we are still suffering the aftereffects of the earlier crisis, governments and economic firms will have little ability to lessen the suffering and pain next time.

A4. Balance statistics for experiments

This section includes statistics to ensure that there were no significant differences across treatment groups in various demographic characteristics in our experiments.

Table A5: Balance statistics**Study 1**

Demographic	Control	Economic Anxiety	Economic Anger	Populism	Cultural Discontent	Total
Percentages						
Region						
Southeast	34.23	26.13	28.80	32.65	34.44	31.28
Northeast	22.97	23.62	22.51	24.49	20.00	22.77
Midwest	22.97	28.14	23.04	21.43	23.33	23.79
West	12.61	8.54	9.95	14.29	13.33	11.74
Southwest	6.31	11.56	15.18	.14	8.89	9.72
Gender						
Male	54.05	55.50	53.13	56.63	48.62	53.68
Female	45.95	44.50	46.88	42.6	50.83	46.12
Nonbinary	.00	.00	.00	.51	.55	.20
Race						
White	80.18	75.50	75.39	78.46	76.11	77.23
Black	12.16	14.50	14.66	9.23	10.56	12.25
Other	7.66	10.00	9.95	12.31	13.33	10.53
Means						
Party ID	3.23	3.54	3.37	3.49	3.23	3.37
Education	4.46	4.54	4.45	4.28	4.25	4.40
Income	6.29	6.52	6.37	6.18	6.13	6.3
Age	37.75	37.48	37.64	37.00	37.81	37.54

Demographic	Chi-square	p-value	Kendall's Tau-b
Region	28.67	.095	-.005
Gender	6.050	.642	.024
Race	7.87	.449	.025

Demographic	F-Stat	p-value
Party ID	.85	.493
Education	1.92	.104
Income	.50	.735
Age	.16	.958

Study 3

Demographic	Control	Cultural Threat	Econ Threat, Dread	Econ Threat, Grievance	Total
Percentages					
Region					
Southeast	27.86	26.34	22.89	24.21	25.35
Northeast	23.38	22.93	22.89	23.16	23.09
Midwest	25.37	23.90	27.36	24.21	25.22
West	11.94	14.63	16.92	20.53	15.93
Southwest	11.44	10.73	8.96	7.89	9.79
Gender					
Male	49.75	56.10	52.97	55.79	53.63
Female	50.25	43.90	46.53	44.21	46.24
Nonbinary	.00	.00	.50	.00	.13
Race					
White	80.60	70.24	76.73	79.58	76.72
Black	8.96	17.56	12.87	11.52	12.77
Other	10.45	12.20	10.40	8.90	10.51
Means					
Party ID	3.26	2.98	3.17	3.13	3.14
Education	3.90	3.71	3.80	3.70	3.78
Income	6.56	6.49	6.60	6.35	6.51
Age	47.1	45.6	45.4	47.4	46.4

Demographic	Chi-square	p-value	Kendall's Tau-b
Region	13.38	.573	.028
Gender	5.04	.538	-.030
Race	8.960	.176	-.010

Demographic	F-Stat	p-value
Party ID	.750	.525
Education	.740	.528
Income	.190	.905
Age	.760	.518

None of the differences across treatments in either the percentages (for categorical demographics) nor means (for quantitative demographics) were significant. The randomization procedures appear to have worked well and the demographics are balanced.

A5. Comparison of Spanish observational data demographics (age and gender) compared to Spanish census

The PSAS pilot wave was a simple random sample taken from a nationally demographically representative panel. To determine if our sample matched the demographic characteristics of the Spanish public, we took population data broken out by age and gender from the Spanish census (https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176951&menu=ultiDatos&idp=1254735572981). We then compared the percentage of respondents in each age and gender category to our sample. The results are presented in Table A5, below.

Table A6. Comparison of PSAS demographics to Spanish census data

Age and gender	Percent, PSAS	Percent, Spanish Public	Difference
Men	49.95	48.48	1.47
18-30	4.04	8.29	-4.26
31-40	8.98	8.24	0.74
41-50	11.81	10.13	1.67
51-60	12.82	8.74	4.08
61-70	9.59	6.35	3.23
70+	2.72	6.73	-4.00
Women	50.05	51.52	-1.47
18-30	8.17	8.00	0.18
31-40	10.90	8.27	2.63
41-50	11.20	9.95	1.25
51-60	12.92	8.93	3.98
61-70	5.35	6.90	-1.55
70+	1.51	9.48	-7.96


The demographics in the PSAS sample were reasonably close to Spanish population data. Our sample was slightly younger than the Spanish population, driven by a significant underrepresentation of senior citizens (those 70 years of age or older). This is not surprising given that this was an online panel. The PSAS sample was also had slightly more men than the Spanish population. But these differences were not substantively very large, generally just a few percentage points either way.

A6. Full graph, populism dimensions regressed on cultural discontent, emotions, and controls


Due to space constraints, we did not include controls, emotions, or treatments in our figure showing results analyzing influences on populism. Those parameters are included in Figure A3 below.

Figure A3: Populism dimensions regressed on treatments, emotions, cultural discontent, and control variables, experiments

Study 1



Study 3



A7. Spanish observational study path analysis with Manichaeism as coequal dimension of populism

Table A7: Path analysis results

Predictor	Anger	Fear	Cultural Discontent	Antielitism	People-Centrism	Manichaeism
Economic Evaluation	-.487*** (.038)	-.458*** (.042)	-.474*** (.041)	-.070 (.053)	.195** (.069)	.421*** (.077)
Anger	-	-	.176** (.065)	.139* (.077)	.116 (.102)	-.059 (.111)
Fear	-	-	-.046 (.070)	-.115 (.082)	.060 (.108)	.253* (.118)
Cultural Discontent	-	-	-	.596*** (.044)	.190** (.063)	.386*** (.069)
Female	.010 (.034)	.010 (.036)	-.031 (.027)	.033 (.031)	.039 (.041)	-.036 (.046)

Education	-.035 (.035)	-.023 (.038)	-.043 (.033)	-.068* (.033)	-.036 (.043)	-.127** (.048)
Social Class	-.039 (.037)	-.072 (.039)	-.107** (.034)	.029 (.035)	-.026 (.045)	.047 (.050)
Age	-.013 (.034)	-.103** (.037)	-.045 (.033)	-.130*** (.033)	.142*** (.043)	-.057 (.049)
Ideology	.074 (.039)	.165*** (.042)	.086* (.038)	.043 (.038)	-.171*** (.049)	-.112* (.055)

Results were consistent with those presented in the manuscript.

A8. Full results, mediation analyses

Due to space constraints, we present only the differences between the full and reduced models for the mediation analyses within text. Here, we present the coefficients for the reduced and full models of each treatment.

Table A8: Effect of Treatments on Cultural Discontent (Value Discontent), Mediated Through Anger and Fear

Effect on Value Discontent	Treatments			
	Econ. Anxiety	Econ. Anger	Populism	Cult. Discontent
Reduced	.02 (.02)	.05*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)
Full	-.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.07*** (.02)
Difference	.03*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)
<i>N</i>	991	991	991	991

Effect of Treatments on Cultural Discontent (Identity Discontent), Mediated Through Anger and Fear

Effect on Identity Discontent	Treatments			
	Econ. Anxiety	Econ. Anger	Populism	Cult. Discontent
Reduced	.02 (.02)	.05*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.10*** (.02)
Full	-.00	.01	.03	.07***

	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Difference	.03***	.04***	.05***	.03***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
<i>N</i>	991	991	991	991

Effect of Treatments on Antielitism, Mediated Through Value Discontent, Identity

Discontent, Anger and Fear

Effect on Antielitism	Treatments			
	Econ. Anxiety	Econ. Anger	Populism	Cult. Discontent
Reduced	-.00	.01	.05***	.05***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Full	-.03	-.03*	-.00	-.00
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Difference	.02**	.04***	.05***	.05***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
<i>N</i>	991	991	991	991

Effect of Treatments on People-Centrism, Mediated Through Value Discontent, Identity

Discontent, Anger and Fear


Effect on People- centrism	Treatments			
	Econ. Anxiety	Econ. Anger	Populism	Cult. Discontent
Reduced	-.01	.00	.03*	.03**
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Full	-.03*	-.03*	-.01	.01
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Difference	.02**	.03***	.04***	.03***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
<i>N</i>	991	991	991	991

Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The reduced model predicts the dependent variable with only the treatments (the control is suppressed for reference), while the full model predicts cultural discontent with the treatments and measures of discrete emotional responses (anger and fear) in parts 1 and 2, and both emotional responses and both measures of cultural discontent in parts 3 and 4. *** - $p < .01$, ** - $p < .05$, * - $p < .10$.

We have conducted additional mediation analyses per Preacher and Hayes (2008) to show robustness of our main findings. Since the Preacher and Hayes (2008) mediation is limited to a dichotomous treatment variable, we compare the effects of the Econ. Anger treatment to the

control group on Value Discontent and Identity Discontent, finding that Anger mediates these relationships.


Figure A4a. Mediation of Anger and Fear on Value Discontent (Anger Treatment)



Indirect effect through Anger : 0.032** (0.013)
 Indirect effect through Fear: 0.008 (0.006)
 Total indirect effect: 0.043 (0.033)
 Ratio of Indirect to Direct Effect: 6.55
 Proportion Mediated: 0.87

Mediation Analyses conducted per Preacher and Hayes (2008)

Figure A4b. Mediation of Anger and Fear on Identity Discontent (Anger Treatment)



Indirect effect through Anger : 0.034** (0.013)
 Indirect effect through Fear: 0.007 (0.006)
 Total indirect effect: 0.038 (0.031)
 Ratio of Indirect to Direct Effect: 5.59
 Proportion Mediated: 0.85

Mediation Analyses conducted per Preacher and Hayes (2008)

A9. Analyses with multiplicative populism index.

Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen (2020) argue that populism is a syndrome combining several dimensions; for the Castanho Silva et. al. scale, these dimensions are antielitism, people-centrism, and Manichaeism. As a syndrome, a high value of one dimension cannot compensate for a low value on another dimension. As such, the authors recommend using a multiplicative scale, antielitism*people-centrism*Manichaeism, to measure populism. For reasons laid out in the paper, we do not follow this strategy. However, here we replicate the analyses in Study 1 and Study 2 using the multiplicative index in place of the individual dimensions of populism. For the experimental study, we use two versions of the index: one multiplying all three dimensions, one multiplying only antielitism and people-centrism. We do both versions due to the concerns we have over the Manichaeism dimension (discussed in the paper); we do not include analyses of the second version for the PSAS observational analyses because results did not differ from those using the three-dimensional index. Results are presented in the table below.

Table A9. Study 1 and 2 analyses with multiplicative populism index

Study 1

Three-dimension populism index

Treatment	Estimate	Std. Err.	p-value
Economic threat, fear	.006	.014	.704
Economic threat, anger	.001	.015	.948
Populism	.021	.015	.156
Cultural discontent	.038	.015	.010

Two-dimension populism index

Treatment	Estimate	Std. Err.	p-value
Economic threat, fear	-.007	.017	.657
Economic threat, anger	.007	.017	.689
Populism	.045	.017	.007

Cultural discontent	.044	.017	.011
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Study 2

Predictor	Estimate	Std. Err.	p-value
Economic Evaluation	.006	.008	.473
Anger	-.004	.010	.687
Fear	.001	.011	.960
Cultural Discontent	.020	.007	.006
Female	.004	.002	.089
Education	-.001	.001	.028
Social Class	.003	.002	.144
Age	.000	.000	.327
Ideology	-.007	.005	.168

Results were mostly consistent with those presented in the manuscript. The cultural discontent treatments and variables had a significant, positive influence on the populism index. Oddly enough, the populism treatment did not influence the three-dimension index, but it did influence the two-dimension index. This suggests that our concerns over the Manichaeism dimension are justified, namely that it does not respond to stimuli the same way as the other two dimensions and thus should not be treated as part of the populism syndrome.


A10. PSAS analysis of the influence of cultural discontent on attitudes towards immigrants and marginalized groups.

We elected to use a novel set of measures of cultural discontent for reasons discussed in the paper. This raised concerns that our measures are too far from standard measures of cultural backlash, such as hostility toward immigrants and negative attitudes towards marginalized groups. To allay those concerns, we show here that our measures of discontent are closely associated with these more typical measures of cultural backlash, at least among conservatives. We used two indicators from the PSAS. The first is a summary index of negative attitudes towards immigrants (immigrants harm the economy, immigrants hurt the culture, immigrants


make Spain a worse place to live). The second is an index of negative attitudes towards marginalized groups. This was constructed using a series of questions asking if the respondent would accept or reject a member of each group as a coworker, boss, neighbor, tenant, or spouse for the respondent's child. Respondents were asked about Latin Americans, Romani, Moroccans, people of African ancestry, immigrants, and Muslims. We used a second-order CFA model, with a single latent prejudice factor influencing latent negative attitudes toward each group, and each latent group attitude factor influencing the actual survey questions. For more details on how these indices were constructed, see CITE REDACTED. We regressed each of these indices on a summed index of cultural discontent, formed by adding value discontent and identity marginalization and rescaling the resulting index to between 0 and 1. We include all demographic controls included in the analysis of Study 2 in the paper. As we expect discontent to more strongly influence these specific attitudes among those predisposed to hold them, we interacted discontent with the ideology scale. Results are presented in the Figures below.

Figure A5. Effect of cultural discontent on attitudes towards immigrants and marginalized groups, moderated by ideology.

Attitudes towards immigrants



Attitudes towards marginalized groups



Cultural discontent had a very large and significant influence on both these attitudes. As expected, the effects were much larger amongst conservatives. Although such a simple analysis should not be considered definitive, it does show that our measure of backlash operates the way it should among conservatives and thus the validity of the measures is supported by these analyses.

A11. Analysis of support for populist leaders


To determine if the relationships we analyzed earlier did predict greater support for populist leaders, we collected feeling thermometer data evaluating two populists: Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. We then split our sample in thirds, based on party identification: strong and firm Democrats in one group, party “leaners” and independents in another, and strong and solid Republicans in the final group.⁸ This was done because we expect party sympathy and ideology to not just influence these variables, but to completely alter the data generating process. Populist attitudes may positively influence support for Trump among Republicans while strongly negatively influencing the same factor among liberals. Ordinarily this can be handled with interactions, but we would have to interact nearly every variable in our model; this also assumes that the effect changes are multiplicative, and not some more complex function. It is simpler and more accurate to simply divide the sample, analyzing how Democrats (n=357) feel about Sanders, and how Republicans (n=118) feel about Trump. For each subsample, we performed two regressions: we first regressed the populism dimensions and emotions on support for the populists; we then regressed the antecedents on support with controls included each time. This was necessary because of the strong relationships between antecedents and dimensions, which

⁸ We used a two-step process to determine party ID. First, we asked if people considered themselves Democrats or Republicans; then we asked how strongly they identified with their choice. Anyone who did not select one of the parties in the first step was coded as nonpartisan for this analysis.

produced Variance Inflation Factors of greater than 20 in some cases when regressed in a single analysis. We used Tobit regressions to account for the censoring of the feeling thermometers.

Results are presented in Figure A4.

Figure A6: Support for Sanders and Trump Among Fellow Travelers



We do find that populist attitudes and cultural discontent influenced support, although different sets of variables mattered for each leader (thus partially validating our decision to split the sample). Among Republicans, Manichaeism was significantly influenced support for Trump. We were surprised that antielitism did not significantly predict Trump support, especially since an earlier pilot of this study conducted shortly after Trump's inauguration did find a significant relationship between the two. We suspect that our measures of populism may, in fact, be measures only of *insurgent* populism. The election and consolidation of a populist government may fundamentally alter how populist persons view the political elite which now includes their leader. The only other variable that significantly influenced support for Trump was right-wing

producerism, but its influence was very large: on average, a change from producerism's minimum to its maximum produced a 41-degree increase.

Sanders supporters, on the other hand, were motivated by popularism, cultural discontent, and negatively influenced antielitism. This makes sense for the followers of a populist out in the cold but may also indicate a fundamental difference in the structure of populism between left- and right-wing ideologues. Support for Sanders was also predicted by fear, a sense of social victimization, and anti-authoritarianism.

A12. Change to Castanho Silva et. al. scale in Study 2

We made a minor modification to the CS populism scale due to the fact that the scale was empirically underidentified. This occurred because one indicator, man2, is made con-trait by a single word ("not") and thus respondents in a long survey often fail to recognize it as con-trait, making it load weakly, if at all, on the Manicheanism latent factor. As a result, we exclude this indicator, and have the method factor influence the con-trait items, rather than the pro-trait items.

A13. Questionnaires

Study 1:

Demographic block

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

INTRO. Thank you for taking the survey. To begin, we'd like to ask some questions about you.

GENDER. Which gender, if any, do you identify with?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Neither/other

STATE. In which state do you currently reside? (SELECT STATE FROM LIST).

IDEOLOGY. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely

liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

1. Very liberal
2. Liberal
3. Somewhat liberal
4. Moderate/middle of the road
5. Somewhat conservative
6. Conservative
7. Very conservative
8. Haven't thought much about this

PID1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent

REP1. GETIF PID = 1. Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?

1. Strong Republican
2. Not a very strong Republican

DEM1. GETIF PID = 2. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not a very strong Democrat

IND1. GETIF PID = 3. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

1. Republican party
2. Democratic party
3. Neither party

AGE. What is your birth year?

ED. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree received?

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate (or equivalent, including GED)
3. Some college but no degree
4. Associate degree (2-year)
5. Bachelor's degree (4-year)
6. Master's degree
7. Doctoral or terminal professional degree (Ph.D., JD, MD)

INCOME. What is your household income?

1. Less than \$10,000
2. \$10,000 - \$19,999
3. \$20,000 - \$29,999
4. \$30,000 - \$39,999
5. \$40,000 - \$49,999
6. \$50,000 - \$59,999
7. \$60,000 - \$69,999
8. \$70,000 - \$79,999
9. \$80,000 - \$89,999
10. \$90,000 - \$99,999
11. \$100,000 - \$149,999
12. More than \$150,000

EGOTROPIC. How has your personal economic and financial situation changed in the last 12 months?

1. Gotten much better
2. Gotten somewhat better
3. Stayed about the same
4. Gotten somewhat worse
5. Gotten much worse

LATINO. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

0. No
1. Yes

RACE. Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:

- White
- Black or African-American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

- Other (Text entry)

TREATMENT#. (Treatments. Respondents shown 1 of 5 treatments)

Treatment block (Respondents shown 1 of the following treatments)

Control

Think about a time in your life when brushed your teeth. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now.

Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could imagine brushing their teeth themselves.

Ecinsec

Think about a time in your life when you felt anxious the economic situation of the country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel economic anxiety themselves.

Ecanger

Think about a time in your life when you felt angry about the economic situation of the country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel anger over the economy themselves.

Populism

Think about a time when you felt like the leaders of this country betrayed the people they were supposed to represent. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were. If you cannot recall such a time, try to imagine such a situation.

For the next 90 seconds, please write about how this statement makes you feel. Be as detailed as you can so that someone reading your answer could feel like you do.

Cultdisc

Think about a time in your life when you felt that you or people like you did not belong in this country. Try to think of all of the details of what was happening at the time, to the point that you could imagine this is happening to you now. Think about when this happened, who was involved, and what your feelings were.

For the next 90 seconds, please write in detail about this event. Write with enough detail that someone reading this description could feel like they themselves would feel as you felt in the circumstances you describe.

Emotions block

PANAS-M. (RESPONSES RANDOMLY DISPLAYED). Now we want to ask some questions about how that exercise made you feel. Please select any of the emotions that you felt after participating in the writing exercise.

- Angry
- Anxious
- Hostile

- Upset
- Afraid
- Disturbed
- Distressed
- Mad
- Furious
- Outraged
- Nervous
- Hopeful
- Proud
- Enthusiastic
- I did not feel any of these

(BEGIN RANDOM BLOCK. Coded as 1 if not selected in PANAS-M)

ANGRY. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Angry

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

ANXIOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Anxious

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

HOSTILE. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Hostile

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

UPSET. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Upset

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

AFRAID. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Afraid

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

ASHAMED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Ashamed

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

DISTRESSED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

DISTRESSED

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely.

MAD. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Mad

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

FURIOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Furious

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

OUTRAGED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Outraged

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

NERVOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Nervous

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

HOPEFUL. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

HOPEFUL

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

PROUD. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

PROUD

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

ENTHUSIASTIC. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

ENTHUSIASTIC

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

(END RANDOM BLOCK)

Cultural discontent Block: Respondents get only 1 of each pair of numbered questions.

CD1a. My values are respected in this country.

CD1b. My values are not respected in this country.

CD2a. I often see my beliefs and values respectfully portrayed on television.

CD2b. I often see my beliefs and values disrespectfully portrayed on television.

CD4a. People with values like mine are treated well in this society.

CD4b. People with values like mine are treated poorly in this society.

CD6a. People like me are treated fairly in this country.

CD6b. People like me are marginalized in this country.

CD8a. The decisions our government makes usually match my values and beliefs.

CD8b. The decisions our government makes usually violate my values and beliefs.

CD9a. Institutions in this country uphold values that are important to me.

CD9b. Institutions in this country disrespect values that are important to me.

CD14a. Other people generally treat me pretty fairly.

CD14b. I typically am not treated as fairly as I deserve.

CD16a. Regardless of who is in political power, things are generally pretty good for people like me.

CD16b. Regardless of who is in political power, things are generally pretty bad for people like me.

CD17a. Society is generally pretty fair to people like me.

CD17b. Society is generally pretty unfair to people like me.

CD20a. The political system is set up to benefit people like me.

CD20b. The political system is not set up to benefit people like me.

Populism block

pp11. Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.

pp12. Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.

pp13. The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.

ant1. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.

ant2. Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.

ant3. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.

man1. You can tell if a person is good or bad based only on their politics.

man2. The people I disagree with politically are not evil

man3. I consider people I disagree with politically to be my enemies.

Conspiracism Block

CONSP1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret.

CONSP2. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement

CONSP3. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity.

CONSP4. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small, unknown groups who really control world politics.

CONSP5. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions

CONSP6. Certain significant events, like economic crises or wars, have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events

Consp7. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence to deceive the public

Consp8. New and advanced technology which would harm current industries is being suppressed.

Consp9. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest

Punitivism block

PP1. The people who are hurting our country hardly ever get punished.

PP2. We should punish those people whose actions harmed the economy in the past, even if doing so hurts the economy now.

PP3. I see a lot of people getting away with doing things that are bad for our country.

PP4. Politicians who take actions that are bad for the country should be removed from office, even if doing so means a less qualified candidate gets elected.


PP5. We can't let the people who are hurting the country get away with it, no matter the cost.

PP6. Too often in this country people are able to do things that hurt the country's future without getting punished for it.

PP7. Lobbyists and other special interest who put themselves above the country should be punished.

Debrief

Thank you for participating in this study. In this study, wanted to study how different prompts were able to trigger emotional responses. You may have seen a video or written about a situation designed to make you feel anxious. We do not want you to continue to feel anxious, so here is a picture of a smiling dog to cheer you up!



Please enter the following code for payment on Mechanical Turk: [RESPID]

Study 2:

Emotions block

PANAS-M. (RESPONSES RANDOMLY DISPLAYED).

Para comenzar, me gustaría que piense en la situación general de España en estos momentos.

Piense en la situación económica, política y social de España. ¿Cómo le hace sentir a Ud. la situación general?

Ahora, lea las palabras de abajo y elija todas apropiadas para usted. Indique cómo se siente usted cuando piensa en la situación del país.

Interés

Tensión

Ánimo

Disgusto

Energía

Culpa

Susto

Enojo

Entusiasmo

Orgullo

Irritación

Disposición

Vergüenza

Inspiración

Nerviosismo

Decisión

Atención

Intranquilidad

Actividad

Temor

(BEGIN RANDOM BLOCK. Coded as 1 if not selected in PANAS-M)

Tensión. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida se siente usted la emoción ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

- 1. Muy poco**
- 2. Poco**
- 3. Algo**
- 4. Mucho**
- 5. Muchísimo**

Disgusto. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Culpa. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Susto. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Enojo. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Vergüenza. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Irritación. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Nerviosismo. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Intranquilidad. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Interés. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Ánimo. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Energía. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Entusiasmo. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Orgullo. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Disposición. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Inspiración. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Decisión. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Atención. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

Actividad. Y podría decirme ¿en qué medida siente usted la emoción que ha elegido en la pregunta anterior?

(END RANDOM BLOCK)

Cultural discontent Block: Respondents get only 1 of each pair of numbered questions. (1-7 agree/disagree scales. Display in random order, one question at a time)

Por favor, dígame en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con cada una de estas frases sobre la cultura de España. Sitúese en una escala de 1 a 7, en la que 1 significa “muy de acuerdo” y el 7 significa “muy en desacuerdo”.

CD1a. Mis valores son respetados en este país.

CD1b. Mis valores no son respetados en este país.

CD2a. A menudo veo mis creencias y valores retratados respetuosamente en la televisión.

CD2b. A menudo veo mis creencias y valores irrespetuosamente retratados en la televisión.

CD4a. Las personas con valores como los míos son tratadas bien en esta sociedad

CD4b. Las personas con valores como los míos son maltratadas en esta sociedad

CD6a. Las personas como yo son tratadas con justicia en este país.

CD6b. Las personas como yo están marginadas en este país

CD8a. Las decisiones de nuestro gobierno generalmente coinciden con mis valores y creencias.
 CD8b. Las decisiones de nuestro gobierno generalmente infringen mis valores y creencias.
 CD9a. Las instituciones en este país defienden valores que son importantes para mí.
 CD9b. Las instituciones en este país no respetan valores que son importantes para mí.
 CD14a. Otras personas generalmente me tratan bastante justamente.
 CD14b. otras personas no me tratan tan justamente como merezco.
 CD16a. Sin importar quién tenga el poder político, las cosas en general son bastante buenas para personas como yo.
 CD16b. sin importar quién tenga el poder político, las cosas son generalmente malas para personas como yo.
 CD20a. El sistema político está configurado para beneficiar a personas como yo.
 CD20b. El sistema político no está configurado para beneficiar a personas como yo.

POPULISM BOCK (1-7 agree/disagree scales. Display in random order, one question at a time)

Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con estas frases. Vamos a usar una escala en donde el número 1 representa “muy de acuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy en desacuerdo”.

Ppl1. Los políticos siempre deben escuchar con atención los problemas del pueblo.
 Ppl2. Los políticos no necesitan pasar tiempo con la gente corriente para hacer un buen trabajo
 Ppl3. La voluntad del pueblo debería ser el principio más elevado de la política de este país.
 Ant1. El gobierno está dirigido en gran medida por unos pocos grandes intereses que miran por sí mismos.
 Ant2. Los cargos del gobierno utilizan su poder para intentar de mejorar la vida de la gente.
 Ant3. Muchas de las personas que dirigen el gobierno son deshonestos.
 Man1. Puedes saber si una persona es buena o mala conociendo su postura política.
 Man2. Las personas con las que discrepo políticamente no son malas.
 Man3. Las personas con las que discrepo políticamente sólo están mal informadas.

Regime support block

Ahora, sitúese en una escala de 1 a 7, en la que 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y el 7 significa “muy de acuerdo” con cada frase.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como yo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
 EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
 EFF3. Las personas como yo no tienen ni voz ni voto acerca de lo que hace el gobierno
 EFF4. A los funcionarios públicos no les importa mucho lo que piensan las personas como yo.
 EFF5. Mi voz cuenta en España
 PERF1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?
 PERF2. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?
 PERF3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?
 PERF4. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

(For these questions, 1-7 scale where 1 is Nada and 7 is Mucho)

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escala, en la que 1 significa “nada” y el 7 significa “mucho”.

RS1. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de España?

RS2. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político español?

RS3. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político de España?

Conspiracism Block (random order, 1-7 agree/disagree scales)

Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con estas frases. Vamos a usar una escala en donde el número 1 representa “muy de acuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy en desacuerdo”.

CONSP1. Ocurren muchas cosas en el mundo sobre las que el público nunca es informado

CONSP2. Los políticos normalmente no nos cuentan los verdaderos motivos de sus decisiones

CONSP3. Las agencias gubernamentales vigilan estrechamente a todos los ciudadanos

CONSP4. Sucesos que no parecen estar conectados, a menudo son el resultado de actividades secretas

CONSP5. Hay organizaciones secretas que influyen enormemente en las decisiones políticas

Punitivism block (random order, 1-7 agree/disagree scales)

Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con estas frases. Vamos a usar una escala en donde el número 1 representa “muy de acuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy en desacuerdo”.

PP1. Las personas que están lastimando a nuestro país casi nunca son castigadas.

PP2. Deberíamos castigar a aquellas personas cuyas acciones perjudicaron la economía en el pasado, incluso si hacerlo perjudica a la economía ahora

PP3. Veo a mucha gente salirse con la suya haciendo cosas que son malas para nuestro país.

PP4. Los políticos que toman medidas que son malas para el país deben ser destituidos de su cargo, incluso si hacerlo significa que un candidato menos cualificado sea elegido.

PP5. No podemos dejar que las personas que están lastimando al país salgan impunes, sin importar el precio.

PP6. Con demasiada frecuencias las personas pueden hacer cosas que perjudican el futuro de nuestro país sin ser castigadas por ello.

PP7. Los grupos de presión y otros que ponen sus intereses por encima del país deben ser castigados.

Spain1. Debajo, hay algunas fórmulas alternativas de organización territorial del Estado en España. Dígame, por favor, ¿con cuál está Ud. más de acuerdo?

Un Estado con un único Gobierno Central sin autonomías

Un Estado en el que las comunidades autónomas tengan menor autonomía que en la actualidad

Un Estado con comunidades autónomas como en la actualidad

Un Estado en el que las comunidades autónomas tengan mayor autonomía que en la actualidad

Un Estado en el que se reconociese a las comunidades autónomas la posibilidad de convertirse en estados independientes

Debajo, hay una serie de posibles relaciones entre Ud. Y personas [tipo]. Por favor, dígame en cada caso, si acepta o aceptaría ese tipo de relación, trataría de evitarla o la rechazaría.

[[choices : aceptaría, trataría de evitarla, rechazaría, depende, no lo sé.]]

1. Vivir en el mismo barrio en el que viven muchos inmigrantes
2. Alquilar un piso a inmigrantes.
3. Trabajar/estudiar con inmigrantes
4. Que un inmigrante sea su jefe en el trabajo
5. Que su hijo lleve amigos inmigrantes a casa
6. Que su hijo se case con una persona inmigrante

Inmigración

Ahora querría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre las personas de otros países que vienen a vivir a España.

Imm4. Diría ud. Que, por lo general, para la economía española, ¿es bueno o es malo que gente de otros países venga a vivir aquí?

Sitúese en una escala de 1 a 10, en la que 1 significa “Malo para la economía” y el 10 significa “bueno para la economía”.

Imm5. ¿Cree Ud. Que la vida cultural española se empobrece o se enriquece con las personas de otros países que vienen a vivir aquí?

Sitúese en una escala de 1 a 10, en la que 1 significa “la vida cultural español se empobrece” y el 10 significa “la vida cultural español se enriquece”.

Imm6. La llegada de personas de otros países, ¿contribuye a que España sea un lugar peor o mejor para vivir? Sitúese en una escala de 1 a 10, en la que 1 significa “peor lugar para vivir” y el 10 significa “mejor lugar para vivir”.

Demographic block

INTRO.

Ahora, me gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre Ud.

GENDER. Sexo: Hombre Mujer Otro

¿En que provincia vive usted?

ARABA-ÁLAVA

ALBACETE

ALACANT/ALICANTE

ALMERÍA

ASTURIAS

ÁVILA

BADAJOS

ILLES BALEARS

BARCELONA

BURGOS

CÁCERES

CÁDIZ

CASTELLÓ/CASTELLÓN

CIUDAD REAL

CÓRDOBA

CORUÑA
CUENCA
GIRONA
GRANADA
GUADALAJARA
GIPUZKOA
HUELVA
HUESCA
JAÉN
LEÓN
LLEIDA
LUGO
MADRID
MÁLAGA
MURCIA
NAVARRA
OURENSE
PALENCIA
PALMAS (LAS)
PONTEVEDRA
RIOJA (LA)
SALAMANCA
SANTA CRUZ DE TENERIFE
SEGOVIA
SEVILLA
SORIA
TARRAGONA
TERUEL
TOLEDO
VALÈNCIA/VALENCIA
VALLADOLID
BIZKAIA
ZAMORA
ZARAGOZA
CEUTA
MELILLA

IDEOLOGY. Cuando se habla de política se utilizan normalmente las expresiones izquierda y derecha. En esta tarjeta hay una serie de casillas que van de izquierda a derecha. ¿Podría situar Ud. su posición en esta escala?

1 izquierda
10 derecha
no lo sé

Ideology2. ¿Cómo se definiría Ud. En política según la siguiente clasificación?

Conservador/a
Demócrata cristiano/a
Liberal
Progresista
Socialdemócratas
Socialista
Comunista
Feminista
Ecologista
Otra respuesta ¿cuál?

PID1 ¿me podría decir por qué partido siente Ud. Mas simpatía?

PP
PSOE
Podemos
Ciudadanos
IU
VOX
PACMA
Otro partido ¿cuál?

(the following are all regional parties)

En Comú Podem
Compromis
ERC
PDeCAT(JxCat)
En Marea
EAJ-PNV
EH Bildu
CC
UPN
FAC (Foro Asturias)
BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego)
Partido Aragonés (PAR)
CHA (Chunta Aragonesista)
MES (PSM-Entesa)
PI(Proposta per les Illes Balears)
PRC (Partido Regionalista de Cantabria)
UPL (Union del Pueblo Leones)
Coalicion Caballas
MDyC (Mov. Por la Dignidad y la Ciudadania)
Coalicion por Melilla
PPL (Populares en Libertad)

PID2. ¿Ud. Es de las personas que votan siempre por el mismo partido, que por lo general suelen votar por el mismo partido o, según lo que más les convenza en ese momento, votan por un partido u otro, o no votan?

Votan siempre por el mismo partido

Por lo general suelen votar por el mismo partido

Según lo que mas les convenza en ese momento, votan pro un partido u otro, o no votan

Votan en blanco o nulo

No suelen votar

Es la primera vez que votan no recuerda/No sabe

AGE. ¿En qué año nació?

ED. ¿Cuáles son los estudios de más alto nivel oficial que Ud ha finalizado?

Menos de cinco años de escolarización

Primaria (enseñanza primaria o hasta 5º de EGB)

Formación Profesional inicial

Secundaria (Bachillerato Elemental, EGB completa, ESO completa)

Formación Profesional de grado medio (FP I)

Bachillerato/COU.PREU (Bachillerato Superior, BUP, bachillerato)

Formación Professional de grado superior (FP II)

Universitarios medios (diplomatura, arquitectura o ingeniería técnica)

Universitarios superiores (licenciatura, grado, master oficial, doctorado)

Otros estudios no reglados

CLASE ¿A qué clase social diría Ud. que pertenece?

EGOTROPIC. ¿Cree Ud. que su situación económica personal es mejor, igual o peor que hace un año?

Muy Buena

Buena

Regular

Mala

Muy mala

No se

No contesta

NACIONALIDAD. querría preguntarle si tiene Ud. la nacionalidad...

Española

Española y otra

Otra nacionalidad

¿Pertenece usted a una minoría étnica en España?

Si

No

No lo sé

Study 3:

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

INTRO. Thank you for taking the survey. To begin, we'd like to ask some questions about you.

GENDER. Which gender, if any, do you identify with?

4. Male
5. Female
6. Neither/other

STATE. In which state do you currently reside? (SELECT STATE FROM LIST).

IDEOLOGY. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

9. Very liberal
10. Liberal
11. Somewhat liberal
12. Moderate/middle of the road
13. Somewhat conservative
14. Conservative
15. Very conservative
16. Haven't thought much about this

PID1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

4. Republican
5. Democrat
6. Independent

REP1. GETIF PID = 1. Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?

3. Strong Republican

4. Not a very strong Republican

DEM1. GETIF PID = 2. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

3. Strong Democrat
4. Not a very strong Democrat

IND1. GETIF PID = 3. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

4. Republican party
5. Democratic party
6. Neither party

AGE. What is your birth year?

ED. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree received?

8. Less than high school
9. High school graduate (or equivalent, including GED)
10. Some college but no degree
11. Associate degree (2-year)
12. Bachelor's degree (4-year)
13. Master's degree
14. Doctoral or terminal professional degree (Ph.D., JD, MD)

INCOME. What is your household income?

13. Less than \$10,000
14. \$10,000 - \$19,999
15. \$20,000 - \$29,999
16. \$30,000 - \$39,999
17. \$40,000 - \$49,999
18. \$50,000 - \$59,999
19. \$60,000 - \$69,999
20. \$70,000 - \$79,999
21. \$80,000 - \$89,999
22. \$90,000 - \$99,999
23. \$100,000 - \$149,999
24. More than \$150,000

EGOTROPIC. How has your personal economic and financial situation changed in the last 12 months?

6. Gotten much better
7. Gotten somewhat better
8. Stayed about the same
9. Gotten somewhat worse
10. Gotten much worse

LATINO. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

1. No
2. Yes

RACE. Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:

- White
- Black or African-American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- Other (Text entry)

TREATMENT#. (Treatments. Respondents shown 1 of 4 treatments)

Now we'd like to show you a short video. Be sure to watch the entire video as there may be questions and/or other methods used to determine if you viewed it from beginning to end, and payment may be denied if you don't pay attention to the entire video.

1. Control: Sandwich video
2. Cultural threat video
3. Economic crisis, fear
4. Economic crisis, anger

PANAS-M. (RESPONSES RANDOMLY DISPLAYED). Now we want to ask some

questions about how the video you just saw made you feel. Please select any of the emotions that you felt after seeing the video.

- Angry
- Anxious
- Hostile
- Upset
- Afraid
- Disturbed

- Distressed
- Mad
- Furious
- Outraged
- Nervous
- I did not feel any of these

(BEGIN RANDOM BLOCK. Coded as 1 if not selected in PANAS-M)

ANGRY. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Angry

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

ANXIOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Anxious

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

HOSTILE. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Hostile

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

UPSET. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Upset

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

AFRAID. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Afraid

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

ASHAMED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Ashamed

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit
5. Extremely

DISTRESSED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

DISTRESSED

1. Very slightly
2. A little
3. Moderately
4. Quite a bit

5. Extremely.

MAD. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Mad

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

FURIOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Furious

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

OUTRAGED. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Outraged

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately
9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

NERVOUS. Now please tell us how strongly or weakly you feel the emotions you selected in the previous question:

Nervous

6. Very slightly
7. A little
8. Moderately

9. Quite a bit
10. Extremely

(END RANDOM BLOCK)

STUDY 1 ENDS HERE, SKIP TO DEBRIEF

Populism block.1 22 questions (combined)

SOCIOTROPIC1. How has the economic situation of the country changed in the last 12 months?

1. Gotten much better
2. Gotten somewhat better
3. Stayed about the same
4. Gotten somewhat worse
5. Gotten much worse

Sociotropic2. How would you rate the current economic situation of the country?

1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Average
4. Poor
5. Terrible

Now we'd like to ask you some questions about some of your thoughts and opinions about politics and society. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

PR1. Most rich people earn their money because they produce things society needs.

PR2. In this country, the wealthiest people are usually those who work the hardest.

PR3. If a person wants to be a good citizen, he or she needs to be economically self-sufficient.

PR4. There are two types of people in society: people who contribute to society, and people who leech of the contributions of others.

PR5. People in this country are either makers or takers.

PR6. Politicians shouldn't pay attention to people who don't contribute to society.

Dec1. The sense of being one country has been lost for good.

Dec2. My children will be worse off in their lives than I have been.

Dec3. Intolerance between different kinds of people is bound to increase in the future.

Dec4. America's best days are behind it.

Authoritarianism Block [4 qs]

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:

[sliding scale response for each with these as the poles]=

AUTH1: Independence, or respect for elders

AUTH2: Obedience, or self-reliance

AUTH3: Be considerate, or be well-behaved

AUTH4: Curiosity, or good manners

PERF. (Randomly display questions; 1-7 satisfaction grid) For these questions, we want you to consider what the people who are running the country (the President, leaders in Congress, etc.) are doing. For each of the following topics, please tell us how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the performance of our current leaders in that area:

1. Reducing poverty
2. Combating corruption
3. Reducing crime
4. Managing the economy
5. Promoting job creation

[NOTE: Following use 1-7 Not at all – Very much scales)

EFF. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

EFF1. Politicians don't care about the opinions of people like me.

EFF2. Political parties only care about my vote, not my opinions.

EFF3. People like me have a lot of say in what the government does.

EFF4. By participating in politics, people like me can make a real difference in what our government does.

Eff5. By voting in elections, I can make people in government pay attention to people like me.

RS1. How much do you respect the political institutions of the United States?

RS2. How much do you think you should support the political system of the United States?

RS3. How much pride do you feel to live under the political system of the United States?

MAN1. You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.

MAN2. The people I disagree with politically are not evil.

MAN3. I consider people I disagree with politically to be my enemies.

Conspiracism block

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

CONSP1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well known public figures, and keeps this a secret.

CONSP2. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement

CONSP3. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity.

CONSP4. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small, unknown groups who really control world politics.

CONSP5. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions

CONSP6. Certain significant events, like economic crises or wars, have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events

Consp7. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence to deceive the public

Consp8. New and advanced technology which would harm current industries is being suppressed.

Consp9. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out off self-interest

Populism block 2

Ppl1. Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.

Ppl2. Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.

Ppl3. The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.

Ant1. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.

Ant2. Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.

Ant3. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.

Pop1. We need to get rid of the people in Washington and put in leaders who will fight for the people.

Pop2. The only way this country can get out of the mess it's in will be if average, good people come together to fight for what's right, against all the politicians and bureaucrats.

RD1. I am the kind of person who can never get a break.

RD2. Government doesn't do enough for people like me; others are always advantaged.

RD3. When there is an economic downturn people like me are the first to be victims.

Feeling thermometer block - FTs (18 qs)

Next, the survey will display the name of a person or group and I'd like you to rate that person or group using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person or group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person or group and that you don't care too much for that person or group. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person or group. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person or group. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.

[NOTE: RANDOMIZE DISPLAY ORDER]

FT1. Caucasians

FT2. African Americans

FT3. Latinos

FT4. Black Lives Matter Activists

FT5. Bernie Sanders

FT6. Donald Trump

FT7. Undocumented Immigrants

FT8. Muslims

FT9. Wall Street Bankers

FT10. Asians

FT11. Radical university students

FT12. Gays and Lesbians

FT13. Conservatives

FT14. Liberals

FT15. Pro-life individuals

FT16. Transgender people

FT17. Trump supporters

FT18. Attention check

Prejudice block 2

Social Distance (9 Q – can shorten to 6 by using Relative/Friend/Neighbor, which tend to get the most movement)

SD1 I would be willing to accept an immigrant as...

1. A close relative by marriage
2. My close personal friend
3. Neighbors on my street

SD2 I would be willing to accept an Wall Street banker as...

1. A close relative by marriage
2. My close personal friend
3. Neighbors on my street

SD3 I would be willing to accept a Trump supporter as...

1. A close relative by marriage
2. My close personal friend
3. Neighbors on my street

(7pt Strongly agree - Strongly disagree)

RR1. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

RR2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

RR3. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

RR4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Prejudice block 3: Ethnocentrism / Stereotyping (15 q)

Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are "hardworking/intelligent/trustworthy." A score of 7 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are "lazy/unintelligent/untrustworthy" A score of 4 means that you think the group is not towards one end or the other, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

ETHC1Whites

ETHC2: African-Americans

ETHC3: Latinos

ETHC4: Asians

ETHC5: Muslims

[NEW PAGE]

Intolerance block (9 qs)

Consider a person who is [an immigrant to the United States]/[a banker at a Wall Street firm]/[voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and supports his presidency]

SPEAK: If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community about [immigration/banking/Donald Trump], should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

[Allowed/Not allowed] – We could make this a likert as well

[Strongly believe should be allowed/Should be allowed/Neutral/Should not be allowed/Strongly believe should not be allowed]

TEACH: Imagine this person is offered a job at your local college or university. Would you support this person being allowed to teach at your local college or university?

[Strongly support/Support/Neutral/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

BOOK: If some people in your community suggested that a book this person wrote on [immigration/banking/Donald Trump] be taken out of your local public library, would you be in favor of removing this book, or not?

[Strongly favor/Favor/Neutral/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

Immigration block (6 qs)

Now we'd like to ask you some questions about immigration policy. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

IMM1: Immigrants enrich and improve our country's culture.

IMM2: Legal immigrants are bad for our country's economy.

IMM3: Undocumented immigrants are bad for our country's economy.

IMM4: Legal immigrants are a drain on government spending.

IMM5: Undocumented immigrants are a drain on government spending.

IMM6: Illegal immigration pose a major danger to our country.

IMM7. The number of illegal border crossings at our southern border with Mexico is a crisis that requires drastic action to resolve.

Why immigrants come block

Whycome. Immigrants come to our country to a variety of reasons. Please tell us how important you think each reason is for explaining why immigrants chose to come to our country

1. To help international drug cartels smuggle drugs into this country
2. To find a job that can support the immigrant and his or her family
3. To take advantage of welfare benefits

Why immigrants come block

Allowimm. There are many factors that people think authorities should consider when deciding whether or now to allow an immigrant to permanently relocate to this country. In your opinion, how important should each of the following criteria be when making these decisions? How important do you think it is if the immigrant...

1. Is Christian?
2. Is non-Christian?
3. speaks English
4. already has family in this country?
5. has a job offer in an industry where there are not enough workers already in the country?
6. Is fleeing political persecution in their home country
7. Is facing criminal, gang, or domestic violence in their home country?

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