# Incumbency advantage upon removal of single-term limits: Mexican municipal elections

Eric Magar

ITAM, Mexico City

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**Abstract**

En route

## 1 Introduction

En route

## 2 A hypothesis perhaps

**Hypothesis 1:** Presidents are more likely to fast-track bills when the committee chair with jurisdiction over the bill belongs to the president's party than otherwise.

Figure 1: The president rules game

Figure 2: Population-weigthed altitude deviations in municipalities



# 3 Incumbents running v. open seats

| In party | incumbent on the ballot | | | | open seat | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | %won | %lost | sum | (N) | %won | %lost | sum | (N) |
| pan | 66 | 34 | 100 | (121) | 39 | 61 | 100 | (1663) |
| pri | 49 | 51 | 100 | (219) | 50 | 50 | 100 | (3546) |
| prd | 55 | 45 | 100 | (88) | 39 | 61 | 100 | (1082) |
| morena | 100 | 0 | 100 | (8) | 88 | 12 | 100 | (18) |
| other | 45 | 55 | 100 | (99) | 25 | 75 | 100 | (631) |
| total | 54 | 46 | 100 | (535) | 44 | 56 | 100 | (6940) |

| In party | incumbent on the ballot | | | | open seat, party | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | won | lost | sum | (N) | won | lost | sum | (N) |
| left | 58 | 42 | 100 | (96) | 39 | 61 | 100 | (1100) |

# 4 Regression model

# 5 Discussion

# Acknowledgements

Table 1

| | PAN | Residual<br>PRI | Left |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| vote share (lagged) | −0.187*** | −0.035*** | −0.339*** |
| | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| party incumbent | 0.224*** | 0.171*** | 0.165*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.018) |
| other-party incumbent | −0.021** | −0.011 | 0.005 |
| | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.010) |
| party open seat | 0.162*** | 0.124*** | 0.130*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| governor | −0.009* | 0.028*** | 0.008 |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| population (10k) | 0.002 | 0.002** | 0.006*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| elevation (pop. weigthed) | −0.003 | −0.00005 | −0.031*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| sd.elev | −0.143*** | −0.038 | −0.080** |
| | (0.034) | (0.031) | (0.035) |
| post reform | 0.085*** | −0.156*** | 0.047*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| elev x sd.elev | 0.105*** | −0.017 | 0.085*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.025) |
| Intercept | −0.041*** | −0.036*** | −0.062*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.004) |
| Observations | 8,314 | 8,314 | 8,314 |
| $R^2$ | 0.213 | 0.293 | 0.183 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 8303) | 0.163 | 0.152 | 0.169 |
| F Statistic (df = 10; 8303) | 225.2*** | 344.3*** | 185.6*** |

*Note:* $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

# References