Jennifer M. Piscopo
Dissertation Overview

Women worldwide have recently gained unprecedented access to legislative office. Observers often suggest these advances matter not only for ending discrimination, but also for promoting public policies that improve society. For instance, speaking in Los Angeles in April 2007, Sandra Herrera, a leading activist in Mexico's conservative party, the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), explained that male politicians are "more insensitive to the realities of malnutrition, domestic violence, and the abandonment of children."[i] In Argentina, female legislators likewise believe that "Women are more interested than men in health, poverty, disability and the elderly," and "Women will bring domestic violence, sex trafficking, and abortion to the table when men will not."[ii] Such comments resonate because observers, voters and the legislators themselves believe that women will change policies, typically in the direction of social welfare and gender rights. This "consequentialst" reasoning for electing women holds that female citizens have distinct "women's interests," and that female leaders will represent women by using their position to advocate these interests.

The dissertation explores women's interests and women's representation in order to enhance understandings of about how political identities are constructed, deployed, and reshaped during the policymaking process. The recent, worldwide adoption of gender quota laws—mechanisms which compel political parties to nominate specified percentages of women to office—has returned scholars' attention to a classic debate within political science: does changing *who* representatives are transform *what* is represented? Gender quotas are frequently adopted in newly democratizing and post-conflict countries, often producing an overnight transformation in the distribution of political power. Why do seemingly "macho" societies—

such as Argentina and Mexico—choose to promote women's participation and rights? If more women are elected to legislatures, do these female newcomers represent the interests of female constituents? In other words, do female legislators support policies that benefit women in society, and do male legislators change their preferences and behavior in response? Answering these questions about "women's substantive representation" speaks to research on the causes and consequences of electoral reform, the strength of legislative institutions, and the scope and impact of public policies.

The dissertation begins by establishing the rationale for choosing Argentina and Mexico. Both federal systems have 30% quota laws, high degrees of electoral competition, disciplined political parties, and relatively autonomous legislatures. The countries vary, however, on three factors that affect women's substantive representation. First, Argentina over-fills its quota while Mexico under-fills its quota, making the mechanism stronger in Argentina than in Mexico. Second, Mexican political parties are more ideologically and programmatically coherent than those in Argentina, which differentially affects legislators' incentives and strategies. Third, institutional support for gender policy appears only in Mexico, where a "Commission on Equity and Gender" with lawmaking and veto power occupies a central place in the policymaking process. Chapter One of the dissertation explores these factors in-depth.

The empirical chapters of the dissertation trace the impact of female legislators in four moments of the policymaking process: identifying demands, setting agendas, changing statutes, and implementing policies. Chapter Two, entitled "What Women Want: Gender, Mobilization, and Public Opinion," tackles the polemical question of "women's interests," that is, whether female constituents indeed advance specific, unique demands. I use quantitative data from the World Values Survey to show that female citizens are more likely than male citizens to support

policies associated with social justice and humanitarian objectives. Moreover, female survey respondents assess modern gender roles more positively than male survey respondents, and women's civil society groups likewise seek the rights associated with these roles.

Chapter Three, "Setting Agendas for Women in the Legislature" moves from constituent demands to legislators' preferences. I use an original, longitudinal dataset to show that female parliamentarians' agenda setting activity largely corresponds to the sex differences in public opinion and civic mobilization. Additionally, male parliamentarians undertake women's substantive representation less than their female colleagues. Most notably, I show that, male legislators' efforts focus *not* on policies that promote women's equal rights, but on programs that encourage motherhood and protect children.

Chapter Four, "Transforming Policy Outcomes," examines whether women's agendas succeed or fail. This chapter uses an original, quantitative dataset on bill passage. I explain policy outcomes by considering and comparing the following factors: the openness of the system to reform, the nature of the committee system and party control in the congress, the lobbying strategies adopted by female legislators, and the extent of executive support for gender policy. Greater cross-party collaboration among women in Mexico, as well as the presence of a legislative commission on gender and equity, explains the higher proportion of rights-focused legislation in Mexico when compared to Argentina.

Finally, Chapter Five, entitled "The Impact of Reform: Gender Policy Implementation and Delivery," explores the material consequences of electing women to the legislature. Many scholars have viewed statutory transformation as the endpoint of women's substantive representation. Yet, in newly democratizing countries where institutions are inchoate and weak, policy changes may fail to bring tangible benefits to their beneficiaries. In this chapter, I advance

theories of interest representation by conceptualizing executive branch officials as representatives of "women's interests." I use case studies of sexual health reforms in Argentina and domestic violence reforms in Mexico to explain how federal systems and chief executives can limit or facilitate the material impact of women's representation.

In sum, the dissertation makes an original contribution by including male legislators in the analysis, examining outcomes at distinct policymaking moments, and including program delivery as one measure of interest representation. I show that electing women will have substantive and positive effects on governments' equality policies. Yet, the specific policy gains vary between Argentina and Mexico. These differences highlight how political party structures, legislative institutions, and executive branch support condition the causal relationship between women's representation and policy results.

Endnotes

[i] http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=68463

[ii] Author's interviews, conducted in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from February-August 2009.

Jennifer M. Piscopo
Chapter 2
What Women Want: Gender, Mobilization and Public Opinion

Introduction

In 2006, Argentine women's organizations in Buenos Aires and Córdoba convened a region-wide conference entitled "*Ciudades que Deseamos*" [Cities that We Desire].[1] Workshops, sponsored by the United Nations' Fund for Women (UNIFEM), taught female participants strategies for confronting domestic violence in their homes and neighborhoods; the interventions took a holistic approach, proposing that curbing violence against women protects not merely the physical integrity of women, but the health and safety of the community. Indeed, international and domestic activists routinely signal gender violence and citizen security as concerns held by Argentine women, alongside access to employment, sexual health, the decriminalization of abortion, and the wellbeing of children and minorities. This package of demands is conceptualized as "women's interests"—a set of policy concerns which, according to conventional wisdom, are addressed not simply by nongovernmental women's organizations, but by female legislators.

This chapter addresses the major criticism faced by this proposition: that the concept of "women's interests" presumes an *a priori*, or essentialist, women's identity. The idea that women (as some universal category) care about gender violence, citizen security, reproductive rights, children, and the disadvantaged is based on stereotypical assumptions about female domesticity and caretaking. To assume that female legislators will automatically represent these interests assumes, in the first place, that all women possess these concerns simply because they are women. On the other hand, the mobilization of international and domestic women's groups shows that women *do* converge on certain policy demands. In the specific case of *Ciudades que*

Deseamos, women have united to eliminate violence from their communities; in the general case of the United Nations' four World Conferences on Women, women have agreed on shared principles and strategies for combating gender inequality in the domestic, professional, and political spheres of their respective countries. This convergence occurs despite women's racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological, geographical, and class differences. One way of resolving the tension between "women's interests" and "women's differences" is acknowledging that, while women share broad policy concerns and identify common policy problems, the solutions will vary according to domestic contexts and ideological beliefs.

What matters for analyzing whether female legislators undertake the representation of women's interests then, is having an understanding of female constituents' policy demands in specific cases. This chapter analyzes public opinion data and women's activism to establish that understanding for the Argentin and Mexican cases. Understanding "what women want" accomplishes two objectives: (1) it gives credence to the polemical claim that women's interests exist as distinct from men's interests, and so meets the need for the *external validity* of studying women's substantive representation; and (2) it establishes that women can hold common values and share policy concerns without necessarily agreeing on solutions. Indeed, it will be female legislators, in the agenda setting and statute change phases of the representative process, who will negotiate responses to constituents' problems and priorities. Understanding "what women want" will show whether female legislators—as democratically elected representatives—respond to public opinion. The study of how female legislators represent women's interests in Argentina must therefore begin with female citizens' opinion and activities.

Chapter Overview and Methodology

This chapter examines political and social differences between men and women, divergences which can then be linked to differences in male and female legislators' policymaking initiatives. The aim is to uncover the content of Argentine and Mexican women's interests: *what do women want?* The research thus begins with the theoretical prediction outlined in the introduction: women feel strongly about those policy areas connected to (a) their social roles as wives and mothers and (b) their equal rights as citizens. Women's interests thus encompass wellbeing and rights**.** Which specific policy problems constitute "wellbeing and rights" in the two cases, however, require exploration.

I analyze public opinion along two dimensions where gender theory predicts differences between men and women: political attitudes and societal values. For Argentina and Mexico, political attitudes emerge from questions on the 1999 and 2005/2006 World Values Survey (WVS); I also include the 1999 Romer election poll from Argentina. Questions from these sources asked respondents about their country's goals and priorities, their confidence in institutions, and their modes of political participation and civic engagement.[2] Societal values emerge from questions asked by the 1999 and 2005/2006 WVS about women's workforce participation, family responsibilities, and reproductive morals. Direct comparisons between 1999 and 2005/2006 are not always possible, however, as the WVS did not ask the exact same questions in the two survey waves.[3] The WVS asked some—but not all—the same questions in both Argentina and Mexico during each wave (the other available survey data for Latin America, the Americas Barometer, does not include Argentina). The WVS data is analyzed using simple male-female cross-tabulations, with a Pearson chi-squared test for statistical significance between the differences in the proportions of male respondents and the proportions of female

respondents. I also draw on survey results published by non-governmental organizations, particularly to develop the analysis of men's and women's societal values.

This data thus reveals trends in male and female citizens' preferences for my period of study, 1999 to 2009. Importantly, the data only reveal *sex* differences, meaning percentage agreements of disagreements among male and female respondents. The data from the WVS also offers an indirect measure of women's policy interests, mostly because the questions are designed to gauge citizens' level of modernity. I consequently exploit those few questions that *do* ask respondents about their political priorities, and I draw inferences from a range of questions that ask respondents about their group membership and political activity as well as beliefs about ideal family structures. To bolster these inferences, I draw on qualitative evidence to connect sex differences to gender role socialization and women's activism in Argentina and Mexico. Lastly, the qualitative evidence shows how sex differences link to women's shared policy concerns.

This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I discuss differences in political attitudes concerning men's and women's priorities, confidence, participation and engagement in Argentina. Second, I present differences in men's and women's societal values, meaning beliefs about Argentine women's roles and opportunities in society. This section is subdivided into values about paid and unpaid labor and values about reproduction, contraception, and abortion. Third, I contrast the Argentine analysis with 2005 WVS data from Mexico. Throughout, and particularly in the subsection on reproductive values, I incorporate stories about women's activism to explain patterns in the data. I conclude by developing the link between public opinion and legislative behavior.

Women and Political Attitudes in Argentina

The analysis begins with broad political attitudes and telescopes to specific priorities and activities. Graph One shows Argentines' self-placement on a standard, 10-point left-right ideological scale, where one represents leaning fully left and 10 represents leaning fully right. Argentines generally lean slightly right, but men and women track very closely on the ideological spectrum. While women appear more right-leaning at the middle, middle-right, and far right of the spectrum (points 5, 6, and 10), a result corresponding to conventional wisdom about Argentine women, the overall difference between men and women (the space between the two lines) is *not* statistically significant.[4] This finding suggests that sex differences in political attitudes cannot be explained by simple left-right ideological divergence.



Narrowing the question, I examined several WVS questions dealing with men's and women's ranking of Argentina's priorities among a determined series of options (Table 1A). Questions sought to elicit respondents' priorities by asking them to choose among the economy, security, citizen participation, civic pride, and freedom/rights. In the first question, women preferred economic growth less frequently than men, preferred security about the same as men,

and preferred citizen participation and national beautification *more* than men (statistically significant at the 10% level). Likewise, in the second and third questions, women continued to prefer rights-oriented goals more than men (21.3% of women and 16.9% of men chose "progress towards a more humane society" over other alternatives); women also continued to support economic growth less than men (54% of men and 50.7% of women chose "a stable economy" over other alternatives). These differences, however, were not statistically significant. Two additional questions on foreign aid and economic versus environmental protection also lacked statistically significant differences: both men and women trend toward less foreign aid (77.7% of men and 79.5% of women) and split on privileging the economy or the environment (46% of men and 44.3% of women favor the environment, and 38% of men *and* women favor the economy). The data thus suggest that women diverge slightly from men only in placing a higher priority on civic pride and citizen participation, and in favoring community wellbeing ("humane society").[5]

Data from the 2006 WVS again shows that women prioritize citizen participation and wellbeing (Table 1B). Women in Argentina continued to favor economic growth less frequently than men, and security the same as men. Compared to 1999, women demonstrated an even stronger preference for civic participation than men, with 28.1% of women compared to 22.1% of men favored "giving people more say." Female respondents now favored national beautification less than men, a factor partially explained by their greater migration to supporting "giving people more say" in 2006 compared to 1999. Again, these proportions are statistically significant at the 10% level. In 2006, women also favored "fighting rising prices" more than men, and "freedom of speech" and "maintaining order in the nation" less than men (differences statistically significant at the 1% level). In this question, female respondents deemphasized

those rights typically associated with individual freedoms (speech and law-and-order) and emphasized those rights typically associated with group wellbeing (civic participation).

Another question on political priorities presents a notable, and related, difference: women are much more skeptical than men when asked whether Argentina sufficiently respects human rights. In 1999, only 2.6% of women, compared to 7% of men, believed their country demonstrated "a lot of respect for individual human rights" and 82.6% of women, compared to 73.2% of men, believed the country demonstrated "not much respect" or "no respect at all" (significant below the 1% level; Table 1A). This trend appeared again in 2006, where women continued to evince greater criticism about respect for individual rights: more women believed there "is not much respect" (48.4% of women versus 45.9% of men) and "no respect at all" (15.2% of women versus 12.7% of men; Table 1B). However, these results were less statistically robust than the 1999 results, perhaps due to the fact that the 2006 variant of the question deemphasized the *government's* respect for individual rights and asked about respect more generally.

Nonetheless, the finding that Argentine women express greater doubt about rights' protections is substantively meaningful. The history of women's activism in Argentina supports the claim that Argentine women prioritize human rights. The contemporary women's movement began during Argentina's seven-year military dictatorship (1976-1983), when the mothers and grandmothers of the "disappeared" (the victims of political violence whose bodies were never found) organized to protest human rights violations. These women became known as the *Madres* [mothers] and the *Abuelas* [grandmothers] of the Plaza de Mayo, named for the plaza outside the presidential palace where they marched, carrying photos of their missing children and grandchildren. The *Madres* and the *Abuelas* still march today, but have evolved into

international human rights organizations which, in addition to searching for the disappeared, demand equal rights for women, children, and the rural and working poor. The premise of the *Madres, Abuelas*, and other human rights organizations is social justice—a claim which focuses less on individual freedoms and more on group concerns. The association in Argentina between women's interests, social justice, and human rights thus remains very strong. Indeed, it is hard to ask anyone about the women's movement in Argentina without being referred to its antecedents in the human rights activism of the *Madres* and the *Abuelas.*

A more robust demonstration of Argentine women's prioritization of wellbeing and human rights comes from an analysis of a 1999 pre-election survey conducted by the Argentine polling firm Graciela C. Romer & Associates. I analyzed a question where 1412 adults from 15 urban areas in Argentina were asked to offer the country's gravest problem (and thus top priority) and their own gravest problem (and thus largest concern). The respondents offered 18 different answers, which I grouped into two categories consisting of "social problems" (including healthcare, poverty, education, human rights, and quality of life) and "economic problems" (including inflation, tax evasion, tariffs, and pension funds).[6] The categorical dependent variable is whether respondents expressed concern for social problems (coded as 1) versus economic problems (coded as 0). The principal independent variable of interest is sex, coded as 0 for men and 1 for female; I included controls for age, household income (a proxy for socioeconomic status), and zone (whether the respondent lived inside or outside of Greater Buenos Aires).[7]

Table A (page 9) shows probit regression results for the independent variable (sex) and the controls (age, household income, and zone) on the choice of either social or economic problems. For the country's gravest problem, the regression coefficient on female of .073 means

that women are 7.3% more likely than men to name a social, rather than an economic problem; this result is statistically significant at the 1% level. For the gravest personal problem, the regression coefficient on female of .057 means that women are 5.7% more likely to offer a social, rather than an economic, problem; this result is statistically significant at the 5% level. In other words, controlling for other variables, moving from male to female respondents raises the likelihood that a social issue is chosen by 7.3% for the country's problems and 5.6% for the respondent's problems. These percentages appear small, but public opinion data rarely show percentage gaps of more than or twelve percent on even the most polarizing questions.[8] These differentials therefore support insights gleaned from the World Values Survey that, when selecting from among predetermined alternatives, Argentine women prioritize social problems.

Table A: Probit Regression: Likelihood to Prioritize Social Problems
(1999 Romer & Associates Public Opinion Survey)

	Country (Social)	**Personal (Social)**
female	.073 (2.73)**	.057 (2.08)*
age range	.013 (1.25)	-.003 (0.29)
household income	.025 (4.13)**	.030 (5.00)**
Zone	-.0593 (2.11)*	-.0001 (0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.0192	.0185
number of cases	1263	1203
* Significant at 5% ** Significant at 1% *robust z statistics in parentheses*		

Moving from priorities to activities will reveal how Argentine women and men translate their preferences into action. I begin with 1999 World Values Survey data on confidence in political and social institutions. Graph 2 (page 11) tests for differences between men's and women's optimism (expressed as having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence) and

skepticism (expressed as having "not very much" or "none at all" confidence) in particular social and political institutions. Men and women trend in the same direction, expressing skepticism on all institutions save the Church, for which both men and women trend optimistic. Yet, for all institutions save the Church, women express much greater skepticism than men. Women expressed much more doubt than men about the armed forces (79.3% of women expressed little or no confidence, versus 66.5% of men) and the police (79.7% of women expressed little or confidence, versus 71.3% of men). Women also doubted rulemaking bodies and interest groups more than men: 90.6% of women versus 86.6% of men doubted the legislature; 82.5% of women versus 77.4% of men doubted the government; and 89% of women versus 87.1% of men doubted the labor unions. The data suggest that women mistrust traditional political institutions.

This proposition gains credence by further analyzing the confidence data for the Church and the women's movement. Sixty three percent of women believe in the Church (versus 56% of men), and 37% of women doubt the Church (versus 44% of men). Argentine women are, overall, more deeply religious than men (Desposato and Norrander 2008). Indeed, other WVS data show that women attend Church more frequently than men.[9] Women, according to the WVS, also believe more strongly that the Church provides guidance for moral problems and social problems, responding more affirmatively than men in both 1999 and 2006 when asked about the Church's ability to lead in these two areas. For instance, in 2006, 44% of women compared to 34.2% of men believed the Church could solve social problems (though this response was down slightly from 1999, when 52% of women responded affirmatively compared to 48% of men).[10] The Church did lose credibility in Argentina in the early 2000s, due largely to high-profile sex abuse scandals; nonetheless, women continue to perceive the Church as providing a site for social and moral problemsolving.



** Significant at or below the 1% level; * Significant at the 10% level

The Church represents only one civil society alternative to traditional political institutions. Argentine women may be skeptical of the women's movement, but, by 2006, they were *less* skeptical than men. In a shift from 1999, 54.3% of women are skeptical of the women's movement compared to 67.6% of men. In other words, 45.6% of women regard the movement favorably, compared to 32.4% of men, a difference which is statistically significant below the 1% level (Table 2). Moreover, after the Church, Argentine women are *most positive* about the women's movement. Argentine women in fact regard the women's movement more favorably than any political institution: in 1999, 33.4% of female respondents rated the women's movement optimistically, compared to 20.7% for the armed forces, 20.3% for the police, 16.5% for the government, 9.4% for the legislature, and 11% for labor unions. In 2006, 45.6% of women rated the women's movement favorably, compared to the 31.8% for the armed forces, 23% for the police, 37.4% for the government, and 8.1% for the labor unions. Moreover, female respondents' optimistic valuation of the women's movement rose by over ten percentage points

from 1999 to 2006. This increase can be attributed to the greater mobilization of the women's movement—and related positive exposure—following the economic crisis of 2001.

The women's movement has also largely developed and worked outside political institutions, a fact which also accounts for women's low confidence ratings in governments, security forces, and labor unions. By marching in the Plaza de Mayo during the 1970s and the 1980s, *Las Madres* and *Las Abuelas* demanded the return of the disappeared outside the highly circumscribed channels of citizen-government communication allowed by the military junta. Following the economic crisis of 2001, female protestors in Argentina have engaged in *cacelorazos,* marches wherein lower- and middle-class housewives bang pots and pans; the cacophonous noise expresses the distressed caused by vanishing household incomes, contracting public services, and diminishing employment opportunities. The *cacelorazos* are deliberately disruptive and disconcerting, showing women's desire to "shame" or "confront" the government in ways other than writing letters to politicians (Eltantawy 2008). Finally, the recent publicity surrounding the trafficking of women and girls in Argentina has prompted women to organize marches and demonstrations throughout the country; in Córdoba, marches held in April of 2009 were accompanied by women's groups covering the walls of the city with graffiti, painting slogans which said "without male clients, there are no female victims."[11] Other disruptive acts undertaken by Argentine women's NGOs have included banging pots and pans outside the homes of police officers who refuse to arrest domestic violence offenders, and taking over soccer pitches in communities where the fields are traditionally places of men's recreation.[12]

The confidence data on the women's movement therefore have two, complementary interpretations. First, female respondents regard the women's movement quite highly when compared to traditional political institutions; this regard signals Argentine women's preferences

for acting outside existing structures, in order to make the existing structures work. Second, some female respondents may express skepticism towards the women's movement but not the practice of gender-based activism. This latter point emerges because many female citizens participate in the *cacelorazos* or other rights-demanding demonstrations, but reject the label "feminist"—largely because the term carries, for some, the connotation of a Western-style individualism that is antithetical to Argentine women's self-perception as members of communities. In this latter sense, the positive evaluation of the Argentine women's movement, as shown in the WVS data, may be artificially deflated: women's organizing, whether motivated by feminist individualism or by community concerns, plays a meaningful role in demanding society's wellbeing and human rights.

Further, the concept that "traditional politics" is not the venue most favored by Argentine women reappears in their responses to questions aimed at measuring political interest. The 1999 WVS contained three items referring to traditional ways of paying attention to politics: questions asked respondents how interested they were in politics, how often they followed politics in the news, and how often they discussed politics with friends (Table 3). While women and men again trend in the same direction, women manifest greater disinterest than men: 52.5% of women (versus 46.1% of men) find politics not appealing, and fewer women than men (29.5% versus 35.1%) find politics somewhat appealing. This gap reappears in data on following politics in the news: 14.5% of women (versus 10.9% of men) never follow politics in the news, and 16.5% of women (versus 14% of men) follow politics infrequently. Surprisingly, despite men's and women's claims to be *disinterested* in politics (only 6.5% of men and 5.8% of women are "very interested" in politics), most men and women follow politics in the news daily (50% of men and 45.7% of women). Note, however, that women still respond less enthusiastically about their

interest and their news attention; these differences are significant at the 10% level. The strongest difference appears in how often men and women discuss politics with friends. Fifty three percent of women (versus 44% of men) responded "never" and only 17% of women (versus 20.5% of men) responded "frequently"; these differences are significant at the 1% level. The divergence may, however, result from conceptualizing human rights and social welfare as separate from "typical" politics—where "typical" politics involves the daily happenings in the government and financial sectors.

Data on political action also focus on traditional forms of activism. The 1999 WVS survey included four questions seeking to characterize political participation: questions asked whether respondents would attend a lawful demonstration, join an unofficial strike, support a boycott, or occupy buildings and factories (Table 4A). Women and men yet again trend in the same direction, but women express greater unwillingness than men in all four categories. Argentines appear more predisposed to favor lawful demonstrations and strikes, though women slightly less so than men: 65.6% of women (versus 61.8% of men) would never attend legal protests, and 85.5% of women (versus 83.2% of men) would not strike without permission (these findings are not statistically significant). Argentines express greater dislike for boycotts and property takeovers: 93.1% of women (versus 88.2% of men) would *never* participate in a boycott, and 91% of women (versus 86.9% of men) would *never* occupy buildings of factories (these findings are significant below the 5% level). That women dislike these activities more than men is consistent with viewing strikes, protests, and property takeovers as conventional, masculine forms of political participation.

However, these conclusions should not be overdrawn. Focusing on women's lower participation rates compared to men obscures instances where they *do* participate: in 1999,

women reported joining protests (12.7%), striking unofficially (4.3%) and taking over buildings and factories (1.3%). Women in Argentina have joined the *piquetero* movement, a nation-wide social movement which emerged among the homeless, the desperately poor, and the underemployed in the mid-1990s. To make their plight visible, the poor launch widespread demonstrations that shutdown transportation networks, block access to economic centers, and occupy public buildings. Journalist Marie Trigona estimates that 65% of the *piqueteros* are women, participating both as demonstration leaders and as community coordinators.[13] Female *piqueteras* formed organizations such as *Mujeres Agropecuarias en Luchas* [Agricultural Women in Struggle] to protest the forced sale of family farms. Yet, Borland and Sutton note that women "are ignored" in many reports of the *piqueteros:* "much of the work on the recent mobilization barely mentions women's resistance, using the generic masculine to refer to both men and women activists (e.g., *piqueteros*), which tends to make women invisible and implicitly suggests that activists are men" (2007: 703). This invisibility has psychological implications for Argentine women: not only are *piqueteras'* accomplishments elided, but non-*piqueteras* cannot envision themselves as undertaking such activism. As Borland and Sutton explain, "although many *piqueteras* were in road blockages, some wearing masks, many critics of the movement consistently portrayed its members as dangerous men" (709). Female sympathizers will thus resist joining an ostensibly masculine movement.

The WVS data also end at 1999, before Argentina's 2001 economic crisis further energized the lower class *piqueteros* as well as mobilized the middle- and middle-upper classes in *carcerolazos.* Indeed, in the 2006 WVS (Table 4B), nearly 58% of women (as well as 58% of men) either had, or were willing to, participate in peaceful demonstrations. When the question was rephrased to ask men and women about their most recent political action, more women than

men reported having attended a demonstration (19% versus 17%), though the difference was not statistically significant. Women in 2006 were also more likely to have joined boycotts (3% versus 2%) as well as signed petitions (27.8% versus 25.4%), though again the differences between men's and women's actions are not statistically robust. Nonetheless, the data show a marked increased in women's protest activity from 1999 to 2006.

Qualitative evidence also demonstrates that women's participation in the extra-legal or extra-institutional activities has increased throughout the 2000s. For instance, the *piqueteros'* recent strategies include occupying factories, expelling the owners and transforming the enterprises into worker-owned collectives. Women have assumed leadership roles in these new cooperatives.[14] The *piqueteros* have also formed social service networks in their *barrios* [neighborhoods], wherein female activists direct food kitchens, used clothes sales, and health clinics (Borland & Sutton 2006; Sutton 2007). Likewise, their female compatriots in the *carcerolazos* have formed *asambleas barriales* [neighborhood assemblies] as alternatives to municipal government: these assemblies undertake disparate tasks ranging from food drives to distributing lists of job openings, organizing artistic shows, and supporting the *piqueteros* (Briones & Mendoza 2003). In these movements, employment becomes a social problem: women transform un- and underemployment from an economic statistic to human rights challenge, as lack of work aggravates poverty and accelerates family disintegration. Most importantly, the *piqueteros* and the *asambleas barriales* refuse to become incorporated (or co-opted) into traditional politics; they eschew political parties, labor unions, and direct engagement with elected representatives. The assemblies "consider themselves sovereign and independent of any other higher-level organization" (Briones & Mendoza 2003). The activism of *some*

Argentine women to transform poverty is thus consistent with women's preference for acting outside traditional institutions, as well as consistent with prioritizing wellbeing.

To discover what women want, then, the data ought to therefore analyze what women *do.* World Values Survey questions on civil society engagement, meaning associations and membership in community organizations, show an increase in women's activism when compared to questions on political interest and political participation. Graph 3 depicts men's and women's 1999 WVS responses about belonging to specific civic organizations. These findings are both statistically significant and substantively meaningful.

In every category save ecology/animal rights, women manifest higher civic engagement than men: the rates are statistically significant at the 1% level (for poverty/equality, health, and religious organizations) or the 10% level (for women's groups). Women's heavy involvement in religious organizations supports earlier data presented on Argentine women's greater religiosity. Female respondents are also most active in community groups addressing problems of poverty and equality, health, and women, patterns which reinforce their prioritization of these specific social problems. In 1999, whereas only 1.2% of women admitted to participating in a boycott, and 1.3% of women



** Significant at or below the 1% level; * Significant at or below the 5% level

admitted to occupying a factory, 4.5% of women belonged to community groups organized around poverty and equality (including employment, housing, and racial and ethnic rights), and 3.6% of women belonged to a community group organized around health. These patterns further indicate how the prioritization of social problems leads women to engage their communities—and therefore to undertake political activism—through avenues outside of governments, legislatures, and labor unions.

The 2006 WVS survey on community engagement shows a continuation and deepening of the 1999 trends (Table 5 and Graph 4). Men again participate more frequently than women in environmental groups (0.9% of women are active environmental advocates, compared to 2.5% of men), but women report greater active membership in church organizations (20.6% of women compared to 13.1% of men) and greater active membership in charitable/humanitarian organizations (7.5% of women compared to 3% of men). In these latter two categories, women are also more likely to be *inactive* members, with 24.9% of women belonging to church organizations (compared to 19.8% of women), and 8.5% of women belonging to charitable/humanitarian organizations (compared to

Graph 4
Active Membership in Civic Groups
2006 World Values Survey



** Significant at or below the 1% level; * Significant at or below the 10% level

6.5% of men). These differences are statistically significant below the 1% level (for environmental groups and charitable/humanitarian groups) and below the 10% level (for church groups). The increased proportions of women's participation (both active and inactive) compared to 1999 also supports the emerging picture that Argentine's women's activism increased steadily during the 2000s.

Rounding out the image of Argentine's women's greater commitment to communities' wellbeing, a 2006 WVS question asked respondents to compare themselves to a hypothetical person who valued "helping others nearby" (Table 5). Seventy percent of female respondents believed this person was much like them and 25.5% believed this person was somewhat like them; male respondents were more cautious, with only 61.9% of men believing this person was much like them and 32.2% believe this person was somewhat like them. This finding, too, was significant (below the 1% level). In this question, the word "nearby" is critical to understanding the difference in men's and women's responses: the question asks not about helping an abstract stranger, but about helping a friend or neighbor. Argentine women, with their greater presence in charitable and humanitarian organizations, many of which have a social justice orientation, are more likely than men to have a self-image as community helpers.

Finally, women in Argentina have no doubt that they can effectively exercise leadership and express their concerns. The 1999 and 2006 World Values Survey asked respondents whether "men make better political leaders than women." As shown in Graph 5A and Graph 5B (page 20), women *overwhelmingly* reject this statement. In 1999, 73% percent of women disagreed or disagreed strongly compared to 60.6% of men; if women did agree, they agreed at rates less than men (39.4% of men agreed or agreed strongly, versus 26.3% of women). These differences are statistically significant well below the 1% level. The pattern is the same for

2006: 24.8% of women strongly disagree, and 52.1% of women disagree, compared to 11.8% and 45.6% of men, respectively; these differences are again statistically significant below the 1% level. The stark disparity in these responses shows that men remain attached to traditional gender roles and stereotypes, withholding leadership capacity from women.





Related, a 2006 survey of 1600 women in four metropolitan areas by the *Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género* [Latin American Team for Justice and Gender, or ELA] indicated that 70% of respondents believed female leaders represented the population *better* than male leaders (ELA 2006: 68). These respondents were nonetheless doubtful that women could become leaders, with 48% believing that women have fewer opportunities than men and 14% believing that women have *no* opportunities (ELA 2006: 64). This ELA finding is supported by a 2006 WVS question, which asked respondents whether a university education was more important for a boy than for a girl.

Men were more conservative, agreeing more frequently than women that girls did not need a university education (a difference statistically significant well below the 1% level) (Table 6). Women are often not encouraged to begin educational or career pathways that culminate in leadership positions within traditional institutions, structural factors which prompted Argentina to pass gender quota laws for legislative posts in 1991 and labor unions in 2003. As discussed in the next section, Argentine women lack equal opportunities, a factor which placed equal rights to employment and access to decisionmaking positions within the demands of women's movement.

Overall, the World Values Survey data shows important convergences and divergences in the political attitudes of men and women. Men's and women's political attitudes trend in the same direction: Argentine men and women lean to the right, place similar weight on economic growth, foreign aid, and the environment, remain skeptical about traditional institutions, intermittently follow politics, and participate occasionally in conventional protests such as strikes, boycotts, and lawful demonstrations. The public opinion data and qualitative evidence also show, however, that women—more so than men—eschew conventional politics and act outside traditional institutions.

Other crucial sex differences appear in the data. Argentine women rank economic growth and security as less important than civic participation and group wellbeing; they trust security forces and government structures less than men; and they participate in community organizations and public protests centered around poverty, underemployment, social services, housing, healthcare, and equality. Their attitudes favor those rights which advance humanistic goals and promote community wellbeing. The ELA team found, for instance, that 58% of women ranked gender equality as a top priority *alongside* unemployment, education and health (2006: 78). In the 2006 WVS, on a question about Argentina's gravest problems, women named

the specific challenges of discrimination against women and girls, poor public health and sanitary conditions, and inadequate education, more often than men (Table 7). In essence, as demonstrated in the Romer & Associates data, and correlated in the other surveys, Argentine women prioritize social problems for their country and for their personal lives.

Societal Values in Argentina

The public opinion data on women's societal values reinforces the conclusion that Argentine women respond more dynamically and flexibly to the social realm than men. The term "societal values" captures men's and women's beliefs about gender roles in Argentina: how men and women should behave, which life pursuits men and women ought to undertake, and which choices men and women ought to have. First, Argentine women generally feel more strongly than men that women can join the workforce while still nurturing their family life. These trends show that, as with the WVS questions about political leadership, female citizens in Argentina favor greater flexibility in women's traditional roles. Women's work inside and outside of the home, as well as within their communities, develops their capabilities and expands their options while contributing to the vibrant *"ciudades que deseamos"* [cities we want]. Second, Argentine women *and* men support expanded access to contraception and the partial or whole decriminalization of abortion. These values about family, work, and reproduction show attitudinal shifts favoring greater choices for women. An expansion of women's roles also appeared on the policy agenda in Argentina: since the 1980s, female legislators have worked with the women's movement to reform the labor code to protect equal employment rights, to distribute contraception throughout the health sector, and to rewrite the penal code to strengthen penalties for violence against women and trafficking in women and girls.

The drive to expand women's choices thus appears across all areas of women's activism. Though the *piqueteros* and *carcerolazos* are often regarded as apart from the intellectual women's movement, these distinctions—though meaningful to participants who remain skeptical of feminism—are theoretically artificial. First, any civic engagement designed to improve women's quality of life invokes the feminist principal of *reinvindicación* [a reassertion of autonomy, dignity, and rights]. Second, women's membership in organizations ranging from the *Madres* of the Plaza de Mayo to the *asambleas barriales* has generated an understanding that sexism places upon women the burden of unpaid housework while subjecting them to men's violence and control (Borland & Sutton 2007; Frey & Crivelli 2007). The critique of the gendered division of labor unites all civil society organizations formed by and oriented toward women, and these organizations, alongside more explicitly feminist groups seeking the decriminalization of abortion, all constitute the women's movement. In Argentina, these organizations seek empowerment (leadership of women within their communities), equality (workforce opportunities, equity, and legal protections), and healthcare (expanded reproductive rights and services for victims of domestic violence). These goals show how public opinion data showing greater support for changing gender roles translates into women's policy demands.

Values about Work, Children, and Families

In 1999, World Values Survey questions relating to women's workforce opportunities, parenting, and childrearing responsibilities show that women do *not* view employment as antithetical to successfully fulfilling their roles as wives and mothers (Graph 6, page 24). The first question explored women's identities, proposing "a woman needs children to be fulfilled." Women disbelieved this statement more than men: 44.2% of women disagreed (versus 43.9% of men), and 55.8% of women agreed (versus 56.1% of men). These percentages seem close, but

the divergence was statistically significant below the 1% level. The next questions targeted women's identities as mothers versus women's identities as workers, stating "a job is great but being a housewife is just as fulfilling" and "working mothers can be as close to children as stay-at-home mothers." For question two, on whether housewifery fulfilled women as much as employment, women disagreed more strenuously: 27.9% of women disagreed or disagreed strongly, compared to 21.3% of men. Women also agreed less than men, with 72.1% of women concurring compared to 78.7% of men; the divergence was significant at the 5% level. For question three, women agreed more frequently than men that working women could remain close to their children: 80.5% of women agreed or agreed strongly, versus 70.1% of men, a difference significant below the 1% level.



** Significant at the 1% level; Significant at the 5% level

These findings show that domesticity still exerts a strong pull on Argentine women, but that many women also prefer the workforce. In these instances, women believe they do not need children for fulfillment, or women seek both children and employment. The trend continued in 2006 (Table 8). While both women and men tend to agree that "being a housewife is just as fulfilling," women tend to agree *less* than men (62.5% versus

70.3%) and disagree *more* than men (37.5% versus 29.7%), a finding with strong statistical significance (below the 1% level). More women also disagreed in 2006 compared to 1999, perhaps because the economic crisis in 2001 catapulted women into the workforce. This change not only gave many previous homemakers a change to earn wages; it also brought greater visibility to women's new roles.

These data underscore the proposition that, as women join the workforce, their autonomy increases. Argentine researchers for the World Bank report that, when a woman works outside the home, "she takes care of the household expenses with what she earns, and she decides many more things" (Narayan et al 2000: 119). The *Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género* (ELA) survey likewise found that 64% of working women concurred that "work is one way to disconnect from children and family chores" and 91% of working women believed that "employment gives freedom to women" (2006: 37). Even non-working women agreed, with 70% endorsing employment as a respite from family demands, and 85% supporting employment as liberty for women. Undeniably, workforce participation gives women more control over their expenditures and their time.

This autonomy gain does not mean, however, that all Argentine women receive positive financial and psychological returns from work. Researchers place the wage gap in Argentina as high as 30%, with men earning more.[15] Ana Ortega explains that Argentine companies practice wage and hiring discrimination: employers pay women less, and female homemakers are not perceived to need jobs with the same urgency as male breadwinners (2006). A 2006 WVS question supports Ortega's findings, proposing that "when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than woman." Though male and female respondents both disagreed, men were less likely to disagree than women (52.6% compared to 66.6%), and more likely to agree

(32.1% compared to 23.7%), differences which were highly statistically significant (see Table 8). The default assumption is that men *need* the work in order to support their families, whereas women's work, in providing supplementary support to their family's income, can be sacrificed during hard times.



Significant at the 1% level

Another default assumption is that men make better business leaders than women. As shown in Graph 7, a 2006 WVS question asked whether "men make better business executive than women." As with the similar question on political leadership, men endorsed this position more ardently than women: 66.9% of men disagreed or disagreed strongly, compared to an overwhelming 82.2% of women, a statistically robust difference (Graph 6). Again, men appear more resistant to abandoning gender ideals about women as dependent and private (domestic) beings, and men as independent and public (economic) beings.

Related, Ortega also finds that women are more likely than men to be unemployed, particularly when they have children (2006). These statistics are corroborated by an Argentine umbrella NGO known as *Centro de Intercambio y Servicios Cono Sur Argentina* [Center of Argentine & Southern Cone Interchanges and Service]. This NGO hub, known as CISCSA, coordinates several women's organizations and networks. CISCSA's recent study showed

women's labor market participation declining as their number of young children rises: single women participate at 68.6%, women with one child at 59.9%, women with two children at 51.1%, and women with three children or more at 37.3% (Martínez 2007: 21). ELA likewise found that pregnancy, children or other family responsibilities explained 38% of women's departures from the workforce (2006: 33). Additionally, the problem of women's *doble jornada* [double day] persists. Women perform 85 to 90% of all household tasks (Martínez 2007: 22); for instance, only 11% of men clean the house and a mere 16% wash clothes (ELA 2006: 47). The dual burden of women's paid labor and unpaid housework, as well as widespread discrimination, explains why women's organizations from CISCSA to the *asambleas barriales* have made gender equity in the workplace *and* in the family a principal focus. For instance, a recent campaign undertaken by the *Fundación para Estudio y Investgiación de la Mujer* [Foundation for Women's Studies and Investigation, or FEIM] features yellow traffic signs that say "men at work" and show black silhouettes of men changing diapers and reading to girls. Feminist activists believe ending the *doble jornada* is one of women's top priorities.

Additional questions from the 1999 World Values Survey further target men's and women's values about work (Table 9). Question one asked whether women and men should contribute equally to household incomes. Women "agreed" or "agreed strongly" more frequently than men (94% of women versus 86.1%), and "disagreed" or "disagreed strongly" less frequently than men (5.6% of women less than 13.9% of men). Whether for economic necessity, psychological benefit, or both, Argentine women prefer to financially support their families. On question two, where respondents considered whether "it's a problem if women have more income than their husbands," men actually agreed *less* and disagreed *more*. For instance, 61.9% of men disagreed that women's higher income caused friction, versus 50.5% of women; more

women than men agreed that earning more money posed difficulties for relationships (49.4% versus 38.1%).

However, question two asked about the reality of women out-earning men, and not whether women out-earning men created problems. Women's greater likelihood to respond affirmatively that "it's a problem if women have more income than their husbands" can be interpreted as their greater understanding that, indeed, women's higher wages causes problems. Women's higher earning capacity both increases women's decision-making abilities within the home, as well as challenges men's identities as breadwinners; this shift in gender relations can sometimes cause resentment and frustration among more *machista* men.[16] An Argentine women's professional association, *Mujeres de Empresa* [Women of Business], explained that women earning more than men confront the deflated ego of their romantic partners.[17] More seriously, this challenge to men's identities, particularly when men cannot find work, can exacerbate the tensions that lead to domestic violence (Narayan et al 2000). This WVS question thus distinguishes between women as secondary and primary contributors to family income: employment may contribute to women's financial and psychological autonomy, but surpassing men's earning potential—becoming fully independent—may not be favorable regarded.

These conservative trends notwithstanding, societal values favor expanded economic opportunities for women in Argentina; this trend correlates with societal values favoring flexible family arrangements. As shown above, almost half of Argentine women believe they do *not* need children for fulfillment. Attitudes about whether Argentine women can have children alone have also liberalized. In response to two 1999 WVS questions about women as single parents, women more than men approved of female-headed households (Table 10). Men disagreed more strenuously than women on whether "a woman may choose to have children when not in a

relationship with a man": 32.6% of men disapproved, whereas 28.2% of women disapproved, and 57.8% of men approved compared to 64.5% of women. The divergence in women's greater support for becoming single mothers is statistically significant below the 5% level. Men also agreed more emphatically that "children need homes with a father and a mother to grow up happy": 93.7% of men agreed compared to 89.1% of women, and 6.3% of men disagreed compared to 10.9% of women. In 2006, men continued to express greater disapproval for woman as single parents, disagreeing with the concept 33.4% of the time (compared to women, who disagreed 24.2% of the time). Women not only expressed greater agreement with women as single parents—69.6% of women agreed compared to 58.2% of men—but they agreed in greater percentages than in 1999 (Table 10). These divergences, showing women's greater acceptance of alternative family arrangements, were all statistically significant. Support for women's autonomy is increasing in Argentina, particularly among women themselves.

Values about Reproduction, Contraception, and Abortion

This flexibility of family arrangements connects to women's reproductive autonomy, with public opinion data showing that men and women, and especially women, favor expanded reproductive rights. Here, I analyze data from several sources: a series of reproductive rights surveys conducted by Argentine public health specialist Monica Petracci, under the auspices of *Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad* [Center for Study of State and Society, or CEDES], and the 2006 ELA survey. While the Petracci surveys regrettably did not disaggregate the results by sex, the ELA survey illuminates that women surveyed separately trend the same as men and women surveyed together. Specifically, within the policy area of reproductive rights, women demand access to contraception and the liberalization of abortion.

In 2003, two years after female activists and female legislators labored to pass a comprehensive sexual health reform that mandated the free distribution of contraceptive devices in public and private health clinics, Petracci's team asked 303 residents of Greater Buenos Aires about the values enshrined in the legislation, known colloquially as *Salud Sexual*. Ninety six percent of male and female respondents agreed that "men and women ought to access contraceptive methods in pharmacies and health centers"; only 2% disagreed and 2% responded "neutral" or "refused" to state. Ninety six percent of respondents also expressed disagreement with an Argentine judge who attempted to pass an injunction against *Salud Sexual*; again, 2% disagreed and 2% were neutral/refused to state (Petracci 2003). These percentages have remained stable across time, with follow-up surveys reporting that respondents affirmed that "men and women have the right to freely decide when to have children" 94% of the time in 2004 and 96% of the time in 2006 (Petracci 2007b). In a separate 2006 survey, conducted in Buenos Aires and three other metropolitan areas, respondents agreed with the "free decision" of "how many children to have and when to have them" 95% of the time; eighty six percent also supported tubal ligations for women and 79% supported vasectomies for men. Seventy-eight of these respondents supported reproductive choice while also identifying as Catholic (Petracci 2007a). Moreover, 99% of respondents in the 2003 survey supported the goal of the *Salud Sexual* legislation, defined as "enabling women to make decisions about their sexual and reproductive lives" (Petracci 2003).

The strong level of public consensus on reproductive choice is also reflected in women's activism, which typically unfolds to confront the Catholic Church's ongoing opposition to the implementation of the *Salud Sexual* law. Since 2003, the Church has supported conservative civil society organizations in bringing lawsuits against local and provincial governments for

distributing contraception—lawsuits themselves which do not accurately reflect public opinion in Argentina. The Church has also exerted influence over provincial executives and ministers of health, causing interruptions in the program in certain localities (Piscopo 2009; Lopreite 2008). To counter the distortion induced by the Church's intervention, a consortium of more than 400 local, provincial, and national women's organizations have formed CoNDeRs, the *Consorcio Nacional de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos* [National Consortium for Sexual Health and Reproductive Rights]. CoNDeRs provides its constituent organizations with the materials necessary to engage in monitoring in their localities, to expose program deficiencies, and to demand that local and provincial officials be held accountable for implementing *Salud Sexual.* The *Consorcio* also holds consultative status with the national Ministry of Health. The narrowness of the *Consorcio's* objectives—to monitor and enforce the sexual health program—shows how female citizens in Argentina mobilize in response to case-specific policy problems.

The related policy problem around which Argentine women are broadly mobilized is the liberalization of abortion. Women I interviewed throughout 2005, 2007, and 2009 often highlighted the decriminalization of abortion as *the* priority of the women's movement; indeed, the movement to liberalize abortion often overshadows the movement to support the implementation of *Salud Sexual.* Abortion is currently illegal in Argentina save for two circumstances: when a mentally incapacitated woman has been raped, and when the woman's life or health is in danger. In practice, however, many judges refuse to grant permission in even these circumstances, interpreting the "life or health" clause extremely narrowly. In one instance, a woman seeking an abortion to undergo chemotherapy treatment was denied the procedure by three different judges; the cancer spread rapidly, and she and the fetus both died. These high-profile cases, which make the problem of maternal mortality particularly urgent, help shape the

Argentine women's movement dual focus: (1) the protection of women's rights to abortions which are *no-punible* [non-punishable] under Argentina's current penal code and (2) the decriminalization of abortion in all circumstances. The women's movement strategy includes marches and demonstrations, teach-ins, lobbying of legislators, and media exposure.

Public opinion is broadly favorable to these women's movements aims. In the 2006 CEDES survey of four Argentine cities, 70% of respondents "believed the Catholic Church ought to be more flexible about abortion." In addition, a vast majority of Argentines support those instances where abortion is *no-punible*: when a mentally-ill woman is raped (88%), when the woman's life is in danger (83%), when the woman's health is in danger (83%). The vast majority also agree with abortion in cases not specified by the law, including when a young woman has been raped (83% agree), any woman has been raped (83%), the fetus will be born with a birth defect (83%), and the woman's *mental* health is in danger (70%) (Table 11A). ELA posed the same series of questions to the women whom it surveyed in 2006. Among the 1600 respondents, 1250—78 percent—favored the partial or whole decriminalization of abortion, particularly in cases of rape, the woman's health, and illness or defect of the fetus (ELA 2006: 105-106). Of these respondents, 91% believed that abortion in Argentina should be freely available (ELA 2006: 110). Seventy-two percent also identified as Catholic (ELA 2006: 108), a percentage similar to those Catholics supporting contraception and family planning in the CEDES surveys. Overall, ELA concludes that those woman favoring the partial or whole decriminalization of abortion were most likely to be agnostic, educated, have a part- or full-time job, reside in Buenos Aires, and be younger than 60 (ELA 2006: 110).

The data also show Argentines' increasing acceptance of abortion in those circumstances beyond rape and the health or life of the mother and fetus. In three survey years, 2003, 2004,

and 2006, Petracci's team from CEDES asked 300 respondents in Buenos Aires whether they favored abortion in the following "non-therapeutic" cases: when the woman and her family lacked the economic resources to care for a child; when the woman did not wish to have children at this moment in her life, and woman became pregnant through the failure of contraception (interpreted as the woman *used* contraception, but the contraception failed). In general, support for abortion decriminalization in these non-therapeutic instances is much lower than the support for abortion decriminalization in instances of rape and health: endorsement of abortion ranges from 25% to 40% for the non-therapeutic cases, compared to a range of 70% to 88% for the rape/health cases (Table 11B). Nonetheless, the favorability of all three non-therapeutic instances has increased over time. Regarding whether abortion should be legal when the woman and her family lack economic resources, Buenos Aires respondents agreed at 30% in 2003, 39% in 2004, and 49% in 2006. Regarding whether abortion should be legal when the woman wished not to have children, agreement rose from 28% in 2003 to 34% in 2004, and to 39% in 2006. Finally, regarding whether abortion was permissible in cases of contraceptive failure, support increased from 25% in 2003 to 31% in 2004, to 40% in 2006 (Petracci 2007b). This trend suggests that the women's movement's lobby has support in an Argentine society that expresses increasingly liberal positions over time.

Contrasts to Public Opinion in Mexico

While not all women will experience and act on their gender identity in the same way, there are significant trends among Argentine women. Female respondents to the WVS survey and the Romer Poll expressed strong feelings about social problems, namely under- or unemployment, poverty, health, the sexual division of labor, and reproductive rights. They also favored political action outside of traditional institutions, relying on religious organizations, the

women's movement, demonstrations, and grassroots initiatives rather than parties and bureaucracies. Argentine women generally feel more strongly than men about flexible family arrangements and women's rights to employment. These women's preferences, which match the broad categorization of women's interests as wellbeing and rights, are echoed in the Mexican case.

Women and Political Attitudes in Mexico

As in Argentina, there is no statistically significant difference between men's and women's self-placement on the standard 10-point ideological scale. As depicted in Graph 8 (page 35), men and women track closely together, place most of their allegiance at the left, center, and right ends of the political spectrum. This graph reflects the strength of Mexico's three major political parties, with the PRD (*Partido Revolucionario Democrático*) capturing the left, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) constituting a catch-all party that typically leans left or hovers around the center, and the PAN (*Partido Acción Nacional*) capturing the right.[18] This ideological distribution stands in contrast to that for Argentina (Graph 1), where voters' allegiance—as well as parties—clusters around the center.



Nonetheless, in both countries, sex differences in political attitudes cannot be reduced to ideology.

Moving from ideology to priorities does, however, show significant and substantive findings in men's and women's political attitudes. In Mexico, when respondents were asked to choose among a pre-selected list their country's most important objectives (see Table 12), women favored "making cities and the countryside more beautiful" and "giving people more say" more than economic growth; women also chose "progress towards a more humane society" and the "fight against crime" as more important than a stable economy. As in Argentina, Mexican women appear more concerned with rights and well-being (i.e., civic) participation and delinquency) than the economy. These sex differences are all statistically significant below the 1% level. Also significant are the differences on Mexican men's and women's choices for the "most serious problem facing the country." Here, Mexican women selected "people living in poverty and need" *less* than men (55.7% versus 50.5%), which would contradict the hypothesis regarding women's greater orientation to the social, rather than the economic realm. Yet what happened was that female respondents migrated, choosing other social problems as more pressing, especially when compared to men: women named "poor sanitation and infectious diseases" more frequently than men (6.7% compared to 4.9%) as well as "environmental pollution" (10.3% versus 11.7%). Most importantly, women more than men chose "discrimination against women and girls" as the country's most serious problem: 17.1% compared to 11.5%.

Additional evidence from Mexico supports the conclusion that female respondents consider social goals and priorities more than men. While the self-placement scale showed no significant difference in men's and women's responses, several 2005 WVS questions asked in

Mexico did find Mexican women titling to the left (Table 13). When asked whether income distributions should be more equal, or whether larger incomes were necessary for individual incentives, women responded more favorably to income equality than men: 32.2% of women (versus 27.8% of men) endorsed greater income inequality, with only 48.7% for women (versus 55.8% of men), supporting individuals' wealth accumulation. Likewise, women believed more strongly than men that competition harmed society (18.2% of women compared 14.4% of men), that the government (rather than private corporations) should own property (46.5% of women compared to 38.3% of men), and that the government (rather than individuals) should take responsibility for well-being (43.7% of women compared to 36.5% of men). These findings, all statistically significant, show men and women *trend* in the same direction: Mexicans are generally comfortable with income disparities and marketplace competition, divided on the question of government versus individual responsibility for wellbeing, and more positive about government ownership of property. Nonetheless, within these trends, women lean more to the left in terms expressing greater support for equality and social safety nets.

This finding is further supported by World Value Survey data that reveals Mexican women to be more tolerant of disadvantaged, minority, or different individuals. Table B (page 37) depicts the expressed tolerance of 1411 survey respondents who were asked about their feelings towards various societal groups. The first column, "total tolerant," reflects the total percentage of those 1411 respondents, men and women, who expressed tolerance; the second and third columns are the percentages of men and women within those who *were* tolerant. While the resultant sample size is too small for a statistical analysis to confirm the strength of the differences between men and women, the percentages are nonetheless noteworthy: for every group save homosexuals, Mexican women express greater tolerance than Mexican men.[19] In fact,

women's acceptance of heavy drinkers, cohabitating partners (those in *convivencia*), people with AIDS, and people from different religious or linguistic backgrounds outstrips that of men by nine to sixteen percentage points.

Table B. Percentage of Respondents Expressing Tolerance for Difference
2005 World Values Survey Data

Group	**Total Tolerant**	**Women Tolerant**	**Men Tolerant**
Drug Addicts	85.5%	51.0%	49.0%
Heavy Drinkers	55.0%	54.1%	45.9%
Homosexuals	33.0%	**45.8%**	54.2%
Different Religion	15.0%	54.0%	46.0%
Different Language	12.3%	58.0%	42.0%
Living Together without Marriage	10.2%	54.2%	45.8%
People with AIDS	9.1%	52.7%	47.3%

Mexican women also resemble their Argentine counterparts when other trends in political attitudes are considered. First, despite expressing clear preferences for social concerns, Mexican women's levels of political interest are as low as in Argentina. The majority of women and the majority of men are "not very" or "not at all" interested in politics, with women manifesting more disinterest than men: 69.4% of women compared to 63.2% of men (Table 14). Second, Mexican women (like Argentina women) are much more skeptical of traditional political institutions than men (Table 15): 76.7% of women, and 75.4% of men doubt the political parties; 76.9% of women, and 71.9% of men, doubt the legislature; and 58% of women, and 52.5% of men, doubt the government. These findings vary in statistical significant (see Table 15), but generally reflect Mexican citizens' general—and Mexican women's specific—political disillusionment (Zetterberg forthcoming). Indeed, patterns of disenchantment have been noted not simply for Argentina and Mexico, but for Latin America as a whole (add cites).

The third resemblance between Argentine women and Mexican women comes from their attitudes towards religion. Mexican women express overwhelming confidence in the Church, with 86.1% of female respondents regarding the Church optimistically compared to 66.1% of men (Table 15). Women in Mexico also self-identify "as a religious person" more frequently than men (80% versus 70%), and this sex difference is statistically significant below the 1%. Also significant at this level is women's belief that the Church gives answers to moral problems, with 58.7% of women answering affirmatively compared to 51.8% of men. For social problems, both men and women look to the Church less, but again, women still answer more positively than men: 49.5% of women and 43.6% of men believe the Church also gives answers to social problems (Table 16).

Fourth, as in Argentina, Mexican women are more active than men in civic groups organized around religion and charitable or humanitarian concerns. As shown in Table 17 and Graph 9, Mexican men (like Argentine men) are active in environmental organizations more than women. Mexican women (like Argentine women) participate most in groups organized around moral and social well-being.



** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 10% level

Where Argentine women *diverge* from Mexican women is in their political attitudes regarding the women's movement. In Argentina, only 45% of female citizens express confidence in the women's movement, in Mexico, 65% of female citizens express confidence in the women's movement (Table 15). One explanation for this finding—which will have implications later in the agenda setting phase of policymaking—is that the women's movement in Mexico has been less socially divisive than in Argentina. Throughout the 1990s, the Mexican women's movement focused on consensus building, coordinating on policy agendas that were broadly shared and setting aside demands that were contentious. As Tarres explains, women's organizations "decided to maintain an equilibrium between what was politically correct and what was possible" (2006:216). This coordination lead women's demands to focus on policies that advanced equity and fairness, rather than policies that dramatically transformed gender roles (such as abortion liberalization) or vociferously demanded large-scale redistribution or social assistance (as in the *piqueteros* or *cacelorazos*). This "equilibrium" brought women from across the political spectrum—and from the three major parties—into the women's movement, generating greater public acceptability for a movement largely concerned with equity. Importantly, the movement succeeded in drawing attention to the women's lobbying within the political parties, as Mexican women—*like* their Argentine counterparts—firmly believe that women are as competent as men in serving as political leaders (Graph 10, page 40).

Women and Social Attitudes in Mexico

Mexican women's attitudes toward work, family, and children also display balance between demands for equity and the favoring of traditional gender roles. On the one hand, Mexican women identify discrimination against women and girls as one of *the* priorities for

Mexico in the upcoming years; further, Mexican women are also much more tolerant of couples living together outside marriage than are Mexican men (Table B). On the other hand, Mexican women identify equal rights between women and men as an essential characteristic of democracy *less* frequently than men (77.9% of women compared to 81.8% of men; statistically significant below the 5% level, Table 18), and they are *less* likely than men to believe that "marriage is an outdated institution" (Table 19). In response to this latter question on the 2005 WVS survey, 73.6% of Mexican women tended to disagree, compared to 69.1% of Mexican men (statistically significant at the 5% level). One possible explanation for this difference is that marriage may offer women emotional security, financial stability, and cultural acceptance, though such values do not preclude other arrangements (*convivencia*) or demanding fair and equal treatment based on sex.



Significant at the 1% level

Additional questions about children and careers highlight the ambivalence of Mexican women further (Table 19). Mexican women and men largely approve of women choosing to have children when not in relationships with men, with no noticeable difference in the proportions of male and female respondents (60.7% and 60.9%). When the question is asked

with alternative phrasing, however, a notable difference between men and women appears. Both sexes largely agree that "a child needs a home with a mother and a father," though Mexican women agree *less* strongly than Mexican men: 80.5% of women agree compared to 87.4% of men, a different statistically significant well below the 1% level. Thus, Mexican women approve of *convivencia*, but also in marriage; they approve of women's choices to have children even without male partners, but continue to support dual-parent, heterosexual households. Support for non-traditional family arrangements appears less strong among Mexican women than among Argentine women.

When looking at questions about careers and families, these patterns of ambivalence continue. Nearly seventy-seven percent of Mexican women "strongly agree" or "agree" that "having a career is great but being a housewife is just as fulfilling, compared to 70.2% of Mexican men, a statistically significant difference below the 1% level (Table 19). These findings were stronger than in Argentina, where women agreed less strongly than their Mexican counterparts. Nonetheless, Mexican women do not view the equal weight assigned to being a housewife as undercutting their ability to pursue educations and careers, should they choose (Table 20). When asked agree or disagree with the statement, "when jobs are scarce, men have more right to jobs than woman," female respondents in Mexico disagreed at 70.8%, compared to male respondents who disagreed at 64% (statistically significant below the 5% level). Female respondents also objected more strenuously that "men make better business executives than women," with 80.5% of women disagreeing or disagreeing strongly, compared to 74.2% of men (statistically significant below the 1% level). Finally, Mexican women also protest more vigorously than men when asked if a university education is more important for a boy than a girl:

76.2% of women, and 73.8% of men, disagree or disagree strongly (statistically significant below the 10% level).

These findings suggest that Mexican women share similar political attitudes to Argentine women, namely in their privileging of social problems (i.e., civic participation and beautification) and social justice (i.e., greater income inequality and less individual competition for success). Yet, Mexican women appear more ambivalent than Argentine women in the choosing between "traditional" and "modern" gender roles: while the acceptance of women's education, leadership, and careerism is widespread, this acceptance coexists with strong positive feelings about motherhood and homemaking. The public opinion data analyzed here thus coincides with other scholars' discussion of the greater conservatism of Mexican women compared to their counterparts elsewhere in Latin America (add cites), as well as the widespread appeal of the conservative PAN party among many Mexican women. Indeed, one women legislator from the PAN described her responsibility as "representing the interests for all those women who choose to stay at home and be housewives because that's what they want."[20] This statement from the PAN's female leadership reinforces the observation that women's groups and women's party caucuses in Mexico have coordinated on policy demands that set-aside radical "feminist" demands and focus instead on equity and non-discrimination.

Conclusion

During in-person interviews I conducted in Argentina and Mexico, male politicians argue that women fail to participate in traditional political institutions—governments and parliaments—because they prioritized families and household matters. One Argentine politician, describing a networking breakfast he hosted for a senator, justified the attendance of 1 congresswoman and 17 congressmen as evidence that "women simply didn't care about

politics."[21] Turnout at off-hour meetings indeed decreases due to women's domestic responsibilities: in interviews and conversations, Argentine and Mexican women, whether public officials or private citizens, overwhelmingly cite childcare and housework as *the* barrier to seeking political office or undertaking political activism. The *doble jornada* may partially explain why women show less political interest and more infrequent political participation when compared to men, but it also explains why women's activism is concentrated in the social realm: drives for gender equity transform gender roles, create more choices for women, and improve women's ability to engage and construct their communities.

From the *doble jornada* to beliefs that "men make better political leaders than women," women lack the same opportunities as men to enter electoral politics. For those women who *do* enter traditional institutions, politics offers not merely the prospect of professional development, but the chance to further transform social policies in directions that improve women's and society's wellbeing. Female legislators in Argentina have run for office because the *carcerolazos* showed them how poor women desperately needed access to food and medicine, or because they were longtime activists in the human rights movement that brought down the dictatorship. Female legislators in Mexico firmly believe in creating equal opportunities for men and women to participate in society and politics.[22] These reasons all represent women's desire to solve social problems; while individual legislator's stories vary, the theme remains the same. The next chapters address this point.

Endnotes

[1] See http://unifem.sitiosur.cl/actividad.php?PID=447. The conference formed part of a larger, ongoing series of workshops throughout Buenos Aires entitled *Ciudades seguras sin violencia contra las mujeres; Ciudades seguras para todas"* (http://www.redmujer.org.ar/inf_arg.html).

[2] World Values Survey data can be downloaded on the website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. The 1999 Graciela C. Romer & Associates election poll was downloaded from the Latin American Databank archived by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[3] Whenever direct comparisons between 1999 and 2006 are not made, the default assumption is that the same question was not asked in the two survey years.
[4] Simply speaking, statistical significance is the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In this instance, the test is whether men and women diverge in their ideological self-placement; the hypothesis is that *yes*, men and women diverge, and the null hypothesis is that *no*, men and women do not diverge. Because the finding is *not* statistically significant, the null hypothesis—that there is *no* difference between men and women—is likely to be true. Since the null cannot be rejected with 10%, 5%, or 1% confidence, there is no finding. When a finding *is* statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, it means the null hypothesis will only be true at that infrequent rate, meaning the hypothesis is likely to be true.
[5] Note that the World Values Survey did not order the questions one, two, three, four, five, and six. I drew these (and other) questions from among the roughly 700 questions asked by the WVS. I then organized the selected questions into categories relevant for the analysis in this chapter. All numbering schemes (all ordering of questions within categories) is my own.
[6] Answers coded as social were as follows: quality of life, drug consumption, social situation/poverty, public security/delinquency, healthcare, justice system, education, human rights/freedom of the press, environmental pollution. Answers coded as economic were as follows: taxes and tariffs, salaries, dealing with pensioners, inflation, tax evasion, recession, unemployment, government corruption.
[7] Age range and household income are categorical variables, with 5 categories for age (18-20, 21-29, 30-39, 40-54 55-70) and 11 categories for household income (beginning with less than 250 pesos/month and ending with more than 7500 pesos/month). Zone is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent lives in Greater Buenos Aires and 2 if the respondent lives in the provinces.
[8] Conversation with statistics experts at the University of California, San Diego.
[9] In 1999, Thirty three percent of women attend Church at least once a week, compared to 15% of men, and 34% of women *never* attend Church, compared to 47% of men; these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The trend continues in 2005, with 27.6% of women attending church at least once a week, compared to 14.3% of men, and only 19.7% of women never attending Church, compared to 38.5% of men. The sex differences are against statistically significant below the 1% level.
[10] For social problems, statistical significance is just above the 10% level for 1999 and below the 1% level for 2005. For moral problems, the 1999 data is statistically significant and the 2005 data is not; the responses, however, continue to trend in the same direction: women believe the church provides better guidance for moral problems, with 58% of women answering affirmatively in 1999 (compared to 50% of men), and 58% of women answering affirmatively in 2005 (compared to 62% of men).
[11] Interview with female legislators, Argentine, May and June 2009.
[12] Interview with feminist activist, Córdoba, Argentina, June 2009.
[13] See Trigona: http://americas.irc-online.org/citizen-action/focus/0211argentine.html. For an overview of the *piquteros* as of 2002, see the *World Press Review* (December 2002): http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/789.cfm.
[14] See Trigona. Also see http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/29/32/. For a social history of some of the factory takeovers, see Ranis (2006).
[15] http://www.clarin.com/diario/2000/02/06/o-02201d.htm
[16] Interviewees and journalists alike often refer to "*hombres machistas*" (macho men) or "*hombres tradicionales*" (traditional men) when discussing men's reaction to women's professional success.
[17] http://www.mujeresdeempresa.com/blog/?p=219
[18] Add footnote on ideology of PRI in1990s and 2000s
[19] An analysis performed on another WVS question, which asked whether homosexuality was justifiable, showed no statistically significant difference in men's and women's beliefs on this point.
[20] Interview conducted in Mexico City, December 2009.
[21] Interview conducted in Buenos Aires, September 2005.
[22] Interview with legislator for the city of Buenos Aires, August 2005; Interview with PRI federal legislator, August 2005; Interviews in Mexico City, December 2009.

Appendix

Table 1A – Sex Differences in Political Priorities from Among Predetermined Outcomes, Argentina
1999 World Values Survey

1. Which among the following should be the country's top priority?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
High economic growth	56.6% (332)	49.7% (333)	
People have more say in politics	29.0% (170)	33.2% (222)	
Strong defense forces	8.6% (50)	9% (60)	
Making cities and countryside beautiful	5.7% (33)	8.1% (54)	7.28 Pr = 0.063
Total	100% (586)	100% (670)	Sig at <10%
2. In your opinion, which is the most important goal?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A stable economy	54% (318)	50.7% (339)	
The fight against crime	21.2% (125)	19.9% (142)	
Progress towards a more humane society	16.9% (100)	21.3% (142)	
Ideas count more than money	7.9% (47)	8.1% (54)	3.87 Pr = 0.276
Total	1005 (589)	100% (669)	Not Significant
3. In your opinion, which is the most important goal for the nation?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Maintaining order in the nation	35% (207)	32% (214)	
Giving people more say	30.9% (183)	29.6% (198)	
Fighting rising prices	16% (95)	19% (127)	
Protecting freedom of speech	18.1% (107)	19.4% (130)	2.86 Pr = 0.414
Total	100% (591)	100% (670)	Not Significant
4. We should give economic aid to poor countries.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
More than we do now.	4.3% (23)	2.9% (17)	
About the same as we do now.	17.8% (95)	17.6% (106)	
Less than we do now.	77.7% (410)	79.5% (479)	2.02 Pr=0.364
Total	100% (528)	100% (602)	Not Significant
5. Choose between strengthening our economy or protecting our environment?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Protect the environment	46% (255)	44.3% (275)	
Promote economic growth and create jobs	38.1% (211)	38.2% (237)	
Other answer (dislike two choices)	15.8% (88)	17.4% (108)	0.596 Pr=0.742
Total	100% (553)	100% (620)	Not Significant
6. Our country respects individual human rights.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A lot of respect	7% (41)	2.6% (17)	
Some respect	19.8% (116)	14.7% (96)	
Not much respect	51.3% (302)	55.3% (362)	
No respect at all	21.9% (129)	27.3% (179)	21.911 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (588)	100% (653)	Sig at < 1%

Table 1B – Sex Differences in Political Priorities among Pre-Determined Priorities, Argentina
2006 World Values Survey Data

Which among the following should be the country's top priority?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
High economic growth	62.3% (280)	59.9% (301)	
People have more say in politics	8.1% (36)	8.1% (41)	
Strong defense forces	22.8% (102)	28.1% (141)	
Making cities and countryside beautiful	6.8% (31)	3% (20)	6.674 Pr=-0.083
Total	100% (449)	199% (503)	Significant <10%
In your opinion, which is the most important goal?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Maintaining order in the nation	36.7% (170)	27.8% (144)	
Giving people more say	21.3% (98)	26.8% (140)	
Fighting rising prices	28.1% (134)	33.7% (175)	
Protecting freedom of speech	12.9% (60)	11.6% (60)	11.734 Pr=0.008
Total	100% (462)	100% (519)	Significant <1%
How much respect is there for human rights nowadays?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A lot of respect	7.9% (36)	9% (46)	
Some respect	33.5% (152)	27.5% (139)	
Not much respect	45.9% (209)	48.4% (245)	
No respect at all	12.7% (58)	15.2% (77)	5.438 Pr=0.142
Total	100% (455)	100% (507)	Not significant

Table 2 – Sex Differences in Confidence in the Women's Movement, Argentina
2006 World Values Survey Data

How much confidence do you have in the women's movement?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	4.1% (15)	3% (13)	
Quite a lot	28.3% (101)	42.6% (179)	
Not very much	39.6% (141)	34.3% (144)	
None at all	28% (100)	20% (84)	18.3066 Pr=0.00
Total	100% (357)	100% (420)	Significant at <1%

Table 3 – Sex Differences in Political Interest, Argentina – 1999 World Values Survey Data

How interested are you in politics?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Very interested	6.5% (39)	5.8% (39)	
Somewhat interested	12.2% (73)	12.2% (82)	
Not very interested	35.1% (209)	29.5% (198)	
Not at all interested	46.1% (274)	52.5% (353)	6.1167 Pr = 0.106
Total	100% (595)	100% (672)	Sig at 10%
How often do you follow politics in the news?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Every day	50% (298)	45.7% (309)	
Several times a week	14.1% (84)	13.9% (94)	
Once for twice a week	11% (66)	9.4% (64)	
Less Often	14% (83)	16.5% (112)	
Never	10.9% (65)	14.6% (99)	8.7130 Pr = 0.069
Total	100% (596)	100% (677)	Sig at <10%
How often do you discuss politics with friends?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Frequently	20.5% (120)	17% (113)	
Occasionally	35.5% (208)	30.1% (200)	
Never	44% (258)	53% (353)	10.0673 Pr = 0.007
Total	100% (586)	100% (666)	Sig at <1%

Table 4A – Sex Differences in Political Participation, Argentina – 1999 World Values Survey

Attend a lawful demonstration	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have do	13.8% (80)	12.7% (83)	
Might do	24.4% (141)	21.7% (142)	
Would never do	61.8% (357)	65.6% (429)	1.9734 Pr = 0.373
Total	100% (578)	100% (654)	Not Significant
Join an unofficial strike	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have do	6.5% (37)	4.3% (28)	
Might do	10.3% (59)	10% (65)	
Would never do	83.2% (478)	85.8% (558)	2.8855 Pr = 0.236
Total	100% (574)	100% (650)	Not Significant
Participate in a boycott	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have do	2.9% (16)	1.2% (7)	
Might do	8.9% (49)	5.76% (36)	
Would never do	88.2% (484)	93.1% (580)	9.5373 Pr = 0.008
Total	100% (549)	100% (623)	Significant at <1%
Occupying buildings or factories	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have do	2.4% (14)	1.3% (8)	
Might do	10.7% (62)	7.7% (50)	
Would never do	86.9% (500)	91% (591)	6.1841 Pr = 0.045
Total	100% (575)	100% (649)	Significant at <5%

Table 4B – Sex Differences in Political Participation, Argentina – 2006 World Values Survey

Would you take the following political action: signing a petition?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	25.7% (111)	29.4% (142)	
Might do	39.6% (170)	38.9% (188)	
Would never do	34.5% (148)	31.7% (153)	1.595 Pr=0.451
Total	100% (429)	100% (483)	Not significant
Would you take the following political action: join a boycott?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	2.9% (13)	3.2% (15)	
Might do	18.9% (82)	12.1% (57)	
Would never do	78.2% (338)	84.7% (400)	8.183 Pr=0.017
Total	100% (433)	100% (472)	Not significant
Would you take the following political action: attending a lawful demonstration?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	16.9% (74)	18% (88)	
Might do	40.5% (178)	39.9% (196)	
Would never do	42.6% (187)	42.1% (207)	0.1845 Pr=.912
Total	100% (439)	100% (491)	Not significant
Of your most recent political actions, have you signed a petition?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	25.4% (119)	27.8% (142)	
Have not done	74.6% (348)	72.2% (369)	0.6637 Pr=0.413
Total	100% (467)	100% (511)	Not significant
Of your most recent political actions, have you joined a boycott?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	2.3% (11)	3% (15)	
Have not done	97.7% (454)	97.3% (495)	0.3105 Pr=0.577
Total	100% (465)	100% (510)	Not significant
Of your most recent political actions, have you attended a lawful demonstration?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Have done	17% (79)	19% (97)	
Have not done	83% (384)	81% (414)	0.605 Pr=0.437
Total	100% (463)	100% (511)	Not significant

Table 5 – Sex Differences in Community Participation, Argentina – 2006 World Values Survey

Active Inactive Member of Environmental Organization	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	91.6% (433)	91.1% (482)	
Inactive member	5.9% (28)	8% (42)	
Active member	2.5% 912)	0.9% (5)	5.193 Pr=0.075
Total	100% (473)	100% (529)	Signifcant <10%
Active/Inactive Member of Church or Religious Organization	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	67.2% (318)	54.6% (289)	
Inactive member	19.8% (94)	24.9% (132)	
Active member	13.1% (62)	20.6% (109)	17.624 Pr=0.00
Total	100% (473)	100% (529)	Significant <1%
Active/Inactive Member of Charitable/Humanitarian Organization	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	90.4% (328)	84% (444)	
Inactive member	6.5% (31)	8.5% (45)	
Active member	5.4% (14)	6.5% (40)	12.230 Pr=0.002
Total	100% (473)	100% (529)	Significant <1%
A person who "helps others nearby is…."	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Much like me	61.9%(287)	60% (363)	
Somewhat like me	32.8% (152)	25.5% (132)	
Not like	5.2% (24)	4.6% (24)	7.124 Pr=0.028
Total	100% (464)	100% (519)	Significant <5%

Table 6 – Sex Differences in Favoring Education for Boys versus Girls, Argentina
2006 World Values Survey

University is more important for a boy than for a girl	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	3% (13)	2.9% (15)	
Agree	15.7% (70)	8.8% (45)	
Disagree	53.6% (240)	48.8% (249)	
Strongly disagree	27.6% (123)	39.4% (201)	20.328 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (447)	100% (511)	Significant <1%

Table 7 – Sex Differences in Naming Argentina's Top Priority – 2006 World Values Survey

What is the most serious problem facing your own country?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
People living in poverty and needs	75.5% (350)	70.7% (367)	
Discrimination against girls and women	1.9% (9)	2.2% (11)	
Poor sanitation and infectious diseases	4.9% (23)	7.5% (39)	
Inadequate education	14% (65)	16.7% (87)	
Environmental Pollution	3.7% (17)	3% (16)	4.775 Pr=0.311
Total	100% (463)	100% (518)	Not significant

Table 8 – Sex Differences in Values about Family and Work, Argentina – 2006 World Values Survey

A job is okay, but being a housewife is just as fulfilling.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	22.8% (86)	29.5% (148)	
Agree	47.5% (376)	33% (165)	
Disagree	23.9% (90)	27.5% (138)	
Strongly disagree	5.8% (22)	10% (50)	20.896 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (376)	100% (500)	Significant <1%
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than woman.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree	32.1% (148)	23.7% (123)	
Disagree	52.6% (242)	66.6% (344)	
Neither	15.3% (70)	9.7% (50)	20.137 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (460)	100% (517)	Significant <1%

Table 9 – Sex Differences in Societal Values about Women's Incomes, Argentina
1999 World Values Survey

1. Women and men should contribute equally to household income	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	26.2% (152)	31.1% (206)	
Agree	59.9% (347)	63.2% (418)	
Disagree	12.9% (75)	5.3% (35)	
Strongly disagree	1% (6)	0.3% (2)	26.1046 Pr = 0.00
Total	100% (579)	100% (661)	Significant at <1%
2. Problem if women have more income than their husbands	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	9.6% (45)	13.7% (73)	
Agree	28.5% (134)	35.7% (189)	
Disagree	50.7% (238)	42% (223)	
Strongly disagree	11.2% (53)	8.5% (45)	13.596 Pr=0.004
Total	100% (469)	100% (529)	Significant at <1%

Table 10 – Sex Differences in Societal Values about Female-Headed Households, Argentina
1999 and 2006 World Values Survey Data

1. A woman may have children when not in a relationship with a man (1999)	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Disapprove	32.6% (187)	28.2% (187)	
Approve	57.8% (331)	64.5% (428)	
Depends	9.6% (55)	7.3% (48)	6.35 Pr=0.042
Total	100% (573)	100% (663)	Significant at <5%
2. Children need home with father and mother to grow up happy (1999)	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Disagree	6.3% (37)	10.9% (73)	
Agree	93.7% (554)	89.1% (595)	8.96 Pr=0.003
Total	100% (591)	100% (667)	Significant at <1%
3. A woman may have children when not in a relationship with a man (2006)	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Approve	58.2% (264)	69.6% (358)	
Disapprove	33.4% (151)	24.2% (124)	
Depends	8.3% (38)	6.2% (32)	13.577 Pr=0.001
Total	100% (452)	100% (514)	Significant <1%

Table 11A – Public Opinion on Abortion in Cases of Rape and Health, Argentina
2006 Survey Data from Four Argentine Cities (source: Petracci 7007a)

A women can interrupt her pregnancy (abort) if…	Agree	Disagree	Neutral/RTS
….she is mentally ill and has been raped.	88%	7%	5%
…she is less than 15 years old and has been raped.	83%	11%	6%
….*she has been raped.*	83%	12%	5%
…the fetus will be born with a severe birth defect.	83%	8%	9%
*….the women's **life** is in danger during birth.*	83%	8%	9%
*….women's **health** is in danger during birth.*	79%	11%	10%
*… the women's **mental health** is in danger from birth and childrearing.*	70%	21%	9%

Table 11B – Public Opinion on the Non-Therapeutic Interruption of Pregnancy, Argentina
2003, 2004, and 2006 Survey Data from Buenos Aires (source: Petracci 2007b)

I agree that a woman can interrupt her pregnancy (abort) if…	**2003**	**2004**	**2006**
…she and her family lack the economic resources to raise a child.	30%	39%	49%
…she does not want to have children at this moment in her life.	28%	34%	39%
…she became pregnant because she used contraceptives, but the contraceptives failed.	25%	31%	40%

Table 12. Sex Differences in Political Priorities, Mexico
2005 World Values Survey Data

1. Which among the following should be the country's top priority?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
High economic growth	55% (418)	49.6% (383)	
Strong defense forces	5.4% (41)	6.5% (50)	
People have more say in politics	30.9% (233)	31.7% (245)	
Making cities and countryside beautiful	8.3% (63)	12.2% (94)	8.6535 Pr=0.034
Total	100% (755)	100% (772)	Significant <5%
2. In your opinion, which is the most important goal?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A stable economy	47.1% (357)	39.2% (205)	
Progress towards a more humane society	14.6% (111)	16.3% (127)	
Ideas count more than money	9.1% (69)	9.9% (77)	
The fight against crime	29.2% (221)	34.7% (270)	43.3021 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (758)	100% (779)	Significant <1%
3. In your opinion, which is the most serious problem for the nation?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
People living in poverty and need	55.7% (423)	50.5% (390)	
Discrimination against women & girls	11.5% (87)	17.1% (132)	
Poor sanitation & infectious diseases	4.9% (37)	6.7% (52)	
Inadequate education	17.7% (134)	14.0% (108)	
Environmental pollution	10.3% (78)	11.7% (90)	15.927 Pr=0.003
Total	100% (759)	100% (772)	Significant <1%

Table 13. Sex Differences in Response to Left-Right Ideological Questions, Mexico
2005 World Values Survey Data

Income Distribution	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
More equal	27.8% (209)	32.2% (242)	
Neutral	16.4% (123)	19.1% (144)	
Larger incomes necessary for incentives	55.8% (419)	48.7% (366)	7.6440 Pr=0.022
Total	100% (751)	100% (752)	Significant <5%
Competition	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Competition is good	72.8% (555)	67.1% (510)	
Neutral	12.7% (97)	14.7% (112)	
Competition is harmful	14.4% (110)	18.2% (138)	6.147 Pr =0.046
Total	100% (762)	100% (760)	Significant <5%
Property Ownership	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Private ownership of businesses should increase	38% (280)	29.9% (214)	
Neutral	23.7% (175)	23.6% (169)	
Government ownership of businesses should increase	38.3% (282)	46.5% (333)	12.851 Pr=0.002
Total	100% (737)	100% (716)	Significant <1%
Responsibility for Wellbeing	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Government should take more responsibility	36.5% (274)	43.7% (331)	
Neutral	20.4% (153)	19% (144)	
People should take more responsibility	43.1% (323)	37.3% (283)	8.241 Pr=0.016
Total	100% (750)	100% (758)	Significant at 10%

Table 14. Sex Differences in Political Interest, Mexico
2005 World Values Survey Data

How interested are you in politics?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Very interested	9.3% (71)	7.8% (61)	
Somewhat interested	27.6% (211)	22.8% (178)	
Not very interested	34% (260)	35% (273)	
Not at all interested	29.2% (223)	34.4% (269)	8.0102 Pr=0.045
Total	100% (765)	100% (781)	Significant <5%

Table 15. Sex Difference in Confidence Levels for Political and Social Institutions, Mexico
2005 World Values Survey Data

How much confidence have in political parties?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	3.8% (29)	3.1% (24)	
Quite a lot	20.7% (157)	20.2% (156)	
Not very much	35.8% (271)	36.7% (284)	
None at all	39.6% (300)	40% (309)	0.7542 Pr=0.863
Total	100% (757)	100% (773)	Not Significant
How much confidence do you have in the legislature?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	5% (38)	2.5% (19)	
Quite a lot	23.2% (174)	20.5% (158)	
Not very much	37.7% (285)	36.9% 285)	
None at all	34.2% (258)	40.2% (310)	11.6772 Pr=0.009
Total	100% (755)	100% (772)	Significant <1%
How much confidence do you have in the government?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	11.1% (84)	10.5% (81)	
Quite a lot	36.4% (277)	31.5% (243)	
Not very much	34.1% (259)	35.7% (275)	
None at all	18.4% (140)	22.3% (172)	5.9603 Pr=0.114
Total	100% (760)	100% (771)	No
How much confidence do you have in the Church?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	33.9% (260)	42.9% (338)	
Quite a lot	32.1% (246)	31.6% (249)	
Not very much	23.4% (179)	17.4% (137)	
None at all	10.6% (81)	8.1% (64)	17.4595 Pr=0.001
Total	100% (766)	100% (788)	Significant <1%
How much confidence do you have in the women's movement?	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
A great deal	20.7% (156)	25.2% (194)	
Quite a lot	43.4% (327)	39.8% (307)	
Not very much	24.3% (183)	23.6% (182)	
None at all	11.6% (87)	11.4% (88)	4.553 Pr=0.208
Total	100% (753)	100% (771)	Not Significant

Table 16. Reliance on the Church, Mexico – 2005 World Values Survey Data

The church gives answers to moral problems	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
No	46.5% (355)	38.5% (304)	
Yes	51.8% (395)	58.7% (464)	
Maybe	1.7% (13)	2.8% (22)	18.3752 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (763)	100% (790)	Significant <1%
The Church gives answers to social problems	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
No	55% (420)	48% (378)	
Yes	43.6% (333)	49.% (390)	
Maybe	1.4% (11)	2.5% (20)	8.9495 Pr=0.011
Total	100% (764)	100% (788)	Significant at 10%

Table 17. Membership in Civic Organizations, Mexico – 2005 World Values Survey Data

Active Inactive Member of Charitable/Humanitarian	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	76.8% (581)	76% (586)	
Inactive member	10.2% (77)	9% (66)	
Active member	13.1% (99)	15% (118)	2.4207 Pr=0.298
Total	100% (757)	100% (770)	Not Significant
Active/Inactive Member of Church or Religious Organization	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	36% (276)	26% (201)	
Inactive member	29% (218)	26% (201)	
Active member	35% (265)	48% (374)	30.890 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (759)	100% (776)	Significant <1%
Active/Inactive Member of Environmental Organization	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Not a member	85% (643)	89% (686)	
Inactive member	8% (63)	6% (45)	
Active member	7% (51)	5% (42)	5.0955 Pr=0.078
Total	100% (757)	100% (773)	Significant <10%

Table 18. Equal Rights Between Men and Women as an Essential Characteristic of Democracy, Mexico 2005 World Values Survey Data

Women and men holding the same rights is an essential characteristic of democracy.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Yes	81.8% (737)	77.9% (573)	
Maybe	7.5% (55)	7.3% (54)	
No	10.9% (79)	14.8% (109)	5.5109 Pr=0.064
Total	100% (737)	100% (737)	Significant <10%

Table 19. Attitudes about Work and Family, Mexico – 2005 World Values Survey Data

1. Marriage is an outdated institution.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Tend to agree	30.8% (232)	26.4% (203)	
Tend to disagree	69.1% (520)	73.6% (567)	3.753 Pr=0.053
Total	100% (752)	100% (770)	Significant At 5%
2. A woman wants to have a child when not in a relationship with a man.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Approve	60.7% (464)	60.9% (478)	
Disapprove	33.4% (255)	32.9% (258)	
Depends	5.9% (45)	6.2% (49)	0.111 Pr=0.946
Total	100% (764)	100% (785)	Not Significant
3. Child needs a home with a father and a mother to grow up happy.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Tend to agree	87.4% (666)	80.5% (629)	
Tend to disagree	12.6% (96)	19.5% (152)	13.470 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (762)	100% (781)	Significant <1%
4. Having a career is great, but being a housewife is just as fulfilling	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Strongly Agree	13.4% (98)	23.3% (181)	
Agree	56.8% (416)	53.5% (416)	
Strongly Disagree	27.3% (200)	19.9% (155)	
Disagree	2.6% (19)	3.2% (25)	29.958 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (733)	100% (777)	Significant <1%

Table 20. Attitudes about Education and Careers, Mexico – 2005 World Values Survey Data

1. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than woman.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree	27.1% (207)	23.6% (185)	
Disagree	64% (491)	70.8% (555)	
Neither	8.5% (65)	5.6% (44)	8.9130 Pr=0.012
Total	100% (763)	100% (784)	Significant <5%
2. University is more important for a boy than for a girl	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	3.6% (27)	3.7% (28)	
Agree	22.5% (168)	20.2% (154)	
Disagree	59.5% (444)	36.8% (434)	
Strongly disagree	14.3% (107)	19.4% (148)	7.1194 Pr=0.068
Total	100% (746)	100% (764)	Significant <10%
3. Men make better business executives than woman.	**Men**	**Women**	**Chi^2 Test Results**
Agree strongly	3.5% (26)	3% (24)	
Agree	22.4% (166)	16.3% (125)	
Disagree	61.9% (459)	59% (452)	
Strongly disagree	12.3% (91)	21.5% (165)	26.9250 Pr=0.000
Total	100% (742)	100% (766)	Significant <1%

Jennifer M. Piscopo
Chapter 3
Setting Agendas for Women: Bill Introduction in Argentina and Mexico

Introduction

This chapter offers a deeper exploration of what counts as women's substantive representation. Recent theorizing has focused on which policy areas dovetail with women's interests (the "content" of WSR), and which legislative activities indicate that women's substantive representation has occurred (the "form" of WSR) (cf. Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo 2009). Since all reforms are initially placed on the legislative agenda, I examine bill introduction as the form of women's substantive representation. Further, I take an innovative methodological approach to analyze content. Rather than preselecting policy areas as falling inside or outside a women's interests rubric, I triple-code *all* bills introduced in the Argentine Congress as follows: (1) by policy area; (2) by whether or not the proposal addresses gender issues and/or treats women as beneficiaries; and (3) by the precise women's policy issue the proposal addresses. The second coding and the third coding offer specific information about the content of women's interests. This strategy makes new contributions to the study of women's substantive representation. I show not only how frequently female and male legislators represent women, but how the content of women-centered proposals compares across issues and over time.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline a research agenda on substantive representation and review the logic for selecting the Mexican and the Argentine cases. Second, I present my data, model, and results from the Argentine case. Third, I present data from the Mexican case, developing a comparison between agenda setting activity in the two countries. I conclude with a discussion of qualitative evidence from Mexico, to illuminate why the *level* of

agenda setting for women, as well as the *content* of these agendas, differs in the two countries. Critical for determining the nature of WSR is the extent of collaboration among female legislators as well as the programmatic coherence of the political parties.

A Research Agenda on Women's Substantive Representation

While earlier debates on women's substantive representation raised important concerns about essentialism, most scholars accept that differences in the social construction of gender lend validity to conceiving of women as a distinct group. Philips (1995) and Mansbridge (1999) theorize that women's shared experiences of socialization and marginalization lead to shared interests that—while subject to debate and contestation—can nonetheless be represented in politics. In general, scholars can discuss aggregate trends in the identities, preferences, and behaviors of women without claiming that *all* women are essentially alike.

Comparative studies thus reveal broad evidence for women's substantive representation in both agenda setting and floor voting. Jones (1997) shows that female legislators in Argentina and the United States more frequently introduce bills that favor women's rights, children, and families; Schwindt-Bayer reports the same results using data from Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica (2006). Additional studies from Latin America show Argentine female legislators' greater activity on questions of violence against women, sexual harassment, affirmative action, and reproductive rights (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008), as well as Mexican female legislators' greater concern with domestic violence and equality policy (Beer 2008). Scandinavian female politicians are more likely than men to prioritize maintaining the welfare state, protecting the environment, and promoting gender equality (Raaum 2005). Evidence from Canada and New Zealand shows that, as women gain more access to parliaments, they become more active on policy questions of child care, parental leave, pay equity, and domestic violence (Trimble 1997;

Grey 2002). Likewise, in Russia, female members of the Dumas vote in favor of legislation on women, children, and families more than male legislators (Schevchenko 2002). United States congresswomen are more concerned with women's health than congressmen (Swers 2002).

In general, issues such as family leave, environmental protection, breast cancer, and pay equity are salient concerns in developed welfare states. In India, where the infrastructure and the economy are less-developed, women's interests address basic needs: rural women are responsible for water portage, and female (but not male) mayors respond by distributing public goods such as pumps (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). In countries where customary laws or religious doctrines have influenced civil statutes, female legislators have demanded the equal treatment of the sexes. For instance, female politicians in Rwanda overturned restrictions on women's property ownership (Devlin and Elgie 2008), and women MPs in Turkey argued for nondiscriminatory divorce and adultery laws (Ayata and Tütüncü 2008). Finally, specific policy crises can affect the shape of women's interests, as in Africa, where women's legislative presence has generated public health policies more sensitive to the feminization of HIV transmission (Bauer and Britton 2006).

A common pattern thus appears wherein female legislators in the developed and developing world are more likely than male legislators to address children and families, gender equality, violence against women, welfare, and sexual health and reproductive rights. The specific content of these issues, however, varies according to states' level of economic development, degree of democratization, and extent of preexisting gender equality. These divergences highlight how women's representation may depend not on an "essentialist" vision wherein women's identities and preferences are equivalent across time and space, but on contextual factors such as domestic institutions, policy norms, and issue salience.

Studying women's representation, then, poses an array of theoretical and methodological questions. First, many studies select on the dependent variable. Schevchenko (2002), for example, looked exclusively at Russian legislators' roll-call votes on bills that addressed the welfare state, domestic caretaking, pornography and the environment. Methodological choices such as these, while grounded in theories of the social construction of gender, lack a reference category: that is, how do female and male legislators compare when advocating for policies that do *not* implicate women? Scholars wonder whether the excluded policy areas might reveal additional information about WSR: perhaps, for instance, female members of the Russian Dumas *also* care about nuclear proliferation. Second, other studies—particularly those relying on qualitative interviews, such as Devlin and Elgie's pioneering work on Rwanda—have examined the activities of only women legislators. As with selecting on the dependent variable, artificially restricting the independent variable means an inability to truly claim that female legislators' activities differ from those of men, or that male legislators rarely (or never) represent women.

Still other theorists worry about assuming an ideological conformity among female legislators. A frequent criticism of the women's substantive representation literature is that scholars hold an explicit or implicit normative bias in favor of progressive women's issues. For example, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) counted those proposals that expanded access to reproductive health services as women's substantive representation; they did *not* count proposals that prohibited reproductive choice. While feminist scholars may be reluctant to include retrograde policies under the rubric of WSR, the fact remains that conservative female politicians *do* influence women's rights and wellbeing, often in response to demands made by conservative female voters. Celis et al. argue for studying "who acts for women's substantive representation" as well as "how is women's substantive representation expressed" (2008). This question can be

nuanced further, by asking about the *direction* of this action: does the expression of WSR entail the liberalization of women's opportunities or the reification of traditional gender roles?

Moreover, scholars have worried that consequentialist expectations place high demands on female legislators' successes. Focusing on female legislators' undertaking of women's substantive representation has unintentionally created the normative impression that advancing women's interests is *all* female legislators do (or ought to do). Yet securing reforms that benefit female constituents does not simply depend on female legislators' numbers and commitments; such achievements are further conditioned by competing policy priorities, local norms, party identification, legislative hierarchies, and other myriad cultural and institutional features of the policymaking process (Childs and Krook 2006; Grey 2006; Beckwith 2007). The social construction of gender cannot be the only factor predicting whether, and how frequently, some or all female legislators engage in the substantive representation of women.

Finally, setting agendas is not the same as changing policies, though scholars frequently substitute either bill introduction or roll call votes as measures of WSR. This conflation of two distinct policymaking moments has led Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) to distinguish between substantive representation as *process* (that is, setting agendas for women) and substantive representation as *outcome* (that is, actually changing laws). Other scholars emphasize that the "form" of WSR can include other process-related policymaking moments, such as participating in floor debates, questioning committee witnesses, and holding press conferences (Celis et al. 2008). When choosing what form of women's substantive representation to study, scholars stress the need for in-depth knowledge about cases (Beckwith 2007).

My study of Argentina and Mexico focuses on this process-related aspect of women's substantive representation. I examine agenda setting activity, operationalized as bill

introduction. This approach addresses several of the theoretical and methodological concerns delineated in the extant literature: designing tests consistent with the interior logic of the case; evaluating the legislative activities of male *and* female politicians, while controlling for party hierarchy, party identification, and legislative specialization; and examining policy advocacy across all thematic categories, irrespective of gender content. I discuss these advantages in the next section.

Case Selection and Approach

Argentina and Mexico rank among the top countries in the world for the number of women seated in the legislature. Their prominence is due principally to the adoption of legislative gender quotas. Now in place in over 100 countries worldwide, gender quotas—either at the party or legislative-level—constitute the most widespread electoral reform of the 20th Century (Krook 2009). In Latin America, gender quotas have principally been adopted via parliamentary statute, making the provisions binding on all parties competing in the election. Democratizing states, and the male elites who governed them, became persuaded to adopt these measures by female policy entrepreneurs. These advocates capitalized on the following contextual factors: (1) the institutional flux brought about by deepening democratization and heightened electoral competition; (2) discourses about the centrality of rights and participation to democratization (3) and international attention to equality as evidence of modernity. Moreover, quota laws were initially adopted either as recommendations or as requirements with weak oversight. These loopholes allowed male elites to benefit from the positive publicity associated with promoting women's rights—without binding themselves to significant overhauls of their parties' candidate nominate procedures (Piscopo 2006). Once in place, however, quotas created

entrenched beneficiaries, namely female politicians, who then used their greater numbers and bargaining powers to secure reforms that deepened the laws' efficacy.[1]

In Argentina, the 1991 quota law stipulated that women must constitute 30% of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies (lower house), which is elected using a closed-list proportional representation system. The quota first applied to the 1993 mid-term elections, when half of the lower house was renewed. Subsequent reforms strengthened the quota law by clarifying that a woman's name must appear in every third slot on a candidate list and that parties failing to comply with this placement mandate cannot enter the election. In 2005, a reform explained that if parties are contesting two or fewer seats, or if parties are competing for the first time, the women's name must appear in every second slot on the list, raising the quota to a *de facto* 50% in these instances. Under these reforms, women's presence in the lower chamber has risen substantially. Women held 12% of the seats in 1993, but gained 27.2% of the seats by 1995, when both halves of the Congress renewed. By 2009, women had gained 38.5% of the legislative seats, a threefold increase from 1993.

In Mexico, the quota was adopted in 1996 as a "suggestion" for political parties, and reformed in 2002 as a mandatory requirement. Mexico employs a mixed electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies: 300 *diputados* are chosen via plurality rule in single-member districts (SMDs), and 200 *diputados* are chosen via closed-list proportional representation (PR). The PR lists are drawn from five 40-member districts, corresponding to geographical divisions known as *circunscripciones*. The quota applies to both the plurality and the PR competitions, but parties cannot engineer female candidates' success in the plurality races. (Parties even deliberately shirk the quota in the SMD races by knowingly running female candidates in unwinnable districts.) More seriously, the 2002 quota reform created a loophole wherein political parties selecting

candidates via internal primaries are exempted from meeting the quota. The Mexican *Instituto Federal Electoral* (IFE) has categorized primaries rather broadly as well as failed to verify parties' claims that primaries have occurred; this lack of oversight has permitted political parties to obtain numerous exemptions for fulfilling the quota (Huerta and Magar 2006: 15; Baldez 2008). As a result, women's gains in the Mexican Congress have been less notable than in Argentina, but their presence has increased from 17.4% in 1997 to 28.2% in 2009. Figure 1 depicts this growth for both countries.

Figure 1. Increase of Women's Presence in the Lower Houses of Argentina and Mexico



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from Marx, Bonner, and Caminotti (2007) for Argentina, and on data from the *Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género* (CEAMEG) in Mexico.

Given women's significant presence in these congresses, "consequentialist" arguments would predict that policy would have shifted dramatically in the past two decades. Such shifts ought to deepen women's rights specifically and citizen welfare more generally. Argentina and Mexico also share some contextual features—a common cultural heritage and ongoing efforts to build democratic, equitable, plural, and transparent institutions—that may make WSR comparable in

the two cases. Additionally, unique features of each country's political system—namely the party system and the policymaking process—may similarly affect the possibilities for women's substantive representation.

In Argentina, the closed-list PR system means that legislators "are much less independent and less focused on the preferences of voters in their districts" than their counterparts in majoritarian systems" (Alemán et al. 2009). Argentine political parties are highly disciplined, with legislators' future careers depending on maintaining the favor of party bosses, who control access to lucrative, post-congressional appointments (Jones 2002). Moreover, insulation from constituent preferences and emphasis on party discipline influences legislators' roll call votes: studies have shown that roll call votes in Argentina act as an expression of allegiance to either the government or the opposition (Alemán et al 2009; Jones et al. 2009).[2] In other words, the floor vote reflects parties' stubborn desire to either support or punish the governing majority, even when such actions appear self-defeating. The ability to predict vote choice along a government-opposition dynamic tempers theoretical expectations about substantive representation as *outcome* in Argentina.

Argentine legislators' policy authorship therefore reflects their preferences more cleanly than their floor votes. The characterization of Argentina's parties as non-ideological describes their members' collective roll call behavior (Coppedge 1998; Levistky and Murrillo 2006), and not members' individual preferences. When choosing to affiliate beneath a party label, individual politicians will choose a winning party *and* a peer group with similar preferences. As shown by Aleman et al. (2009), when legislator preferences are measured using ideal points generated from co-sponsorship data, these preferences track along a left-right ideological dimension (whereas ideal points generated from roll call data track along a government-

opposition dimension). Moreover, party bosses count roll call votes, but not necessarily bill introduction, as measures of party loyalty. Legislators thus have more individual autonomy to follow their preferences and beliefs when writing bills.

In Mexico, legislators enjoy similar constraints and freedoms. The constitutional prohibition on reelection allows party leaders to exercise control over their deputies. Parties control their members' future appointments, meaning that even the 300 deputies elected in SMDs are more responsive to party bosses than to electoral constituencies (Weldon 2004). Moreover, Mexico's political parties are more ideologically cohesive than in Argentina, and politicians' preferences cohere within parties. The *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) dominated Mexican politics for seven decades, until losing its congressional majority in 1997 and the presidency in 2000. Under hegemony, the PRI's deputies in Congress ensured the smooth passage of the president's policy agenda; PRI legislators rarely introduced legislation, and the opposition introduced legislation merely to grandstand its inherently unattainable platforms (Nacif 2002; Nava and Yáñez 2003). Yet, even under hegemony, PRI legislators would occasionally introduce bills whose tenets would deviate from the party line; these bills were simply never examined in commission (Nacif 2002: 33).

Divided government in Mexico has lead to a direct increase in bill introduction by deputies from all major parties, and a corresponding decrease in bills originating in the executive branch (Nava and Yáñez 2003). Since 1997, bill introduction in the Mexican Congress has become a "fairly open process"; more legislators author proposals, and legislators from different parties frequently author proposals similar in theme but reflective of their party's particular solutions (Nacif 2002: 26-35). Party bosses still exercise control, but they leave bill introduction untouched. What party authorities determine is how quickly initiatives are

discussed in the commissions, which amendments are drafted by the commissions, and which initiatives advance to the plenary (Nacif 2002). Deputies are free to introduce bills; ones that are unfavorable or unimportant, from the perspective of the leadership, simply do not advance. Party discipline in Mexico, as in Argentina, is counted not in proposal authorship but in roll call votes (Weldon 2004; Nacif 2002).

For these reasons, which emerge from the interior logic of each case, my test of the "consequentialist" reasoning behind women's substantive representation focuses on legislators' agenda setting activities. Importantly, substantive representation as process is not a "poor second cousin" of substantive representation as outcome. While reforming laws remains an important goal, the very act of considering women's interests is constitutive of long-term processes of political and cultural change. Introducing bills also retains particular significance in developing countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, where women were previously marginalized from positions of power.

Argentina: Data and Methods

The Argentine dataset consists of all bills introduced in the lower house of the congress for the years 1999, 2003, and 2006.[3] The bills were downloaded from the on-line archive of the Argentine Congress. Each bill is a unit of observation, and is coded according to "type," as determined through a keyword analysis of the title or content analysis of the executive summary. The model predicts the probability that a bill of its type will be introduced, given certain characteristics of its author:

$$Prob_{introduction} \text{ Bill Type} = f(\text{author sex, author ideology, author rank, author specialization, controls}).$$

The Dependent Variables

The innovative feature of the research design is how the bills, as the dependent variable, are coded. The goal is to capture three discrete features about proposals made by male and female legislators: the general policy area, whether there is a women's interest dimension, and, if so, the content of that women's interest. Bills are thus coded in the following ways:

```
(1) Standard Policy Category;
(2) Women's Interest: Yes/No
(3) Women's Interest Policy Category (If (2) = yes)
```

Coding (1) reflects the standard practice of grouping bills into policy categories based on their title, using keywords to determine the categorization. This coding contains 15 policy categories, as shown in Table 1. While the 15 regular policy categories used for coding (1) include a category for "women, children, and family," bills falling into this group are limited: they consist of proposals to revise the Argentine Civil Code in matters such as property rights for cohabiting couples. Such proposals play critical roles in eliminating sexist language and transforming discriminatory practices. Nonetheless, civil code reforms fail to cover the entire universe of proposals wherein women's interests may be invoked. Women's status, wellbeing, or additional gender-related questions are frequently addressed in other proposals. For instance, a proposal to reform the public university system falls into the "standard" policy category of "education"; yet, a subset of proposals under education deal specifically with prohibiting universities from expelling pregnant students. Likewise, a bill falling within the standard categorization of "taxes" invokes "women's interests" when it offers tax breaks to companies using gender quotas in hiring.

Thus, coding (1) reveals in which "standard" policy categories female legislators concentrate. Codings (2) and (3), by contrast, reveal how female legislators represent women

across policy categories. These codings are determined through a content analysis of the bill's executive summary.

Coding (2) is a binary code, operationalizing whether the bill either (a) treats a gender issue or (b) invokes women as a beneficiary of the proposal (1 = yes, 0 otherwise). Addressing a "gender issue" or treating a "women as beneficiaries" means that a proposal manifested concern with women's roles in society, their access to public and private spaces, their entitlements in terms of pensions, social security, and other forms of state assistance, and their right to be free from violence, discrimination, and other prejudicial treatment. Proposals addressing children were included as women's interests, given that theories focusing on the social construction of gender continue to emphasize the importance of women's connection to the home. Coding (2) importantly identifies a unique subuniverse of bills, reorganizing the data on women's interests to cut across standard policy categories. It identifies when women's interest appears not just in civil code reforms, but in reforms to everything from education regulation to tax incentives.

Table 1. Coding Scheme (1)
Standard Policy Categories

Civic Matters
Education
Employment and Labor Unions
Finance, Commerce, and Industry
Health and Environment
International Affairs
Judicial and Penal Reforms
Political and Constitutional Reforms
Rights for Disadvantaged Groups
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Science and Technology
Security and Defense
Social Benefits (state assistance)
Taxes and Budget
Women, Children, and Family

Table 2. Coding Scheme (3)
Women's Interests Policy Categories

Child Welfare
Civil Reforms - Marriage/Family
Health - Anti-Choice
Health - Women/Maternity/Reproductive
Labor Reforms – Women
Family Values
Sex Crimes – Children
Sex Crimes/Violence – Women
Social Assistance Children
Social Assistance Women
Trafficking – Children
Trafficking - Women
Women's Rights Promotion

Coding (3) goes further, breaking down this subuniverse of women's interest bills by content, to truly focus on which themes or problems legislators identify as important. For instance, the tax bill discussed above is re-coded as "women's employment" and the education bill is re-coded as "rights promotion." Notably, these categories—as shown in Table 2—allow us to distinguish between conservative and progressive issues, and therefore examine whether women's substantive representation always moves in a liberalizing direction.[4]

Overall, this coding seeks to address the methodological concerns highlighted in the literature on women and substantive representation. First, coding (1) addresses the frequent failure to specify how female legislators' concentration on women compares to their *other* legislative concentrations, as well as to those legislative concentrations adopted by men. In his 1997 piece comparing bill introduction in the lower houses of Argentina and the United States, Jones looked at seven bill categories. Six "women's interests" categories—Women's Rights, Children and Families, Health Care, Education, Welfare/Social Security, and Environment—were compared to a seventh category of "everything else." Schwindt-Bayer (2006) offers a slightly more precise test, grouping bills introduced in the Argentine Congress into the categories of Women's Issues, Children/Family, Education, Health, Economics, Agriculture, Fiscal Affairs, and "other." My model goes further, specifying policy categories for "everything else" and "other." Second, codings (2) and (3) address the possibility that "women's interests" may occur in these miscellaneous categories. These variants on the dependent variable capture which policy categories are constitutive of women's substantive representation.

Dataset and Independent Variables

The Argentine dataset samples three years from the 1999-2009 period.[5] The dataset includes a total of 4,829 bills, introduced by 586 legislators. Of the 586 legislators, 181 (30.9%) are women and 405 (69.1%) are men. Table 3 describes the breakdown in more detail.

Table 3. Bills Introduced in Argentina

	1999	2003	2006	Total
Total Bills Introduced	1434	1392	2003	4829
Total Bills Introduced by Women	475	611	697	1783
Total Bills Addressing Women	80	145	262	487
Percent Total Bills Addressing Women	5.6%	10.4%	13.1%	10.1%

Regarding the right-hand side of the equation, I look only at the features of the bill's author to predict whether or not a bill of that type will be introduced. While bills introduced in Argentina's Chamber of Deputies frequently have numerous co-sponsors, these co-sponsors are *not* contributing authors. These supporters share an ideological or partisan or other professional affinity with the author, and they might join the author in lobbying for the initiative's successes. Yet, they are not treated as the visionaries behind the initiative. In Argentina, only one legislator—the man or woman whose name appears at the top of the list of sponsors—receives credit as the author.

Independent variables are constructed in relation to bill authorship. The first hypothesis is that the legislators' gender will determine which proposals they introduce; gender is operationalized as dummy variable for sex, where female=1 and male=0. The legislators' party rank (operationalized as list position and logged to reduce the scale) is included, as higher ranking legislators may have greater maneuverability vis-à-vis party discipline, perhaps experiencing greater flexibility to author controversial gender measures (i.e., the liberalization of abortion) when compared to lower-ranking legislators. The legislators' expertise might also play a role, given that

committee positions are often assigned based on individuals' backgrounds (i.e., party bosses often send doctors to the health committee). Expertise is therefore operationalized as whether or not the legislator sits on the committee where the bill was sent, where yes=1 and no=0.

Legislators' party ideology should influence their bill authorship, as theorists frequently speculate that left-leaning representatives will consider women's interests, as well as social wellbeing, more frequently than right-leaning representatives (Htun and Powers 2006). I transformed the author's party identification into party ideology by locating the party on left-right scale. The values were derived from Aleman et al. (1999), who used co-sponsorship data to generate ideal points for all individuals in office from 1983-2007. Given that legislators' preferences, as revealed in co-sponsorship data, track along a left-right ideological spectrum, and given that groups of legislators from the same party express similar preferences, this data can be used to place Argentina's parties on a left-right spectrum *in terms of bill introduction.*[6]

Aleman et al.'s ideal points ranged from [-1] to [1], with [-1] representing the right-leaning opposition party, the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), and [1] representing the left-leaning government party, the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ or "Peronists"). While the longstanding faceoff between the UCR and the PJ has often characterized Argentina as a two-party system, the 1990s and 2000s have witnessed the growth of multiple small parties, many of whom capture several seats in the legislature each election. To code the Argentine parties, I used the UCR, PJ, and known right-wing and left-wing parties as anchor points, to determine parties' placement on the scale. The scale was arranged as follows: parties falling between [-1] and [-0.5] were coded as right, between [-0.5] and -0.25] as center-right, between [-0.25] and [0.25] as center, between [0.25] and [.5] as center-left, and between [.5] and [1] as left. The wider range used to classify the middle (including center-left and center-right) accounts for the centrist pull in Argentine politics

(Levitsky 2006; Torre 2006). Moreover, since parties' positions frequently change in response to the government-opposition dynamic, I re-coded parties' ideology for each presidential term.

Results: Women's Interests in the Standard Policy Categories

The first test of whether women's substantive representation occurs in Argentina examines bill introduction across standard policy categories. Each policy category was constructed as a binary dependent variable (e.g., 1 = education, 0 otherwise). This resulted in fifteen dependent variables, regressed on the independent and control variables. For sex, male was used as the reference category; for party ideology, center parties were used as the reference category. Regressions were performed four times, for bills introduced in 1999, bills introduced in 2003, bills introduced in 2006, and bills introduced in all three years.[7]

Table 4 summarizes these results across the 15 regular policy categories. The table reports the direction of the predicted probability for the effect of legislators' sex on bill introduction, holding all other independent and control variables at their mean, with the bold type drawing attention to the most significant findings. Overall, being a female legislator raises the probability of authoring a bill in the following three categories: (1) education; (2) health; and (3) women, children, and family. An equally strong finding was that, across each year as well as for all years combined, female legislators are *less* likely than male legislators to author bills addressing (1) employment and labor unions; (2) finance, commerce, and industry; and (3) taxes and budget. These findings correspond to those of Schwindt-Bayer (2005), who reported positive effects of legislators' sex on bill introduction for women's issues, education, and health, and negative effects for economic affairs and fiscal matters. Moreover, these effects support theories that female legislators' representative activities correspond to traditional gender role socialization.

Table 4. Direction of Predicted Probability:
Effects of Being Female on Bill Introduction in a Standard Policy Category, Argentina

	1999	2003	2006	Pooled
Civic Matters	(+)	(+)	(-)	(+)
Education	**(+)**	**(+)****	**(+)**	**(+)****
Employment and Labor Unions	**(-)**	**(-)****	**(-)***	**(-)****
Finance, Commerce, and Industry	**(-)**	**(-)**	**(-)***	**(-)****
Health and Environment	**(+)****	**(+)****	**(+)****	**(+)****
International Affairs	(-)	(0)	(-)	(-)
Judicial and Penal Reforms	(+)	(+)	(+)**	(+)
Political and Constitutional Reforms	(+)	(+)	(-)	(-)
Rights for Disadvantaged Groups	(-)	(+)*	(+)	(+)*
Political Rights and Civil Liberties	(-)	(-)	(+)	(-)
Science and Technology	(-)	(-)	(+)	(-)
Security and Defense	(+)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Social Benefits	(-)	(-)	(+)	(+)
Taxes and Budget	**(-)****	**(-)****	**(-)***	**(-)****
Women, Children, and Family	**(+)****	**(+)****	**(+)****	**(+)****

** Statistically significant at or below the 1% level; * Statistically significant at or below the 5% level.

Yet surprises also appear in the data. First, no consistent or statistically significant effect appears for female legislators' likelihood to author bills addressing access to social benefits, which includes social security, pensions, and state assistance for the marginalized or the urban and rurual poor. Second, only a slightly positive effect appears for female legislators' likelihood to author bills addressing the rights of disadvantaged groups. These results were immune to alternate keyword coding schemes.[8] These findings thus lend no support to the hypothesis that women's representation generally improves citizen wellbeing. While there is a negative effect on being female in terms of the legislators' likelihood to author bills in international affairs, security and defense, and science and technology, which may correspond to expectations about women's lesser preoccupation with these realms, the results are neither consistent nor significant. Further, the other independent variables—legislators' party rank, specialization, and party ideology—have no consistent effect on representatives' likelihood to author bills any of the categories.

Going Further: Specifying the Gender Content of Proposals in Argentina

The second and third tests of women's substantive representation as process involve looking at those bills which invoke gender issues or women as beneficiaries. In coding scheme (2), bills from all 15 of the regular categories were grouped by whether or not they represented a women's interest. This division essentially separates women's interests bills from a remainder of other, non-women specific bills. Here, a women's interest bill could appear in a variety of forms, ranging from purchasing mammogram machines for public hospitals to discounting public transit for pregnant women.

To Represent Women's Interests or Not?

The data reported in Table 5 show which proportions of bills introduced by female legislators, and which proportions of bills introduced by male legislators, correspond to women's interests in a given year. These data offer some initial comparisons. First, female legislators dedicate a greater proportion of their bill initiation activities to considering women's interests when compared to male legislators. For all the years combined, bills invoking women's interests constitutes 16.1% of the total number of female legislators' proposals, versus 6.6% of the total number of male legislators' proposals. The rate at which female legislators author proposals addressing women's interests also increases over time. This increase tracks the entrance of more female legislators into the Argentine Congress under the quota law, echoing the trend uncovered by Franceschet and Piscopo (2008). In 1999, bills invoking women's interests constituted 9.7% of female legislators' total bill authorship; this number rose to 14.6% in 2003 and to 21.8% in 2006. A much-less dramatic increase also occurred for male legislators' attention to women's interests: from 3.5% in 1999, to 7.2% in 2003, to 8.4% in 2006.

Table 5. Frequency of Introducing Women's Interest Bills, Argentina

	1999	2003	2006	All
Male Legislators	3.5% (34 of 959)	7.2% (56 of 781)	8.4% (110 of 1306)	6.6% (200 of 3046)
Female Legislators	9.7% (36 of 475)	14.6% (89 of 611)	21.8% (152 of 697)	16.1% (287 of 1783)

Second, more individual female legislators write WSR proposals compared to individual male legislators. Out of the 586 legislators included in the dataset, 196 (33.4%) introduced at least one bill dealing with women's issues. Said another way, two-thirds of legislators do not undertake women's substantive representation. The remaining one-third—those legislators who do represent women—accounts for *half* of the female legislators and *one quarter* of the male legislators.[9] In other words, female legislators are twice as likely as male legislators to substantively represent women's interests, as measured in the frequency of individual legislators' proposals. On the one hand, this percentage confirms expectations that women parliamentarians undertake WSR more frequently than their male counterparts; on the other hand, the 2:1 ratio implies that male parliamentarians are surprisingly proactive on women's interests. Finally, also consistent with the findings from Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), the legislators introducing WSR bills represent a diversity of political parties, with no one party generating a disproportionate share of the action.

Importantly, this data addresses the concern that studies of women's substantive representation fail to specify *how much* the substantive representation of women occurs. Estimating a probability model based on total bill introduction further reveals the likelihood that WSR legislation is introduced relative to all other policy proposals. Table 6 reports the regression results for the binary dependent variable that captures whether the initiative addressed a women's interest or not (1 = yes; 0 otherwise). Male is the reference category for sex, and center ideology is the reference category for party ideology. For ease of interpretation, I report the coeffiecients and z-statistics for a "dprobit" regression in Stata. Coefficients for the right-hand side variables

represent the probability of a bill being introduced that addresses women's interests, given a positive value of that right-hand side variable and holding all other variables at their mean.

As the regression results show, legislator sex emerges as the most significant predictor that a representative in the Argentine lower house will author a women's interest bill. For all three years combined, female legislators are 10% more likely to author a women's interest bill compared to male legislators, relative to all other bills they could possibly author. Moreover, this trend again increases over time: female legislators are 13.5% more likely to undertake women's substantive representation as process in 2006 when compared to 7.6% in 1999 and 6.9% in 2003. Party rank, legislator expertise, and party ideology have no consistent effects on these probabilities, particularly after controlling for year-specific effects in the fourth model.

Table 6. Predicted Probability for Authoring a Women's Interest Bill, Argentina

	1. 1999	2. 2003	3. 2006	4. all
	.0762 (4.15)**	.0699 (3.97)**	.1353 (7.88)**	.1000 (9.61)**
list position	-.0303 (2.82)**	.0304 (2.42)*	-.0241 (1.69)	-.0105 (1.35)
Commission	.0073 (0.51)	.0062 (0.39)	-.0120 (1.35)	-.0032 (0.35)
party right	.0155 (0.96)	-.0357 (1.58)	-.0122 (0.29)	-.0166 (1.09)
party center right	-.0093 (0.31)	.0019 (0.05)	.0404 (0.74)	.0172 (0.73)
party center left	-	-.0551 (2.57)**	-.0039 (0.09)	-.0256 (1.66)
party left	-	-	.0175 (0.37)	.0014 (0.06)
2003	-	-	-	.0509 (2.91)**
2006	-	-	-	.0846 (4.99)**
Pseudo R^2	0.0866	0.0003	0.0497	0.0499
Observations	825	1352	1988	4168

** Statistically significant at or below the 1% level; * Statistically significant at or below the 5% level.

The Substance of Women's Interests

The final coding examines the specific content of women's interests proposals in Argentina. A total of 487 bills from the original 4,829 were coded as "yes" for women's interests. Women introduced 287 (59%) and men introduced 200 (41%). Again, female legislators

collectively introduce more bills, but male legislators' WSR activity is surprisingly high. Yet are female and male deputies agreeing on the substance of women's interests? Do these proposals reflect similar conceptions of, and approaches to, women's interests?

To answer these questions, I identified three trends in the substance of the 487 WSR proposals. First are those proposals that focus on *children and adolescents*, including measures dealing with sex crimes (pedophilia and child pornography), offering social assistance to children (such as subsidies to disabled infants), or generally promoting wellbeing (such as programs for adolescents' volunteerism). Second are those proposals that position women in relation to *traditional gender roles.* These proposals fall into two groups: those that invoke family values and develop social programs to fortify the family as the "fundamental and irrevocable unit of Argentine society," and those that restrict, prohibit, and/or criminalize women's access to family planning services, contraception, and abortion. Third are those proposals which commonly seek to *liberalize women's social, economic, and political positio*n. These include the following measures: (1) reforms to the civil code; (2) bills guaranteeing reproductive and maternal health services; (3) proposals demanding equal rights in employment; (4) bills penalizing sexual harassment, rape, domestic violence, and other sex crimes; (5) initiatives seeking social assistance for women; and (6) bills containing general equality reforms (e.g. approving international women's rights treaties).

Table 7. Relative Frequencies for the Content of Women's Interests, Argentina

	Children and Adolescents	Traditional Women's Roles	Progressive Women's Roles	Total
Men	52.8% (112)	78.9% (15)	28.5% (73)	41% (200)
Women	47.2% (100)	21.1% (4)	71.5% (183)	59% (287)
Total	100% (212)	100% (19)	100% (256)	100% (487)

p=0.000 (<1%)

Table 7 reports the frequency of male legislators and female legislators' initiatives for each of the three content categories. An initial glance shows that men author the majority of WSR proposals addressing women and children, and an overwhelming amount of the initiatives focused on traditional women's roles. Table 8 explores this analysis further, reporting dprobit regression results that compare legislators' probability of authoring a bill in one of the WSR content categories to the probability of authoring a bill in the other two. The independent and control variables are those used in the previous model (see Table 6).

Table 8. Probability of Introducing aWomen's Interest Bills with Particular Content, Argentina

	1. Children and Adolescents	2. Children and Adolescents (with year dummies)	3. Traditional Women's Roles	4. Traditional Women's Roles (with year dummies)	5. Progressive Women's Roles	6. Progressive Women's Roles (with year dummies)
Sex	-.1967 (3.86)**	-.1944 (3.79)**	-.0259 (1.82)	-.0217 (1.06)	.2505 (4.87)**	.2454 (4.74)**
list position	.0509 (1.20)	.05560 (1.31)	-.0295 (2.19)*	-.0429 (2.28)*	-.0012 (0.03)	.0018 (0.04)
Commission	.0448 (0.88)	.0442 (0.87)	.0001 (0.08)	.0012 (0.17)	-.0482 (0.93)	-.0499 (0.96)
party right	.1085 (1.39)	.0885 (1.04)	-.0149 (1.21)	-.0156 (1.47)	-.0456 (0.58)	-.0122 (0.14)
party center right	.0721 (0.64)	.0579 (0.49)	.0109 (0.56)	-.0004 (0.03)	-.0116 (1.03)	-.0777 (0.65)
party center left	.1548 (2.09)*	.1468 (1.73)	-.0486 (2.91)**	-.0051 (3.21)**	-.0565 (0.75)	-.0148 (0.17)
party left	-.1867 (1.82)	.2122 (1.87)	-	-	.2880 (2.83)**	.3291 (2.97)**
2003		.0513 (0.56)		.0747 (1.25)*		-.0607 (0.65)
2006		.0077 (0.08)		.0360 (1.80)		-.09120 (0.99)
Pseudo R^2	0.0593	0.0611	0.2677	0.2677	0.0779	0.0796
Observations	439	437	392	392	439	439

* Statistically significant at or below 5%; ** Statistically significant at or below 1%

To begin, bills treating children and adolescents as policy beneficiaries draw a significant amount of attention, from legislators, particularly male legislators. Being male *increases* the probability that representatives authoring a women's interest bill will focus on youth issues in comparison to both traditional and progressive gender roles. Said another way, female legislators are 19% less likely to focus on youth than male legislators. The positive significance of

membership in a center-left party (model 1) also disappears once year dummies are intrdocued (model 2), suggesting there may be year-specific effects wherein certain issues become more salient and thus more subject to legislation (though more data would be needed to explore this hypothesis).

The proportions from Table 7 further show that male legislators in Argentina are most concerned with youths. Men introduce the majority of women's interests bills focused on children and adolescents. Moreover, summing *across* male legislators' bill introduction in 1999, 2003, and 2006 reveals the following: "children and adolescents" bills account for 56% of male legislators' WSR activity (112 of 200). For female legislators, however, introducing proposals concerned with children and adolescents only accounts for 35% (101 of 287) of their WSR activity. These figures suggest an important methodological point: researchers ought to construct separate categories for women and children. The inclusion of "children" in a general rubric of "women's interests" confuses the question of not only *who* undertakes women's substantive representation, but who shapes the *content* of the WSR measures. The bulk of male legislators' representation of women's interests focuses on youth, and not on questions of women's rights or equality.

This finding is underscored by policy proposals that treat women in relation to traditional gender roles. While bill introduction on conservative gender issues is quite low overall, male legislators dominate this group, introducing the bulk of proposals to limit women's reproductive choices. Thirteen bills introduced by male representatives, compared to two bills introduced by female representatives, seek to restrict Argentine women's access to family planning, reproductive health counseling, and legal abortions (which are permitted in cases of rape or endangerment to the woman's health or life). Combining the anti-choice proposals together with family values proposals reveals that 78.9% of these initiatives were authored by male legislators (Table 7). The

statistical analysis further demonstrates that male legislators are more concerned with maintaining traditional gender roles. Being female *lowers* the probability of introducing a bill supporting anti-choice measures or family values, though the coefficients are not statistically significant (Table 8). Notably, party ideology also plays a strong role. All else equal, legislators who belong to center-left parties are approximately 5% less likely than legislators belonging to other parties to introduce bills promoting conservative gender values.

Looking at bills with traditional gender content thus generates three conclusions. First, not all of women's substantive representation seeks the liberalization of gender roles; conservative constituents *will* find their interests represented by elected officials. Second, reinforcing traditional gender roles draws more attention from male legislators than female legislators. Argentine men's sustained WSR activism is consequently explained by their concern for women's roles as mothers and for the wellbeing of children. Third, while partisan ideology has little-to-no general relationship with whether legislators will author a policy proposal that addresses women's interests, left-leaning ideology has a negative and statistically significant relationship with authoring policies that enshrine traditional gender roles. The sample size for "traditional gender roles" is quite small, however, and findings for this WSR category should be treated cautiously.

Moreover, the vast majority of women's interest proposals in Argentina focus on improvements to women's social positions, economic opportunities, and political rights. These proposals acknowledge and address modernizing trends in women's roles and responsibilities. As shown in Table 8, being female positively predicts the authorship of bills addressing progressive gender roles compared to bills dealing with youth or bills promoting traditional roles. Female legislators are 25% more likely than male legislators to author these bills, even when controlling for year specific effects. Further, membership in a left party predicts this policy focus very

strongly. Using Stata to generate predicted probabilities from a probit model, and setting all other variables at their mean, reveals the following: women in left parties have an 85% probability of authoring bills on progressive gender issues, compared to a 60% probability for women in non-left parties. These predicted probabilities are lower for men: male legislators belonging to left parties have a 65% probability of authoring a proposal with liberal gender content, compared to a 35% probability for men belonging to non-left parties.

These projections are supported by the relative frequencies listed in Table 7. Female legislators authored the majority of the liberalizing proposals, or 71.5% compared to male legislators' authorship of 28.5%. Moreover, this authorship accounted for 68% of female legislators' total WSR activity. These statistics show that female legislators, and particularly female legislators on the left, are disproportionately active on progressive gender issues when compared to male legislators.

Finally, within the category of progressive proposals, the three most prominent reforms in Argentina pertain to the civil code, reproductive choices, and promotions of women's rights. The second-most prominent reforms seek to guarantee women's equitable treatment in employment practices and to protect women from gender-based violence. Only a small number of proposals deal with combating trafficking in women or extending social assistance to women. The scarcity of the latter occurs because most social assistance proposals treat women as beneficiaries *because they are mothers*. For instance, I coded proposals allocating subsidies to mothers of handicapped children as social assistance for children, as these proposals are chiefly concerned with rearing healthy offspring. Those few proposals that were coded as social assistance to women dealt with revising welfare rules to consider widows and female heads of households as beneficiaries. Importantly, the rate of policy proposals increased over time for all types of reform within the

"liberal gender roles" category, signifying an overall and growing trend among male and female legislators—but particularly female legislators—to support the expansion of Argentine women's social, political, and economic roles.

Comparative Reflections from Mexico

This section of the paper draws on data from 360 women's interests bills presented in the lower chamber of the Mexican legislature. The analysis of the Mexican dataset focuses on coding schemes (2) and (3), facilitating a comparison of the rate and content of WSR in the two countries. On the one hand, similar cultural and political contexts suggests that women's interests should focus on liberal gender roles in Mexico as well as in Argentina; on the other hand, "liberal gender roles" constitutes a broad category, and specific concentrations (i.e., domestic violence versus reproductive choice) may well vary. The results in fact show differences in the scope of legislators' concern with women's interests as well as stronger party effects in Mexico than in Argentina.

The Mexican Dataset: Overview and Preliminary Comparisons

The Mexican dataset begins in 1997, the mid-term elections in which the PRI first lost its majority in the Congress (also the first congressional session for which data on both bill introduction and legislators' profiles is available). In Mexico, legislative terms last three years, so the data covers four sessions: the LVI legislature (1997-2000), the LVII legislature (2000-2003), the LIX legislature (2003-2006), and the LX legislature (2006-2009). I include data on the bills and their authors' profiles (including party identification, district, and candidacy type).[10] Mexico's three principal parties—the conservative PAN, the centrist PRI, and the leftist PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*)—are explicitly analyzed.[11] The smaller parties are grouped according to

left/right ideology, determined according to party platforms and electoral allegiances formed with PRI, PAN or PRD.

Using the criteria established for coding scheme (2), which captured whether a proposal addressed a gender issue or treated women as beneficiaries, I identified 360 bills from *all* the bills introduced in Mexico from 1997-2009. An immediate contrast between WSR in Argentina and WSR in Mexico is the greater preponderance of women's initiatives in Argentina. Recall that the Argentine data samples the years 1999, 2003, and 2006; across this period, the introduction of women's interests bills relative to all bills rose steadily, reaching 13.1% (Table 3). In Mexico, however, the 360 bills represent *all* twelve years from 1997-2009, and constitute only 4.3% of the total bills introduced per year. As shown in Table 9, this proportion has been relatively stable over time. While the overall productivity of Mexican deputies has increased, due largely to the growing multipartism of the Mexican Congress (Nava and Yáñez 2003), the rate of attention legislators devote to women's interests has remained constant.

Table 9. Frequency of Women's Interest Bill Introduction in Mexico

Legislature	Years	Total Women's Bills Presented	Total Other Bills Presented	Total Bills Introduced
LVII	1997-2000	4.7% (32)	95.3% (653)	100% (685)
LVIII	2000-2003	3.5% (46)	96.5% (1264)	100% (1310)
LIX	2003-2006	4% (129)	94% (3107)	100% (3236)
LX	2006-2009	4.9% (153)	95.1% (2971)	100% (3124)
Total	1997-2009	4.3% (360)	95.7% (7995)	100% (8355)

Of the 360 women's interests bills introduced in Mexico, 26.7% (96) were introduced by men, and 73.3% (264) were introduced by women. These proportions are quite different from those in Argentina, where men and women introduced 41% and 59% of WSR bills, respectively. In other words, not only do Mexican legislators undertake substantive representation as process

less frequently than in Argentina, but male legislators are particularly inactive when compared to their Argentine counterparts.

Calculating the WSR activity of *individual* male and female legislators supports this conclusion. The 360 WSR bills correspond to bills authored by 215 legislators. Comparing these 215 legislators to all legislators seated in the Congress reveals the following: 31% of female representatives in Mexico author a WSR bill, compared to just 6% of male representatives.[12] By comparison, the Argentine data showed that 50% of female legislators introduced at least one WSR bill, compared to 25% of male legislators. These figures underscore Mexico's lower rate of WSR, as well as its lower rate of WSR activity undertaken by men.

Table 10. Frequency of Women's Interests Bill Introduction in Mexico by Party

	Men	Women	Total Party Share
PAN	31.9% (23)	68.1% (49)	20% (72)
PRI	23.5% (24)	76.5% (78)	28.3% (102)
PRD	21.8% (26)	78.2% (93)	33.1% (119)
Right Parties (PVEM)	56.3% (18)	43.8% (14)	8.9% (32)
Left Parties	16.1% (5)	83.9% (26)	8.6% (31)
Independent	0	100% (4)	1.1% (4)
Total			100% (360)

p=0.004 (<1%)

Table 10 explores these relationships by examining the party affiliation of each proposal's lead author. (In Mexico, unlike in Argentina, co-authorship signals genuine participation in the proposal's redaction.)[13] First, deputies from the PRD introduced the majority of WSR bills, followed by the PRI and then the PAN. The preponderance of PRD initiatives is consistent with theoretical expectations about the greater likelihood of left-leaning parties to focus on women. Second, of the women's interests bills authored within each party, the majority were authored by the *women* of that party. Female legislators from the PRD, the PRI, the PAN, and the left-leaning

parties introduced over two-thirds (or nearly two-thirds) of the WSR bills. The one exception was the PVEM (*Partido Verde Ecologista de México*, the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico), the only right-leaning party in the Mexican legislature during this period: here, women introduced less than half of their party's WSR initiatives.[14] The greater activity of "Panista" and "Verde" men, compared to Panista and Verde women, will appear once we account for the *content* of these proposals.

In sum, the Mexican dataset provides comparative insights into WSR rates. First, women's interests are placed on the legislative agenda less frequently in Mexico than in Argentina. Second, and consistent with theoretical expectations, female legislators in *both* countries introduce the vast majority of women's interest proposals when compared to their male colleagues. Yet, male legislators in Argentina undertake larger proportions of WSR than male legislators in Mexico. Third, when male legislators in Mexico do author proposals that address women, they belong to conservative parties (the PAN and the PVEM) more than to moderate or left parties. The next section will explore whether sex and party ideology influence the content of WSR in Mexico. These findings—lower overall attention to WSR, and lower male attention to WSR—may be explained by the content of these initiatives in Mexico, discussed next.

The Content of Women's Interests in Mexico

The 360 women's interests bills proposed in Mexico from 1997-2009 were coded according to coding scheme (3) and then divided into the content categories of children and adolescents, traditional gender roles, and progressive gender roles. Time trends, not reported here, show increasing attention from both male and female legislators to liberal gender roles and to youth, and no increase in activity on traditional gender roles. The aggregate frequencies are shown in Table 11.

Table 11. Frequency of the Content of Women's Interests, Mexico

	Children and Adolescents	Traditional Women's Roles	Progressive Women's Roles	Total
Men	41.6% (32)	23.1% (3)	22.6% (61)	26.7% (96)
Women	58.4% (45)	76.9% (10)	77.4% (209)	73.3% (264)
Total	100% (77)	100% (13)	100% (270)	100% (360)

Chi^2=29.0762; p=0.006

Clearly, female legislators in Mexico undertake a greater share of WSR when compared to their male colleagues. As in Argentina, female legislators author the vast majority of proposals that recognize or encourage the modernization of gender roles. What is surprising is that female deputies in Mexico *also* author two-thirds of the proposals conceptualizing women's roles as *traditional*: this proportion is the inverse from that in Argentina, where male legislators authored two-thirds of these proposals. Female deputies in Mexico likewise authored the majority of the proposals addressing youth, also an inverse finding from Argentina. While male legislators in Mexico have been *more* active when authoring proposals focused on youth than with authoring proposals focused on either conservative or liberal gender roles, they still author the minority of bills in each category. Again, the question appears as to why male legislators in Mexico express less interest in women's interests.

To study this matter further, I examined the frequencies by party. For proposals invoking a traditional vision of women's roles, the majority of female authors hailed from the PAN. For bills targeting youth wellbeing, the majority of female authors hailed from the PAN and, perhaps surprisingly, the PRD. Male legislators authoring bills on youth also principally belonged to the PAN. By contrast, Mexican deputies from left-leaning parties, both male and female, authored the largest proportions of proposals that recognized the modernization of women's roles. *Diputados* and *diputadas* from the PRD, followed by the PRI, authored most of these proposals, compared to

men and women from the PAN, who authored very few of these proposals. The party data reveals a strong commitment from left-leaning Mexican women to legislate for gender equality, and the greater pull of conservatism for *Panista* women compared to their Argentine counterparts.

The statistical analysis supports these conclusions. As with Argentina, I conducted "dprobit" regressions that compare the likelihood of authoring a bill in one category as opposed to the other two categories. These results are reported in Table 12, which parallels Table 8.

Table 12. Probability of Introduction of Women's Interests Bills with Particular Content, Mexico

	1. Children and Adolescents	2. Children and Adolescents (with term dummies)	3. Children and Adolescents (with term and regional dummies)	4. Traditional Gender Roles	5. Traditional Gender Roles(with term dummies)	6. Traditional Gender Roles (with term and regional dummies)
Sex	-.1480 (2.80)**	-.1543 (2.93)**	-.1630 (3.08)**	.0171 (0.80)	.0111 (0.55)	.0102 (0.57)
PR district	-.0257 (0.51)	-.0272 (0.55)	-.0307 (0.61)	-.0271 (1.26)	-.0263 (1.32)	-.0225 (1.27)
Commission	.0637 (1.27)	.0647 (1.39)	.0542 (1.16)	-.0024 (0.12)	.0008 (0.04)	.0021 (0.12)
PRI	-.1752 (3.24)**	-.1746 (3.24)**	-.1699 (3.31)**	-.0423 (2.03)*	-0.0378 (2.01)*	-.0340 (2.00)*
PRD	-.1218 (2.25)*	-.1164 (2.16)*	-.0871 (1.49)	-.0467 (2.07)*	-.0428 (2.06)*	-.0413 (2.08)*
party left	-.0881 (1.11)	-.0736 (0.90)	-.0481 (0.54)			
party right	-.0321 (0.39)	-0.0477 (0.59)	-.0403 (0.48)			
Leg58		-.1988 (1.19)	-.0986 (1.05)		-.0272 (1.02)	-.0230 (0.97)
Leg59		.0267 (0.32)	.0289 (0.34)		-.0194 (0.70)	-.0170 (0.70)
Leg60		-.0361 (0.44)	-.0247 (0.29)		-.0536 (0.79)	-.0467 (.173)
Cir1 (NW)			.0634 (0.78)			.0121 (0.32)
Cir2 (NE)			.1255 (1.74)			.0308 (0.80)
Cir3 (S/SE)			-.0006 (0.01)			.0669 (1.26)
Cir5 (S)			.0687 (0.95)			.0658 (1.31)
Pseudo R^2	388	388	388	322	322	322
Observations	0.0612	0.0718	0.0818	0.0722	0.1103	0.1388

* Statistically significant at or below 5%; ** Statistically significant at or below 1%

The chief independent variable is the sex of the bill's author, coded as female=1, male=0. Other independent variables include whether or not the author was popularly elected (operationalized as elected from a PR-district instead of SMD district), whether the author

specializes in the policy area (operationalized as whether the author was seated on a commission to where the bill was sent), and the author's party identification.[15] I include dummy variables to control for term-specific effects as well as electoral constituency. The latter variable captures characteristics about the author's district, and was operationalized as the five electoral-geographical divisions known *circunscripciones.*[16] Further, since the object of the regressions is to determine which legislator characteristics influence the likelihood of bill authorship in certain categories, I counted proposals with co-authors twice (or three times if three co-authors were present). For instance, if the proposal was co-authored by a PRI deputy and a PAN deputy, the first observation used data from the PRI deputy, and the second observation used data from the PAN deputy. In the models, PAN is the reference category for party and the fourth *circunscripción* (the district containing Mexico City) is the reference category for electoral constituency.

To begin, the predicted probability of female legislators' likelihood to author WSR bills whose content focuses on children and adolescents is negative. Models 1, 2, and 3 strengthen the findings from Argentina: in both cases, youth issues draw a significant amount of male legislators' attention. In Mexico, female legislators are 16.3% *less* likely to author these initiatives when controlling for term- and region-specific effects.

Additionally, legislators from the PRI and the PRD are less likely to author these proposals when compared to legislators from the PAN (though the statistical significance of PRD membership disappears once the controls for *circunscripción* are introduced). The regressions were also performed using the PRI as the reference category. In that model (not reported here), *Panista* deputies were 22.3% *more* likely to author proposals focusing on children and adolescents, when compared to "*Priísta*" and "PRD-ista" deputies. Party identification clearly affects Mexican

legislators' likelihood to make youth the focus of WSR initiatives. Further, the influences of legislator sex and of legislator party identification are independent; when the models were run with interaction terms, these variables were not statistically significant. Popular election, policy specialization, legislative term, and electoral constituency were also not statistically significant.

Regression results from models 4, 5, and 6, for WRS bills addressing traditional gender roles, likewise show positive probabilities for PAN deputies and negative probabilities for PRD and PRI deputies.[17] All else equal, male and female legislators from the PRI and PRD are respectively 3% and 4% less likely than legislators from the PAN to focus on traditional gender roles. As with Argentina, the sign on the coefficient for sex is negative, indicating that being female *lowers* the probability of introducing a "traditional" WSR bill. Both countries present an inverse relationship between being female or being leftist, on the one hand, and authoring bills with a conservative focus, on the other. Nonetheless, sex is not statistically significant in the models from either country, and the sample size in both cases is very small. Without more data, these conclusions remain tentative.

Finally, models 7, 8, and 9 confirm that, in Mexico as in Argentina, being female significantly enhances the probability of authoring initiatives that seek improvements to women's social, economic, and political status. All else equal, female legislators are almost 15% more likely than male legislators to author bills with liberal conceptualizations of gender roles when controlling for term-specific and region-specific effects. Membership in either the PRI or the PRD positively predicts this likelihood as well; all else equal, *Priístas* are nearly 22% more likely, and PRD-istas nearly 17% more likely, to advance liberal gender roles when compared to deputies from other parties. When the regression was performed using the PRI as the reference category, the inverse probability was found for members of conservative parties: *Panistas* were 29% less

likely than other party members to author these proposals. The direction and significance of the findings was affected neither by the other independent and control variables, nor by the inclusion of interaction terms (the latter regressions not shown here).

Table 12 (continued)

	7. Progressive Women's Roles	8. Progressive Women's Roles (with term dummies)	9. Progressive Women's Roles (with year & regional dummies)
Sex	.1344 (2.50)*	.1391 (2.55)*	.1471 (2.70)**
PR district	.0654 (1.25)	.0660 (1.26)	.0639 (1.22)
Commission	-.0725 (1.48)	-.0750 (1.53)	-.0683 (1.38)
PRI	.2274 (4.12)**	.2261 (4.11)**	.2181 (3.93)**
PRD	.1885 (3.40)**	.1815 (3.28)**	.1670 (.286)**
party left	.1422 (1.80)	.1207 (1.46)	.1183 (1.38)
party right	.0854 (1.03)	.0971 (1.19)	.1053 (1.30)
Leg58		.0920 (0.89)	.0781 (0.75)
Leg59		-.0820 (0.89)	-.0860 (0.92)
Leg60		.0224 (0.25)	.0094 (0.10)
Cir1 (NW)			-.0078 (0.09)
Cir2 (NE)			-.1227 (1.63)
Cir3 (S/SE)			-.0347 (0.53)
Cir5 (S)			-.1108 (1.44)
Pseudo R^2	0.0774	0.0931	0.1039
Observations	388	388	388

* Statistically significant at or below 5%; ** Statistically significant at or below 1%

Thus, Mexico and Argentina share some, but not all, trends in legislators' undertaking of women's substantive representation as process. First, female legislators in both countries, and particularly female legislators on the left, generally drive the content of women's interests towards liberal conceptualizations of gender roles. Second, male legislators in both countries, and particularly conservative male legislators, will undertake WSR less frequently than female legislators; when they do author WSR bills, they typically focus on children and adolescents. This

finding again highlights the methodological importance of separating "children and adolescents" from "women" in WSR analyses. Conflating these two categories obscures important theoretical and empirical points about how non-group members (i.e., men) substantively represent certain identity groups (i.e., women). Third, and related, male legislators in Argentina—but *not* necessarily in Mexico—undertake WSR activities that are concentrated more on women's traditional roles than on women's modern roles. In both countries, however, legislators from left-leaning parties are unlikely to write these sorts of bills.

Fourth and finally, Mexico's three major parties have coherent, ideologically-driven stances on women's interests. *Panistas* are more likely to focus on protecting youth and on maintaining women's traditional roles; *Priístas* and PRD-istas are more likely to advance women's status in economics, politics, and society. Argentine political parties are less coherent on these issues, save for leftists' greater likelihood to author initiatives that seek to liberalize gender roles. In general, the strong significance of the PAN, PRI, and PRD in the Mexican data supports the literature's characterizations of Mexico's parties as highly programmatic (Rosas 2005). Argentina's parties, by contrast, are fluid and opportunistic (Torre 2005; Levitsky 2005).

Walking Together or Separately: Collaboration in Mexico, Patchwork in Argentina

The content analysis of women's interests yields important methodological lessons and substantive conclusions about which policy areas become the focus of female and male legislators' WSR activities. Nonetheless, the division of "women's interests" into three categories—youth, traditional gender roles, and progressive gender roles—actually glosses over important trends in the two countries. As noted, "liberal gender roles" is a broad category, capturing a diverse array of proposals. Further, the probability analysis does not explain why overall rates of WSR in Mexico are lower than in Argentina, and why Mexican men appear more generally disinterested in

women's interests when compared to Argentine men. This final section teases out these subtleties through a qualitative analysis of agenda setting strategies in the two countries.

Differences in the substantive content of bills between the two countries first appear in coding (2), which identified women's interests bills from among the standard policy categories. Different "standard" policy categories yielded more women's interests bills in each case. Bills addressing women within the health and environmental sectors, and within the judicial and penal sectors, comprised a greater proportion of women's interests bills in Argentina than in Mexico. By contrast, bills examining women's rights, wellbeing, or entitlements in relation to employment and to political, electoral, or constitutional reforms are more frequently introduced in Mexico than in Argentina. A second clue appears when exploring the bills categorized as addressing progressive gender roles in coding (3). In Argentina, legislators were more concerned with reproductive rights, civil code reforms, and rights promotion; they were less concerned with labor reforms and violence against women. In Mexico, legislators were highly concerned with labor reforms and sex crimes, and *overwhelmingly* focused on rights promotion, a trend also reported by Beer (2008).

Evidence from my interviews in Mexico and Argentina further suggests that women from each country have a distinctive vision *within* a common agenda of liberalizing women's roles.[18] In Mexico, current and former female legislators from the PAN, PRI, and PRD were asked "what introducing proposals to benefit women meant to them." They consistently answered using two words: *armonización* (harmonization) and *transversalidad* (mainstreaming). By *armonización*, the interviewees were referring to revising Mexico's existing statutes in order to incorporate the doctrine of gender equality. *Transversalidad* describes the incorporation of women's perspectives, wellbeing, and needs into the policymaking process. Both *armonización* and *transversalidad* have similar aims, with harmonization referring to changing existing statutes and mainstreaming

referring to writing new ones. Mainstreaming thus often becomes a policy goal itself. Indeed, twenty percent (72 of 360) of Mexico's WSR proposals can be classified as mainstreaming initiatives, that is, they seek to impose "gender friendly" regulations on myriad government branches and agencies. For instance, the tourism ministry was asked to create programs that showcase indigenous women's distinct contributions to native cultures, or the telecommunications agency was asked to show more images of girls playing sports.

The dual emphasis Mexican legislators place on *harmonización and transversalidad* explains why WSR in Mexico focuses on labor laws, violence against women, and political, electoral, and constitutional reforms. While harmonization theoretically implicates *all* statutes, irrespective of their standard policy category, harmonization practically means reforming statutes that address employment, domestic violence, and civil and political liberties. Gender gaps in these statutes are generally more identifiable than, say, in statutes dealing with road construction and energy regulation. Proposing amendments to these statutes—for instance, demanding that police officers treat women's testimonies with equal weight as men's testimonies—is therefore a fairly straightforward, and largely technical, process. Likewise, mainstreaming primarily targets bureaucratic procedures that deal with employment, civil and criminal procedures for gender-based violence and women-in-prison, and discrimination and rights. Proposals to mainstream gender frequently entail policy recommendations to the executive branch. Beyond a subset of proposals dealing with pay equity and parental leave, neither *harmonización* nor *transversalidad* dramatically redistribute economic resources.

Importantly, the focuses on harmonization and mainstreaming in Mexico result from a coordinated, collaborative effort among Mexican female legislators—evidence of a partnership among women representatives that does *not* exist in Argentina. I am not suggesting that female

legislators in Argentina never collaborate. Rather, bill introduction in Argentina proceeds in an ad-hoc, or piecework, fashion: legislators write proposals whose focus corresponds to particular, personal preferences. Female legislators in Argentina rarely mention party identification as a key determinant in choosing to author a WSR bill; this distinction highlights the difference between party ideology *being consistent with* the content of a WSR bill and party ideology *being the driving factor in writing* that bill. This ad-hoc process also accounts for why multiple legislators in Argentina introduce identical proposals: many legislators share the same WSR preferences, but not all bills advance. When a representative's initiative does advance, she then builds a coalition to ensure fair consideration in commissions. The pattern in Argentina is ad-hoc agenda setting followed by ex-post collaboration.

In Mexico, by contrast, the pattern is ex-ante collaboration to ensure ex-post agreement. Female politicians from all the parties define a WSR agenda before being elected and before entering office—*and before authoring any proposals*. In 1993, building on momentum attained by reforming the definition of marital rape, feminists from within the PRI and the PRD formed the group "From A to Z," whose slogan was "Women walk a ways together before our policy differences separate us" (Tarrés 2006: 418).[19] In 1997, female legislators attended a conference entitled "Avancemos un Trecho" [Let's Move Forward a Stretch]. Women from eight political parties, including the PAN, "moved forward" by agreeing on a five-point legislative agenda, as follows: (1) freedom from discrimination based on gender; (2) regulation of the rights and responsibilities for family maintenance; (3) prohibition of pregnancy tests for employment and of the termination of pregnant employees; (4) daycare in the workplace; (5) more aggressive detection and treatment program for family violence (Tarrés 2006: 418; Stevenson 1999: 72).

Beginning in 1998, female politicians became more explicit in their articulation of a shared legislative agenda. That year, female legislators secured statutory approval to host the first *Parlamento de Mujeres* [Women's Parliament]. Convened in the plenary chambers of the Congress, the *Parlamento* included female participants from party directorates, ministries, and the women's movement; male legislators and male party leaders could not participate, though they were encouraged to attend and observe. The *Parlamento* organized participants into working groups on political participation, intra-family violence, education, employment, family law, women's health, women in the media, indigenous women, and peasant women. Each working group then drafted policy recommendations which were reported to the congressional plenary, published in the congressional record, and sent to the Congress's Commission on Equity and Gender for further development. The Women's Parliaments then became an annual tradition.[20]

In 2000, Mexican female candidates signed a document of shared goals entitled "Hacia una Agenda Legislativa…por la Equidad" [Towards a Legislative Agenda for Equity]. Then, following their elections, they convened a *Congreso Nacional de Mujeres hacia la Reforma del Estado* [National Women's Congress for the Reform of the State]. This convention—held in the parliamentary chamber but without the attendance of male legislators—allowed female legislators to strategize on how to reach these goals. Subsequently, in 2003 and 2009, legislators-elect from all parties signed *Pactos Entre Mujeres* [Pacts Among Women] at ceremonies in the Mexican Congress. The 2003 agreement was notably subtitled "Un Trecho Más por la Ciudadanía Plena de las Mujeres en México" [A Little Way More for the Full Citizenship of Mexican Women]. All agreements focused on the following objectives: greater budgetary appropriations for women's programs, combating violence against women, promoting sexual and reproductive rights,

enhancing women's political participation, ending discrimination, and ensuring the equitable distribution of family responsibilities.

This language of collaboration and collusion marks a distinctive feature of female legislators' WSR activity in Mexico, and nothing remotely comparable has unfolded in Argentina. For instance, a signatory of the 2000 "Hacia una Agenda Legislativa" explained that the document would "continue the new trend among Mexican women to arrive at agreements and compromises."[21] María Luisa Farrera Paniagua, then-President of Mexico's *Instituto Federal Electoral* [Federal Electoral Institute], noted in 2003: "A constitutive characteristic of this new political practice is the pact among women. Before our partisan or ideological differences separate us, there is a common path that we can walk along together."[22] As Tarrés concludes, female activists and elites in Mexico "decided to maintain an equilibrium between what was politically correct and what was possible" (2006: 416).

"Walking together" in Mexico has driven female legislators' focus on *harmonización* and *transversalidad.* While the *Pacto Entre Mujeres* recognizes reproductive rights, neither the *Pacto* nor the other agreements use strong language about women's liberation or women's autonomy. They never mention abortion. Female politicians in Mexico have agreed to leave those policy areas—which are separated by partisan ideology—off the agenda. Every interviewee in Mexico, including women from the PAN, mentioned an explicit agreement among female legislators to not discuss "divisive" or "controversial" issues. Even the 24 of the 360 proposals that did focus on reproductive health dealt more with prenatal or postnatal care than with family planning. By contrast, equal employment, freedom from violence, and nondiscrimination are "least common denominator" policies that women from the PRI, PRD, and PAN can agree on.

Further, women's collusion in Mexico has streamlined the WSR agenda *and* excluded men from its articulation. In Mexico, women's substantive representation as process has depended on agreements and pacts, which has both narrowed the scope and diminished the quantity of WSR initiatives. This feature accounts for the lower preponderance of WSR initiatives in Mexico as compared to Argentina, where a more open and more fluid women's agenda permits the introduction of more initiatives. Finally, Mexican women's conferences, pacts, and parliaments, while remarkable in their ability to facilitate intra-party collaboration, have created the impression that setting a women's agenda is women's work. Female politicians in Mexico have carved out a "women's space" in their parties and in the Congress, a space which explicitly excludes their male colleagues (as in the *Parlamentos de Mujeres*) or tacitly implies their unwelcome (as in the *Pactos Entre Mujeres*). Men from the PAN, PRD, PRI, and the small parties are treated as allies, but not as co-visionaries, in the twin agendas of *harmonización* and *transversalidad.* Perhaps ironically, greater collaboration among women explains why so few male legislators in Mexico author WSR initiatives when compared to their Argentine counterparts.

Conclusion

Consistent with theoretical expectations, the data presented in this paper show considerable support for the unfolding of women's substantive representation as process in Argentina and Mexico. Further, a detailed focus on the content of bills shows subtle, underlying trends. In Mexico, collaboration limits the legislative agenda to the "least common denominator" proposals of *armonización* and *transversalidad.* Female legislators in Mexico largely agree on women's rights to equal employment and protection from violence, and disagree on reproductive choice, thus focusing the legislative agenda on the former rather than the latter. In Argentina, by contrast, a patchwork approach broadens the array of initiatives introduced, but, ultimately, lowers the

probability of consensus. Thus, the content of women's substantive representation as process can vary across cases while nonetheless conforming to a generalized pattern: female legislators typically advocate the liberalization of gender roles.

The data also show important trends in the bill introduction activity of male legislators, a comparison often overlooked by the extant literature. Male legislators undertake women's substantive representation as process less than female legislators. They show particular concern with children and adolescents' wellbeing, as well as with promoting family values and motherhood. The finding that male legislators will undertake women's substantive representation, but will usually not address the modernization of gender roles when they do so, is novel and important.

Finally, the data present a nuanced picture of how party ideology and different modes of intra-party collaboration can affect both the likelihood to represent women as well as the content of the interests represented. In both countries, membership in a left-party positively affects whether a legislator will author a policy with progressive gender content, and negatively affects whether a legislator will author policies promoting traditional gender roles. Greater collaboration across parties, as in Mexico, also influences the substance of progressive proposals, making questions of equal opportunity and non-discrimination more central than drives to "liberate" women from childrearing.

These conclusions leave open two directions for future research. First, additional studies should strengthen the preliminary findings about the influence of legislator sex and legislator party ideology. Second, research on WSR policy authorship means that the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of a vast majority of male legislators, and healthy proportion of female legislators, are neglected. Not all legislators introduce women's interests bills. Expanding the study to include

co-sponsorship and committee trajectories may bring more legislators into the analysis, shedding further light on *who* supports *which* women's interests.

[1] A vast literature discusses, in detail, the adoption of gender quotas in Latin America. For the region as a whole, see Hutn and Jones (2004). For Argentina, see Bonder and Nari (1995), Piscopo (2006), and Marx et al. (2007). For Mexico, see Bruhn (2003), Rodríguez (2003), Baldez (2004 and 2008), and Piscopo (forthcoming).

[2] Using the data from Aleman et al. 2009, I independently verified this assertion by comparing the roll-call ideal point estimates across the administrations considered for my study.

[3] Bills addressing the following matters were eliminated from the dataset: property transfers, national holidays, declarations of historic sites, renaming of places or buildings, territorial borders, and the lottery.

[4] I am fluent in Spanish and coded all bills. For coding scheme (1), I read the title of all 4,829 bills and assigned a code based on keywords. For coding schemes (2) and (3), I read the title, executive summary, and, if necessary, the proposal itself; I identified the purpose behind the proposal and/or the constituencies that would benefit, and assigned women's interest codes accordingly. I consulted with Argentine legal experts for clarification when appropriate.

[5] While the Argentine quota was introduced in 1991, data availability limits the study to beginning in 1999.

[6] Data on party rank, legislative specialization, incumbency, and legislative experience are drawn from Argentina's *Directorio Legislativo* [Legislative Directory]. The Legislative Directory is compiled annually by an Argentine non-governmental organization dedicated to government transparency. Data on the author's home province and party identification come from the on-line congressional archives, from where the bills were also downloaded.

[7] Incumbency, total number of terms served, and provincial origin are included as control variables. For some years, certain party categories are dropped from the models; for instance, "party left" is dropped for regressions performed for the year 1999. This occurs because, for that year in the Argentine legislature, there were either no parties present that matched the ideological description or all the observations for that party were perfectly correlated with no outcomes on the dependent variable. Please contact author to see full regression results.

[8] For instance, "Rights for Disadvantaged Groups" includes all bills relating to reparations, amnesty, or other extant matters from Argentina's 1976-1983 military dictatorship. Moving these bills from the category of "Rights for Disadvantaged Groups" to the category of "Judicial and Penal Reforms" had no effect on either the sign or significance of the coefficient for both categories.

[9] Of those legislators who *do* substantively represent women, 92 are women and 103 are men. Female representatives account for 181 of the 586 legislators, and 92 divided by 181 is 50.8%: thus, half of female legislators in the Argentine lower house introduced at least one women's interest bill. Male representatives, by contrast, account for 405 of the 586 legislators, and 103 divided 405 is 25.4%: only one quarter of male legislators in the Argentine lower house introduced at least one women's interest bill.

[10] Data were drawn from the on-line congressional archives for the Mexican Chamber of Deputies as well as from the Mexican Congress's independent research center CEAMEG, *Centro de Estudios para el Adelanto y la Equidad de la Mujer* (Center for the Study of Women's Advancement and Equity).

[11] Ideologically categorizing the PRI in Mexico is increasingly similar to categorizing the PJ in Argentina. Both parties began as leftist parties based on populist platforms of land reform, social services, and wealth redistribution. Over time, however, both parties have developed a "catchall" ideology to stay in power. The PRI, increasingly under electoral pressure from the PRD on the left and the PAN on the right, has become programmatically opportunistic and ideologically heterogeneous. For this reason, the party is frequently treated as moderate or middle-of-the-road.

[12] Of the 215 legislators who authored the 360 WSR bills, 89 (41.4%) were men and 126 (58.6%) were women. Mexican deputies seated during the 1997-2009 period totaled 1,595 men and 404 women (these numbers are higher than in Argentina due to the larger chamber size as well as the prohibition on reelection). Dividing 89 by 1,595 and 126 by 404 reveals the following: only 5.6% of male legislators in Mexico authored at least one WSR bill, compared to 31% of female legislators.

[13] Twenty five of the 360 bills in the dataset (7%) had multiple authors.

[14] While it may seem surprising for an "Ecological Green" party to be categorized as right, the PVEM in Mexico self-describes as "conservative ecologist" and frequently allies with the PAN to generate congressional majorities.

[15] Unfortunately, data on the legislators' list position in Mexico was not available.

[16] The electoral map showing the five *circunscripciones* can be downloaded from Mexico's *Instituto Federal Electoral* Federal Electoral Institute] (http://www.ife.org.mx). I also performed the regressions using an alternate coding for electoral constituency that divided Mexico's 32 states into north, center, and south. Neither variable was significant.
[17] In regressions treating traditional gender roles as the dependent variable, the independent variables for left-leaning party and right-leaning party were dropped, as these variables perfectly correlated with no observations on the dependent variable.
[18] I conducted 15 interviews with current and former female legislators from the PAN, PRI, and PRD in Mexico City in December 2009. I conducted 33 interviews with female *and* male legislators from an array of political parties in Argentina. The Argentine interviews were conducted during three trips: August-September 2005, August 2007, and February-August 2009.
[19] This process began with the construction of an integrated, multi-class, multi-ethnic women's movement in Mexico, which included the widespread participation of female politicians (Lamas et al 1995; Tarrés 2006).
[20] The *Parlamento de Mujeres* was held from 1998 to 2006, suspended in 2007, 2008, and 2009, and re-inaugurated in 2010.
[21] Sara Lovera, 23 June 2000. http://www.cimac.org.mx/noticias/00jun/00062304.html
[22] Address to the presidents of the states' electoral institutes. 25 September 2003 in the City of Chetumal, Quintana Roo, Mexico

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