

# The Chills and Thrills of Whole Genome Sequencing

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**Thanks to:** E. Ayday, P. Baldi, R. Baronio, G. Danezis,  
S. Faber, P. Gasti, J-P. Hubaux, G. Tsudik

# TL;DR

## Progress in Genomics...

Enables advances in medicine and healthcare

Gives rise to a market for genetic testing

Prompts a greater good vs privacy tension


## Genomic Data is...

Extremely sensitive



Inherently hard to anonymize

## In this talk...

A computer scientist's perspective



# How to read the genome?



## Sequencing

Determining the full nucleotide order of an organism's genome

## Genotyping

Determining genetic differences using a set of markers

# WGS Progress

## Some dates

- 1970s: DNA sequencing starts
- 1990: The “Human Genome Project” starts
- 2003: First human genome fully sequenced
- 2005: Personal Genome Project (PGP) starts
- 2012: UK announces sequencing of 100K genomes

## Some numbers

- \$3B: Human Genome Project
- \$250K: Illumina (2008)
- \$5K: Complete Genomics (2009), Illumina (2011)
- \$1K: Illumina (2014)

1/05/2011 @ 4:57PM | 30,076 views

# Genetic Gamble

*New Approaches to Fighting Cancer*

PART ONE  
A Race to Leukemia's Source

PART TWO  
Promise and Heartbreak

## The First Child Saved By DNA Sequencing

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## In Treatment for Leukemia, Glimpses of the Future



## LETTER

doi:10.1038/nature13394

# Genome sequencing identifies major causes of severe intellectual disability

Christian Gilissen<sup>1\*</sup>, Jayne Y. Hehir-Kwa<sup>1\*</sup>, Djie Tjwan Thung<sup>1</sup>, Maartje van de Vorst<sup>1</sup>, Bregje W. M. van Bon<sup>1</sup>, Marjolein H. Willemsen<sup>1</sup>, Michael Kwint<sup>1</sup>, Irene M. Janssen<sup>1</sup>, Alexander Hoischen<sup>1</sup>, Annette Schenck<sup>1</sup>, Richard Leach<sup>2</sup>, Robert Klein<sup>2</sup>, Rick Tearle<sup>2</sup>, Tan Bo<sup>1,3</sup>, Rolph Pfundt<sup>1</sup>, Helger G. Yntema<sup>1</sup>, Bert B. A. de Vries<sup>1</sup>, Tjitske Kleefstra<sup>1</sup>, Han G. Brunner<sup>1,4\*</sup>, Lisenka E. L. M. Vissers<sup>1\*</sup> & Joris A. Veltman<sup>1,4\*</sup>

# The Good News

Affordable WGS facilitates the creation of large datasets for research purposes

Crucial for hypothesis-driven research

Low-cost WGS will bring genomics to the masses

Motivated by clinical care and/or personal curiosity, a large number of individuals will have the means to have their (fully) genome sequenced, and possibly store/retain it

In general, genomic tests can be done “in silico”, using specialized computation algorithms

MAY 27, 2013



# TIME

## THE ANGELINA EFFECT

Angelina Jolie's double mastectomy puts genetic testing in the spotlight. What her choice reveals about calculating risk, cost and peace of mind

BY JEFFREY KLUGER & ALICE PARK

time.com

Time

# disease risk

Share my health results with family and friends

## Show results for

[See new and recently updated reports »](#)

 23andWe Discoveries were made possible by 23andMe members who took surveys.

### Elevated Risk

Name	Confidence	Your Risk	Avg. Risk	Compared to Average
Type 2 Diabetes	★★★★	23.6%	18.2%	1.30x higher risk 
Age-related Macular Degeneration	★★★★	16.1%	7.0%	2.30x higher risk 
Exfoliation Glaucoma	★★★★	2.9%	1.0%	2.89x higher risk 
Bipolar Disorder	★★★★	0.2%	0.1%	1.44x higher risk 
Ankylosing Spondylitis	★★★			
Gallstones	★★★			
High Blood Pressure (Hypertension)	★★★			
Primary Biliary Cirrhosis	★★★			
Stomach Cancer	★★★			
Thyroid Cancer	★★★			
Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate	★★			
Essential Tremor	★★			

# AncestryDNA Results


Your genetic ethnicity reveals where your ancestors lived hundreds—perhaps even thousands—of years ago.



Scandinavian	33%
British Isles	26%
Eastern European	17%
Central European	14%
Uncertain	10%

[See Full Results](#)

# Genome: A CS Perspective



```
ex1.sam
1 @HD V1:NCBI-REF-GENOME-1.0
2 @SQ SN:chr1
3 @SQ SN:chr2
4 @CO ID:1
5 B7_59
6 EAS54
7 EAS54
8 B7_59
9 EAS54
10 EAS54
11 EAS12
12 B7_59
13 EAS12
14 EAS54
15 EAS12
16 B7_59
17 EAS54
18 EAS54
19 EAS51_64:5:257:960:682 73 seq1 31 75 35M * 0 0 AACTCGTCCATGGCCCAGCATTAGGGAGCTGTGGA
20 EAS54_61:4:143:69:578 99 seq1 36 98 35M = 185 184 GTACATGGCCCAGCATTAGGGAGCTGTGGACCCCG
=====;=====48=844;=-;+==*57,2+5&,5+5 MF:i:18 Aq:i:35 NM:i:2 UQ:i:38 H0:i:0 H1:i:1
```

# Genomics: A CS Perspective

Once sequenced... a genome becomes an  
(annotated) file

Needs to be stored somewhere

Can be queried/searched/tested/etc

But... not all data are  
created equal!

# Security Researcher's Perspective

Genome = the ultimate **identifier**

Hard to anonymize / de-identify

Treasure trove of **sensitive** information

Ethnic heritage, predisposition to diseases

Sensitivity is **perpetual**

Cannot be “revoked”

Leaking one's genome ≈ leaking **relatives'** genome

# The Greater Good vs Privacy?

Genomic advances dependent on **data sharing**

Sharing is an important **asset** for research in genomics

Privacy and discrimination fears are **top concerns**

# With genetic testing, I gave my parents the gift of divorce

Updated by George Doe on September 9, 2014, 7:50 a.m. ET

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TECH 4/25/2013 @ 3:47PM | 17,111 views

## Harvard Professor Re-Identifies Anonymous Volunteers In DNA Study

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
A Harvard professor has re-identified the names of more than 40% of a sample of anonymous participants in a high-profile DNA study, highlighting the dangers that ever greater amounts of personal data available in the Internet era could unravel personal secrets.

From the onset, the [Personal Genome Project](#),



# The rise of a new research community

Studying privacy issues



Exploring techniques to protect privacy



# Kin Privacy

Quantifying how much privacy do relatives lose when one genome is leaked?



M. Humbert et al., “*Addressing the Concerns of the Lacks Family: Quantification of Kin Genomic Privacy.*” Proceedings of ACM CCS, 2013

# Re-Identification

TECH 4/25/2013 @ 3:47PM | 17,111 views

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[+ Comment Now](#) [+ Follow Comments](#)

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From the onset, the [Personal Genome Project](#),



Harvard Professor Latanya Sweeney

Melissa Gymrek et al. “*Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference.*” Science Vol. 339, No. 6117, 2013

# Studying Privacy

OK... anonymization doesn't really work.  
What about aggregation?

Even statistics from allele frequencies can be used to identify genetic trial participants

Rui Wang et al. "Learning Your Identity and Disease from Research Papers: Information Leaks in Genome Wide Association Study." Proceedings of ACM CCS, 2009

Routes for breaching privacy

Y. Erlich and A. Narayanan. "Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy." Nature Review Genetics, Vol. 15, No. 6, 2014

# With genetic testing, I gave my parents the gift of divorce

Updated by George Doe on September 9, 2014, 7:50 a.m. ET

 TWEET    SHARE   +



## Most Read

1

Read the Iranian foreign minister's passive aggressive response to Tony Blair

2

Where the world's migrants go, in one chart

3

Why there's a roaring controversy over Hillary Clinton's "homebrewed" email server


4

A new theory for why the bees are vanishing

5

# The rise of a new research community


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
# Differential Privacy



Maximizing the accuracy of queries from statistical databases

Minimizing the chances of identifying its records

# Differential Privacy



## Supporting Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS)

Computing number and location of SNPs associated to disease  
Test significance, correlation, etc. between a SNP and a disease

A. Johnson and V. Shmatikov. “Privacy-Preserving Data Exploration in Genome-Wide Association Studies.” Proceedings of KDD, 2013

# Privacy-Friendly Personal Genomics

# Privacy-preserving Genomic Tests

## Privacy as **control**


User's genome never disclosed (unless encrypted)

Doctors/labs run genomic tests on encrypted data


Disclose only the minimum **required amount of information**:

- Individuals don't reveal their entire genome, and
- Testing facilities keep test specifics confidential

Two main approaches...



## CERTIFIED INSTITUTION (CI)



# 1. Users keep sequenced genomes

Baldi et al. (CCS'11)

Privacy-preserving version of a few genetic tests, based on private set operations

Paternity test, Personalized Medicine, Compatibility Tests  
(First work to consider fully sequenced genomes)

De Cristofaro et al. (WPES'12), extends the above

Framework and prototype deployment on Android  
Adds Ancestry/Genealogy Testing

More by yours truly ☺

## 2. Using Semi-Trusted Parties

Ayday et al. (WPES'13)

Data is encrypted and stored at a “Storage Process Unit”

Disease susceptibility testing

Ayday et al. (DPM'13)

Encrypting raw genomic data (short reads)

Allowing medical unit to privately retrieve them

# Open Problems

## Storage

If storing encrypted genomes at semi-trusted parties, encryption can't guarantee **security** past 30-50 yrs

If users keep (encrypted) copies of their genome, **reliability** and **availability** issues?

## Miscellaneous

How much understanding/involvement required from **users**? **Key** distribution?

**Efficiency** overhead incurred by privacy protection layer?

Data representation **assumptions**:

Insertions, deletions, sequencing errors, ...

# Question?

Why do we care about genome privacy???

**We all leave biological cells behind...**

Hair, saliva, etc., can be collected and sequenced?

But... collecting and sequencing samples is  
**expensive, illegal, prone to mistakes**

**Different scale of attacks!**