



THE LEDGER.

Identify contract audit:
Presale phase summary

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**“In a gentle way you can
shake the world.”**

- Mahatma Gandhi

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CONCLUSION

We audited all the contracts in the pre-sale and we deem them as production ready. We do still recommend reviewing the contracts by multiple third parties.

We are aware a possible integer underflow and reentrancy is possible at the "approveAndCall" method in the CustomToken.sol smart contract. But this is not one of a critical kind.

This document is a summary of a complete audit document delivered on Friday 20th of April 2018. The hash (checksum of sha-256) of the complete delivered audit document is:

D2057B02AD897B8F00AF7DD7D1DBEEEF4B947C73C63225DEA8DF3362A
6F420E0

STATIC ANALYSIS RESULT¹

We ran the codebase through multiple open-source analysis tools to check for well-known bugs, errors and attack vectors.

Attack vector	Result
EVM Code Coverage ²	100%
Callstack Depth Attack Vulnerability	False
Transaction-Ordering Dependence (TOD)	False
Timestamp Dependency	False
Re-Entrancy Vulnerability	False
Parity multisig bug 2	False

¹ Using multiple open source tools like [Oyente](#) and [Mythril](#)

² Number of opcodes executed / total number of opcodes

TESTED VULNERABILITIES

In the table below, we summed up some well-known vulnerabilities. Divided in 3 levels: Solidity, EVM and blockchain. On the last column a description is of possibility is written down.

Level	Cause of vulnerability	Possible
Solidity	Call to the unknown (DAO)	Only in the approveAndCall method. But this has no critical effects.
	Gasless send	No.
	Exception disorders	Using 'required' keywords to check input parameters.
	Type casts	Not applicable.
	Reentrancy	In the CustomToken approveandcall method due to the low-level call method. But checks are in place to not harm the contract when this is executed.
	Keeping secrets	No secrets are necessary.

EVM	Immutable bugs	Tests are written for finding bugs. Note that there can never be a 100% certainty of bug-free contracts.
	Ether/token lost in transfer	Don't send to 'orphan' addresses. Meaning addresses that are not associated to any user or contract. But these tokens can be transferred back by the owner of the token.
Blockchain	Unpredictable state	Multiple checks are in place.
	Time constraints	Only for begin and end time of presale. But miners can only modify time in a small way. These small modifies have no serious impact on the presale.

TESTS

The total code coverage is 96% on functions.³ Tests are written in JavaScript.

Contract	#test
Identify Token	20
Presale	24
Whitelist	19
MultiSig	22
Total	85

³ Tested with the solidity-coverage tool from sc-forks (<https://github.com/sc-forks/solidity-coverage>)

SAFETY FUNCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION

PAUSE FUNCTION

This function can only be invoked by the owner of the presale. This is a safety function when things go wrong, or a bug is found, the damage will be limited.

ENABLE TRANSFER FUNCTION

The enable transfer will only be used in the transfer and transferFrom (and functions derived from it) functions. Your contract still works properly, just the transferring of tokens will be enabled or disabled. This can be useful when a malicious person has found a way to extract tokens. Through the enableTransfer this will be stopped. When implementing a burn function, these tokens can be burned.

ISCONTRACT FUNCTION

Contracts cannot participate in the presale. This choice is obviously made to reduce the attack vector.