

TOUGH CHOICES: EXCEPTED SERVICE APPOINTMENTS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ALLOCATION OF ATTENTION

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April 13, 2015

INTRODUCTION



PHOTO: BILL O'LEARY; JIM LEE/ GETTY IMAGES

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WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT APPOINTMENTS?

- Scholars have been particularly concerned with politicization of the bureaucracy (e.g. Hart 1995; Heclo 1975; Lewis 2005, 2008).
- Tradeoff between political loyalists and experts (e.g. Hollibaugh forthcoming; Moe 1985; Parsneau 2013).
 - While experts cannot be trusted to advance the president's political interests (Moe 1985)...
 - ...loyalists lack the skill to execute policy well or efficiently (e.g. Lewis 2005; Gilmour and Lewis 2006; Heclo 1975, 1977).
- Presidents may decide based on patronage considerations (e.g. Hollibaugh et al. forthcoming; Patterson 2008; Tolchin and Tolchin 2010).
- Low-level appointees largely slip under the radar of media and congressional oversight (Lewis and Waterman 2013).

WHAT DON'T WE KNOW ABOUT APPOINTMENTS?

- Presidents have many options in their toolkits for advancing policy (e.g. Rudalevige 2002). Staffing is one of those tools.
- While influence is largely studied, attention is not.
 - We do not know how presidents allocate finite administrative resources.
- Agenda Setting and issue agenda literature largely focused on how the media or public opinion shapes the agenda the president pursues with Congress (e.g. Cohen 1995; Edwards and Wood 1999; Hill 1998).

WHY WOULD ATTENTION VARY ACROSS AGENCIES


- Agencies may differ in their willingness to follow the president's directives based on the ideological leaning of the agency (Aberbach and Rockman 1976, 1995, 2000; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Clinton and Lewis 2008; Clinton et al. 2012; Hollibaugh et al. forthcoming)
- It is not obvious which way this relationship would go.
 - Presidents could support agencies which are ideologically similar.
 - But an argument could just as easily be made that presidents support ideologically dissimilar agencies.
- No clear theory for how bureaucratic agencies are operated internally.
- Appointments present an opportunity cost. An appointment in one area is not available for an appointment elsewhere.

EXCEPTED SERVICE AND ATTENTION

- There are many different types of Excepted Service Appointments.
- Excepted Service Appointments are flexible.
- Excepted Service Appointments do not undergo advice and consent.



Excepted Service Executive and Schedule C Appointments Over Time




EXPECTATIONS

- We expect that president will use these flexible appointments especially in urgent situations.
- We expect that agencies tasked with communicating the president's message to Congress or the public to be staffed using Excepted Service.
- We expect that agency ideology will be connected with staffing by Excepted Service.
- We expect changes in attention between presidents to reflect their relative agendas.


- OPM produces an online "statistical datamart," which includes information about most federal employees and most agencies from 1998-2013.
- Few studies utilize this data.
- 692 agencies exist over the period with varying levels of agency aggregation.
- Within the agency, we can determine total employment broken down by appointment type.

URGENCY

Proportion Homeland Security Headquarters that is SC or ESE




Number in Homeland Security Headquarters that is SC or ESE




LIAISON AGENCIES

Proportion SC and ESE in Labor Congressional Affairs Office



Average Proportion of SC and ESE in an Agency




ATTENTION AND IDEOLOGY

- The result is meant to serve as a validation of using Schedule C and ESE appointments to study attention.
- Ideology is measured as the absolute distance between the agency ideal point and the president's ideal point.
- Negative Binomial Regression Model.
 - Outcome Variable: Counts of Schedule C and ESE appointments in each agency 1998-2013.
 - Model includes ideology measure, presidential dummies, and agency fixed effects.

IDEOLOGY

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	SC and ESE Apts	
Ideology	0.218 (0.06)	0.058 (0.023)
Bush	0.048 (0.110)	0.007 (0.023)
Obama	0.018 (0.118)	-0.018 (0.025)
Constant	3.08 (0.108)	-0.011 (0.506)
<hr/>		
Agency Fixed Effects	No	Yes
Observations	1,213	1,213
Log Likelihood	-5,047.143	-3,140.066
θ	0.513(0.019)	51.100 (6.226)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,102.290	6,442.132

Regression Results




SHARE OF ATTENTION


- Looking at which agencies receive the largest share of the total Schedule C and ESE appointments is another way to look at attention.
- Of the total Schedule C and ESE appointments, which agencies are getting more or less?
- The changes in the share of attention should be suggestive of differences in the president's agenda at different time periods.
- This analysis seeks to capture policy dimensions, not the ideological dimension.

APPOINTMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIORITIES

Change in Attention: Obama('09) Minus Bush('01)



APPOINTMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIORITIES



CONCLUSION

- Attention is important but understudied
- We know little about how presidents apportion their more flexible personnel.
- Schedule C and Excepted Service Executive Appointments appear to be good for measuring attention.
 - As we would expect, there are high proportions of these appointments in a new agency, which then declines over time.
 - Also as expected, liaison agencies have consistently high proportions of these appointments for all presidents.
 - Ideology is correlated with counts of these appointments. The negative relationship might be suggestive for future theory-building.
 - Changes in shares of attention do appear suggestive of elements of the Bush and Obama agendas.

BUSH AND OBAMA UNIFIED AND DIVIDED

More Attention in 2006			More Attention in 2007		
DJ09	Office U.S. Attorney	-0.00641	DN00	Department of Energy	0.00414
DJ01	Just. Ofs, Boards, and Divs.	-0.00465	DD01	Ofc. Secretary Defense	0.00374
HSDA	Nuclear Detection Office	-0.00434	NF00	Natl Science Found.	0.00371
DD34	Defense Commissary Agency	-0.00257	TC00	U.S. Intl Trade Comm.	0.00286
DJ07	Ofc. of Justice Programs	-0.00219	TR91	Treas. Departmental Ofcs.	0.00261
CM54	NOAA	-0.00217	AH03	Inst. Museum and Library Serv.	0.00244
NV18	Naval Medical Command	-0.00173	SB00	Small Business Admin.	0.00234
IB00	Broadcasting Board of Govs.	-0.00172	VAAD	Board Veteran's Appeals	0.0021
CM51	Office Sec. Commerce	-0.00153	AH01	Natl Endowment Arts	0.00202
EP00	EPA	-0.00153	AG07	Rural Housing	0.00186

More Attention in 2010			More Attention in 2011		
DN00	Department of Energy	-0.00752	DJ08	U.S. Marshal's Service	0.00907
TR91	Treasury Departmental Offices	-0.00619	AF13	USAF HQ and Support	0.00478
EDEA	Secretary of Education	-0.00527	EDEE	Undersec. of Education	0.0039
AF0N	HQ USAF	-0.00349	DJ09	Office U.S. Attorney	0.00381
CM51	Secretary Commerce	-0.00267	VAAD	Board Veteran's Appeals	0.00346
IN01	Secretary Interior	-0.00267	AM00	USAID	0.0026
HSDA	Nuclear Detection Office	-0.00262	SB00	Small Business Admin.	0.00256
DJ01	Justice Offices, Boards, and Divs	-0.00228	AG01	Office Secretary Agriculture	0.00213
DD60	DOD Tricare Management	-0.00218	SZ00	Social Security Admin.	0.00174
ST00	State Department	-0.00192	FW00	Office of Special Counsel	0.00174

ZERO INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	AllCount
abs(Ideo)	0.059*** (0.023)
Bush	0.008 (0.023)
Obama	-0.014 (0.025)
Constant	-0.015 (0.505)