Hazard Analysis ScoreGen

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Table 1: Revision History

Date	Developer(s)	Change
25-10-2024	Jackson, Emily, Mark, Ian	Revision 0
28-10-2024	Jackson	Issue 123: peer review
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Contents

1	Introduction											
2 Scope and Purpose of Hazard Analysis												
3	System Boundaries and Components											
	3.1 The Application											
	3.1.1 User Interface (UI)											
	3.1.2 Back-end Software											
	3.2 User Device											
	3.3 User External Input Devices											
4 5	Critical Assumptions Failure Mode and Effect Analysis											
6	Safety and Security Requirements											
7	Roadmap											
	7.1 Safety-Critical Requirements											
	7.2 Privacy Requirements											
	7.3 Access Requirements											
	7.4 Audit and Immunity Requirements											

List of Tables

1	Revision History														
	FMEA														

1 Introduction

Hazards within a software system are not physically dangerous in the same way other engineering systems can be, but nonetheless there are still inherent properties of this system that when combined with its environment have the potential to cause harm. In the case of ScoreGen, a hazard is any situation or condition that may produce an undesirable outcome for any of the system's stakeholders. The hazardous outcomes of this system are not likely to cause physical harm, but may instead provide harm to a user's mental wellbeing, reputation, and other intangible ill-effects. There is a possibility of physical hazards that arise from interfacing with external systems, which may cause bodily harm in addition to the non-physical effects.

2 Scope and Purpose of Hazard Analysis

Hazards within the system have potential to incur losses on behalf of the developers, users, and other stakeholders. Performing a hazard analysis on the ScoreGen system can reduce the scope of potential losses and ensure the correct mitigation strategies are in place. Risks and liabilities of the system are likely to reduce user satisfaction with the system, pushing them away from our product and losing their trust. Accumulation of such occurrences will damage the system developers' reputation, making it difficult to compete with other software systems that provide similar functionalities.

This hazard analysis will focus on potential hazards arising from the software system being designed (ScoreGen), but hazard scope is extended to include various external interfacing systems as well. These systems include an Audio Interfacer (a device needed to process continuous signals from a cable audio input), the user's instrument of choice, and the device being used to run the application.

3 System Boundaries and Components

Outlined below are the key components that define the system and its interactions. These include both software and hardware elements.

3.1 The Application

3.1.1 User Interface (UI)

A graphical user interface (GUI) that allows the users to interact with the application. The user will use the GUI to upload audio files, export files, and view system feedback.

3.1.2 Back-end Software

The core of the application that processes user input, it can be further broken down into the following:

- Raw audio data processing: Read in audio signals and convert to symbolic music notation (e.g., .WAV to MIDI).
- **Transcription:** Convert the processed data to music layout formats for rendering into sheet music.
- **File management:** Export symbolic music data or rendered sheet music (MIDI, musicXML, PDF).

3.2 User Device

The device that the user will install and run the application on. The device provides the existing hardware and software that the application will interact with, such as the operating system (OS) and relevant system libraries that perform I/O operations (e.g., file management, audio device access, etc.).

3.3 User External Input Devices

Other devices or hardware the user may have, such as microphones, audio interfaces, or instruments.

4 Critical Assumptions

Critical Assumptions About Users

User Environment

Users will operate in a reasonably quiet environment when recording to minimize background noise and ensure clear audio capture.

User Knowledge and Skills

Users possess a basic understanding of how to connect and use audio equipment (e.g., microphones) and navigate the application interface effectively.

Technical Proficiency

Users have a general level of comfort and familiarity with technology, enabling them to troubleshoot minor issues independently without significant frustration.

User Intent

Users are genuinely interested in creating music and will not intentionally misuse the product or engage in harmful behaviors that could disrupt functionality.

Hardware Availability

Users have access to compatible devices and equipment necessary for the application to function properly (e.g., computers, microphones).

5 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

Table 2: FMEA

			e and Effects Ana	alysis		
	lio to sheet music g					
	e: System Requirer		- C	D 1.1	GD.	- D C
Design	Failure	Effects of	Causes of	Recommended	\mathbf{SR}	Ref.
Function	Modes	Failure	Failure	Action		
Generate	Sheet music	Potential	Incorrect	Limit screen	PR-SC1	
sheet music	flashes on the	trigger for users	rendering or	effects that		
	screen	with epilepsy.	scrolling	could		
			through the	potentially		
			sheet music	flicker		
	A bad	Embarassment	The user	Point to	N/A	
	microphone	for the user	microphone has	troubleshooting		
	causes notes to		pitch drift	steps or suggest		
	be off due to		(mechanical	that the User		
	pitch drift		issue)	should acquire a		
			,	new/higher		
				quality		
				microphone		
Process	Audio	Loss of musical	Microphone	Notify the user	N/A	
audio	improperly	performance	error	that there is a	,	
	recorded			microphone		
				issue		
			Signal	Notify the user	FR-SP4	
			processing error	that a signal		
				processing error		
				that has		
				occurred		

File	Files outside	Hardware	Improper file	Limit system	S-P1
functions	scope of the	failure if BIOS	I/O actions	access	
	application are	and system			
	deleted	critical files are			
		deleted			
	Files outside	Hardware	Improper file	Limit system	S-P1
	scope of the	failure if BIOS	I/O actions	access	
	application are	and system			
	modified	critical files are			
		modified			
Output	Overly loud	Hearing damage	Volume settings	Advise user to	N/A
audio	audio emitted		improperly	check their	
			calibrated	device's volume	
				settings	
		User is	Volume settings	Advise user to	N/A
		surprised and	improperly	check their	
		has a heart	calibrated	device's volume	
		attack		settings	
Application	App crashes	User loses	Power outage,	Regular	PR-
runtime	unexpectedly	progress	OOM error,	automated	RFT3
			device	saving, if	
			overheats,	allowed by user	
			malware		

6 Safety and Security Requirements

Currently, there are no new safety or security requirements, but any new requirements will be added to this document as part of our iterative development process. Newly discovered requirements will also be evaluated and incorporated into the SRS to ensure alignment with evolving project needs and insights gained during development.

7 Roadmap

We will aim to fulfill every one of the security and safety-critical requirements within the timeline of the capstone course, and we will be loosely following the compliance of the requirements based on the priority assigned below:

7.1 Safety-Critical Requirements

• PR-SC1 Epilepsy Safety: *High priority*, as it ensures the app's visual safety for users from the start. Compliance with WCAG 2.1 should be confirmed early on to prevent any risks during development.

• PR-SC2 Instrument Input Setup: *High priority* for both user safety and accurate functionality, ensuring users can set up their instruments without misconfiguration. This interactive guide can be iteratively refined through user testing early in development.

7.2 Privacy Requirements

- S-P2 PII: *High priority*, as ensuring the app does not collect any Personal Identifiable Information aligns with the app's privacy-first design. This requirement should be validated as soon as any data processing is introduced.
- S-P3 Input Data: Low priority, focusing on ensuring that temporary files are properly cleared after processing is complete. Implementing this is less critical since we will not be storing any data outside of the user's system.
- S-P1 Data Storage: *Medium priority*, ensuring that user-generated data is stored in local, user-chosen locations. This feature should be verified once output functions are introduced.

7.3 Access Requirements

• S-A1 User Authentication: *High priority*, by removing the need for login functionalities, we will speed up initial development. It should be verified after the core interface is complete.

7.4 Audit and Immunity Requirements

- Audit Requirements (N/A): Low priority, as the system is offline and does not require developer responsibility over user data.
- Immunity Requirements (N/A): Low priority, as no data storage minimizes exposure to security risks.

Appendix — Reflection

The purpose of reflection questions is to give you a chance to assess your own learning and that of your group as a whole, and to find ways to improve in the future. Reflection is an important part of the learning process. Reflection is also an essential component of a successful software development process.

Reflections are most interesting and useful when they're honest, even if the stories they tell are imperfect. You will be marked based on your depth of thought and analysis, and not based on the content of the reflections themselves. Thus, for full marks we encourage you to answer openly and honestly and to avoid simply writing "what you think the evaluator wants to hear."

Please answer the following questions. Some questions can be answered on the team level, but where appropriate, each team member should write their own response:

1. What went well while writing this deliverable?

Mark This deliverable went very smoothly. It demonstrated that the group is on the same page regarding project understanding as there was minimal conflict, and the progress of the task was relatively consistent throughout its duration.

Ian Outlining the system boundaries and components further solidified my understanding of the project and helped me to neatly segment it in my mind. Thinking about and contributing to the analysis also allowed me to recognize that software still has relevant hazards despite the fact that it is non-physical. Without this deliverable, I probably would have given little thought to potential software hazards in other projects or at the very least, undermined its importance.

Emily Writing the introduction section for this deliverable helped me to gain an understanding of how we can mitigate risks and avoid hazards in our project, despite our system not containing many hazards in the traditional sense. When I think 'hazard analysis' my mind goes to things like WHMIS and high voltage training - even the lab trainings I've done for software courses have only ever focused on physical hazards. That being said, there are certainly still other ways for a person to incur loss, and putting this deliverable together painted a better picture in my mind of how we can do our best to mitigate risks throughout our capstone project.

Jackson I think this deliverable was more straightforward than others which allowed us all to have a clear picture of what is expected. As a result, we were able to accomplish the sections we designated as 'group sections' very easily as we could have conversations about hazards without any confusion. This was also helped by our group member Emily, who kindly laid out clear definitions of hazards for us to follow.

2. What pain points did you experience during this deliverable, and how did you resolve them?

Mark The most significant challenge was revising my understanding of hazards, since my traditional approach would be to focus on physical dangers, but due to the software nature of the project, I had to consider issues regarding customer satisfaction, or developer reputation as well. Additionally, it was difficult to determine which hazards could be considered reasonable, as opposed to ones that cannot be addressed and would not be our fault. Fleshing out the critical assumptions helped resolve this pain point and create a better understanding of how to think of new hazards.

Ian One of the pain points I experienced was the feeling that the system components section was lacking in quantity. I sometimes mistakenly associate quantity with quality. This was easily resolved just by going through everything our team has fleshed out for this project so far with a fine tooth comb and making sure no major components are missing.

Emily The part of this deliverable that I thought went well was simultaneously the largest pain point - brainstorming the possible non-physical hazards for ScoreGen. The process overall helped me to expand my understanding of a hazard, but it took a lot of back and forth for us to settle on and come up with a viable set of potential hazards. This is the kind of pain point that can't really be resolved, but just has to be worked through instead. Talking aloud and throwing ideas at one another helped to ease the brainstorming process and finalize the FMEA.

Jackson I think there was one main pain point that stood out in my mind, which was redundancy. This came about because much of what we are discussing in this document was already discussed at length in the form of security and safety requirements, along with use cases and risks. While we were writing some of the sections it felt very redundant to be repeating the points we already made, and in an effort to reduce redundancy, we tried our best to link things back to other sections, which proved to be difficult since the deliverables were so large in scope.

3. Which of your listed risks had your team thought of before this deliverable, and which did you think of while doing this deliverable? For the latter ones (ones you thought of while doing the Hazard Analysis), how did they come about?

Team-level Reflection:

Before writing this deliverable our team thought that unexpected crashes

would appear as a potential hazard. Since software systems aren't inherently 'hazardous,' we saw unexpected crashes as a more general, intuitive hazard applicable to similar applications. All of the other hazards came about through brainstorming as a team. Our approach to brainstorming proved very effective and made the process of thinking of hazards easier. We first approached this by trying to come up with hazards directly but found that identifying the design functions first was easier. After identifying these functions, we began exploring each area individually rather than approaching the whole system at once.

4. Other than the risk of physical harm (some projects may not have any appreciable risks of this form), list at least 2 other types of risk in software products. Why are they important to consider?

Legal Risk: Software products can carry legal risks, such as copyright infringement, data privacy violations, or failing to comply with industry regulations. These risks are important to consider because they can result in lawsuits, fines, or a loss of trust in the company. Ensuring compliance with laws and obtaining necessary licenses or permissions can mitigate these risks.

User Satisfaction Risk: A software product that doesn't meet user expectations or is difficult to use can lead to poor user satisfaction. This is crucial because low satisfaction can result in negative reviews, loss of users, and damage to our brand's reputation. Prioritizing user experience through thorough testing and feedback can help address this risk.