

# Online Appendix

## Sampling Strategy

Out of the ethnic groups in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, I selected minority groups that (1) are either powerless, discriminated, or self-excluded (so they are under risk of repression), and (2) have at least one powerful ethnic kin group, defined by their access to political power at the level of monopoly, dominance, or senior partnership in the executive branch of the government.

A disadvantaged minority is either i) powerless, ii) self-excluded, or iii) discriminated. Powerless minority groups have no access to political power at national level. Self-exclusion implies that the minority group excluded itself from the central authority and declared autonomy or independence in its own territory. Lastly, discriminated minority groups are excluded from political power intentionally by the central government.

I consider an external ethnic kin group as powerful if it has access to political power in its own country. This access may be in the form of monopoly, dominance, senior partner, or junior partner. Since being only a junior partner in the government would require more complex theoretical explanations (e.g. coalition politics), I focus on higher levels of access to political power in which an external kin can directly influence its government's policy towards the disadvantaged minority group.

There were 195 minority groups with 69 Ethnic Kin those met these criteria. Next, I excluded the cases in which:

- the minority group is challenging to identify or distinguish and collecting

data is difficult (e.g. the "Other Indigenous Groups" in Chile with Bolivia as the External Kin; or "Indigenous People" in Liberia with Mali as the External Kin; or "Other Southern Nations" in Ethiopia with Kenya as the External Kin).

- the minority group has multiple external kin and none of them has been considered as the primary protector of the minority group (such as the "Arabs" in Chad, Sudan, and Syria with Mali is the External Kin; "Asians" in Uganda with Nepal is the External Kin; or "Christians" in Jordan with Lebanon as the External Kin).
- the minority group is too small (less than 1% of the country's total population) (such as "Mongolians" in China)

After the manual elimination process based on the criteria above, 71 disadvantaged minority groups with 15 powerful external ethnic kin between 1946 – 2017 remained. I picked a sample of 5 powerful ethnic kin (with 20 minority groups and their host governments) with "the goal of having a representative sample with useful variation on certain dimensions".<sup>1</sup> I used a stratified sampling strategy to maximize the regional variation in the external kins and their power status.<sup>2</sup> Regional variation allows me to account for potential differences in perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic kinship, which can be conflated with racial or tribal identities in some regions. Therefore, External Kins from different regions increase representativeness of my sample and the external validity of my findings. Additionally, the power status of

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<sup>1</sup>Seawright, J., Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294-308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>

<sup>2</sup>Cochran, W. G. (1977). *Sampling techniques*. John Wiley Sons, p.89

countries matter, because if I analyze only the great powers, then the results would be biased as great powers are more likely to get involved in the domestic affairs of other countries, and we would probably observe more successful deterrence by these states. Conversely, if I pick small powers only, then the results would be biased again, and we would probably observe failed deterrence mostly. While the definitions of great, middle, and small powers are inevitably subjective to some extent, I define Great Power as a state that claims or has the capacity to claim global hegemony or holds a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Middle powers have no claim to the title of global hegemon or great power but are capable of influencing regional politics to a significant degree. Lastly, Small Powers lack of any claim or capacity to be a great or middle power.<sup>3</sup> The table below shows the cross tabulation of the 15 ethnic kin groups based on region and power status. Region

	Middle East	Europe	Asia	Africa
Great Power		Germany	<b>Russia</b> , China	
Middle Power	<b>Turkey</b> , Israel	<b>Greece</b>	India, Pakistan, Korea	Nigeria
Small Power			Thailand	Mali, <b>Burundi</b> , Niger, <b>Rwanda</b>

Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Regions and Power Status

I selected at least one country from each power status and region, ensuring a diverse representation.

From the Middle East, I had to pick between Turkey and Israel. Since Israel's ethnic kinship overlaps with religious ties, I picked Turkey. This decision left me with no alternative but to select only small Powers from Africa. I randomly choose Burundi and Rwanda. Next, I needed to include a great power, and I chose Russia due to high number of minority groups with kinship. Finally, I had

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<sup>3</sup>Glazebrook G.Det. The Middle Powers in the United Nations System. International Organization. 1947;1(2):307-318. doi:10.1017/S0020818300006081

to decide between Greece and Germany from Europe, and I randomly selected Greece. Once I formed my sample based on the criteria for External Kin, I also ensured that the average minority group size in my sample (0.08549) is close to the average minority group size in the population (0.08732). The final sample includes 675 observations between 1946-2017.

## Data Collection Process

To gather extra data on minority groups, their history, status, and transborder ties, I primarily relied on the yearly country reports from various institutions. These sources encompass the Country Reports and Assessments of the Minorities at Risk Project (<https://www.refworld.org/publisher/MARP.html>), the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports (<https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>), Human Rights Watch World Reports (<https://www.hrw.org/previous-world-reports>), Freedom House's Freedom in the World Reports (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>). I supplemented and verified the data obtained from these systematic data sources by referring to official statements and reports by government offices, news articles, policy reports, and academic publications authored by regional experts (refer to the bibliography at the end).

## Codebook

**dyadid:** The unique ID for each Government-External Kin dyad.

**EK1\_ccode:** COW country code of the External Kin's country (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010).

**year:** Year.

**countries\_gwid:** COW code of the Minority group's country (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010).

**countryname:** Name of the Minority group's country.

**gwgroupid:** EPR-TEK ID of the Minority group (Vogt et al., 2015).

**groupname:** Name of the Minority group (Vogt et al., 2015).

**groupsize:** The percentage of the Minority group's population to total population of its country (Vogt et al., 2015).

**statusname:** Status of the Minority group. A disadvantaged/weak minority group can have one of the following status (Vogt et al., 2015, p. 5):

- **Powerless:** Elite representatives hold no political power (or do not have influence on decision making) at the national level of executive power - although without being explicitly discriminated against.
- **Discriminated:** Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics (excluding discrimination in the socio-economic sphere).
- **Self-exclusion:** The special category of self-exclusion applies to groups that have excluded themselves from central state power, in the sense that they control a particular territory of the state which they have declared independent from the central government.

**SQ:** Coded as "1" if the Minority group remains *Powerless* and does not suffer

active political discrimination according to the “statusname” variable; and coded as “0”, if the Minority is *Discriminated* in the EPR data (Vogt et al., 2015).

**REP:** Coded as “1” if the Minority group suffers active political discrimination according to the “statusname” variable (Vogt et al., 2015).

**Peaceyears\_rep:** Number of years until the occurrence of *Repression*.

**Powerful TEK:** A dichotomous variable coded as “1” if the Minority group has at least one powerful (in the sense of being the major group with access to political power) ethnic kin in another country, and “0” otherwise (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1:** Name of the powerful ethnic kin’s country (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1\_ID** EPR-TEK ID of the External Kin’s country (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1\_Groupname:** Name of the powerful ethnic kin group (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1 Status:** Status of the External Kin in its own country. External Kin can have access to government power at varying levels (Vogt et al., 2015, p. 5):

- Monopoly: Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to the exclusion of members of all other ethnic groups.
- Dominance: Elite members of the group hold dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of members of other groups who however do not have real influence on decision making.
- Senior Partner: Representatives of the group participate as senior partners in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement. By power sharing, we mean any arrangement that divides executive power among leaders who claim to represent particular ethnic groups and who have real influence on political decision making.

**EK1\_from:** The year that *EK's Status* started (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1\_to:** The year that *EK's Status* ended (Vogt et al., 2015).

**EK1\_size:** The percentage of the external kin group's population to total population of its country (Vogt et al., 2015).

**G\_EK\_Contiguity:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the the External Kin's country and the Minority's country are contiguous in any of the following forms (Douglas et al., 2002, p. 3):

- Separated by a land or river border
- Separated by 12 miles of water or less
- Separated by 24 miles of water or less (but more than 12 miles)
- Separated by 150 miles of water or less (but more than 24 miles)
- Separated by 400 miles of water or less (but more than 150 miles)

**GEKalliance:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if there is a defensive, neutrality or nonaggression alliance between the Government and External Kin (Gibler, 2008).

**G\_EK\_DefensiveAlliance:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the Government and External Kin are in a defensive alliance, and "0" otherwise (Gibler, 2008).

**G\_EK\_NeutralityAlliance:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the Government and External Kin signed terms that included neutrality toward one or more states in the alliance, and "0" otherwise (Gibler, 2008).

**G\_EK\_NonaggressionAlliance:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the Government and External Kin signed terms that included a promise of

non-aggression toward one or more states in the alliance, and “0” otherwise (Gibler, 2008).

**G\_EK\_Entente:** A dichotomous variable coded as “1” if the Government and External Kin signed terms that included an understanding that they would consult with one or more states in the alliance if a crisis occurred, and “0” otherwise (Gibler, 2008).

**G\_EK\_Smoothtrade:** Smoothed total trade values between the Government and External Kin. Total trade values is calculated as the sum of imports of Country A from Country B and imports of Country B from Country A, in US millions of current dollars (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins, 2008).

**G\_Cinc:** CINC Score of the Government. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score aggregates the six individual measured components of national material capabilities (total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production) into a single value per state-year. The CINC reflects an average of a state’s share of the system total of each element of capabilities in each year, weighting each component equally. In doing so, the CINC will always range between 0 and 1. “0.0” would indicate that a state had 0% of the total capabilities present in the system in that year, while “1.0” would indicate that the state had 100% of the capabilities in a given year (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972, p. 8).

**EK\_Cinc:** CINC Score of the External Kin. Coding rules are same with the *Government’s CINC Score* (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).

**CincRatio:** Equals to  $EK\_Cinc / G\_Cinc$ . It measures the ratio of material powers of the External Kin to Government. The higher the EK\_cinc compared to G\_cinc, the higher the CincRatio. In other words, higher CincRatio means more



powerful EK (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).

**G\_RegimeType:** Regime type of the Government. It is coded as follows (Coppedge et al., 2018):

- 1= Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index.
- 2= Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index, but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem’s Liberal Component Index.
- 3= Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem’s Liberal Component Index.

**EK\_RegimeType:** Regime type of the External Kin. Coding rules are same with the *Government’s Democracy Level* (Coppedge et al., 2018)

**G\_EthnicFract:** The probability that two individuals selected at random from Minority and Government’s country will be from different ethnic groups [0-1] (Fearon, 2003).

**EK\_EthnicFract:** the probability that two individuals selected at random from External Kin's country will be from different ethnic groups [0-1] (Fearon, 2003).

**Dispersion:** The initial reason that the minority and external kin live in different countries:

- 1= Migration
- 2= Collapse of an Empire
- 3= Colonial Borders
- 4= Never lived together (but historically share the same ethnic origins)

**Dispersion2:** A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if Dispersion is equal to 1, 2, or 3; and "0" otherwise.

**M\_EK\_LangRel:** In addition to the shared ethnic origins, the minority and external kin can also share the same language and/or religion:

- 0=no language or religious ties
- 1=only language or religious
- 2=both language and religious ties

**M\_goal:** Minority's goals/demands from the government

- 1=policy change (improvement of minority rights and/or economic grievance)
- 2=autonomy (or greater autonomy)
- 3=independence

**M\_coherence:** To what extent the minority group is centrally institutionalized:

- 0=unorganized/not institutionalized (no NGO/party/militant organizations)
- 1=moderately centralized (NGO-Civil Society Organizations)
- 2=highly centralized and organized (NGO-Civil Society Organizations+Political Party or Militant organization)

**Job\_security:** Is there any coup risk, security, or bureaucratic defection?

- 0=No coup risk
- 1=Only security or bureaucratic defection
- 2=Both security and bureaucratic defection

**M\_support:** Does any other third party (a State/IO/INGO) support the Minority against the Government:

- 0=No State/IO/INGO support
- 1= Low-level diplomatic support by a State/IO/INGO
- 2=Diplomatic support + Economic sanctions by a State/IO/INGO

**G\_support:** Does any other third party (a State/IO/INGO) support the Government:

- 0=No State/IO/INGO support
- 1= Low-level diplomatic support by a State/IO/INGO
- 2=Diplomatic support + Economic sanctions by a State/IO/INGO

**EK\_sup\_dip:** A dichotomous variable coded as “1” if the External Kin provides diplomatic support to the Minority, and as “0” otherwise.

**EK\_sup\_econ:** A dichotomous variable coded as “1” if the External Kin provides economic support to the Minority, and as “0” otherwise.

**Dual\_citizenship:** Do the members of the Minority hold dual citizenship (both in their host country and the external kin’s country)?

- 0=No dual citizenship
- 1=Dual citizenship

**Diaspora:** Does the Minority have a diaspora organization in the External Kin’s country:

- 0= M does not have any diaspora organization in the EK’s country
- 1= M has a diaspora organization in the EK’s

**Credibility:** increases when (1) the Government and the External Kin are contiguous (Douglas et al., 2002), (2) the Minority and External Kin share the same language and religion, (3) the Minority has an active diaspora organization in the External Kin’s country, (4) the External Kin is a democratic country (Coppedge et al., 2018), (5) members of the External Kin and Minority shared a homeland before, (6) the members of the Minority group can have dual citizenship from the External Kin’s state, and (7) the External Kin have provided diplomatic and economic support to the Minority in the previous year. The credibility of the External Kin’s threat decreases when (1) there is an alliance between the Government and External Kin (Gibler, 2008), and (2) the level of ethnic

fractionalization in the External Kin's country is high.

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## The Proof of PBE of the Game Theoretical Model

### Proof of Proposition 1 and 2

In order to find PBE, I define the players' expected utilities for each outcome and calculate the threshold values, which make the players indifferent about the available options. It allows me to make inferences about the players' incentives to prefer one option over another. I begin with the expected utility function of an External Kin at node 3. Since I assume that the Government is *hard* and always chooses to defy at node 4 ( $w = 1$ ), an External Kin's decision at node 3 depends on its utility from *MID* and *Intrastate War* outcomes. If  $E_{\text{MID}} > E_{\text{IW}}$ , an External Kin chooses to support at node 3. If  $E_{\text{MID}} < E_{\text{IW}}$ , External Kin chooses to stay out at node 3. When considering the preference orderings of a *hard* and *soft* External Kin, a *hard* External Kin will always choose  $E_{\text{MID}}$  over  $E_{\text{IW}}$ , whereas a *soft* External Kin will always choose  $E_{\text{IW}}$  over  $E_{\text{MID}}$ .

At node 2, a *hard* Minority's expected utility is

$$EU_{\text{M|H}} = x_h[p_e M_{\text{MID}} + (1 - p_e) M_{\text{IW}+}] + (1 - x_h) M_{\text{R}} \quad (1)$$

from which it follows that

$$\frac{\partial EU_{\text{M|H}}}{\partial x_h} = p_e M_{\text{MID}} + (1 - p_e) M_{\text{IW}+} - M_{\text{R}} \quad (2)$$

This derivative must be non-negative if  $x_h$  is equal to 1 and nonpositive if  $x_h$  is equal to 0 at equilibrium. To find the conditions that maximize a *hard* Minority's expected utility at equilibrium, I also calculate the threshold value that makes

a *hard* Minority indifferent between resisting and not resisting at node 2. The threshold for a *hard* Minority at node 2 is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_{M|H}(Resist) &= EU_{M|H}(\text{Not Resist}) \\
 p_e M_{MID} + (1 - p_e) M_{IW+} &= M_R \\
 p_e M_{MID} + M_{IW+} - p_e M_{IW+} &= M_R \\
 -p_e M_{MID} - M_{IW+} + p_e M_{IW+} &= -M_R \\
 p_e (M_{IW+} - M_{MID}) &= M_{IW+} - M_R
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

$$p_e = \frac{M_{IW+} - M_R}{M_{IW+} - M_{MID}} = m_h \tag{4}$$

$m_h$  shows the threshold value that makes the expected utilities of resisting and not resisting equal for a *hard* Minority at node 2. The sign of  $p_e - m_h$  is the same sign as the derivative above (equation 20). Based on the derivative and this threshold value, we can make the following inferences about the conditions that maximize a *hard* Minority's expected utility at node 2:

- If  $p_e \geq m_h$ , a *hard* Minority will choose to resist at node 2 ( $x_h = 1$ ).
- If  $p_e = m_h$ , a *hard* Minority will be indifferent to the two options at node 2.
- If  $p_e \leq m_h$ , a *hard* Minority will choose not to resist at node 2 ( $x_h = 0$ ).

However,  $M_{MID}$  is always greater than  $M_{IW+}$ , and  $M_{IW+}$  is always greater than  $M_R$ . Hence,  $m_h$  is always negative and  $p_e$  is always greater than  $m_h$ . It makes  $m_h$  an insignificant threshold value as it does not affect any of the perfect bayesian equilibria.



A *soft* Minority's expected utility at node 2 is

$$EU_{M|S} = x_s[p_e M_{MID} + (1 - p_e)M_{IW-}] + (1 - x_s)M_R \quad (5)$$

from which it follows that

$$\frac{\partial EU_{M|S}}{\partial x_s} = p_e M_{MID} + (1 - p_e)M_{IW-} - M_R \quad (6)$$

This derivative must be non-negative if  $x_s$  is equal to 1 and non-positive if  $x_s$  is equal to 0 at equilibrium. To find the conditions that maximize a *soft* Minority's expected utility at equilibrium, I also calculate the threshold value that makes a *soft* Minority indifferent to resisting and not resisting at node 2. The threshold for a *soft* Minority at node 2 is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_{M|S}(Resist) &= EU_{M|S}(\text{Not Resist}) \\ p_e M_{MID} + (1 - p_e)M_{IW-} &= M_R \\ p_e M_{MID} + M_{IW-} - p_e M_{IW-} &= M_R \\ -p_e M_{MID} - M_{IW-} + p_e M_{IW-} &= -M_R \\ p_e(M_{IW-} - M_{MID}) &= M_{IW-} - M_R \\ p_e &= \frac{M_{IW-} - M_R}{M_{IW-} - M_{MID}} = m_s \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

$m_s$  shows the threshold value that makes the expected utilities of resisting and not resisting equal for a *soft* Minority at node 2. The sign of  $p_e - m_s$  is the same sign as the derivative above (equation 24). Based on the derivative and this threshold value, we can make the following inferences about the conditions that maximize a *soft* Minority's expected utility at node 2:

- If  $x_s = 1$  and If  $p_e \geq m_s$ , then a *soft* Minority chooses to resist at node 2 ( $x_s = 1$ ).
- If  $p_e = e_s$ , then a *soft* Minority is indifferent between the two options at node 2.
- If  $p_e \leq m_s$ , then a *soft* Minority chooses not to resist at node 2 ( $x_s = 0$ ).

In contrast to  $m_h$ ,  $m_s$  can be negative or positive because  $M_R$  can be greater than  $M_{IW}$ . which allows  $p_e \geq m_s$  or  $p_e \leq m_s$ . This is why  $m_s$  is a meaningful threshold affecting the perfect bayesian equilibria.

Finally, the Government's expected utility at node 1 is

$$EU_{G|H} = u\{z_r G_R + z_p[p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e)G_{IW}]\} + (1 - u)G_{SQ} \quad (9)$$

$$z_r = p_m(1 - x_h) + (1 - p_m)(1 - x_s) \quad (10)$$

$$z_p = p_m x_h + (1 - p_m)x_s \quad (11)$$

$z_p$  and  $z_r$  represent the possibility that a *hard* Minority does not always resist and a *soft* Minority sometimes resists.  $z_r$  represents the sum of the probability that a *hard* Minority does not resist and the probability that a *soft* Minority does not resist. However, as the  $m_h$  threshold shows, a *hard* Minority always resists which makes  $x_h = 1$  and  $z_r = (1 - p_m)(1 - x_s)$ .  $z_p$  represents the sum of the probability that a *hard* Minority resists and the probability that a *soft* Minority resists.

The derivative of the Government's expected utility function is as follows:

$$\frac{\partial EU_{G|H}}{\partial u} = z_r G_R + z_p[p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e)G_{IW}] - G_{SQ} \quad (12)$$

This derivative must be non-negative if  $u$  is equal to 1 at equilibrium, and non-positive if  $u$  is equal to 0.

With each player's expected utility functions determined, I can find the PBE of the full game now by determining the Government's optimal choice at node 1. The Government chooses not to repress the Minority at node 1 iff

$$G_{SQ} \geq z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] \quad (13)$$

Government chooses to repress the Minority iff

$$G_{SQ} \leq z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] \quad (14)$$

These two options for the governments produce two classes of PBE: Deterrence Equilibria (DET) and Repress Minority Equilibria (RME).

### Proof of Deterrence Equilibrium

**DET<sub>1</sub>:** When  $p_e$  is greater than  $m_s$ , both a *hard* and *soft* Minority will resist. So,  $x_h = x_s = 1$  from which it follows that  $z_r = 0$  and  $z_p = 1$ . A *hard* External Kin will always support the Minority ( $y_h = 1$ ) and a *soft* External Kin will always stay out at node 3 ( $y_s = 0$ ). The Government's expected utility from repressing the Minority at node 2 becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_G(\text{Repress}) &= z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] \\ EU_G(\text{Repress}) &= p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW} \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

As equation 31 illustrates, when both a *hard* and *soft* Minority resist, the Government's optimal choice depends on the value of  $p_e$ . The threshold value

of  $p_e$  that makes the Government indifferent to repressing or not repressing the Minority is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(\text{Not Repress}) &= EU_G(\text{Repress}) \\
G_{SQ} &= (1 - p_e)G_{IW} + p_e G_{MID+} \\
G_{SQ} &= G_{IW} - p_e G_{IW} + p_e G_{MID+} \\
-G_{SQ} &= -G_{IW} + p_e G_{IW} - p_e G_{MID+} \\
G_{IW} - G_{SQ} &= p_e (G_{IW} - G_{MID+}) \\
p_e &= \frac{G_{IW} - G_{SQ}}{G_{IW} - G_{MID+}} = g_1
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

$$p_e = \frac{G_{IW} - G_{SQ}}{G_{IW} - G_{MID+}} = g_1 \tag{17}$$

Equation 33 demonstrates that if  $p_e$  is greater than  $g_1$ , equation 31 is satisfied and the Government will choose not to repress the Minority at node 1. Therefore, a PBE called  $DET_1$  exists where  $[u, w; x_h, x_s; y_h, y_s] = [0, 1; 1, 1; 1, 0]$  when  $p_e \geq g_1$  and  $p_e \geq m_s$ .

## Proof of Repress Minority Equilibria

When  $g_1 \geq p_e \geq m_s$ , both a *hard* and *soft* Minority will still resist at node 2. However,  $p_e$  is not high enough to deter the Government ( $x_h = x_s = 1$ ). It is easy to verify that  $z_r = 0$  and  $z_p = 1$ . A *hard* External Kin will always support the Minority ( $y_h = 1$ ) and a *soft* External Kin will always stay out at node 3 ( $y_s = 0$ ). The Government's expected utility from repressing the Minority at node 2 becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU_G(\text{Repress}) &= z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{\text{MID}+} + (1 - p_e) G_{\text{IW}}] \\
EU_G(\text{Repress}) &= p_e G_{\text{MID}} + (1 - p_e) G_{\text{IW}}
\end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

Equation 34 shows that the Government's choice depends on the  $p_e$  which can be high enough to make *Not Repress* a more desirable choice for the Government or low enough to make *Repress* more desirable. We already know that when  $p_e$  is less than or equal to  $g_1$ , the Government always chooses to repress.

Therefore, a PBE called  $\text{RME}_1$  exists where  $[u, w; x_h, x_s; y_h, y_s] = [1, 1; 1, 1; 1, 0]$  when  $p_e \geq m_s$  and  $p_e \leq g_1$ .

There are two possible outcomes depending on the External Kin's type. If the External Kin is soft, then it stays out and the outcome is *Intrastate War*. If the External Kin is hard, then it supports the Minority and the outcome is *MID*.

**RME<sub>2</sub>:** In the second RME, deterrence fails because an External Kin's threat is not credible enough to deter the Government and to encourage both Minority types to resist the Government repression. In the absence of a highly reliable External Kin, only the *hard* Minority resists.

More technically, when  $p_e \leq m_s$ , a *soft* Minority will not resist since it cannot rely on an External Kin's support. A *hard* External Kin will always support the Minority ( $y_h = 1$ ) and a *soft* External Kin will always stay out at node 3 ( $y_s = 0$ ). When  $p_e$  is less than or equal to  $m_s$ ,  $p_e$  is also less than  $g_1$ , and so the Government always represses the Minority at node 1. These conditions satisfy equation 31 and deterrence fails. Therefore, a PBE, called  $\text{RME}_2$ , exists where  $[u, w; x_h, x_s; y_h, y_s] = [1, 1; 1, 0; 1, 0]$   $p_e \leq m_s$  and  $p_e \leq g_1$ .

There are three possible outcomes in this equilibrium depending on the Minority's and External Kin's type, . If both the Minority and an External Kin

are *hard*, despite the Government's perception, the outcome will be *MID*. If the Minority is *hard* and an External Kin is *soft*, the outcome will be *Intrastate War*. If the Minority is *soft*, the outcome will be *Repression* regardless of the External Kin's type.

# PBE Graph




Figure 1: Location of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria Under Incomplete Information

## Robustness Test

Table 2: Robustness Test II: Linear Regression Models

	Dependent Variable: The Likelihood of Repression	
	Random Effects	Fixed Effects
<i>Capability</i>		
CincRatio	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
<i>Credibility</i>		
External Kin's Diplomatic Support to Minority	−0.15** (0.05)	−0.14* (0.06)
External Kin's Economic Support to Minority	−0.09+ (0.05)	−0.13* (0.05)
Contiguity	0.18+ (0.11)	
External Kin and Minority Shared Homeland	0.02 (0.23)	
Joint Language and Religion	−0.25 (0.21)	
Dual Citizenship Right for Minority	0.29* (0.12)	
Diaspora	−0.44*** (0.12)	
External Kin's Democracy Level	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
External Kin's Ethnic Fractionalization	0.85 (0.73)	
Alliance Between Government and External Kin	−0.12** (0.05)	−0.08+ (0.05)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Government's Democracy Level	−0.09*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.02)
Government's GDP (logged)		−0.02* (0.01)
Coup Risk for the Government	0.04 (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)
Minority's Goal	0.02 (0.07)	−0.00 (0.09)
Minority's Coherence	−0.09* (0.04)	−0.13** (0.04)
Third-Party Support to Minority	0.18*** (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)
Peace Years (Until Repression)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Peace Years (Until Repression) <sup>2</sup>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peace Years (Until Repression) <sup>3</sup>	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
(Intercept)	0.83 (0.51)	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.22
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.18
Num. obs.	642	642

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; + $p < 0.1$