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Transborder Ethnic Ties and Repression of Ethnic Minorities

Abstract

Transborder ethnic ties constitute an alignment between an ethnic minority group and its external ethnic kin in another country. Similar to interstate alliances, in which a powerful state extends its deterrent capability to protect its protégé state against another state, a powerful external kin can extend its deterrent capability to protect a minority group against the target government. I employ deterrence theory and develop a game-theoretical model to analyze the triadic strategic interaction between a government, a minority group, and this minority group's external kin. I argue that a minority group can only be effectively protected by its external kin when the external kin possesses a credible and capable threat of using force. I test the predictions of my model with a newly developed dataset covering 20 minority groups and 5 powerful ethnic kin. The results show that a highly credible and capable threat by an external kin significantly decreases the likelihood of government repression in the form of active and targeted political discrimination. Specifically, previous economic support to the minority group by their militarily powerful external kin constitutes a strong signal of a credible military threat, contributing to general deterrence and diminishing the probability of repression. This research contributes to the literature by moving beyond the mostly invariant factors, such as geographical proximity or the nature of ties between the groups, to understand the effect of an external ethnic kin on a minority's security.

Keywords: Deterrence, Ethnicity, Minority, Repression

Introduction

The location of ethnic groups does not always coincide with the political boundaries of countries. Many ethnic groups have ethnic kin in other countries (Stein 2017). These ties between ethnic kin groups persist despite international borders, and transborder ethnic ties significantly influence the relationship between these ethnic groups and their respective governments.

The significance of transborder ethnic ties becomes evident when considering examples such as Turkmen groups living in Syria and Iraq, Uyghurs in China, and Turks in Turkey, who share the same ethnicity. Among them, only the Turks in Turkey constitute the majority of the population and have access to executive power. The Turkish government, as the powerful ethnic kin of Turkmen and Uyghurs, has been expected to act as the protector of these groups. However, successive Turkish governments have not always prioritized the status of their weaker brethren in these countries, despite the enduring nature of their ties.

Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy toward Turkmen in Syria and Iraq differs from its approach toward Uyghurs in China. While Turkey has consistently provided varying levels of support to Turkmen groups in Iraq, Turkmen in Syria were initially overlooked by the Turkish public and government. It was only after the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011 that Turkmen in Syria became a significant part of Turkish foreign policy. Similarly, in 1992, the Turkish prime minister announced support for the independence of East Turkestan (*Xinjiang region of China*), whereas subsequent leaders have maintained a lower profile regarding the status of Uyghurs in China. Turkish officials have repeatedly stated that Turkey respects China's territorial integrity and supports the fight against radical Islamic terrorism, which the Chinese government has used to justify repressive policies in Xinjiang (Adıbelli 2007). In short, Turkey's foreign policy toward Turkish minorities living in other countries varies over time and space. What can explain this

variation? How does this fluctuation affect the status of minority groups and the relationships between the involved states?

I start with the assumption that the alignment between an ethnic minority group and its external kin in another country can function similarly to an interstate alliance against the government of the ethnic minority's country. This alignment can influence how the host government treats the minority group when the external ethnic kin becomes involved. To explore this concept, I provide a brief review of existing knowledge regarding the effects of transborder ethnic kinship on domestic political violence. I then employ a simple game-theoretical model, a modified version of the interstate deterrence models developed by Quackenbush (2006) and Zagare and Kilgour (2003), to establish a theory of transborder ethnic politics.

In this theoretical framework, the credibility and capability of threats by the external kin of the minority groups are the key explanations for government repression. I choose to use perfect deterrence theory over classical deterrence theory to conceptualize credibility and capability, as the former provides a more logically consistent framework (Quackenbush 2011a, 2010, 2011b).¹ While classical deterrence theory suggests that a credible threat is a threat that is believed by other actors, "threats can be believed exactly when it is rational to carry them out; thus, only rational threats are credible threats." according to perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 66). Accordingly, a threat is rational and, therefore credible, if the threatener estimates that the "anticipated worth of doing so exceeds the anticipated worth of failing to do so" (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 68). In the context of a transborder ethnic alignment, credibility refers to the set of factors that increase the external kin's willingness to fight the host government to protect the minority group.

Capability of a threat, on the other hand, is the only necessary, albeit not sufficient,

¹Named perfect deterrence theory because their conception of credibility aligns with the perfectness criterion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as defined by Selten (1975)

condition for successful deterrence. A threat is considered capable “only if the other -the threatened player- prefers the status quo to the outcome that results when and if the threat is carried out” (Zagare 2011, 49). Zagare and Kilgour (2000) identify two possible reasons for the absence of a capable threat. First, a player may lack the ability to carry out the threat. Second, the threat may not be able to harm the target if the target is highly dissatisfied with the status-quo, or willing to take the risk of the other player following through on their threat. In a transborder ethnic alignment, capability refers to the extent which the external kin increases the cost of a potential conflict for the host government.

I hypothesize that credibility and capability of an external kin’s threat decrease the likelihood of repression that minority groups suffer and test it using a newly developed dataset covering 20 minority groups with 5 powerful ethnic kin.² The model and findings reveal that we must move beyond invariant factors, such as geographical proximity or the nature of ties between ethnic kin groups, to comprehend the outcomes of transborder ethnic interactions. An external kin’s resolve and ability to protect their vulnerable ethnic kin group vary across time and space, shedding light on why some ethnic minority groups are protected by their ethnic kin at times while facing government repression at other times.

The Role of Transborder Identities in Government Repression and Intrastate War

Transborder identities challenge conventional definitions of national interests and security. When cultural boundaries of a nation extend beyond geographical borders, a state’s national security and interests expand beyond its territorial confines. Transborder identities necessitate states to redefine their national interests, considering the protection

²The game-theoretical model and the original dataset partially draws upon the author’s unpublished dissertation, titled “Transborder Ethnic Alignments and the Interplay between Domestic and International Violence” (Yazici 2019)

of their kin in other countries as crucial as safeguarding citizens within their homeland (Stein 2017). These transborder relations can be best understood as an alliances between vulnerable minority groups and their powerful external kin in other countries (Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 1997, 2002, 2012; Salehyan, Gleditsch,, and Cunningham 2011). They resemble interstate alliances in that such groups typically share policy preferences due to their common cultures and worldviews (Moore and Davis 1998; Salehyan, Gleditsch,, and Cunningham 2011). The shared identity between these two groups fosters a sense of "us versus them," prompting the government of a powerful group's country to assist the minority in another country during instances of repression or ethnic conflict (Weiner 1971; Brubaker 1996; Van Houten 1998; Jenne 2007). Saideman (1997, 728) explains that this mechanism is rooted in a straightforward relationship between public opinion and foreign policy:

Because constituents care about those with whom they share ethnic ties, they prefer their state to take sides in ethnic conflicts elsewhere, supporting the side with which they have ethnic ties. Politicians, because they need support and fear its loss, take the preferences of their supporters seriously and push for policies assisting the ethnic kin of their constituents.

The powerful external kin, therefore, should be able to influence its government's foreign policy decisions regarding the treatment of a weak ethnic minority in another country.

Research suggests that powerful external kin may escalate domestic conflict by supporting rebel groups, (Gleditsch 2007; Weiner 1971; Brubaker 1996; Salehyan, Gleditsch,, and Cunningham 2011). Even the expectation of such support from an external kin can radicalize the demands of a minority group and escalate intrastate war (Jenne 2007). In contrast, external kin can also have repression dampening effects by influencing the bargaining process between minority groups and governments, affecting cost-benefit calculations and potentially deterring government repression (Cetinyan 2002). Civil conflict would

only erupt when there are failures in bargaining due to uncertainty about the external kin's intentions and capabilities. My theoretical model builds on this approach to ethnic kinships.

The status of external kin matters, with dominant kin groups in neighboring countries more likely to provide substantial assistance (Saideman and Ayres 2012; Saideman 2012). Ethnic composition and institutional constraints in the kin's country also play a role, as high fragmentation and constraints may limit support (Carment and James 1996). The effect of external kin on civil war onset can be curvilinear as well. According to Cederman et al. (2013), large external kin groups can decrease the probability of civil war, while the external kin groups within the middle range of the size spectrum increase the risk of conflict.

The economic status of an external kin is a critical factor that determines their ability and likelihood of providing economic support. Han (2013) and Han, O'Mahoney, and Paik (2014) argue that weaker minority groups are primarily concerned with their living standards. If the external kin does not offer better living standards, it cannot provide a more attractive alternative to the weaker minority group. In such cases, the minority group is more likely to conform to the national identity imposed by its government rather than resisting it.

The foreign policy stance of both the external kin and the host state can significantly impact the status of a minority group. Van Houten (1998) argues that if the external kin has irredentist claims, its support for the minority may lead to an interstate dispute. Similarly, the host states tend to accommodate a minority group when the group is supported by one of the host state's allies, while repression of minority is more likely if the external power is an enemy of the host state (Mylonas 2012; McNamee and Zhang 2019; Han and Mylonas 2014).

In summary, empirical findings demonstrate that an ethnic alliance between a weak

minority group in one country and its external kin in another country can have a positive influence on the behavior of the host state when the external kin i) holds political and economic power in a neighboring state, ii) exhibits low ethnic fragmentation and weak institutional constraints, and iii) maintains favorable interstate relations with the host state. I incorporate these factors into my model I describe in the following section.

A Theory of Transborder Ethnic Alignments and the Interplay Between Domestic and International Violence

A Tripartite Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments

In this section, drawing on the foundations of perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000) , I introduce the tripartite extended deterrence game of transborder ethnic alignments. This framework provides a comprehensive and logically consistent theory to understand the asymmetrical strategic interaction involving a minority group, a government, and an external kin.

I assume that an alignment exists between an ethnic minority group in a country and its powerful external kin in another country. A relevant alignment to exist, the ethnic minority should have experienced government repression in the past and/or be under risk of repression. Otherwise, there would be no need for an alignment with external groups against the host government. Hence, the game I develop here starts in a context where an ethnic minority is at risk of government repression.

At node 1, the Government faces a choice: it can either repress the Minority or refrain from doing so. If the Government opts not to repress the Minority, the outcome remains in a "Status-Quo (SQ)" state. "Status-Quo" denotes the absence of active and targeted political discrimination by the Government, even though the Minority still lacks the ability to influence national-level decision-making (Vogt et al. 2015). It should

be noted that *Status-Quo* does not necessarily mean the absence of social or economic discrimination. I accept low levels of social and economic discrimination as *Status-Quo* because my primary focus is on political repression, and it would be unrealistic to assume that these minority groups have been entirely free from any form of repression.

If the Government chooses to repress, the Minority has the option to back down or resist. If the Minority refrains from resisting, the game ends, and the outcome is *Repression (R)*. I define *Repression* as the opposite of *Status-Quo* signifying active and targeted political discrimination by the Government. In a *Repression* outcome, the Minority is excluded from the political power at national level. Alternatively, if the Minority resists, their External Kin can stay out or support the Minority. If the External Kin stays out, we should observe *Intrastate War (IW)* between the Government and the Minority. *Intrastate War* can take the form of a violent protest movement or escalation into a civil war.

If the External Kin supports the Minority, the Government faces a decision to either back down or defy. External Kin's support, in this context, refers to the threat of force to protect the Minority or direct military assistance to the Minority.³ If the Government backs down, the players reach a *Compromise*. In the *Compromise (C)* outcome, the Government is coerced into treating the Minority more favorably. If the Government defies, then we should observe a *Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID)* between the External Kin and the Government. A *MID* involves at least the threat of force which may (or not) escalate into an armed conflict.⁴

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) associated with transborder ethnic kinship are not prevalent, but they still take place occasionally. One of the primary examples is the

³Other forms of support by the External Kin, such as economic or diplomatic support, are considered credible signals of potential future military support or threat.

⁴It should be noted that the Minority's resistance to *Repression* always leads to *Intrastate War (IW)*. This implies that when there is an *MID*, there might be an ongoing *Intrastate War (IW)* at the same time. They are considered separate outcomes because, in the presence of an *MID* between an External Kin and the Government, the conflict becomes internationalized, with the *MID* prevailing as the dominant conflict type.

Transnistria War that occurred between Moldova and Russia in 1992. The tension between the Russian minority in Transnistria, which constitutes around 25.5 percent of the regional population (Vahl and Emerson 2004, 152), and the central Moldovan government was at the center of this conflict. Following the erupting violence in the region, the 14th Soviet Army, already stationed in Moldova and supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan government, supported pro-Transnistrian forces (Vahl and Emerson 2004, 155). A ceasefire agreement was signed between the Moldovan President Snegur and Russian President Yeltsin on July 21 1992 (Gibler 2018, 376). This example demonstrates that the motivation to protect ethnic kin can play a central role in militarized interstate disputes, albeit rarely.

Figure 1 provides a simplified representation of the entire strategic interaction described above.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Preference Orderings of the Players over Outcomes

I assume that the Government is unwilling to concede against the Minority's demands (e.g., better treatment, secession, autonomy). I do not argue that all governments seek to endlessly repress minority groups. However, my theory addresses potentially repressive governments, because otherwise neither minority groups nor their external kin would mobilize and constitute a politically relevant triad I describe here. Hence, the Government's first preference is to repress the Minority without any resistance or external intervention. The Government should be willing to repress the Minority even if it resists. Thus, the Government prefers *Intrastate War* over the *Status-Quo*. I also assume that the Government prefers the *Status-Quo* over the outcomes in which the External Kin becomes involved (*MID* and *Compromise*). Yet whether the Government prefers a *MID* over *Compromise* depends on its resolve (credibility of its threat). A *hard*

Government will prefer a *MID* over *Compromise*, whereas a *soft* Government will prefer *Compromise* over a *MID*. Therefore, a *hard* Government is a repressive government which aims to repress the Minority as long as the External Kin is not involved. However, if the External Kin becomes involved, the *hard* Government will be willing to fight with the External Kin instead of compromising. A *soft* Government is also willing to repress the minority group but not willing to fight with another state for this goal.

$$\text{Government : } G_R > G_{IW} > G_{SQ} > [G_{MID}, G_C] \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Hard Government : } G_R > G_{IW} > G_{SQ} > G_{MID} > G_C \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Soft Government : } G_R > G_{IW} > G_{SQ} > G_C > G_{MID} \quad (3)$$

If the Government compromises at node 4, the External Kin and the Minority will be able to negotiate a better agreement with the Government. Thus, the External Kin's first preference is *Compromise*. If the External Kin is not capable of coercing the Government into compromising, then it will prefer *Status-Quo* over *MID* or *Intrastate War*. Yet whether it prefers *MID* or *Intrastate War* depends on their resolve (credibility of its support). A *hard* External Kin will be willing to take the risk of a *MID* and support a minority group, whereas a *soft* External Kin will avoid a *MID* and stay out. The least preferred outcome for an External Kin is the *Repression* of the Minority since this outcome means both the Minority and the External Kin are defeated.

$$\text{External Kin : } E_C > E_{SQ} > [E_{MID}, E_{IW}] > E_R \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Hard External Kin : } E_C > E_{SQ} > E_{MID} > E_{IW} > E_R \quad (5)$$

$$\text{Soft External Kin : } E_C > E_{SQ} > E_{IW} > E_{MID} > E_R \quad (6)$$

The Minority's most preferred outcome is a *Compromise*, in which it will gain a better deal with the Government. If a *Compromise* is not achievable, then the Minority will

prefer *Status-Quo* over the other outcomes, including violence and uncertainty. If violence is inevitable, the Minority will not want to fight alone against the Government, and will prefer the External Kin to honor its alignment by fighting (*MID*). Whether the Minority prefers *Intrastate War* or *Repression* depends on its resolve. A *hard* Minority will prefer *Intrastate War* over *Repression*, whereas a *soft* Minority will not resist government repression.

$$\text{Minority : } M_C > M_{SQ} > M_{MID} > [M_{IW}, M_R] \quad (7)$$

$$\text{Hard Minority : } M_C > M_{SQ} > M_{MID} > M_{IW} > M_R \quad (8)$$

$$\text{Soft Minority : } M_C > M_{SQ} > M_{MID} > M_R > M_{IW} \quad (9)$$

Tripartite Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments Under Incomplete Information

Actors are not always sure about the credibility and/or capability of each others' threats. I analyze the Tripartite Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments under the assumption of incomplete information to account for this uncertainty. In this incomplete information game, players are either *hard* or *soft* depending on their willingness to use force to reach their most-desired outcome. I account for these different types of players by giving two different values to the utilities of outcomes for each player:

G_{MID+} : *hard* Government's utility for MID

G_{MID-} : *soft* Government's utility for MID

E_{MID+} : *hard* External Kin's utility for MID

E_{MID-} : *soft* External Kin's utility for MID

M_{IW+} : *hard* Minority's utility for IW

M_{IW-} : *soft* Minority's utility for IW

The Government's utility for *MID* (G_{MID}) is a binary random variable satisfying

$$G_{MID} \begin{cases} G_{MID+} & \text{with probability } p_g \\ G_{MID-} & \text{with probability } 1 - p_g \end{cases}$$

so that the Government is *hard* with the probability p_g and *soft* otherwise.

An External Kin's utility for *MID* (E_{MID}) is a binary random variable satisfying

$$E_{MID} \begin{cases} E_{MID+} & \text{with probability } p_e \\ E_{MID-} & \text{with probability } 1 - p_e \end{cases}$$

so that an External Kin is *hard* with the probability p_e and *soft* otherwise.

The Minority's utility for *IW* (M_{IW}) is a binary random variable satisfying

$$M_{IW} \begin{cases} M_{IW+} & \text{with probability } p_m \\ M_{IW-} & \text{with probability } 1 - p_m \end{cases}$$

so that the Minority is *hard* with the probability p_m and *soft* otherwise. Therefore, p_g , p_e , and p_m represent the credibility of the players' threats since they reflect others' beliefs

about to what extent a player is willing to use force. I also define the probabilities those represent the players' moves at each node, to denote PBE:

$u \in [0, 1]$: the probability that the Government chooses to *Repress* at node 1

$x_h \in [0, 1]$: the probability that a *hard* Minority chooses to *Resist* at node 2

$x_s \in [0, 1]$: the probability that a *soft* Minority chooses to *Resist* at node 2

$y_h \in [0, 1]$: the probability that a *hard* External Kin chooses to *Support* at node 3

$y_s \in [0, 1]$: the probability that a *soft* External Kin chooses to *Support* at node 3

$w \in [0, 1]$: the probability that the Government chooses to *Defy* at node 4

I assume that the Government is known to be *hard* but the other players' types are uncertain ($p_g = 1$, $p_e \in [0, 1]$, $p_m \in [0, 1]$) because when Government is *soft*, deterrence is always successful, and the type of External Kin or Minority does not affect the PBE outcome. Uncertainty about an External Kin's and Minority's type has significant implications for the outcome of the game. The game is solved using Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) concept (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). There are 3 PBE in this game, which are separated into two classes: Deterrence Equilibrium (DET) and Repress the Minority Equilibria (RME). The equilibria are summarized in Table 1, which shows the strategic variables and the existence conditions for each equilibrium. I discuss only the deterrence equilibrium below.⁵

[Insert Table 1 here]

⁵See the supplemental material for the detailed solutions of the other equilibria.

PBE of the Tripartite Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments

The Government's expected utility at node 1 is

$$EU_{G|H} = u\{z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}]\} + (1 - u) G_{SQ} \quad (10)$$

$$z_r = p_m(1 - x_h) + (1 - p_m)(1 - x_s) \quad (11)$$

$$z_p = p_m x_h + (1 - p_m) x_s \quad (12)$$

where z_r represents the probability that neither a *hard* nor a *soft* Minority will resist; whereas z_p represents the probability that both a *hard* and a *soft* Minority will resist. The derivative of the Government's expected utility function is as follows:

$$\frac{\partial EU_{G|H}}{\partial u} = z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] - G_{SQ} \quad (13)$$

Now, I can find the PBE of the full game by determining the Government's optimal choice at node 1.

Proposition 1: The Government chooses not to repress the Minority at node 1 iff ⁶

$$G_{SQ} \geq z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] \quad (14)$$

Proposition 2: The Government chooses to repress the Minority iff ⁷

$$G_{SQ} \leq z_r G_R + z_p [p_e G_{MID+} + (1 - p_e) G_{IW}] \quad (15)$$

⁶See the supplemental material for the proof.

⁷See the supplemental material for the proof.

Deterrence Equilibrium ($u = 0, w = 1$)

For a successful deterrence strategy, an External Kin and the Minority should be able to convince the Government that the Minority will resist at node 2 and an External Kin will support the Minority at node 3 which would lead to the *MID* outcome. Since the Government prefers the *Status-Quo* over *MID*, the Government always chooses not to repress the Minority at node 1 in such a deterrence equilibrium. There is only one distinct deterrence equilibrium that satisfies these conditions.

The deterrence equilibrium occurs when an External Kin is credible enough to assure the Minority that they will provide support at node 3. In this scenario, both a *hard* and *soft* Minority will resist at node 2. More technically, when p_e is greater than m_s , both a *hard* and *soft* Minority will resist. When both Minority types resist, the Government's optimal choice depends on the value of p_e . If p_e is greater than g_1 , equation 14 is satisfied and the Government chooses not to repress the Minority at node 1.

It should be noted that g_1 threshold is a function of the Government's utility from *MID*. A capable threat by an External Kin can make utility of *MID* smaller or greater for the Government. It means that the capability of the External Kin's threat affects the equilibrium by increasing or decreasing the threshold value.

In sum, a PBE called DET_1 exists where $[u, w; x_h, x_s; y_h, y_s] = [0, 1; 1, 1; 1, 0]$ when $p_e \geq g_1$.⁸ This PBE shows that the Government will not risk an *MID* when they perceive that an External Kin's threat is highly credible. Thus, an External Kin with a highly credible threat can deter the Government even in the absence of a *hard* Minority. The unique outcome for this equilibrium is *Status-Quo*.

⁸See the supplemental material for the proof.

Summary and Comparative Statics

All of the PBE are summarized in Table 1, which provides an overview of the strategic variables and existence conditions for each equilibrium. Government can be effectively deterred from repressing the Minority if the Government perceives that an External Kin's threat as highly credible. When $p_e \geq g_1$, the risk of entering into an *MID* becomes unexpectedly high for the Government, leading it to choose not to repress the Minority at node 1 (DET_1). Furthermore, when an External Kin's threat is highly credible, ($p_e \geq g_1$), both types of Minority will resist rendering p_m irrelevant for the Government's decision-making process.

- *Hypothesis 1: As the credibility of an External Kin's threat increases, the likelihood of Repression decreases.*

Capability of the External Kin's threat can affect the likelihood of *Status-Quo* by establishing the value of g_1 threshold. The value of g_1 is determined by the Government's expected utility associated with each possible outcome:⁹

$$p_e = \frac{G_{IW} - G_{SQ}}{G_{IW} - G_{MID+}} = g_1$$

When the capability of the External Kin's threat increases, the Government becomes less likely to succeed in an *MID* and the associated costs rise. In other words, as the capability of the External Kin's threat increases, G_{MID+} decreases. As indicated in the equation above, when G_{MID+} decreases, the value of g_1 threshold decreases and the region of deterrence equilibrium (DET_1) becomes larger.

- *Hypothesis 2: As the capability of an External Kin's threat increases, the likelihood of Repression decreases.*

⁹See the supplemental material for the proof.

These PBE suggest that a credible and capable threat by an External Kin can protect a Minority from repression, regardless of the Minority's capacity and resolve. Building on the earlier studies, I point out that the conflict-dampening effect of external kin can extend beyond civil wars and stabilize the relationship between minority groups and central governments before violence erupts. More importantly, the size of the external kin (Cederman et al. 2013) and its access to political power and geographical distance (Saideman 2012) may not be enough to deter government repression. Not all large external kins in neighboring countries pose credible and capable threats of intervention if their protege is under threat. Also, a powerful external kin may have more than one protege minority group, and these groups may not be equally salient. This variation in the salience of the groups can determine to what extent it is rational to carry out a military threat and, consequently, its credibility.

Research Design

In this section, I begin by introducing my sample and dataset. Following that, I present the operationalization of my variables and discuss the statistical and substantive significance of the empirical results. I conclude with a summary of the findings.

Sample

As my game-theoretical model implies, my theory addresses the cases in which there is a disadvantaged minority group with a powerful external ethnic kin. Empirically, including powerful minority groups with some degree of access to political power would make it more difficult to observe the contribution of external kin's deterrence. If a minority group consistently enjoys a favorable status, attributing the cause to external kin's deterrence becomes more challenging. Although adding such cases to my sample would likely increase the likelihood of rejecting the null hypotheses, the significance of

the external kin's effect becomes more crucial and meaningful when the minority group is at risk.

I define a disadvantaged minority, based on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) (Vogt et al. 2015), as either i) powerless, ii) self-excluded, or iii) discriminated. Powerless minority groups have no access to political power at national level. Self-exclusion implies that the minority group excluded itself from the central authority and declared autonomy or independence in its own territory. Lastly, discriminated minority groups are excluded from political power intentionally by the central government.

I identify the relevant powerful external ethnic kin based on their access to political power in the form of monopoly, dominance, or senior partnership in the executive branch of the government. In some of the earlier studies (Cederman et al. 2013), external kin's size and access to state power were acknowledged as key characteristics for preventing civil wars. Here, all of the external kin in my sample are already powerful in the sense of having access to state power. This sampling decision enables me to observe the variation in the effects of powerful external kin on minority groups' status.

There were 195 minority groups with 69 Ethnic Kin those met the criteria above. Next, I excluded the cases where minority groups were challenging to identify, had multiple external kin, or were too small. This left 71 minority groups with 15 powerful external ethnic kin between 1946 – 2017. From the remaining pool including 71 disadvantaged minority groups with 15 powerful external ethnic kin between 1946 – 2017, I picked a sample of 5 powerful ethnic kin (with 20 minority groups and their host governments) with the goal of having a representative sample with useful variation on certain dimensions (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). I used a stratified sampling strategy to maximize the regional variation in the external kins and their power status (Cochran 1977). This variation is allows me to account for potential differences in perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic kinship, which can be conflated with racial or tribal identities in some regions.

Additionally, the power status of countries matter, because including only great or small powers would bias the results. Table 2 lists the cases in my sample.¹⁰ The unit of analysis is dyad-year.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable, *Repression* refers to active and targeted political discrimination of the minority group. This variable reflects whether or not the extended deterrence was successful. I use the EPR data (Vogt et al. 2015) to code this variable. *Repression* is a dichotomous variable which is equal to “1” if the *statusname* variable in the EPR data is coded as “Discriminated”, and “0” otherwise’. According to EPR, a Minority is *Discriminated* if “Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power.” Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics (excluding discrimination in the socio-economic sphere).” (Vogt et al. 2015, 5).

One may plausibly argue that lack of repression is not necessarily caused by extended deterrence of the External Kin if the Government has no interest in repressing the Minority in the first place. I address this issue by analyzing only the minority groups that are at risk of repression (or have already been suffering low levels of repression). Furthermore, I add some of the domestic factors that affect the likelihood of Government repression as control variables in my empirical models (such as democracy level and coup risk). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that lack of repression that I observe in my data

¹⁰See the supplemental material for more information on the sample selection process

are affected by the External Kin's threat. Even when the outcome is not directly caused by deterrence, my empirical tests account for the other possible explanations.

Independent Variables

Credibility of the External Kin's Threat

The credibility of an External Kin's threat represents a set of factors making carrying out their threat more or less rational. I argue that an External Kin's willingness to carry out its threat is a function of the salience of the Minority and Government. In addition, if an External Kin clearly signals its intention to protect the Minority, the credibility of the threat should be higher.

Contiguity, shared language and religion, and the dual citizenship of members of a Minority group should increase the salience of the Minority and make the External Kin's public more sensitive to the status of the Minority. Also, initial reason of dispersion (such as migration, collapse of an empire, or colonial borders) can affect salience of the Minority for an External Kin. If the Minority and an External Kin have fallen apart because of migration or collapse of an empire, their relationship should be stronger compared to a Minority and an External Kin who never lived together but share the same ethnic origins. For example, Turks in Turkey have stronger ties with the Turks in Bulgaria as the reason of their dispersion was the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century compared with their ties with Uyghurs in China who have not shared the same homeland with the Turks in Turkey in the recent past.

The salience of the Minority for an External Kin may decrease if the External Kin's country has high ethnic fractionalization as the overall public support for Minority will decrease. When the level of social and economic repression the Minority suffers increases and a diaspora organization advocates for the Minority, we should also see mobilized public support for the Minority in an External Kin's country. Accordingly, an External

Kin's government should be responsive to the public and be more willing to support the Minority. Although authoritarian regimes can be responsive to public opinion to maintain their legitimacy, higher levels of democracy should increase the magnitude of the public opinion effect and eventually increase credibility.

An External Kin may have an agenda independent from the Minority's status. The presence of a salient strategic relationship between an External Kin and the Government should decrease the credibility of an External Kin's threat, since they will be less willing to risk their interdependent interests. Accordingly, If an External Kin is in an alliance with the Government, we can expect a decrease in the credibility of its threat.¹¹

Lastly, an External Kin will have a more credible threat if it had previously provided diplomatic and/or economic support to the Minority. It indicates the External Kin's willingness to take concrete actions to protect the Minority. In other words, providing diplomatic and economic support to the Minority serves as a robust signal of potential future military assistance.

In short, the credibility of the External Kin's threat increases when (1) the Government and the External Kin are contiguous (Douglas et al. 2002), (2) the Minority and External Kin share the same language and religion, (3) the Minority has an active diaspora organization in the External Kin's country, (4) the External Kin is a democratic country (Coppedge et al. 2018), (5) members of the External Kin and Minority shared a homeland before, (6) the members of the Minority group can have dual citizenship from the External Kin's state, and (7) the External Kin have provided diplomatic and economic support to the Minority in the previous year. The credibility of the External Kin's threat decreases when (1) there is an alliance between the Government and External Kin (Gibler 2008), and (2) the level of ethnic fractionalization in the External Kin's country is high (Fearon 2003).¹²

¹¹Bilateral trade between the External Kin and Government is excluded from the empirical models due to high amount of missing data.

¹²The composite *Credibility* variable is the sum/extraction of the *z scores* of these variables. See

Capability of the External Kin's Threat

The capability of an External Kin's threat represents its capacity to hurt the Government. First, if an External Kin is militarily more powerful than the Government, this indicates that the External Kin will be more capable of hurting the Government in the event of an MID. Hence we can estimate the capability of an External Kin's threat by using the ratio of material power of an External Kin and Government (Singer, Bremer,, and Stuckey 1972).¹³

$$\text{Capability of the External Kin's Threat} = (\text{EK's CINC Score} / \text{G's CINC Score})$$

Table 3 summarizes the components of credibility and capability for External Kin. The signs next to each variable indicate the expected direction of their effects on the dependent variable.

[Insert Table 3 here]

Control Variables

I control for the effects of (1) *Government's Democracy Level*, (2) *Minority's Goal*, (3) *Minority's Coherence*, (4) *Third-Party Support to Minority*, (5) *Government's GDP (logged)*, (6) *Coup Risk for the Government*, and (7) *Peace Years (Until Repression)*. First, government repression should be more likely when the Minority has a more ambitious goal and is less coherent. Similarly, if there is any third party (other than the External Kin) on the Minority's side, the scale of the threat posed by the Minority would increase,

Supplemental Material for detailed operationalization of the variables.

¹³The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score aggregates the six individual measured components of national material capabilities (total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production) into a single value per state-year.

and so the likelihood of *Repression* would increase. I use original data to measure *Minority's Goal*, *Minority's Coherence*, and *Third-Party Support to Minority*. *Minority's Goal* refers to the extent of the Minority's demands from the Government and is equal to "1" if the Minority's demands is only policy change, "2" if Minority seeks autonomy, and "3" if the Minority aims independence eventually. *Minority's Coherence* is also an ordinal variable measuring to what extent the minority group is centrally institutionalized. It is equal to "0" if the Minority is unorganized and there is no NGO, party, or militant organization, "1" if the Minority is moderately institutionalized, and "2" if the Minority is highly centralized and organized through all kinds of organizations. *Third-Party Support to Minority* can be in the form of diplomatic or economic assistance by a third-party other than the External Kin.

Another alternative explanation of *Status-Quo* would be the overall economic indicators of the host country. We should observe less government repression in richer countries (Poe and Tate 1994). I use the natural logarithm of GDP in (millions of US dollars) from the Penn World Table (v.9.0) to control for this effect.

Status-Quo is also more likely when there is no (or very low) coup risk (Ritter 2014). I collected original data to measure *Coup Risk for the Government*. It is coded as "2" if there is both security and /civilian/bureaucratic defection, as "1" if there is either security or bureaucratic defection, and "0" if there is no defection or coup risk.

Lastly, it is assumed that each observation is independent in the statistical models below. However, observations of different years of the same government-minority-external kin triad are rarely independent. Based on Carter and Signorino's (2010) suggestion, I include *Peace Years (Until Repression)* along with its square and cube to model this time dependency in my data.

Summary Statistics

Table 4 presents the summary statistics for all the variables described above. The average value of *Repression* indicates sufficient variation to test the effect of the independent variables on this outcome. The average democracy level of the governments in the sample is low, which is consistent with my sampling decision to focus on minorities at risk of repression, as non-democratic countries are more likely to repress ethnic minority groups.

The average values of *Minority's Goal* and *Minority's Coherence* show that most of the Minorities are moderately centralized and have less ambitious goals. Most of the External Kin in the sample are not liberal democracies (e.g. Russia, Turkey, Burundi). Average ethnic fractionalization in the External Kin is low, which is not surprising given only powerful external kin are included in the dataset.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Methodology

Logistic regression is the most appropriate method given that my dependent variable is binary. Table 5 in the next section presents the results of a pooled logistic regression model. However, my dataset is time-series cross-sectional where the unit of analysis is dyad-year. The observations within each section may not be independent. Although a standard pooled logistic regression could still provide consistent results, the standard errors would not be accurate (Poirier and Ruud 1988). To address this issue, Table 6 shows the results of a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors.

Also, time dependency can cause severe problems in a time-series cross-sectional data. When observations are influenced by previous time periods, it violates the assumption of independence among observations. I address this by using cubic polynomial approximation

to model time dependency as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010).¹⁴ As a result, the following equation is used to estimate and interpret the effect of time and X_i (the independent variable X at time t for section i) on the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1:¹⁵

$$pr(y_{it} = 1|X_{it}, t) = \frac{1}{1 - exp[-(X_{it}\beta + \alpha t_i + \alpha_2 t_i^2 + \alpha_3 t_i^3)]} \quad (16)$$

Lastly, I use mixed effects logistic regression given the hierarchical structure of the data. This model allows us to estimate both *within* and *between* effects by allowing intercept to vary randomly by each External Kin-Government dyad (Huntington-Klein 2021). Table 7 presents the results of this mixed effects model.¹⁶

Findings

Table 5, 6, and 7 present the results of the logistic regression and mixed effects models that enable interpretation of statistical significance of the variables' effects.¹⁷ Each table contains three models: one with the composite independent variables (e.g. credibility) but without the control variables, one with the composite independent variables and control variables, and one with disaggregated independent variables. In all models, I anticipate the indicators of capability and credibility to exhibit statistically significant effects on the likelihood of repression (refer to Table 3 for the expected directions of the effect).

¹⁴I could alternatively use time dummies or splines as suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), however the cubic polynomial approximation outperforms the time dummies and splines. Also, cubic polynomial approximation is easier to implement and simpler to interpret (Carter and Signorino 2010).

¹⁵See Carter and Signorino (2010, 282) for the original version of the equation

¹⁶Table 9 in the appendix shows that results of the random effects and fixed effects linear regression models. Even though OLS is not the ideal estimator for a binary dependent variable, the results show the directions of the effects are consistent with the logistic regression models

¹⁷Time-invariant variables are automatically excluded in the mixed effects model, which estimates the fixed effects over time within each dyad.

[Insert Table 5 here]

[Insert Table 6 here]

[Insert Table 7 here]

In line with my expectation, Ratio of the External Kin's CINC Score to Government's CINC score, the indicator of capability, has a negative effect on the likelihood of the repression. It is statistically significant at least at the 90 percent confidence level in pooled logistic regression models, while its standard error increases when clustered on dyads. In the mixed effect logistic regression model, it is statistically significant at the 88 percent confidence level. These results suggest that when the External Kin is more capable of hurting the Government, the Minority is less likely to face repression. However, it should be noted that capability is a necessary condition for deterrence, but not sufficient; it must be accompanied by credibility.

The effect of the composite *Credibility* variable fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance in any models. This prompts us to explore models with disaggregated indicators of credibility to discern specific variables that influence government repression. Among all indicators, the External Kin's economic support to the Minority emerges as the most statistically significant predictor of repression likelihood. This finding is not surprising, as economic support serves as a costlier signal of future military assistance and enhances the credibility of threats more than mere diplomatic support.

In line with my theoretical expectations, if the External Kin and Minority shared a homeland previously, and the Minority has an organized diaspora in the External

Kin's country, the likelihood of repression decreases due to the increased credibility of the External Kin's threat—though the levels of significance are not consistent across all models. Also, the External Kin's ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of repression with this effect surpassing conventional levels of statistical significance in both pooled and clustered logistic regression models. These findings underline the degree to which the salience of a minority for the external kin enhances the credibility of their threat, consequently affecting the likelihood of repression.

Contrary to theoretical expectations, joint language and religion between the Minority and External Kin, as well as a military alliance between the External Kin and Government do not exhibit statistically significant effects in any of the models. While the contiguity of two countries and dual citizenship right for the Minority has statistically significant effects in the opposite directions in some models, External Kin's democracy level show statistically significant effects in the opposite directions consistently. These findings require further attention in future research. Yet, the negative relationship between the likelihood of repression and External Kin's democracy level might be attributed to the lower likelihood of the use of military force by democracies. Governments may perceive a democratic External Kin's threat as less credible due to institutional checks and balances. The positive effect of contiguity on the likelihood of repression may result from the Government's concern regarding potential irredentist claims by the External Kin.

The results for the control variables suggest that a more democratic Government with a higher GDP reduces the likelihood of repression. Furthermore, when the Minority receives support from other third parties, it heightens the Government's threat perception, thereby increasing the likelihood of repression. Coherence of the minority group does not consistently yield the same results across the models. It exhibits a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood of repression in the random effects logistic regression models, whereas the effect is negative in the mixed effects model. Other control variables

do not have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of repression.¹⁸

Overall, the findings indicate that the capability of an external kin's threat is a significant predictor of the repression of a minority group, as suggested by my extended deterrence framework. In essence, minority groups with militarily powerful external ethnic kin are less likely to suffer government repression due to the deterrent umbrella provided by their ethnic kin. However, only certain components of external kin's credibility significantly influence government repression. In particular, previous economic support to the minority group serves a costly signal of the external kin's intent to protect the minority group in the event of repression. Additionally, if the external kin group resides in highly fractionalized country, extended deterrence is less likely to be effective. The lack of statistical significance for the composite credibility variable might be due to the null effects of the remaining components of credibility. Moreover, the size of my sample may not be large enough to yield consistent results although the joint significance test (based on the linear model in the robustness test) allow me reject the null hypothesis and infer that the model in overall is good fit.¹⁹

Substantive Effects

To provide a better understanding of the substantive effect of the External Kin's extended deterrence on the likelihood of government repression, I use simulation-based inference (Tomz, Whittenberg, and King 2003) to estimate the change in the predicted probability of repression, depending on varying values of credibility and capability.²⁰ Table 8 presents the results in two scenarios. In the first scenario, both the credibility and capability of the External Kin's threat are at their average values. In the second

¹⁸The results of robustness tests, as presented in the linear models in Table 7, align largely with the findings of the main models. Notably, diplomatic support from the External Kin and military alliance between the External Kin and Government show statistically more significant effects on the likelihood of repression in these linear models.

¹⁹Results of the F-test: $F = 10.285$, $p - \text{value} < 2.2e - 16$

²⁰Estimation of these quantities of interest are based on the pooled logistic regression.

scenario, the likelihood of repression is presented when both credibility and capability are high.²¹

[Insert Table 8 here]

The results in Table 8 suggest that higher levels of capability and credibility in the External Kin's threat correspond to an increased likelihood of deterring the Government from repression. The likelihood of repression decreases significantly from 10 percent to approximately 1 percent, and this change is statistically significant, as the confidence intervals of the two probabilities do not overlap. This finding provides further empirical support for the predictions of the game-theoretical model.

An illustrative example of such successful extended deterrence by a transborder ethnic alignment is the lack of active and high-level discrimination against the Greeks in Albania. This status of the Greeks in Albania can be attributed to Albania's democratization, its accession negotiations with the European Union, an increase in Albania's GDP, and the coherence of the Greek community in Albania. My findings underline the role of Greece, in addition to all these factors, in the status of the Greeks in Albania.

For instance, in 1994, the relations between Greece and Albania deteriorated following an attack on an Albanian border post, resulting in the death of two soldiers. According to the allegations of the Albanian President, the attack on the border post was organized and sponsored by the Greek government, while the Greek government accused the Albanian authorities of arbitrary detentions and discrimination of the Greek minority in Albania (UPI Archives 1994; Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The status of the Greeks in Albania was at the center of the dispute (Human Rights Watch 1995). Despite a high-level diplomatic crisis including expulsion of diplomats, the dispute did not escalate militarily.

²¹In the second scenario, either the maximum or minimum values of the credibility variables are used depending on the direction of their expected effects. The ratio of CINC scores is set equal to its third quartile. Control variables are held at their average values.

Yet, the Greek government did not back from its role as the protector of the Greeks in Albania.

The following statement from the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlines Greece's commitment to monitoring the situation of the Greek minority throughout Albania and the importance of Albania meeting its obligations regarding minority rights (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019):

Greek foreign policy's top priority with regard to Albania is to monitor the situation of all the members of the Greek minority throughout the country, and not just in the areas arbitrarily recognized by the Albanian state as "minority" areas. Full respect for the rights of the minority and implementation of the relevant commitments and obligations of the Albanian side are criteria that Albania needs to meet on its European course, and are a barometer in Greek-Albanian bilateral relations.

This statement, taken alone, reflects the intention of the Greek government. However, my theory and empirical findings enable me to assert that Greece had the capacity to influence the status of the Greeks in Albania when this intention was coupled with a highly credible and capable threat directed at the Albanian government. Factors such as their geographical proximity, shared language and religion, shared homeland in the recent past, consistent and substantial diplomatic and economic support, as well as Greece's superior material capabilities, collectively enhanced the Greek government's ability to protect the rights and well-being of the Greek minority in Albania.

Conclusion

Can minority groups be protected by their external ethnic kin? To answer this question, I employ a theory of interstate conflict, known as perfect deterrence theory,

and develop a tripartite extended deterrence game of transborder ethnic alignments. This game-theoretical model offers a comprehensive and cohesive framework for understanding the dynamics between a government, a minority, and the minority's powerful external kin. I argue that a powerful external kin can protect a minority group from government repression only when it can pose a credible and capable threat of use of force to protect the minority.

The external kin's credibility reflects its willingness to protect the minority from repression whereas the capability of their threat is about to what extent they can hurt their opponents when they execute their threat. I identify the sources of credibility and capability for each player and solve the game with incomplete information. The resulting perfect Bayesian equilibria show that when the external is both more willing to and capable of protecting the minority, the likelihood of repression decreases. Therefore, I argue that an external kin's influence on the minority-government relationship hinges on dynamic variables such as credibility and capability of threats, which extend beyond factors like geographical proximity or the external kin's access to political power. My findings show that the external kin's military superiority, serving as the source of a capable threat, and previous economic support to the minority group, functioning as a costly signal of a credible threat, are significant predictors of the status of a minority group.

If we return to the example of Turkey and Turkish minorities in other countries, empirical findings shows that neither presence of Turkey as a powerful ethnic kin nor geographical proximity helps the minority groups. While the Turkmens in Iraq have suffered high levels of repression (until democratization of Iraq after 2003), the Turks in Macedonia have not been discriminated by their government despite their similar distance to Turkey. I argue that Turkey's military superiority over Macedonia (the ratio of their CINC scores=54.3) compared with Iraq (the ratio of their CINC scores=3.4), is an

important explanation of this difference. Similarly, Uyghurs in China have experienced higher levels of repression despite varying degrees of diplomatic support from Turkey. This aligns with my empirical findings, which indicate that diplomatic support does not significantly affect the likelihood of repression. More importantly, Turkey again lacks of a highly capable threat against China which prevents a successful extended deterrence. Another example is the Tatars in Crimea (Ukraine), who did not face active targeted political discrimination until the invasion of Crimea by Russia, at which point Turkey lost capability of its threat. In short, Turkey was able to protect their ethnic kin only when it posed a highly capable threat.

The implication of this study for the literature is that the presence of an external kin does not automatically help minority groups. The external kin should demonstrate its willingness to take action to protect the minority with costly signals (i.e. economic support), and this action should be capable of hurting the host government. Even if the external kin does not explicitly make a threat immediately after repression, its resolve and military capability can achieve general deterrence preventing repression from happening in the first place because the host government is convinced that repressing the minority will trigger a costly interstate dispute.

We can also infer that external ethnic kin of minority groups are more likely to deter government repression compared to other third-parties because ethnic ties increase the credibility of threat through by generating public support within the third-party. In short, this research contributes to the literature by theorizing the role of transborder ethnic alignments in domestic politics and testing the predictions using newly developed time-series cross-sectional quantitative data. I particularly show that the effect of an external kin on the status of a minority varies across time and space; and, it depends on the credibility and capability of their threat, rather than fixed characteristics like geographical proximity. Future research may employ case studies and process tracing to

investigate the particular causal mechanisms underlying the components of external kin's credibility and the status of minority groups. Another direction for future research is to delve into the impact of ethnic kinship on interstate relations and the preferences of minority groups.

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Tables

Table 1: Perfect Bayesian equilibria and the existence conditions for the Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments with incomplete information

Equilibrium	Strategic Variables						Existence Conditions	Outcome(s)
	Government		Minority		External Kin			
	u	w	x_h	x_s	y_h	y_s		
DET ₁	0	1	1	1	1	0	$p_e \geq g_1$	<i>Status-Quo</i>
RME ₁	1	1	1	1	1	0	$p_e \geq m_s$ and $p_e \leq g_1$	<i>MID</i> or <i>Intrastate War</i>
RME ₂	1	1	1	0	1	0	$p_e \leq m_s$ and $p_e \leq g_1$	<i>Repression, MID, or Intrastate War</i>

Table 2: Sample

Government	Disadvantaged Minority	External Kin	Time Period
Albania	Greeks	Greece	1990 - 2017
Moldova	Russian speakers	Russia	1991 - 2017
Estonia	Russian speakers	Russia	1991 - 2017
Latvia	Russians	Russia	1991 - 2017
Lithuania	Russians	Russia	1991 - 2017
Kyrgyzstan	Russians	Russia	1991 - 2017
Uzbekistan	Russians	Russia	1991 - 2017
Kazakhstan	Russian speakers	Russia	1991 - 2017
Congo, DRC	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Burundi	1966 - 1995
Rwanda	Tutsi	Burundi	1962 - 1994
Congo, DRC	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	Rwanda	1996 - 2017
Macedonia	Turks	Turkey	1991 - 2017
Kosovo	Turks	Turkey	2000 - 2017
Greece	Muslims/Turks	Turkey	1990 - 2017
Bulgaria	Turks	Turkey	1947 - 2017
Russia	Tatars	Turkey	2014 - 2017
Ukraine	Tatars	Turkey	1991 - 2014
Iraq	Turkmen	Turkey	1928 - 2017
Syria	Turkmen	Turkey	1979 - 2017
China	Uighur	Turkey	1949 - 2017

Table 3: Credibility and Capability of the External Kin's Threat

Actor	Credibility	Capability
External Kin	<p>What Affects an External Kin's Willingness to Support the Minority at the Expense of a MID?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contiguity (+) • Presence of a diaspora organization (+) • Shared Language and Religion (+) • Shared Homeland (+) • Dual Citizenship (+) • Level of democracy (+) • Ethnic fractionalization (-) • Military alliance with the Government(-) • Diplomatic support (+) • Economic support (+) 	<p>To What Degree Does the Execution of an External Kin's Threat Hurt the Government?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ratio of the material power of the External Kin to the Government (+)

Note: + = positive effect, - = negative effect

Table 4: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Repression	675	0.370	0.483	0	1
Ratio of CINC Scores	643	39.645	70.172	0.060	401.220
External Kin's Diplomatic Support to Minority	675	0.794	0.460	0	1
External Kin's Economic Support to Minority	675	0.227	0.419	0	1
Government's Democracy Level	672	1.028	1.083	0	3
Government's GDP	675	550,196	1,990,547	2,429.944	17,080,304
External Kin's Democracy Level	675	1.461	0.751	0	3
Joint Language and Religion (External Kin-Minority)	675	1.973	0.161	1	2
Minority's Size	675	0.083	0.092	0.002	0.337
Minority's Goal	675	1.342	0.663	1	3
Minority's Coherence	675	1.196	0.784	0	2
Coup Risk for the Government	675	0.081	0.309	0	2
Third-Party Support to Minority	675	0.344	0.545	0	2
Dual Citizenship Right for Minority	675	0.227	0.419	0	1
Diaspora	675	0.874	0.332	0	1
External Kin's Ethnic Fractionalization	675	0.297	0.057	0.059	0.333
Contiguity	675	0.711	0.454	0	1
Peace Years (Until Repression)	675	19.630	18.221	0	82
Alliance Between Government and External Kin	675	0.354	0.479	0	1
External Kin and Minority Shared Homeland	675	0.898	0.303	0	1

Table 5: Results (Pooled Logistic Regression)

	Dependent Variable: The Likelihood of Repression		
	Without Control Variables	With Composite IVs	With Disaggregated IVs
Capability (Cinc Ratio)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.11 ⁺ (0.06)
Credibility	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	
<i>Components of Credibility</i>			
External Kin's Diplomatic Support to Minority			-0.87 (0.70)
External Kin's Economic Support to Minority			-1.09 (0.68)
Contiguity			11.55 (889.01)
External Kin and Minority Shared Homeland			-11.09 (889.01)
Joint Language and Religion			-10.11 (5204.73)
Dual Citizenship Right for Minority			2.16** (0.70)
Diaspora			-2.35** (0.79)
External Kin's Democracy Level			0.99** (0.35)
External Kin's Ethnic Fractionalization			16.65*** (4.64)
Alliance Between Government and External Kin			-0.55 (0.49)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Government's Democracy Level		-1.57*** (0.23)	-1.93*** (0.28)
Government's GDP (logged)		-0.61*** (0.11)	-0.63*** (0.15)
Coup Risk for the Government		0.07 (0.41)	0.37 (0.43)
Minority's Goal		-1.10*** (0.27)	-0.18 (0.72)
Minority's Coherence		1.24*** (0.30)	1.56** (0.53)
Third-Party Support to Minority		0.76* (0.37)	1.32* (0.51)
Peace Years (Until Repression)		0.00 (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)
Peace Years (Until Repression) ²		0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peace Years (Until Repression) ³		-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
(Intercept)	0.56*** (0.13)	7.26*** (1.14)	21.56 (10409.46)
AIC	627.76	419.36	403.97
BIC	641.16	472.94	497.73
Log Likelihood	-310.88	-197.68	-180.98
Deviance	621.76	395.36	361.97
N	643	642	642

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ⁺ $p < 0.1$

Table 6: Results (Logistic Regression with Clustered Standard Errors)

	Dependent Variable: The Likelihood of Repression		
	Without Control Variables	With Composite IVs	With Disaggregated IVs
Capability (Cinc Ratio)	−0.13* (0.06)	−0.14* (0.06)	−0.11 (0.09)
Credibility	0.02 (0.09)	−0.05 (0.14)	
<i>Components of Credibility</i>			
External Kin's Diplomatic Support to Minority			−0.87 (1.26)
External Kin's Economic Support to Minority			−1.09 (1.40)
Contiguity			11.55** (4.36)
External Kin and Minority Shared Homeland			−11.09+ (5.78)
Joint Language and Religion			−10.11 (12.42)
Dual Citizenship Right for Minority			2.16 (1.80)
Diaspora			−2.35 (2.00)
External Kin's Democracy Level			0.99+ (0.56)
External Kin's Ethnic Fractionalization			16.65+ (10.03)
Alliance Between Government and External Kin			−0.55 (0.85)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Government's Democracy Level		−1.57*** (0.43)	−1.93*** (0.46)
Government's GDP (logged)		−0.61* (0.29)	−0.63* (0.30)
Coup Risk for the Government		0.07 (1.56)	0.37 (1.12)
Minority's Goal		−1.10 (0.67)	−0.18 (1.19)
Minority's Coherence		1.24 (0.91)	1.56+ (0.93)
Third-Party Support to Minority		0.76 (0.52)	1.32* (0.60)
Peace Years (Until Repression)		0.00 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Peace Years (Until Repression) ²		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peace Years (Until Repression) ³		−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
(Intercept)	0.56 (0.52)	7.26** (2.65)	21.56 (23.22)
AIC	627.76	419.36	403.97
BIC	641.16	472.94	497.73
Log Likelihood	−310.88	−197.68	−180.98
Deviance	621.76	395.36	361.97
N	643	642	642

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.1$

Table 7: Results (Multilevel Mixed Effects Logistic Regression)

	Dependent Variable: The Likelihood of Repression		
	Without Control Variables	With Composite IVs	With Disaggregated IVs
Capability (Cinc Ratio)	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.26 (0.22)	−0.36 (0.23)
Credibility	−0.24* (0.09)	−0.08 (0.12)	
<i>Components of Credibility</i>			
External Kin's Diplomatic Support to Minority			−0.18 (1.01)
External Kin's Economic Support to Minority			−2.06* (0.99)
External Kin's Democracy Level			2.46*** (0.60)
Alliance Between Government and External Kin			−1.41 (2.50)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Government's Democracy Level		−3.23*** (0.87)	−2.81*** (0.84)
Government's GDP (logged)		0.15 (0.18)	−0.62** (0.23)
Coup Risk for the Government		−0.46 (1.72)	1.08 (2.02)
Minority's Goal		−0.88 (2.78)	−0.40 (2.93)
Minority's Coherence		−3.35* (1.33)	−2.96* (1.35)
Third-Party Support to Minority		2.14+ (1.29)	1.47 (1.54)
(Intercept)	−0.50 (1.49)	5.31 (5.47)	10.84 (6.21)
AIC	301.08	253.18	219.75
BIC	318.95	297.83	277.79
Log Likelihood	−146.54	−116.59	−96.87
N	643	642	642
Num. groups: dyadid	21	21	21
Var: dyadid (Intercept)	23.63	64.05	58.30

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.1$

Table 8: Substantive Effect of the Credibility and Capability of the External Kin's Threat on the Probability of Repression

	Predicted Probability of Repression
Average Credibility - Average Capability	0.1044 [0.0431 0.2562]
High Credibility - High Capability	0.000417 [0.0000 0.0411]

95% Confidence intervals are shown in brackets

Figures




Figure 1: Tripartite Extended Deterrence Game of Transborder Ethnic Alignments