Prospectus Proposal



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Thesis Commitee

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Energy Inputs in the Production Function: Evidence from India

Just Rut it in the Piev. stide

Motivation - Bigger Picture

- Need to reduce greenhouse emission efficiently.
- Externality → classical econ theory advocates carbon tax.

Implemented through **proportional** taxes on polluting inputs.

How should we optimally tax polluting inputs like fossil fuels? Can we do better than carbon pricing? Ly Is this a sub-build?

Answer depends on firms energy choices

Ly Use this as lead up to your Q

Empirical Evidence

Model

Identification

Results 0000 Thesis Plan



How do energy inputs enter firms' production function?

1. Document salient features of plant-level fuel usage in industry (37% of global emissions, Worell, Bertstein, Roy, Price and Harnisch, 2009) why blue? we gray or Corner solutions in fuel usage Space New tching between fuel sets across periods Identify and estimate production model with flexible energy input choices. Switching between fuels set related to productivity. Wind of obvious statement. ► Cleaner fuels are more productive/energy efficient. by I don't like this trasparency. Either show it or hide it.

This Paper

Q2: How do energy inputs enter firms' production function?

- 1. Document salient features of plant-level fuel usage in industry (37% of global emissions, Worell, Bertstein, Roy, Price and Harnisch, 2009)
 - Corner solutions in fuel usage

Non-standard

- Switching between fuel sets across periods
- 2. Identify and estimate production model with flexible energy input choices.
 - Switching between fuels set related to productivity.
- **-**
 - ► Cleaner fuels are more productive/energy efficient.

Contribution

Energy Substitution in industry Wiertzema, Ahman and Harvey (2018), Luh et al. (2020),

Lechtenbohmer et al. (2016), Joskow and Mishkin (1977), Aktinson and Halvorsen (1976)

I allow for fairly general energy input substitution patterns that go beyond canonical assumptions.

Intensive Margin: Energy Tasks] what does this mean?

Cite what you are using

Extensive Margin: Discrete fuel set choice to extend Acongst

Factor-augmenting productivity Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018), Hassler (2012), Demirer (2020)

I identify and estimate plant-level endogenous energy and fuel-augmenting productivity without relying on markovian assumptions for productivity.

Are you builting on something?

Data 🖇

Indian Survey of industries (ASI): 2009-2016

- Panel of all Indian manufacturing plants with at least 100 workers and a sample of plants with more than 10 workers (\sim 300,000 observations)
- Standard production function inputs
- pspace here Energy inputs: Coal, Oil, Natural Gas and Electricity
 - Convert to equivalent energy units (million british thermal units mmBtu)

 - How energy (mmBtu) gets used depends on technology/productivity.
 - 1. Electric arc furnaces vs. Coal-powered furnace
 - 2. Quality

Indian plants use opposition-intensive energy





Figure: Pollution Intensity of Energy - Cement manufacturing

- Many Indian plants primarily use coal (right-end cluster)
- ► Switching from coal to gas → large contributor to manufacturing clean-up in dev. economies (Rehfeldt et al. 2020)
- Natural gas cleanest energy in India



nts in narrowly defined industries use different fuel mixes



40% of plants switch between energy mixes at least once

New Fuel (%) Drops Existing Fuel (%)

No 58.5 60.4 Yes 41.5 39.6 Total 100.0 100.0 What ongo does this git?		Adds New Fuel (%)	Drops Existing Fuel (%)
Yes 41.5 39.6 Wed ongo does this gd?	No	58.5	60.4
Total 100.0 100.0 What ones does this	Yes	41.5	39.6
	Total	100.0	100.0 What ones does the gal?

Number of unique plants that add and drop a fuel (Balanced Panel)

Identification

Model

Empirical Evidence


 $p(\omega) = \min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left\{ \frac{p_f}{\psi_f(\omega)} \right\}$

lacktriangleright task-level technologies aggregate to average fuel productivity. $\Gamma_f(\mathbf{p}_{\mathcal{F}}, \Psi)$ Consider splitting and giving mon ditail on inner step Ishle can diswes

Thesis Plan

Full Model - definition and timeline

Plants produce differentiated products and engage in monopolistic competition. Each year, production decisions are made according to the following timeline:



Identification \hail \beamabotton 3lt{



Observe fuel quantities e_{fit} (inner nest) but not E_{it} (outer nest).


Under optimality, it is true that energy spending equals total fuel spending:

$$p_{eit}E_{it} = \sum_{f} p_{fit}e_{fit}$$
(1)
Structural variation in expenditure shares between a flexible input and energy recovers

$$E_{it}$$
 (Grieco et al. 2016):

$$\frac{E_{it}}{\bar{E}} = \left(\frac{p_{eit}E_{it}}{p_{mit}M_{it}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{\alpha_m}{\alpha_e}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \frac{M_{it}}{\bar{M}} \tag{2}$$





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which fuel switching across years isn't random



Plants that added a fuel to their mix were more productive in the previous year.

Marginal effects, probability of adding fuel (current year)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Any fuels	Natural Gas	Coal
Lagged log(TPF)	0.011***	0.006***	0.0036***
	(0.0012)	(0.00073)	(0.00057)
\overline{N}	102,951	102,951	102,951




Standard errors in parentheses

tive of strategic (non-random) fuel switching

Pistribution of In Prit Fuel-augmenting prod computation aways fuel product, vity (La Prix)

Left-skewed distribution means higher productivity \rightarrow Natural Gas is decrease more productive.



Identification (in progress)

use words, math

How do of this?

1. $\Gamma_{fit}: (\psi_{fit}(\omega), p_{fit}) \in \mathbb{R}^M \to \mathbb{R}$ Distribution of fuel-by-task productivity $\psi_f(\omega)$ can theoretically be recovered under parametric distributional assumption (Fréchet) using simulated GMM. Petails

2. Fixed fuel adoption costs κ_f .



Missing a slide telling us what you will do with model after estimation (and how)

Overview of thesis plan

have you fit the sollowing slides into this one

- 1. Energy Inputs in the Production Function: Evidence from India (JMP)
- 2. Optimal Environmental Taxes on Energy Inputs
- 3. Asymmetric Environmental Regulation and Carbon Leakage (Summer Paper)

Overview of thesis plan

- 1. Energy Inputs in the Production Function: Evidence from India (JMP)
- 2. Optimal Environmental Taxes on Energy Inputs
 - taxes in the Indian Context. Say thing about estimates verbally.

 Relative tax rate between different inputs (departure from carbon pricing).
- 孠

- Optimal transportation price of Natural Gas across proximity of plants to pipeline
- networks. Details
- 3. Asymmetric Environmental Regulation and Carbon Leakage (Summer Paper)

Overview of thesis plan

- 1. Energy Inputs in the Production Function: Evidence from India (JMP)
- 2. Optimal Environmental Taxes on Energy Inputs
- 3. Asymmetric Environmental Regulation and Carbon Leakage (Summer Paper)
 - ▶ Model where plants compete across location and are subject to different environmental regulation.
 - ▶ I estimate the model with Canadian plants and find little evidence of carbon leakage between Canadian provinces as a result of the 2008 BC carbon tax.

Fuel-Augmenting Productivity

With production function parameters, I get an estimate of normalized effective energy: $\frac{E_{it}}{E}$, which I use to recover (inverse) fuel-augmenting productivity

$$e_{fit} = E_{it}\Gamma_{fit} \tag{3}$$

$$\widehat{\bar{E}\Gamma_{fit}} = e_{fit} \left(\frac{\bar{E}}{E_{it}}\right) \tag{4}$$

I decompose Γ_{fit} between a scale component $\exp(1/\gamma_{it})$ and a relative fuel productivity component $\tilde{\Gamma}_{fit}$ such that

$$\widehat{\overline{E}\Gamma_{fit}} \equiv \overline{E} \underbrace{\frac{\Gamma_{fit}}{\sum_{f} \Gamma_{fit}}}_{\widehat{\Gamma}_{fit}} \underbrace{\sum_{f} \Gamma_{fit}}_{\exp(1/\alpha_{fit})}$$
(5)

Assumption on distribution of fuel-by-task productivity

known to the plant but unknown to the economist

$$P(\psi_f(\omega) \le w) = e^{-T_f w^{-\theta}} \tag{6}$$

Then, the probability that fuel f is chosen for task ω is given by:

$$\tau_f(\omega) = P\left(\frac{p_f}{\psi_f(\omega)} = \min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \left\{ \frac{p_f}{\psi_f(\omega)} \right\} \right) = \frac{(T_f p_f^{-\theta})^{|\mathcal{F}|}}{\prod_{j \neq f}^{|\mathcal{F}|} (T_f p_f^{-\theta} + T_j p_j^{-\theta})} = \tau_f \tag{7}$$

And the probability that fuel f is used for m tasks follows a binomial distribution by the symmetry of tasks:

$$P_r(M\mathcal{T}_f = m) = \left(\frac{M}{m}\right)\tau_f^m(1 - \tau_f)^{M-m} \tag{8}$$

Algorithm to recover the distribution of fuel-by-task productivity

Algorithm 1 Estimation of $\{T_f\}_{f=1}^F, \theta, M$ by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM)

For each plant-year, I observe Γ_{fit}

- 1: Set guess for $\hat{\Theta} = \{\hat{T}_f\}_{f=1}^F, \hat{\theta}, \hat{M}$
- 2: For each plant-year, draw ψ_f M times for each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{it}$
- 3: Compute allocation of fuels to task
- 4: Get number of tasks $(M\mathcal{T}_f)$ and associated productivity (ψ_f) for chosen fuels
- 5: Compute $\Gamma_{fit}(model) = \sum_{i=1}^{MT_{fit}} \psi_{fit}^{-1}$
- 6: Repeat 1-5 S times

Iterate 1-6 until $\hat{\Theta}$ minimizes $||\hat{m}(\Gamma_{fit}|\Theta) - m(\Gamma_{fit})||$ for some moments



Production for a single plant

Adaptation of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2021) to study energy substitution. Production for a single plant:

$$\frac{Y}{\bar{Y}} = e^z \left(\alpha_k \left(\frac{K}{\bar{K}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + \alpha_l \left(\frac{L}{\bar{L}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + \alpha_m \left(\frac{M}{\bar{M}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + \alpha_e \left(\frac{E}{\bar{E}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\nu \sigma}{\sigma - 1}} \tag{9}$$

$$\frac{E}{\mathcal{M}} = \min\{\tau(\omega) : \omega \in [0, 1]\}$$
(10)

$$\tau(\omega) = \sum_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \psi_f(\omega) e_f(\omega) \tag{11}$$

Energy-task model within a standard CES in capital, labor, intermediates and Energy.

Example of energy tasks: oil for transportation, electricity for heating the plant and coal for industrial melting.



Implications

Energy task prices:

$$p(\omega) = \min\left\{\frac{p_1}{\psi_1(\omega)}, ..., \frac{p_F}{\psi_F(\omega)}\right\}$$
 (12)

demand for fuel in task ω :

$$e_f(\omega) = \frac{E}{M} \psi_f(\omega)^{-1} \tag{13}$$

More productive fuel means less fuel quantity needed to produce one unit of energy \rightarrow more energy efficient.



Aggregation across tasks

Let $\mathcal{T}(p_{\mathcal{F}})_f$ be the set of tasks performed by fuel f. Then, conditional fuel demand is

$$e_f = \int_{\mathcal{T}_f} e_f(\omega) d\omega = E \frac{1}{M} \int_{\mathcal{T}_f} \psi_f(\omega)^{-1}$$
(14)

$$=E\Gamma_f \tag{15}$$

 Γ_f relate to the inverse of factor-augmenting productivity for fuel f. This is very flexible because it can be 0 if fuel f is not chosen for any of the tasks ($\mathcal{T}_f = 0$) while it can represent total fuel productivity if fuel f is chosen for all tasks ($\mathcal{T}_f = 1$). Back to main

Main Identification Goal and challenge

I would like to recover fuel-augmenting productivity Γ_{fit} and study how they change with variation in fuel prices through market-based environmental policy. However, I face an identification challenge:

$$e_{fit} = E_{it}\Gamma_{fit} \tag{16}$$

$$e_{fit} = E_{it}\Gamma_{fit}$$

$$= f(\mathbf{p_{it}}, \theta) \frac{\Gamma_{fit}}{\exp(z_{it})}$$
(16)

Think of a plant using only fuel f. I cannot in principle separately identify the scale of fuel-augmenting productivity from the TFP term z_{it} because I don't observe E_{it} .



Estimating Equation

I can plug the optimal choice of E_{it}/\bar{E} as a function of expenditure shares and the normalized quantity of intermediates back into the CES production function and get an estimating equation for all production function parameters in log revenues with two restrictions:

$$\ln R_{it} = \ln \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} + \ln \left[\frac{P_{mit} M_{it}}{\nu} \left(1 + \frac{\alpha_k}{\alpha_m} \left(\frac{K_{it}/\bar{K}}{M_{it}/\bar{M}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} + \frac{\alpha_l}{\alpha_m} \left(\frac{L_{it}/\bar{L}}{M_{it}/\bar{M}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right) + p_{eit} E_{it} \right] + u_{it}$$

s.t.

$$\overline{P_e E} / \overline{P_m M} = \frac{\alpha_e}{\alpha_m} \tag{18}$$

$$\alpha_k + \alpha_l + \alpha_m + \alpha_e = 1 \tag{19}$$

▶ Back to mair

Average output Elasticities (Selected industries)

Output elasticity with respect to specific factors are defined as:

$$\hat{\epsilon}_{it,yj} = \frac{\hat{\alpha}_j(x_{jit}/\bar{x}_j)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}{\sum_j \hat{\alpha}_j(x_{jit}/\bar{x}_j)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}}$$
(20)

Table: Average Output Elasticities

	Cement	Steel & Iron	Casting of Metal
$\overline{ar{\epsilon}_{y,l}}$	0.27	0.11	0.21
$ar{\epsilon}_{y,k}$	0.05	0.03	0.04
$ar{\epsilon}_{y,m}$	0.46	0.74	0.64
$\overline{\epsilon}_{y,e}$	0.22	0.11	0.11

Total-Factor Productivity estimate

- ▶ I follow De Loecker (2011) to get an estimate of hicks-neutral productivity $\exp(z_{it})$ by deflating revenues with year/indsutry dummies.
- ▶ I decompose fuel-augmenting productivity into a scale component $\exp(\gamma_{it})$ and a relative fuel productivity component. Then, following Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2018), I multiply the scale component by $\epsilon_{it,ye}$ to get it in units of output.

(log) TFP is then calculated as follows:

$$\ln TFP_{it} = z_{it} + \epsilon_{it,ye}\gamma_{it} \tag{21}$$



Optimal Policy - relative tax on energy inputs

Benchmark: carbon tax

$$ghg = \sum_{f} \gamma_f e_f \implies \frac{\tau_f}{\tau_k} = \frac{\gamma_f}{\gamma_k} \tag{22}$$

What I expect to find:

- Lower relative tax rate on cleaner fuels than carbon tax (e.g. natural gas). Why?
 - presence of fixed adoption costs means taxes must be low enough on cleaner fuels to incentive adoption.
 - When cleaner fuels are more productive, additional energy efficiency gains from incentivizing their adoption.



Optimal Policy- relative price of natural gas across districts

- Natural Gas is very costly to transport
 - ► High-pressure steel pipelines to keep it gasified.
- Large variation in price of natural gas based on location of plants relative to existing pipeline networks and source of gas.
 - ▶ 80% of natural gas pipelines owned by government corporation (GAIL)
 - Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) sets transportation price jointly with GAIL.

In November 2020, PNGRB announced that it would increase transportation cost of natural gas by 20-30% for plants near source and equivalently decrease it for plants far from source.

