

## Accelerated Site-to-Site VPN

Intermediate Talk

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# Why VPNs are Important

- Todays business is multi-national and international
- Many distributed sites that need to be interconnected
- Provide a secure channel for communication over insecure medium
- Other usecases: VM interconnects, cell tower backbones, firm intra-nets

=> Need for high throughput solutions



## Focus: Site-to-Site VPN




Figure 1: Overview of example Site-to-Site VPN setup

- Only two (or similar few) endpoints connecting many hosts
- Very high bandwidth between the gateways



## Goals of this Thesis

- Create benchmark criteria for Site-to-Site setups
- Evaluate performance of common implementations
- Develop a general performance model for VPNs
- Explore different approaches for performance improvements



# Overview of Common Implementations

## OpenVPN

- Pure Userspace Sockets
- TLS & X.509
- L2 and L3
- Platform independent

### IPsec (on Linux)

- Very complex protocol & code
- Build into Kernel
- L3 only (without L2TP)

#### WireGuard

- Very new with radical approaches
- State-of-the-Art cryptography
- Kernel module (inclusion ongoing)
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<sup>1 64</sup> byte packets, COTS hardware



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## Shared problem:

Different degrees of slow under high load and in general No implementation achieves >5 Mpps or >10 Gbit/s<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1 64</sup> byte packets, COTS hardware



## WireGuard under Load



# Benchmarking: Traffic Shapes

Exact traffic pattern and distributions vary depending on setup/use-case. **Influences performance**.

Common metric is **number of flows**. Identifies a group of packets to a connection/subnet/host. Usually 3-tuple (L2 proto, L3 src, L3 dst) or 5-tuple (+ L4 ports).

**Packets-per-second** (Mpps) is more interesting than **bits-per-second** (Gbit/s). 64 byte packets (minimum Ethernet frame size), but more realistic distributions are possible.

- Single flow, high bandwidth
   Worst case, models single client-server setup
- Multiple flows, equal bandwidth
   Best case, fits site-to-site setups, easy to model
- "Elephant" flows (few number of flows dominate bandwidth-wise) Realistic case (Netflix, Youtube, ...)



# Example: Underutilization with single flows




Figure 2: WireGuard forwarding rate of 64 byte packets, single flow, X540-AT2






Figure 3: CPU/Queues utilization under single flow traffic

- NIC distributes packets to queues by L3 addresses
- One flow => everything in one queue
- Can be configured to include ports, not every NIC supports this



## MoonWire

- DPDK network stack to bypass slow kernel
- Lua for fast prototyping and interfacing with libraries (crypto)
- · Aims for protocol compatibility with WireGuard
- Allows experimenting with different data structures, algorithms, ...



# MoonWire Graphs

### [bytes/cycle graph of different ciphers]

- Cryptographic operations can become the bottleneck
- Hard to improve, correctness is more important

### Solution: work distribution to multiple cores

- WireGuard utilizes Kernel worker tasks and a queue
- Lots of possible implementations



## Symmetric Encryption in a Nutshell

encrypt(shared\_key, nonce, message) = ciphertext

Should be easy to scale up?



# Symmetric Encryption in a Nutshell

encrypt(shared\_key, nonce, message) = ciphertext

- Correct nonce generation/handling is critical. Nonce reuse (under the same key) breaks scheme and allows key recovery
- Nonce generation depends on length IETF ChaCha20 & AES256 GCM: 96 bit (12 byte)
   Too short to be random (birthday problem)
   Recommendation: Counting up
- Regular re-keying still recommended

But: Must be global over all threads/cores. Accessed for each packet => highly critical. Synchronization (mutex) and atomics are far too slow.



## **Nonce Generation Tricks**

existing protocol

Partition nonce space per worker/CPU/thread:

8 bit worker\_id + 94 bit counter = 96 bit

Worker<sub>0</sub>: **0**123, **0**124, **0**125, ...

Worker<sub>1</sub>: **1**123, **1**124, **1**125, ...

Beware of "overflows" into different worker partition

Different cipher: XChaCha20 has 192 bit (24 byte) nonce
 Can be randomly generated safely
 Each worker has own PRNG instance (seeded carefully)
 Independent state & no sharing => fast
 Trade-off: messages get larger (by 10 bytes), incompatible with

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 existing protocol

Good news: Decryption is much easier. Message contains everything.



# Multi-core Scaling Opportunities

Source IP & port identical over all packets => Simple RSS does not work



# Remaining Work

- More benchmarking & measurements
- Try more other performance improvements
  - AVX512 cipher implementations & CPU downclocking
  - NUMA
- Thesis writing