Evidence and Cloud Computing:
The Virtual Machine Introspection Approach[*]

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Abstract

Cloud forensics refers to digital forensics investigations performed in cloud computing environments. Nowadays digital investigators face various technical, legal, and organizational challenges to keep up with current developments in the field of cloud computing. But, due to its dynamic nature, cloud computing also offers several opportunities to improve digital investigations in cloud environments. The enormous available computing power can be leveraged to process massive amounts of information in order to extract relevant evidence. In the first part of this paper we focus on the current state-of-the-art of affected fields of cloud forensics. The benefit for the reader of this paper is therefore a clear overview of the challenges and opportunities for scientific developments in the field of cloud forensics. As this paper represents an extended version of our paper presented at the ARES 2012 conference, we describe digital forensics investigations at the hypervisor level of virtualized environments in greater detail. cloud computing setups typically consist of several virtualized computer systems. Therefore we introduce the reader to the topic of evidence correlation within cloud computing infrastructures.

Keywords: Cloud Computing, Digital Forensics, Cloud Forensics, Hypervisor Forensics, Evidence Correlation

1   Introduction

In recent years, cloud computing has gained vastly in importance. It has been introduced to optimize the general usage of IT infrastructures. cloud computing is a technology that evolved from technologies of the field of distributed computing, especially grid computing [2]. According to NIST [3], "cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e. g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction"

The European Union highlights in their digital agenda [4] the high value of cloud computing for businesses and the governmental sector. An important factor to reach the full potential delivered by cloud computing techniques is the reduction of uncertainty which is currently addressed by EU's cloud strategy [5].

Experts agree that there will be a substantial growth in the field of cloud computing over the next few years. According to Kazarian and Hanlon [6], 40% of small and medium businesses (SMBs) from different countries are expected to use three or more cloud services and migrate their data into the cloud. In 2010, Gartner [7] released a study which forecasted the cloud service revenues to reach 148.8 billion in 2014 (compared to 58.6 billion in 2009). Beside the usage of cloud computing in the economic sector it is increasingly used in a governmental context (e.g. [8, 9]). Paquette et al. discuss in their work [9] specific risks which have to be considered for cloud technologies in government use.

Carlton and Zhou [10] state that cloud computing is, from a technical point of view, a combination of existing technologies. People have difficulties to capture the big picture: for managers and customers of cloud services the idea is similar to exchanging information through web-based user interfaces. Others view the concept as being an extension of the timesharing concept from the 1960s. cloud providers sell services based on different business models (also referred to as "service models"): Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) [11, 12]. With SaaS, the customer uses applications which are provided by the service seller (e. g. web-based e-mail services). With PaaS, the service seller then provides his infrastructure (servers, operating systems, network, etc.). The customer is able to write/use his own applications using the application programming interface made available by the provider. IaaS enables the user to use and run software of his choice (e. g. operating systems). The service seller provides the customer with the necessary infrastructure (servers, network, storage facilities, etc).

Depending on the level of access to the underlying cloud infrastructure the following types of clouds have been categorized [11, 13]: private clouds, community clouds, public clouds, and hybrid clouds. In "private clouds" the infrastructure is operated on behalf of a single entity. Usually the infrastructure is located in the premises of the organization. "Community clouds" refer to cloud deployments where the infrastructure is shared by several organizations. In "Public clouds" one or more providers run the infrastructure and make it available to anybody who wishes to pay for the service. "Hybrid clouds" refer to setups which are formed out of two or more cloud infrastructures. These in turn can be private, community, or public clouds.

Another upcoming trend is the usage of cloud infrastructures for criminal activities. In line with legal cloud business models, so called crime-as-a-service [14, 15] has been introduced as term for performing malicious activities in the cloud.

The shift in intercommunications and interaction between IT systems poses new challenges for digital forensics investigations. cloud Service Providers (CSPs) often do not let their customers look behind their "virtual curtains" [16, 17]. Vendor dependent implementations, multiple jurisdictions and proprietary data exchange formats [18] bring digital forensics into a deeper crisis as it is already facing [19]. Ruan et al. [20] defined cloud forensics as being a cross discipline between cloud computing and digital forensics. It is further recognized as a subset of network forensics [21]. Network forensics deals with investigating private or public networks and as cloud computing is based on broad network access it should follow the main phases of the network forensic process. Delport et al. [22] deem cloud forensics to be a subset of computer forensics as clouds consist of several nodes which are computers. This means that cloud forensics combines both, computer forensics and network forensics [23].

Ruan et al. [20] further extended the definition of cloud forensics across three major dimensions: technical, legal, and organizational. The technical dimension describes the set of procedures and tools which are utilized to carry out the digital forensics process in cloud environments. The organizational dimension refers to the fact that cloud computing involves at least two parties: CSPs and cloud customers. Further it is possible that CSPs outsource some of their services to other CSPs. The legal dimension refers to multi-jurisdiction and multi-tenancy challenges. Both fields have been exacerbated in cloud environments. Existing agreements and regulations have to be adopted for forensics activities to not breach any jurisdictions or confidentiality measures. Digital forensics can be divided into live and dead

analysis [24]: while the former refers to investigations being performed while systems are running, the latter investigates systems that are in powered-off state. cloud forensics involves both disciplines as it is possible to acquire memory dumps without changing systems' states. Investigating hard disk or storage images from virtual machines can be performed with techniques known from the field of dead or post-mortem analysis.

This paper is structured into two parts. First we focus on the current State-of-the-Art of affected fields of cloud forensics. In the second part, based on the current State-of-the-Art, related challenges and opportunities are identified in order to derive and describe open research problems.

2   State of the Art of Cloud Forensics

This chapter describes the State-of-the-Art of affected fields of digital forensics investigations in cloud environments. Further, this chapter higlights possible challenges and opportunities for cloud forensics.

2.1   Existing Digital Forensics Frameworks

Digital investigations have to consider various perspectives (e.g. legal perspective, technological perspective) in order to be successful. In order to coordinate the efforts between the various stakeholders, there exist a variety of publications dealing with procedures how to handle, analyze, document and present digital evidence. The presented work in this subsection contains well-known and well-established guidelines which are not specifically tailored to cloud computing. To some extent the principles introduced are also valid for cloud technology. However, an adaption of the organizational frameworks has to be considered to deal with the new challenges arising from the usage of cloud computing.

In the First Responder's Guide for Electronic Crime Scene Investigations [25], the forensic process is split into the four phases, (1) collection, (2) examination, (3) analysis and (4) report. The first phase is dedicated to capture electronic evidence. Thereafter, in the examination phase content and state of evidence is documented and the evidence is examined concerning hidden and obscured information. The last step of the second step is to reduce the information. In the analysis phase the evidence is analyzed concerning the relevance to the case. While examination is a technical task, analysis is usually conducted by an investigation team. Finally, in the last step reporting takes place [25].

NIST SP800-86 [26] shows how digital forensics can support incident handling. This publication focuses tackles digital forensics mainly from an IT perspective, not a legal perspective. The forensics process uses the phases of [26].

Further widely-used digital forensic frameworks include the digital forensics framework of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) [27] and the DFRWS (Digital forensics Research Workshop) Investigative Process model [28]. Cohen proposes, in [29], a model consisting of the seven phases: identification, collection, transportation, storage, examination and traces, presentation, and destruction. Ke [30] describes the application of the SABSA model to the digital forensics process to obtain forensically sound evidence. More information on digital forensics frameworks can be found in [31].

[32] present in their paper an iterative framework based on the well-established and widely accepted work of [33] and NIST SP800-86 [26]. The proposed framework comprises the phases *Evidence Source Identification and Preservation*, *Collection*, *Examination and Analysis* and *Reporting and Presentation*. Possible iterations of the process are initiated by the Examination and Analysis step.

2.2   Investigation of Cloud Infrastructures

According to Zimmerman and Glavach [34], the technology of cloud computing is not new. It is a new way of providing applications and computing resources on demand. Therefore the technology seems

a perfect solution for smaller businesses that do not have the necessary resources to completely fulfill their IT needs [35, 36]. Further, it allows private end users to utilize massive amounts of computing resources at affordable prices. However, the introduction of new technologies poses new challenges for the digital forensics investigator [37]. Grispos et al. show "how established digital forensic procedures will be invalidated in this new environment" [38]. They propose research agendas for addressing the new challenges depending on the investigation phase. As mentioned in the previous section there exist several organizational digital investigations frameworks. In the following the different investigation steps: identification, preservation, examination, and presentation are elucidated regarding their implementation for the investigation of cloud environments.

Identification, Preservation, and Acquisition: Grispos et al. outline in [38] the lack of frameworks to determine which elements were affected by IT specific crimes. The usage of conventional intrusion detection systems in the context of cloud computing infrastructures has been proposed by several authors [38]. The preservation and acquisition step deals with evidence collection from computer based systems. The increasing storage capacity of devices and computer systems are everlasting challenges in digital forensics investigations [38]. With the introduction of cloud computing systems this challenge is still ubiquitous: the elastic ability of cloud computing infrastructures allows the user to request additional data storage in a limitless fashion.

The chain of custody documents how evidence was handled in the context of the digital investigations process [39]. The documentation describes how evidence was collected, analyzed, and preserved to be approved in court. Due to the remote nature of cloud computing scenarios, assumptions that have been made with the investigation of traditional computer systems are not valid anymore [40]. Investigators usually had physical access to traditional computer systems [34]. Therefore they were able perform a live analysis or to remove storage devices for analyzing them in a forensics laboratory. Storage devices are accessed through a computer network. Digital investigators have to obtain control of cloud services before investigating them [20]. Depending on time an investigator requires to gain control of such a service, relevant evidence can be destroyed (deliberately or accidentally) by both, the service user and the cloud provider [38]. In this regard, IaaS deployments provide much more useful information for digital forensics investigations than PaaS or SaaS setups [16, 41]. With PaaS or SaaS deployment scenarios, customers do not have any control of the underlying operating infrastructure. The amount of information from servers is limited and therefore, the client has to contribute to the investigation process. Besides the technical challenges, the lack of regulatory and legal frameworks complicate meeting the chain of custody requirements [42].

In forensics, 'live' acquisitions and investigations allow to obtain data stored in non-persistent memory such as process information or active network connections [43] as well as temporary data, such as file locks or web browsing caches [16, 38], RFC3227 [44] explains several best practices regarding live investigation of systems in case of security incidents.

However, traditional forensics guidelines require storage images to be forensically sound. Therefore bit-by-bit copies including a check sum are made from digital storage devices from instances in "dead" state (the system has been shutdown) to proof the unadulteratedness of digital evidence [27]. Traditional search and seizure procedures may be impractical for performing digital investigations in cloud computing environments. Digital evidence is stored in cloud data centres, desktop computers or mobile phones which could be out of physical control by the digital investigator [45]. As it is almost impossible to make a bit-by-bit copy of storage devices [34] the ACPO guidelines are rendered pointless when it comes to complete authenticity of digital evidence in cloud environments. Acquiring all storage devices from such a setup would be too time consuming for investigators and too disruptive for CSPs [38]. Usually cloud users are only offered remote access to the logical representation of their data. In most cases, the underlying physical infrastructure is transparent for the user. In the future, new methods will be needed to allow partial recovery of data from physical devices in accordance with accepted forensic principles.

Therefore, forensics tools have to be hybrid of the current live and post-mortem analysis methods [34]. There will be a need for intelligent tools that note and predict artefacts based on heuristics. Delport et al. outline in [22] that it might be necessary to isolate cloud instances in case they have to be investigated. The problem associated with isolating cloud instances is the integrity of data intended for digital forensics investigations [35].

Basically, methods for clearing include moving uninvolved instances or suspicious instances to other nodes. This way the CIA of other instances is protected, but it might result in loss of possible evidence. However, by moving instances, evidence is protected from being tampered by these moved instances. Delport et al. [22] presented different techniques to isolate instances of cloud environments.

Instance relocation means moving an instance inside a cloud environment by moving the data logically or by creating new and destroying old instances. Server farming refers to putting up a spare instance which offers the same functionality as the instance intended for digital investigations. By Sandboxing programs can run in an environment which they cannot escape. Man in the Middle (MitM) refers to placing an entity between a sender and a receiver. In the field of digital forensics this entity is placed between the cloud instance and the hardware of the cloud. Delport et al. [22] conclude that none of their presented approaches fulfils every requirement for the investigation of cloud environments. However, depending on the case techniques may be combined to gain explicit access to a cloud instance. In his paper, Yan [46] describes the basic architecture of a Cybercrime Forensic System which can be deployed in cloud computing set ups. It interacts as an extra layer which is placed between clients and actual services offered by the cloud.

The usage of cryptography in cloud environments poses additional challenges. CSPs offer encryption as a security feature to their customers. All data is encrypted on the client's side. The key to the encrypted data is never stored in the cloud environment [47].

Deleted data represents another major challenge due to the volatility and elasticity of cloud environments. On one hand, data that has remotely been requested to be deleted can be a rich source of evidence as it can still be physically existing [38]. On the other hand it depends on the CSP how to proceed in the event of a user requesting his data to be deleted [16, 34] (e. g. Google's policy includes the deletion of such data from both, its active and replication servers as well as of all pointers to this data).

Reilly et al. [40] also mentioned the lack of tool support for dealing with digital investigations with cloud data centres. Currently, most tools are intended for examining data from traditional computer setups such as office or home computers. Taylor et al. [45] recommended to update existing tool suites such as EnCase or FTK to account for new developments in the field of cloud computing.

Examination and Analysis: Forensic tool suites such as The SleuthKit, FTK or EnCase perform "pattern matching" and "filtering" of data that is existing in different types of memory. Evidence in cloud is manifold and will likely be similar to evidence found in traditional computer setups [38]: office application documents, file fragments, digital images, emails, and log file entries [48]. Checksums are used to verify the integrity of objects (disk images, files, log entries, etc.) in the cloud. Detecting file signatures of files in question or files which should be excluded from a digital forensics investigation are crucial for the filtering process. Hegarty et al. [49] describe a method for adapting existing signature detection techniques for their usage in cloud environments. To detect files with a specific hash value a so called "initialiser" submits the target buckets (storage units of a cloud customer) as well as the hash value to a so called "Forensic Cluster Controller" which in turn distributes the job of finding files with that has value to so called "Analysis Nodes".

In the future investigating cloud infrastructures may be a task performed by cloud deployments. However, cloud customers may access applications offered in the cloud from a myriad of different computer setups (mobile phones of different make, desktop PCs with different operating systems, etc.) [45].

Presentation: Digital evidence can be utilized in several ways: it can be submitted to court in the form of a report [28] or it may be used by an organization to improve corporate policies and support

future investigations [50]. Grispos et al. [38] highlight the need for a standard evaluation method for cloud forensics so that cloud forensics investigation results pass the Daubert principles [51]. Another challenge arises from explaining the cloud computing concept to a jury in court [40]. It may be difficult for a jury member to comprehend the concept as jury members will usually only have basic knowledge of how to use home PCs.

2.3   Digital Investigations using Cloud Infrastructures

According to cloud security alliance [52], industry is heading forward to create Security-as-a-Service (SecaaS). The authors identified the following ten domains that are likely to interest consumer in the future: (1) Identity and Access Management Services; (2) Data Loss Prevention; (3) Web Security; (4) Email Security; (5) Security Assessments; (6) Intrusion Management, Detection and Prevention (IDS/IPS); (7) Security Information and Event Management; (8) Encryption; (9) Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery; (10) Network Security. Within one of these domains the authors identify the requirement to "...provide customers with forensics support...". This opinion is also supported by Ruan et al. [20] who derive from the emerging trend to security-as-a-service that forensics-as-a-service will gain importance in cyber criminal investigations by providing massive computing power.

Reilly et al. [40] take the discussion of the usage of cloud technologies for forensic investigations one step further and highlight the benefits delivered by the usage of cloud computing for digital investigations. The major advantages identified by the authors include large-scale storage, high availability and massive computing power. Roussev and Richard [53, 54] recognized the need for distributed forensics at an early stage. In their paper [55] they formulated the following requirements that should be satisfied by a distributed digital forensic toolkit: Scalability, platform-independence, lightweight, interactivity, extensibility and robustness. As cloud technologies can meet the abovementioned requirements, Roussev et al. evaluate in their paper [55] the feasibility and applicability of MapReduce for forensics applications. Map Reduce [56] was developed by Google in order to facilitate large scale computing. Phoenix [57] and Hadoop [58] are well known implementations of Google's MapReduce model. In their paper, the authors present their prototype, called MPI MapReduce (MMR), which is based on the Phoenix shared memory implementation. In order to test the performance of the prototype they implemented three Hadoop samples (wordcount, pi-estimator and grep) for MMR.

Cohen et al. introduce in [59] their GRR Rapid Response framework which pursues the objective to support live forensics within in an enterprise. The framework is designed to be highly scalable and is available for all common platforms. The proposed architecture is supported by an open-source prototype that is available [59].

Hegarty et al. present in their paper [49] the distributed calculation of file signatures if analyzing distributed storage platforms. Their proposed architecture consists of the three components: initializer, forensic cluster controller and analysis nodes.

Distributed computing power for password recovery or hash cracking is already well established. Various publications (e.g. [60]) and tools (e.g. Distributed Network Attack by AccessData [61, 62]) are devoted to this significant subject. eDiscovery applications which are also an important component in an digital investigator's daily business are already available for cloud implementations. An example is the open source eDiscovery software FreeEed [63].

2.4   Digital Evidence in Cloud Computing Environments

The introduction of cloud computing provided a change of paradigms to the distributed processing of digital data. In their paper Taylor et al. [64] focuses on the legal aspects of digital forensics investigations. They concluded that due to the increasing number of interacting systems the acquisition and analysis of

digital evidence in cloud deployments is likely to become more complex. The data could be encrypted before being transferred to the cloud or it could be stored in different jurisdictions resulting in data being deleted before investigators have access to it [11].

Flaglien et al. [65] evaluated currently used formats for handling digital evidence against criteria identified in recent research literature. Recent developments with a focus on evidence exchange have been presented. Formats intended for storing evidence from highly dynamic and complex systems are characterized by incorporating additional information which can be processed by data mining tools.

Birk [16] and Wegener [41] mentioned digital evidence to be in one of three different states: at rest, in motion or in execution. Data at rest is stored on storage media. In this case it does not matter if the data is allocated to a file or if it has been deleted. Data in motion is usually data that is transferred over a computer network. Data that is neither in rest nor in motion is referred to as to be in execution. Usually this means process data that has been loaded into memory. In cloud environments evidence can be found on several sources: the virtual cloud instance (where the incident happened or originated), the network layer, and/or the client system [34, 16]. Especially in SaaS setups evidence can be found on client systems.

Lu et al. [66] proposed to adopt the concept of provenance to the field of cloud computing. As a data object is able to report who created it and modified its contents, provenance could provide digital evidences for post investigations. However, up to now, provenance is still an unexplored area in cloud computing. Provenance information would have to be secured in cloud environments as leaking this information could breach information confidentiality and user privacy. Marty [48] follows a similar approach. CSPs and application providers utilize logging facilities to generate and collect relevant data to support the digital forensics investigation process. The sources for logging can be manifold: "business relevant logging covers features used and business metrics being tracked" [48]. Operational logging covers errors that concern a single cloud customer, critical conditions that impact all users, system related problems, etc. forensics investigations are supported by security logging which focuses on login information, password changes, failed resource access and all activity that is executed by privileged accounts.

Cloud customers lose control over their data and executions in case they outsource the execution of business processes to the cloud [67]. Accorsi [68] stated that this problem could be overcome with remote auditing. Data analytics perform traditional audits remotely by assess and report on the accuracy of financial data. This requires the introduction of an additional service model: business-process-as-a-service (BPaaS). It is based on the SaaS provision model and provides methods for modelling, utilizing, customizing, and executing business processes in cloud infrastructures. Access to the physical systems is neither possible nor necessary: external auditors will have access to both the auditee's system and the auditee's compartment in the cloud. Then it is possible for the auditors to employ remote auditing, thus addressing the inherent loss of control.

3   Hypervisor Forensics

This section describes the process when acquiring data in a forensically sound manner from virtualized environments. New environments and technologies pose new challenges to researchers and digital investigators. On the other tack, hypervisors allow access to computing ressources on a low-level without chaning the system's state. Thus, traditional limitations known from the field of live data acquisition can be overcome using these new technologies.

3.1   Utilizing Virtual Machine Introspection in Forensics

Hypervisors (also referred to as "Virtual Machine Manager" or "VMM") can be understood as a host operating system which performs the allocation of computing resources such as memory, CPU, disk I/O and networking among operating systems that are running as "guest operating systems" [21]. As hypervisors build the bridge between guests and physical computer hardware, all data that is processed has to pass through the hypervisor before it can access physical devices (e. g. network interface cards, CPU . . .).

The usage of data from hypervisors to prove various actual situations has been proposed in previous research papers [69, 70]. The terminology has been referred to as "virtual machine introspection" (VMI) and data gathered from this level of access supported the operation of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). It is suitable for investigating cloud infrastructures as long as there is access to the Hypervisors. Thus, it is not suitable for investigation of Public clouds in case access to the hypervisor is denied or in case that infrastructure components are located in remote regions, such as given in the Amazon cloud or Google cloud Platform.

As known from digital forensics investigations on physically available devices volatile data might be lost in case cloud instances are shut down [16]. One example for such a scenario would be Amazon AWS EC2 cloud instances. Before shutdown persistent data would have to be stored in long time storage containers such as Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) or Amazon's Elastic Block Storage (EBS). At the time of writing, approaches of how to interface Virtual Machine Monitors are product-specific. Currently, Xen is one of most widely used hypervisors [24]. Payne and Lee [71] focused on the development of an abstract monitoring architecture. Their programming library "XenAccess" has been released as an open-source project in 2006. Four years later the source-base has been forked: the project is currently released as another open-source programming library "LibVMI". The library is "focused on reading and writing memory from virtual machines" [72]. Therefore monitoring applications can access the memory state, CPU registers and disk activity of target operating systems in a safe and efficient manner. Memory can directly be read during runtime of virtual machines. Thus, it is possible to create memory dumps for further processing. In order to meet safety and integrity requirements target VMs can be paused in order to eliminate the chance of acquiring inconsistent snapshots. The library itself is written in C and comes with a Python wrapper to be able to integrate access to VMs to Python scripts.

Obtaining high-level information from low-level information found in memory images is referred to as the "semantic gap" problem [73] in recent research publications [74]. Essentially, the modes described by Pfoh et al. [74] differ in two ways: the place where the view-generation takes place (e. g. internally or externally), and the way in which semantic knowledge is incorporated. Pfoh et al. [74] considered three modes in their formal model in order to bridge the semantic gap:

- Out-of-Band delivery: The view-generating function is implemented so that semantic knowledge is received in advance before the actual VMI begins. VMs do not need to run while the view generation process takes place. Among the main disadvantages is that this approach cannot be implemented guest-portable [24]. However, it allows the integration of tools such as the usage of the Volatility Framework [75] to evaluate data structures from memory dumps acquired from virtualized environments.

- In-Band delivery: The view-generating function is internal and therefore it can make use of the guest OS' knowledge of the deployed software architecture. A disadvantage arises from this component being susceptible to compromise from malicious entities which have compromised monitored guest OSes [74]. Further, this method actually does not bridge the semantic gap, it rather avoids it.

- Derivation: In this case information is derived from the VMM through semantic knowledge of the hardware architecture. In their paper, Pfoh et al. [74] mention that "understanding a particular architecture and monitoring control registers within a CPU provides us with some semantic knowledge". Thus, the approach is guest-portable [24].

In the following we will describe different approaches depending on different common hypervisors. All of them follow the "out-of-band delivery" approach.

XEN   Due to the requirement of direct memory access of virtualization hardware, the LibVMI framework runs within Dom0. When an application running in Dom0 accesses a specific address within a VM running in DomU, XEN has to translate this address into a physical address. This address in turn gets mapped back into the Dom0 address space. This procedure has to be repeated for every access to the different memory regions. As an example, access to the `task_struct` of the Linux operating system is described. The data structe mentioned before contains pointers to information required to manage tasks of the Linux operating system like the next and previous entry, the process ID offset, executable name offset or the `signal_struct` offset. To get all information about processes, relevant memory addresses have to be mapped forth and back between Dom0 and DomU address space. In order to "walk" through this process list, each entry of the list has to be mapped to an accessible memory region of Dom0 [76]. This procedure creates overhead for virtual machine introspection which is made necessary by the design of this virtualization approach. LibVMI enables investigators to access low-level information. Memory mapping procedures are abstracted away from users of the programming library.

Paravirtualization and hardware-assisted virtualization. Former requires the guest-operating system to be modified. In case of Windows the paravirtualized approach is supported through the "Xen Windows GplPv" drivers [77]. The introduction of technologies such as "Intel VT-x" and "AMD-V" allowed hardware-assisted virtualization which resulted in the ability to run unmodified (closed-source) operating systems such as Microsoft Windows.

In their work, Lengyel et al. [78] utilize information from Xen hypervisors in order to analyze malware samples. The major contribution of their project is an automated malware collection and analysis system by setting up hybrid honeypots that are exposed to unprotected public Internet. Baiardi et al. [79, 80] follow a similar approach ("PsycoTrace"), but malware samples are analyzed through both static and dynamic tools. The sequence of system calls is described by static tools that rely on a context-free grammar. Dynamic tools observe call traces of processes in order to check if they belong to static definitions. Conformity is further checked by the evaluation of assertions.

KVM   Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) [81] is a solution for Linux on x86 platforms that supports full virtualization. Hardware virtualization extensions such as Intel VT or AMD-V are supported through loadable kernel-modules that provide the core virtualization infrastructure as well as processor specific functionality. The virtualization infrastructure (such as computer devices like hard-disks, sound-card, etc.) is provided by Qemu [82]. LibVMI [72] offers functionality to inspect KVM-virtualized virtual machines in order to obtain forensically sound memory dumps. At the time of writing this feature is experimental. Patches [72] are available only for specific versions (QEMU-KVM 0.14.0) of Qemu. Another source of information for KVM virtualized environments is the Qemu monitor (reachable via "Ctrl-Alt-2" within a session window). E. g. the "memsave" command allows to dump memory in a read-only fashion of virtual machines. Memory dumps can then be processed further in order to obtain information about the processes running in virtual machines.

The "KvmSec" [83] project focuses on extending the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine in order to increase the protection of guest virtual machines against viruses and kernel rootkits. In contrast to most other projects this project's architecture is composed of multiple modules that live both in the host as well

as the guest kernels. Thus, this project implements the in-bound delivery model [74]. Modules inside and outside of VMs communicate with each other through shared memory. Sharif et al. [84] follow a similar approach: in order to provide security monitors, that improve the security of executed processes, a general-purpose framework based on hardware-virtualization is installed into the VM that is protected.

VMware ESXi   A prototype ("Livewire") for a VMI-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been proposed by Garfinkel and Rosenblum [69]. They modified VMware Workstation on Linux for the x86 platform to offer hooks in order to gain access to memory, CPU registers and device states.

In 2008 VMware announced the VMsafe program [85]. This closed development is only available for chosen partners of VMware who develop security solutions in order to enhance the security of virtual machines. The software provided by this project provides interfaces to the hypervisor to enable the implementation of antivirus, firewall, and IDS/IPS solutions on an abstraction level close to the hypervisor. The VMsafe API is split into three parts: vCompute, vNetwork, and the Virtual Disk Development Kit (VDDK) API [86].

The vCompute API enables introspection of CPU states and registers and access to the VMs memory. The vNetwork API enables packet inspection between the virtual switch and the vNIC of running VMs. This allows for running firewalls right in front of one or more VMs, thus eliminating the need for a dedicated virtualized firewall, a physical appliance or personal firewall which simplifies the overall configuration effort for the network part. The VDDK API allows to manage virtual storage. It comes bundled with an API as well as a SDK and allows to implement e. g. malware or antivirus solutions [86] without the need for running several instances of antivirus software on each of the involved virtual machines.

The "CloudSec" project [87] focuses on active, transparent, and real-time monitoring of security properties of hosted VMs in IaaS cloud setups by an additional monitoring appliance. Access to physical memory of VMs is accomplished by performing Virtual Machine Introspection interfacing VMware's VMsafe APIs. It is not necessary to install security code inside VMs. Low-level information (bytes) is mapped into high-level data structures (OS data structures) that allow the detection of Dynamic Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) and Kernel Object Hooking (KOH) rootkits. The semantic gap is bridged by the so called "Semantic Gap Builder" (SGB). It reads specific physical memory pages according to definitions of OS global variables' addresses based on specified Kernel Structures Definitions (KSDs). Access to memory occurs through a back-end (the VMI component). Thus, this approach corresponds to the out-of-band delivery model. Triggers are installed to invoke functionality in the cloudSec front-end.

Microsoft Hyper-V   In a blog entry on Microsoft's TechNet [88] Russinovich introduced "LiveCloudKd" which extends the existing "LiveKd" project [89]. LiveKd is a utility that allows to run Microsoft's kernel debuggers (Kd and Windbg) on locally live systems. "LiveCloudKd" further extends the project by supporting VMs powered by Microsoft Hyper-V. LiveCloudKd allows for pausing and resuming VMs and copying their memory to files. The tool runs within the Hyper-V server. LiveCloudKd is developed by M. Suiche and available for free [90]. "HyperTaskMgr" [91] allows to visualize all running Hyper-V VMs on a system and to extract further information like running processes and attached DLLs. Further it enables the user to elevate the privileges of any process or to kill specified processes from outside of virtual machines.

3.2   Correlation of Evidence Accross Cloud Environments

The resource pooling feature of cloud computing environments is implemented by utilizing virtualization techniques [3]. With virtualization being a key-technology involved in cloud computing, the Virtual Machine Introspection approach has to be taken one step further. Information and digital evidence acquired

from different hypervisors in order to obtain the "big picture" of such highly distributed systems as given in cloud infrastructures.

Existing scientific research which was based on VM introspection and monitoring software focused mainly on the detection of and defence from malicious software. Ando et al. [92] modified Linux as guest operating system to be able to obtain event-driven memory snapshots. Heuristics developed in this project allowed the detection of unknown malware which could not be detected by characteristic signatures. Kuhn and Taylor [93] focused on capturing exploits in virtualized environments (such as cloud infrastructures). They concluded that there is no common collective base of root-kits, applications, and kernel versions for the forensic analysis of memory in virtualized environments to form a ground-truth for cross technology comparisons. Lempereur et al. [94] presented a framework which could be used to automatically evaluate live digital forensic acquisition tools on different platform configurations. Live digital forensics techniques play an important role in the area of virtualized environments. In their work they describe three classes of digital forensic evidence: stored information (high amount, slow access), information pending storage, and operational information. Operational information can help to narrow down the amount of searches to analyze stored information. This is true for both locally stored information (e. g. within an instance) and information stored on remote systems (e. g. cloud storage). Krishnan et al. [95] proposed a forensics platform that transparently monitored and recorded data access events within a virtualized environment by only using the abstractions which were exposed by the hypervisor. The developments focused on monitoring access to objects on disk and allowed to follow the causal chain of the accesses across processes even if objects were copied into memory. Transactions of data have then be recorded in an audit log which allowed for faithful reconstruction of recorded events and the changes that they induced. In their work the authors demonstrated how their approach could be used to obtain behavioral profiles of malware. Dykstra and Sherman [96] explain how to extract volatile and non-volatile data from cloud infrastructures such as Amazon EC2 with nowadays tools such as Guidance EnCase and AccessData Forensic Toolkit.

Recent projects combine Hypervisor forensics with techniques known from the field of Live/Memory forensics. Dolan-Gavitt et al. [97, 98] interlink the Volatility Framework [75] with techniques from the field of Hypervisor forensics. To improve the results of the acquisition and analysis process the authors developed a whole-system dynamic slicing technique for executables. The semantic gap is bridged by modeling the behavior of operating systems. From a high-level point of view, the process of modeling an OS' behavior occurs in three phases: the training, the analysis, and the runtime phase. During the training phase, in-guest programs start processes that are started so that as many execution paths of each process are executed as possible. Result of this procedure are instruction traces that can be used to analyze memory structures outside introspected VMs. During the analysis phase "noise" of the execution process is removed by performing dynamic data slice on each trace (footprint). The result of this step is a unified program that can be used for out-of-guest introspection. During the runtime-phase the generated program is then used to introspect running virtual machines. In case of the Virtuoso project, the base for obtaining memory dumps from VMs is "PyXa" [98, 24]. Access to VMs virtualized in Xen is provided through Python objects with a `read` method that reads single pages of physical memory when invoked. The Python wrapper allows for prototyping VMI applications. The Volatility Framework [75] is also implemented in Python, thus allowing for interoperability between developments.

Different acquisition modes from the formal models to bridge the "semantic gap" [74] have to be applied in order to determine relevant evidence from cloud infrastructures. In order to obtain information from within VMs it could be helpful to install additional software inside the VMs. This corresponds to the in-bound delivery model mentioned above. Carbone et al. [99] follow this approach by developing a secure and robust infrastructure called "SYRINGE". The monitoring application is protected because it is put into a separate virtual machine as known from the out-of-guest approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to invoke guest functions by utilizing the function-call injection technique. Another technique, localized

shepherding, helps to verify the secure execution of invoked guest OS code. Localized Shepherding refers to a technique that allows to shepherd the thread of guest code executed after being injected for function calls. Shepherding in turn refers to verifying code in memory against pre-compiled white lists in order to prevent code-patching attacks. Instrumentation further helps to dynamically evaluate instructions that could be changed by attackers to divert the regular control flow.

In order to correlate information from different hypervisors, information from additional cloud infrastructure elements has to be considered. Figure 1 shows an example of the current OpenStack ("Folsom" release) architecture [100]. Circles refer to Linux services which are part of OpenStack. Rectangles refer to external components which are not part of the OpenStack project. Interactions between OpenStack components and external components are shown as solid line. Dashed lines represent interactions between external components [101]. Central elements of this architecture are the "Message queue" (RabbitMQ, Qpid, or ZeroMQ) as well as the "Database" (MySQL, PostgreSQL, or sqlite). As all tasks are coordinated through these components, it turns out that crucial meta-data about the overall information flow can be found there.


Figure 1: Architecture of the OpenStack Folsom Project [101]

4   Conclusion and Outlook

Within this paper the current State-of-the-Art in cloud forensics has been presented. We focused on existing digital forensics frameworks to show the lack of regulations when investigating cloud environments. Further we described the investigation of cloud infrastructures from technical, legal, and organizational points of view. Subsequently we elucidated how to perform digital investigations using cloud infrastructures. Due to the massive computing power available in cloud environments there are opportunities that can improve the forensics acquisition and analysis process. Main contribution of this part is an extensive discussion on acquiring digital evidence from hypervisors with a focus on cloud computing.

Current research results demonstrate the feasibility of information acquisition from virtual machine managers (Hypervisors) to support the digital forensics analysis process. However, most work is focused on smaller setups (e. g. single physical machine with several VMs). Therefore we propose that more research should be done to investigate the acquisition of digital evidence across multiple virtualized environments, as given in cloud computing. In regard to the OpenStack project we consider to perform more research in the area of this cloud's infrastructural components in order to improve the process of acquiring digital evidence from cloud computing environments. More specifically we consider to investigate the data structures used in both the queuing and the database backend of OpenStack. Further we intend to correlate data acquired from different hypervisors supported by information acquired from the backends mentioned before.

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