## Dynamics

* some discussion of contingent patterns (e.g. habits) but no discussion of how to measure or operationalize these
* does mention cross-lagged temporal autoregressive relationships but only in passing
* cross-lagged dynamics may help to map why “mental representations may partially overlap”

## Situations

* little discussion of situations, particularly psychological situations
* very little of John Rauthmann, Ryne, and David Funder’s work on psych situations, which seems like a rather egregious oversight
* talked about changing situations to change behavior but didn’t actively discuss this as situations selection

## Networks

* discussion of how behaviors cluster in networks feels incomplete, as does the discussion of network properties
* weak emergence wasn’t contrasted with what would be expected from strong emergence
* Discussion of the importance of how you choose and define nodes and edges not complete. Makes it seem like you can pretty much toss anything into a model
* Discussion of how to test network properties and broader outcomes felt misleading and incomplete. IMO, the way it’s been done in the past isn’t really helpful
* suggest that clusters of behaviors may accrue into broader behavioral outcomes, but how to test what these clusters are and the relationship among them is unclear. However, we could probably tie this in with some of the degree centrality / network density stuff from ARP

## Measurement

* moderator variables are key for linking micro-level processes to macro-level traits and outcomes. This makes me think of another talk from ARP from the same symposium where they presented some of the points from this paper. They were arguing that in order to study individual differences in need for cognition, we have to experimentally place participants into conditions that draw these out – that is, if you don’t actually need to think deeply about something, then you’ll probably end up with restricted variance in responses.
* suggest that motivation, affect, and cognition be simultaneously measured, but LITERALLY HOW?

## Functionalist

* equifinality: behavioral tendencies that serve to reach the same goal
* multifinality: detrimental to other goals
* might be able to tie this in with a network approach — positive and negative signs / direction

## Affective Processes

* Could do an mlVAR (network or otherwise) that includes outgoing and positive affect, both of which are in PAIRS
* “Action initiation can be catalyzed by affective processes, such as negative affect associated with goal failure, and positive affect associated with goal attainment” (p. 34); makes me think of mindfulness training cognitive restructuring, as well as behavioral activation. Change has to acknowledge the context in which a person (and his behavior) exist

## Motivational (and goal) Processes

* discussion of motives almost seems too inextricably bound with learning processes / theories
* **age-correlated shifts in goals:** basically sounds like social investment theory / the cumulative continuity model / literally anything by Baltes
* non-normative roles —> diminished or even opposite developmental patterns. This is a really interesting possibility that hasn’t really been addressed. I’m wondering if we don’t have some data somewhere that we could test for this. Not for this commentary, but for the future. Could be really cool to use slopes from LGCM that include some sort of grouping (or continuous) variable that deals with the normativeness of social roles.

## Self Reflection

* changes in self-concept and vice versa may not follow one another: plug for our correlated change project

## Self Regulation Processes

* The whole section on self-regulation processes felt confounded with Conscientiousness but never actually acknowledged that

## Learning

* posits that individual differences in behavior could be due to different histories of learning (classical conditioning / instrumental conditioning). Might be able to make an argument for the use of if…then contingencies as a way of testing this, as well as changes in behavior following significant life events
* **behavioral activation:** we can’t know a person’s whole learning history, but we can try to understand how much they value certain stimuli or outcomes
* **extinction:** in a learning framework of personality, the question of extinction is not typically treated beyond “change the situation, change the behavior.” But extinction seems bound up with generalizability. If a context can bring on spontaneous recovery, then the behavior has likely not generalized, making the behavior not seem dispositional
* individual differences in conditioning responses touted as important, but there doesn’t seem to be a great way of identifying individual differences in these responses. Could propose a method for doing so.
* personality as removing the UCS from the CS —> UCS —> R chain; I’m not sure how we could do this, but it could be a really important work to try to identify how this occurs within the framework of our intervention study
* habit training as effortful: makes me think of learned industriousness, which is basically inserting considerations of effort and thresholds into any intervention plan. So here, if an intervention is manageable for a person, then you are arguably slowly building up automaticity / a new habit

## Development

* change in personality trait structure could be due to different trajectories at the level of specific indicators.
* There was no discussion of measurement invariance and it’s implications for trait structure, development, processes, and manifestations; could be a good plug for discussing the implications and maybe considering alternative techniques like p-filtering and arguing for ideographic approaches
* change as gains or losses in behavioral opportunities; not sure this is nicely separable from psychological situations

## Other Notes

* **Shiner & DeYoung (2013):** traits broaden in content and become more differentiated at the facet level across adolescence
* Molenaar & Campbell (2009)
* **Cooper, Heron, & Heward (2013):** “motivating operations”
* Perugini & Prestwich (2007)
* Revelle & Condon (2015)
* Costantini, Richetin, et al. (2015)
* Hudson & Fraley (2015): people do specifically intend trait change
* Leikas & Ilmarinen (2016)
* Gawronski & Bodenhausen (2006)
* Schmitt et al. (2015): behavioral intentions
* Geukes et al. (2016)
* Wrzus et al. (in press)
* Kurzius & Borkenau (2015)