

# The Interregnum of a Madman: Sultan Mustafa I and the Ottoman Empire at the Precipice

## Introduction

Sultan Mustafa I, the fifteenth sovereign of the Ottoman Empire, was not a historical actor in the conventional sense. He did not forge policies, lead armies, or shape the destiny of the state through force of will. Instead, his two brief and chaotic reigns (1617–1618 and 1622–1623) serve as a stark and tragic reflection of an empire at a systemic precipice. Mustafa I was a profound symptom of the deep institutional crises that defined the early 17th century. His accession to and removal from the throne—twice—were not products of his own agency but rather the outcomes of ferocious power struggles between competing factions that had come to dominate the political landscape. His life and nominal rule provide a unique lens through which to analyze the fracturing of traditional Ottoman power structures: the definitive breakdown of dynastic succession practices, the ascendancy of the Imperial Harem and the military as kingmakers, and the palpable erosion of the sultan's absolute authority.<sup>1</sup> His personal tragedy, a mind arguably broken by the very system of princely confinement designed to preserve the dynasty, mirrors the state's own violent struggle with institutional decay and forced transformation.<sup>2</sup>

For decades, the historiography of this period was dominated by a narrative of inexorable "decline." However, since the late 20th century, scholars have increasingly reframed the 17th century not as a simple downward trajectory but as a tumultuous era of "crisis, adaptation, and transformation".<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman state was not passively decaying; it was actively, if violently, reconfiguring itself in response to immense internal and external pressures. This report adopts this latter framework, arguing that the events surrounding Mustafa I's reigns were the chaotic crucibles in which a new, more decentralized, and more factionalized Ottoman political order was forged. By examining contemporary accounts from Ottoman chroniclers such as İbrahim Peçevi, Kâtip Çelebi, and Mustafa Naima, alongside modern scholarly analyses, this report will construct a multi-faceted account of both the man and his time.<sup>5</sup>

This report is structured in two distinct parts to address the dual nature of the historical problem. Part I provides a detailed biographical and psychological analysis of Sultan Mustafa I, tracing his life from his precarious youth in the palace, through his two disastrous reigns, to his final years in confinement. It explores how his mental condition was both a cause and a

consequence of the political machinations that surrounded him. Part II broadens the scope to examine the Ottoman Empire at large during this period. It dissects the complex interplay of the dominant political factions—the "Sultanate of Women," the Janissary corps, and the administrative elite—and analyzes the cascading military, economic, and social consequences of the power vacuum at the heart of the empire. Ultimately, this report will demonstrate that the story of the "mad" sultan is inseparable from the story of an empire undergoing a violent and fundamental metamorphosis.

Year	Event	Key Figures Involved	Significance
<b>1603</b>	Accession of Ahmed I (age 13).	Ahmed I, Handan Sultan, Kösem Sultan	Ahmed I spares his younger half-brother Mustafa, breaking with the tradition of royal fratricide and initiating the <i>Kafes</i> system of confinement.
<b>1603–1618</b>	Ottoman-Safavid War.	Ahmed I, Shah Abbas I	A long and costly war that ends unfavorably for the Ottomans, draining the treasury and exposing military weaknesses.
<b>1606</b>	Peace of Zsitvatorok.	Ahmed I, Habsburg Monarchy	Ends the Long Turkish War with the Habsburgs. The treaty recognizes the Habsburg emperor as an equal, signaling a shift in the balance of power.
<b>1617</b>	Death of Ahmed I (Nov. 22). Accession of Mustafa I.	Mustafa I, Halime Sultan, Kösem Sultan, Sofu Mehmed Pasha	First time a sultan is succeeded by his brother instead of his son, establishing the principle of agnatic seniority. Halime Sultan becomes regent.
<b>1618</b>	Deposition of Mustafa I (Feb. 26). Accession of Osman II.	Osman II, Mustafa Agha	First time a reigning Ottoman sultan is deposed on grounds of incompetence. Mustafa is returned to the <i>Kafes</i> .

1621	Osman II executes his half-brother, Şehzade Mehmed.	Osman II, Kösem Sultan	Confirms Kösem Sultan's fears about the threat Osman posed to her own sons, likely hardening her opposition to his rule.
1621	Ottoman-Polish War; Battle of Khotyn.	Osman II	Osman II blames the Janissaries' lack of discipline for the military failure and begins planning to replace them with a new army.
1622	Janissary Rebellion (May 19).	Osman II, Janissaries, Halime Sultan, Davud Pasha	The Janissaries, learning of Osman's plans, revolt and storm the palace.
1622	Deposition and Regicide of Osman II (May 20).	Osman II, Davud Pasha	The first regicide in Ottoman history. The event is termed the <i>Ha'ile-i Osmaniye</i> ("The Ottoman Tragedy").
1622	Second Accession of Mustafa I.	Mustafa I, Halime Sultan, Davud Pasha	Mustafa is forcibly restored to the throne by the rebels as a puppet ruler.
1622–1623	Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha.	Abaza Mehmed Pasha	The governor of Erzurum launches a major rebellion in Anatolia to avenge Osman II's murder, targeting Janissaries.
1623	Safavid Empire captures Baghdad.	Shah Abbas I	The Safavids exploit the chaos in Istanbul to seize control of Iraq, a major blow to Ottoman prestige and security.
1623	Second Deposition of Mustafa I (Sep. 10). Accession of Murad IV.	Mustafa I, Murad IV, Kösem Sultan	Mustafa is deposed by a fatwa citing his mental illness. The 11-year-old Murad IV is

			enthroned, with his mother Kösem Sultan as regent.
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# Part I: The Sultan – A Life Forged and Broken by the System

## Chapter 1: The Prince in the Gilded Cage

The life of Şehzade Mustafa was defined from its very beginning by a monumental shift in the dynastic logic of the Ottoman Empire. His survival into adulthood was a direct consequence of the abandonment of a centuries-old tradition of systematic royal fratricide, a practice that had been codified by Sultan Mehmed II and was brutally demonstrated by Mustafa's own father, Sultan Mehmed III. Upon his accession in 1595, Mehmed III had the coffins of his nineteen executed brothers precede his own father's casket in the funeral procession, a grim spectacle of dynastic consolidation.<sup>1</sup> When Mehmed III died in 1603, this same fate was expected for his youngest son, Mustafa. However, the new sultan, Mustafa's thirteen-year-old half-brother Ahmed I, defied precedent and spared his life.<sup>5</sup>

This decision was not a simple act of youthful compassion but a calculated response to a complex web of political pressures and dynastic anxieties. The primary motivation was pragmatic: Ahmed I was a young teenager who had not yet produced an heir. Mustafa was the only other living male of the House of Osman. To execute him would be to gamble the very survival of the 600-year-old dynasty on the life of a single boy.<sup>1</sup> This dynastic imperative was powerfully reinforced by the intricate politics of the Imperial Harem. Ahmed's mother, Handan Sultan, is recorded as having been instrumental in persuading her son to spare Mustafa.<sup>5</sup> An even more significant influence was likely wielded by Ahmed's powerful and ambitious favorite consort, Kösem Sultan. For Kösem, a living Mustafa served as a crucial political counterweight. Had Mustafa been executed, the next in line after Ahmed would have been Şehzade Osman, Ahmed's firstborn son by another consort, Mahfiruz Hatun. If Osman were to become sultan, the law of fratricide, even if temporarily suspended, could be revived to eliminate his half-brothers—Kösem's own sons. By ensuring Mustafa's survival, Kösem was preemptively defending her children's lives and her own future political influence.<sup>5</sup> A final factor was Mustafa's own perceived state; his mental infirmities may have already been apparent, rendering him an unlikely threat to the throne and making his execution seem both unnecessary and cruel.<sup>1</sup>

Though his life was spared, Mustafa's existence was one of profound isolation. He became the first formal inmate of the *Kafes* (the Cage), a system of princely confinement that replaced fratricide.<sup>12</sup> The *Kafes* was not a literal cage but a collection of opulent apartments within the

Topkapi Palace harem, where potential heirs were kept under constant surveillance in a form of luxurious house arrest.<sup>12</sup> For the fourteen years of Ahmed I's reign, Mustafa lived in this "golden captivity," entirely cut off from the outside world and denied any form of education in governance or military affairs.<sup>10</sup> His only companions were servants and concubines, themselves instruments of his surveillance.<sup>8</sup> Some accounts suggest his confinement was particularly severe; one source mentions that Ahmed had a wall constructed in front of his chambers, deepening his isolation and psychological torment.<sup>10</sup>

The psychological toll of this existence was devastating. Living for over a decade in a state of sensory deprivation, social isolation, and under the constant, terrifying threat of a visit from the royal executioner's bowstring, Mustafa's mental health deteriorated catastrophically. Whether he suffered from a congenital condition or developed his illness as a direct result of his imprisonment—or, most likely, a combination of both—the *Kafes* was the crucible that forged his madness.<sup>3</sup> His documented eccentricities, such as compulsively throwing coins to birds and fish in the palace fountains, likely originated as desperate coping mechanisms in this sterile environment.<sup>5</sup> He emerged from his fourteen-year confinement a man detached from reality, prone to paranoia, and utterly unprepared for the world, let alone for the throne of a vast empire.<sup>13</sup>

The very innovation that saved Mustafa's life—the *Kafes*—created a new and deeply corrosive systemic problem for the Ottoman dynasty. While the practice of fratricide was brutal, it had the effect of clearing the path for a single, often experienced heir who may have served as a provincial governor. The shift to confinement, while ostensibly more humane, guaranteed a supply of heirs but also ensured that they would be psychologically damaged, politically naive, and easily manipulated pawns for the powerful factions at court. Mustafa I stands as the tragic prototype of this flawed system, the first in a line of unprepared and often incompetent sultans, such as the later Ibrahim I, whose weakness created the very power vacuums the system was meant to prevent.<sup>12</sup> The survival of Mustafa, therefore, did more than just save one prince; it set a critical political precedent. Upon Ahmed I's death, the court's decision to enthrone the adult Mustafa over the young Osman formally established the principle of agnatic seniority—succession by the oldest living male of the dynasty—as the new law of the land. This fundamental change, which would last until the empire's end, was a direct result of the political maneuvering that had kept Mustafa alive, transforming every male member of the dynasty from a condemned man into a potential political asset.<sup>5</sup>

## **Chapter 2: The Unwilling Sultan: The First Reign (22 November 1617 – 26 February 1618)**

The unexpected death of Sultan Ahmed I from typhus in November 1617 plunged the Ottoman court into an unprecedented succession dilemma. For the first time, there were multiple eligible princes living within the Topkapi Palace: Ahmed's young sons, the eldest of whom was the fourteen-year-old Osman, and his adult but mentally infirm brother, Mustafa.<sup>1</sup> A powerful

faction at court, headed by the Şeyhülislam Hocaşâde Esad Efendi and the acting Grand Vizier Sofu Mehmed Pasha, decisively intervened. They argued that enthroning the young Osman would provoke adverse commentary and potential unrest among the populace, and they successfully pushed for the accession of the 25-year-old Mustafa.<sup>5</sup> This decision was fiercely opposed by key figures like the Chief Black Eunuch, Mustafa Agha, who explicitly cited the prince's severe mental problems as a disqualifying factor. His objections, however, were overruled, and on November 22, 1617, Mustafa I was brought forth from his long confinement to become the fifteenth Ottoman sultan.<sup>5</sup>

From the outset, it was clear that Mustafa was incapable of ruling. The true power resided with his mother, Halime Sultan, who ascended to the position of Valide Sultan and became the de facto regent of the empire.<sup>21</sup> Having lived in relative obscurity as a consort, she now commanded immense authority, exercising power more directly than many of her predecessors due to her son's complete incompetence.<sup>5</sup> Her elevated status was reflected in her daily stipend of 3,000 aspers, a significant sum that underscored her role at the apex of the court hierarchy.<sup>23</sup> Her regency marked a high point in the era known as the "Sultanate of Women," where the political vacuum left by weak or young sultans was filled by the formidable women of the Imperial Harem.<sup>23</sup>

There was a fleeting hope among some at court that Mustafa's release from confinement and regular social contact would ameliorate his condition.<sup>5</sup> This hope was quickly and publicly dashed. Mustafa's behavior remained profoundly eccentric and alarming, confirming the worst fears of those who had opposed his accession. During meetings of the Imperial Council, he was observed pulling off the turbans of his viziers and yanking their beards, acts of unimaginable disrespect that shattered the solemn decorum of the court.<sup>5</sup> He continued his childhood habit of scattering gold and silver coins into palace fountains for the birds and fish, a sign of his complete detachment from the value of the imperial treasury.<sup>5</sup> The contemporary Ottoman historian İbrahim Peçevi captured the consensus of the time, writing, "this situation was seen by all men of state and the people, and they understood that he was mentally disturbed".<sup>5</sup>

While Mustafa's behavior was widely seen as madness (*deli*), the faction that depended on his rule attempted a remarkable political rebranding. They circulated the idea that the sultan was not insane but a holy man, a saint (*veli*) whose strange actions were manifestations of a divine connection.<sup>1</sup> An English observer noted the rumor that he was "esteemed a holy man, that hath visions, and Angel-like speculations".<sup>1</sup> This cynical attempt to use the language of popular piety and Sufi mysticism to legitimize a puppet ruler highlights the deep ideological manipulations at play, as factions sought to justify the unprecedented situation of having a mentally incompetent man on the throne.

The experiment, however, was unsustainable. Mustafa was nothing more than a tool for court cliques, and his manifest incapacity created a dangerous power vacuum that paralyzed the state.<sup>1</sup> After a mere 96 days, another palace faction, led by the same Chief Black Eunuch Mustafa Agha who had initially opposed the accession, moved against him.<sup>1</sup> On February 26, 1618, in a swift and bloodless coup, Mustafa I was deposed. He was sent back to confinement

in the palace, and his young nephew was enthroned as Sultan Osman II.<sup>1</sup> This event was a watershed moment, marking the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire that a reigning sultan had been removed from the throne by his own officials on the grounds of unfitness to rule.<sup>1</sup> The deposition was more than a simple coup; it was a constitutional experiment that shattered the aura of the sultan's invincibility. It implicitly established a new principle: that the person of the sultan could be subordinated to the perceived needs of the state, and that a consensus of the ruling elite had the power to declare a sovereign incompetent. This act created a powerful and dangerous precedent, demonstrating that the sultan was no longer sacrosanct and could be held accountable to a standard of competence—a standard that would be defined, and violently enforced, by those same elites.

### **Chapter 3: The Restored Puppet: The Second Reign (20 May 1622 – 10 September 1623)**

The catalyst for Mustafa I's improbable return to power was the first and most shocking regicide in Ottoman history. His successor, Osman II, was an energetic and reform-minded young sultan who recognized the deep-seated corruption and insubordination of the Janissary corps, particularly after their poor performance during his Polish campaign in 1621.<sup>31</sup> Determined to break their power, Osman II began secretly planning to raise a new, loyal army composed of Anatolian and Syrian troops, using a pilgrimage to Mecca as a pretext for his recruitment efforts.<sup>29</sup> When the Janissaries learned of this existential threat to their privileged status, they rose in a furious rebellion in May 1622.<sup>8</sup> Lacking a strong maternal power base in the harem to counter the intrigues of Halime Sultan and Kösem Sultan, Osman found himself isolated and vulnerable.<sup>23</sup> The rebels stormed the Topkapi Palace, captured the sultan, and, needing a legitimate dynastic figurehead to sanctify their coup, turned to the only available alternative: the deposed Mustafa.<sup>6</sup>

Mustafa's restoration was a scene of chaos and coercion. The rebels broke into the *Kafes*, where he had been kept in neglect. Some accounts describe them having to smash a hole in the roof to extract the former sultan, whom they found terrified and weakened, having been deprived of food and water for several days.<sup>13</sup> Far from desiring a return to power, Mustafa was dragged from his confinement. He reportedly resisted, pleading, "I am reading the Koran and I do not want to be the Sultan," but his protests were ignored.<sup>15</sup> On May 20, 1622, he was forcibly acclaimed as sultan for the second time.

This second reign, lasting just over 16 months, was even more anarchic and dysfunctional than the first.<sup>1</sup> It was not a period of governance but an exercise in raw, factional retribution. Mustafa was a complete puppet, controlled entirely by his mother, Halime Sultan, and his brother-in-law, Kara Davud Pasha, who was appointed Grand Vizier.<sup>5</sup> The first and most pressing objective of this new regime was to eliminate any possibility of a counter-coup by executing the deposed Osman II. The young sultan was subjected to public humiliation, paraded through the streets of Istanbul on a mule, and then brutally strangled in the Yedikule

(Seven Towers) fortress, an act that sent shockwaves through the empire.<sup>6</sup> With their rival eliminated, Halime's faction began a purge of their opponents, while the administration of the empire descended into utter paralysis. Five different Grand Viziers were appointed and dismissed in the short span of the reign, a clear sign that statecraft had been completely subordinated to the rewarding of allies and the punishment of enemies.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, Mustafa's mental condition had only worsened. He was reportedly seen wandering the corridors of the palace, knocking on doors and calling out for his murdered nephew, Osman, begging him to return and relieve him of the "burden of rule".<sup>18</sup> His detachment from reality was absolute, leaving the state rudderless at a time of profound crisis.

The chaos in the capital could not last. The regicide had delegitimized the Janissary-backed government in the eyes of many, especially in the provinces. In Anatolia, the governor of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, launched a large-scale rebellion, framing it as a righteous campaign to avenge the murder of Sultan Osman by systematically hunting down and executing Janissaries.<sup>6</sup> This was not merely another Celali uprising; it was a direct military challenge to the regime in Istanbul, fueled by a powerful ideological justification that resonated with many provincials. As Abaza Mehmed Pasha's forces gained strength and marched toward the capital, the squabbling factions in Istanbul were forced to unite against this existential threat.<sup>29</sup> The farcical rule of a madman was no longer tenable. A consensus formed among the political elite, likely spearheaded by Kösem Sultan, that a credible ruler was needed to restore a semblance of authority and unify the state against the rebellion. On September 10, 1623, the Şeyhülislam issued a formal fatwa declaring that a person with mental imbalances could not hold the office of Sultan or Caliph, providing the necessary legal and religious sanction for his removal.<sup>15</sup> Mustafa I was deposed for the second and final time, and his eleven-year-old nephew Murad IV, the son of Ahmed I and Kösem Sultan, was placed on the throne.<sup>21</sup> The provincial backlash, therefore, acted as the decisive catalyst, forcing an end to the destructive interregnum that had begun with the murder of Osman II.

## **Chapter 4: An Epilogue in the Kafes**

Following his second deposition in September 1623, Mustafa I was escorted back to the familiar confines of the *Kafes* within the Topkapi Palace.<sup>8</sup> This time, there would be no return. He was destined to spend the remainder of his days in the gilded prison that had both preserved his life and shattered his mind. For the next fifteen to sixteen years, Mustafa lived as a forgotten figure, a non-person secluded from the world while his young nephew, Murad IV, grew from a boy ruler under the regency of Kösem Sultan into one of the most ruthless and autocratic sultans in the empire's history.<sup>8</sup>

Mustafa died on January 20, 1639, at the age of 47 or 48.<sup>1</sup> The most widely accepted cause of death is natural, likely resulting from a severe epileptic or nervous seizure, consistent with the lifelong psychological and neurological ailments he was known to suffer.<sup>15</sup> However, the shadow of political intrigue that had loomed over his entire life persisted even in death. Some contemporary and later sources entertained the possibility that he was executed on the quiet



orders of Sultan Murad IV.<sup>28</sup> Murad IV was known for his extreme brutality and his obsession with restoring absolute state authority; he had already executed several of his other brothers and may have viewed his incapacitated uncle as a latent but unacceptable risk—a potential rallying point for any future conspiracy against the throne. Whether Murad truly gave the order is uncertain, but the existence of the rumor itself speaks to the brutal political logic of the era and the perceived danger that even a "living ghost" could pose.

In a final historical curiosity, Mustafa I was not buried in a traditional imperial tomb. Instead, his body was interred in the courtyard of the Hagia Sophia, within a structure that had served as a baptistery during the Byzantine era.<sup>1</sup> His legacy is not that of a ruler, but of a potent symbol. Known to history as *Deli Mustafa* (Mustafa the Mad), he remains a footnote whose true significance lies not in what he did, but in what his presence on the throne revealed about the state of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> His life encapsulates the profound institutional crises of his time: the weakness of the sultanate, the destructive ascendancy of court factions, and the tragic human cost of the *Kafes* system.

The final sixteen years of Mustafa's life represent a unique phenomenon in Ottoman dynastic history: a twice-deposed sultan permitted to live out his natural life within the palace walls. Before this era, a deposed ruler's life was almost always forfeit to prevent future challenges. The new system of confinement, however, had no established protocol for such a situation. To execute him immediately after his second deposition in 1623 would have been politically risky, potentially angering the remnants of his mother's faction or appearing as an act of gratuitous cruelty against a man universally acknowledged as helpless. Yet, allowing him to live meant that a legitimate, if incapacitated, alternative to the reigning sultan always existed within the palace—a permanent, latent source of instability. Mustafa became a living reminder of the elite's power to make and unmake sultans. His continued existence was a testament to the breakdown of the old, ruthless certainties of dynastic succession, and the persistent rumor of his eventual murder was a testament to the brutal logic of power that, in the end, always sought to reassert itself.

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## Part II: The Empire – A State in the Throes of Crisis

### Chapter 5: The Cauldron of Power: Factionalism at the Porte

The period of Mustafa I's reigns was defined by a near-total collapse of the sultan's personal authority and the corresponding rise of powerful, competing factions that treated the throne as a prize to be won and controlled. The weakness of the sultans—Ahmed I's youth, Mustafa I's mental incapacity, Osman II's lack of a maternal power base, and Murad IV's minority—created a persistent power vacuum at the center of the empire. This void was filled by three primary groups: the women of the Imperial Harem, the Janissary corps, and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and religious establishment.

The era is most famously characterized as the "Sultanate of Women," a period when the mothers and consorts of sultans wielded unprecedented political influence.<sup>23</sup> The rivalry between Halime Sultan and Kösem Sultan dominated the court during Mustafa's time. As Mustafa's mother, Halime Sultan acted as his regent and was the de facto co-ruler of the empire.<sup>5</sup> Her power was direct and, during her son's brief tenures, nearly absolute. However, her political base was narrow and precarious, relying heavily on her son-in-law, the Grand Vizier Kara Davud Pasha, and the loyalty of the Janissary factions that had orchestrated the overthrow of Osman II.<sup>23</sup> Her primary political goals were not stable governance but the preservation of her son's throne and the elimination of her rivals through retribution.<sup>24</sup> Her chief adversary was Kösem Sultan, the favored consort of the late Ahmed I and the mother of several princes, including the future sultans Murad IV and Ibrahim.<sup>40</sup> Kösem was a master of long-term political strategy. She astutely supported Mustafa's first accession to the throne as a means of implementing the principle of seniority, thereby protecting her own sons from their ambitious older half-brother, Osman II.<sup>5</sup> Even when relegated to the Old Palace (*Eski Sarayı*) during the reigns of Mustafa I and Osman II, she remained a key political player, using her immense wealth and extensive network of allies to influence events from afar. She was a central figure in the conspiracies that led to both of Mustafa's depositions, ultimately succeeding in placing her own 11-year-old son, Murad IV, on the throne, which secured her own position as regent for the next decade.<sup>6</sup>

The second pillar of power was the Janissary corps. Long evolved from an elite slave-infantry, the Janissaries had become a deeply entrenched political and economic interest group in Istanbul.<sup>45</sup> Their military prowess had declined, but their political power had grown immense. They had become kingmakers, capable of demanding accession bonuses and, most critically, of deposing or even murdering sultans who threatened their privileges.<sup>45</sup> Their violent overthrow of Osman II in 1622 was the ultimate demonstration of this power.<sup>31</sup> While the Agha of the Janissaries was an influential courtier with direct access to the sultan, his control over the individual regiments (*ortas*) was often tenuous, making the corps a volatile and unpredictable force prone to mutiny.<sup>47</sup> Their deep integration into the city's commercial life had further diluted their military identity and transformed them into a powerful, reactionary urban lobby.<sup>46</sup>

The third group consisted of the high-ranking officials of the state: the viziers of the Imperial Council and the senior members of the religious establishment (*ulema*), led by the Şeyhülislam. These figures often acted as the facilitators and legitimizers of the coups engineered by the harem and the military. The Şeyhülislam's religious opinion, or *fatwa*, was crucial for providing legal and divine sanction for the deposition of a sultan, as seen in both of Mustafa's removals.<sup>15</sup> Grand Viziers and other pashas, meanwhile, were rarely independent actors. Their survival depended on aligning with the dominant faction, making them clients of either the Valide Sultan or the military leadership. This resulted in a constant and destabilizing turnover of high officials, exemplified by the five Grand Viziers who served during Mustafa's chaotic 16-month second reign.<sup>6</sup>

The dynamic between these factions reveals a crucial aspect of the era's power structure.

While the Janissaries possessed the raw physical force to overthrow a sultan, they lacked the legitimacy to rule themselves. They could not place one of their own commanders on the throne without fundamentally destroying the dynastic foundation of the empire.<sup>46</sup> The sole source of legitimate dynastic succession lay within the Imperial Harem, which was the domain of the Valide Sultans and their rivals.<sup>39</sup> This created a deeply unstable but symbiotic relationship. After murdering Osman II, the Janissaries had no choice but to turn to Halime Sultan to produce Mustafa as a figurehead. Later, when that regime collapsed under the weight of its own incompetence and the pressure of provincial rebellion, the broader political elite had to negotiate with Kösem Sultan to enthrone her son, Murad IV. The military provided the muscle for political change, but the women of the harem controlled the wellspring of legitimacy, making figures like Halime and Kösem the ultimate political brokers of their time.

Faction Leader	Key Allies	Power Base	Primary Goal
<b>Halime Sultan</b>	Kara Davud Pasha (son-in-law, Grand Vizier)	Rebel Janissary factions, palace officials loyal to Mustafa	Secure Mustafa's throne, eliminate rivals (Osman II), consolidate personal power.
<b>Kösem Sultan</b>	Various pashas and aghas (client network), palace bureaucracy	Immense personal wealth, legitimacy as mother of princes, influence in Old Palace	Protect her sons, undermine rivals (Osman II, Halime), enthrone her own son (Murad IV).
<b>Janissary Corps</b>	Agha of the Janissaries, regimental officers	Military force in the capital, urban economic networks	Protect corporate privileges and pay, resist military reforms, act as kingmakers.
<b>Provincial Faction</b>	Abaza Mehmed Pasha	Provincial armies in Anatolia, anti-Janissary sentiment	Avenge the murder of Osman II by purging Janissaries, restore order and legitimacy.
<b>Ulema/Bureaucracy</b>	Şeyhülislam Esad Efendi, Sofu Mehmed Pasha	Religious authority, administrative apparatus	Maintain stability, legitimize or de-legitimize rulers, align with dominant factions.

## Chapter 6: Regicide and Rebellion: The Collapse of Central Authority

The defining event of the period, and the direct cause of Mustafa I's second reign, was the deposition and murder of Sultan Osman II in May 1622. This act, the first regicide in the

empire's history, was labeled by the contemporary historian Kâtip Çelebi as the *Ha'ile-i Osmaniye*, or "The Ottoman Tragedy".<sup>6</sup> Osman II was an intelligent, courageous, and reform-minded young ruler who correctly identified the Janissary corps as a source of indiscipline and political decay.<sup>31</sup> Following a disappointing military campaign against Poland in 1621, which he blamed on the Janissaries' poor performance, he initiated a series of reforms aimed at curbing their power. He closed their coffee shops, which served as hubs for political conspiracy, and cut their pay.<sup>31</sup> His most radical and ultimately fatal plan was to travel to the empire's Asian provinces, ostensibly on a pilgrimage to Mecca, with the real purpose of recruiting a new, loyal army of Anatolian and Syrian troops to replace the Janissaries entirely.<sup>29</sup>

When the Janissaries learned of this scheme, they erupted in revolt. Osman's critical weakness was his lack of a secure power base within the palace. His mother was either dead or had been exiled, leaving him without the protection of a powerful Valide Sultan who could navigate harem intrigues and counter the machinations of rivals like Halime and Kösem.<sup>23</sup> Isolated and unprotected, Osman was captured by the rebels, subjected to the profound humiliation of being paraded through the city on a common nag, and then brutally strangled in the Yedikule fortress.<sup>6</sup>

The political implosion in the capital was mirrored by widespread and persistent anarchy in the provinces. The Celali Rebellions, a series of uprisings that had plagued Anatolia since the late 16th century, intensified during this period of central collapse. These revolts were complex phenomena, involving a motley coalition of disbanded mercenary soldiers (*sekbân*), landless cavalymen (*sipahis*), overtaxed peasants, and ambitious provincial governors.<sup>52</sup> They were not typically secessionist movements aimed at overthrowing the Ottoman dynasty; rather, they were violent reactions to a deep socio-economic crisis characterized by currency depreciation, crushing taxation, and the breakdown of law and order.<sup>54</sup> The power vacuum in Istanbul during Mustafa's reigns created a fertile environment for these rebellions to flourish, as the central government was too weak and distracted to project its authority into the provinces.<sup>57</sup>

Among these provincial uprisings, the rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, was unique and particularly consequential. His revolt was not a product of economic grievance but a direct political response to the regicide in Istanbul. Abaza Mehmed Pasha declared his loyalty to the memory of the murdered Sultan Osman II and announced his intention to exact vengeance upon the Janissaries.<sup>6</sup> This gave his movement a powerful ideological legitimacy that many other Celali leaders lacked, and he quickly attracted widespread support in eastern Anatolia. His campaign to purge Janissaries posed a direct military threat to the new regime in Istanbul and was a primary factor in convincing the capital's elite that the farcical rule of Mustafa I was unsustainable. The need to present a unified and legitimate front against Abaza Mehmed Pasha's advancing forces was a key catalyst for Mustafa's second deposition and the enthronement of Murad IV.<sup>29</sup>

The events of this period reveal the profound interconnectedness of the empire's center and periphery. The regicide in Istanbul and the rebellion in Anatolia were not separate crises but two facets of a single, empire-wide collapse of state legitimacy. Osman II's plan to raise a

provincial army was, in essence, an attempt to use the periphery to discipline the corrupt center. When the center struck first and killed the sultan, the periphery, under Abaza Mehmed Pasha, rose up in reaction to the center's illegitimate act. This created a vicious feedback loop of violence: the instability in Istanbul under Mustafa's inept government fueled the rebellion in Anatolia, and the threat from Anatolia, in turn, forced a political realignment in Istanbul. This dynamic demonstrates that the empire was no longer a monolithic entity controlled from the capital, but a fractured polity where the center and periphery were engaged in an open and violent struggle for control. The historical narrative of the regicide itself became a political battleground. The chronicle written by Tûghî, a former Janissary, shows a deliberate evolution in how the event was portrayed. Initial accounts reflected a sense of collective guilt among the military for their role in the sultan's murder. However, as the political backlash grew, the narrative was strategically reshaped to absolve the Janissary corps as a whole, shifting the blame onto a few key individuals. This manipulation of the historical record highlights a sophisticated awareness of the power of narrative in a time of crisis and the lengths to which factions would go to secure their political survival.<sup>34</sup>

## **Chapter 7: The Fraying Empire: Military and Economic Consequences of Instability**

The relentless political turmoil that defined the period of Mustafa I's reigns had devastating and immediate consequences for the Ottoman Empire's military security and economic stability. The state, consumed by internal power struggles, was effectively paralyzed, unable to govern at home or defend its borders abroad.

The most significant military consequence was the collapse of the eastern front. The long and draining Ottoman-Safavid War had concluded in 1618 on terms largely unfavorable to the Ottomans. The chaos that followed Ahmed I's death, culminating in the regicide of Osman II and the chaotic restoration of Mustafa I, presented a golden opportunity for the ambitious Safavid ruler, Shah Abbas I. In 1623, with the Ottoman government in complete disarray, Safavid forces invaded and captured Baghdad and most of Iraq with little resistance.<sup>2</sup> The loss of Baghdad, a former capital of the Islamic Caliphate and a major provincial center, was a catastrophic blow to Ottoman prestige and a grave strategic setback. The empire was simply too fractured and consumed by the rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha and the power struggles in Istanbul to mount an effective defense. This military paralysis was a direct result of the breakdown of the empire's military institutions. The Janissary corps in the capital had devolved into a political lobby more concerned with securing pay and deposing sultans than with fighting wars.<sup>45</sup> Simultaneously, the traditional provincial army, the *sipahi* cavalry supported by land grants (*timars*), was in an advanced state of decay. The *timar* system was being eroded by corruption, with lands being seized by court favorites and converted into private estates, depriving the state of both revenue and trained soldiers.<sup>54</sup> This decay not only weakened the army but also fueled the Celali revolts as dispossessed *sipahis* joined rebel bands.

This military decline was inextricably linked to a deepening economic crisis. Decades of warfare, combined with rampant corruption, had drained the imperial treasury. To meet its short-term obligations, such as paying the increasingly restive Janissaries, the government resorted to desperate fiscal measures. The most damaging of these was the frequent debasement of the silver currency, the *akçe*. This policy triggered runaway inflation, which devastated the purchasing power of anyone on a fixed salary, including soldiers and bureaucrats, and spurred a vicious cycle of further corruption, extortion, and social unrest.<sup>59</sup> In the provinces, the collapse of central authority led to predatory taxation by local officials and tax farmers, who sought to extract as much wealth as possible in the shortest amount of time. This, combined with the physical destruction wrought by the Celali rebels, drove countless peasants off their land.<sup>53</sup> The resulting depopulation of the countryside led to a sharp decline in agricultural output, which in turn created food shortages in the cities and drastically reduced the state's tax base. The anarchy also rendered Anatolia's trade routes unsafe, disrupting commerce and the vital flow of goods and revenues to the capital.<sup>58</sup> By the time of Mustafa's second reign, the state was effectively bankrupt. The government was unable to regularly pay the Janissaries, a primary source of their agitation.<sup>18</sup> The desperation of the treasury is vividly illustrated by the fact that upon the accession of Murad IV in 1623, the state was forced to levy a forced loan of 5,000 gold coins from Istanbul's Jewish community to pay the customary accession bonus (*cülus bahşişi*) to the soldiers.<sup>38</sup> The political and economic crises of the era were not parallel developments but were locked in a mutually reinforcing downward spiral. Political instability and the corruption of a weak central government led to disastrous economic policies. These policies, particularly currency debasement, impoverished the very military class whose support the government depended on. The aggrieved and politically empowered Janissaries then reacted with violence to protect their economic interests, staging coups that caused even greater political instability. This chaos further crippled the state's ability to collect taxes or secure commerce, deepening the fiscal crisis. Mustafa I's reigns represent the nadir of this cycle, a period when the Ottoman state could neither govern its people nor pay its own army, leading to a state of near-total systemic paralysis.

## Chapter 8: A Violent Transformation

The turbulent period bracketed by the death of Ahmed I in 1617 and the accession of Murad IV in 1623 was more than just a chaotic interlude. It was a crucial, violent, and irreversible turning point in the evolution of the Ottoman state. The reigns of Mustafa I, characterized by deposition, regicide, and rebellion, marked the definitive end of the classical model of the all-powerful, expansionist warrior-sultan who stood as the unquestioned center of the political universe. The crises of this era did not simply cause temporary instability; they solidified new political norms and accelerated the transformation of the empire's fundamental structure.

The most immediate and lasting change was in the law of succession. The decision to

enthroned Mustafa I in 1617 established the principle of agnatic seniority—succession by the oldest male of the dynasty—over the traditional practice of primogeniture. Born of expediency to avoid a child ruler, this principle became entrenched and would govern Ottoman succession until the dynasty's end.<sup>5</sup> A direct corollary to this was the solidification of the *Kafes* system. Princely confinement, which had been an ad-hoc solution for Mustafa, now became the standard institution for managing succession. This ensured that future sultans would ascend to the throne after decades of isolation, without any experience in statecraft, making them inherently weaker and more susceptible to manipulation by court factions.<sup>12</sup> The sultan was transformed from an active ruler into a confined figurehead, a symbol of authority to be wielded by others.

The events of 1617-1623 also confirmed the new political reality that effective power had been permanently diffused. The Janissaries and the great women of the harem, particularly the Valide Sultan, emerged as institutionalized political actors with the demonstrated power to make, unmake, and even eliminate sultans.<sup>4</sup> The regicide of Osman II was the ultimate proof that the military could overrule the monarch, while the successful intrigues of Halime Sultan and later Kösem Sultan showed that control of the harem and its princes was tantamount to control of the state. This new distribution of power would define Ottoman politics for much of the 17th century, with a series of regencies and powerful vizierates attempting to manage the state in the name of a weakened sultan.

This period thus accelerated the empire's transition from a patrimonial state, where power emanated directly from the sultan's person and household, to a more bureaucratic and factional one.<sup>2</sup> Governance was no longer the execution of a single man's will but a constant, often violent, negotiation between the great power centers: the palace households of the Valide Sultan, the military command of the Janissaries, the senior bureaucracy of the viziers, and the religious establishment of the *ulema*. Sultan Mustafa I, the man who had no will of his own, stands as the perfect, tragic symbol of this profound transformation.

While this era is often viewed through the lens of decline, the intense crises surrounding Mustafa's reigns can also be understood as the brutal but necessary catalyst for the empire's adaptation and survival. The classical Ottoman system was no longer viable by the early 17th century. The model of the expansionist warrior-sultan had become obsolete as the empire's borders stabilized and the challenges became primarily administrative and economic.<sup>50</sup> The old military system based on the *timars* was ill-suited to new gunpowder warfare and was fiscally unsustainable.<sup>2</sup> The crises of deposition and regicide were the violent death throes of this old order. They were not the cause of the decline but the symptoms of a painful and necessary transition. The new, unstable system that emerged—with a factionalized government managing a confined sultan—was an adaptation, however flawed. It allowed the Ottoman state to continue functioning, to weather the storms of the 17th century, and to eventually find a new, albeit temporary, equilibrium under strong, reformist Grand Viziers like the Köprülü later in the century. Mustafa's reign was the chaotic crucible in which this new, more complex, and decentralized Ottoman state was violently forged.

# Conclusion

The historical significance of Sultan Mustafa I lies not in his actions, but in his profound inaction. His two reigns were not periods of his rule, but vacuums of power that exposed the deep fissures running through the Ottoman state. His life, from his unlikely survival to his tragic death, serves as a microcosm of the empire's tumultuous transition in the early 17th century. He was a man created and subsequently destroyed by a political system in the midst of a violent metamorphosis. Spared by the strategic abandonment of fratricide, his mind was shattered by its institutional replacement, the psychological torment of the *Kafes*. His enthronements were not triumphs but the tactical maneuvers of competing court factions who required a legitimate, pliable figurehead to sanctify their power grabs.

The analysis of Mustafa's time on the throne reveals an empire grappling with a total crisis of authority. The principle of succession, the bedrock of dynastic stability, was irrevocably altered, replaced by a system of seniority that prioritized age over competence and fostered intrigue over training. The sultan, once the absolute center of power, was reduced to a pawn, a confined and often incapacitated symbol whose authority was wielded by others. The true rulers of the day were the formidable women of the Imperial Harem, like Halime Sultan and Kösem Sultan, and the insubordinate Janissary corps, who together demonstrated their collective power to depose and even murder a sovereign who dared to challenge their interests.

This political breakdown at the center radiated outward, paralyzing the empire's ability to respond to external threats and internal decay. The loss of Baghdad to the Safavids, the intensification of the Celali Rebellions in Anatolia, and the spiraling economic crisis of inflation and depopulation were all direct consequences of the anarchy in Istanbul. The story of Mustafa's reigns is ultimately the story of the transfer of effective power from the person of the sultan to the interlocking, and often warring, factions of the harem, the military, and the bureaucracy.

In the grand sweep of Ottoman history, Mustafa I remains a footnote, remembered as *Deli Mustafa*, the Mad. Yet, his symbolic importance is immense. He is the ultimate embodiment of the weakened sultanate, the tragic figurehead of an era that witnessed the violent death of the classical Ottoman order. His story is essential for understanding the transition to a new, more volatile, and more bureaucratically complex form of Ottoman governance that would characterize the centuries to come. His personal tragedy was not merely his own; it was the tragedy of a dynasty and an empire forced to remake itself in an age of profound and unrelenting crisis.

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