

# The Gilded Cage of the Bosphorus: Sultan Abdulaziz, the Tanzimat, and the Imperial Twilight (1861–1876)

## Introduction: The Titan in the Era of Transition

The reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (1861–1876) stands as one of the most complex, contradictory, and consequential epochs in the late history of the Ottoman Empire. Ascending the throne following the death of his brother, Sultan Abdulmejid I, Abdulaziz inherited a state that was suspended precariously between two worlds. On one side lay the ancient, theocratic foundations of the House of Osman, deeply rooted in Islamic tradition and imperial martial culture. On the other lay the relentless, accelerating machinery of the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization)—a top-down modernization project initiated by his father, Mahmud II, and carried forward by his brother, aimed at salvaging a sprawling, multi-ethnic empire from the centrifugal forces of nationalism and the predatory ambitions of the European Great Powers. Abdulaziz was a figure of immense paradox, a physical giant who embodied the tensions of his age. He was the first Ottoman Sultan to travel to Western Europe on a state visit, embracing the pageantry of the Victorian and Napoleonic courts and accepting the Order of the Garter from Queen Victoria.<sup>1</sup> Yet, he was also a man of profound traditionalism, a wrestler of immense physical strength who sought to project an image of ancient Ottoman martial vigor, surrounding himself with oil wrestlers (*pehlivans*) rather than poets.<sup>2</sup> His rule saw the zenith of Ottoman naval power, with the empire possessing the third-largest ironclad fleet in the world, yet this military expansion was built upon a foundation of fiscal quicksand, leading directly to the sovereign default of 1875—the "Ramadan Decree"—which shattered the empire's financial sovereignty.<sup>4</sup>

This report provides an exhaustive analysis of this fifteen-year period, bifurcating its focus between the biography of the man—his psychology, his travels, his artistic temperament, and his mysterious death—and the structural realities of the Empire he ruled. It explores the administrative restructuring of the provinces through the Vilayet Law, the codification of civil law in the *Mecelle*, the fatal accumulation of public debt through the mechanism of the Galata bankers and foreign loans, and the geopolitical crises in Crete and the Balkans that ultimately precipitated his downfall.

The analysis posits that the reign of Abdulaziz was characterized by "Ornamental Modernization"—a period where the state achieved remarkable feats in infrastructure, legal codification, and military procurement, but failed to secure the underlying economic and

human capital necessary to sustain them. It was a tragedy of ambition outstripping capacity, ending in the violent deposition of the Sultan and a crisis that would reshape the map of Europe.

## Part I: The Sultan as Monarch and Man

### 1.1 Profile of a Pehlivan Sultan: The Physicality of Power

Born on February 8, 1830, to Sultan Mahmud II and the Valide Sultan Pertevniyal, Abdulaziz grew up in the shadow of the transformative reforms initiated by his father.<sup>6</sup> Unlike his predecessor Abdulmejid, who was often described as gentle, frail, and thoroughly westernized in manner, Abdulaziz cut a figure of imposing physical robustness. He was a man of the body as much as the throne.

His passion for traditional Turkish oil wrestling (*yağlı güreş*) was not merely a hobby but a performative aspect of his kingship. He was known to possess brute physical strength, a quality that resonated with the traditional segments of Ottoman society who yearned for a return to the warrior-sultan archetype of the classical age.<sup>2</sup> The Sultan did not merely spectate; he trained. He surrounded himself with famous *pehlivans* (wrestlers) like Kavasoğlu İbrahim, Şamdancıbaşı Kara İbo, and the legendary Alico, who held the title of *Baspehlivan* (head wrestler) at the Kırkpınar tournament for a record-breaking 27 years.<sup>3</sup>

These men were not just athletes; they were part of the Sultan's inner circle, sometimes serving as bodyguards or unofficial confidants. When Abdulaziz traveled to Europe in 1867, he included wrestlers in his entourage, using them to project an image of Ottoman vitality and masculine strength to the curious Western public.<sup>3</sup> This physicality signaled a shift in the visual language of the Sultanate. While the Tanzimat era is often associated with the frock coat (*stambouline*) and the adoption of French manners, Abdulaziz's persona retained a rougher, more martial Ottoman core. He yearned to restore the image of the Sultan as a *Ghazi* (warrior), even as he navigated diplomatic salons in London and Paris.

However, this rough exterior concealed a man of significant artistic sensitivity. Abdulaziz was a skilled composer of classical music. His works contributed to the repertoire of the Ottoman court, which by the mid-19th century had become a unique hybrid of Western and Eastern musical traditions.<sup>7</sup> He was also a pianist, an instrument that had become a staple of the Ottoman royal household.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, he was a talented painter and sketch artist. His sketches, often unsigned or attributed broadly to the palace school, reveal a simplistic but creative hand, demonstrating an engagement with the visual arts that went beyond mere patronage.<sup>9</sup> An exhibition of his sketches in Vienna, London, and Paris in recent years has highlighted this often-overlooked dimension of his character—a ruler who could sketch a battleship with the same hand that signed execution orders or played a prelude.<sup>9</sup>

The Sultan was also a member of the Mawlawiyyah (Mevlevi) order of dervishes, the Sufi order famous for their whirling ceremonies.<sup>10</sup> This affiliation suggests a spiritual depth and a connection to the mystical traditions of Islam that stood in contrast to the secularizing reforms of his government. This duality—the wrestler who played the piano, the autocrat who toured democratic Europe, the Mevlevi who built ironclads—defined the internal tension of his reign.

## 1.2 The Egyptian Prelude (1863): A Rehearsal for Modernity

Before venturing into the heart of Europe, Sultan Abdulaziz undertook a significant journey to Egypt in 1863. This trip, often overshadowed by his later European tour, was a crucial precursor. Egypt, technically a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire under the rule of the Khedives, had in many ways outpaced the imperial center in terms of industrialization and modernization under the dynasty of Muhammad Ali.<sup>11</sup>

Accompanied by the princes—his nephews Murad (later Murad V) and Abdulhamid (later Abdulhamid II), and his son Yusuf Izzeddin—Abdulaziz traveled to Alexandria and Cairo. The itinerary was not merely ceremonial; it was an inspection of modernity. The Sultan visited the industrial workshops established in Bulaq, weaving factories in Cairo, museums, and the pyramids.<sup>11</sup> He observed firsthand the economic and social changes wrought by aggressive modernization reforms.

This visit served a dual purpose. Domestically, it was an assertion of imperial suzerainty over a province that had frequently threatened rebellion. By traveling there, Abdulaziz reminded the Khedive Ismail Pasha of his subordination. Developmentally, it provided the Sultan with a concrete vision of what a modernized Islamic state could look like—factories, railways, and organized bureaucracy—whetting his appetite for similar developments in Istanbul.

## 1.3 The Grand Tour of 1867: Breaking the Ottoman Isolation

The defining event of Abdulaziz's personal reign was his tour of Western Europe in the summer of 1867. This journey was historically unprecedented; never before had a ruling Ottoman Sultan set foot in Christian Europe for peaceful diplomatic purposes, nor had one traveled without an army.<sup>7</sup> The impetus for the trip was an invitation from Emperor Napoleon III to attend the *Exposition Universelle* in Paris, a global showcase of industrial and cultural achievement that defined the 19th-century belief in progress.<sup>12</sup>

### The Itinerary and Diplomatic Theater

The tour, lasting 48 days from June 21 to August 7, 1867, was a masterclass in what historians have termed "ornamental diplomacy".<sup>1</sup> The Sultan's party traveled by sea to Toulon and then

by rail to Paris.

In **Paris**, the Sultan was feted as an exotic potentate, a living embodiment of the "Orient" that had fascinated the European imagination for centuries. He stayed at the Élysée Palace and participated in the opening of the exhibition. The American press noted that the trip was not merely for leisure but was a calculated diplomatic maneuver intended to secure continued French and British support against Russian expansionism and to assuage concerns regarding the recent Cretan revolt.<sup>15</sup> The Sultan, dressing in European-style military uniforms, projected an image of a modernizing monarch, attempting to visually refute the "Sick Man of Europe" label.<sup>16</sup> He visited the exhibition halls, marveling at the engines of industry, a visual reinforcement of the technological gap between his empire and the West.

Following Paris, the Sultan crossed the channel to **London**. His arrival in Britain was greeted with immense public curiosity. The *Times* reported on the historic nature of the visit, noting that the "Chief of the Mussulman race" was now a guest of the Queen.<sup>12</sup> The visit was marked by a "musical extravaganza" at the Crystal Palace, where massed choirs were trained to sing praises to the Sultan in Turkish, a gesture that deeply impressed the music-loving monarch.<sup>12</sup> A significant diplomatic wrestle occurred regarding the **Order of the Garter**. Queen Victoria was initially reluctant to bestow this highest order of chivalry—traditionally reserved for Christian monarchs—upon a Muslim ruler. However, the British Foreign Office, led by Lord Stanley, argued that denying the Sultan the honor while having granted it to the French Emperor would be a diplomatic insult that could push the Ottomans toward Russia or France. Through diplomatic maneuvering and the necessity of maintaining the Ottoman alliance, the Queen relented. The ceremony took place on the royal yacht *Victoria and Albert* during a naval review at Spithead. The Sultan accepted the Garter, a symbolic validation of the Ottoman Empire's status as a member of the Concert of Europe.<sup>1</sup> In a reciprocal gesture of gift-giving, the Sultan presented the Queen with Arab horses, navigating the gendered and cultural complexities of royal exchange.<sup>1</sup>

The naval review at Spithead was particularly impactful. Seeing the massed power of the Royal Navy—the ironclads, the steam power, the sheer discipline—solidified Abdulaziz's obsession with naval expansion. He left England convinced that the security of his empire rested on mimicking this maritime might.

The return journey took the Sultan through **Belgium, Prussia, Austria, and Hungary**. In Pest-Buda (modern Budapest), his presence was symbolic of the changing tides of history; the descendant of conquerors who had once besieged the city was now welcomed with a folk ceremony and 72 cannon shots as a passing dignitary.<sup>18</sup>

## The Cultural and Political Aftermath

The trip had profound domestic repercussions. It cemented Abdulaziz's conviction that Westernization was the only path to survival, yet it also whetted his appetite for European material culture.<sup>16</sup> He returned with plans for new palaces, naval expansions, and urban reforms, inspired by the boulevards of Paris and the dockyards of London. However, the trip

also highlighted the stark disparity between the industrial might of Western Europe and the agrarian reality of his own domains. While he successfully projected an image of power abroad, the immense cost of the tour and the subsequent spending on Western luxuries exacerbated the empire's financial fragility.

## 1.4 The Melancholy of Power and the Palace

Upon his return, Abdulaziz retreated increasingly into the splendors of palace life. He oversaw the completion of the **Beylerbeyi Palace**, a stunning fusion of Western Neoclassical and Ottoman styles on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus, which served as a summer residence and a guest house for foreign dignitaries.<sup>13</sup>

However, as the decade wore on, the Sultan's psychological state began to deteriorate. With the deaths of his two most capable ministers, **Mehmed Fuad Pasha** (1869) and **Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha** (1871), Abdulaziz lost the bureaucratic buffers that had previously managed the affairs of state.<sup>7</sup> These two men, the architects of the Tanzimat, had effectively run the empire, often sidelining the Sultan. In their absence, Abdulaziz attempted to assert personal, absolutist rule.

The political vacuum led to a period of instability known as the "Palace Autocracy." The Sultan appointed a succession of Grand Viziers, including the Russophile **Mahmud Nedim Pasha** (nicknamed "Nedimoff" for his pro-Russian leanings), whose chaotic administration alienated the reformist bureaucracy.<sup>7</sup> Abdulaziz became increasingly erratic, suspicious, and prone to violent outbursts. The isolation of the palace, combined with the mounting external pressures and internal economic collapse, contributed to a sense of siege that pervaded the Yıldız and Dolmabahçe courts.

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## Part II: Governance and the Mature Tanzimat

While the Sultan wrestled and toured, the machinery of the Ottoman state was undergoing a profound transformation. The period 1861–1876 is often viewed as the maturation phase of the Tanzimat, where the abstract principles of the 1839 and 1856 edicts were translated into concrete legal and administrative institutions.

## 2.1 The Vilayet Law of 1864: Rationalizing the Map

One of the most significant structural reforms of Abdulaziz's reign was the reorganization of provincial administration. In 1864, the **Vilayet Law** (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) was promulgated, replacing the old eyalet system.<sup>7</sup> This reform was not merely a change in nomenclature; it was a comprehensive attempt to rationalize the empire's geography and governance structures along French lines.

The law established a clear hierarchy of administrative units:

- **Vilayet** (Province) – governed by a *Vali*
- **Sancak** (Sub-province) – governed by a *Mutasarrif*
- **Kaza** (District) – governed by a *Kaymakam*
- **Nahiye** (Commune/Parish) – governed by a *Müdür*

Crucially, the law introduced the principle of separation of powers at the local level. While the governor (*vali*) retained executive authority, the law created administrative councils (*meclis*) that included both elected and appointed members, ensuring representation for both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.<sup>11</sup> This was a radical step toward local participation in governance, intended to bind the diverse subjects of the empire more closely to the center and check the power of local notables.

To oversee these reforms and serve as a supreme administrative court, the **Council of State** (*Şura-yı Devlet*) was established in 1868.<sup>7</sup> Modeled on the French *Conseil d'État*, this body was responsible for drafting legislation and adjudicating disputes between the state and its subjects. It became a training ground for the Ottoman bureaucratic elite.

## 2.2 The Mecelle: Codifying an Islamic Modernity

Legal reform was central to the modernization effort. The diverse legal systems of the empire—comprising Sharia courts, millet courts for non-Muslims, and consular courts for foreigners—created a chaotic juridical landscape known as legal dualism. Under the leadership of the erudite scholar and statesman **Ahmet Cevdet Pasha**, the empire embarked on the monumental task of codifying Ottoman civil law.<sup>7</sup>

The result was the **Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliye** (The Ottoman Civil Code), enacted in sixteen books between 1869 and 1876. The *Mecelle* was a landmark achievement in Islamic jurisprudence. Rather than adopting the French Civil Code wholesale (as had been done with commercial and penal codes), Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and his commission chose to codify the **Hanafi** school of Islamic law into a modern, statutory format compatible with Western legal practices.<sup>21</sup>

The *Mecelle* covered contracts, torts, property, and procedure, providing a standardized legal framework that could be applied in the newly established *Nizamiye* (secular/state) courts. It represented a sophisticated attempt to synthesize Islamic legal tradition with the requirements of a modern capitalist economy. Although it did not cover family law, which remained the domain of religious courts, the *Mecelle* remained the civil code of the Ottoman Empire until its collapse and continued to influence the legal systems of successor states like Jordan, Kuwait, Israel/Palestine, and Bosnia well into the 20th century.<sup>21</sup>

## 2.3 Educational Strides: The Galatasaray Lyceum

Abdulaziz's reign also witnessed critical developments in public education. The Sultan,

impressed by the French educational system during his 1867 visit, championed the establishment of a high-quality secondary school that would produce the future elite of the bureaucracy.<sup>24</sup>

In 1868, the **Mekteb-i Sultanisi** (Galatasaray Imperial Lyceum) was opened.<sup>24</sup> This institution was revolutionary in the Ottoman context. It was a secular, French-medium school that admitted students regardless of religion. For the first time, Muslim, Greek, Armenian, and Jewish students studied side by side in a curriculum that emphasized Western sciences, humanities, and languages.<sup>26</sup> The school was established on the grounds of the old Galata Palace School, founded by Bayezid II, linking the new reform to imperial history.<sup>26</sup> The establishment of Galatasaray met with resistance from conservative religious quarters (both Muslim and Christian) and from Russia, which feared French cultural penetration.<sup>25</sup> However, the school succeeded in its mission, becoming a nursery for the Ottoman and later Turkish intelligentsia. While attempts to establish a full university (*Darülfünun*) were more halting, with intermittent openings and closings due to conservative backlash, the library systems were modernized. Catalogues for the Damad İbrahim Pasha and Ragip Pasha libraries were published, and library hours were standardized to increase public access.<sup>27</sup>

## 2.4 Daily Life and Urban Modernization

Administrative modernization extended into the daily lives of Ottoman subjects. In 1863, the empire issued its first **postage stamps**, a symbol of state capacity to regulate communication.<sup>7</sup> In 1875, the Ottoman Empire became a founding member of the **Universal Postal Union**, signaling its integration into global communication networks.<sup>7</sup>

In 1873, the empire officially adopted the **metric system**, attempting to standardize weights and measures that had varied wildly across provinces, a move crucial for internal trade.<sup>19</sup> Urban transportation also evolved; the **Şirket-i Hayriye** (ferry company), established earlier, expanded its operations, connecting the shores of the Bosphorus and facilitating the growth of Istanbul's suburbs.<sup>28</sup>

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## Part III: The Ironclad Obsession (Military & Navy)

Perhaps the most visible, and financially ruinous, aspect of Sultan Abdulaziz's reign was his obsession with military modernization, specifically the expansion of the Ottoman Navy.

### 3.1 Building the World's Third Largest Navy

Following the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Navarino (1827) and the technological lessons of the Crimean War—where explosive shells decimated wooden

hulls—the empire recognized the obsolescence of sailing ships. Under Abdulaziz, the Ottoman Empire embarked on one of the most rapid naval armament programs in history.<sup>29</sup>

By 1875, the Ottoman Navy possessed **21 battleships** and 173 other warships, ranking as the **third-largest naval force in the world**, surpassed only by the British Royal Navy and the French Navy.<sup>31</sup> This fleet was not merely numerically impressive; it was technologically advanced. The pride of the fleet included the *Mesudiye* class of central-battery ironclads. The *Mesudiye* itself, commissioned in 1875 and built by the Thames Ironworks in London, displaced nearly 9,000 tons and was armed with heavy rifled muzzle-loading guns.<sup>4</sup> Other classes, such as the *Osmaniye*, *Aziziye*, and *Orhaniye*, formed a formidable battle line.

**Table 1: Comparative Naval Strength (Ironclads) c. 1875**

Rank	Power	Number of Major Ironclads	Strategic Focus
1	Great Britain	> 40	Global / High Seas / Empire Defense
2	France	> 30	Mediterranean / Atlantic / Colonial
3	Ottoman Empire	~ 21	Black Sea / Bosphorus / Aegean
4	Russia	~ 15	Black Sea / Baltic (Rebuilding)
5	Italy	~ 12	Adriatic / Mediterranean

(Data derived from <sup>31</sup>)

### 3.2 Strategic Rationale: The Struggle for Recognition

The naval expansion was driven primarily by the "Russian Threat"—the need to defend the Bosphorus, the Black Sea, and the Danube from Tsarist aggression.<sup>30</sup> The Crimean War had demonstrated the vulnerability of the Ottoman coast. However, scholars have argued that the scale of the fleet exceeded the empire's defensive needs and was driven by a constructivist "struggle for recognition".<sup>35</sup>

Abdulaziz viewed the ironclad fleet as a status symbol. In the 19th-century hierarchy of nations, possessing a modern battlefleet was the entry ticket to the club of Great Powers. Just as Kaiser Wilhelm II and Stalin would later build fleets to challenge hegemons, Abdulaziz built his navy to demand equal standing with Britain and France and to deter Russian adventurism through sheer presence.<sup>35</sup>

### 3.3 The Hollow Armada: Problems of Personnel and Logistics

While the ships were formidable, the infrastructure to support them was critically lacking. The empire relied heavily on British and French shipyards for the construction of these vessels, meaning the capital expenditure flowed directly out of the Ottoman economy.<sup>30</sup> There was little technology transfer; the Ottomans bought the ships but did not learn to build them. Furthermore, the personnel required to operate these complex steam-powered ironclads were in short supply. The **Naval Academy** was reorganized to train officers in the new technologies of steam and armor, but the human capital lagged behind the hardware.<sup>29</sup> The empire relied on British naval advisors, such as Hobart Pasha, to manage the fleet. More critically, the operational costs of such a massive fleet—coal, maintenance, and salaries—were astronomical.<sup>32</sup> An ironclad in port consumes money; an ironclad at sea consumes a fortune. When the financial crisis hit in 1875, the ships became expensive liabilities. In the subsequent Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, this mighty fleet would prove largely ineffective, blockaded in port or unable to prevent the Russian crossing of the Danube, illustrating the tragedy of acquiring strategic assets without the economic base to sustain them.<sup>35</sup>

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## Part IV: The Fiscal Abyss – Economy & Debt

The splendor of the palaces and the might of the ironclads masked a rotting financial core. The economic history of Abdulaziz's reign is a narrative of debt, deficit, and eventual default.

### 4.1 The Debt Trap: From Internal to External Borrowing

The Ottoman Empire had resisted foreign borrowing for centuries, relying on internal mechanisms like *mukataa* (tax farming), *malikâne* (life-term tax farming), and *esham* (revenue sharing bonds).<sup>37</sup> However, the costs of the Crimean War (1853–1856) broke this isolation. By the accession of Abdulaziz, the state was addicted to foreign loans to finance its budget deficits.<sup>5</sup>

Between 1854 and 1874, the empire contracted a series of loans with European banks, primarily French and British. These loans were often issued at unfavorable rates, with the actual cash received being significantly lower than the face value of the debt due to commissions and discounts.<sup>5</sup> For instance, a bond might be issued at a face value of £100, but the treasury would only receive £60, yet remained liable for interest on the full £100.

Domestically, the state relied on the **Galata Bankers**—a group of mostly non-Muslim (Greek, Armenian, Jewish) and Levantine financiers based in the Galata district of Istanbul.<sup>28</sup> These bankers, including families like the Baltazzis and Camondos, provided short-term, high-interest loans to the treasury to bridge the gap between tax collection and expenditure. They played a crucial role in the financial ecosystem, even helping to found the first securities

exchange and the *Şirket-i Hayriye*.<sup>28</sup> However, their high interest rates cannibalized future revenues.

## 4.2 The Baron Hirsch and the Railway Concessions

A major component of this debt was infrastructure investment, specifically railways. The empire believed that railways would unlock the economic potential of the Balkans and Anatolia. In 1869, the government granted a massive concession to **Baron Maurice de Hirsch**, a Bavarian financier, to build a "Rumelian Railway" linking Constantinople to Vienna.<sup>40</sup> The project was fraught with corruption and financial mismanagement. Hirsch's concession involved a rent of 14,000 Francs per kilometer from the government, a deal that incentivized the construction of meandering, inefficient routes to maximize mileage payments.<sup>42</sup> Hirsch financed the project through "Turkenlose" (Turkish Lottery Bonds), which became a speculative mania in Europe.<sup>43</sup> While some track was laid, the network remained disconnected and strategically vulnerable. Critics viewed Hirsch's enterprise as a "Trojan horse for German interests" or simply a vehicle for personal enrichment at the Ottoman expense.<sup>40</sup>

## 4.3 The Ramadan Decree: The Bankruptcy of 1875

The breaking point arrived in 1875. The global financial **Panic of 1873** dried up the availability of credit in London and Vienna, making it impossible for the Ottomans to roll over their debt.<sup>5</sup> Simultaneously, a severe **drought and famine in Anatolia (1873-1874)** devastated the agricultural tax base.<sup>38</sup>

On **October 6, 1875** (during the month of Ramadan), the government issued the "**Ramadan Decree**" (*Ramazan Kararnamesi*). This decree unilaterally declared that the state would pay only half of the interest due on its debt in cash, with the other half paid in promissory notes (scrip) bearing 5% interest.<sup>5</sup>

In diplomatic and financial terms, this was a sovereign default. The reaction in Europe was furious. The **Corporation of Foreign Bondholders** in London mobilized the press and politicians against the "Turkish defaulters".<sup>46</sup> The default destroyed the empire's creditworthiness and stripped it of its diplomatic leverage, leaving it vulnerable to the political machinations of the Great Powers just as the Balkans were erupting into violence.<sup>38</sup> The default paved the way for the eventual establishment of the **Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA)** in 1881, which would take direct control of Ottoman revenue sources.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 2: Key Economic Indicators of the Collapse**

Year	Event	Financial Impact
1854	First Foreign Loan	Beginning of external debt cycle to fund Crimean War.

1861-74	14 Major Loans Contracted	Debt accumulates to fund palaces, navy, and deficit.
1869	Rumelian Railway Concession	Massive liability for Baron Hirsch's railway project.
1873	Global Financial Panic	Credit markets in London/Vienna dry up; refinancing becomes impossible.
1874	Anatolian Famine	Tax revenues collapse due to agricultural failure.
1875	<b>Ramadan Decree</b>	<b>Sovereign Default:</b> Interest payments halved; credit destroyed.
1881	Decree of Muharrem	Establishment of OPDA; formal European financial control.

(Data derived from <sup>5</sup>)

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## Part V: The Geopolitical Cauldron

The financial collapse coincided with, and partly caused, a massive geopolitical crisis. The "Eastern Question"—the diplomatic struggle over the fate of the decaying Ottoman Empire—entered a hot phase during Abdulaziz's final years.

### 5.1 The Cretan Revolt (1866–1869)

Early in his reign, Abdulaziz faced a major insurrection in Crete. The Christian population of the island, desiring union (*enosis*) with Greece, rose up against Ottoman rule in 1866.<sup>49</sup> The revolt lasted three years and attracted significant sympathy from European public opinion, fueled by reports of massacres.

The Ottoman response was a mixture of military suppression and political concession. Grand Vizier Âli Pasha personally visited the island to negotiate a settlement. The result was the **"Organic Law of 1868"** (*Nizamname-i Girit*).<sup>50</sup> This statute granted Crete a special autonomous status within the empire. It provided for a mixed Christian-Muslim administration, recognized Greek as an official language of the island alongside Turkish, and established a General Assembly with Christian representation.<sup>52</sup> While it failed to satisfy the desire for union with Greece, the Organic Law temporarily pacified the island and served as a model for future autonomy arrangements in the Balkans.

## 5.2 The Herzegovina Uprising: The Spark of 1875

If Crete was a rehearsal, Herzegovina was the main event. In the summer of 1875, peasants in the **Nevesinje** district of Herzegovina rose in rebellion.<sup>53</sup> The immediate causes were agrarian and fiscal. The local Muslim lords (*beys*) and tax farmers (*mütesellim*) were squeezing the Christian peasantry for taxes—specifically the tithe on crops—even as the harvest failed.<sup>53</sup> The central government, desperate for cash to service its foreign debt, pressured local officials to maximize collection, breaking the fragile social contract.<sup>55</sup>

The "Nevesinje Rifle" (*Nevesinjska puška*), the first shot of the uprising on July 9, 1875, triggered a chain reaction.<sup>54</sup> The rebellion spread rapidly to Bosnia and then to Bulgaria. It drew in the semi-independent principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, and ultimately the Russian Empire, which saw an opportunity to champion the Pan-Slavic cause.<sup>55</sup> The inability of the Ottoman army to quickly suppress this guerilla uprising, coupled with the financial default, created a perception of total state paralysis.

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## Part VI: The Tragic End (1876)

By the spring of 1876, Sultan Abdulaziz's position was untenable. The empire was bankrupt, the Balkans were in flames, and the capital was seething with discontent.

### 6.1 The Constitutional Movement and the Coup

A new political force had emerged in Istanbul: the "Young Ottomans." This group of intellectuals and bureaucrats (including Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha) believed that the only way to save the empire was to curb the absolute power of the Sultan and establish a constitutional monarchy.<sup>7</sup> They found a powerful ally in **Midhat Pasha**, a reformist statesman who had served as governor of the Danube and Baghdad provinces and was a champion of the constitution.<sup>58</sup>

Midhat Pasha, along with the Minister of War **Hüseyin Avni Pasha** and the director of the Military Academy **Süleyman Pasha**, orchestrated a coup d'état. They mobilized the theological students (*softas*) to demonstrate in the streets, creating a pretext of public disorder.<sup>60</sup> They secured a *fatwa* from the Şeyhülislam authorizing the deposition of the Sultan on the grounds of madness, political incompetence, and financial mismanagement.<sup>60</sup> On **May 30, 1876**, the conspirators surrounded the Dolmabahçe Palace with troops. Abdulaziz was deposed without a fight and replaced by his nephew, **Murad V**, who was believed to be sympathetic to the constitutionalist cause.<sup>7</sup> Abdulaziz was confined to the **Feriye Palace** along the Bosphorus.

## 6.2 The Mystery of the Feriye Palace: Suicide or Assassination?

On **June 4, 1876**, just days after his deposition, Abdulaziz was found dead in his chambers at the Feriye Palace. His wrists had been slashed. The official verdict of the new government was suicide; it was claimed that the depressed ex-Sultan had asked for a pair of scissors to trim his beard and used them to kill himself.<sup>7</sup>

However, this verdict has been the subject of intense historical debate for nearly 150 years. The physical impossibility of deeply slashing *both* wrists effectively, the presence of bruises on his body, and the political convenience of his death for the coup leaders (particularly Hüseyin Avni Pasha, who had a personal vendetta against him) fueled immediate rumors of assassination.<sup>61</sup>

In 1881, during the reign of Abdulhamid II (who succeeded the mentally unstable Murad V after only 93 days), a show trial was held at Yildiz Palace which convicted Midhat Pasha and others of Abdulaziz's murder. While this trial was politically motivated to eliminate Abdulhamid's rivals, modern forensic analysis has kept the debate alive. In **2007**, the discovery of the clothes Abdulaziz wore at the time of his death in the Topkapi Palace archives provided new evidence. The blood patterns and the nature of the tears in the clothing have led many modern historians to conclude that the "suicide" was indeed a clumsy assassination disguised as self-destruction.<sup>62</sup>

## Conclusion: The Legacy of the Broken Titan

The reign of Sultan Abdulaziz was the hinge upon which the fate of the Ottoman Empire turned. It began with the optimistic promise of the Tanzimat—a belief that through administrative rationalization, legal codification, and technological adoption, the empire could become a modern European state. It ended in bankruptcy, civil war, and regicide.

Abdulaziz himself embodied the tragedy of his empire. He was a man who sought to project strength—through his wrestlers, his ironclads, and his palaces—but whose power was hollowed out by the structural economic dependency on the West. His "Grand Tour" of 1867 remains a poignant symbol: an Ottoman Sultan feted in the capitals of Europe, receiving the Order of the Garter, while the financial instruments that would eventually strangle his empire were being signed in the counting houses of the very cities he visited.

The consequences of his reign were profound. The bankruptcy of 1875 led directly to the loss of financial sovereignty. The naval expansion, while impressive on paper, proved a sunk cost. Yet, the administrative and educational reforms, particularly the Mecelle and Galatasaray Lyceum, were durable, laying the intellectual and legal groundwork for the future Republic of Turkey. Abdulaziz was a transitional figure—a traditional autocrat attempting to survive in a world of industrial capitalism and constitutional nationalism. His failure to reconcile these forces set the stage for the long, paranoid, and absolutist reign of Abdulhamid II, who would

spend the next three decades trying to hold back the tide that had engulfed his uncle.

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