San Francisco | February 24 – 28 | Moscone Center



SESSION ID: HTA-R07

Automotive/IoT Network Exploits: From Static Analysis to Reliable Exploits



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
Who am I?

- CEO at Moabi (San Francisco, Paris)
- Security Researcher: Bitlocker, MS IE/Edge, most BIOS Firmwares, SAP.
- "Inventor" of Hardware Backdooring (Rakshasa, 2011)
- Firmware Security Pioneer (INTEL-SA-00016)
- Previously Director of Offensive Security at Salesforce
- Speaker at Blackhat (x5), Defcon (x3)
 - MS Engineering, MS C.S., PhD candidate



Disrupting static analysis for IIoT

- 128b taint analysis and symbolic execution
- Built for IIoT / Industrial Processes
- Scales to 100k+ binaries / day / client
- Covers entire SSDLC
- Finds Odays automatically
- Enables secure supplier relationship management



Return on Experience



"Moabi is the perfect fit to address the new challenges posed by the greatest changes in the automotive industry, in over a century: electric cars, connected and self-driving vehicles ".

engineering department - Renault Nissan Mitsubishi Alliance























IIOT static analysis: case study

Auditing GenIVI


Use case: audit of GenIVI








Use case: audit of GenIVI








genivi-dev-platform-raspberrypi2-20171023155717.rootfs.rpi-sdimg : The following 13 vulnerabilities were discovered by Moabi				
CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW	undefined			
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CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW	undefined			
CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW	undefined			
CWE-61 - ARBITRARY FILE CREATION	undefined			
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CWE-61 - ARBITRARY FILE CREATION	undefined			
CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW	undefined			
CWE_326: CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength	undefined			
CWE-120 - BUFFER OVERFLOW	undefined			



Hostapd: overview





Hostapd: Pseudo Random Number Generator


Vulnerability						
	Score: 8.00	Impact: 7	Confidence: 9	Risk: 10		
Туре	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values					
Address	00081cf8					
function	00081cf8					
Description	Vulnerability when calling function rand():					
	call to rand() without initializing PRNG via srand() first. Cryptographic sequences will be predictable.					
Backtrace	#00 <81cf8> int rand(void) at: ./27a0432f7b54d70611f33f47bd9c0193e181c81b:0x81cf8 #01 <81cf8> function_81cf8() at: ./27a0432f7b54d70611f33f47bd9c0193e181c81b:0x81cf8 #02 <81404> function_81404() at: ./27a0432f7b54d70611f33f47bd9c0193e181c81b:0x81404					



Hostapd: CVE-2016-17043

In depth analysis

Hostapd: Pseudo Random Number Generator



Use of rand() and random() without seeding PRNGS

- Reference: <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions</u> /330.html
- Silently fixed in version 2.6 (2016)
- Reported to CERT in 03/2019



Hostapd: CVE-2016-10743

```
unsigned long os_random(void)
{
    return random();
}
```



```
* wps generate pin - Generate a random PIN
* Returns: Eight digit PIN (i.e., including the checksum digit)
     unsigned int val;
      if (random get bytes((unsigned char *) &val, sizeof(val)) < 0) {</pre>
              struct os_time now;
              os_get_time(&now);
              val = os_random() ^ now.sec ^ now.usec;
      val %= 10000000;
      /* Append checksum digit */
      return val * 10 + wps_pin_checksum(val);
```

RS/Conference2020

Exploit prototyping

Bridging the gap between static analysis and exploitation

From static analysis to reliable exploit: Witchcraft (WCC)

- The binary is ARM
- How do we verify if the vulnerability exists ?
- Let's rely on the Witchcraft Compiler Collection (WCC)



The Witchcraft Compiler Collection (WCC)

- Open Source Software
- Introduced at DEFCON and BLACKHAT 2016
- https://github.com/endrazine/wcc
- Rapid Cross platform analysis
- JIT binary translation from ARM to x86_64 thanks to qemu



DEMO

Witchcraft Compiler Collection

Pseudo Random Number Generator Failure

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
    // guaranteed to be random.
}
```



Source: https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/random_number.png

Conclusion

Take away

Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
 - Update hostapd to latest version
- Within six months you should:
 - Identify gaps in your SSDLC to include modern technologies such as static analysis
 - Measure your organization's exposure to firmware vulnerabilities
 - Kickstart a secure supplier relationship management process



Thanks for your attention

Get in touch: info@moabi.com