

# **EGGS**Smart Contract Review

**Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report** 

Security Report July 2021

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# **Report Summary**

Title	EGGS Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	EGGS		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura	Revision date	04/07/2021
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited	Approval date	04/07/2021
		Nº Pages	23

## **Overview**

# Background

EGGS requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their Smart Contract.

## **Project Dates**

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- July 04: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **July 04**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

## Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

# **Coverage**

# Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of EGGS.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

• EGGS Project: https://bscscan.com/address/0xDfac1652bfA8c9e935C2ef439410f1D031e7ee33#code

# Introduction

Given the opportunity to review EGGS Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

#### About EGGS: -

Item	Description
Issuer	EGGS
Website	https://eggsonbsc.com/
Type	BEP20
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	July 04, 2021

#### The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the
	critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to
	reproduce in engineering.

## The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item
	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	MONEY-Giving Bug
Pacia Cadina Puga	Blackhole
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
	Business Logics Review

	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security	
Advanced Deri Scrutiny	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

# Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

# **Findings**

# Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the EGGS's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract sourcecode and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	0
Total	0

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **0 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 0 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved and bug free by common recommendations given under POCs.

# Contract Details: -

Contract Name:	EGGS
Contract Address:	0xDfac1652bfA8c9e935C2ef439410f1D031e7ee33
Total Supply:	100000000000000000000000000000000000000
Token ticker:	EGGS
Decimals:	9
Token Holder:	1798
Transactions Count:	6010
Total Fees	14290284256003464680646765606471
Uniswap V2 Pair:	0x8a855701d31c52a0660960719311b05da97ce62e

## **Functional Overview**

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + [Int] IERC20
  - [Ext] totalSupply
  - [Ext] balanceOf
  - [Ext] transfer #
  - [Ext] allowance
  - [Ext] approve #
  - [Ext] transferFrom #
- + [Lib] SafeMath
  - [Int] add
  - [Int] sub
  - [Int] sub
  - [Int] mul
  - [Int] div
  - [Int] div
  - [Int] mod
  - [Int] mod
- + Context
  - [Int] \_msgSender
  - [Int] \_msgData

+ [Lib] Address - [Int] isContract - [Int] sendValue # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Prv] \_functionCallWithValue # + Ownable (Context) - [Int] <Constructor> # - [Pub] owner - [Pub] renounceOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] transferOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] geUnlockTime - [Pub] lock # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] unlock # + [Int] IUniswapV2Factory - [Ext] feeTo - [Ext] feeToSetter - [Ext] getPair - [Ext] allPairs - [Ext] allPairsLength - [Ext] createPair #

- [Ext] setFeeTo #

- [Ext] setFeeToSetter #

+ [Int] IUniswapV2Pair - [Ext] name - [Ext] symbol - [Ext] decimals - [Ext] totalSupply - [Ext] balanceOf - [Ext] allowance - [Ext] approve # - [Ext] transfer # - [Ext] transferFrom # - [Ext] DOMAIN\_SEPARATOR - [Ext] PERMIT\_TYPEHASH - [Ext] nonces - [Ext] permit # - [Ext] MINIMUM\_LIQUIDITY - [Ext] factory - [Ext] token0 - [Ext] token1 - [Ext] getReserves - [Ext] price0CumulativeLast - [Ext] price1CumulativeLast - [Ext] kLast - [Ext] mint # - [Ext] burn # - [Ext] swap # - [Ext] skim # - [Ext] sync # - [Ext] initialize # + [Int] IUniswapV2Router01 - [Ext] factory


- [Ext] WETH
- [Ext] addLiquidity #
- [Ext] addLiquidityETH (\$)
- [Ext] removeLiquidity #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #
- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens (\$)
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
- [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens (\$)
- [Ext] quote
- [Ext] getAmountOut
- [Ext] getAmountIn
- [Ext] getAmountsOut
- [Ext] getAmountsIn
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router02 (IUniswapV2Router01)
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (\$)
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- + EGGS (Context, IERC20, Ownable)
  - [Pub] <Constructor> #
  - [Pub] name
  - [Pub] symbol
  - [Pub] decimals

- [Pub] totalSupply - [Pub] balanceOf - [Pub] transfer # - [Pub] allowance - [Pub] approve # - [Pub] transferFrom # - [Pub] increaseAllowance # - [Pub] decreaseAllowance # - [Pub] isExcludedFromReward - [Pub] totalFees - [Pub] deliver # - [Pub] reflectionFromToken - [Pub] tokenFromReflection - [Pub] excludeFromReward # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] includeInReward # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Prv] \_transferBothExcluded # - [Pub] excludeFromFee # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] includeInFee # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setTaxFeePercent # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setLiquidityFeePercent # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setMaxTxPercent #
- [Pub] setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled #- modifiers: onlyOwner- [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)

- modifiers: onlyOwner

- [Prv] \_reflectFee #
- [Prv] \_getValues
- [Prv] \_getTValues
- [Prv] \_getRValues
- [Prv] \_getRate
- [Prv] \_getCurrentSupply
- [Prv] \_takeLiquidity #
- [Prv] calculateTaxFee
- [Prv] calculateLiquidityFee
- [Prv] removeAllFee #
- [Prv] restoreAllFee #
- [Pub] isExcludedFromFee
- [Prv] \_approve #
- [Prv] \_transfer #
- [Prv] swapAndLiquify #
  - modifiers: lockTheSwap
- [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
- [Prv] addLiquidity #
- [Prv] \_tokenTransfer #
- [Prv] \_transferStandard #
- [Prv] \_transferToExcluded #
- [Prv] \_transferFromExcluded #

# Inheritance



# **Unit Testing Results**

Test function	Test code	Result
Before All	<pre>function beforeAll() public {     // <instantiate contract="">     Assert.equal(uint(1), uint(1), "1 should be equal to 1"); }</instantiate></pre>	PASSED
Check Success	<pre>function checkSuccess() public {     // Use 'Assert' methods: https://remix- ide.readthedocs.io/en/latest/assert_library.html     Assert.ok(2 == 2, 'should be true');     Assert.greaterThan(uint(2), uint(1), "2 should be greater than to 1");     Assert.lesserThan(uint(2), uint(3), "2 should be lesser than to 3");   }</pre>	PASSED
Check Success2	<pre>function checkSuccess2() public pure returns (bool) {     // Use the return value (true or false) to test the contract     return true; }</pre>	PASSED
Check Failure	function checkFailure() public {     Assert.notEqual(uint(1), uint(1), "1 should not be equal to 1");     }  ( Details:  Error Message: "1 should not be equal to 1" Assertion: Expected value should be notEqual to 1 Received value: 1 Skipping the remaining tests of the function. )	FAILED
Check Sender and Value	/// #sender: account-1 /// #value: 100  function checkSenderAndValue() public payable {     // account index varies 0-9, value is in wei     Assert.equal(msg.sender, TestsAccounts.getAccount(1),     "Invalid sender");     Assert.equal(msg.value, 100, "Invalid value"); }	PASSED

## **Detailed Results**

## **Issues Checking Status**

As there are no security vulnerabilities, business logic issues or coding bugs found in first phase of these smart contracts, there are no detailed results to show.

## **Basic Coding Bugs**

#### 1. Constructor Mismatch

- Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.
- Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 2. Ownership Takeover

- o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.
- Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 3. Redundant Fallback Function

- o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.
- Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 4. Overflows & Underflows

- Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities
- Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 5. Reentrancy

- Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.
- Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 6. MONEY-Giving Bug

• Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

#### 7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

#### 8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 10. Unchecked External Call

 Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 11. Gasless Send

o Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 12. Send Instead of Transfer

o Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 17. Deprecated Uses

• Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

## **Semantic Consistency Checks**

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

## Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed EGGS's Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized and there are promptly no issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

# **About eNebula Solutions**

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in