

F4: public key cryptography (PKC)

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PKC – General Characteristics

- public-key/two-key/asymmetric cryptography
- uses 2 keys
 - public-key
 - may be known by anybody, and can be used to encrypt messages, and verify signatures
 - private-key (secret key)
 - known only to the recipient, used to decrypt messages, and sign (create) signatures
- keys are related to each other but it is not feasible to find out private key from the public one
 - Modular arithmetic


PKC – General Characteristics

- It is computationally easy to encrypt/decrypt messages when the relevant keys are known
 - RSA, ElGamal
- Trapdoor one-way function
 - k_u (K^+ or k_p): public-key,
 - k_r (K^- or k_s): private key or secret key

$Y = f_{k_u}(X)$ easy, if k_u and X are known
 $X = f_{k_r}^{-1}(Y)$ easy, if k_r and Y are known,
but infeasible if k_r is not known

a one-way function

- before discussing trapdoor one-way function, let's talk about a one way function
- a one-way function is a function that is easy to compute on every input, but hard to invert given the image of a random input.



Some examples of one way functions

- Cryptographic hash function:
 - Converts an arbitrary size message x into a tag of fixed length y
 - $f: x \rightarrow y, |y| = \text{constant}$
- multiplying two prime numbers vs Factoring:
 - $f(p,q) \rightarrow p \cdot q$
 - If p and q are prime it is hard to recover them from $p \cdot q$
- exponentiation vs Discrete Log:
 - $f: x \rightarrow g^x \bmod p$

where p is prime and g is a “generator” (*i.e.*, g^1, g^2, g^3, \dots generates all values $< p$)

One-way functions in PKC

- $y = \text{ciphertext}$ $x = \text{plaintext}$ $k = \text{public key}$
- Consider: $y = f_k(x)$ or $f(k,x)$
- Everyone knows k and f
 - computing $f(x)$ should be easy
 - $f^{-1}(y)$ should be hard
- Otherwise an eavesdropper could decrypt y
- But what about the intended recipient, who should be able to decrypt y ?

Trapdoor One-Way Functions


Easy: $x \xrightarrow{f} y$

Hard: $x \xleftarrow{f^{-1}} y$

Easy: $x \xleftarrow[\text{trapdoor}]{f^{-1}} y$

- A **one-way** function with a “trapdoor”
- The **trapdoor** is a private key that makes it easy to invert the function $y = f(x)$
- Example: **RSA**
 $y = x^e \bmod n$
where $n = pq$ (p, q : prime, and p, q, e : random)
(p & q) or d (where $ed = 1 \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$) can be used as trapdoors
- In public-key algorithms
 $f(x)$ is easy with public key (e.g., e and n in RSA)
 $f^{-1}(y)$ is easy only with trapdoor (e.g., d in RSA)

Public-Key Cryptography: Encryption



Source: NetworkWorld


Math Expression of PKC

- Bob has a public key, k_p , and a secret key, k_s
- Bob's public key is known to Alice
- Everybody knows encryption and decryption fns.
- Asymmetric Cipher: $f^{-1}(k_s, f(k_p, m)) = m$

Alice

1. Construct m
2. Compute $c = f(k_p, m)$
3. Send c to Bob

c




Bob

4. Receive c from Alice
5. Compute $m = f^{-1}(k_s, c)$
6. Deliver m

Public-Key Cryptography - Authentication

Using public and private keys is **Commutative!**

Authentication



Why PKC?

- Initially developed to address two challenging issues:
 - key distribution
 - symmetric crypto requires how to securely share the key
 - With PKC, the public key can be known to everyone
 - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) distributes public keys
 - But we still need trusted third parties in PKI
 - digital signatures (non-repudiation)
 - not possible with symmetric crypto

PKC applications

- encryption and decryption
 - confidentiality
- digital signatures
 - authentication and non-repudiation
- key exchange
 - to agree on a session key (for symmetric cipher)
 - why not use PKC for encryption and decryption?

PKC ciphers and issues


- two PKC ciphers
 - RSA
 - ElGamal
- Performance issues
 - too slow compared to symmetric cryptography
 - when two parties communicate, it is better to derive a symmetric key by PKC
 - then the derived key is used for encryption/decryption

how to make a shared key btw. two parties

- two remote points
 - send a message?
 - ask a trusted third party?
- Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm
 - based on discrete logarithm

background of DH algorithm

- modulo operation
- By Fermat's little theorem: $a^{(p-1)} = 1 \pmod{p}$
- Example of Z_7 (actually Z_7^*)


Generators 

x	x^2	x^3	x^4	x^5	x^6
1	1	1	1	1	1
2	4	1	2	4	1
<u>3</u>	2	6	4	5	1
4	2	1	4	2	1
<u>5</u>	4	6	2	3	1
6	1	6	1	6	1

DH Algorithm

- DH model's primary contribution:
 - Take a prime p and a primitive element g
 - Cyclic group in finite field
 - Publicize both g and p
 - Alice chooses some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and sends $(g^x \bmod p)$ to Bob
 - Bob chooses some $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and sends $(g^y \bmod p)$ to Alice
 - Eve can see both $(g^x \bmod p)$ and $(g^y \bmod p)$ but she cannot calculate x or y
 - Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)

D-H Algorithm




- Alice calculates the key; $k = (g^y)^x \bmod p$
- Bob calculates the same key; $k = (g^x)^y \bmod p$
- Since Eve does not know x or y , she cannot calculate the key k
- Diffie and Hellman developed this method to share a key using some publicly available information

MESSAGE INTEGRITY


Message Digest

- Function $H()$ that takes as input an arbitrary length message and outputs a fixed-length string:
message digest, tag, fingerprint, hash
- Note that $H()$ can be a many-to-1 function
- $H()$ is called a “hash function”
 - MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3



- Desirable properties:
 - Easy to calculate
 - Irreversibility: Can't determine m from $H(m)$
 - Collision resistance: Computationally difficult to find m and m' such that $H(m) = H(m')$
 - Seemingly random output

Message Authentication Code (MAC)



- Authenticates sender
- Verifies message integrity
- No encryption!
- Also called “keyed hash”
- Notation: $t = H(s||m)$; send $m||t$

s = shared secret

$||$: concatenation

MAC properties

- Symmetric
 - MACs are based on secret symmetric keys
 - The generating and verifying parties must share a secret key.
- Arbitrary message size
 - MACs accept messages of arbitrary length.
- Fixed output length
 - MACs generate fixed-size authentication tags.
- Message integrity
 - MACs provide message integrity: Any manipulations of a message in transit will be detected by the receiver since its MAC does not match with the modified message.
- Message authentication
 - The receiving party is assured of the origin of the message.
- No non-repudiation
 - Since MACs are based on symmetric principles, they do not provide non-repudiation.


Digital Signatures

- data integrity, non-repudiation, authentication
- Basic idea: leveraging PKC
 - use your private key on the message to generate a piece of information that can be generated only by yourself
 - because you are the only one who knows your private key
 - public key can be used to verify the signature
 - so everybody can verify
- Generally signatures are created and verified over the hash of the message
 - Not over the original message. Why?

Digital Signature – PKC approach

Sender Alice

Receiver



Source: W. Stallings "Cryptography and Network Security"

M : message to be signed

H : Hash Function

E : RSA Private Key Operation

KR_a : Sender's Private Key

D : RSA Public Key Operation

KU_a : Sender's Public Key

$E_{KR_a}[H(M)]$: Signature of sender Alice over hash of M