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Author(s): Kathleen S. Lamp

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“A City of Brick”: Visual Rhetoric in Roman Rhetorical Theory and Practice

Kathleen S. Lamp

Perhaps none of the words Augustus, the first sole ruler of Rome who reigned from 27 BCE to 14 CE, actually said are quite as memorable as the ones Cassius Dio has attributed to him: “I found Rome built of clay and I leave it to you in marble” (1987, 56.30).¹ Suetonius too discusses Augustus’s building program, offering an alleged quote along with an explanation of his motivation: “Since the city was not adorned as the dignity of the empire demanded, and was exposed to flood and fire, he so beautified it that he could justly boast that he had found it built of brick and left it in marble” (1998, *Aug.*28.3). Though Suetonius’s explanation is practical, Dio argues Augustus’s “city of brick” had a more metaphoric or symbolic meaning: “In saying this he was not referring literally to the state of the buildings, but rather to the strength of the empire” (1987, 56.30).

Both historians, then, perceive a connection between the physical appearance of the city and Rome’s place at the head of the (Roman) world. Maecenas, Augustus’s right-hand man who was essentially the minister of culture, explicitly draws attention to this strategy in a speech fabricated by Dio. Maecenas advises Augustus, “Make this capital beautiful, spare no expense in doing so, and enhance its magnificence with festivals of every kind. It is right for us who rule over so many peoples to excel all others in every field of endeavor, and even display of this kind tends to implant

respect for us in our allies and to strike terror into our enemies" (1987, 52.30). Here Dio suggests, albeit in hindsight, that Augustus's building program was a conscious "display" of Rome's supremacy meant to elicit a reaction, particularly from those who dwelled outside the city.

Though from this passage of Dio's it is possible to argue that the physical appearance of the city of Rome was meant to persuade, or at least elicit some response, the passage does not provide support for the claim that architecture, monuments, and city planning functioned rhetorically in ancient Rome. After all, Quintilian reminds us that "many other things have the power of persuasion" (1970, 2.15.6–9). Nonetheless, this passage does generate questions about the relationship between the Augustan building program, or more broadly the Augustan cultural campaigns, and rhetoric in the principate—specifically about the way in which the cultural campaigns functioned rhetorically to help Augustus gain and maintain power.

Recently, I have argued that the *Ara pacis Augustae*, an Augustan monument commissioned in 13 BCE, functioned as a visual example of a rhetorical text, meant not only to celebrate Augustus's successful campaigns in Spain and Gaul but also to garner public support for Augustus's heir and the process of dynastic succession. Because specific rhetorical techniques often associated with the epideictic genre clearly function on the altar, the *Ara pacis* demonstrates that Augustus and/or his ministers were thinking rhetorically when constructing at least some Augustan monuments (Lamp 2009). Similarly, architectural historian Diana Favro has argued that certain aspects of Augustan architecture made use of rhetorical techniques related to the canon of memory (1996). These findings are perhaps not surprising given that George Kennedy, writing nearly forty years ago, acknowledged that Augustus, a figure he called "the greatest rhetorician of antiquity," "developed new techniques of verbal and visual persuasion which took over some of the functions and adapted some of the methods of traditional oratory" (1972, 378, 382).

Still, very little attention has been paid to Augustus as a rhetorical figure, which is not to say that scholars of rhetoric have paid no attention to Roman rhetoric. While the classicist Theodore Mommsen, writing in the latter half of the nineteenth century, went as far as to refer to the principate as the "end to the entire discipline of rhetoric" (1992, 125), the decline narrative in regards to Roman rhetoric is shifting. Traditionally, this decline narrative suggested that following the assassination of Cicero, traditional oratory retreated into schools of declamation and what would eventually become the Western educational curriculum as established in the work of

Quintilian (see Kennedy 1972, 301–77; Bizzell and Herzberg 2001, 8, 34; Enos 2008, 59, 78).²

While the decline narrative in regard to Roman rhetoric has evolved, the narrative still holds tight in regard to Augustus as a rhetorical figure. In their volume on the history of rhetoric, *The Rhetorical Tradition* (which Richard Leo Enos notes is “the most important” of “general work[s] . . . on the history of rhetoric” to date [2009, 36]), Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg summarize their understanding of the rhetorical tradition in Rome:

Oratory in Cicero’s time (the first century BCE) was a powerful political weapon—one Cicero himself wielded—and rhetoric, however derivative its theory, was an art that helped organize civilized communal life. By the time of Quintilian (the first century CE), Rome was an empire and political oratory was suppressed. Rhetoric was still used in the law courts, but it also became a form of entertainment, focused on stylistic extravagance. Yet Quintilian envisions the creation, through rhetorical training that includes broadly humane learning, of a “good man speaking well” who might save the state. (2001, 8)

It becomes clear that for Bizzell and Herzberg Augustus played no small role in the transformation of Roman rhetoric: “Octavian consolidated his power by reducing the Senate to a powerless advisory body and accepting from it the title Augustus, which made him officially a demigod. The reign of Imperial Rome—Rome governed by a tyrant or, more politely, an emperor—might be said to begin from this time” (2001, 34).

It is this widely held view of Augustus that has limited scholars in considering rhetoric in the principate. Five wider assumptions are at work here. First is the equation of rhetoric with deliberative oratory. Second is the assumption that Roman rhetoric is merely Greek rhetoric rehashed. Third is the notion that the republic was generally democratic and the principate was essentially a tyranny, coupled with the implicit assumption that “healthy” rhetoric functions only in a democracy. Fourth, the decline narrative derives from a literal examination of only literary sources. And fifth is the belief that the nature of Augustus’s power was purely military; that is, that his rule was so absolute that he had no need of rhetoric and/or that the people were so constrained that they could not function as a rhetorical audience. Each of these is, I believe, a misconception about rhetoric in

the principate, be it definitional, contextual, methodological, historical, or situational. This essay, however, does not primarily seek to counter these misconceptions but rather to explore the relationship between Roman rhetorical theory and the visual in order to better understand that relationship, the nature of visual culture in Rome, and how the Augustan cultural campaigns functioned rhetorically.

This essay builds on previous work that contends that elements of the Augustan cultural campaigns made use of traditional rhetorical theory (Lamp 2009; Favro 1996) as well as on broader claims about the importance of these campaigns in communicating with the populace. For example, Kennedy argues that “a new rhetoric in the verbal and visual arts . . . arose to influence public opinions” (1972, 377). This new program, in part, is what art historian Paul Zanker refers to as a “new visual language[,] . . . a whole new method of visual communication” (2003, 3). Still, despite numerous calls to consider a wider variety of rhetorical artifacts and the acknowledgment of the significance of such artifacts in the principate, very little work has been written that makes theoretical connections between rhetoric as it was defined in the late Roman republic and early empire and the practice of (visual) rhetoric in the principate (Fredal 2002, 592; Kjeldsen 2003, 133).³ In order to accurately understand the history of rhetoric in the principate, the role of the visual must be considered from the perspective of Roman rhetorical theory. As Enos notes, “Any historical research, as with contemporary writing practices, needs to be no less attentive to situational constraints and the mentalities of culture. To fully appreciate and be sensitive to rhetoric, one must understand context” (2009, 40).

In this essay I focus on the relationship between rhetoric and the visual in Roman rhetorical treatises as they relate to the Augustan cultural campaigns, particularly the Augustan building program that transformed the city of Rome to a “city of marble.” While one can discern connections between the visual and rhetoric throughout Roman rhetorical treatises, here I concentrate on definitions of rhetoric and categorizations of the arts found in Quintilian and on the use of memory described in Cicero and Quintilian.⁴ I then build on existing work to trace these theoretical connections into oratorical practice before suggesting implications for the Augustan cultural campaigns. I conclude that there is a great deal to support the consideration of the Augustan transformation of the city of Rome as rhetorical. This conclusion redefines what counts as a rhetorical artifact in the principate and in doing so allows for a more nuanced understanding of the nature of Augustus’s power and of how the largely illiterate urban

populace understood and defined their role in the new government, and it also greatly augments our disciplinary history in regards to Augustus as a rhetorical figure and the history of visual studies.

RHETORICAL THEORY IN ROME

Definitions of rhetoric. Though Roman rhetorical treatises make many connections between the verbal and the visual, one means of understanding this connection comes from probing classical definitions of rhetoric. Recently, some scholars of rhetoric, seeking to understand the role of the visual in Greek rhetoric, have closely examined Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric: “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case to see the available means of persuasion” (1991, 1355a; see O’Gorman 2005; Newman 2002). Though this is potentially a fruitful place to start, at least for making the case that the visual was understood by Greeks to be a rhetorical element, the definition is less applicable to Roman rhetorical practices. After all, Aristotle gives this definition after a long passage on the power of words. The acceptance of nontraditional rhetorical media in classical rhetorical theory based on this definition depends on the persistence of Aristotle’s psychological model of the “mind’s eye” in Roman thought. I return to this matter shortly, but preliminarily, let me say that it is slight reach to suggest that the “mind’s eye” concept is carried forward into Roman thought.

Quintilian, on the other hand, gives a definition of rhetoric useful for conceptualizing the role of the visual in Roman rhetorical theory when he refutes “the common definition of rhetoric as the power of persuading” (1970, 2.14.3). Here, he notes that a number of rhetoricians such as Isocrates, Plato’s Gorgias, and at times even Cicero (1970, 2.15.4–6) have described persuasion as the aim of rhetoric.⁵ Quintilian’s main objection to definitions that focus on rhetoric as persuasion is as follows:

But many other things have the power of persuasion, such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual’s great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person. Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence of Manius Aquilius tore open his client’s robe and revealed the honorable scars which he had acquired while facing his country’s foes, he relied no longer on the power of speech, but appealed directly to

the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused. Again there is the speech of Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by the pity he aroused only by his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpius Gallus. So also according to general opinion Phryne was not saved by the eloquence of Hyperides, admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed by drawing aside her tunic. And if all these have the power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing cannot adequately be defined as persuasion. (1970, 2.15.6–9)⁶

In addition to noting in the course of recounting and refuting these several instances of persuasion as rhetoric that many things can persuade, Quintilian clearly describes the power that the sense of sight has to move the emotions of an audience. Perhaps more importantly, Quintilian suggests that the visual does not require the mediation of words—that is, that things like scars can serve as symbols to move an audience in the same way speech can or even in a way speech alone cannot. In suggesting that not everyone would separate the nonverbal means of persuasion—“money,” “influence,” “authority and rank of the speaker,” “sights unsupported by language” such as the “memory of some individual’s great deeds,” “appearance” and “beauty”—from the realm of rhetoric, Quintilian demonstrates that at least some would have considered these elements as rhetorical under a commonly circulating notion of rhetoric as persuasion (1970, 2.15.6).

This popular definition of rhetoric as persuasion has great value in exploring the role of the visual in Roman rhetorical theory and practice in general. It also is helpful in specifically addressing visual and material rhetoric used in the principate. Still, it is plainly evident that Quintilian does not view these practices as rhetorical; rather, he looks on what modern scholars might call “material” or “visual” rhetoric with disdain, lumping both in the category of “harlots, flatters and seducers” (1970, 2.15.11). Historically, rhetoric has been called worse; nonetheless, the definition of rhetoric as persuasion in Roman thought leaves much wanting as a starting point to understanding the rhetorical underpinnings of the Augustan cultural campaigns.

Categorization of the arts. Though Quintilian’s consideration of definitions of rhetoric shows that some might have considered the visual to

be part of rhetoric in Roman thought, a more likely starting point for arguing that nontraditional rhetorical media ought to be seen as a feature of Roman rhetorical theory is found in Quintilian’s categorization of the arts. Quintilian classifies the arts based on their ends. He describes arts that “are based on examination,” such as “astronomy,” to be “theoretical arts,” arts based in “action,” such as “dance,” to be “practical arts,” and arts based on “producing a certain result” through “the completion of a visible task,” such as “painting,” to be “productive.” Quintilian admits rhetoric can be all three of these things in various forms. For example, rhetoric can be theoretical in one’s “private study” of it (what we might call rhetorical criticism), practical when one delivers a speech, and productive when one writes a speech or produces a “historical narrative.” Still, Quintilian sees rhetoric as predominantly a practical and therefore a performance-based art (1970, 2.17.1–5). However, Quintilian’s account of rhetoric as at times falling under all three categories of arts suggests that his concept of rhetoric was extremely broad and contextually bound.

Perhaps the most significant change in the practice of rhetoric in the principate, one Quintilian reacts against, is from practical to productive art, the funneling of rhetorical training in new directions such as the writing of poetry, plays, or histories. At the beginning of Tacitus’s *Dialogue on Oratory* we find his character Maternus turning his back on oratory to compile a volume on Cato and mentioning that his next project will be a tragedy (1963, 3; see Walker 2000, 102–4). Tacitus, whose own career resembles that of his character Julius Secundus, an orator/historian, suggests that poetry (and history) might be an area that admits of more freedom (Walker 2000, 102). His Maternus says, “Nor should I hesitate to contrast the poet’s lot in life and his delightful literary companionships with the unrest and anxiety that mark the orator’s career. . . I would rather have the seclusion in which Virgil lived, tranquil and serene, without forfeiting either the favour of the sainted Augustus, or the popularity with the citizens of Rome” (1963, 13).

Though Tacitus’s *Dialogue* suggests those who were rhetorically trained were turning toward productive arts, the works of Dio, Suetonius, and even Tacitus himself demonstrate the same phenomenon. Dio does not reference rhetoric specifically, but his own rhetorical training is evident in a variety of ways, most clearly in the fictitious speeches he attributes to the likes of Augustus, Antonius, Maecenas, Agrippa, Livia, and Tiberius. “Tiberius’s” eulogy of Augustus shows Dio had a working knowledge of the conventions of epideictic oratory, while at the same time the eulogy clearly differentiates Dio’s history of Augustus’s reign from the eulogy, which is close

in substance to Augustus's own (panegyric) account given in the *Res gestae*. Dio was clearly rhetorically savvy and chose to write a history. Suetonius, who served as imperial secretary to Hadrian and had a career as an advocate and writer under Trajan, writes panegyric modeled in part on Augustus's own *Res gestae* and Pliny's panegyric of Trajan and in doing so displays his rhetorical training.⁷ In other words, Dio, Suetonius, and Tacitus were all rhetorically trained and chose to practice productive arts well into the Roman Empire.

Though it is impossible to draw direct connections between Augustus and his specific input on most individual rhetorical artifacts, he was also, as expected for a man of his class, rhetorically trained. He practiced oratory throughout his reign. Suetonius says Augustus was trained by Apollodorus of Pergamum, had a clear and concise style, appeared in court to defend his friends, and preferred to write his speeches out rather than memorize them (1998, *Aug.*86, 89). Dio notes that Augustus gave eulogies for most of his family members and chosen successors who passed away including Marcellus, Agrippa, and Octavia (1987, 53.30, 54.28, 54.34). Dio also mentions that Augustus sat in on court deliberations, but he makes it sound as if Augustus did not participate, though Dio does describe several cases where the emperor pleaded cases for friends (1987, 55.34, 55.4). This shows that Augustus, like Suetonius, Dio, Tacitus, and most men of the upper classes, was rhetorically trained and that he made use of his rhetorical training in the traditional venues for oratory in the administration of the empire and perhaps also funneled his training in productive ways.

The mind's eye: the Aristotelian physiological model. One significant way the visual may have played a role in the realm of rhetoric is via what I refer to as the psychological model of Aristotle. Scholars such as Ned O'Gorman and Sarah Newman have argued that for Aristotle, perception, knowledge, thought, memory, imagination, deliberation, and therefore the art of rhetoric were all based on the sense of sight (O'Gorman 2005, 17, 20, 21, 34–35; Newman 2002, 21–22). O'Gorman argues, based on his examinations of *phantasia* (a rhetorical technique used by orators to create emotion in audiences by depicting a vivid scene) in *De anima* and the *Rhetoric*, that “rhetoric is for Aristotle an art that may shape opinion and direct the affections through the creation of image” (2005, 25). O'Gorman first shows that for Aristotle, “all human deliberation depends on *phantasia*” (2005, 21). He argues that “the relationship between phantasmatic and pragmatic rhetorics depends on the degree to which public deliberation is like private deliberation” (2005, 34). Therefore, the role of the visual is not limited to the

personal (psychological) or even the epideictic genre but can also play a role in deliberative rhetoric.

This psychological model is significant on several fronts. First, it suggests that Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric includes visual means of persuasion in addition to words. Second, it suggests that, at least in Aristotle’s line of thinking, the difference between words and images is not so great. O’Gorman shows that Aristotle’s views on the relationship between the visual and the verbal influenced Roman thought generally and that evidence of that influence specifically appears in the terminology in Quintilian’s discussion of *phantasia* and *enargeia*. Nonetheless, even though Quintilian does use the term *phantasia* similarly to Aristotle, it is still hard to determine precisely how much of Aristotle’s thinking on the relationship between the verbal and the visual makes it into Roman thought.

Visualization. Any discussion of “the mind’s eye” inevitably leads to the role of techniques of “bringing before the eyes,” usually *enargeia* or *phantasia*, though other terms such as *ekphrasis*, *hypotyposis*, *diatyposis*, *evidentia*, *repraesentatio*, *illustratio*, *demonstratio*, *descriptio*, and *sub oculos subiectio* function similarly because they all deal with the construction of a “visual image” through “concrete detail” (Vasaly 1993, 90). These terms often have to do with either creating emotion in the rhetor so that the rhetor can convey that emotion to the audience or with creating an image through words in the minds of the audience in order to move them in some way.

Two of the most frequently discussed terms in Roman rhetorical theory are *enargeia* and *phantasia*. Quintilian defines *enargeia* as a “vivid illustration” or “representation” that goes beyond “clearness” and instead “consists in giving an actual word-picture of a scene,” which forms a “mental picture” for the audience and makes the audience a “spectator” (1970, 8.3.61–63).⁸ Quintilian composes an example of *enargeia* to demonstrate the emotional effect it can create: “We may move our hearers to tears by the picture of a captured town” (1970, 8.3.67). Further describing the appropriate use of *enargeia*, he notes that “we shall secure the vividness we seek, if only our descriptions give the impression of truth, nay we may even add fictitious incidents of the type which commonly occur” (1970, 8.3.70). Quintilian suggests that *enargeia* gives the rhetor the power to move the emotions of the listeners by creating an image but suggests the details used should be true, though the “impression of truth” might better be constructed from fictitious details.

Quintilian briefly mentions another figure that appeals to the visual, *phantasia*, “or imagination, which assists us to form mental pictures of things”

(1970, 8.3.88). It is worth noting that Quintilian uses this word for painting as well, suggesting the concept is not limited by medium (1970, 7.10.6). Quintilian points out that “the prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel those emotions oneself” (1970, 6.2.26). He says, “There are certain experiences which the Greeks call *phantasia*, and the Romans visions [*visiones*], whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over emotions” (1970, 6.2.29–30).⁹ The purpose of conveying such emotion is clearly to move the audience, but as Longinus explains, *phantasia* is a particularly powerful rhetorical tactic that “far exceeds the limits of persuasion” and “draw[s our attention] from the reasoning to the enthralling effect of the imagination” (1995, 15.11).

The discussion of *enargeia* and *phantasia* in Roman rhetorical treatises is important for understanding the relationship between rhetoric and the visual for several reasons. First, the language used in such discussion seems to suggest, as O’Gorman has argued, that Aristotle’s psychological model persisted, at least in certain respects, in Roman thought. Second, these discussions serve as a theoretical starting point for connecting the common rhetorical practice of manipulating the environment to suit the rhetor’s needs with Roman rhetorical theory as espoused in treatises and handbooks. That is, *enargeia* and *phantasia* can help to bridge what seems to be a sizable gap between Roman rhetorical theory and practice. As Ann Vasaly argues, “an orator trained and practiced in using these techniques” of “bringing before the eyes” “to exploit the associations of places and monuments not visible to his audience would obviously be well equipped to draw on the characteristics of the place where he gave his speech as well, in order to amuse, convince, or arouse his listeners” (1993, 24). Additionally, the discussion of techniques of “bringing before the eyes” suggests that the realm of the realistic, not the actual, was the territory of the rhetor. Finally, as Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric also reveals, the difference between words and images were not so great in Roman thought (Vasaly 1993, 94).

The canon of memory. Though definitions of rhetoric, ways of categorizing the arts, and rhetorical methods of bringing before the eyes offer starting points for considering the role of the visual and material in the rhetoric of the principate, there is perhaps no more fruitful area of Roman rhetorical theory for theorizing the relationship between the Augustan cultural campaigns and rhetoric than memory. Traditionally one of the five parts of the art of rhetoric, systems of memory contained a strong visual and spatial

element, influencing invention and likely the ways Romans understood and constructed their environments.

Cicero and Quintilian, as is well known, both describe a system for improving memory based on visualization, space, and movement. This system was meant to help orators remember their speeches: they would first memorize the rooms of a house or the buildings of a public space and then memorize the various objects in those spaces and then finally connect symbols, which were associated with the various aspects of the speech, to form a kind of memory device through visualization, movement, and association. Cicero's Antonius elaborates on this system of memory when he says, “The memory of things is the proper business of the orator; thus we may be enabled to impress on ourselves by the creation of imaginary figures, aptly arranged, to represent particular heads, so that we may recollect thoughts by images, and their order by place” (1970, 2.88). Crassus again emphasizes this system of memory as utilizing space and movement through that space: “Certain places must be fixed upon, and that of things which they desire to keep in memory, symbols must be conceived in the mind, and ranged, as it were, in those places; thus the order of things, and the symbols of the things would denote the things themselves; so that we should use the places as waxen tablets, and the symbols as letters” (1970, 2.86).¹⁰

Though examples of this system of memory often suggest using the rooms of a house, Quintilian says that “public buildings, a long journey, the ramparts of a city, or even pictures” work as well (1970, 11.2.21). This system of memory, sometimes referred to as the “mnemonic system,” has encouraged scholars to connect nontraditional rhetorical media with Roman rhetorical theory.

Emphasizing both the visual nature of the human mind and the specific impact that visual and vivid language have on the memory, Cicero's Antonius elaborates on the mnemonic system. He argues that

of all the senses that of seeing is the most acute; and that accordingly, those things are most easily retained in our minds which we have received from hearing or the understanding, if they are also recommended to the imagination by means of the mental eye; so that a kind of form, resemblance, and representation might denote invisible objects, and as such as are in their nature withdrawn from the cognizance of the sight, in such a manner, that what we are scarcely capable of comprehending by thought we may retain as it were by the aid of visual faculty. By these imaginary forms and

objects, as by all those that come under our corporeal vision, our memory is admonished and excited; but some place for them must be imagined; as bodily shape cannot be conceived without a place for it. (1970, 2.87)

It is the connection between the visual and the human thought process in Roman thinking that allows Cicero's Antonius to focus on specifically visual ways for the orator to improve his own memory. The method Antonius describes stimulates memory through a process of visualization; he emphasizes the impact of images on the mind. Here Antonius suggests something important about the visual: Cicero elaborates on Quintilian's argument that the visual more immediately moves the emotions by suggesting that the visual is retained prior to thought in a way that the verbal is not; therefore, in using the imagination to add a visual and spatial dynamic to the parts of the speech, the speech is retained by the mind.

Quintilian focuses on another visual means of improving memory—writing. Quintilian's discussion of the use of writing necessarily begins by disputing the long-standing Platonic assumption that writing harms memory. He describes the practice of reading a text repeatedly to commit it to memory: "There is one thing which will be of assistance to everyone, namely, to learn a passage by heart from the same tablets on which he has committed it to writing. For he will have certain tracks to guide him in his pursuit of memory, and the mind's eye will be fixed not merely on the pages on which the words were written, but on the individual lines, and at times he will speak as though he were reading aloud" (1970, 11.2.32). Here Quintilian suggests that writing is also a visual means of stimulating the mind's eye, a process that is similar to that of associating symbols with objects. He goes on to endorse the technique of improving memory through reading to oneself rather than being read to on the grounds that "the perception of the eye is quicker than that of the ear" (1970, 11.2.34). Again, like Cicero's Antonius, Quintilian is suggesting that which is seen is taken up and retained more quickly than that which is heard. Quintilian emphasizes the visual nature of writing; by reading over a speech repeatedly, an orator will be able to picture the words on the page while delivering the speech. For Quintilian, the specifically visual nature of the written word functions as a memory device when seen again and again.

Both Cicero and Quintilian are discussing means by which the orator can improve his own memory for the sake of retaining knowledge for the purpose of making arguments and giving speeches, but the classical notion

of memory suggests an important link between the visual, rhetoric, and (public) memory. Both Cicero and Quintilian argue that repeated exposure to visual media, be it writing or public spaces, shapes memory. Presumably, if people were routinely exposed to the same spaces, images, words and symbols, those things would impress themselves in their memories. Moreover, the technique of associating symbols with objects has potentially important implications for building campaigns and turning the process of memory outward, thereby creating a public memory (Favro, 1996, 7). Quintilian alludes to the formation of such a public memory, insinuating that memory itself can function persuasively when he argues that one thing that functions persuasively “unsupported by language” is the “memory of some individual’s great deeds” (1970, 2.15.6).

Potentially, repeated exposure to spaces that already have symbols imposed on them in the form of words and images could function much the same way as the system of memory by heads, that is, the association of the parts of a speech with objects in a space, Quintilian and Cicero describe to form public memory, which could then act persuasively with or without the mediation of a rhetor.

ROME: A CITY OF MARBLE

At the same time that Cicero and Quintilian draw many connections between the visual and rhetoric, the most provocative of which fall under the canon of memory, oratorical practice in Rome suggests that orators likewise routinely considered their visual and material environments in constructing and performing the oratorical act. A very brief survey of secondary work in the field suggests it is well recognized that orators in Rome routinely gestured to their surroundings, including buildings, statues, and monuments, to harness the memory or emotion of a certain structure, that they used the built environment as a setting or stage for the oratorical act, going as far as to manipulate the setting for rhetorical purposes, and that, finally, they used the built environment as a means of invention, thus suggesting the potential of the built environment to shape or even control the oratorical act. This survey is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to point out that the connection between the visual and rhetoric does not end at theory. Instead, these connections are manifested in oratorical practice in ways not accounted for by theory alone.

I begin this section by showing how the building process in Rome created a certain legitimacy and embodied public memory before showing

how these structures were used in oratorical practice and then going on to argue not only that rhetorical theory shaped Augustan structures and created rhetorically savvy viewers but also that the Augustan cultural campaigns functioned rhetorically without the mediation of an orator.

Building programs in Rome. There was a certain innate legitimacy associated with the construction of Roman buildings, which, perhaps not surprisingly, extends to the rhetorical use of buildings in oratory. First, in the Roman republic there were limited occasions for erecting public buildings. Generally the privilege to build monuments was reserved for triumphing generals or magistrates with *imperium* in the case of temples (Polyb. 6.15.8 qtd. in Favro 1996, 53, 55). The former required the approval of the Senate; the latter could occasionally bypass that process. For the most part, however, there had to be some consensus on the building project, and the sponsor had to have a degree of popularity, because the right to build was essentially an state-sanctioned endorsement of the individual that would result in greater “personal celebrity and prestige” and was often a source of “blatant self-promotion” (Favro 1996, 53). In addition to these public enterprises, there were private buildings as well, including family houses and funeral monuments.

In classical sources there is a connection between building projects and public notoriety or popularity: Cicero, in a letter to his friend Atticus, comments on Lepidus Aemilius Paullus’s restoration of the Basilica Aemilia. Cicero says, “It goes without saying that a monument like that will win for him more popularity and glory than anything” (Cic. *Ad att.* 4.17 qtd. in Favro 1996, 63). In addition, Cicero expresses the desire to buy property, which will literally keep him in the public view (Cic. *Ad att.* 12.19 qtd. in Favro 1996, 22). Vitruvius too “directly associates the use, size, decoration, and form of a house with the status of the resident” (6.5.2 qtd. in Favro 49). So then buildings, both public and private, were used to gain popularity and notoriety in Rome.

Buildings and other public works, the naming of the structures, and inscriptions naming the benefactor served as a kind of history, if not public memory. For example, Suetonius in introducing Augustus’s family, of which little was known, says: “There are many indications that the Octavian family was in the days of old a distinguished one at Velitrae; for not only was a street in the most frequented part of town long ago called Octavian, but an altar was shown there besides, consecrated to an Octavius” (1998, *Aug.* 1). Besides public works being rather generally associated with

social standing, buildings could also be tied to specific events. For example Suetonius associates the Temple of Mars with Augustus's victory at the battle of Philippi. He says of Augustus, “He had made a vow to build a temple of Mars in the war of Philippi, which he undertook to avenge his father; accordingly he decreed that in it the senate should consider wars and claims for triumphs” (1998, *Aug.*29). So then, the Temple of Mars was linked to the memory of Augustus's battle at Philippi, both by the event it was meant to commemorate, as well as by use.

The visual in oratorical practice. Certainly public building projects in Rome have a long history independent of rhetoric and were often meant to do little more than gain notoriety or popularity for the sponsors; however, there is overlap between the two traditions, which often run parallel. As is well attested, the harnessing of memory or meaning in a structure was common practice by rhetors, particularly through the use of gesturing. Gregory Aldrete specifically addresses the role of gestures in the principate, arguing that “buildings and spaces themselves that formed the background or setting” and that “were often loaded with symbolic meaning or powerful associations” became part of the speech through the orator's gestures (1999, 18–19). Specifically referencing Augustan structures, Aldrete mentions that the Curia Julia and the *clupeus virtutis* (shield of virtues) would have provided two such visual reference points available to speakers in the Senate (1999, 21).

Ann Vasaly discusses the same phenomenon: orators, specifically Cicero, often gestured to structures to recall the meaning imbued in edifices for rhetorical purposes. However, Vasaly's work shows that orators often did more than just gesture. Vasaly shows that Cicero, for example, chose to stage his first *Catilinarian* in that temple of Jupiter Stator. The setting allowed the orator to harness the emotional impact of the myth of the temple's construction through an extended parallel argument comparing Cicero to Rome's mythic founder Romulus and Catiline to the Sabines, an outside threat to the city of Rome. Later, when he could not find dramatic enough setting for his third *Catilinarian*, Cicero constructed one himself (Vasaly 1993, 42, 46, 59, 81–84).

Building on the work of Aldrete and Vasaly, I would suggest that nontraditional rhetorical media, specifically in the form of buildings and monuments, played an important role for orators, functioning as a repository of public memory that they could gesture to in both the late republic and the principate.

Significantly, it is possible to extend Vasaly's account and argue that such structures were useful not only for emotional impact, as in the case of Cicero's first *Catilinarian*, but also as a starting point, literally a locus, for creating a parallel argument. This has important implications for understanding the rhetorical importance of the Augustan cultural campaigns, which in addition to having possibly been influenced by rhetorical theory and practice may have also in turn influenced rhetorical invention. Augustan structures carried a certain legitimacy, both because of the process required by Roman law in order to build and because of their nature as visual and material media that impacted audiences in a immediate way that words alone could not. Put differently, these monuments gave Romans a shared rhetorical vocabulary from which they could efficaciously draw that would be immediately intelligible to their interlocutors.

Not surprisingly, none of the oratorical practices described by Aldrete and Vasaly are mentioned in rhetorical theory, which is not to say they were not rhetorical; however, Vasaly has suggested that "the Greek-derived structure of Latin rhetorical treatises would have made it difficult to provide an adequate theoretical description of technique" (1993, 19, 26). Or more simply, Roman rhetorical theory did not keep pace with practice. Either way, it is clear that understanding the relationship between the visual and rhetorical practices in Greek rhetorical theory is inadequate for understanding the same relationship in Rome.

Memory and the Roman people. While the works of Aldrete and Vasaly suggest orators used the visual and material for emotional impact, several other important connections can be made between systems of memory and the urban environment in Rome. First, systems of memory, though traditionally used by an orator as a memory device to retain a speech, were turned outward in the late republic and principate. This suggests that audiences possessed the knowledge to construct narratives from their environment and, perhaps more importantly in considering the Augustan cultural campaigns, that Rome, as a city of marble, was rhetorically constructed.

Citing one more brief example, Vasaly argues that Cicero turned the system of memory outward to help his audience remember his speech when he described objects stolen by the provincial governor Verres. She describes the strategy as follows: "Cicero may well have understood that the mnemonic techniques by which he impressed ideas on his own mind could be employed to impress concepts on the minds of his listeners" (1993, 101).

In other words, in addition to helping orators remember their speeches, the mnemonic system could also serve as an organizational means made apparent to the audience for the sake of improving their retention of an orator's argument. Tacitus reminds us that even those Romans not exposed to a rhetorical education were becoming more rhetorically savvy, suggesting that it is possible Roman audiences were familiar with the mnemonic system (1963, 19–20).

This familiarity likely influenced the way Romans experienced the visual and their environment. Vasaly claims “ancient, nonliterate society may well have possessed powers of pictorial visualization much greater and more intense than our own” (1993, 99). While this visual culture may have made rhetorical techniques like *enargeia* or *phantasia*, as well as the oratorical practices of gesturing to and/or manipulating the surroundings, particularly effective, a familiarity with the mnemonic system may also have shaped the way Romans experienced the Augustan cultural campaigns. Favro argues that “as an aid in the memorization of long speeches, teachers of rhetoric instructed orators to fashion environments (*loci*) in their minds and to stock them with memorable objects (*imagines*) representing various concepts. . . . Familiar with this mnemonic system, learned Romans were predisposed to look for an underlying, coherent narrative in built environments” (1996, 7).

Favro, who discusses the architectural and spatial features of the Augustan building program, argues that systems of memory influenced both those who might view urban environments as well as those who constructed them. She makes a case that because teachers of rhetoric recommended “imagines,” that is the objects with which one associated the heads of speech, “that were unusual in scale, color, or form,” it is not coincidental that the Augustan building program sought to create such places (1996, 153). Ultimately, Favro provocatively links techniques of memory found in Roman rhetorical theory to Augustus's building program, suggesting the city was designed to evoke a specifically Augustan narrative of the history of the city and that the people of Rome could decipher such a narrative (1996, 7, 86, 153).

The works of Aldrete, Vasaly, and Favro make important connections between rhetorical theory, particularly the mnemonic systems, oratory as practiced by Roman rhetoricians, and building projects. They suggest four basic premises that underlie arguments to the effect that nontraditional rhetorical media figured as rhetoric in Rome in accounts of such projects

as the Augustan cultural campaigns. First, rhetors were in the practice of not only using but also manipulating their environments in order to utilize either the memory of a place or object. This allowed rhetors the use of an emotion associated with a structure or the possibility of assigning a (new) meaning to that structure as part of the rhetorical act. Second, the same structure or object could function as a repository for memory, meaning, or emotion that shaped the process of invention for the rhetor. Third, Roman audiences' familiarity with the mnemonic system predisposed them to look for visual narratives in the environment. Fourth, theoretically, mnemonic systems influenced the construction of the Augustan building program with the end goal of producing a rhetorically significant cityscape. These four basic premises form what I believe to be the most convincing way to begin to argue that the Augustan cultural campaigns, consisting predominantly of visual and material media, did function rhetorically in the principate and were consciously used by Augustus's administration not merely for the sake of delighting or moving audiences but also for the purpose of instructing them as to how to conceive of the principate and how to participate as citizens in the new Roman Empire.

CONCLUSION

I began this essay by discussing classical historians' descriptions of Augustus's transformation of the city of Rome from one of brick to one of marble and the claim that this transformation, like Augustus's cultural campaigns more broadly, has great rhetorical significance. I suggested this rhetorical significance was important for both understanding the history of the principate and rhetorical history.

The theoretical current that moves through rhetorical treatises, to oratorical practice, and eventually into the construction of the Augustan cityscape makes it possible to theorize the city of marble as a rhetorical text. Though I have focused specifically on the Augustan cultural campaigns, the rhetorical treatises I draw on here span from 55 BCE to 95 CE, leaving room for my conclusions to be expanded on as rhetorical practice dictates. Broadening the definition of what counts as a rhetorical artifact in the late republic and early empire answers the call for a "rhetorical archaeology" that seeks out new primary texts in the classical period (Enos 2009, 39). Such "texts," in the form of visual and material artifacts, have a great deal to tell

scholars of rhetoric about how the people of Rome, that is, the plebeians, slaves, and other urban dwellers who did not compose oratory, experienced the Roman state.

It perhaps goes without saying that in Rome a very small percentage of the populace was literate and that even if the republic was truly “democratic,” a point that is debated, political offices in Rome were reserved for a select few men from a very select few families. And though Tacitus reports that the people were becoming more rhetorically savvy—and by this he seems to mean that they started to demand an ornate or polished style—rhetorical education in the early empire was still accessible only to men of a certain class (1963, 19–20). My point here is that though scholars of rhetoric often like to think of oratory as equalizing class in the late republic and early empire, very few people in Rome produced oratory, which is too often thought of as synonymous with rhetoric in Rome. When it comes to production of texts, at least in the principate, visual and material artifacts offer a much more inclusive source for understanding the communication between the state and the people.

Recognizing these nontraditional rhetorical artifacts adds to an understanding of the history of rhetoric, contributes to the understanding of the history of visual studies, and also allows for a revision of the decline narrative in this period. Though this essay does not primarily seek to counter the decline narrative, the findings do challenge the ways scholars in the field have thought about Augustus, which generally takes one of two forms: Augustus was a tyrant and did not need rhetoric, and/or Augustan rhetoric was tyrannical and therefore not the best kind of rhetoric. As I point out in the introduction, these findings are based on five assumptions about rhetoric that lead to either an a priori dismissal of the possibility of Augustan rhetoric or a predetermination about the quality of Augustan rhetoric. While the definitional and methodological problems—equating rhetoric with deliberative oratory and only using literary sources—are evolving, the idea that Augustus was a tyrant is still alive and well and has given scholars of rhetoric a good excuse to ignore Augustan rhetoric.

While the essay does not provide enough evidence to dismiss the decline narrative, it does open the door for examining a wider range of legitimate rhetorical artifacts in the principate—the products of the Augustan cultural campaigns and also media created by the people of Rome in response to the principate. Examining such artifacts fills an important void in both the

history of rhetoric and also in the thinking about the relationship between the *princeps* and the people in this period. If we as scholars of rhetoric are truly interested in the relationship between the government and the people and in the question of how decisions were made in the early Roman empire, we must examine the rhetorical materials that were most accessible to the people—visual and material artifacts.

Examining visual and material artifacts from a rhetorical perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of rhetorical practices in Rome and the of the kind of exchange that took place between Augustus's administration and the Roman people. One reason (of several) that scholars suggest that Augustus's reign was so overbearing—thus allowing it to get by without recourse to rhetorical means of influence or rhetorical audiences—is the uniformity of everything Augustan. As Paul Zanker says,

Never before had a new ruler implemented such a far-reaching cultural program, so effectively embodied in visual imagery; and it has seldom happened since. A completely new pictorial vocabulary was created in the next twenty years. This meant a change not only in political imagery in the narrow sense, but in the whole outward appearance of the city of Rome, in interior decoration and furniture, even in clothing. It is astonishing how every kind of visual communication came to reflect the new order, how every theme and slogan became interwoven. (2003, 101).

By recognizing Augustus's city of marble and the larger cultural campaigns as a rhetorical text, however, scholars of rhetoric are in a unique position to uncover the interplay of dominant and popular rhetorics and to show how rhetorical techniques like imitation were used and how the end result of Augustus's reign systematizes public memory. In other words, what at first appears uniform, is actually a subtle give and take, even an exchange, between a highly organized rhetorical program on the part of Augustus's administration and the people that continues to systemize responses, including those of scholars. This understanding of Augustus's reign challenges both the assumption that Augustus had no need of rhetoric and that there were no rhetorical audiences in the principate while also opening the door to many new primary texts at Rome.

*Department of English
Arizona State University*



NOTES

1. C. Octavius Caesar, who appended “Caesar” to his name after his adoption by Julius Caesar in 44 BCE, took the title “Augustus” in 27 BCE and “princeps” in 23 BCE, giving the name “principate” to his rule. For consistency, I refer to him as “Augustus” throughout the essay. Dio’s description of Rome before Augustus as “γῆνιν,” meaning “of earth” or “of mud” is less popularly quoted than Suetonius’s “latericiam” meaning “made of brick,” though both reference unfired brick.

2. See for example (Walker 2000, 71–138) and (Calboli and Dominik 1997, 3–12).

3. There have been several calls to examine visual and material artifacts (see Fredal 2002, 592; Kjeldsen 2003, 133). Several notable works do address visual rhetoric in Rome (see Vasaly 1993; Lauer 2004; Jay 1993; Aldrete 1999; Corbeill 2003).

4. The work of Cicero predates the principate; *De oratore* dates from 55 BCE. Cicero and Augustus were well, though often not pleasantly, acquainted. Using the work of Quintilian to discuss rhetoric in the principate is more challenging. Concepts such as memory and “bringing before the eyes” are generally similar to those offered in Cicero, though often more detailed; however, Quintilian who wrote *Institutio oratoria* circa 95 CE, can be seen as reacting to rhetorical practices as they changed after Augustus. Though the definitions he mentions all predate Augustus and would have been accessible to him, both those and his categorization of the arts are, I think, reactionary and an attempt to cordon off a (marketable) body of knowledge in light of the changes in the early empire.

5. Butler suggests the definition Quintilian references by Isocrates is in a lost treatise and possibly is the work of a disciple of Isocrates. Butler traces the other definitions as well (see Pl. *Grg.* 453 A; Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.5.6; *De or.* 1.31.138).

6. The Latin corresponding to “He relied no longer on the power of speech, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people” reads “non orationis habuit fiduciam sed oculis populi Romani vim attulit.” Butler translates *orationis* as “eloquence.” The more literal “speech” is perhaps more accurate. Butler translates *actione* as “eloquence.” This could also be translated as “performance” or “delivery.”

7. See Bradley’s introduction to Suetonius 1998.

8. Butler translates *verbis depingitur* as “word-picture.” “Verbal depiction” would work as well.

9. Cicero and Longinus give similar summaries of *phantasia* (see *De or.* 3.100.65; *Subl.* 15.1–2).

10. Quintilian uses practically the same language and examples in discussing techniques of memory (*Inst.* 11.2.9–10, 19).



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