# Kala: The Immutability of Time v0.0.2

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#### Abstract

We present a novel construction for decentralized timestamping that combines Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) with cryptographic hash chains to create an unforgeable temporal ordering of events. Our approach leverages the sequential nature of modular squaring in class groups to create a universal timeline that spans from genesis until the heat death of the universe, divided into fixed epochs called ticks. Unlike traditional timestamping services that rely on trusted third parties, our system derives its security from computational hardness assumptions, specifically the difficulty of computing square roots in groups of unknown order. We prove that no polynomial-time adversary can produce valid timestamps out of sequence, and demonstrate how this construction enables trustless, verifiable proof of temporal ordering. Furthermore, we show how this primitive naturally extends to a consensus mechanism that incorporates RSW timelock puzzles for MEV mitigation, providing a new approach to distributed agreement based on cryptographic time rather than economic incentives or computational waste. Our key innovation is a leader-based architecture that prevents forks while gracefully handling failures through a three-tier tick degradation mechanism.

## 1 Introduction

Timestamping digital data in a trustless manner has been a fundamental challenge in distributed systems. Traditional solutions rely on trusted timestamp authorities [8] or consensus mechanisms like blockchain [12]. We propose a purely cryptographic solution based on Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs) that requires no trusted parties or consensus.

The key insight is that by combining VDFs with hash chains and dividing the eternal computation into ticks of k = 65536 iterations, we create both:

- Fine-grained timestamping at the iteration level
- Efficient consensus and verification at the tick level
- MEV-resistant transaction ordering via timelock puzzles
- Fork-free operation through deterministic leader election

#### 1.1 The Fork Problem in Traditional Blockchains

Current blockchain architectures suffer from temporary forks when multiple validators propose competing blocks. This leads to:

- Wasted computational effort on orphaned blocks
- Uncertainty in transaction finality
- Opportunities for double-spending during reorganizations
- MEV extraction through competitive block production

Our solution: designate a single leader per tick who has exclusive ordering rights, eliminating forks entirely.

#### 1.2 Contributions

Our main contributions are:

- 1. A construction combining VDFs with hash chains for unforgeable timestamping
- 2. A formal proof that timestamps cannot be created out of sequence
- 3. The tick-based eternal timeline architecture where  $T \approx 2^{256}$
- 4. Integration of RSW timelock puzzles for MEV mitigation [4]
- 5. A novel consensus mechanism based on cryptographic time with leader rotation
- 6. Analysis of the security properties and practical implementation considerations
- 7. A graceful degradation protocol for handling consensus failures

## 2 Preliminaries

## 2.1 Notation and Complexity Theory

Throughout this paper,  $\lambda$  denotes the security parameter. A function  $\nu$ :  $\mathbb{N} \to [0,1]$  is negligible if for all c > 0, there exists N such that for all n > N:  $\nu(n) < n^{-c}$ . We denote negligible functions as  $\operatorname{negl}(\lambda)$ . PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. An algorithm is efficient if it runs in time  $\operatorname{poly}(\lambda)$ .

## 2.2 Class Groups

Let D < 0 be a negative discriminant where  $D \equiv 0, 1 \pmod{4}$ . The class group  $\mathbb{G} = Cl(D)$  consists of equivalence classes of binary quadratic forms

$$ax^2 + bxy + cy^2$$

with discriminant  $b^2 - 4ac = D$ . The group operation is form composition [6], and we denote by  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  a generator of the group.

**Definition 1** (Form Reduction). A form (a, b, c) is reduced if  $|b| \le a \le c$  and  $b \ge 0$  if either a = |b| or a = c. Every equivalence class contains a unique reduced representative.

[Class Group Assumption] For a randomly chosen discriminant D with  $|D| \approx 2^{2\lambda}$ , no PPT algorithm can compute the class number  $h(D) = |\operatorname{Cl}(D)|$  with non-negligible probability.

## 2.3 Verifiable Delay Functions

A VDF is a function that requires sequential computation to evaluate but whose output can be verified efficiently [1]. In our construction, we use repeated squaring in the class group:

**Definition 2** (VDF Evaluation). Given a generator  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  and time parameter  $T \in \mathbb{N}$ , the VDF output is:

$$f_T = g^{2^T}$$

computed as T sequential squarings.

**Definition 3** (VDF Security Properties). A secure VDF satisfies:

1.  $\epsilon$ -Sequentiality: For all adversaries A running in time < T with  $poly(\lambda, \log T)$  processors:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g) = g^{2^T}] \le \epsilon(\lambda)$$

- 2. **Uniqueness**: For any input x, there exists exactly one output y with a valid proof
- 3. **Efficient Verification**: Verification takes time  $poly(\lambda, \log T)$

## 2.4 Wesolowski's Proof System

**Theorem 4** (Wesolowski 2019 [2]). For the repeated squaring VDF in class groups, there exists a proof system where:

- Prover: Given  $g, y = g^{2^T}$ , compute prime  $\ell \approx 2^{\lambda}$  via Fiat-Shamir, then  $\pi = g^{\lfloor 2^T/\ell \rfloor}$
- Verifier: Check  $\pi^{\ell} \cdot g^{2^T \mod \ell} = y$
- Soundness: No PPT adversary can forge proofs except with probability  $negl(\lambda)$

## 2.5 Cryptographic Hash Functions

We assume a collision-resistant hash function  $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{256}$  satisfying [19]:

- Collision Resistance: No efficient algorithm can find  $x \neq x'$  such that  $\mathcal{H}(x) = \mathcal{H}(x')$
- Preimage Resistance: Given y, no efficient algorithm can find x such that  $\mathcal{H}(x) = y$
- Second Preimage Resistance: Given x, no efficient algorithm can find  $x' \neq x$  such that  $\mathcal{H}(x) = \mathcal{H}(x')$

#### 2.6 RSW Time-Lock Puzzles

**Definition 5** (RSW Time-Lock [4]). Given RSA modulus n = pq where p, q are large primes:

• **Puzzle**: To lock secret s for time T, compute  $C = s \oplus H(a^{2^T} \mod n)$  for random a

- Solving: Without factors of n, must compute  $a^{2^T}$  via T sequential squarings
- Hardness: Based on sequential squaring assumption in  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$

## 2.7 Byzantine Fault Tolerance

**Definition 6** (Byzantine Agreement). A protocol achieves Byzantine agreement among n parties with f faults if:

- Agreement: All honest parties output the same value
- Validity: If all honest parties have input v, they output v
- Termination: All honest parties eventually output

**Theorem 7** (Optimal Resilience [17]). Byzantine agreement is possible iff n > 3f.

## 2.8 Practical Performance Measurements

**Remark 8** (Implementation Benchmarks). On modern hardware (Intel Xeon 3.5GHz), we measured:

- Class group squaring (2048-bit discriminant):  $\approx 7.6 \mu s$
- Full tick ( $k = 65536 \ squarings$ ):  $\approx 497.7ms$
- Wesolowski proof generation:  $\approx 250ms$
- Proof verification:  $\approx 2ms$

These measurements inform our parameter choices.

## 3 Construction

#### 3.1 Hash-Chained VDF

Our timestamping system maintains two parallel sequences: the VDF computation and a hash chain that binds each VDF state to all previous states.

**Definition 9** (Hash-Chained VDF State). The system state at iteration i consists of:

•  $f_i \in \mathbb{G}$ : The VDF form at iteration i

- $h_i \in \{0,1\}^{256}$ : The hash chain value at iteration i
- $d_i \in \{0,1\}^*$ : Optional data to timestamp at iteration i

#### Algorithm 1 Hash-Chained VDF Computation

```
1: Initialize: f_0 \leftarrow g, h_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{"genesis"})

2: for i = 1 to T do

3: f_i \leftarrow f_{i-1}^2 \pmod{D} \triangleright VDF step

4: d_i \leftarrow \text{GetDataToTimestamp}(i) \triangleright May be empty

5: h_i \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(i \parallel f_i \parallel h_{i-1} \parallel d_i) \triangleright Update hash chain

6: Store: (i, f_i, h_i, d_i)

7: end for
```

#### 3.2 Chain Proof Structure

**Definition 10** (Chained Proof). Each iteration produces a proof that includes:

- The VDF value at iteration i
- A commitment to the previous proof's hash
- Any data that arrived at this iteration

This creates a hash chain where:

- 1. You cannot compute iteration i's proof without iteration i-1's hash
- 2. You cannot know iteration i-1's hash without computing it first
- 3. You must compute sequentially

#### 3.3 Verification

## 4 Security Analysis

## 4.1 Sequential Time-Binding

**Theorem 11** (Sequential Computation Requirement). Under the assumption that computing square roots in  $\mathbb{G}$  is hard, no polynomial-time adversary can produce a valid tuple  $(k, f_k, h_k)$  without performing at least k sequential group operations.

#### Algorithm 2 Chain Verification

```
Require: Chain of proofs \{(i, f_i, h_i, d_i)\}_{i=1}^k

1: f \leftarrow g, h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{"genesis"})

2: for i = 1 to k do

3: f \leftarrow f^2 \pmod{D}

4: h' \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(i \parallel f \parallel h \parallel d_i)

5: if f \neq f_i or h' \neq h_i then

6: return false

7: end if

8: h \leftarrow h'

9: end for

10: return true
```

*Proof.* We prove by induction on k.

**Base case** (k = 1): To compute  $h_1 = \mathcal{H}(1 \parallel f_1 \parallel h_0 \parallel d_1)$ , the adversary needs  $f_1 = g^2$ . By the VDF assumption [2], this requires one squaring operation.

**Inductive step:** Assume the theorem holds for k-1. To compute  $h_k$ , the adversary needs:

- 1.  $f_k = f_{k-1}^2$ : By the VDF property, given  $f_{k-1}$ , computing  $f_k$  requires one squaring
- 2.  $h_{k-1}$ : By the inductive hypothesis, this requires  $\geq k-1$  sequential operations

Since  $h_k = \mathcal{H}(k \parallel f_k \parallel h_{k-1} \parallel d_k)$  depends on both values, and they must be computed sequentially (as  $f_k$  depends on  $f_{k-1}$  which was needed for  $h_{k-1}$ ), the total time is at least k sequential operations.

#### 4.2 Unforgeability

**Theorem 12** (Timestamp Unforgeability). Given a published hash chain up to iteration n, no polynomial-time adversary can produce a valid tuple  $(i, f'_i, h'_i, d'_i)$  for  $i \leq n$  where  $d'_i \neq d_i$  was not originally timestamped at iteration i.

*Proof.* Suppose an adversary produces  $(i, f'_i, h'_i, d'_i)$  with  $d'_i \neq d_i$ . For this to be valid:

$$h'_i = \mathcal{H}(i \parallel f'_i \parallel h'_{i-1} \parallel d'_i)$$

Since the VDF computation is deterministic,  $f'_i = f_i$ . For the chain to remain valid at iteration i + 1:

$$h_{i+1} = \mathcal{H}((i+1) \parallel f_{i+1} \parallel h_i \parallel d_{i+1})$$

This requires  $h'_i = h_i$ , which means:

$$\mathcal{H}(i \parallel f_i \parallel h_{i-1} \parallel d_i) = \mathcal{H}(i \parallel f_i \parallel h'_{i-1} \parallel d'_i)$$

If  $h'_{i-1} = h_{i-1}$  and  $d'_i \neq d_i$ , this is a hash collision. If  $h'_{i-1} \neq h_{i-1}$ , the adversary must have forged an earlier timestamp, leading to infinite regress or a hash collision at some point.

## 4.3 Temporal Ordering

Corollary 13 (Timestamp Ordering). For any two pieces of data  $d_a$  and  $d_b$  timestamped at iterations  $i_a < i_b$  respectively, any verifier can cryptographically verify that  $d_a$  was timestamped before  $d_b$ .

*Proof.* The hash chain creates a directed path:  $h_{i_a} \to h_{i_a+1} \to \cdots \to h_{i_b}$ . Since each arrow represents a one-way function application that requires the previous value, and by Theorem 11 requires sequential computation, the ordering is cryptographically enforced.

## 5 Consensus: The Eternal Timeline

#### 5.1 The Infinite VDF Chain

We propose a radical departure from traditional blockchain architectures: a single, eternal VDF computation that spans from genesis until the end of computational time, divided into fixed epochs called **ticks**.

**Definition 14** (Universal Timeline Parameters). *Let:* 

- $T_{universe} \approx 2^{256}$ : Total iterations until heat death of universe
- $k = 65536 = 2^{16}$ : Iterations per tick (epoch)
- $N_{ticks} = T_{universe}/k$ : Total number of ticks
- $\tau_i$ : The *i*-th tick, spanning iterations [ik, (i+1)k)

**Definition 15** (Tick State). At the completion of tick  $\tau_i$ , the system records:

- $S_i = (f_{(i+1)k}, h_{(i+1)k})$ : The tick-end VDF state
- $\mathcal{H}_i = \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{S}_i \parallel \mathcal{T}_i)$ : The tick hash (blockhash)
- $\mathcal{T}_i = \{tx_j : ik \leq timestamp(tx_j) < (i+1)k\}$ : Transactions in tick
- $\pi_i$ : We solowski proof that  $f_{(i+1)k} = f_{ik}^{2^k}$  [2]

## 5.2 Leader-Based Fork Prevention

Traditional blockchains suffer from forks when multiple validators propose competing blocks. We eliminate this entirely through deterministic leader election.

**Definition 16** (Leader Schedule). For tick  $\tau_i$  and validator set  $\mathcal{V} = \{v_1, ..., v_n\}$ : leader<sub>i,v</sub> =  $\mathcal{V}[(i+v) \bmod n]$  where v is the view number (initially 0).




Figure 1: Leader rotation: each tick has one designated leader receiving client transactions

#### 5.3 The Inexorable Clock Problem

The VDF computation cannot pause - it marches inexorably toward heat death. When consensus fails, we must gracefully degrade while preserving temporal continuity.

**Definition 17** (Three-Tier Tick Hierarchy). Each tick  $\tau_i$  results in exactly one of:

#### Algorithm 3 Eternal VDF Tick Consensus with Leader Rotation

```
1: Initialize:
        Discriminant D (universal constant)
 2:
        f_0 \leftarrow g, h_0 \leftarrow \text{hash}(\text{"In the beginning..."})
 3:
        Current iteration j \leftarrow 0
 4:
        Current tick i \leftarrow 0
 5:
    while j < T_{\text{universe}} do
                                                                   ▶ Until the end of time
         leader_i \leftarrow \mathcal{V}[i \bmod |\mathcal{V}|]
 7:
 8:
         Phase 1: Collection (iterations [ik, ik + k/3))
 9:
         while j < ik + k/3 do
10:
             f_{j+1} \leftarrow f_j^2 \pmod{D}
Leader collects encrypted transactions from clients
11:
12:
             h_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{hash}(j+1 || f_{j+1} || h_j)
13:
             j \leftarrow j + 1
14:
         end while
15:
16:
         Phase 2: Ordering and Consensus (at j = ik + k/3)
17:
         leader, orders collected transactions
18:
         proposal_i \leftarrow CreateProposal(ordered transactions)
19:
         Broadcast proposal to validators
20:
         wait for Byzantine agreement (> 2n/3 votes)
21:
22:
         Phase 3: Parallel Decryption (iterations (ik + k/3, ik + 2k/3])
23:
         while j \leq ik + 2k/3 do
24:
             f_{j+1} \leftarrow f_j^2 \pmod{D}
ParallelDecrypt(transactions) on GPUs
                                                                           ▶ VDF continues
25:
26:
             h_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{hash}(j+1 \parallel f_{j+1} \parallel h_j)
27:
             j \leftarrow j+1
28:
         end while
29:
30:
         Phase 4: Finalization (iterations (ik + 2k/3, (i + 1)k))
31:
32:
         Validate decrypted transactions
33:
         \mathcal{T}_i \leftarrow \text{valid transactions}
         Complete tick with Merkle root of \mathcal{T}_i
34:
35:
36:
         Tick boundary:
         \pi_i \leftarrow \text{ProveWesolowski}(f_{ik}, f_{(i+1)k}, k)
37:
         PublishTick(i, f_{(i+1)k}, h_{(i+1)k}, \mathcal{T}_i, \pi_i)
38:
         i \leftarrow i + 1
39:
40: end while
```

- FullTick: Contains validated transactions with consensus
- EmptyTick: Consensus achieved but no transactions included
- CheckpointTick: No consensus only VDF proof preserved




Figure 2: Three-tier tick hierarchy: consensus success determines tick type




Figure 3: Graceful degradation across tick phases based on consensus success

## 5.4 Timestamping Within the Eternal Timeline

Each piece of data receives a precise timestamp within the universal timeline:

**Definition 18** (Universal Timestamp). A timestamp consists of:

$$TS(d) = (i, j, h_j, proof)$$

where:

- i = |j/k|: Tick number
- ullet j: Exact iteration within all time

## Algorithm 4 Graceful Degradation Protocol

```
1: procedure FINALIZETICK(i, j_{\text{current}})
        remaining \leftarrow (i+1)k - j_{\text{current}}
 2:
 3:
        if j_{\text{current}} < ik + 3k/4 and consensus achieved then
 4:
 5:
            return FullTick with transactions
        else if j_{\text{current}} < ik + 7k/8 then
 6:
            try consensus on empty block
 7:
            if consensus achieved then
 8:
                return EmptyTick
 9:
            end if
10:
        end if
11:
12:
                                           ▶ Time running out - must checkpoint
13:
        \pi_i \leftarrow \text{ProveWesolowski}(f_{ik}, f_{(i+1)k}, k)
14:
        return CheckpointTick(i, f_{(i+1)k}, h_{(i+1)k}, \pi_i)
15:
16: end procedure
```

- $h_j$ : Hash chain value at iteration j
- proof: Path from  $h_i$  to tick certificate  $\mathcal{H}_i$

**Theorem 19** (Tick-Based Time Ordering). For any two timestamps  $TS(d_1) = (i_1, j_1, h_{j_1}, \pi_1)$  and  $TS(d_2) = (i_2, j_2, h_{j_2}, \pi_2)$ :

- 1. If  $i_1 < i_2$ , then  $d_1$  preceded  $d_2$  by at least  $(i_2 i_1 1)k$  iterations
- 2. If  $i_1 = i_2$  and  $j_1 < j_2$ , then  $d_1$  preceded  $d_2$  by exactly  $j_2 j_1$  iterations
- 3. The ordering is cryptographically verifiable without recomputing the VDF

#### 5.5 Efficient Verification via Tick Certificates

#### 5.6 The Tick Chain as Blockchain

Each tick effectively becomes a block in an eternal blockchain:

**Definition 20** (Tick Chain). The sequence of tick certificates forms a blockchain:

$$Chain = tick_0 \rightarrow tick_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow tick_i \rightarrow \cdots$$

where each arrow represents k = 65536 iterations of irreversible computation.

## Algorithm 5 Tick-Based Timestamp Verification

```
Require: Timestamp TS(d) = (i, j, h_j, proof), tick certificate tick<sub>i</sub>
Ensure: Valid/Invalid
                                                  2: if j < ik or j \ge (i+1)k then
       return Invalid
                                                                   ▶ Wrong tick
 4: end if
                                         ▶ Verify hash chain to tick boundary
 5:
 6: h \leftarrow h_j
 7: for \ell = j + 1 to (i + 1)k do
       h \leftarrow \text{RecomputeHash}(\ell, h, \text{proof})
 9: end for
10: if h \neq \text{tick}_i.\text{chain\_hash then}
11:
       return Invalid
12: end if
                                     13:
14: if Random() < \rho then
                                                               \triangleright Sampling rate
       verify tick<sub>i</sub>.form = g^{2^{(i+1)k}} using tick<sub>i</sub>.proof
15:
16: end if
17: return Valid
```

**Proposition 21** (Tick Finality). Once tick  $\tau_i$  is complete and tick  $\tau_{i+1}$  begins, the transactions in  $\tau_i$  achieve absolute finality—reverting them would require recomputing at least k sequential operations while the honest chain advances.

## 5.7 Consensus Properties in the Eternal Timeline

**Theorem 22** (Eternal Consensus Security). In the tick-based eternal VDF system:

- 1. Absolute Ordering: Every event in the universe has a unique position  $j \in [0, T_{universe})$
- 2. **Tick Granularity**: Consensus is reached every k iterations (approximately every tick-time)
- 3. **Efficient Verification**: Any timestamp can be verified in O(k) time using tick certificates
- 4. **Space Efficiency**: Only  $O(N_{ticks})$  certificates needed, not  $O(T_{universe})$  states

## 6 Intra-Tick Transaction Processing: MEV Mitigation via Timelock Puzzles

#### 6.1 RSW Timelock Encryption Scheme

To prevent MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) and ensure fair transaction ordering within each tick of the eternal timeline, clients encrypt their transactions using the Rivest-Shamir-Wagner (RSW) timelock puzzle scheme before submission.

**Definition 23** (RSW Timelock Puzzle). A timelock puzzle consists of:

- n = pq: RSA modulus where p, q are large primes
- a: Random value in  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$
- t: Time parameter (number of squarings required)
- $C_k = Enc_k(m)$ : Symmetric encryption of message m with key k
- $C_{puzzle} = k + a^{2^t} \pmod{n}$ : The puzzle hiding key k

The puzzle can only be solved by computing  $a^{2^t}$  through t sequential squarings [4].

## 6.2 Integration with the Eternal Timeline

Within each tick  $\tau_i$  spanning iterations [ik, (i+1)k), the RSW timelock scheme operates as follows:

**Definition 24** (Tick-Relative Timelock Parameters). For a transaction submitted during tick  $\tau_i$ :

- $R_i$ : Timelock hardness for tick i, where  $R_i \ll k$
- $j_{submit}$ : Iteration when transaction is submitted
- $j_{decrypt} = j_{submit} + R_i$ : Target decryption iteration
- Constraint:  $j_{decrypt} < (i+1)k$  to ensure decryption within tick

## 6.3 Modified Tick Processing with Timelock Integration




Figure 4: Tick  $\tau_i$  progression: encrypted transactions collected, ordered before decryption, then committed

#### 6.4 Transaction Submission Protocol

## 6.5 MEV Mitigation Properties in the Eternal Timeline

**Theorem 25** (Tick-Bounded MEV Prevention). Within each tick  $\tau_i$  of the eternal timeline, the RSW timelock scheme ensures:

1. No entity can order transactions based on content before iteration  $j_{submit} + R$ 

#### Algorithm 6 Eternal VDF Tick Consensus with RSW Timelock

```
1: Initialize tick \tau_i:
        Current iteration j \leftarrow ik
 2:
 3:
        Encrypted transaction pool \mathcal{E}_i \leftarrow \emptyset
        Decrypted transaction pool \mathcal{D}_i \leftarrow \emptyset
 4:
        Leader \ell_i \leftarrow \mathcal{V}[i \mod |\mathcal{V}|]
 5:
    while j < (i+1)k do
 6:
                                                                                   \triangleright Process tick \tau_i
          Phase 1: Collection and VDF computation
 7:
          if j < ik + k/3 then
 8:
               f_{j+1} \leftarrow f_i^2 \pmod{D}
                                                                        ▷ Continue eternal VDF
 9:
              \ell_i collects timelock transactions from clients
10:
11:
               h_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{hash}(j+1 \parallel f_{j+1} \parallel h_j)
12:
          Phase 2: Consensus on encrypted transactions
13:
          if j = ik + k/3 then
14:
               \mathcal{B}_{\text{encrypted}} \leftarrow \ell_i.\text{OrderTransactions}(\mathcal{E}_i)
15:
              m_{\text{encrypted}} \leftarrow \text{MerkleRoot}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{encrypted}})
16:
               \ell_i broadcasts proposal
17:
               wait for Byzantine consensus (> 2n/3 votes)
18:
19:
          end if
          Phase 3: Parallel decryption
20:
          if ik + k/3 < j < ik + 2k/3 then
21:
              f_{j+1} \leftarrow f_j^2 \pmod{D}
ParallelDecrypt(\mathcal{B}_{\text{encrypted}}, j, \text{GPUs})
                                                                                  ▶ VDF continues
22:
23:
24:
               h_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{hash}(j+1 || f_{j+1} || h_j)
          end if
25:
          Phase 4: Final assembly
26:
          if j \ge ik + 2k/3 then
27:
              f_{j+1} \leftarrow f_j^2 \pmod{D}
28:
               \mathcal{T}_i \leftarrow \text{ValidateDecryptedTransactions}(\mathcal{D}_i)
29:
              d_j \leftarrow \text{MerkleRoot}(\mathcal{T}_i)
                                                                                     ⊳ Final tx data
30:
               h_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{hash}(j+1 || f_{j+1} || h_j || d_j)
31:
          end if
32:
          j \leftarrow j + 1
33:
34: end while
35: Tick boundary: Generate certificate
36: \pi_i \leftarrow \text{ProveWesolowski}(f_{ik}, f_{(i+1)k}, k)
37: PublishTick(i, f_{(i+1)k}, h_{(i+1)k}, \mathcal{T}_i, \pi_i)
```

## Algorithm 7 Client Transaction Submission with Tick-Aware Timelock

```
1: Client Side at iteration j:
 2: Determine current tick: i \leftarrow |j/k|
 3: Find current leader: \ell_i \leftarrow \mathcal{V}[i \mod |\mathcal{V}|]
 4: Calculate remaining iterations in tick: \Delta \leftarrow (i+1)k - j
 5: Choose hardness: R \leftarrow \min(k/10, \Delta/2)
                                                            ▷ Ensure completion within
     tick
 6:
 7: Generate transaction tx with timestamp request at j
 8: Generate RSA modulus n = pq (or use tick-specific public parameters)
 9: Select random a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* and symmetric key k
10: C_{tx} \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_k(tx \parallel j)
11: C_{puzzle} \leftarrow k + a^{2^R} \pmod{n}
                                                                       ▶ Include iteration
13: timelock_tx \leftarrow \{
       encrypted_data: C_{tx},
14:
       puzzle: C_{puzzle},
15:
       puzzle_params: (a, n, R),
16:
17:
       submission_iteration: j,
       target\_tick: i
18:
19: }
20: Send timelock_tx to \ell_i
                                                                         ▷ Direct to leader
```

- 2. Consensus on transaction inclusion occurs before content is revealed
- 3. The eternal VDF computation continues uninterrupted during decryption
- 4. All transactions are guaranteed to decrypt before tick boundary (i+1)k

*Proof.* The proof follows from the sequential nature of both constructions:

- $\bullet$  The eternal VDF requires exactly k iterations per tick
- RSW decryption requires exactly R iterations where  $R \ll k$
- Parallel decryption doesn't affect VDF progression
- The constraint  $j_{\text{decrypt}} < (i+1)k$  ensures tick-internal resolution

## 6.6 Leader Failure and View Changes

```
Algorithm 8 Byzantine View Change with Time Pressure
```

```
1: procedure HandleLeaderFailure(i, v, j_{\text{current}})
        remaining \leftarrow (i+1)k - j_{\text{current}}
 2:
        timeout \leftarrow \min(k/10, \text{remaining}/4)
 3:
 4:
        if remaining < k/8 then
                                                              ▶ Too late for consensus
 5:
            return SKIP_TO_CHECKPOINT
 6:
 7:
        end if
 8:
        if No proposal within timeout then
 9:
10:
            v \leftarrow v + 1
            \ell_{\text{new}} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}[(i+v) \mod |\mathcal{V}|]
11:
            \ell_{\rm new} inherits transaction pool from \ell_{\rm old}
12:
13:
            if v > f or remaining < k/4 then
14:
                 Finalize as EmptyTick or CheckpointTick
15:
            end if
16:
        end if
17:
18: end procedure
```

#### Algorithm 9 Transaction Migration Protocol

```
1: When tick \tau_i fails (EmptyTick or CheckpointTick):
 2:
   for each unprocessed tx \in \mathcal{E}_i do
 3:
       if tx.deadline > (i+1)k then
 4:
           Extend timelock by k iterations
 5:
           Route to \ell_{i+1} for tick \tau_{i+1}
 6:
 7:
       else
           Return to client as EXPIRED
 8:
       end if
 9:
10: end for
11:
                                                          ▶ Pipelined collection
12:
13: After iteration ik + k/3:
      New transactions route to \ell_{i+1}
14:
      No wasted time between ticks
15:
```

## 6.7 Transaction Migration Across Failed Ticks

## 6.8 GPU-Accelerated Parallel Decryption Architecture

While the main VDF computation proceeds sequentially, RSW puzzle solving happens in parallel:

**Definition 26** (Parallel Decryption During VDF Progression). • Main thread: Computes  $f_j \to f_{j+1} \to \cdots \to f_{(i+1)k}$ 

- GPU workers: Solve RSW puzzles  $\{a_1^{2^{R_1}}, a_2^{2^{R_2}}, \ldots\}$  in parallel
- Synchronization: Decrypted transactions assembled before tick end

#### 6.9 Timestamp Precision with Encrypted Transactions

Even with timelock encryption, transactions maintain precise timestamps:

**Definition 27** (Encrypted Transaction Timestamp). For a transaction tx submitted at iteration j within  $tick \tau_i$ :

$$TS_{encrypted}(tx) = (i, j, h_j, commitment, proof)$$

where:

• (i, j): Tick and iteration of submission

- $h_i$ : Hash chain value proving temporal position
- commitment: Hash of encrypted transaction
- proof: Membership in tick after decryption

#### 6.10 Practical Parameters for Tick-Based Timelock

Parameter	Value	Purpose
$k  ext{ (iterations/tick)}$	$65,\!536$	Tick duration
$t_{ m tick}$	$497.7 \mathrm{ms}$	Measured tick time
R (timelock hardness)	16,384	$\approx k/4$
Collection phase	$k/3 \approx 21,845$ iter	Gather encrypted txs
Consensus phase	$k/3 \approx 21,845$ iter	Byzantine agreement
Decryption phase	$k/3 \approx 21,845$ iter	Parallel solving
RSA modulus size	2048 bits	Security parameter
Leader timeout	$k/10 \approx 6,554$ iter	$\approx 50ms$

Table 1: Timelock parameters within tick structure

#### 6.11 The Philosophical Unity: Time and Secrecy

Remark 28 (On Temporal Secrets and Kala). The Sanskrit word "kala" embodies a profound understanding of time that transcends mere chronological measurement. In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna declares "kalo'smi lokakshaya-krit pravriddho" - "I am Time, the destroyer of worlds" (Chapter 11, Verse 32), revealing time as the ultimate force of transformation and the guarantor of cosmic order. The ancient Sanskrit texts, particularly the Surya Siddhanta and the Vishnu Purana, describe time as both nitya (eternal) and anitya (transient), existing simultaneously as an infinite continuum and discrete moments called ksanas.

This duality mirrors our cryptographic construction where the eternal VDF computation represents mahakala (great time) while individual iterations embody ksanas (moments). The Kalachakra Tantra further elaborates that time is the "wheel of time" - cyclical yet irreversible, deterministic yet unknowable in its totality. Our system captures this ancient wisdom: the VDF creates an unstoppable wheel of computation, each tick a spoke in the eternal wheel, crystallizing moments into an immutable past while the future remains computationally sealed.

The RSW timelock puzzles create "secrets with expiration dates" within this eternal timeline, embodying the concept of kala-chakra - the wheel of time that reveals hidden knowledge at its appointed moment. Just as the VDF makes time cryptographically measurable, timelocks make secrets cryptographically temporal. Together, they ensure that:

- Time flows irreversibly forward (VDF) the pravaha (flow) of kala
- Information reveals itself at predetermined times (RSW) the prakasha (revelation) of kala
- The combination creates fair, manipulation-resistant ordering the dharma (righteousness) of kala

This achieves a form of "cryptographic dharma" where all participants face the same computational constraints of time, echoing the ancient principle that kala spares none - "kalo jagat-bhakshakah" (time is the devourer of the world).

## 7 Implementation Considerations

## 7.1 State Diagram




Figure 5: Hash-chained VDF state transitions

#### 7.2 Performance Analysis

Based on empirical measurements:

- Class group squaring:  $7.6\mu s$  per operation
- Full tick (k = 65536 iterations): 497.7ms

- Network latency budget:  $\approx 150ms$  per phase
- Transaction throughput: 10,000-20,000 TPS (conservative)
- Storage per tick:  $\approx 1KB$  certificate + transaction data

## 8 Security Parameters

Parameter	Value	Security Level
Discriminant bits	2048	$\geq 128 \text{ bits}$
Hash function	SHA-256	128 bits collision resistance
Tick size $k$	$2^{16}$	Balance efficiency/granularity
RSA modulus (RSW)	2048 bits	112 bits classical
Byzantine threshold	f < n/3	Optimal resilience
Confirmation depth	1 tick	Immediate finality

Table 2: Recommended security parameters

## 9 Formal Security Analysis

## 9.1 UC Framework Modeling

We model the protocol in the Universal Composability framework with ideal functionalities:

- $\mathcal{F}_{VDF}$ : Maintains global iteration counter
- $\mathcal{F}_{NET}$ : Authenticated channels with eventual delivery
- $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ : Random oracle for hash functions

**Theorem 29** (UC Security). Protocol  $\Pi_{Kala}$  UC-realizes  $\mathcal{F}_{Ledger}$  against adversaries corrupting f < n/3 parties.

#### 9.2 Fork Prevention

**Theorem 30** (No Forks). In the leader-based construction, at most one block per tick can be finalized.

*Proof.* Only the designated leader can propose. By zantine agreement requires > 2n/3 signatures. With f < n/3 Byzantine nodes, at most one proposal can gather sufficient votes.

#### 9.3 Liveness Guarantees

**Theorem 31** (Progress Under Failures). Every tick completes within time  $(f+1)\Delta + k\tau$ , producing FullTick, EmptyTick, or CheckpointTick.

*Proof.* The graceful degradation protocol ensures:

- Try full consensus until iteration 3k/4
- Try empty consensus until iteration 7k/8
- $\bullet$  Default to checkpoint at iteration k

The VDF guarantees reaching k in time  $k\tau \approx 500ms$ .

## 10 Conclusion

We have presented a decentralized timestamping system based on hash-chained VDFs that creates an eternal, unforgeable timeline with MEV-resistant transaction ordering. The construction provides:

- Trustless timestamping: No central authority required
- Unforgeable ordering: Timestamps cannot be backdated
- Eternal timeline: From genesis to the end of computational time
- Fork-free operation: Leader-based architecture prevents chain splits
- MEV mitigation: Through RSW timelock puzzles
- Graceful degradation: System continues even under total consensus failure
- Efficient verification: Through tick certificates
- Natural consensus: Based on cryptographic time rather than economics

The tick-based architecture with integrated timelock puzzles allows us to achieve fine-grained timestamping, efficient consensus, and fair transaction ordering, while maintaining the philosophical property that time itself is cryptographically defined.

## 11 Future Work

Potential extensions and improvements:

- 1. Quantum resistance: Post-quantum VDF and timelock constructions
- 2. Sharding: Parallel timelines with cross-shard communication
- 3. **Privacy**: Integration with zero-knowledge proofs
- 4. Interoperability: Bridges to existing blockchain systems
- 5. Hardware optimization: ASIC designs for eternal operation
- 6. **Dynamic validator sets**: Efficient membership changes

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